Forei Gn Policy Under Military Rule in Ghana, 19

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MILITARY RULE IN GHANA, 19 6 6 - 1982 Akylnba Kofi Etsiah A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Arts U n ive rsity o f the W itwatersrand, Johannesburg fo r the Degree o f Master o f A rts Johannesburg 1985 DECLARATION I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University. Akyinba Kofi E' • 'rh "•X2- day of _____ , (* (A. u i n ^ {/ 1985 ABSTRACT This study examines the performance of the three mili tary regimes that ruled Ghana during the period, 1966 - 1982. The analysis would seem to suggest that, contrary to post-covp rhetoric and expectations, military regimes are, in general, poor economic and political perfor mers. In the field of foreign policy, a rational foreign policy based on an even balance between Ghana's national interest and its actual and potential power eluded the country under the three regimes. The study is exploratory, designed to contribute a better empirical base to the field of study and to formulate a preliminary theoretical proposition, namely that, in Ghana, the foreign policy formulation and conduct of military officers tends to vary accor ding to differences in their reference group identifi cations and these in turn, vary according to differen ces in the professional socialisation process under gone by the country's officer corps. To the degree that the professional socialisation of officers differs, or to the degree that it changes over time, differences can be expected in the nature of Ghana's foreign policy under military rule. It would therefore be expected that as tho colonial experience becomes remote, so will the reference group identifications of the military officers be affected, and with it, their attitudes and behaviour. In time, Ghana may come to rely on its own training institutions and/or its army may undergo combat experience (such as the one in Congo-Zaire) from which it develops an indigenous military tradition as a result of which non-indigenous reference groups can be expected to be of much less salience for the officer corps. Finally, it may be noted that in Ghana, junior officers who do not receive "elite" training in foreign academics, or those who were not profession ally socialised in the pre-independence coloi.ial army, can be expected to possess less intense psychological commitments to non-indigenous reference rjroups than those of their superiors who have received such training. But whether foreign or locally trained, the analysis would suggest that military officers are hardly the right people to pursue successful foreign policies. The main reason for this is the military's lock of political legitimacy, with all its international economic, political and diplomatic implications. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I am grateful to several people who supported my work on this study. I have had discussions with some officials of the Ghana Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Accra, and with friends of former military officers, many of whom have gone into exile for fear of their lives under the present military regime, (Provisional National Defence Council, PN D C ). My discuss.i ons with Mr. Alex Quaison-Sackey (a former President of the United Nations General Assembly and later Ghana's Foreign Minister in the Nkrumah Government) disabused my mind of many naive misconceptions about the inner workings of Ghana's international diplomacy. I wish co express my gratitude to Mr. 0. Amponsah- Koomson of the Principal Secretary's Office in the Ghana Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Koomson's candour in answering my questions was of great help in the crystallization of my ideas. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Dirk Kunert, Hoad of the International Relations Department at the University of tho Witwatcrsrand. Professor Kunert, a fine scholar, made effect ivo contributions to my efforts in respect of this study. Mr. Colin Vale, my dissertation supervisor, was always willing to assist with much-valued advice and suggestions. His guidance helped me intensify the focus of this study. But for him, work on this dissertation would have taken years to complete. Finally, I wish to thank Mrs. Travis for her thought fulness in typing this dissertation with promptitude. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS RWAFF ; Royal West African Frontier Force : Convention People’s Party : Central Intelligence Agency • United Nations Organisation OAU ! Organisation of African Unity UK : Uni ■ <3 Kingdom NLC : National Liberation '"ouncil UP s United Party UAS : Union of African States : Unites States (of America) : General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade $ Order of the British Empire NRC : National Redemption Council SMC : Supreme Military Council TUC i Trades Union Congress XLO : International Labour Organisation AFRC * Armed Forces Revolutionary Council : Provisional National Defence Council PNP • People's National Party PDC s People's Defoncc Committee WDC s Workers' Defence Committee NUGS : National Union of Ghana Students s Ghana Industrial Molding Corporation : Ghana Bar Association i Association of Recognised Professional Bodies UGFC United Ghana Farmers' Council CPC : Cocoa Purchasing Company GCP : Ghana Congress Party TC : Togo]and Congress MAP : Muslim Association Party NPP : Northern People's Party CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE INTRODUCTION SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACK - GROUND FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DR. KWAME NKRUMAH'S GOVERNMENT FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL (NCL) 101 GHANA BETWEEN THE COUPS 139 FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NATIONAL, REDEMPTION COUNCIL - Sut’RBMB MILITARY COUNCIL (NRC - : C) FOREIGN POLICY OF THE AWED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL - PROVISIONAL NATIONAL DEFENCE COUNCIL (AFRC - PNDC) 191 CONCLUSION ?.24 APPENDICES 235 BIBLIOGRAPHY 269 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Military rule in Sharia can be said to be part of a wider phenomenon of military intervention in the politics of developing countries generally and of African states in particular *1 *. Much of the extensive literature tends to deal almost exclusively with motives and rationalisations of military rule in the states concerned These taxonomies of "factors" regarded as to the coup-prone states of Africa seem to ignore the fact that the kinds of features said to give rise to coup-proneness are often just as charac teristic of t • states where coups have not occurred. Dependency, > anomic malaise, ethnic competition, corruption, inadequately professionalised armies, widespread public discontent ar.-1 shortages of essential commodities arc some of the factors often citad as precipitating c "i-s d1 etat in Africa. In snort, traditional thought .. the nature of military intervention in dcv-'Jci.ing countries and the location of the impetus for such action in a state has, in a sense, typically polarised along the theoretical biases of the investigators: those whose primary professional interests were military have sought the causes of mi. itary interven tion in the social background of the officer corps or with reference to the internal structure of a military organisation ^ \ while those whose interests were primarily political, in the political and institutional structure of the society. The argument of the latter group of scholars heu$ been that. officers of every social class have led coups, that there is no discernible relationship between such factors as internal military cohesion and political intervention. Samuel Huntington sums up the latter position in defining the nature of praetorian society: "Military explanations do not explain military intervention ... military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politici zation of social forces and institutions ... In under developed societies the military are concerned not only with pay and promotion, although they are concerned with that, but also with the distri bution of power and status throughout the political system." ^ ^ In the class of ideologically motivated ccups, Huntington discorns three separate and distinct patterns $ the attempts by radically oriented soldiers to destroy a conservative oligarchy (such as the 1952 Free Officers Coup in Egypt or the Thai Revolu tion of 1889); responses to the escalation of social conflicts hy groups such as unions and students (the recurring political instability in the Dominican Republic is an excellent example of this t^ne of intervention); and finally "veto coups" which prevent "the accession to power of popular lower class or reform movements", or deter a party in power wishing to "promote radical policies or to develop an appeal to groups the military wishes to esclude from power." *4 ^ (The Brazilian coup is a good example of the last type of ideological intervention). One can accept both Huntington's criticism of theorists who neglect the importance of political variables in the study of military intervention, as well as M s own analysis of the positive relation ship between the absence of political institutionali sation and the frequency of military intervention. However, this does not necessitate either accepting entirely his statement that "military explanations do not explain military interventions", or the unstated presumption that in all ctisos, military intervention is based on social or ideological variables. *^ * a. Other scholars, such as S.E. Finer, have noted at least two other potential motives for military inter vention

Load more