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Supreme Court of the United States ______ No. ______ In the Supreme Court of the United States ________________ ROBERT A. RUCHO, et al., Appellants, v. COMMON CAUSE, et al., Appellees. ________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina ________________ JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ________________ PHILLIP J. STRACH PAUL D. CLEMENT MICHAEL D. MCKNIGHT Counsel of Record OGLETREE, DEAKINS, ERIN E. MURPHY NASH, SMOAK & ANDREW C. LAWRENCE STEWART, P.C. KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 4208 Six Forks Road 655 Fifteenth Street, NW Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20005 Raleigh, NC 27609 (202) 879-5000 [email protected] Counsel for Appellants Robert A. Rucho, David R. Lewis, Timothy K. Moore, and Philip E. Berger October 1, 2018 QUESTIONS PRESENTED Earlier this year, while Gill v. Whitford was pending before this Court, a three-judge district court invalidated North Carolina’s 2016 congressional districting map as a partisan gerrymander. After Gill was handed down, this Court vacated that decision and remanded for further consideration in light of Gill. That period of reconsideration did not last long. In the decision below, the district court largely readopted its previous reasoning and became the first post-Gill court to divine a justiciable test—in fact, four tests—and invalidate a legislatively enacted map as a partisan gerrymander. Although plaintiffs here, like those in Gill, sought to vindicate only generalized partisan preferences, the court concluded they had standing. The court then found justiciable standards for partisan gerrymandering claims under the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, and (uniquely in the history of redistricting litigation) the Elections Clauses of Article I. The court found the 2016 map to violate each of those newly articulated tests and enjoined the State from using the map after the November 2018 elections. The questions presented are: 1. Whether plaintiffs have standing to press their partisan gerrymandering claims. 2. Whether plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable. 3. Whether North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map is, in fact, an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. ii PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING The following were parties in the court below: Plaintiffs: Common Cause; North Carolina Democratic Party; Larry D. Hall; Douglas Berger; Cheryl Lee Taft; Richard Taft; Alice L. Bordsen; Morton Lurie; William H. Freeman; Melzer A. Morgan, Jr.; Cynthia S. Boylan; Coy E. Brewer, Jr.; John Morrison McNeill; Robert Warren Wolf; Jones P. Byrd; John W. Gresham; Russell G. Walker, Jr.; League of Women Voters of North Carolina; William Collins; Elliott Feldman; Carol Faulkner Fox; Annette Love; Maria Palmer; Gunther Peck; Ersla Phelps; John Quinn, III; Aaron Sarver; Janie Smith Sumpter; Elizabeth Torres Evans; Willis Williams Defendants: Robert A. Rucho, in his official capacity as Chairman of the North Carolina Senate Redistricting Committee for the 2016 Extra Session and Co- Chairman of the Joint Select Committee on Congressional Redistricting; Representative David R. Lewis, in his official capacity as Chairman of the North Carolina House of Representatives Redistricting Committee for the 2016 Extra Session and Co-Chairman of the Joint Select Committee on Congressional Redistricting; Timothy K. Moore, in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives; Philip E. Berger, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate; A Grant Whitney, Jr., in his official capacity as Chairman and acting on behalf of iii the North Carolina State Board of Elections; North Carolina State Board of Elections; State of North Carolina iv TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ........................... ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... vi INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1 OPINION BELOW ..................................................... 3 JURISDICTION ......................................................... 3 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..... 3 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 3 A. Background ................................................... 3 B. Pre-Gill Proceedings ..................................... 5 C. Post-Gill Decision ......................................... 8 REASONS FOR PLENARY CONSIDERATION .... 14 I. Plaintiffs Lack Standing To Press Their Partisan Gerrymandering Claims .................... 16 II. Plaintiffs’ Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Are Not Justiciable ............................................ 23 III. This Case Underscores That A “Limited And Precise” Test For Adjudicating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Does Not Exist .......... 28 A. The District Court Declined to Establish a Definitive Equal Protection Standard .... 29 B. The First Amendment Standard Would Preclude Any Intent to District for Partisan Advantage .................................... 32 C. The Elections Clauses Standards Are Entirely Novel and Would Preclude Any Intent to District for Partisan Advantage ................................................... 34 v CONCLUSION ......................................................... 37 APPENDIX Appendix A Memorandum Opinion, United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, Common Cause v. Rucho, No. 1:16-cv-1026 (Aug. 27, 2018) ................ App-1 Appendix B Notice of Appeal, United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, Common Cause v. Rucho, No. 1:16-cv-1026 (Aug. 31, 2018) ............ App-349 Appendix C Order, United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, Common Cause v. Rucho, No. 1:16-cv-1026 (Sept. 4, 2018) .......................................... App-351 Appendix D Order, United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, Common Cause v. Rucho, No. 1:16-cv-1026 (Sept. 12, 2018) ........................................ App-355 Appendix E Constitutional Provisions Involved ........ App-373 U.S. Const. art. I, §2 ................................ App-373 U.S. Const. art. I, §4 ................................ App-373 U.S. Const. amend. I ............................... App-373 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1 ..................... App-373 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Agre v. Wolf, 284 F. Supp. 3d 591 (E.D. Pa. 2018) ..................... 36 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) ................................................ 17 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) .................................... 24, 26, 27 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) ................................................ 27 Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 (M.D.N.C.) .............................. 6 Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017) .............................................. 3 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) ........................................ passim FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) ................................................ 33 Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010) ................................................ 35 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) ................................................ 29 Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) .............................................. 6 Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) .................................... passim Harris v. Cooper, 138 S. Ct. 2711 (2018) .............................................. 5 vii Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600 (M.D.N.C. 2016) ..................... 3 Harris v. McCrory, No. 1:13-cv-949, 2016 WL 3129213 (M.D.N.C. June 2, 2016) .......................................... 5 Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) .......................................... 29, 32 Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221 (1986) ................................................ 27 Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007) ................................................ 17 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) .............................. 25, 30, 31, 35 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .......................................... 16, 17 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) .......................................... 16, 23 Rucho v. Common Cause, 138 S. Ct. 2679 (2018) .......................................... 6, 7 Rucho v. Common Cause, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) ................................................ 7 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) ...................................... 16, 21 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) .................................................. 16 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) ................................................ 31 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) ........................................ passim viii Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012) ................................................ 23 Constitutional Provisions U.S. Const. art. I, §2 ............................................. 6, 34 U.S. Const. art. I, §4 ............................................. 6, 34 Statutes 2 U.S.C. §2c ............................................................... 28 N.C. Gen. Stat. §120-2.4(a) ........................................ 7 Other Authorities H. Res. 283, 115th Cong. (2017) ............................... 28 H. Res. 343, 115th Cong. (2017) ............................... 28 H. Res. 364, 115th Cong. (2017) ............................... 28 S. 3123, 115th Cong.
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