The Financial Crisis, 3Rd Ed
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Lecture Sunday 2019-09-22 Monday 2019-09-23 Room Time 13:00 15:00 16:30 19:00 09:00 11:00 11:30 12:30 13:45 15:00 17:00 19:00 Foyer Coffee Breaks 10:30 - 11:00, 16:30 - 17:00 KN 1: Paulinum Opening M. Petrova PD Gossen PD PD Audimax Core Con- Award / Central DIW ference Thünen L. Banks Albertina WS WS WS Vortrags- Mentoring Mentoring Econ. saal for Women for Women Consulting Albertina WS Fürsten- DFG zimmer HS 9 HS 13 OM: A01 OM: B01 HS 14 OM: B02 Inv. Session: HS 15 Econ. Theory HS 16 OM: A02 OM: B03 HS 17 OM: A03 OM: B04 HS 18 OM: A04 OM: B05 HS 19 OM: A05 OM: B06 HS 20 S 202 OM: A06 OM: B07 S 203 OM: A07 OM: B08 S 204 OM: A08 OM: B09 S 205 OM: A09 OM: B10 S 210 OM: A10 OM: B11 S 211 OM: A11 OM: B12 S 212 OM: A12 OM: B13 S 213 OM: A13 OM: B14 S 214 OM: A14 OM: B15 S 215 OM: A15 OM: B16 S 220 OM: A16 OM: B17 S 221 OM: A17 OM: B18 S 222 OM: A18 OM: B19 S 223 OM: A19 OM: B20 S 224 OM: A20 OM: B21 S 225 OM: A21 OM: B22 S 226 OM: A22 OM: B23 Jobmarket Jobmarket Jobmarket Jobmarket Jobmarket Jobmarket Jobmarket S 227 Seminar Seminar Seminar Seminar Seminar Seminar Seminar S 228 OM: A23 OM: B24 S 229 OM: A24 OM: B25 Reception Ring-Café Selten Award Restaurant Reception Felix Neues Rathaus WS = Workshop KN = Keynote OM = Open Meeting PD = Panel Discussion Lecture Tuesday 2019-09-24 Wednesday 2019-09-25 Room 09:00 11:00 12:30 13:45 15:00 16:45 19:00 09:00 11:00 11:30 12:30 13:45 15:00 16:15 8:00 - 9:00 Info Event AvH / Breaks 10:30 - 11:00, 16:30 - 16:45 Coffee Break 10:30 - 11:00 Foyer Paulinum PD 18:15 PD KN 2: PD PD KN 3: PD Lokalorg. -
Economic Dialogue with Greece
IPOL DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES EGOV ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE SUPPORT UNIT I N-D EPT H ANALYSIS Economic Dialogue with Greece ECON on 2 March 2016 This note presents selected information on the current status of the EU economic governance procedures and related relevant information in view of an Economic Dialogue with Mr Euclid Tsakalotos, Minister of Finance of the Hellenic Republic, in accordance with the EU legal framework, in particular Article 2a of EU Regulation 1467 as amended by Regulation 1177/2011 and Article 7(10) of EU Regulation 472/2013.This briefing is an update on a previous briefing on Greece’s Financial Assistance Programme. 1. Latest economic developments After returning to growth in 2014 and showing unexpected resilience during the first half of 2015, Greece's economy has slipped back into recession in the second half of 2015 reflecting sharp deterioration in confidence, renewed stress within the banking system (which led to imposition of capital controls1 in June 2015) and uncertainty stemming from prolonged negotiations in the context of Greece programme review(s). According to Eurostat's preliminary data, the Greek economy contracted by 1.4% q-o-q in Q3 2015 and 0.6% q-o-q in Q4 2015. If confirmed, this data would bring real GDP contraction to 0.7% for 2015 as a whole (as compared to a 0.0% real GDP growth expected by the European Commission (COM) in the winter 2016 forecast2). Looking ahead, negative carryover effects from 2015 are to weigh on output dynamics in 2016 (-0.7%) before a progressive rebound in confidence, along the 'expected easing of capital controls and compliance with the conditionality of the new ESM assistance programme', helps the Greek economy to return to growth in 2017 (+2.7 %). -
Biases of Professional Exchange Rate Forecasts: Psychological Explanations and an Experimentally Based Comparison to Novices
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Leitner, Johannes; Schmidt, Robert; Bofinger, Peter Working Paper Biases of professional exchange rate forecasts: Psychological explanations and an experimentally based comparison to novices W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers, No. 39 Provided in Cooperation with: University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics Suggested Citation: Leitner, Johannes; Schmidt, Robert; Bofinger, Peter (2003) : Biases of professional exchange rate forecasts: Psychological explanations and an experimentally based comparison to novices, W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers, No. 39, University of Würzburg, Department of Economics, Würzburg This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48447 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu W. -
Money in the Great Recession BUCKINGHAM STUDIES in MONEY, BANKING and CENTRAL BA.NKING
Money in the Great Recession BUCKINGHAM STUDIES IN MONEY, BANKING AND CENTRAL BA.NKING Seri Editor: Tim Congdon CBE, Chairman, Ins1itute of [nternalional Jlonewry R.:search and Professo1~ University of Buckingham, Uniled Kingdom The Institute of International Monetary Research promotes research into how Money in the Great dc:\'elopments in banking and finance affect the wider economy. Particular attention is paid to the effect of changes in the quantity of money, on inflation and detlation, and on boom and bust. The Institute's wider aims are to enhance economic kno\\'ledge and understanding, and to seek price stability, steady Recession economic growth and high employment. The Institute is located at the University of Buckingham and helps with the university's educational role. Buckingham Studies in Money, Banking and Central Banking presents some Did a Crash in Money Growth Cause the of the Instilllte·s most important work. Contributions from scholars at other Global Slun1p? universities and research bodies. and practi tioners in finance and banking. are also welcome. for more on the Institute. see the \\·ebsit.: at www.m\·-pr.org, Edited by Tim Congdon CBE Chairman, Institute of Internatio11al 1V oneta1y R esearch and Profess01; University of Buckingham, United Kingdom BUCKINGHAM STUDIES IN MONEY, BANKING AND CENTRAL BANKING IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS ~Edward Elgar ~ PUBL I SH I NG Cheltenham, UK• Northampton, MA, USA ';;' Tim Congdon 2017 Contents :-\II rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored 1n a retrieval S~ ' Stem or transmitted in anv form orb\' an\' means electronic mechanical o: photoco_pying, recording. -
Crises in Europe and Challenges for Economic Education
Journal of Social Science Education © JSSE 2013 Volume 12, Number 2 ISSN 1 61 8-5293 Birgit Weber Editorial: Crises in Europe and Challenges for Economic Education Keywords: economic crisis, European crises, concepts, views and minds about European crises, economic education Since 2009 the European Union is facing a severe At such dynamically changing times, where eco- economic crisis. Does the current crisis reflect the nomy is affected by multiple crises and in which failure of the economic player or markets? Or does it also the discipline of economics critically reflects even reflect the failure of an entire economic system their limitations, it does not belong to the easiest inevitably culminating in speculative bubbles, tasks of economic education to provide with increasing economic inequality, always accompanied orientation, judgment, decision-making and action by severe crises? Or is it more of a failure of the according to economic situations, problems and political institutions that relinquished its power by phenomena. On the one hand, the crises generates the liberalization of financial markets, cancelling the quite considerable interest by their ubiquity, liability of financial institutions, becoming helpless particularly focusing on the other hand only on repair institutions of financial capitalism? Or is the fragments and dominant controversies of the European crisis “only” an extension of the global respective current situations. On the one hand, the financial crisis of 2008, which resulted in the rescue understanding of relationships and developments is of individual states, brought them to stumble complex and on the other hand, considerable themselves? Or does it just bring the design flaws of uncertainty and controversy of experts create the the European Monetary System to light? There is no impression of arbitrariness. -
Beatrice Weder Di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro INSEAD Ph: +65 6799 5388 1 Ayer Rajah Avenue Email: [email protected] 138676 Singapore CEPR Ph: +44 20 71838801 33 Great Sutton Street Email: [email protected] London EC1V 0DX, UK EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION: INSEAD, Singapore Research Professor, since 2018 DistinguisheD Fellow-in-ResiDence Emerging Markets Institute, since 2016 Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London President, since 2018 Research Fellow, since 2003 University of Mainz, MainZ Professor of Economics Chair of Policy and International Macroeconomics, 2001–2018 German Council of Economic Experts, WiesbaDen Member, 2004–2012 University of Basel, Basel Assistant Professor of Economics, 1998–2001 United Nations University, Tokyo Research Fellow, 1997–1998 The World Bank, Washington Consultant for WorlD Development Report, 1996–1997 International Monetary Fund, Washington Economist Program, European Department 1994-1995, Fiscal Affairs Department, 1995–1996 University of Basel, Basel Lic rer pol 1989, Dr. rer pol 1993 TEMPORARY OR VISITING POSITIONS: INSEAD, Singapore Visiting Scholar, August–December 2015 European Commission, DG ECFIN, Brussels Fellow of Research Fellowship Initiative 2014–15 International Monetary Fund, Washington Research Department, Resident Scholar, April–September 2010 Visiting Scholar, April 1999, August 1999, March 2000, March 2002, October 2002, March 2003, October 2003, May 2006 National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), CambriDge MA Visiting Scholar, March–April 2006 Federal Reserve Board of New -
View Conference Report
October 13–14, 2016 Conference Report Introduction: Greece as a Litmus Test for Europe Greece, renowned as the cradle of democracy, stands at a turning remains on life support, and, even with bailout money approved point. Fittingly, as with any commentary on Greece, a brief review of through 2020, it is unclear whether the country will be able to stand history is in order. We need not go too far back in time; 2008 is a good fully on its own by then. place to begin. Each round of bailout negotiations was excruciating: each time In the years since the global financial crash of 2008, the country’s creditors re-examined Greece’s finances, things looked worse. This led name has been synonymous with crisis. Thanks to a variety of factors to a downward spiral of trust and the imposition of ever-stricter within and beyond its control, ranging from fiscal profligacy to conditions on the disbursal of bailout funds. Clearly unable to survive geography, Greece has become the epicenter for a convergence of without those funds—certainly not within the EU—Greece took the crises—economic, political, and demographic—besetting the European money and, grudgingly, the conditions attached to it. The sense of Union as a whole. None of these challenges are unique to Greece, but being dictated to by the EU, plus years of grinding austerity that have they have hit hard there, exposing deeper fault lines in the EU as a followed, have precipitated a political crisis: with business as usual so whole. How Greece and the European Union respond will prove a clearly not working, both apathy and radicalism have increased litmus test for the European project. -
Calendar of Benoît Cœuré, January 2018 1
Calendar of Benoît Cœuré Member of the ECB’s Executive Board January 2018 Date Meeting / Event (incl. topic / meeting participants, as applicable) Location Sunday, 7 January Bank for International Settlements (BIS) – bi-monthly meetings Basel Monday, 8 January Meeting with German Ministry of Finance, Mr Levin Holle, on Basel regulatory issues Financial Stability Board (FSB) Steering Committee Basel Tuesday, 9 January Executive Board ECB Governing Council ECB ECB farewell dinner for Chair of Board of Governors of US ECB Federal Reserve System, Ms Janet Yellen Thursday, 11 January Eurogroup Working Group Brussels Friday, 12 January Eurogroup Working Group Brussels Bellagio Group meeting ECB Saturday, 13 January Bellagio Group meeting ECB Monday, 15 January Meeting with Hellenic Bank Association (HBA), on Greek banking ECB system Meeting with European Investment Bank (EIB), Mr Andrew ECB McDowell and Ms Debora Revoltella, on prospects for investment in the euro area Tuesday, 16 January Meeting with Graduate Institute of International and Development ECB Studies (Geneva), on digital currencies Executive Board ECB Wednesday, 17 January Meeting with Norges Bank, Mr Jon Nicolaisen, Mr Torbjørn ECB Hægeland and Mr Audun Grønn, on issues of common interest Meeting with media ECB Meeting with Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the ECB Calendar of Benoît Cœuré, January 2018 1 European Union, Deputy Minister of Finance, Ms Marinela Petrova, and Deputy Governor of Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank), Mr Kalin Hristov, on the Presidency’s work programme Meeting with BNP Paribas, on global economic prospects ECB Meeting with Bruegel, on economic situation in the euro area ECB Thursday, 18 January Meeting with French Embassy in Berlin, Mr Etienne Oudot de ECB Dainville, on euro area issues Meeting with Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the ECB International Monetary Fund (IMF), Mr Prakash Loungani and Mr Laurence M. -
14:45 Greece's Debt: Where Do We Really Stand? 15:45
ORGANIZER AMERICAN-HELLENIC UNDER THE AUSPICES OF CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ORGANIZER AGENDA DAY ONE ❯ MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2015 12:30 REGISTRATION | WELCOME RECEPTION 13:15 OPENING REMARKS Elias Spirtounias, Executive Director, American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce WHY A NATIONAL CONSENSUS Simos Anastasopoulos, President, American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce 13:45 THE ISSUES IN PERSPECTIVE Constantine Michalos, President, Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry Athanasios Savvakis, President, Federation of Industries of Northern Greece 14:00 THE U.S. VIEWPOINT 14:15 THE GREEK ECONOMY: IS THERE HOPE? Euclid Tsakalotos, Minister of Finance 14:45 GREECE’S DEBT: WHERE DO WE REALLY STAND? Paul Kazarian, Founder, Chairman & CEO, Japonica Partners USA Fragkiskos Koutentakis, President, Public Debt Management Department* Athanassia Xenaki, Alternate President, ELSTAT* Michael Jacobides, Sir Donald Gordon Chair of Enterpreneurship and Innovation, London Business School John A. Moran, Director, EIB & f. Secretary General, Department of Finance, Ireland* George Serafeim, Jakurski Family Associate Professor of Business Administration, Harvard University* 15:45 WHY MEMORANDA? ANALYZING THE BASICS George Chouliarakis, Alternate Minister of Finance* Rasmus Rüffer, Head of Division, Monetary Policy Strategy Division, European Central Bank (ECB) Declan Costello, Mission Chief for Greece, European Commission Nikos Vettas, General Director, Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research (IOBE) and Professor, Athens University of Economics and Business Delia -
90 Χρόνια / Bank of Greece Publications: 90 Years
Εκδόσεις της Τράπεζας της Ελλάδος: 90 χρόνια / Bank of Greece publications: 90 years Ιανουάριος-Μάρτιος 2018, τεύχος 46 January-March 2018, issue 46 KENTPO ΠΟΛΙΤΙΣΜΟΥ, EPEYΝΑΣ KAI ΤΕΚΜΗΡΙΩΣΗΣ TPAIIEZA THΣ EΛΛΑΔΟΣ EYPΩΣΥΣΤΗΜΑ Library of the Bank of Greece Περιεχόμενα / Contents Εισαγωγή / Introduction 2 Ι. Έντυπη συλλογή / Print collection of the Library 3 I.1 Μονογραφίες / Monographs .............................................................................................. 3 Ι.2 Μονογραφικές σειρές / Monographic series ................................................................... 21 Αρχείο μελετών και ομιλιών / Papers and lectures 21 Δοκίμια εργασίας / Working paper series 30 Ειδικά δοκίμια συνεδρίων / Special conference papers 46 Ινστιτούτο Τραπεζικών Μελετών / Institute of Banking Studies 48 Σειρά εδικών μελετών / Series of special economic studies 49 Ι.3 Περιοδικά / Journals ......................................................................................................... 51 II. Ηλεκτρονική συλλογή / Electronic collection 57 IΙ.1 Μονογραφίες / Monographs ........................................................................................... 57 IΙ.2 Περιοδικά / Journals ........................................................................................................ 59 IΙΙ. Κατάλογος θεμάτων που δημοσιεύθηκαν σε προηγούμενα τεύχη της Βιβλιογραφίας / List of topics published in previous issues of the Bibliography 60 Τα τεύχη αναρτώνται στο διαδίκτυο: All issues are available at the internet: http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/el/Bank/Library/ne -
W. E. P. Würzburg Economic Papers
W. E. P. Würzburg Economic Papers No. 39 Biases of professional exchange rate forecasts: psychological explanations and an experimentally based comparison to novices Johannes Leitner, Robert Schmidt and Peter Bofinger October 2003 Universität Würzburg Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Geld und internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen Sanderring 2, D-97070 Würzburg [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Postal address: Johannes Leitner, Institut für Statistik und Operations Research Universität Graz Universitätsstraße 15/E3 8010Graz (Austria) Tel: +43(316)380-7245 Fax: +43(316)380-9560 Email: [email protected] Robert Schmidt Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Geld und internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen Universität Würzburg Sanderring 2 D- 97070 Würzburg Tel: +49-(0)931-312945 Fax: +49-(0)931-312775 Email: [email protected] Peter Bofinger Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Geld und internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen Universität Würzburg Sanderring 2 D- 97070 Würzburg Tel: +49-(0)931-312945 Fax: +49-(0)931-312775 Email: [email protected] Homepage: http://www.kfunigraz.ac.at/soowww/index.html http://www.wifak.uni-wuerzburg.de/vwl1.htm ii Biases of professional exchange rate forecasts: psychological explanations and an experimentally based comparison to novices Johannes Leitner, University of Graz Robert Schmidt, University of Wuerzburg§ Peter Bofinger, University of Wuerzburg and CEPR, London Abstract The empirical performance of macroeconomic exchange rate models is more than disappointing. This dismal result is also reflected in the forecasting capabilities of professional analysts: all in all, analysts are not in a position to beat naïve random walk forecasts. The root for this deficient outcome stems from the fact that professional forecasts are to a large extend influenced by actual changes in exchange rates. -
S Account of the Greek Crisis: a Self-Incrimination Pt 1
Yanis VaroufakisâEuros"s Account of the Greek Crisis: a Self-Incrimination Pt 1 https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article5474 Yanis VaroufakisâEuros"s Account of the Greek Crisis: a Self-Incrimination Pt 1 - Features - Economic and debt crisis - Publication date: Wednesday 25 April 2018 Copyright © International Viewpoint - online socialist magazine - All rights reserved Copyright © International Viewpoint - online socialist magazine Page 1/39 Yanis VaroufakisâEuros"s Account of the Greek Crisis: a Self-Incrimination Pt 1 Proposals Doomed to Fail In his latest book, Adults in the Room [1] Yanis Varoufakis gives us his version of the events that led to the Tsipras governmentâEuros"s shameful capitulation in July 2015. It essentially analyses the period 2009-2015, though it makes incursions into earlier periods. With this voluminous work (550 pages), Yanis Varoufakis shows that he is a gifted narrator. At times he succeeds in moving the reader. His direct and vivid style makes it easy to follow events. From the authorâEuros"s demonstration, we can clearly see that his behaviour and the politico-economic orientation he defended contributed to the disaster. Yanis Varoufakis clearly claims to have played a major role in working out the strategy adopted by a handful of Syriza leaders âEuros" Alexis Tsipras, Yanis Dragasakis, and Nikkos Pappas, essentially âEuros" before their victory in the January 2015 election. Varoufakis does not plead guilty. He is convinced that had Tsipras actually taken the orientation he proposed and which Tsipras had agreed to late in 2014, the result would not have been defeat for the Greek people. Contrary to the conviction Varoufakis expresses, an attentive reading of his book leads to the conclusion that he contributed to that defeat Varoufakis explains how he gradually convinced Tsipras, Pappas, and Dragasakis not to follow the orientation adopted by Syriza in 2012, then in 2014.