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Perelman, the use of the “pseudo-argument” and human rights Autor(es): Haarscher, Guy Publicado por: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra URL persistente: URI:http://hdl.handle.net/10316.2/32028 DOI: DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/978-989-26-0498-5_17 Accessed : 24-Sep-2021 17:10:17 A navegação consulta e descarregamento dos títulos inseridos nas Bibliotecas Digitais UC Digitalis, UC Pombalina e UC Impactum, pressupõem a aceitação plena e sem reservas dos Termos e Condições de Uso destas Bibliotecas Digitais, disponíveis em https://digitalis.uc.pt/pt-pt/termos. Conforme exposto nos referidos Termos e Condições de Uso, o descarregamento de títulos de acesso restrito requer uma licença válida de autorização devendo o utilizador aceder ao(s) documento(s) a partir de um endereço de IP da instituição detentora da supramencionada licença. Ao utilizador é apenas permitido o descarregamento para uso pessoal, pelo que o emprego do(s) título(s) descarregado(s) para outro fim, designadamente comercial, carece de autorização do respetivo autor ou editor da obra. Na medida em que todas as obras da UC Digitalis se encontram protegidas pelo Código do Direito de Autor e Direitos Conexos e demais legislação aplicável, toda a cópia, parcial ou total, deste documento, nos casos em que é legalmente admitida, deverá conter ou fazer-se acompanhar por este aviso. pombalina.uc.pt digitalis.uc.pt RHETORIC AND ARGUMENTATION IN THE BEGINNING OF XXI AND ARGUMENTATION RHETORIC THE EDITOR THE BOOK Henrique Jales Ribeiro is Associate Professor at the Faculty This book is the edition of the Proceedings of the International of Letters of the University of Coimbra (Portugal), where, Colloquium “Rhetoric and Argumentation in the Beginning of the presently, he teaches Logic, Argumentation Theories, and a XXIst Century” which was held at the Faculty of Letters of the post graduate seminary on the Logic of the Sciences. After University of Coimbra, in October 2-4, 2008, and was organi- his PhD in philosophy, he has been the teacher of the chair on zed by Henrique Jales Ribeiro, Joaquim Neves Vicente and Rui argumentation since its creation in Coimbra - and for the first st Alexandre Grácio. The main purpose of the Colloquium was to CENTURY time in Portugal - from the beginning of the nineties. A large commemorate the publication in 1958 of the books La nouvelle part of his academic activity has been devoted to give seminars, rhétorique: Traité de l’argumentation, and The Uses of lectures and Free Courses on argumentation and its theoretical Argument, by, respectively, C. Perelman/L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, problems. He is the coordinator of the Research Group “Teaching and S. Toulmin. But another important goal was to take stock of Logic and Argumentation” of the Research Unity “Language, the state of rhetoric and argumentation theory at the beginning Interpretation and Philosophy”, which is member of the of a new century. It was a unique event, without parallel in (Portuguese) Foundation for Science and Technology. Portugal and worldwide considering its theme and its aims , which gathered some of the World’s most renowned rhetoric and His main research field has been logic and the history of Ribeiro Henrique Jales argumentation theorists: Alan Gross, Douglas Walton, Erik Krab- analytical philosophy in the twentieth century. He was the be, Frans V. Eemeren, F. Snoeck Henkemans, Guy Haarscher, John organizer, in Portugal, of the “1st National Meeting for Analytical Anthony Blair, Marianne Doury, Oswald Ducrot, Ruth Amossy. Philosophy” [English translation of the Portuguese title], and The book includes a variety of very important contributions to the editor of its respective Proceedings (Coimbra: Faculdade de rhetoric and argumentation theory, ranging from those that natu- Letras, 2003). Besides the authorship of tens of papers published rally fall within the subject matter, to the areas of philosophy, by Portuguese and international philosophy reviews, he has linguistics, communication theory, education theory and law published two books: “Toward an Understanding of the History theory. The “art”, as it was called in the Medieval curricula, is no of Analytical Philosophy” [English Translation of the Portuguese longer a discipline amongst others and has became, according title] (Coimbra: MinervaCoimbra, 2001), and “Bertrand Russell to the view of some specialists and largely owing to Perelman and the History of Analytical Philosophy” [English Translation and Toulmin influences, a “new paradigm” of rationality for our of the Portuguese title] (Coimbra: Pé de Página, 2007). He his a age, which auspiciously encompasses all fields of knowledge and founder of the Portuguese Society for Analytical Philosophy, and culture. member of various international societies, such as the British The book is divided into five parts: I- Historical and philosophical Society for the History of Philosophy, and the International studies on the influences of Perelman and Toulmin; II- Studies in Society for the Study of Argumentation. argumentation theory; III- Linguistic approaches to argumenta- tion theory; IV- Rhetoric; and communication theory / education theory approaches to argumentation; and V- Law theory approa- ches to argumentation. (Página deixada propositadamente em branco) RHETORIC AND ArGUMENTATION IN THE BEGINNING OF THE XXIst CENTURY EDITED BY Henrique Jales Ribeiro • COIMBRA 2009 COORDENAÇÃO EDITORIAL Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra Email: [email protected] URL: http://www.uc.pt/imprensa_uc Vendas online: http://siglv.uc.pt/imprensa/ CONCEPÇÃO GRÁFICA António Barros CAPA José Luís Madeira (IA / FLUC) PRÉ-IMPRESSÃO Paulo Oliveira [PMP] EXECUÇÃO GRÁFICA Sereer, Soluções Editoriais ISBN 978-989-8074-77-5 DEPÓSITO LEGAL ???????????????????????? Obra publicaDA com A COLABORAÇÃO DE: UNIDADE I&D | LINGUAGEM, INTERPRETAÇÃO E FILOSOFIA © JULHO 2009, ImpreNsa DA UNiversiDADE DE Coimbra CHAPTER 17 Perelman, THE Use of THE “pseUDO-arGUment” anD HUman riGHts Guy Haarscher* ABSTRACT: In the Traité de l’argumentation, Perelman defines the “pseudo- argument” as follows. “It is actually possible that one seeks to obtain approval while basing the argument on premises that one does not accept oneself as valid. This does not imply hypocrisy, since we can be convinced by arguments others than the ones used to convince the persons we are talking to.” I am not interested here in the possible absence of “hypocrisy”, as for instance when the speaker uses a path of reasoning that is different from the one he used to convince himself (because the latter would not be understood in a specific context by a particular audience). It happens often, especially today, that the speaker pretends to begin with the same premises as the ones accepted by his audience, because it helps him penetrate the “fortress”. In the examples I shall give, notably related to limitations to free speech, the censor pretends to begin with human rights premises. He then constructs an artificial and non-credible systemic conflict between religious liberty and freedom of expression. In certain instances, he is even able to completely invert the respective positions of the “hangman” and the “victim” by accusing the one who exercises his right to free speech of being a racist (who is guilty, for instance, of “islamophobia”, “christianophobia”, etc.). I shall try to show that the European judges on the European Court of Human Rights have never gone so far, but have accepted in certain circumstances the legitimacy of the “translation” of, notably, the problem of blasphemy into the language of the “right of others” not to be gratuitously hurt in their religious feelings. Now this is precisely, in my opinion, an example of the use of the “pseudo-argument” in the Perelmanian sense. I shall give many other examples of such a rhetorical strategy, which seems to be particularly confusing and pervasive today. * Université Libre de Bruxelles, CP 132, av. Paul Heger 6, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgique. Président du Centre Perelman de Philosophie du Droit. E-mail: [email protected] 283 1. INTRODUCTION Perelman defines the “pseudo-argument” as an argument beginning with premises which the speaker does not really believe in. So why should he argue in such a way? Perelman insists that the pseudo-argument not necessarily involves “hypocrisy”.1 For instance, a judge may want to take a decision for moral reasons which are convincing to him; but in order to write an opinion, he is obliged to find motivations in law. The premises he will begin with are perhaps not the ones he personally finds totally adequate, but he is a judge, not a legislator, or a tyrant who would be entitled to dictate his moral views to all his subjects. Another example of the use of such an argument is when one has been convinced of the validity of a thesis through a certain path of reasoning, but such a rhetorical line of argument will not persuade a particular audience: then the speaker resorts to other premises than the ones he is most “attached” to. But quite often, the use of the pseudo-argument involves what Perelman calls “hypocrisy”. The resort to such a term necessarily imposes on us to enter, as it were, into the psychology of the speaker. If the latter is a “hypocrite”, he will lie about his true positions, and try to deceive the audience by pretending to begin the argument with some premises the latter accepts. In that case, the speaker does not believe in the premises he uses: he resorts to them for other, hidden reasons. Let us suppose that you want to attack the values of liberal democracy in the name of theocracy, or fascism, or the rule of the all-knowing and never-erring Communist party (the Party knows, as Hegel would have said, the cunning path of History). But you are convinced at the same time of the fact that an audience dedicated to defending human rights and democracy will of course not accept such premises, which blatantly run counter to its most cherished commitments.