Number 481 | June 19, 2019 EastWestCenter.org/APB

Slim Prospects for US-Pakistan Relations to Pivot from AFPAK to Indo-Pacific By Riaz Khokhar

The United States has not reoriented its Pakistan strategy away from a solely Afghanistan‐Pakistan basis toward a wider Indo‐Pacific perspecve. Even so, a significantly posive transformaon in Islamabad’s domesc environment and foreign relaons can change the U.S. and internaonal perspecves about Pakistan.

For starters, there is a strong percepon in Washington policymaking circles that unl the Afghanistan issue is resolved, chances are slim that the United States will think of Pakistan in a broader Asian Riaz Khokhar, framework. Even the resoluon of the Afghanistan conundrum would not guarantee an improved U.S.‐ Vising Fellow at the Pakistan relaonship. Although Islamabad’s supporve role in the ongoing U.S.‐Taliban peace talks is East‐West Center in appreciable, there is palpable frustraon in the U.S. Department of Defense regarding Pakistan’s alleged Washington explains patronage of terrorist groups that have killed U.S. troops in Afghanistan. that “Unl the There is also skepcism about the U.S. pullout from Afghanistan because Washington has not yet achieved Afghanistan issue is its primary objecves. These include but are not limited to breaking the nexus between regional and resolved, chances are internaonal terrorist groups; augmenng the capacity of Afghan naonal security forces; and, eliminang slim that the United the possibility of Afghanistan as a launching pad of terrorism in the United States or its allied countries. States will think of Hence, the unaccomplished objecves make it less likely that the U.S. troops will leave any me soon. Pakistan in a broader Asian framework.” In the context of a wider Asian region, the U.S. Naonal Security Strategy of 2017 designated China as a primary strategic rival and downgraded terrorism to a secondary level threat. Thus, although the United States will retain some form of presence in Afghanistan for stability and counter‐terrorism measures, most of its military, economic, and diplomac capital will be directed toward the strategic compeon with China and Russia.

So, as far as Afghanistan and counter‐terrorism issues are concerned, Pakistan has vital importance for the United States. But beyond Afghanistan, whether that means economic engagement or resumpon of military aid and assistance, Washington has nothing in store for Islamabad.

In fact, with reference to the China‐Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), some U.S. government officials have stated that it is also in the U.S. interest that Beijing is contribung to Islamabad’s economic development. However, they have also expressed some concerns regarding the opaque nature of the Chinese loans and the extent to which Pakistan is providing China with access to its land and resources. These factors may make Islamabad more subservient to Chinese interests in the region and may dissuade Washington from considering Pakistan as a partner or even nonaligned in the U.S. strategic rivalry with Beijing. So, is Washington considering an offseng strategy to reduce China’s influence in Pakistan? Not really. Even if it were, there is a percepon in academia and the think tank community in Washington that the United States will not be able to reduce China’s influence in Pakistan. Does that mean that Islamabad does not factor in the U.S. strategy beyond Afghanistan? Not at the moment.

Although the primary thrust of the U.S. Indo‐Pacific strategy is Southeast and Northeast Asia, it would be useful if Washington engages with and invests in some other countries, which do not want to rely solely on Beijing and seek to bring balance in their relaonships with both the United States and China. In this regard, the United States has enacted the Beer Ulizaon of Investment Leading toward Development (BUILD) Act, which may be implemented in the laer end of the year 2019. Under the Act, the U.S. State Department encourages private companies by guaranteeing investment insurances in less developed or developing countries. Apart from that, Japan has already been invesng in infrastructure and energy domains in various countries, including Pakistan, as part of its Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) "The consensus in iniave, which serves as both a commercial vision and an alternave to the Chinese Belt and Road Washington is that the projects. Pakistani state is responsible for aracng This is a great opportunity for Pakistan if the government is serious about aracng foreign direct investment, for which it investment. The consensus in Washington is that the Pakistani state is responsible for aracng needs to improve its investment, for which it needs to improve its business climate, economic governance, and most business climate, importantly its security environment. Foreign companies consider it too risky a proposion to invest in a economic governance, country which is grey‐listed by the Financial Acon Task Force (FATF) — an internaonal finance oversight and most importantly its organizaon — or which is ranked poorly (136/190) in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index. security environment." As for the U.S.‐China strategic compeon, if Pakistan wants to remain nonaligned and not be seen as under China’s influence, there are a few steps that Islamabad can take. First, it should ask the World Bank to offer a technical assessment of its CPEC projects and the financial implicaons of Chinese long‐ term loans under those projects. Second, since the United States is discouraging its allies and partners from buying fih generaon telecommunicaon equipment from the Chinese Huawei network company, Pakistan should also voluntarily refuse to purchase the technology.

Although it is unlikely that Islamabad will take these types of acons, such steps would send a strong signal to the White House and the Capitol Hill that Pakistan is not enrely under China’s influence and that it is making extraordinary efforts to improve relaons with the United States. This could be a stepping stone to enhancing U.S.‐Pakistan relaons in mulple potenal areas of cooperaon in the Indo‐Pacific region.

In sum, the current U.S. administraon does not priorize expanding relaons with Pakistan beyond Afghanistan. Even if it did, Pakistan’s domesc economic slump and the hangover of the blame of terrorism‐sponsoring acvies in the region do not offer enough incenves to American and internaonal businesses to invest in the country beyond marginal levels. Above all, most of Pakistan’s foreign relaons and policies stand at great odds with the U.S. strategic interests. This divergence keeps the relaonship at a taccal level, not on a long‐term or strategic trajectory. This makes the prospects of U.S.‐Pakistan relaons pivong from “AFPAK” to the “Indo‐Pacific” slim.

Riaz Khokhar is an Asia Studies Vising Fellow at the East‐West Center in Washington. He can be contact‐ ed at [email protected].

APB Series Founding Editor: Dr. Satu Limaye | APB Series Coordinator: Peter Valente The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center or any organization with which the author is affiliated.

The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue. Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options.