Judicial Review of Shipowner and Stevedore Liability Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Edmonds V
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University of Miami Law School Institutional Repository University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 4-1-1980 Judicial Review of Shipowner and Stevedore Liability Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique 99 S. Ct. 2753 (1978) Alberto Mora Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr Recommended Citation Alberto Mora, Judicial Review of Shipowner and Stevedore Liability Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique 99 S. Ct. 2753 (1978), 12 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 487 (1980) Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol12/iss2/14 This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter- American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RECENT CASE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SHIPOWNER AND STEVEDORE LIABILITY UNDER THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique 99 S. Ct. 2753 (1978) The apportionment of liability in cases of tripartite litigation aris- ing from an injury to a longshoreman produced by the concurrent negligence of the shipowner and the stevedore-employer has been in dispute ever since the common law norms were partially displaced by the enactment of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com- pensation Act (LHWCA) of 1927,1 its 1972 Amendments, 2 and the growing acceptance of comparative negligence standards in the fields of admiralty, workmen's compensation, and tort law. The majority interpretation of the LHWCA, prevalent since 1972, is the object of the dispute in Edmonds. This interpretation suggests that the Act compels the stevedore to compensate its injured employee to the extent of statutorily-set schedules, allows the longshoreman to bring an action for damages against the shipowner, and grants the stevedore or its insurance carrier a lien against any recovery by the longshore- man from the shipowner up to the amount of the compensation pay- ments. Under this analysis, the shipowner has no right to indemnity, contribution, offset, or credit from the concurrently negligent steve- dore-employer. The Fourth Circuit rejected this majority rule in its Edmonds opinion in favor of a comparative negligence standard.' Confronted with a division in the lower courts, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Fourth Circuit and reestablished the validity of the majority rule in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale 4 Transatlantique. The litigation arose from an injury suffered on March 3, 1974, by longshoreman Stanley Edmonds, an employee of Nacirema Operating 1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (Supp. 1979) (original version at 44 Stat. 1245 (1927)). 2. Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1263 (1972) (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901- 950 (1970)). 3. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Edmonds]. 4. 99 S, Ct. 2753 (1978) (5-3 decision, J.J. Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissenting; Powell, J. did not participate in the decision). LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS Co. (a stevedore), while unloading cargo from a vessel owned by the Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (CGT). Edmonds received the LHWCA statutory compensation benefits from the stevedore- employer and alleging negligence, instituted an action for damages in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against the shipowner (CGT) as a third party. A jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of Edmonds in the amount of $100,000 and a finding that the stevedore was seventy percent negligent in causing the acci- dent, the shipowner twenty percent negligent, and Edmonds ten per- cent contributorily negligent. Despite the finding of preponderant fault on the part of the stevedore, the Court entered judgment against the shipowner in the amount of $90,000, discounting the award only by the extent of the longshoreman's comparative negligence.5 This holding conformed to the traditional interpretation of liability appor- tionment under -the LHWCA. CGT appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground, inter alia, that its liability should have been limited to that proportion of total damages equivalent to the degree of its own com- parative negligence. The Court, partially agreeing, vacated and re- manded. A shipowner's liability, it held, should be limited to its degree of comparative negligence plus "any valid lien the stevedore may have on the recovery by the longshoreman, but. .. not to exceed the whole amount of the possible award against the vessel...." On rehearing, this decision was reversed and remanded by the Court en banc. Reasoning that the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA had altered the traditional maritime rule embodied in the District Court's holding, the Court's new holding conformed to CGT's proposed rule: a shipowner's liability for a longshoreman's injury is proportionate to the vessel's own comparative negligence in causing that injury. The Fourth Circuit's opinion did not establish a particularly powerful argument for this holding. Principally, the Court's reasoning was that the new first and second sentences of the LHWCA's amended Section 905(b), the controlling damage-apportionment statute, con- flicted with each other and ".... [were] irreconcilable if read to mean that any negligence on the part of the stevedore [would] defeat it. They may be harmonized only if read in apportioned terms."" The Court also remarked that ". it is hardly rational to suppose that, without any right of indemnification, the Congress intended to impose 5. Edmonds, 577 F.2d at 1154. 6. Id. at 1155. RECENT CASE a liability upon the ship for all damages suffered when the ship may have been only slightly at fault and the stevedore very greatly so," 7 and noted that the decision was consistent with the expansion of com- parative negligence and the policy underlying that expansion. Two judges dissented from the majority's opinion. Judge Hall noted that the other judicial circuits remained united behind the traditional maritime rule and stressed the disadvantages of inconsistent law. He denied that a conflict existed between the first and second sentences of Section 905(b), as the majority claimed. Faced with a "constitutional act of congress," he felt that a change in the law such as the majority envisaged should not come from the courts, but from Congress.' In a separate dissent, Judge Weidner favored the Circuit Court's first opinion on the matter. It is noteworthy that the Court chose not to enter the relatively extensive field of legal precedent and scholarly commentary on the issue. First, the Court's opinion was unsupported by any cited case. Second, the opinion failed to raise the more telling arguments for its position that are found in the literature, notably the pro tanto, pro rata, or equitable credit schemes advanced to circumvent the LHWCA's prohibition of contribution. Third, the Court accorded no weight to (indeed, it did not even comment upon) the mass of legal precedent arrayed against it. Prior to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Edmonds, all circuit courts considering the issue after the enactment of the 1972 LHWCA amendments had rejected the notion of stevedore liability to the shipowner under any theory. Such was the position of the First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit Courts. Upon a writ of certiorari granted to resolve the conflict below, the Supreme Court held, reversed and remanded: (1) in enacting the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, Congress did not intend to sub- stitute a proportionate-fault rule in place of the established maritime tort rule allowing an injured longshoreman-employee to recover all damages not caused by his own negligence from the negligent ship- owner, notwithstanding the stevedore-employer's own concurrent negligence; and (2) Supreme Court changes in this established mari- time rule are precluded given preemptive Congressional action in balancing the rights and liabilities of longshoremen, stevedores, and shipowners. 7. Id. 8. Id. at 1158, LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS The Court's opinion followed five lines of reasoning and was prefaced by a short general exposition of the legal background of tripartite litigation in cases of longshoreman injury. This opening section noted the pertinent LHWCA provisions and cited the leading Supreme Court cases, including Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,9 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,10 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,11 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S. S. Corp.,2 and Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc." A review of this back- ground is important in order to understand the Court's holding, for as the Court commented, part of the difficulty which the courts have had with this issue is due to the problem of squaring admiralty and com- mon law concepts with statutory provisions. In 1876, admiralty law incorporated the common law rule which permitted an injured party to sue concurrent, indivisibly responsible tortfeasors, either jointly or severally, and to recover total damages from one or all, with another common law rule which prohibited contribution between concurrent tortfeasors. This enabled an injured longshoreman to bring an action against both negligent parties-the shipowner and the stevedore. The right of recovery, however, was curtailed in 1927 by enactment of the LHWCA. With its enactment, the stevedores were obligated to pay an injured longshoreman-em- ployee compensation tailored to the longshoreman's medical injury and earning level, regardless of where the fault for the injury lay. In return for participating in this compensation scheme, a negligent stevedore was shielded from damage suits brought by the injured employee. This shield was created by the LHWCA's so-called "ex- clusivity clause"-still in effect today-which provides that a stevedore- employer's obligation to pay the statutory compensation benefits to an injured longshoreman was to ".