DOCSLIB.ORG

Serbia/Kosovo: the Brussels Agreements and Beyond

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Serbia/Kosovo: the Brussels Agreements and Beyond WORKSHOP REPORT Serbia/Kosovo: The Brussels Agreements and Beyond March, March, 2014 St Antony’s College, University of Oxford “The past is never dead, it’s not even past” William Faulkner “Prediction is difficult, especially about the future” Mark Twain Serbia/Kosovo: The Brussels Agreements and Beyond Friday 29th November 2013 St Antony’s College, University of Oxford The workshop on Serbia/Kosovo: The Brussels Agreements and Beyond was organized by South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) in association with the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford and LSEE, the Research Unit on South East Europe based at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science. The event was sponsored by the Centre for International Studies and Department of Politics and International Relations (University of Oxford), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, LSEE and NATO Public Diplomacy Division. The convenors of the workshop were Professor Richard Caplan, Dr James Ker-Lindsay and Sir David Madden. Overall, an impressive array of expertise was assembled at the workshop, where discussion was free and open in line with the Chatham House rule. The following report conveys some of the main issues and questions raised. The aim of the gathering was to exchange ideas and lessons learnt from the first successful round of negotiations on normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Four separate panels were organized, each covering a different aspect of the negotiations: the background, the negotiations, implementation of the agreement, and future prospects of success. The following report conveys some of the main issues and questions raised at the workshop, and represents SEESOX’s interpretation of the discussions. It does not purport to reflect the views of any of the participants. Panel I: Getting to the Negotiating peacekeeping mission, was status- Table neutral. The international community Discussion in the first panel focussed sought to maintain the status quo, but on the period leading up to the latest the March 2004 riots demonstrated phase of negotiations between Serbia that it was becoming unsustainable. and Kosovo. In particular, it The likelihood of a successful underscored the factors which created negotiated solution was small, as the the conditions for the successful Ahtisaari process demonstrated. One conduct of the negotiations and the part of the international community eventual agreement, while participants therefore opted for supporting a presented their perspectives from the unilateral declaration of independence point of view of the international by Kosovo, seeing it as the least bad community, Belgrade and Pristina. way to break the deadlock. Another part of the international community From the international point of view, objected to this and refused to the 1999 NATO intervention and UN recognise the new state. The Serbian Security Council Resolution 1244 side, and President Boris Tadic in created an uneasy stasis in Kosovo particular, reacted in a restrained without a more permanent solution manner to the new situation; in for Kosovo’s status. KFOR, the NATO 1 particular by seeking to refer the common denominator: the idea that matter to the International Court of UNSCR 1244 guaranteed Serbia’s Justice. By doing so, they chose a continued sovereignty over Kosovo. mature approach to opposing Although there was considerable anger Kosovo’s independence. The eventual in Serbia over the unilateral declaration ICJ decision proved to be a crucial of independence, and Belgrade actively turning point. It failed to support opposed Kosovo’s independence on Serbia’s contention that Kosovo’s the world stage, supported by Russia, declaration of independence was the ICJ verdict forced the government contrary to international law. But to change its approach. equally it did not give the Kosovo side Pristina faced a range of problems: it everything it wanted. In particular, it did not have control of the entire took no stand on whether Kosovo territory of Kosovo; governing was in fact a state. This allowed the structures were dysfunctional and international community to persuade under the influence of organized the two sides to come to the crime; Kosovo was an unfinished negotiating table. The other key state, whose international legitimacy factor that transformed the situation was undermined by the lack of a UN was Serbia’s application for EU seat. Additionally, its EU perspective candidate status. This resulted in the was seen to be unequal as compared EU-brokered dialogue that continues to Serbia’s because five EU member to the present. states did not recognize Kosovo The question that remains open is (although it is important to note that where is the process going? What is Britain, Germany and France did the final outcome or goal? In recognise Kosovo and that, generally, particular, the dilemma for the cooperation among the UN, NATO international community is whether and the EU was good). Despite the ICJ being more flexible on the issue of verdict, Kosovo remained in a weaker autonomy for Kosovo’s Serbs can be position, in part due to the dubious used to secure greater flexibility on international and domestic legitimacy the Serbian side regarding the of its leaders, but also because of its question of Kosovo’s sovereignty. lack of experience and institutional Viewed from Belgrade, it was important memory in conducting negotiations. to understand the local context for The domestic dynamics in Kosovo decision-making. During the 1990s, one were particularly unfavourable in the half of Serbia believed that the problem run up to negotiations. The political in Kosovo was one of a democratic elite was divided while the Prime deficit created by Milosevic and his Minister’s legitimacy was undermined regime, which would be resolved due to the election fraud as well as through his departure; the other half of international accusations regarding Serbia believed that there was an organ trafficking. Moreover, Kosovo international geopolitical conspiracy did not enter into the negotiations against Serbia. After 2000, discussing with a clear idea of what it wanted. Kosovo’s independence was a taboo. Instead it had a better sense of what it Successive governments failed to did not want. explain to the public the reality of the Discussion also focused on whether situation and clung on to the lowest the existence of five EU member- 2 states which did not recognize objective was to bring the two sides Kosovo was positive or negative. On together and resolve practical the one hand, their stance problems (low hanging fruit), which complicated decision making within would help to build trust and thus the EU and prevented the Union from open the way for political issues to be offering Kosovo a clear perspective of tackled. An example of such a membership, which would both have problem was civil registry books from increased its leverage and incentives Kosovo – Serbia had most of them, in relation to Kosovo. On the other Kosovo needed them to function as a hand, they also played a positive role. state. From the point of view of In Serbia, their position allowed Pristina, these books needed to be President Tadic and his government to returned, yet from the point of view maintain the position that the EU of Belgrade this was an illegal regime could not be blamed for Kosovo’s and Serbia was the rightful owner of UDI, as well as that the Union was these books. How could you resolve neutral when it came to Kosovo. This this situation? One way, and the allowed him to keep the goal of EU solution adopted, was by making accession in Serbia alive at a difficult copies of the civil registry books and time, which in turn ensured – later on handing those to Pristina. There were – that the EU had considerable a number of similar issues, including leverage over Serbia. freedom of movement of individuals It was also clear from the discussion, and vehicles which were resolved with and reports of comments made and varying degrees of success. The actions taken, that the five did not establishment of integrated boundary constitute a single united bloc. management was a major step forward. The issue of Kosovo customs Generally, this session demonstrated stamps was more challenging, considerable agreement on the however; and the inability to resolve various factors which brought the two this successfully led to the violence in sides to the negotiating table, under northern Kosovo in July and August EU auspices. 2011. The issue was eventually resolved (with the help of integrated Panel II: Getting to Yes boundary management) just ahead of The next topic of discussion was the elections in Serbia when it was agreed actual negotiations in Brussels. The that the stamps would simply refer to workshop considered how the ‘Kosovo’ rather than ‘Republic of “technical” dialogue began, and some Kosovo’. By this time, the technical of the problems associated with it. dialogue had exhausted itself. It was clear that behind almost every From the beginning of this period of technical issue there was a political dialogue between Belgrade and difficulty and that the dialogue Pristina which began in early 2011, the therefore had to be raised to a higher EU was in the driving seat of political level. mediation efforts. Initially, EU mediators went into the talks with The next phase of the dialogue what was more a list of issues that emerged after the election of a new they wished to solve rather than government in Belgrade. The new anything like a strategy. The overall government, led by the Serbian 3 Progressive Party (SNS), had to start example, while the First Brussels implementing what was previously Agreement dealt with northern agreed in order to improve Serbia’s Kosovo, a second agreement will be credibility within the EU. It also became needed to define the representation aware that Serbia’s position on Kosovo of Serbs in Kosovo central institutions was becoming weaker.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • KFOS LOCAL and INTERNATIONAL VOLUME II.Pdf
    EDITED BY IOANNIS ARMAKOLAS AGON DEMJAHA LOCAL AND AROLDA ELBASANI STEPHANIE SCHWANDNER- SIEVERS INTERNATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF KOSOVO’S STATEHOOD VOLUME II LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF KOSOVO’S STATEHOOD —VOLUME II EDITED BY: IOANNIS ARMAKOLAS AGON DEMJAHA AROLDA ELBASANI STEPHANIE SCHWANDNER-SIEVERS Copyright ©2021 Kosovo Foundation for Open Society. All rights reserved. PUBLISHER: Kosovo Foundation for Open Society Imzot Nikë Prelaj, Vila 13, 10000, Prishtina, Kosovo. Issued in print and electronic formats. “Local and International Determinants of Kosovo’s Statehood: Volume II” EDITORS: Ioannis Armakolas Agon Demjaha Arolda Elbasani Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers PROGRAM COORDINATOR: Lura Limani Designed by Envinion, printed by Envinion, on recycled paper in Prishtina, Kosovo. ISBN 978-9951-503-06-8 CONTENTS ABOUT THE EDITORS 7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 12 INTRODUCTION 13 CULTURE, HERITAGE AND REPRESENTATIONS 31 — Luke Bacigalupo Kosovo and Serbia’s National Museums: A New Approach to History? 33 — Donjetë Murati and Stephanie Schwandner- Sievers An Exercise in Legitimacy: Kosovo’s Participation at 1 the Venice Biennale 71 — Juan Manuel Montoro Imaginaries and Media Consumptions of Otherness in Kosovo: Memories of the Spanish Civil War, Latin American Telenovelas and Spanish Football 109 — Julianne Funk Lived Religious Perspectives from Kosovo’s Orthodox Monasteries: A Needs Approach for Inclusive Dialogue 145 LOCAL INTERPRETATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RULES 183 — Meris Musanovic The Specialist Chambers in Kosovo: A Hybrid Court between
    [Show full text]
  • UNDER ORDERS: War Crimes in Kosovo Order Online
    UNDER ORDERS: War Crimes in Kosovo Order online Table of Contents Acknowledgments Introduction Glossary 1. Executive Summary The 1999 Offensive The Chain of Command The War Crimes Tribunal Abuses by the KLA Role of the International Community 2. Background Introduction Brief History of the Kosovo Conflict Kosovo in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Kosovo in the 1990s The 1998 Armed Conflict Conclusion 3. Forces of the Conflict Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Yugoslav Army Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs Paramilitaries Chain of Command and Superior Responsibility Stucture and Strategy of the KLA Appendix: Post-War Promotions of Serbian Police and Yugoslav Army Members 4. march–june 1999: An Overview The Geography of Abuses The Killings Death Toll,the Missing and Body Removal Targeted Killings Rape and Sexual Assault Forced Expulsions Arbitrary Arrests and Detentions Destruction of Civilian Property and Mosques Contamination of Water Wells Robbery and Extortion Detentions and Compulsory Labor 1 Human Shields Landmines 5. Drenica Region Izbica Rezala Poklek Staro Cikatovo The April 30 Offensive Vrbovac Stutica Baks The Cirez Mosque The Shavarina Mine Detention and Interrogation in Glogovac Detention and Compusory Labor Glogovac Town Killing of Civilians Detention and Abuse Forced Expulsion 6. Djakovica Municipality Djakovica City Phase One—March 24 to April 2 Phase Two—March 7 to March 13 The Withdrawal Meja Motives: Five Policeman Killed Perpetrators Korenica 7. Istok Municipality Dubrava Prison The Prison The NATO Bombing The Massacre The Exhumations Perpetrators 8. Lipljan Municipality Slovinje Perpetrators 9. Orahovac Municipality Pusto Selo 10. Pec Municipality Pec City The “Cleansing” Looting and Burning A Final Killing Rape Cuska Background The Killings The Attacks in Pavljan and Zahac The Perpetrators Ljubenic 11.
    [Show full text]
  • The Kosovo Report
    THE KOSOVO REPORT CONFLICT v INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE v LESSONS LEARNED v THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO 1 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford Executive Summary • 1 It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, Address by former President Nelson Mandela • 14 and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Map of Kosovo • 18 Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogotá Buenos Aires Calcutta Introduction • 19 Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Paris São Paulo Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw PART I: WHAT HAPPENED? with associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Preface • 29 Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the uk and in certain other countries 1. The Origins of the Kosovo Crisis • 33 Published in the United States 2. Internal Armed Conflict: February 1998–March 1999 •67 by Oxford University Press Inc., New York 3. International War Supervenes: March 1999–June 1999 • 85 © Oxford University Press 2000 4. Kosovo under United Nations Rule • 99 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) PART II: ANALYSIS First published 2000 5. The Diplomatic Dimension • 131 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, 6. International Law and Humanitarian Intervention • 163 without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, 7. Humanitarian Organizations and the Role of Media • 201 or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organisation.
    [Show full text]
  • Kosovo After Haradinaj
    KOSOVO AFTER HARADINAJ Europe Report N°163 – 26 May 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE RISK AND DEFLECTION OF REBELLION................................................... 2 A. MANAGEMENT OF THE HARADINAJ INDICTMENT ..................................................................2 B. SHADOW WARRIORS TEST THE WATER.................................................................................4 C. THE "WILD WEST" ON THE BRINK ........................................................................................6 D. DUKAGJINI TURNS IN ON ITSELF ...........................................................................................9 III. KOSOVO'S NEW POLITICAL CONFIGURATION.............................................. 12 A. THE SHAPE OF KOSOVO ALBANIAN POLITICS .....................................................................12 B. THE OCTOBER 2004 ELECTIONS .........................................................................................13 C. THE NETWORK CONSOLIDATES CONTROL ..........................................................................14 D. THE ECLIPSE OF THE PARTY OF WAR? ................................................................................16 E. TRANSCENDING OR DEEPENING WARTIME DIVISIONS?.......................................................20 IV. KOSOVO'S POLITICAL SYSTEM AND FINAL STATUS..................................
    [Show full text]
  • From War to Peace in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Ukraine
    PALGRAVE CRITICAL STUDIES IN POST-CONFLICT RECOVERY Series Editors: Sultan Barakat and Sansom Milton FROM WAR TO PEACE IN THE BALKANS, THE MIDDLE EAST AND UKRAINE Daniel Serwer Palgrave Critical Studies in Post-Confict Recovery Series Editors Sultan Barakat Department of Politics University of York York, UK Sansom Milton Post-war Reconstruction and Development University of York York, UK This series seeks to advance original research in the broadly defned area of post-confict recovery. The Pivot format of the series is designed to meet the growing need for the provision of timely, focused, theoretically- rigorous, and applied research into confict-affected environments. The aim is to bridge the theory and practice of post-confict recovery across a range of disciplinary approaches and interventionary logics including but not limited to humanitarian action, confict resolution, post-war recon- struction, peacebuilding, state-building, and transitional justice. It wel- comes submissions from researchers, practitioners and policy makers, in particular from the Global South. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14708 Daniel Serwer From War to Peace in the Balkans, the Middle East and Ukraine Daniel Serwer School of Advanced International Studies Johns Hopkins University Washington, DC, USA Palgrave Critical Studies in Post-Confict Recovery ISBN 978-3-030-02172-6 ISBN 978-3-030-02173-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02173-3 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018957680 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019. This book is an open access publication. Open Access This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
    [Show full text]
  • Kosovo Media Assessment
    Kosovo Media Assessment Final Report Submitted by: ARD, Inc. 159 Bank Street, Suite 300 Burlington, Vermont 05401 telephone: (802) 658-3890 fax: (802) 658-4247 e-mail: [email protected] Work Conducted under Core TO (Task Order No. 1) Under USAID Contract No. AEP-I-00-99-00041-00 General Democracy and Governance Analytical Support and Implementation Services Indefinite Quantity Contract CTO for the basic contract: Joshua Kaufman Center for Democracy and Governance, G/DG Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research U.S. Agency for International Development Washington, DC 20523-3100 March 2004 The views expressed in the following assessment are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the U.S. Government. Foreword This Assessment was contracted by USAID/Kosovo to help it review and evaluate the current state of the print and broadcast media in Kosovo as well as its Kosovo Independent Media Program (KIMP) implemented by IREX (Cooperative Agreement No. 167-A-01-00107-00). The Assessment was done under the Analytical Services IQC (AEP-I-00-99-00041) by ARD, Inc. The purpose of the Assessment is to determine the principal obstacles hindering the development of a viable, pluralistic and independent media, assess the USAID/Kosovo media assistance program, and recommend and prioritize future activities for USAID/Kosovo media support. The Scope of Work is attached as Appendix B. The Assessment Team consisted of three experts in the media and democracy and governance (DG) sectors. The Team Leader was Sue Nelson, an expert in post-conflict international assistance programs and the former Director a.i.
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution of Media Development Strategies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia from 2000 to 2007
    Model Interventions: The Evolution of Media Development Strategies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia from 2000 to 2007 Hawley Johnson Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy under the Executive Committee of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2012 © 2012 Hawley Johnson All rights reserved ABSTRACT Model Interventions: The Evolution of Media Development Strategies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia from 2000 to 2007 Hawley Johnson The United States, in cooperation with European governments and international aid organizations, has sponsored the development of independent media as a major component of both conflict interventions and democratization programs, and more recently as part of nation building efforts. This study explores the evolution and export of those dominant democratic media models and their impact on recipient communities in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia from 2000 to 2007. International donors came to see media development as a silver bullet for democratization efforts to foster freedom of speech, civil society, good governance, as well as an engaged citizenry. Donors and practitioners initially believed that institutions, once established, would function in a specific way, and coupled with assistance to professionalize and commercialize the media sector, would create or at least jump start systems similar to those in the US and Europe. Over the years, policy makers have identified the vital parts of a democratic media system, but what they have failed to fully understand is the dynamic interaction among them. Now, more than fifteen years after the end of the Bosnian war and twelve after the end of the war in Kosovo, numerous assessments by government sponsors and independent evaluators have reported success in achieving fundamental media freedoms in these countries, yet these media sectors have not demonstrated their anticipated transformative power – leaving struggling or dysfunctional organizations in the wake of donor financial retreat.
    [Show full text]
  • Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue
    POLICY ANALYSIS Number 03 - March 2013 KOSOVO–SERBIA DIALOGUE: Windows of Opportunity or a House of Cards? 1 Kosovo–Serbia Dialogue: Windows of Opportunity or a House of Cards c o m p a n y e 1 a d d r e s s ] ABOUT GLPS Group for Legal and Political Studies is an independent, non-partisan and non-profit public policy organization based in Prishtina, Kosovo. Our mission is to conduct credible policy research in the fields of politics, law and economics and to push forward policy solutions that address the failures and/or tackle the problems in the said policy fields. Cover illustration by Jeton Mikullovci 2 Kosovo–Serbia Dialogue: Windows of Opportunity or a House of Cards c o m p a n y e 2 a d d r e s s ] Policy Analysis No. 03/2013 Kosovo–Serbia Dialogue: Windows of Opportunity or a House of Cards Agron Bajrami Editor in Chief, Koha Ditore Daily, Kosovo March 2013 Acknowledgments The author would like to thank several people who shared information and opinions regarding the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue. Most helpful were Dr. Spyros Economides and Dr. James Ker-Lindsay, both professors of Political Science at London School of Economics, as well as Mr. Bodo Weber from the Democratization Policy Council. A sincere thank you goes to several high officials and diplomats from EU member states and from NATO who were willing to share their views of the process, expected outcomes, and observed risks that the dialogue entails. Most helpful were also officials from the Government of Kosovo, as well as a former official of the Serbian government.
    [Show full text]
  • Kosovo in Limbo: State-Building and “Substantial Autonomy”
    Transitional Administrations Kosovo in Limbo: State-Building and “Substantial Autonomy” Two presidents, a presidency, a prime minister, and an assembly, but not a country? As Kosovo’s majority Albanian population prepares for the election of “provisional institutions of self-govern- ment” on November 17 — and Serbia is welcomed back into the international community — the paper-thin compromise that saw the United Nations follow NATO into Kosovo is likely to become a permanent substitute for a solution. By Simon Chesterman Executive summary • Complex peace operations that involve state-building functions are difficult even when the political outcome is clear, as it is in East August 2001 Timor. In situations such as Kosovo, where the final status of the territory under administration remains unclear, every aspect of state-building is more politically sensitive and more operationally The International Peace Academy’s Project complex. When this occurs in a highly militarized environment and on Transitional Administrations is funded in an unstable region, any departure from a supposedly “interim” by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, solution becomes more difficult still. with additional funding from the Ford • The Dayton Accords in Bosnia show the dangers of a difficult peace Foundation and the John D. and Catherine agreement evolving into a constitutional framework that is both T. MacArthur Foundation. The views unworkable and impossible to change. The conclusion of hostilities may provide the best incentive for belligerents to compromise, but expressed are those of the author alone. it may subsequently become impossible to reopen such questions without the threat of renewed violence. Future peace agreements are therefore likely to contain state-building provisions that interna- TABLE OF CONTENTS tional institutions will assume the task of overseeing, in some Executive summary .
    [Show full text]
  • Tim Judah's Kosovo September 2007
    PICTURE STORY Tim Judah’s Kosovo September 2007 Tim Judah’s Kosovo It is the last piece of the jigsaw. Of all the issues that remain from the destruction of Yugoslavia, Kosovo still defies solution. Will it become independent? When? How? Will it be divided or will it, somehow, remain part of Serbia? We at ESI have long recognised the importance of the Kosovo issue but we have also recognised just how important it is to present our readers with accurate information and on this Balkan issue above all solid facts come at a premium. Now, as part of our series bringing you extracts of some of the best books on the region we have teamed up with Yale University Press to bring you Tim Judah's Kosovo: War and Revenge. We think it is the best book on Kosovo that there is and, over the last few years it has become established as a must read for anyone going to work or serve there and for students of the region. It has also been translated and published in both Kosovo and Serbia. What make's Judah's Kosovo different from most other books on the region is that he combines a reporter's eye for colour and life but never lets up on the facts. Don't forget that you won't find the whole history of Kosovo in these extracts. They are here to give you a guide to its past. For the full story, you will have to read the book! Tim Judah covers Kosovo and the rest of the region for The Economist.
    [Show full text]
  • The Western Balkans and the EU: ‘The Hour of Europe’ Edited by Jacques Rupnik
    THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE EU: ‘THE HOUR OF EuROPE’ Edited by Jacques Rupnik Chaillot Papers | June 2011 126 In January 2002 the Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) became an autonomous Paris-based agency of the European Union. Following an EU Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001, modified by the Joint Action of 21 December 2006, it is now an integral part of the new structures that will support the further development of the CFSP/CSDP. The Institute’s core mission is to provide analyses and recommendations that can be of use and relevance to the formulation of the European security and defence policy. In carrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface between European experts and decision-makers at all levels. Chaillot Papers are monographs on topical questions written either by a member of the EUISS research team or by outside authors chosen and commissioned by the Institute. Early drafts are normally discussed at a seminar or study group of experts convened by the Institute and publication indicates that the paper is considered by the EUISS as a useful and authoritative contribution to the debate on CFSP/CSDP. Responsibility for the views expressed in them lies exclusively with authors. Chaillot Papers are also accessible via the Institute’s website: www.iss.europa.eu Cover photograph: The Mostar Bridge. © Peter Barritt/SUPERSTOCK/SIPA The original image has been modified. THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE EU: ‘THE HOUR OF EuROPE’ Morton Abramowitz, Florian Bieber, Dejan Jović, Robert Manchin, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Sašo Ordanoski, Momčilo Radulović, Jacques Rupnik, Denisa Sarajlić-Maglić, Igor Štiks, Veton Surroi, Jovan Teokarevic; edited by Jacques Rupnik CHAILLOT PAPERS June 2011 126 Acknowledgements The original idea for this Chaillot Paper derived from views on the Balkans exchanged at the EUISS conference in Sarajevo in May 2010.
    [Show full text]
  • International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo
    International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo RICHARD CAPLAN Events in Kosovo since February have shown the continued propensity for violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Long considered to be one of the Balkans’ most dangerous flashpoints, Serbia’s Albanian-majority province has for many years defied the odds and managed to avoid the kind of conflagration that has devastated regions to its north. A combination of repressive measures by Belgrade and a campaign of non-violent resistance by the Kosovar Albanian leadership kept a lid on unrest for nearly eight years since the break-up of Yugoslavia. That delicate balance was severely upset, however, when on February the Serbian authorities launched the first in a series of large-scale offensives against the ethnic Albanian population—ostensibly directed at militant separatists—which by mid-July had left some dead and had forced tens of thousands more to flee their homes and villages. Kosovo’s Serbs, in turn, have increasingly come under attack by Albanian irregular forces. International reaction to the upsurge of violence in Kosovo has been prompt but tentative, at least initially, in seeming disregard of the evidence from the Bosnian conflict that when dealing with Belgrade only diplomacy with real teeth succeeds. And yet it is precisely the failure of the major powers to respond more vigorously to the Bosnian crisis which is providing the dominant leitmotiv for international diplomacy now. ‘We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia,’ US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright warned on March.
    [Show full text]