WORKSHOP REPORT Serbia/Kosovo: The Brussels Agreements and Beyond March, March, 2014 St Antony’s College, University of Oxford “The past is never dead, it’s not even past” William Faulkner “Prediction is difficult, especially about the future” Mark Twain Serbia/Kosovo: The Brussels Agreements and Beyond Friday 29th November 2013 St Antony’s College, University of Oxford The workshop on Serbia/Kosovo: The Brussels Agreements and Beyond was organized by South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) in association with the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford and LSEE, the Research Unit on South East Europe based at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science. The event was sponsored by the Centre for International Studies and Department of Politics and International Relations (University of Oxford), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, LSEE and NATO Public Diplomacy Division. The convenors of the workshop were Professor Richard Caplan, Dr James Ker-Lindsay and Sir David Madden. Overall, an impressive array of expertise was assembled at the workshop, where discussion was free and open in line with the Chatham House rule. The following report conveys some of the main issues and questions raised. The aim of the gathering was to exchange ideas and lessons learnt from the first successful round of negotiations on normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Four separate panels were organized, each covering a different aspect of the negotiations: the background, the negotiations, implementation of the agreement, and future prospects of success. The following report conveys some of the main issues and questions raised at the workshop, and represents SEESOX’s interpretation of the discussions. It does not purport to reflect the views of any of the participants. Panel I: Getting to the Negotiating peacekeeping mission, was status- Table neutral. The international community Discussion in the first panel focussed sought to maintain the status quo, but on the period leading up to the latest the March 2004 riots demonstrated phase of negotiations between Serbia that it was becoming unsustainable. and Kosovo. In particular, it The likelihood of a successful underscored the factors which created negotiated solution was small, as the the conditions for the successful Ahtisaari process demonstrated. One conduct of the negotiations and the part of the international community eventual agreement, while participants therefore opted for supporting a presented their perspectives from the unilateral declaration of independence point of view of the international by Kosovo, seeing it as the least bad community, Belgrade and Pristina. way to break the deadlock. Another part of the international community From the international point of view, objected to this and refused to the 1999 NATO intervention and UN recognise the new state. The Serbian Security Council Resolution 1244 side, and President Boris Tadic in created an uneasy stasis in Kosovo particular, reacted in a restrained without a more permanent solution manner to the new situation; in for Kosovo’s status. KFOR, the NATO 1 particular by seeking to refer the common denominator: the idea that matter to the International Court of UNSCR 1244 guaranteed Serbia’s Justice. By doing so, they chose a continued sovereignty over Kosovo. mature approach to opposing Although there was considerable anger Kosovo’s independence. The eventual in Serbia over the unilateral declaration ICJ decision proved to be a crucial of independence, and Belgrade actively turning point. It failed to support opposed Kosovo’s independence on Serbia’s contention that Kosovo’s the world stage, supported by Russia, declaration of independence was the ICJ verdict forced the government contrary to international law. But to change its approach. equally it did not give the Kosovo side Pristina faced a range of problems: it everything it wanted. In particular, it did not have control of the entire took no stand on whether Kosovo territory of Kosovo; governing was in fact a state. This allowed the structures were dysfunctional and international community to persuade under the influence of organized the two sides to come to the crime; Kosovo was an unfinished negotiating table. The other key state, whose international legitimacy factor that transformed the situation was undermined by the lack of a UN was Serbia’s application for EU seat. Additionally, its EU perspective candidate status. This resulted in the was seen to be unequal as compared EU-brokered dialogue that continues to Serbia’s because five EU member to the present. states did not recognize Kosovo The question that remains open is (although it is important to note that where is the process going? What is Britain, Germany and France did the final outcome or goal? In recognise Kosovo and that, generally, particular, the dilemma for the cooperation among the UN, NATO international community is whether and the EU was good). Despite the ICJ being more flexible on the issue of verdict, Kosovo remained in a weaker autonomy for Kosovo’s Serbs can be position, in part due to the dubious used to secure greater flexibility on international and domestic legitimacy the Serbian side regarding the of its leaders, but also because of its question of Kosovo’s sovereignty. lack of experience and institutional Viewed from Belgrade, it was important memory in conducting negotiations. to understand the local context for The domestic dynamics in Kosovo decision-making. During the 1990s, one were particularly unfavourable in the half of Serbia believed that the problem run up to negotiations. The political in Kosovo was one of a democratic elite was divided while the Prime deficit created by Milosevic and his Minister’s legitimacy was undermined regime, which would be resolved due to the election fraud as well as through his departure; the other half of international accusations regarding Serbia believed that there was an organ trafficking. Moreover, Kosovo international geopolitical conspiracy did not enter into the negotiations against Serbia. After 2000, discussing with a clear idea of what it wanted. Kosovo’s independence was a taboo. Instead it had a better sense of what it Successive governments failed to did not want. explain to the public the reality of the Discussion also focused on whether situation and clung on to the lowest the existence of five EU member- 2 states which did not recognize objective was to bring the two sides Kosovo was positive or negative. On together and resolve practical the one hand, their stance problems (low hanging fruit), which complicated decision making within would help to build trust and thus the EU and prevented the Union from open the way for political issues to be offering Kosovo a clear perspective of tackled. An example of such a membership, which would both have problem was civil registry books from increased its leverage and incentives Kosovo – Serbia had most of them, in relation to Kosovo. On the other Kosovo needed them to function as a hand, they also played a positive role. state. From the point of view of In Serbia, their position allowed Pristina, these books needed to be President Tadic and his government to returned, yet from the point of view maintain the position that the EU of Belgrade this was an illegal regime could not be blamed for Kosovo’s and Serbia was the rightful owner of UDI, as well as that the Union was these books. How could you resolve neutral when it came to Kosovo. This this situation? One way, and the allowed him to keep the goal of EU solution adopted, was by making accession in Serbia alive at a difficult copies of the civil registry books and time, which in turn ensured – later on handing those to Pristina. There were – that the EU had considerable a number of similar issues, including leverage over Serbia. freedom of movement of individuals It was also clear from the discussion, and vehicles which were resolved with and reports of comments made and varying degrees of success. The actions taken, that the five did not establishment of integrated boundary constitute a single united bloc. management was a major step forward. The issue of Kosovo customs Generally, this session demonstrated stamps was more challenging, considerable agreement on the however; and the inability to resolve various factors which brought the two this successfully led to the violence in sides to the negotiating table, under northern Kosovo in July and August EU auspices. 2011. The issue was eventually resolved (with the help of integrated Panel II: Getting to Yes boundary management) just ahead of The next topic of discussion was the elections in Serbia when it was agreed actual negotiations in Brussels. The that the stamps would simply refer to workshop considered how the ‘Kosovo’ rather than ‘Republic of “technical” dialogue began, and some Kosovo’. By this time, the technical of the problems associated with it. dialogue had exhausted itself. It was clear that behind almost every From the beginning of this period of technical issue there was a political dialogue between Belgrade and difficulty and that the dialogue Pristina which began in early 2011, the therefore had to be raised to a higher EU was in the driving seat of political level. mediation efforts. Initially, EU mediators went into the talks with The next phase of the dialogue what was more a list of issues that emerged after the election of a new they wished to solve rather than government in Belgrade. The new anything like a strategy. The overall government, led by the Serbian 3 Progressive Party (SNS), had to start example, while the First Brussels implementing what was previously Agreement dealt with northern agreed in order to improve Serbia’s Kosovo, a second agreement will be credibility within the EU. It also became needed to define the representation aware that Serbia’s position on Kosovo of Serbs in Kosovo central institutions was becoming weaker.