DOCSLIB.ORG

Nihilist Perdurantism: a New Ontology of Material Objects

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Nihilist Perdurantism: a New Ontology of Material Objects University of Kentucky UKnowledge Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy Philosophy 2017 NIHILIST PERDURANTISM: A NEW ONTOLOGY OF MATERIAL OBJECTS Brian Matthew Carlson University of Kentucky, [email protected] Author ORCID Identifier: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9625-2266 Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2017.268 Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Carlson, Brian Matthew, "NIHILIST PERDURANTISM: A NEW ONTOLOGY OF MATERIAL OBJECTS" (2017). Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy. 17. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/17 This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. STUDENT AGREEMENT: I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to register the copyright to my work. REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements above. Brian Matthew Carlson, Student Dr. Clare Batty, Major Professor Dr. Clare Batty, Director of Graduate Studies NIHILIST PERDURANTISM: A NEW ONTOLOGY OF MATERIAL OBJECTS DISSERTATION A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky By Brian Matthew Carlson Lexington, Kentucky Co-Directors: Dr. Clare Batty, Professor of Philosophy Dr. Megan Wallace, Professor of Philosophy Lexington, Kentucky Copyright © Brian Matthew Carlson, 2017 ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION NIHILIST PERDURANTISM: A NEW ONTOLOGY OF MATERIAL OBJECTS Ordinary material objects, such as guitars and houses, do not seem to pose any serious philosophical problems. However, the nature of the material objects and their part-whole relation raises serious questions about fundamental ontologies. Furthermore, part-whole relations are not necessarily spatial; they can be temporal as well. My dissertation investigates the problems posed by ordinary material objects, and the different ontological views that attempt to provide answers to these problems. I then present a new and radical view, which I call Nihilist Perdurantism (NP). NP claims that objects have temporal parts, but not spatial parts. I arrive at this view by first exploring and arguing against different views on composition, with a focus on arguments against common sense ontologies of ordinary objects. I then discuss the nature of mereological simples and argue against several views that claim that qualitatively heterogeneous simples are possible (Markosian and McDaniel). Next, I present my arguments against perdurantist, endurantist, and presentist view of persistence. I especially focus on endurantism, and use the aforementioned argument against the possibility of qualitatively heterogeneous simples to construct a similar argument against endurantism. Finally, I argue in favor of my view, NP. This view combines a mereological nihilist view (defended at various times by Unger, Van Inwagen, Merricks, and Sider) about spatial parts with a perdurantist view (defended at various times by Lewis, Hawley, Heller, and Sider) of temporal parts. Therefore, according to NP, there are no guitars, trees, or houses. The only objects that exist are NP objects; these are line-shaped objects that extend through spacetime. With respect to the three spatial dimensions, these objects have no parts. However, with respect to the temporal dimension, NP objects do have parts in the form of points and line segments. My work shows that NP has better solutions to many of the puzzles and problems posed by material objects, such as the puzzle of change, over the three standard views. Hinchliff argues that change is puzzling because in order for there to be real change, then the following four intuitions must be true: (1) The candle persists through the change. It existed when it was straight, and it exists now when it is bent…(2) Shapes are properties not relations. They are one-placed, not many-placed…(3) The candle itself has the shapes. Not just a part but the candle itself was straight, and not just a part but the candle itself is bent…(4) The shapes are incompatible. If the shapes were compatible, there need not have been a change. The puzzle of change is the mutual inconsistency of these four intuitions. I argue that perdurantists must deny intuition (3), endurantists must deny intuition (2), and presentists must deny intuition (1). I then argue that only NP can accommodate all four intuitions about both macroscopic and microscopic change while resolving the inconsistency of the four intuitions. My dissertation presents a new view that provides a fresh perspective on the debate about the nature of material objects. My development of NP touches on a number of other philosophical problems. In Chapter One, I discuss the role of intuitions in metaphysics, and argue that many supposedly “common sense” intuitions are already philosophical positions. In Chapter 2, I argue against Korman’s and Markosian’s common sense ontologies of ordinary objects. In Chapter 3, I argue that the endurantist view of persistence is inconsistent and should be rejected. In addition to making the case for NP and its solution to the puzzle of change in Chapter 4, I also argue that NP can solve the problem of motion in a homogenous substance. Finally, in Chapter Five, I argue against the possibility of both gunky and junky material objects. KEYWORDS: Metaphysics, Analytic Philosophy, Material Objects, Mereology, Time Brian Carlson July 10, 2017 NIHILIST PERDURANTISM: A NEW ONTOLOGY OF MATERIAL OBJECTS By Brian Matthew Carlson Clare Batty C0-Director of Dissertation Megan Wallace Co-Director of Dissertation Clare Batty Director of Graduate Studies July 10, 2017 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... iv Chapter 1: Motivation and Methodology ............................................................................. 1 1.1 Material Objects ........................................................................................................... 1 1.2: Material Objects and Persistence ............................................................................... 4 1.3: Asking the Right Question ......................................................................................... 6 1.4: Methodology and Assumptions ............................................................................... 12 Chapter 2: Composition ...................................................................................................... 16 2.1: Answers to the SCQ .................................................................................................. 16 2.2: Sometimeser Answers to the SCQ ........................................................................... 23 2.3: Three types of Nihilism ............................................................................................ 53 2.4: The Pointy View ....................................................................................................... 54 2.5: MaxCon .................................................................................................................... 61 2.6 The Natural Property View of Simplicity ................................................................ 80 2.7: Qualitatively Heterogeneous Extended Simples ..................................................... 85 Chapter 3: Time and Persistence ........................................................................................ 96 3.1: A & B Theories of Time and Tensed Propositions ................................................... 97 3.2: Theories of Objects in Time .................................................................................... 111 3.3: The Argument from Vagueness ............................................................................. 130 3.4: The Argument From Temporary Intrinsics ............................................................ 141 Chapter 4: Nihilist
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Prime, Perform, Recover
    Virginia Commonwealth University VCU Scholars Compass Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 2017 Prime, Perform, Recover Patrick Harkin Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd Part of the Fine Arts Commons, Leisure Studies Commons, Photography Commons, and the Television Commons © The Author Downloaded from https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/5276 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars Compass. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 2017 Prime, Perform, Recover Patrick Harkin Virginia Commonwealth University, [email protected] Prime, Perform, Recover A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Fine Arts at Virginia Commonwealth University. By Patrick Harkin BFA, University of Florida, 2015 MFA, Virginia Commonwealth University, 2017 Directors: Justin James Reed Assistant Professor, Photography and Film and Art Foundations Brittany Nelson Visiting Professor, Department of Photography and Film Jon-Phillip Sheridan Assistant Professor, Department of Photography and Film Virginia Commonwealth University Richmond, Virginia May, 2017 1 Acknowledgements Justin James Reed Brittany Nelson Matthew Warren Jon-Phillip Sheridan Sasha Waters-Freyer John Freyer Paul Thulin Mary Beth Reed Mark Boulos Sonali Gulati Nir Evron Marvin Foreman and Tonejet Limited Abbey Lee Sarver Roxana
    [Show full text]
  • The Ship of Theseus: Using Mathematical and Computational Models for Predicting Identity Judgments
    The Ship of Theseus: Using Mathematical and Computational Models for Predicting Identity Judgments Tuna Cakar ([email protected]) Cognitive Science Department, Informatics Institute Middle East Technical University, Ankara, TURKEY Annette Hohenberger ([email protected]) Cognitive Science Department, Informatics Institute Middle East Technical University, Ankara, TURKEY Keywords: identity judgments; paradoxical reasoning; Ship related to the concept of “sameness” or “identity” (Wiggins, of Theseus; modeling of decisions. 2001). It is plausible to assume that participants’ decisions are determined by several dimensions involved in the Introduction critical concept at stake, among them spatiotemporal Reasoning processes have been one of the central targets for considerations: how long did the renewal and reassembly cognitive modeling. Modeling of reasoning processes process take (short or long) and where did it take place (at a appears as an even harder challenge during paradoxical proximal or distal place)? (Rips et al., 2006; Scholl, 2007). conditions such as the Ship of Theseus paradox. This work Functionalist and essentialist positions could be affected by attempts to model empirical data from a behavioral study on these parameters differently. Participants initially performed paradox resolution with different modeling techniques: a Conceptual Tendency Test (CTT) in which they were discriminant analysis (DA), decision tree analysis and asked to rate a set of propositions which are directly related neural networks. While each method has its own advantages to the core concept of “sameness/identity” involved in the and disadvantages, this paper attempts to compare and to paradox before answering the paradox (see method). contrast these methods trying to select the best model for In this current work, we focus on two main research future work.
    [Show full text]
  • The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of the University of Iowa
    The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of the University of Iowa Fall 2018 Vol. 4 In this issue: Tobias Garcîa Vega, “Difficulties in ‘Conceptualizing Well-being for Autistic Persons’: Analyzing Ingrid Robeyns’ Capabilities Approach” Benjamin Nelson, “A Conceptual Understanding of Political Representation” Gada Al Herz, “An Expansion on Growing Block Theory” Anne Ringelestein, “Rawlsian Foundation for Banning Hate Speech” Rebecca Owens, “Metaphysics through the Lens of a Police Box” 3 About the Journal 5 Tobias Garcîa Vega, “Difficulties in ‘Conceptualizing Well- being for Autistic Persons’: Analyzing Ingrid Robeyns’ Capabilities Approach” 11 Benjamin Nelson, “A Conceptual Understanding of Political Representation” 19 Gada Al Herz, “An Expansion on Growing Block Theory” 28 Anne Ringelestein, “Rawlsian Foundation for Banning Hate Speech” 34 Rebecca Owens, “Metaphysics through the Lens of a Police Box” Editors: Kate Lohnes Ben Carlile Jessica Davis 2 why “labyrinth”? Plato uses the image of a winding labyrinth as a metaphor for the process of philosophical investigation in his dial ogue Euthydemus. His image expresses his belief that, unlike the arts of rhetoric or sophistry —which rely on mere assertion and counter- assertion—philosophy absolutely requires that we retrace our steps in an argument and constantly re-examine our views in order to arrive at knowledge of the true and good. This is what we as students of philosophy aim to do, and this journal is meant to aid in that process. our purpose This journal was created with a threefold purpose. First, to provide undergraduate students with the experience and opportunity of publishing a paper in a philosophical journal. Secondly, to give an opportuity for students to be involved in peer to peer interaction through the process of creating the journal.
    [Show full text]
  • Personal Identity I. Persona
    Philosophy 110W: Introduction to Philosophy Hamilton College Spring 2012 Russell Marcus Class #11 - Personal Identity I. Personal Identity In philosophy, we look for true answers to difficult questions. The evidence for our answers may be difficult to establish. Our answers remain debatable. Sometimes, we decide that the questions are poorly formed, as Wittgenstein says about the skeptical question. We are starting a unit on personal identity. The questions we are pursuing concern the nature of our selves. Who are we? What makes us the same people that we were when we were young? What makes us the same as we grow older? Is there a core set of properties that are consistent over our lives? Is there even something called the self, or are we just a bundle of properties, with no unifying thing? Haecceity: thisness II. Material Constitution and the Body Theory One answer to the question of in what our identity consists, one that would be consistent with our general, contemporary preference for materialism, is that we are identical with our bodies. We can call this the body theory of personal identity. The problem with the body theory is that our bodies are changing constantly. We lose skin and hair all the time; most dust is just dead skin and hair. Every seven years, all the cells in our bodies are replaced. If we identify ourselves with our bodies, we are not the same person we were, say, a moment ago. (And, my son is made out of chicken nuggets and noodles.) The problems with the body theory underlie the debtor’s paradox.
    [Show full text]
  • Composition, Persistence and Identity 1
    DRAFT COPY This is a penultimate draft. The final, published version (also with less typos!) appears in in The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics ed. Le Poidevin, Simons, McGonigal and Cameron (2009): 296-309. Please cite that version. Composition, Persistence and Identity 1. Material Objects Unlike many other metaphysical categories, whether there are material objects is (Idealism aside) uncontroversial. No wonder then that the metaphysics of material objects has become a febrile area of contemporary philosophy as everyone (philosopher and non-philosopher alike) can make sense of, and have an interest in, the issues that are at stake. Three areas are mainly discussed: composition, persistence and identity (not that material objects are the sole subjects of these areas, nor do these areas exhaust the metaphysics of material objects). This chapter concentrates on how these areas help us answer questions about what material objects there are, and specifically examines the relationship, the consanguinity, between these areas. 2. Composition 2.1 The Special Composition Question My hand is a part of me; a star is composed of hydrogen and helium; conjoined twins overlap. These are mereological facts i.e. concerning the relation of wholes to their parts: my hand is related to me by parthood; a large number of hydrogen and helium atoms stand in the composition relation to the star; the two twins stand in the overlapping relation to one another. These mereological relations have been formalised in temporally relativised mereology. Take as primitive the relation of temporally relativised proper parthood: ‘__ is a proper part of __ at time __’. Next we can define some mereological vocabulary.
    [Show full text]
  • Parts of Persons Identity and Persistence in a Perdurantist World
    UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO Doctoral School in Philosophy and Human Sciences (XXXI Cycle) Department of Philosophy “Piero Martinetti” Parts of Persons Identity and persistence in a perdurantist world Ph.D. Candidate Valerio BUONOMO Tutors Prof. Giuliano TORRENGO Prof. Paolo VALORE Coordinator of the Doctoral School Prof. Marcello D’AGOSTINO Academic year 2017-2018 1 Content CONTENT ........................................................................................................................... 2 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................... 4 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 5 CHAPTER 1. PERSONAL IDENTITY AND PERSISTENCE...................................................................... 8 1.1. The persistence of persons and the criteria of identity over time .................................. 8 1.2. The accounts of personal persistence: a standard classification ................................... 14 1.2.1. Mentalist accounts of personal persistence ............................................................................ 15 1.2.2. Somatic accounts of personal persistence .............................................................................. 15 1.2.3. Anti-criterialist accounts of personal persistence ................................................................... 16 1.3. The metaphysics of persistence: the mereological account .........................................
    [Show full text]
  • Paradoxes of Personal Identity: Teletransportation, Split Brains, and Immaterial Souls Phil 20229: Midterm Exam Study Guide
    Paradoxes of personal identity: teletransportation, split brains, and immaterial souls phil 20229: Midterm exam study guide Jeff Speaks In class, Thursday, February 25 On the midterm, you will be given four questions from the following list, and will have to answer three: 1. Explain Zeno’s Racetrack and Achilles arguments for the conclusion that motion is impos- sible. What do these arguments assume about the nature of space and time? Is it possible to complete an infinite number of tasks in a finite time? Why or why not? 2. Explain Zeno’s Stadium argument. What does the argument attempt to show? Is it successful? Why or why not? 3. Explain what the A-series properties are, and why McTaggart thought that they were contradictory. Is his argument successful? Why or why not? What, if anything, does it show us about the nature of time? 4. Kant provided arguments against the two claims that material things are ultimately com- posed of simples, and that all material things are composite. Explain the argument which you think is less convincing, and say how you think it can be resisted. 5. Explain why the combination of Galilean relativity, the principle of relativity, and the speed of light’s being a law of nature is inconsistent. What was Einstein’s response to this paradox, and why does it involve the relativity of simultaneity? Why does the relativity of simultaneity lead to the phenomenon of time dilation? 6. Explain the Doomsday Paradox, and say what you think the best response to the paradox is. 7. Explain the paradox of the statue and the clay, and say what you think the best response to the paradox is.
    [Show full text]
  • The Philosophy and Physics of Time Travel: the Possibility of Time Travel
    University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well Honors Capstone Projects Student Scholarship 2017 The Philosophy and Physics of Time Travel: The Possibility of Time Travel Ramitha Rupasinghe University of Minnesota, Morris, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/honors Part of the Philosophy Commons, and the Physics Commons Recommended Citation Rupasinghe, Ramitha, "The Philosophy and Physics of Time Travel: The Possibility of Time Travel" (2017). Honors Capstone Projects. 1. https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/honors/1 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Capstone Projects by an authorized administrator of University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Philosophy and Physics of Time Travel: The possibility of time travel Ramitha Rupasinghe IS 4994H - Honors Capstone Project Defense Panel – Pieranna Garavaso, Michael Korth, James Togeas University of Minnesota, Morris Spring 2017 1. Introduction Time is mysterious. Philosophers and scientists have pondered the question of what time might be for centuries and yet till this day, we don’t know what it is. Everyone talks about time, in fact, it’s the most common noun per the Oxford Dictionary. It’s in everything from history to music to culture. Despite time’s mysterious nature there are a lot of things that we can discuss in a logical manner. Time travel on the other hand is even more mysterious.
    [Show full text]
  • Bergsoniana, 1
    Bergsoniana 1 | 2021 Reassessing Bergson Bergsonian Answers to Contemporary Persistence Questions Florian Fischer Electronic version URL: https://journals.openedition.org/bergsoniana/448 DOI: 10.4000/bergsoniana.448 ISSN: 2800-874X Publisher Société des amis de Bergson Electronic reference Florian Fischer, “Bergsonian Answers to Contemporary Persistence Questions”, Bergsoniana [Online], 1 | 2021, Online since 01 July 2021, connection on 14 September 2021. URL: http:// journals.openedition.org/bergsoniana/448 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/bergsoniana.448 Les contenus de la revue sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International. BERGSONIAN ANSWERS TO CONTEMPORARY PERSISTENCE QUESTIONS Florian FISCHER Introduction Time is one of the central topics of contemporary analytic philosophy, and Henri Bergson is one of the most important philosophers of time, but still Bergson plays virtually no role in the contemporary analytic debate about time. In contrast to his poor reception,1 Henri Bergson has a lot to offer analytic philosophy, as I will argue. More precisely, I will illustrate what the debates about persistence and ontology of time might gain from incorporating Bergsonian ideas. To do so, I will first investigate persistence, i.e., existence through time. The focal point of the contemporary analytic debate is how to conceptualise change without letting the involved incompatibilities lead to a logical contradiction. This can be called a horizontal way of posing the question, namely, how to reconcile two incompatible properties had by one entity at two points in time. Bergson famously asserted that objects are ontologically secondary, mind- dependent abstractions from an underlying dynamic reality.
    [Show full text]
  • Four-Dimensionalism, Eternalism, and Deprivationist Accounts of the Evil of Death
    Synthese https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03393-0 ORIGINAL RESEARCH Four-dimensionalism, eternalism, and deprivationist accounts of the evil of death Andrew Brenner1 Received: 22 June 2021 / Accepted: 28 August 2021 © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2021 Abstract Four-dimensionalists think that we persist over time by having different temporal parts at each of the times at which we exist. Eternalists think that all times are equally real. Deprivationists think that death is an evil for the one who dies because it deprives them of something. I argue that four-dimensionalist eternalism, conjoined with a standard deprivationist account of the evil of death, has surprising implications for what we should think about the evil of death. In particular, given these assumptions, we will lack any grounds for thinking that death is an evil for some individuals for whom we would antecedently expect it to be an evil, namely those individuals who cease to exist at death. Alternatively, we will only have some grounds for thinking that death is an evil for certain individuals for whom we might antecedently be more inclined to think death is not an evil, namely those individuals who survive death, in the sense that they continue to exist after death. Keywords Death · Evil of death · Four-dimensionalism · Eternalism · Perdurantism · Stage theory 1 Introduction According to four-dimensionalism, things which persist over time do so by hav- ing temporal parts at each of the times at which they exist. Four-dimensionalism is almost always conjoined with an eternalist temporal ontology, according to which past, present, and future things are equally real.
    [Show full text]
  • Virtue of Feminist Rationality
    The Virtue of Feminist Rationality Continuum Studies in Philosophy Series Editor: James Fieser, University of Tennessee at Martin, USA Continuum Studies in Philosophy is a major monograph series from Continuum. The series features first-class scholarly research monographs across the whole field of philo- sophy. Each work makes a major contribution to the field of philosophical research. Aesthetic in Kant, James Kirwan Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion, Aaron Preston Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus, Christopher Brown Augustine and Roman Virtue, Brian Harding The Challenge of Relativism, Patrick Phillips Demands of Taste in Kant’s Aesthetics, Brent Kalar Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature, Justin Skirry Descartes’ Theory of Ideas, David Clemenson Dialectic of Romanticism, Peter Murphy and David Roberts Duns Scotus and the Problem of Universals, Todd Bates Hegel’s Philosophy of Language, Jim Vernon Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, David James Hegel’s Theory of Recognition, Sybol S.C. Anderson The History of Intentionality, Ryan Hickerson Kantian Deeds, Henrik Jøker Bjerre Kierkegaard, Metaphysics and Political Theory, Alison Assiter Kierkegaard’s Analysis of Radical Evil, David A. Roberts Leibniz Re-interpreted, Lloyd Strickland Metaphysics and the End of Philosophy, HO Mounce Nietzsche and the Greeks, Dale Wilkerson Origins of Analytic Philosophy, Delbert Reed Philosophy of Miracles, David Corner Platonism, Music and the Listener’s Share, Christopher Norris Popper’s Theory of Science, Carlos Garcia Postanalytic and Metacontinental, edited by James Williams, Jack Reynolds, James Chase and Ed Mares Rationality and Feminist Philosophy, Deborah K. Heikes Re-thinking the Cogito, Christopher Norris Role of God in Spinoza’s Metaphysics, Sherry Deveaux Rousseau and Radical Democracy, Kevin Inston Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue, James Delaney Rousseau’s Theory of Freedom, Matthew Simpson Spinoza and the Stoics, Firmin DeBrabander Spinoza’s Radical Cartesian Mind, Tammy Nyden-Bullock St.
    [Show full text]
  • Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time
    Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time 1 Introduction It is possible to wholly exist at multiple spatial locations at the same time. At least, if time travel is possible and objects endure, then such must be the case. To accommodate this possibility requires the introduction of a spatial analog of either relativising properties to times—relativising properties to spatial locations—or of relativising the manner of instantiation to times—relativising the manner of instantiation to spatial locations. It has been suggested, however, that introducing irreducibly spatially relativised or spatially adverbialised properties presents some difficulties for the endurantist. I will consider an objection according to which embracing such spatially relativised properties could lead us to reject mereology altogether in favour of a metaphysics according to which objects are wholly present at every space-time point at which they exist. I argue that although such a view is coherent, there are some good reasons to reject it. Moreover, I argue that the endurantist can introduce spatially relativised or adverbialised properties without conceding that objects lack spatial parts. Such a strategy has the additional advantage that it allows the endurantist not only to explain time travel, but also to reconcile our competing intuitions about cases of fission. The possibility of travelling back in time to a period in which one’s earlier self or one’s ancestors exist, raises a number of well-worn problems (Grey, 1999; Chambers, 1999; Horwich, 1975 and Sider, 2002). In this paper I am concerned with only one of these: how is it that an object can travel back in time to meet its earlier self, thus existing at two different spatial locations at one and the same time? Four-dimensionalists have an easy answer to this question.
    [Show full text]