Australia and Climate Change Negotiations: at the Table, Or on the Menu?
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Australia and climate change Howard Bamsey and negotiations: at the table, or on Kath Rowley the menu? March 2015 AUSTRALIA AND CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS: AT THE TABLE, OR ON THE MENU? The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international policy debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is not limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: • produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. • promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an accessible and high-quality forum for discussion of Australian international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues and conferences. Lowy Institute Analyses are short papers analysing recent international trends and events and their policy implications. The views expressed in this paper are entirely the author’s own and not those of the Lowy Institute for International Policy or the Climate Change Authority. AUSTRALIA AND CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS: AT THE TABLE, OR ON THE MENU? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The climate change negotiations are changing the global economy in ways that matter to Australia. New norms, standards, rules, and even laws will require Australia to change. These developments create challenges and opportunities for Australian businesses and individuals. Australia’s national circumstances — especially its relatively high current dependence on industries that emit large quantities of greenhouse gases — are distinctive, so Australia must work harder than others to advance its interests. Failure to pay proper, high-level attention to the negotiations would seriously endanger the national interest. By actively engaging in negotiations in a strategic and creative way, Australia can help ensure that the next global agreement provides a smooth adjustment for the global and the Australian economy. This would minimise potential adverse impacts on Australia, and secure access to the new economic and other opportunities that action on climate change brings. 1 AUSTRALIA AND CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS: AT THE TABLE, OR ON THE MENU? In 2013, for the first time outside an election period, the Australian delegation to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties (COP) was not led by a minister. Towards the end of 2013, Australian representatives preparing for hosting the 2014 G20 meeting in Brisbane told their counterparts that climate change would not be discussed in any depth. Australia resisted sustained calls, including from key partners such as the United States and the United Kingdom, to place climate change prominently on the agenda, instead characterising climate change as a distraction from the G20’s proper focus on jobs, economic growth, and trade.1 Australia remained firm until the meeting opened in Brisbane, where other countries effectively forced the issue onto the agenda and into the spotlight. Similarly, in September 2014, the Prime Minister chose not to attend the UN Secretary General’s Climate Summit, despite being in New York near the time, and despite its purpose being to build momentum towards a strong and effective global agreement at the United Nations Climate Conference in Paris at the end of 2015. The Summit was targeted at world leaders; around 100 heads of state and government attended. Prime Minister Abbott was clear about his reasons — at a media conference shortly before the Summit, he reportedly said climate change was “not the only or even the most important” international issue.2 The Liberal National Party Coalition went to the 2013 election with a clear plan to overhaul Australia’s domestic policy on climate change, so the subsequent reforms came as no surprise.3 What was surprising, however, was the new government’s international approach. Previous Australian governments, of both political persuasions, and regardless of differences in the substance of their policies, have dealt with climate change as an important international issue requiring high-priority attention. Australia has consistently played a major role in multilateral climate negotiations, international forums, and leaders’ dialogues.4 And more recently, Australian public opinion has shifted in favour of more The Government’s concerted action. The 2014 Lowy Institute Poll found a significant majority (63 per cent) agree that Australia “should be taking a leadership retreat came at the very role on reducing emissions.”5 Only 28 per cent believe that “it should wait time international for an international consensus before acting.” This can be read as negotiations were increasing support for active international engagement as much as for stronger domestic policy. gaining momentum. The Government’s retreat came at the very time international negotiations were gaining momentum. In October 2014, European Union (EU) leaders agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2030. On the eve of the Brisbane G20 meeting, the United States and China jointly announced their own 2 AUSTRALIA AND CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS: AT THE TABLE, OR ON THE MENU? targets: China to slow and then halt growth in its emissions around 2030; the United States to reduce its emissions by 26-28 per cent below 2005 levels by 2025. They also announced that they would strengthen bilateral cooperation on climate change and work together to secure an ambitious new agreement in Paris.6 The Coalition has repeatedly stated its commitment to reducing Australia’s emissions by between 5 and 25 per cent below 2000 levels by 2020,7 and it will announce its post-2020 target by the middle of this year.8 But statements by ministers, including the Prime Minister, since the last election strongly suggest that a decision has already been made to restrict the 2020 target to the least ambitious end of the range (that is, 5 per cent).9 Given that the conditions for moving beyond 5 per cent have been met,10 Australia may face a difficult task explaining its position to other parties to the UNFCCC — particularly given its strong assertion that, in this context: “We do what we say.”11 Further, against the background of the EU announcement and the US-China accord, a post- 2020 target as unambitious as 5 per cent is for 2020 will doubtless attract widespread and severe criticism. Australia could defend its position, but only if it is well and truly on the front foot in the climate negotiations, actively engaged in a constructive fashion. Australia could defend its At the time of writing, the Government’s approach to the climate position, but only if it is negotiations appeared to be changing, with its engagement increasing in well and truly on the front intensity and profile. One area where Australia’s position had been widely seen as egregiously out of step with international thinking was foot in the climate financing. The Government’s repeated statements that it would not be 12 negotiations... contributing to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) were criticised both within Australia and internationally.13 The Government’s decision during the December 2014 Lima COP to contribute $200 million to the GCF removed the stigma of its previous position and directly enhanced the delegation’s standing at the COP. Foreign Minister Julie Bishop’s attendance at the COP may have made this shift possible, and her attendance marked an important change in itself. Yet the backroom wrangling that evidently took place to get her there (her first request to attend was reportedly rejected by the Prime Minister’s Office; her second request was approved on the condition Trade Minister Andrew Robb attended as a ‘climate chaperone’) evidences the Government’s abiding ambivalence to international climate change negotiations.14 This Analysis focuses on the Government’s strength of engagement in international climate change negotiations, rather than its choice of emissions reduction targets, domestic policies and measures, or positions on specific international issues. While substance and process are inevitably informed by, and reflect, the same set of concerns, this Analysis contends that regardless of its domestic policy settings Australia would benefit from stronger international engagement. It 3 AUSTRALIA AND CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS: AT THE TABLE, OR ON THE MENU? examines the broad risks arising from the tepid engagement in negotiations that characterised the Government’s first year in office, and the rewards that might flow from more vigorous participation in future negotiations. It also considers how Australia might reclaim its position of influence at the international climate change negotiating table. WHY INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS MATTER The UNFCCC may be central to the global response to climate change but it does not enjoy a good press. It is widely seen as a talk-fest, and a …the UNFCCC polarised one at that. Progress is certainly slow, as is inevitable for any negotiations shape group of 195 where all decisions require consensus. It suffers from other failings as well; but the fact is the UNFCCC negotiations shape national national and global and global climate action — and associated economic activity — through climate action — and both formal and informal channels. Climate discussions in other forums associated economic come and go, but the UNFCCC has proven resilient, and remains the only universal forum for negotiating the rules. It thus retains a unique activity — through both 15 legitimacy. formal and informal That is not to say it dictates national obligations. To be clear: the channels. negotiations are an activity of the UN, so the conventional view of national sovereignty is always respected. No country can be compelled to do anything. Given that decisions are made only by consensus, countries have scope to prevent decisions they object to strongly. Ultimately, any country can choose not to become a party to an agreement — as the United States (and, originally, Australia) did with the Kyoto Protocol — and any party can later withdraw if it chooses — as Canada did from the Protocol in 2011.