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THE POLITICS OF IMAGINING NATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY AND THE PARTI QUÉBÉCOIS SINCE THE 1960s

by

Eve V. Pickles

Department ofPolitical Science McGiIl University, Montreal • July 2001

A thesis submitted to the Faculty ofGraduate Studies and Research in partial fuI filment orthe requirements ofthe degree of Master ofArts

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0-612-75251-8

Canadl TABLE OF CONTENTS

• ABSTRACT i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ü

TABLE OFCONTENTS üi

INTRODUCTION 1 CRAPTER. ONE: mEORŒS OF NATIONALISM 13 1. IMAGINING NATIONS THROUGH CULTURE 15 Il. POLmCAL INSTRUMENTS 22 III. CULTURAL VERSUS CIVIC DEBATE 28 IV. A NEW APPROACH 33 L CONCLUSION 35

CHAPTERTWO: NATIONALISM IN SCOTLAND 37

1. CULTURAL NATIONALISM BEFORE THE 19605 39 n. THE ADVENT OF THE SCOTIISH NAnONAL PARTY 44 [II. IMAGlNING THE POLITICAL NATION 49 • IV. JEKYLL AND HYDE 55 V. CONCLUSlON 60

CHAPTERTHREE: NATIONALISM IN QUEBEC 62

Il. CULTURAL NATIONALISM BEFORE THE 19605 64 III. THE ADVENT OF THE PARTI QUÉBÉCOIS 69 IV. IMAGlNlNG THE POLITICAL NATION 76 V. JEKYLL AND HYDE 81 VI. CONCLUSION 85

CONCLUSIONS 88

BIBLIOGRAPHY 98 • • ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are a number ofpeople, without whose encouragement and help, 1would not have come to Canada to undertake the research for this thesis. 1 would first like to thank my grandmother, Doreen Long, for making my graduate studies al McGili University financial1y possible. 1would also like to thank my family for their unflinching faith in my academic capabilities, in particular, my mother Margo Milne and my brother David Milne, for.their love, good humour and well-timed "is Eve a nationalistT' wise-cracks. Much ofthe interest l bold in politics derives from the (essons of my Queensferry High School History teacher, Colin Moodie, and bis sardonic perspective of the British govemment tluff-ups of the Thatcher years. Many unsaid thanks are owed to him. Furthennore, 1am grateful to the encouragement ofAnthony Smith at the London School of Economics, whose courses on nationalism opened my eyes to a discipline rich in meaning and infinite opportunities for research and argument.

At McGill, 1 would like to gratefully acknowledge the tutelage of my thesis advisor, Hudson Meadwell, and his assistance in helping me to fund the second year of my studies. Special thanks are also due to the Department of Political Science graduate secretaries, for their calm and considerate responses to questions, requests and eoquiries.

Last, but not least, [ would like to thank my friends for putting up with, and participating in, my countless rants and discussions of nationalism in various pubs in Edinburgh, • London and Montreal. Much ofmy ideas and arguments were honed during these special occasions. Johanne O~Malley, especially, offered a listening ear and wise criticism during periods ofthesis doubt. Much appreciation is owed to Johanne and my brother David for kindly reading my tirst draft when they probably had much better ways of passing their time. Finally, [ would like Dev Cropper whose encouragement and inspiration l have round unparalleled since bis untimely death in 1998, and Luigi Bettelli, for always saying the right things.

Eve V. Pickles July 2001

• ii • ABSTRACT

In nationalism studies, there bas been insignificant analysis of the politics of imagining nations. This thesis addresses this lacuna in an examination of the fonn and design of imagined nations in Scotland and Quebec. 1argue that the Scottish National Party and the Parti Québécois have, since their advent in the 1960s, created a political-eivic image of the nation that breaks with previous cultural conceptions. However, cultural images ofthe nation, propagated by centralist institutions, remain entrenched in contemporary Scotland and Quebec. The juxtaposition of centralist cultural images and nationalist political images ofthe nation have led to a dualistic, or what 1 have termed a ~Jekyll and Hyde', national consciousness in both countries. This exercise indicates that images ofthe nation are subjeet to multitudinous interpretations and (re)construction by various actors in the competitive state..nation political arena.

Au sein des études sur le nationalisme ce trouve un manque d'analyses importantes par rapport à la politique de «concevoir la nation». Cette thèse présente une examination de la forme et de la construction de nations imaginées, notamment au Québec et en l'Écosse. La thèse propose que le Parti National Écossais (SNP) et le Parti Québécois auront crée une image civique et politique de la nation, qui se qualifie comme différent des images culturelles de la nation qui auraient existés auparavant. Par contre, les images culturelles des deux nations persistent au Québec et en Écosse jusqu'au jour présent par le biasis de leurs représentations au sein des institutions centralistes Québécoises et Écossaises. Cette • juxtaposition d'images centralistes culturelles ainsi que celles politique et nationalistes, auraient menée à un dualisme dénommé içi comme une conscience nationale «Jekyl1 & Hyde» au Québec comme en Écosse. Ce projet nous démontre querimage d'une nation est asujetti à de nombreuses interpretations ainsi que de (re)construction par la main d'acteurs variés dans l'aréne competitive et politique des états nationales.

• III • INTRODUCTION

It is largely acknowledged that, in the social sciences and humanities in particular,

people study subjects that figure personally in their lives. Nationalism is no exception,

indeed its profuse emotional bonds often tum academics into fiery creatures. Thus, [ have

no qualms in admitting that the motivation ofmy research is to come to teons with how [

feel about the country in which 1was born, raised up, and fied trom al the earliest chance.

More than that -[ seek to question what this mutable thing called the 'nation' is, which

conjures up so many images in my mind. My own sense ofidentity bas suffered the

repereussions of'nalion', progressing as [have from being a 'British Socialisf to a

'Scottish Sovereignist' and finally, to a 'European pluralist'. These political identities, as

weil as my feelings toward the 'nation', will surely shift again. This is indicative ofho\v • images ofthe nation must be flexible to allow for re- and de-construction by its members. Yet this project does not eoncem itself with whether and why people are or are

not nationalists, unionists etc. Rather, [ address the more specifie problem - as [ see it-

ofaccepting the 'imagined community' as a singular thing (in the way we imagine it,

what we imagine, and al what level). "Scotland is a place ofthe imagination, what and

where people \Vant it to be,n says David McCrone. 1 Yet there has been liule reference in

nationalism studies to the dualism that is traceable in my sense ofimagined self, and

identifiable in that ofmy compatriots. Not, as commonly prescribed, as a simultaneous

Bnton and Scot. But as a person who sees Scotland in (\\,o very different lights.

1 David McCrone, U1lderstQ1lclillg Scotland: the Sociology ofa Store/css J.;atioll, (London and New York: • Routledge, 1992), p. 11. To return to my 'fleeing ofScotiand', 1did so because 1could no longer stomach • the images ofthe town that 1was brought up in. On one han~ propagated by the Scottish Tounst Board, was the image ofa quaint fishing village ofhistorical importance. On the

other, espoused by classmates and neighbours, lay the less romantic and highly political

image ofthe 'Drugs Capital ofWest Lothian', alcoholism and unemployment. There

were two sides to imagining where 1came from. Furthermore, it is apparent that this

duality cap be applied not only to microcosms ofScotland, but to the whole.

Certainly, my dual evaluation orthe environment in which 1grew up is not

uncommon. But at a broader level, I wondered, is this collective feeling toward the nation

unique? European examples are often discounted as comparable to Scotlan~ due to

Scotland's 'partnered' incorporation, imperialism and certain idiosyncrasies ofthe British

State. This is when, in my early research, 1came across the Quebec situation. As minority

nationalism seeking to challenge the state, which maintains a strong cultural identity • together with political national credence, l looked further (and had to travel 5000 miles to do so). My initial mind-wëlnderings were confinned. The much-cited 'schizophrenia,2 of

Scotland has a companion elsewhere: Quebec.

My objective in this thesis is to reach an understanding ofhow different images of

the "nation" have come into being. From my own experiences, l was able to identify a

romantic image ofScotland that contrasted sharply with a socio-political one. This

realisation has caused me to probe more deeply into the underpinnings ofthese and other

images. It has become apparent that there cxists t\VO dominant ways ofimagining nations

2 Christopher Harvie refers la the 'fruitful schizaphrenia' ofred (casmopolitan) and black (parochial) Scotland. See Christopher Harvie, Seot/a1ld andNatio/la/ism - SeDuis" Society and Polities 170ï to the Preselll, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). p. 22. Tom Nairn speaks ofthe schizophrenia of

• 2 in the late 20th century, which are cultural and political respeetively. My main question is • how these cultural and political images function in modem nationalist movements. As the title ofthe thesis suggests, 1wish to evaluate ways ofimagining the

politicised natio~ or the ~politics' ofimagining nations. But 1have three other research

goals in mind. Firstly, 1will assume an instrumentalist perspective in examining the

imagined 'nation'. That is, 1will look at the role ofpolitical parties in shaping images of

the politic.al nation, and the raie ofnational institutions - the tourist industries, mass

media and local govemment - in creating cultural images ofthe nation. Leading from

this, [ will examine the interplay benl/een culture and politics in the modem nationalist

setting. 1argue that in contemporary Scotland and Quebec, the entanglement ofcultural

and political nationalism has led to a 'Jekyll and Hyde' national psychosis.

1realise that my goals are ambitious. 1am injecting an instrumental political

perspective into a cultural theory ofnationalism that lies in the realm ofsociology - • bordering on psychology. [rely on the heliefthat rigid 'paradigm frontiers' can he transcended. This project will therefore dra\v not only from historical, political and

sociological works, but philosophical and psychological sources too.3 However, as the

analysis ofpolitical panies is central to my research, this paper sits safely in the realm of

political science. Moreover, Many ofthe questions [mise have been addressed by other

political commentators, in particular, the 'cultural versus political nationalism ~ debate.

Yet 1believe attention is lacking from a political analysis ofimagining the nation.

Sconish intelleetuals, who were national but not nationaiisi. See Tom Nairn. The Break-Up ofBrilail1:

Crisis alld Ne~Nalio"a/ismt (London: New Left Books, ]977), p. 161. 3 As the tapie ofQuebec nationalism has generated a substantial amount ofliterature in the disciplines of Canadian politics and general theories ofthe nation and nationalism, the literature analysed herein is wrinen in English. The regrettable anglo-centric bias ofmy research is thoroughly acknowledged. Efforts have been made~ however, to obtain translations ofimportant research documents wriuen in French. • 3 [n this introductory chapter, [ outline sorne preliminary information about the • project 1begin with a brierpreviewofthe argument 1proPOSe concerning the PQlitics of imagining nations in Scotland and Quebec. l then explain the methodology [ have chosen

to employ, and elaborate key tenns to be used oromitted. 1also indicate what 1 will no!

he doing in this project. Following this, 1sketch a more detailed outline ofhow the thesis

is structured, and olTer sorne closing remaries as to how this project May contribute to the

study ofnations and nationalism.

/. Preview ofthe Argument

The idea ofconceiving the nation as an imagined 'cultural artefact' \Vas

introduced by Benedict Anderson in 1983, to widespread acclaim. However, one aspect

of'imagining' the nation has received seant attention - namely the role ofpolitics in

imagined communities. [n accounting for the absence ofa political perspective, 1 • investigate the contribution ofnationalist parties to creating a 'landscape ofthe mind' which acknowledges yet supersedes the cultural implications ofimagining the nation. In

an analysis of'imagined communities', one must not only examine the process of

imagining, but also who it is that is doing the imagining, and for what reasoos.

A new 'angle' ofapproaching nationalism is developed here, which argues that

(existing) imagined communities have becn shaped by political parties, in order to create

a politicised image ofthe nation. This differs from Anderson's notion ofimagining the

nation, which attributes significance to 'bottom-up' socio-cultural practices ofimagining

communities. As poIitical nationalism is largely identified with a single party - the

Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Parti Québécois (PQ) respectively -[ rocus on the

• 4 i·

parties' contribution to imagining the nation. At the same time, 1examine the 4pro­ • nation' stance ofother political parties that have sought 10 affect the imagined political community, such as the Scottish Labour Party and the Quebec Liberal Party.

1will demonstrate that there are two streams of"nationalism'" (or 4processes' of

imagining) and two ways (and sets ofprotagonists) of"imagining communities" in

Scotland and Quebec. 1argue that modem political nationalism since the 1960s has been

intentionally divorced from the cultural nationalism ofprevious years. The pre-1960s

nationalism derived from a cultural and native-institutionaJ perspective ofnationality,

which was largely insular. However, these inherited cultural images in the 1960s found a

competitor. The advent ofpolitical parties advocating independence in Scotland and

Quebec eschewed this method ofimagining communities in favour ofa civic nationalism

that redrew the boundaries ofthe imagination, and changed the content from cultural ta

political. Their aim was and is to translate such imaginings into mass political expression. • Parties' politicisation ofimages ofthe nation also became a validating tool for the nationalist movement. Thus, imagining communities since the 1960s is better seen vis-à•

vis the efforts ofpolitical parties ta de-eulturalise and politicise images ofthe nation.

An important point to make here is that although parties have moved away from

cultural images ofnationhood in favour ofa political discourse, both farms of

nationalism have emerged together in contemporary Scotland and Quebec. This implies

that images ofthe nation are neither static nor homogenous. Cultural imaginings ofthe

nation are widespread in bath countnes. Yet political parties have repudiated previous

cultural nationalism in favour ofa civic-political nationalist discourse. How do \ve

reconcile the two? [ believe this may be called a 4Jek')'l1 and Hyde' phenomenon.

• 5 The 'Jekyll and Hyde7 national situation may he analogised with two ideal types • ofnationalism: ethnie and civic.4 The former is supposedly based on irrational impulses, romanticism, and posits ascriptive criteria for belonging. The latter is allegedly rational,

democratic and emphasises the associative qualities ofmembership criteria These 'ideal

types' ofnationalism are often viewed as mutually exclusive. In Scotland and Quebec,

however, l will demonstrate how the similar (but not the same) 'ideal types' ofpolitical

and cultwal nationalism co-exist. "Dr. Jekyll" may be seen as the cultural rooDster that

we (the artsltourist boards) have created and "Mf. HydeTJ is the SNPIPQ politician. Each

plays a very specifie role in how we imagine nations. Their aims, motives and tactics

must he identified in order to disentangle cultural and politica.l meanings ofthe nation

and to understand their interplay thereafter.

This work is an inevitably Iimited first attempt at grappling with a complex

phenomenon. Yet it stakes out important questions: how do \ve imagine nations, which • actors are involved in this imagining, what is the role ofpolitics in a seemingly cultural realm, and how do we reconciIe ditTerent images ofthe nation with the perceived reality?

Ifwe can get cIarity on these matters, we will be better positioned to address why people

feel attached to their nation, and why nationalism is such a potent mobilising force.

2. Methodology

The methodology employed here involves using a case-study approach to help

understand images of, and attachments to, the nation. The contextuaI approach enables us

to situate nonnative thinking in an empirical context. [ begin in chapter one by examining

" At this point. 1 should mention that 1take issue with the use orthe word 'ethnie' in this context: 'cultural' better describes the nationalism ofpre-1960s Scotland and Quebec. Definitions are explained below. • 6 a selection oftheories ofnationalism, to detennine whether they are adequate to account • for the politics ofimagining nations. Notably, 1focus on works dealing with imagining nations, political nationalism and the eontrariety ofpolitieal and cultural nationalisme

Having highlighted the main points ofthese theories, [ show that sorne aspects ofthis

research is found wanting. Following this, 1draw on the most relevant parts ofthese

theories to develop a new approach for understanding how nations are imagined.

In .chapters two and three, [ consider normative theories in relation to the conduet

ofcultural and political nationalism in Scotland and Quebec. Taking each case-study

separately, [ begin by analysing the pre-1960s cultural images ofnation. Then, through

historie research, 1examine the advent ofpolitical parties since the 1960s and how tbis

altered nationalism in both countries. A section is dedicated to imagining the political

nation, which draws from my own approach. Lastly, 1discuss the conflation ofcultural

and political nationalism, and ho\v images ofthe nation are severely altered as a result. • Finally, 1review from a normative perspective the casework results ofcultural and political images ofnation in Scotland and Quebec. 1explain how my own perspective

relates to and differs from existing theories, and consider whether the notion of'imagined

poIitical communities' is a plausible explanation ofnationalism in Scotland and Quebec.

3. Definitions and Termina/ogy

The choice oftenninology is a vital part ofany argument. This is especially true

when a new concept is being introduced and defined. l would like to outline how r

understand a few ofthe basic, though often contentious, tenns remploy.

• 7 The first word up for scrutiny is, ofcourse, ~nation'. This tenn, l believe, has been • subject to two serious misunderstandings. In much literature, a ~nation ~ is made synonymous with a named human population sharing a territory~ common memories~ a

mass culture and common rights and duties for members. As l understand it, however, a

nation is a recognised mental construct, not the ~named hurnan population' to which it

refers. Secondly, a ~nation' is often mistaken for a ~nation-state'. The latter, as [ see il, is

territory co-extensive with a single state, and exercises power in that state. As such, the

term ~intemational relations' is misleading; it is interstate relations that allow the world's

nation-states to associate with each other. [n speaking ofthe 'nation', then, [ am referring

to a cognitive construct with tangible appearances, which members ofa population with a

set ofselected knowledge regarding history, territory and society imagine they belong to.

Another way to explain this is to say that a 'nation' is imagined in the minds ofits

members. Benedict Anderson advocated this definition when he spoke ofthe nation as an • imagined political community. It is imagined "because the members ofeven the smallest nation \vill never know most oftheir fellow-members, meet them, or even hear ofthem,

yet in the mimis ofeach lives the image oftheir communion."s Thus people imagine

themselves as to form a nation. Moreover, they must form certain images ofwhat that

nation is. Leading from this, we surmise that communities are to be distinguished by the

style in which they are imagined. But what style ofimagination is this? And who is doing

the imagining or creating the images? These questions leading from Anderson's

definition ofa nation will he dealt with throughout this thesis.

S Benedict Anderson. /magilled Comml/Ililies: Rej/ecliol1s oll/he Origin andSpread ofNa/iollalism. (London and New York: Verso, 1991). p. 6. • 8 . i·

The next basic tenn that [ want to clarify is ~nationalism'. This word bas been • subject to diverse and often competing definitioDS. Without going into detail here, nationalism has been associated with a doctrine, ideology, fonn ofbehaviour, political

movement, ethnie mobilisation, collective sentiment, or a type oflanguage, symbolism

and mythology. As Cohen points out, nationalism has become an ~ideological hat-stand'

for theorists.6 Yet, primarily, it is secn as a process (an outcome and a product) ofthe

growth of.nations, or ~nation-building'. Furthennore, there is relatively widespread

agreement that modemity and nationalism are intrinsieally linked7

For the purposes ofthis paper, nationalism May loosely be described as a

movement for attaining and maintaining common ideals ofidentity, unity and autonomy

on behalfofa human population, sorne ofwhose members imagine it to constitute a

nation, with the actuality or possibility ofconstituting a nation-state. The fonn it takes

(political or cultural) depends on the development ofits institutional framewor~ • especially in relation to the nation-state. l concur with Ernest Gellner, in that nationalism was born ofthe modernising forces ofurbanisation, industrialisation and mass

communications.8 It is often driven by the images ofDation, and any threats to their

sanctity. [ argue here that it may exhibit cultural or political traits, usually both. [t may

also he motivated for, and propelled by, cultural or political purposes and forces.

The final term [ wish to qualify is the use ofthe word 'cultural' throughout this

paper. [ ,viII often speak ofcultural nationalism in contrariety to political nationalism.

6 Anthony Cohen. The Social COllstructiall a/Cammlmity, (London: Tavistock, 1985). 7 Notable dissenters ofthe opinion that nationalism is a modern phenomenon include John Armstrong. Natialls he/ore Nationa/ism. (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press. 1982)~ Clifford Geertz. Old Societies andNew States, (New York: Free Press, 1963)~ Anthony Smith. nie Ethnie Origills ofNaliolls, (Oxford: Blackwell. 1986); and Walker Connor. Elhllo-Natiollalism: The Quest for U"derslQ/Jding. ~Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994). See Ernest Gellner, NaliollsalldNalio"alism. (Oxford: BlackwelJ. 1983). • 9 This is not a new idea. Its basic tenets rest on the contrariety of~ethnic' and ~civil"

nationalism.. although my choice ofwords is somewhat less exciting and contraposed. 1

• ~civil' ~political' believe the word can he correlated with nationalisrn. 1refrain, however,

from using the word ~ethnic", which cannot he correlated with culture. ~Ethnicity' implies

something that May he found in cultural nationalism, but does not constitute the whole.

An 'ethnie' group is often based on common ancestry, defined by ascriptive or exclusive

criteria. This is more narrowly defined than ~ cultural' .. \vhieh encompasses not only

shared memories and values, but also common institutions, foons ofbehaviour and ways

oflife. Ihus, l will take my chances \Vith the flexibility that this word provides.

These, then, are the terms as 1understand them in trus discussion. [ have only

discussed a select few, those that are the most basic. Others l will elaborate as l proceed.

4. What [ am not doing • As this is an ambitious project, l wish to make elear what [ will not be trying to achieve in this exercise. As noted earlier, 1do not seek to address the colossal question of

why people are or are not nationalists. Neither do l consider whether nationalism is

moraUya 'good' or 'bad' thing, which [believe cannot explain why people feel

attaehments to a given nation. The omission ofthe question ofthe 'ethics' ofnationalism

allows me to assume a more c1inical perspective ofwhat nationalist parties and other

actors are trying to achieve when they create images ofthe nation.

Regrettably, due to space limitations, [ will not detail the contributions ofpo1itical

parties, other than self-proclaimed nationalist political parties, to the construction of

national images. There is conceivably sufficient information regarding this issue with

• 10 which to comprise a thesis ooto itsel( Having said this, 1will touch on the contributions • ofsome centIalist political parties to the 'Iandscape ofthe mind' and how this bas cteated conflicting images ofthe political nation. But my main focus here is the perfonnance of

nationalist political parties and their efforts to shape the nation as a political construct

5. Chapter Ou/fine

The thesis is presented in three chapters. Selected theories ofnationalism are

critically assessed in the first coopter, ftom which 1devise a new perspective to the topic.

The next two chapters describe the experience ofnationalism in Scotland and Quebec,

thus providing the contextual content ofthe argument. In the conclusio~ l retum to

nonnative arguments, comparing both the feasibility ofthe new account \Vith existing

theories, and the empirical exarnination ofnationalism in Scotland and Quebec.

In the first chapter, [examine and critique a selection oftheories ofthe causes of • nationalism, and its relation to political power. The discussion focuses on theories that address the issue of 'constructing~ national identities, and the involvement ofactors in

this construction. My main cIaim is that whilst these theories are empirically applicable in

sorne parts, they prove unworkable on sorne other dimension. [ then develop another

perspective to nationalisrn, which addresses sorne theoretical gaps.

My second chapter addresses the experience ofnationalism in Scotland. My main

argument is that there have been two forms ofnationalism in the Scottish case, which can

he loosely described as ~culturar and 'politicar. lmportantly, 1argue that certain actors

contrived both cultural and political images. [ feel that insufficient attention has been paid

• Il to political images, 50 1concentrate on the role ofthe SNP in shaping the political nation.

[ then explain how cultural and political images ofnation co-exist in Scotland today.

• Chapter three examines the experience ofnationalism in Quebec. 1argue that we

cao see similar fOnDS ofcultural and political images ofthe nation in Quebec as were

encountered in the Scottish case. In particular, the PQ has attempted to shape political

images ofthe nation that are disassociated from cultural images ofQuebec. These cases

are not idçntical, ofcourse. [ show how the lack ofa politicised civil society in Quebec

before 1960 has, in contrast to Scotland, hindered civic conceptions ofthe nation. 1al50

consider the uniquely Iinguistic dimension ofpolitical nationalism in Quebec.

In a concluding sectio~ [ return to nonnative accounts ofnationalism. 1review

the two streams ofimagining nations found in the casework exercise. [ then highlight the

main similarities and differences found in the experiences ofnationalism in Scotland and

Quebec. Following this, 1consider the implications ofimagining the political nation, and • offer sorne suggestions for future research.

6. Conclusion

ln this introductory chapter, I have outlined the framework ofthe discussion that

proceeds in the next three chapters. [ realise, as noted, tbat this is an ambitious project.

Due to the required length, it also has limitations, and Many aspects and approaches to

nationalism are omitted. 1hope, however, that this exercise clarifies particular approaches

to nationalism in Scotland and Quebec, and also faciJitates a discussion ofalternative

methods ofstudying the imagining ofnations.

• 12 • CHAPTER ONE: THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

The assumption that nation...building is a natural orinevitable process has been

challenged by instrumentalist theorists since the Second World War. Instead offocusing

on the organic or primordial chameter ofnation, we are invited to consider how the

nation is 'builf, what is the role and aetivities ofeHtes in tms constructio~ what are the

dynamics ofclass and politics at play, and for what purpose is the nation constructed It is

clear that there are a number ofways to approach the idea ofnations and nation-building.

In this chapter, 1mean to reviewa selection oftheories which accord with the

approach described above, and which aim to explain the role ofagency, imagination and

the interplay between culture and politics in building nations. 1foeus on three conceptual

frameworks for thinking about nations. Each one makes sorne effort to address what • Hugh Seton-Watson has coined as the 'design' and deliberation ofnation-building.9 Importantly, aIl aecounts refer to the impact ofmodernity. This indicates that the authors,

to varying e"-1ents, concur with Gellner in that nationalism is a modem phenomenon. Yet,

the nation is subject to competing definitions, and each reveals weaknesses. These

weaknesses are addressed in a new approach presented at the end ofthis chapter.

1begin the discussion with a family oftheories that addresses the 'contrivance' of

nations and the use ofimagery in their construction. The work ofBenedict Anderson is

primarily examined. This \vill indicate whether it is necessary to view nations as

imagined political communities, and whether the roots ofnationalism are cultural.

9 Hugh Seton-Watson, NalfollS andSiales, (London: Methu~ (977). • 13 Notions ofthe ~invention' ofnations and traditions, expound~ by Eric Hobsbawm and • Terence Ranger, are a1so considered within the scope ofthis analysis. The political limitations ofthese theories ofnationalism are identified, and will he retumed to later.

Secondly, 1evaluate the political character ofthe nation and nationalisme John

Breuilly's argument is assessed to detennine whether the ~mission' ofthe modem nation

is political, and the primary goal ofnationalism is political control ofthe state. This

perspective will he complemented by an analysis ofinstrumentalist theories ofnation­

building. Hudson Meadwell, among others, provide arguments highlighting the role of

intelleetuals in mobilising support for political nationalism.

Thirdly, 1contrapose theories ofcultural and political nationalism, and consider

their perceived mutual exclusivity within a wider theoretical and empirical framework.

These ideal types differ on the question ofwho belongs to a nation and how the nation is

legitimated. However, 1aim to show that both types may exist at the same rime, though at • different levels ofthe imagination. At the end ofthis section, 1derive an alternative view to nation-building from

previous theoretical analysis. The main weaknesses ofexisting theories examined in this

chapter are addressed. 1propose that too little attention has been paid to politics in

theones ofcultural imagination ofnations, and too [iule attention bas been paid ta culture

and imagination in theories ofpolitical nationalism. However, 1do not merely wish to

create a ~hybrid' approach ta nation-building derived tram these works. Rather, 1aim to

recast the notion ofnations - as cognitive constructs - in a different light.

This chapter is by no means intended as a comprehensive reading or extensive

critique ofexisting theories ofnation-building. 1do not presume to do themjustice in the

• 14 limited space allowed Rather, [ concentrate on what each set oftheories bas to say about • the construction ofnations, and in wbich context it is said Lastly, 1consider the most relevant points and limitations ofthese theories in a new approach to nation-building.

L IMAGrNING NATIONS THROUGH CULTURE

In.his book lmagined Communilies: Reflections on the Origin andSpreadof

Nationa/ism, Benedict Anderson examines the uses ofimagery to explain the fonnation

ofnat1ons. The nation is defined by its communal attachments, somewhat like kinship or

religion: "it is an imagined political community - imagined as both inherently limited and

sovereign.n1o lmagined, he explains, because the members orthe smallest nation will

never meet their fellow members, yet they believe themselves to be part ofa larger

coIlectivity. Limited, because the nation has finite, though elastic borders beyond which • lie other nations. Sovereign, because the nation came to maturity at a stage ofhuman history when self-determination was a vital concept. And imagined as a community,

because it is conceived ofas a deep, horizontal comradeship.

In short then, Anderson posits that a nation exists according to tne style and

perspective ofa significant number ofpeople in a community with limited (1 inguistic)

boundaries, who imagine themselves, through a horizontal fratemity, 50 as to fonn a

nation, or to behave as ifthey fonned one. We are asked to look al the mental processes

involved in nation-building. To say that a nation i5 a 'figment ofthe imagination',

however, is not to say that it is 'false'. Rather, the nation can he interpreted as a set of

ideas, or an aspiration, to he made and remade. It is a transcendent idea that moves 'up

• 15 and down history' to fit the concems ofeach present. The ~style' in which it is imagined • distinguishes it from othercommunities. However, Anderson does Dot interpret ~style' as something to he purposely fashioned. There are no actors dreaming up the nation for the

masses. Nations are unconsciously imagiDed in the minds ofthe members.

The reasan why people imagine communities, Anderson argues, is because oftwo

"fatalities"ll in human existence. First, the nation addresses the needs ofindividuals to

overcome. their fears ofdeath, as it links time immemorial ta a sense ofshared destiny.

Peoples are ready to "die for such limited imaginings" to he remembered by fellow

members and to ultimately gain immonality. The other fatality is the Tower ofBabel: the

inevitable linguistic diversity ofhumanity made it possible for linguistic groups to

imagine Iimited but sovereign nations. For Anderson, language is a crucial 'cultural

identifier' (in Gellner's phrase) which includes, and ofcourse excludes, prospective

community members. A sense ofnational belonging arose from a common language. But • this depended upon sorne material conditions resulting from secular transformation. Nationalism in the modem worleL says Anderson, has to be understood in relation

to the large cultural systems that preceded it. 12 Anderson focuses primarily on the

changes ofthe Enlightenment and rational secularisation. The removal ofstrong religious

beliefs that provided answers to suffering, death, birth etc. were replaced by national

10 Anderson,/magilledCommullilies. p. 6. Il We may translate that 'fatality' for Anderson does not mean •mortality' (as in the inevitability ofdeath), but rather the 'fatedness' or happenstance occurrences ofhuman nature. 12 Anderson argues that five factors encouraged the rise ofthe nation as an imagined community. First, the decline ofthe universal Church and the growth ofseparate and largely autonomous national or state churches. Second, the invention ofthe printing press. which hamessed to capitalism, facilitated the transmission ofnovel ideas. Third, the slow but perceptible displacement ofLatin in official communications by indigenous vemacular languages. Fourth, the graduaI weakening ofdynasticism and monarchy in the eighteenth century. And fifth.. changing conceptions oftime in which a concept such as a nation couId be conceived as moving through empty time measured by dock and calendar. allowing one to imagine the community marching steadily through history. • 16 -! .

beliefs. Nationhood, it was understood, existed beyond death and rests on bistorical • continuity. As Anthony Smith posits., "the nation becomes the constant renewal and retelling ofour tale byeach generation.nU Anderson views the character ofnationalism,

Dot as a political ideology, but as a cultural system with religious/kinship cbaracteristics.

The glue which holds the imagined family together results from the impact of

~print capitaIism' - the technology ofcommunication - on the fatality oflinguistic

diversity.:rhe mass production ofbooks and newspapers e40ne day best-sellers") created

vemacular reading publics. This revolution in print capitalism gave a new ftxity to

language and created unified fields ofcommunication. In these narrated texts, characters

\Vere seen as being members ofa community without readers ever coming into contact

with them. Moreover, reading newspapers resulted in an ~~ex1raordinary mass ceremony,"

performed simultaneously by members who had never met their fellow-members. Print

capitalism, then, initiated people into a fratemal community ofthe imagination. • Anderson therefore offers a structural reading ofthe origins ofnationalism, ditTerentiating between general conditions and specifie historical factors. 14 Cultural

change, ~"he interplay between fatality, teehnology and capitalism," unwittingly created

the conditions that allo\v us to imagine nations. Print communities, based on a shared

13 Anthony Smith, nie El/mie Origills ofNaliolls, (Oxford: Blackwell, ]986), p. 208. 1-1 Anderson's structural account orthe origins and 'modular' forms ofnations are, il must he emphasised, entirely cultural: he correlates the rise ofnationalism with the decline ofreligious and monarchical empires and the effects ofprint capitalism. There is no analysis here ofeither the structural or agency-motivated political conditions, i.e. the break-up or dissolution ofpolitical empires on the periphery ofEurope or the Americas, through which nationalism emerged. This conspicuous lack ofany state-centred or political analysis orthe historie and cultural conditions ofnation~buiJding funher fuels the argument that Anderson pays seant attention to the politics ofimagining nations. This particular Iin~ ofcriticism is unfortunately outside the scope ofthis anaJysis. For an interesting rebuttaJ to Anderson's proposed modular forms ofthe European and Creole imagined nations which are 'transplanted' to other social terrains, see Panha Chatterjee, "Whose Imagined Community?" Millenium, (Vol. 20. No. 3, 1991). • ]7 reading ofliterary products, exhibited the first fonn ofmodem national consciousness. • This hypothesis mises a few questions. According to Jacques Derrida, we must think about the "structurality" of

structures, rather than searching for a non~xistent centre oforigin. 15 An investigation of

any collective identity, any attempt to define the mental processes ofthe print

community, must necessarily bear in mind that knowledge is constructed, and this

construction is endlessly renewed. My greatest criticism ofAnderson, then, is that he

does not explore the "strueturality" ofthe structure - in other words, how the knowledge

ofnation in the imagined minds ofits members is construeted. Anderson says that

selective 'historical' memory and forgetting is an integral part ofnation creation. But

who is creating the nation? The only actor whom Anderson aecounts for in this creation

is the author ofthe novel or newspaper. These texts May he (de-)construeted, but how

retleetive is this ofpeople's images ofthe nation, and is it powerful enough to mobilise • the community-members to figbt and die for their imagined nation? The nation May exist in the subjective rninds ofits members, but there is more than one force at play - more

than the text narrator- in the creation ofthe image ofnation.

Smith, one ofAnderson's greatest eritics, perceives the other forces at play as

'ethnic origins'. In accordance with ms own worlc, he argues that Anderson's historical

discussions tend to "relegate the presence or absence and nature ofpreexistent ethnie

ties...a vivid sense ofcommunity whieh the creators ofthe modem nation took as the

basis oftheir work of'reconstruction. ml6 The nation-narrating intelligentsia was building

on previous attachrnent to ethnie. This argument lies outside the scope ofthis analysis.

IS Jacques Derrida. Decollstntclion in a I1l1lshel/: a com:ersalioll with Jacques Derrida, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997). • 18 Yet, what 1believe is fascinating for Smith is that he criticises Anderson for not taking

into account the context in wbich the print intelligentsia was wriling the nation. Were

• they no~ Smith argues, beholden to other political forces in order for their concepts to

assume concrete shape? And were such forces in question not the ruling elites ofthe

emergent nation? Did not other political aetors comprise the strueturaJity ofthe structure?

These questions bring us to an important point about why print intelligentsias

nanate mpdem images ofthe nation. Smith proposes that any intelligentsia require either

the organs ofthe state or a popular base with which to create its own social order. At the

same time, the intelligentsia may be instrumental to the exercise ofnation-building. Elie

Kedourie coneurs with this analysis, regarding the nation as an artificial construct of

intellectuals. 17 [t appears, in Anderson's account, that there is a missing link between the

'unconscious imagjnings' ofthe community and the conscious narratives ofimage-

makers. Motives are involved in the construction ofsuch images. Smith argues that "the

state and popular community typically reshape the intelligentsia's images and narratives

• nI8 to accord withpolitieal and/or ethnie imperatives. Let us look at another approach that

addresses the role ofpolitical factors in modelling processes.

[n The Invention ofTradition by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, we are told

that many images ofthe nation that we assume to have existed since time immemorial are

ofcomparatively recent origin and the product ofconscious design. Hobsbawm argues,

"the history which becomes part ofa fund ofknowledge or the ideology ofthe nation,

state or movement is not what bas actually been preserved in popular memory, but what

has been selected, pictured, popularised and institutionalised by those whose function it is

i6 Anthony Smith. "The Nation: lnvented, lmagined. Reconstrueted." Mi//ellllillm 20, no. 3 (199]). p. 362. lh 17 Elie Kedourie. Natiolla/ism. 4 00., (Oxford: Blaclewcll. (993). • ]9 to do SO.~~19 Hobsbawm therefore focuses on state inclusion and elite control as the main

processes involved in nation-building.2o This contrasts with Anderson ~ s hypothesis, in

• that state elites are accorded a seminal role in the construction ofthe nation.

Invented tradition is taken to Mean a set ofpractices govemed byaccepted rules,

and ofa ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms, and

which automatically implies continuity with a selected past. Hobsbawm argues that these

traditions.were first invented by ruling elites al the onset ofindustrialisation. As social

habits changed, and old traditions were being left behind, the state had to create new

bonds ofloyalty to create social cohesion and to win the support ofthe new citizenship.

This viewaccords with Poggi's heliefthat the modem state is a "purposively

constructed, functionally specifie machine" and thus it must mobilise commitrnent to it

through 'national' ideology.21 Historical continuity had to he crcated to legitimise the

statc, and thus old traditions were adapted to new situations through semi-fiction and • forgery.22 Taken togetheT, invented traditions constituted an 'alternative civic religion'. The state linked everything to tradition - the British Christmas, the Scottish kilt, the

American national anthem, Bastille Day - and thus civil society and the state became

ioseparable. The idea was not only to tum "peasants into Frenchmen' as Eugene Weber

argues, but also to turn Frenchmen ioto Republicans. 23

IR Smith, 'The Nation', Mi/lellnillm, pp. 363-364, rus emphasis. 19 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The !nvelftion ofTradition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2(00), p. 263. 20 For Hobsba~ the invention oftradition is an aet ofsocial engineering tram above that is designed to keep the masses, or more specifically the working classes, in check. 21 Gianfranco Poggi, The Deve/opmellt ofthe Madenl S'ale, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1978), p. 101. n The variaus functions and roles they fulfil are categorised as follows: (1) thase symbolising social cohesion or membership ofgroups; (2) those legitimising institutions, status and relations ofauthority; and (3) thase intended for socialisation, the inculcation ofbeliefs, value systems and conventions ofbehaviour. 23 Eugene Weber, PeasalllS ill/o FrellChmell: The Modenlisalioll a/Rural France, 1870-/9/-1, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1979). • 20 For Hobsbawm, there is clearly a political side to inventing traditions. Yet he does

not accord as much selfedetennination to the individual's cognitive abilities. Ruling elites

• present images and inventions ofthe nation ta a largely inert massa Yet iftraditions mean

identity for each individual member, boweasy is it to re-ïnvent them? While Anderson

assumes too little a role for political actors and interprets subjective images ofthe nation

as narrative IOgivens', Hobsbawm underestimates the power ofthe mind in accepting,

rejecting oraltering these images. It seems a balance between the two authors is

necessary. And that requires finding the connection between politics, intelligentsia, and

changing interpretations ofthe nation. Let us see where the gap lies in these theories.

Hobsbawm ties pOlitical motives to cultural artefacts ofnation. He concentrates

on how invented traditions played a part in elite attempts to manipulate and win the state­

loyalty ofthe masses. The solution was found in the mobilisation ofclasses through

~civic-religious' national consciousness. However, Hobsbawm ignores ho\v (invented) • images ofnationhood are constructed in the mincis ofmembers, and how they May change according to needs. Nationalism is directly correlated with ritualistic and culture­

based social engineering from above. This pays liule attention to subjective alterations of

the national image and how nationalism is mobilised as a force against a nation-state.

Anderson's focus is primarily on cultural analysis. He identifies nationality and

nationalism as cultural artefacts. Culture enables individuals to share an imagined

community with people whom they do not kno\v. Yet, while his discussion ofnationality

as a cultural creation and abstracted fonn is convincing, it is difficult to argue that

nationalism derives only from nationality. The cultural construction ofnationality May he

• 21 a crucial basis for nationalism, but nationalism also seems to emerge in relation to the • nation-state. This is clearly truc for political party nationalism. From an analysis ofthe emergence ofnationalist political parties, nationalism

takes place where and when a nation and a state come together. Supporters and

sympathisers ofthese parties have made it abundantly clearthat they envisage a state of

theirown. Anderson's concept ofimagined communities and Hobsbawm'5 notion of

invented tradition, however, cannot explain the question ofthe state or the politics of

nationalism. Anderson does not address why people long for, or need, the state.

Hobsbawm does not consider why nationalism May be used as a force against the statc. In

order to considerthe state's role in a nation as imagined community, therefore, we must

think not only about cultural spheres, but about political conditions as weil. • II. POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS In his introduction to Nationalism andthe State, John Breuilly turns existing

cultural theories ofnationalism on their heads. He boldly argues that "nationalism...is

about politics...is about power... is about control ofthe state.,,!4 Breuilly rests his theory

on the beliefthat nationali5m is a modem fonn ofpolitics. It is a political opposition

movement with a set ofarguments for justifying possession ofthe state. As such,

nationalism must he examined in relation to the modem state, upon which it relies for

fonn and purpose. In a world ofanarchy and competition, where the state is the

unchallenged building-block ofintemational society, nationalism discovers i15

fundamental objective: seizure and control ofthe state. Yet nationalism does not derive

• 22 from nationality, Uifby nationality is understood an independently developed ideology or • group sentiment broadly diftùsed through the 'nation.~~ Nationalism, as Breuilly defines il, does not relate to history orculture. It is simply a modem political movement

Breuilly takes early modem Europe as his starting point He maintains that the

idea ofthe nation gained 'limited political relevance,26 with the decline ofinstitutions

such as the churches, estates and guilds. At the same tinte, the idea ofa sovereign state

emerged, 10 be later ~territorialised' in the eighteenth centwy. [t is the modem state that

provided essential political concepts for national movements. Political nationalism, he

argues, depends on three assertions: that a nation seeks recognition ofits uniqueness, that

the interests and values ofthe nation take precedence over ail others, and that the nation

wishes to be independent. Nationalist oppositions - which may he separatist, refonnist or

unifying in nature - seek an alternative political community that can replace the state~ and

are identified as a fonn ofpolitics. Leading from this, Breuilly posits that nationalist • movements are more developed where a modem state fonn is more developed, and thus the state determines the nature ofnationalist movements

Breuilly acknowledges that a nation, as a culturally significant entity, must exist

to make political nationalism possible. But nationalism, it seems, does not grow out of

the nation. Contrarily, nationalism is divorced from any ideas or images ofthe nation.

Nationalist politicians merely use the excuse ofrepresenting the nation to make political

arguments. Nationalist 'mobilisation' is identified as the processes used by politicians to

appeal to the apolitical population. And nationalist success - the establishment ofstate -

turns its back on cultural (Breuilly speaks ofethnic) roots to define itselfpolitically.

nd 24 John Breuilly. Nalio11alism al1d the State, 2 ed .• (Chicago: University ofChicago Press. 1993), p. 1. n Ibid. p398. -

., .. • ...) Why is nationalism a sucœss? Because the nationalist movement fulfils basic • needs and serves political functions - ofmass mobilisatio~ political co-ordination and ideologicallegitimation. These functions are fuelled by the inadequacies ofmodem states

to address the "age-old concem with the relationship between rulers and subjects.....27 It is

out ofthe relationship between civil society (the private sphere) and the state (public

sphere), that nationalism takes hold. Nationalism seeks to transfonn these relations and

answer these concems by melding the public with the private domains; in other words,

entering the state in the interests ofthe civil society it claims to represent

Breuilly concludes that nationalism has tittle to do with the existence or non-

existence ofa nation. Nationalism may just be the most appropriate and pragmatic form

ofopposition to take in the face ofstate power. Confined in the beginning to claiming the

political rights ofa core political community, nationalism gradually extended its claims

basedon cultural distinctions as the state monopolises arguments about political • nationality. For Breuilly, these cultural characteristics exist in the sphere ofcivil society, and outside the parameters ofpolitics, meaning they are not considered within the scope

ofhis argument. Appeals to cultural identity only came after the establishment ofa

political claim to nationhood. This is when the political forces ofstate-seeking

nationalism reintegrate civil society and state (culture and politics).

Can nationalism he explained solely in terms ofpolitics? By limiting nationalism

to political movements, there is a misleading tendency to equate nation with state. We

must bear in rnind that sorne fonns ofcultural nationalism have never aimed at political

control ofthe state. Instead ofaiming at co-ordination, mobilisation and legitimacy,

26 Ibid., p75. 27 Ibid.. p368. • 24 nationalist movements desire unity, autonomyand identity - and these goals must

emanate from the image ofa nation. In fac~ Smith argues that the nation is enduring

• because it was not simply founded on politics. Political ideology must emanate fram a

cultural core, and this cultmal core - the nation - is shaped by the modem state. Breuilly

seems unable ta comprehend the psychologjcal need ofbelonging. He also fails to

address Hobsbawm's concem ofhow the nation-state (through economic policies,

political patronage and mass education systems) seeks to create the emergent nation~ and

how nationalism is appropriated as an official culture and ideology ~ to protect the state

from the effects ofmass movements. This points to sorne involvement from ruling elites

and intellectuals. We must acknowledge that the state MaY shape images ofthe nation,

justas the concept ofnation is al the heart ofthe nationalist claim. And these images of

nation, as Anderson demonstrates, mayemerge outside the realm ofpolitics.

Leading from this, it seems that we need to differentiate bctween nationalism (as • emanating from the image ofnation) and nationalist movements - terms that Breuilly seems to use interchangeably. Ifit is a desire for self-detennination that lies at the core of

nationalist movements, then there must exist a notion ofthe sovereign state to which the

political nationalist can lay claim. But ifthe nation, and the images and constructions

thereof, is seen ta he at the foot ofnationalism, then it is to civil society that one must

tum for cultural sources ofexplanation. In order to make this distinction we must

examine how cultural images ofthe nation are reappropriated for political purposes, and

how the population is convinced ofthe nationalist project.

Hudson Meadwell draws attention to the intelligentsia's pivotai role in nationalist

movements. Let us remember that, for Breuilly, nationalism is not the politics of

• 25 . intellectuals, who May he swayed by any ~interesting ideologies'. Yet this, we have seen,

cannot explain the eatalyst for popular mobilisation, which cames from the melding of

• images ofnation with a political goal ofstate-possession. Meadwell, contrarily, explains

how the intelligentsia May endorse two strategies for popular Dationalist mobilisation in a

~cost-benefit' or rational-choice approach to nationalism.

On one band, intellectuals will pursue the resocialisation ofthe population to

reflect th~ir own cultural attitude, for instance though potitical education. Such a strategy

invotves a specific ideology (or image) ofthe nation-to-be. 28 This answers Hobsbawm's

concem ofstate construction ofnations. On the other hand, the intelligentsia will

advocate the substantial economic henefits ofindependence (such as increased trade in

the interstate system). Nationalist leaders must oirer incentives to the voter. and this May

he the prospect ofeconomic gain ifthe national group chooses sovereignty. There are

thus elements ofcalculation and rational choice in the espousal ofnationalist dreams of • state possession, which Breuilly does not address. The main point here is that cultural meanings ofthe nation have to he constructed

or reappropriated by political eHtes to make the idea ofa nation-state ofone's own

plausible. Donald Horowitz argues that elite-constructed nationalism "must strike roots

in mass sentiments, apprehensions and aspirations in order to succeed.,,29 We cannot

underrate the emotive power ofcultural bonds, argues Walker Connor. 30 And many of

these sentiments are based around images ofnationality - which Breuilly from the start

omits from his argument. Furthennore, these mass sentiments, based on social practices,

21 Meadwell states that the resocialisation strategy deveIops "an ideoJogy that justifies the future society...exhoning individuals ta make sacrifices, and including romantic and magical themes'" Hudson MeadweIl, "Cultural and Instrumental Approaches to Ethnie NationaIism." El/mie and RacialSllidies 12, (1989), p. 321. • 26 shared historie memory etc. cChave an ineffable, and al times overpowerin& eoereiveness • in and of[itselt]'731 as weil as the powerful political forces that influence them. The findings ofinstrumentalist scholars indicate that culture May he manipulate

yet cultural identity cannot he eradieated through the forces ofmodemity precisely

because it eonstitutes the psyehologieal boundaries necessary to structure social

interaction.32 The existence ofpolitical and economic interests does not automatically

negate thê continued existence ofcultural interests. Nationality may thus he understood

as a psychological phenomenon manipulated on an individual basis as Geertz believes,

and reinforced by 'transmitters' ofcultural identity - such as language, history, sYmbols.

Yet ifthis is true, we must also consider whether interested leaders and eHte groups can

equally manipulate nationality for collective purposes, and how the transmitters may be

used (or abused) to facilitate the development ofa collective national identity. Kedourie

argues that the intelligentsia fonn the cadres ofcultural nationalist movements that seek • to build, in antagonism to the existing state, a regenerated national community. Cultural meanings are essential for social interaction in the national community, whilst mass

mobilisation is vital for the achievement ofpoliticai goals. Elites may have the means to

shape cultural images for political purposes, but the interests ofthe elites and masses

must be hannonised ifany mass-based nationalist goal is to he realised.

To elaborate, the cultural and political must be reconciled for the national image

to he both a source ofidentity and a source ofpopular mobilisation. Ifnationalism

2

goals ofthe nationalist movement We mayeven consider that the culturally.defined

nation and the politically.defined nation are separate entities. But we can infer from tbis

analysis that nationalism as an allegiance to a particular cultural grouping, and nationalist

movemenis as political action canying the claim to statehood, must he distinguished.

III. CULTURAL VERSUS CIVIC DEBATE

John Hutchinson maintains that cultural nationalism is a movement independent

ofpolitical nationalism.33 The former has i15 own goals that differ sharply from political

nationalism as defined by Breuilly - the moral regeneration ofthe national community • rather than the achievement ofan autonomous state. Hutchinson, like others, therefore speaks ofcontrasting forms ofnationalisrn. Michael Keating takes this further and

suggests that 'ideal types' ofnationalism can he juxtaposed in contexts other than those

envisioned by Hutchinson and Breuilly - for example, the ethnie and civic, the

continental and liberal, and the voluntarist and organicist. "They differ," says Keating

"on the question ofwho constitutes the nation and on the basis for legitimacy of

nationalist demands.,,34 These distinctions also aim to explain why nationalism is used to

33 John Hutchinson., nie DJmamics o/Cllirurai Nalio"alism. (London: Allen & Unwin. 1987). :w Michael Keating. Natio"sagaillst the Stare. (London: Macmillan.. 1996). p. 3. • 28 .-:------

legitimise or de-stabilise governments on bases ofinclusion or exclusion.3s Let us look at • one opposing set ofnationalisms in more detait: the cultural and civic-political. To begin with 4 civic' or political-democratic nationalism, the criteria for

membership in the national community is associative. This means that the individual cao

vo(untarily consider herselfto he part ofa greater collectivity. Nation-building begins

with the individual and her rights and interests, rather than the nation detennining the

individuars rights and duties from common nationality. The national community of

which one is a part is based on a common identity derived from shared value systems and

institutions, and social and political interactions within a territorially-defined community.

This type ofnational community is oCten associated with tolerance, openness and

democracy. For instance, Miller believes that this type ofcommon nationality must exist

in a democracy to promote shared social trust and to foster a tolerant society.

The intennediary link between civic nationalism and democracy is the concept of • 'citizenship'. This idea emerged famously during the French Revolution. Asense of national consciousness was created when the initiative ofnation- (state-) building was

transferred from the government to the people, i.e. popular sovereignty. National

membership was granted by state citizenship. This symbiotic relationship meant that

nation-states were determined by and accountable to the popular will. Charles Taylor

35 These distinctions, it has been suggested~ were created to account for why national is~ and not Iiberalis~ is the global nonn in the twenty-first century. Nationalis~ it was understood. should have been a 'passing phase' that would cease to exist when its causes were gone. This is clearly not the case and rsaiah Berlin believes that nationalism at its height became incompatible with certain liberal principles. He argues that incompatibility resides mainly in the faet that nationalist goals must necessarily conflict with the goals ofother nations, nationalism sees the group as the basic moral subj~ whereas liberalism enshrines the rights and interests ofthe individual~ and nationaIism is viewed as particularist, whereas liberalism is universalist. See Isaiah Berlin~ "Nationalism. Past NegJect and Present Power," in I. Berlin, ed., Agaillsllhe Cllrrellt. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 342. Others, such as David Miller. argue that liberalism and nationalism are compatible in preserving a national culture. Da\id Miller, 0" Naliollality. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, (995). • 29 alludes to this notion when he states that ~a nation can only ensure the stability ofits • legitimacy ifits members are strongly committed to one another by means ofa common allegiance to the political community.u36 Hobsbawm places tbis phenomenon ofnation-

building in the period 1830-70, when mass political nationalisms unified disparate

cultures into a single national identity. This occurred classically in Italyand Germany.37

However, we need to examine what a 40 citizen-base ~ means when viewing the connection

between rtationalism and democracy.

Rogers Brubaker i5 perturbed that "although citizenship is intemallyinclusive.it

is extemally exclusive. There is a conceptually clear~ legally consequential, and

ideologically charged distinction between citizens and foreigners.~~38 Nationalism, even of

the "civic' type, needs to define itselfin tenns ofthe "other~. Maurizio Viroli articulates

similar concems in his distinction between patriotism and nationalism. Whilst the fooner

is based on civic values leading to "common liberty~', nationalism "'encourages contempt • and intolerance ofcultural, racial, and political diversity both at home and abroad.,.,39 Michael Mann adds further nuances to the relationship bet\veen nationalism and

democracy. He argues that an organic perception ofthe people, founded on democratic

principles, has ereated a backlash ofauthoritarian statism that often involves ethnie and

political cleansing. In colonial contexts, enhanced statism and the organic nationalism

encouraged by local elites, was intended to mobilise the "people' against the 'imperial

enemy'. Popular sovereignty became the basis ofan 'us versus them' mentality, leading

36 Charles Taylor, "The Dynamics ofDemocratie Exclusio~" JOllnla! ofDemocracy 9. (Oetober 1998). ~. 144. 7 Eric Hobsbawm, Natiolls andNatiollLllism silice 1870. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1992).

fs ~::~rs Brubaker. Ci/i:ellship andNaliollhoocJ ;11 France alld(jermall)·. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 21 .

• 30 ·f i

to national homogenising policies. As a result, "genocide (is) the most undesirable • consequence ofthe modem practise ofvesting politicallegitimacy in 'the people'".40 Mann's conception ofthe 'organic people' comes close to resembling the 'ethnie'

breed ofnationalism. It also resonates with Gellner's 'Dark Gods' theory that highlights

the "atavistic forces ofblood or tenitory" and Hobsbawm's definition ofethno-linguistic

nationalisms 1870-1914, which were exclusive and divisive.41 To return to the definition

of'ethnic' nationalism, we May identify a farm ofascriptive identity, often marked by

religious or linguistie ditTerentiation. This ideal type is often associated with intolerance,

exclusiveness and fear of, or superiority over, 'the other'.

Yet, as 1explained above, 'cultural' rather than 'ethnie' nationalism will he herein

examined in contrast to politicaVcivic nationalism. As such, we will need a definition of

cultural nationalism to proceed with this analysis. Hutchinson and Kedourie offer sorne

ways ofthinking about the cultural nation. For Hutchinson, cultural nationalism is a • movement ofmoral regeneration that seeks to reunite the different aspects ofthe nation by retuming to the creative "life-principles" ofthe nation. The cultural nationalist

perceives the state as accidentai, for the essence ofa nation is i15 distinctive civilisation,

which is the product ofa unique history, culture and geography.

Altematively, Kedourie argues that nationalism is a political religion: politics

replaces religion as the key to individual and collective identity. Nationalism is a secular

ideology opposed both to traditionalism and to the bureaucratie state, somewhat

reminiscent ofBreuilly. Unlike Breuilly, Kedourie thinks that elements ofcultural and

39 Maurizio Virol~ For Love afCounlry: Essays 011 Parriatism QI'" Naliolla/ism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 186 and 12. 40 Michael Man~ ·The Dark Side ofDemocraey: The Modern Tradition ofEthnie and Pofitical Cleansing', New Left Review, (May-June 1999), p. 28.

• 31 political nationalism cao be combined. Drawing on the work ofKant and Herder, he • argues that both voluntarist (political) and organic (cultural) nationalism tlowed into a philosophy ofthe organic state, according ta which individuals must find integration

within their national polities defined by their objective cultural attributes.

Kedourie brings us ta the crux ofthis discussion: more than one conception of

nationality contributes toward nation-building. Political and cultural nationalism May

diverge intheir objectives and grassroots strategies, but they may also be two sides ofthe

same coin. Cultural objectives shape the formation ofthe projected pllitical community.

Political objectives drawon a cultural base to achieve their goals. The problem lies in

viewing them as mutually exclusive: either one orthe other can exist in a given context.42

But Mann, Brubaker, et al try to bridge this conceptual gap and uncover an abundance of

~grey areas' that do not fit into either category.

Instead ofidentifying which type ofnationalism exists where or juxtaposing the • '~rival theoretical models" ofnationalist theory43, perhaps the focus should he on whether different strands ofnationalism can be identified in each case. It May be that each fonn of

nationalisrn impinges on the other to fuifi1the basic needs ofthe individual and society.

Culture and politics are certainly distinct spheres ofactivity, but it May also be argued

that tbey are interdependent in the context ofnations and nationalism. For one,

Christopher Harvie posits that two types of ~Scots' exist in Scotland: those who are

cosmopolitan and forward-looking - ~~Red Scots"" - and thase who are parochial and

41 Gellner, Nations alldNatiollalism, p. 130, and Hobsbawm, Natiolls andNatiol1alism si/1ce 1870. 42 Kellas, for example, describes how cultural nationalism exists in the fonner Yugoslavia, whilst civic nationalism exists in Catalonia. He outlines in a table various "types' ofnationalism and where in the world they can be round. James G. Kel1as, The Politics ofNatiol1alism alld EtJmici(v, 2nd ed., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 219. 43 Frederick Appe~ •Instrumentalist and Interpretative Approaches to Quebec Political Culture' in Alain-G. Gagnan. ed., Quebec - State alldSociety, 2lld 00., (Ontario: Nelson Canada., 1993), p. 130. ..., • ~- obsessed with their history - "Black Scots".44 The important thing is that many Scots will • exlubit both traits ofnational identity. ln the next chapter, [present a similar argument Both cultural and political images ofScotland cao he found in the subjective minds of

members, as weil as constituting an objective impetus for aetors in different spheres of

national activity.

IV. A NEW APPROACH

Here 1wish to develop an account ofnations and nationalism that: (1) addresses

the politics ofimagining nations; (2) considers the role ofactors in the construction of

nations; (3) distinguishes between fooos ofcultural and political nationalism and; (4)

explains how cultural and political images ofthe nation may co-exist at the same time.

Anderson believes that the nation can he portrayed as a 'Iandscape ofthe mind'. • However, it is how the mind is used as a canvas, and which nation-as-Iandscape is painted that concerns me. Miller states, "nations are not things that exist in the world

independently ofthe heliefs people have about them.n45 At the same time, national

consciousness does not emerge unconsciously. Human beings cannot he understood

exclusivelyas passive participants in a given 'culturar collectivity. As Hobsbawm

stresses, nationality May be deliberately impregnated with meaning by external stimuli,

which establish continuity with a selected past and visions ofthe future. The task orthe

politicaI party as 1see it is to change the way in which we imagine nations, to allow for a

-4-l Harvie, SeO/fond alldNaliollafism, p. 22. oiS David Miller, The EndofBritish Po/ilies? Scots alldEng/ish 8elraviollr illtlle Sevelllies. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 17. • 33 - ---~ --- - ~ ------

political dimension. This often means avoiding previous cultural methods ofimagination. • More often than not, though, political images ofthe nation co-exist with cultural images. George Schôpflin, for instance, argues that when 4ô civic' nationalism is strong,

4ô ethnic' nationalism will not threaten the survival ofdemocratic govemment-t6 This

indicates that cultural and political fooos ofnationalism can exist at the same time, in

competition with one another. Here, 4ô ethnic' nationalism is viewed in a negative, divisive

light, whire 4ô civic' nationalism is compatible with democracy. Yet in an analysis of

cultural and civic/political nationalism, one deduces different conclusions. Cultural and

political nationalism May compete to achieve different goals and values for society as

described above, but self-determination is rarely a result ofsuch contestation.

Contrarily, we May conceive that only collaboration between the two can result in

political success and cultural protection. As Breuilly points out., "emotion alone cannot

give rise to a specifie political movement and ideology; pragmatisrn needs sorne • emotional basis in which to root itselCw7 Perhaps electoral success only cornes from melding both types ofnationalism. Parties must monopolise political andcultural images

ofnation to ensure that the cultural nation becomes synonymous with the political state.

Therefore, politicai parties have 50ugbt to change the sphere in which we imagine

our national communities. Their motives are underlined by Breuilly. "An opposition that

wished to possess the [state had to] construct an image ofthe political community and of

the society which could 'match' the state it would take over.,,48 PoliticaJ parties have

broken with 'cultural' or 'ethnic' images ofnation, as they would be discredited ifthey

46 George Schopflin, 'Power, Ethnicity and Politics in Yugoslavia', New Hll1lgariall Quarterly 33, (\Vinter 1992), p. 29. 4i Breuilly, Nationalism andthe State. p. 396. olS Ibid., p. 377. • 34 r.

did Dol Insteac:L they seek to create a new realm ofhow we view the nation: transferring • the ~ cultural' sphere ofsubjectively imagining the nation to an objective ~political' sphere. And in order to re-draw or re-imagine the political boundaries ofthe nation,

parties must question the central state. However, the emphasis on civic nationalism may

also Mean not achieving electoral success or nationalist mobilisation. Political images of

the nation May not ucommand such profound emotionallegjtimacy",,9 as ascribed cultural

meanings: Whether or not parties need to fuse emotive cultural nationalism and

pragmatic political nationalism to achieve success will he considered below.

v. CONCLUSrON

The study ofnations and nationalism has been accompanied by disagreement

among scholars conceming the nature ofthe community, images, movement, and actoTS

in question. In this discussion [ reviewed three sets oftheories regarding nation-building, • that emphasise cultural and political processes. The conclusions drawn are manifold. Firstly, attempts to explain imagined cultural communities cannot explain allegiance to

the state or the political actors involved in nationalism, whilst theories ofnationalism as

invented traditions cannot account for nationalism as a political opposition. Secondly,

attempts to explain nationalism as a political opposition movement do not explain how

cultural bases ofthe nation define the state, and the role ofintellectuals in popular

mobilisation is undenated. Finally, attempts to explain 'civic' and cultural nationalisms

exclusively cannot explain how both fonns May exist together.

At the same time, these theones have taught us that a nation is a subjectively

constructed concept which has its roots in cultural communications, and this concept may

49 Anderson, !mag;Iled Commullilies, p. 4. • 35 he manipulated by elites to facilitate nation.building. Nationalism may also come in the • fonn ofa political movement that challenges the legitimacy ofthe state. Thus there is more than one fonn ofnationalism that contributes to nation·building. Nationalism May

exhibit either civic orcultural cbaracteristics, orboth. FinallYt cultural and political

nationalisms may possess different forms and objectives, but the input ofboth is required

to achieve a popular nationalism founded on pragmatic considerations.

In ·this discussion oftheories ofnationalism, we have proceeded from thinking

about nationalism as a result ofcultural change to a movement with set political goals.

We have also progressed from thinking about nationalism as a social 'given' to being

constructed by actors to gain political and material resources. A considerable amount of

ground has been covered, although it is by no means exhaustive. This exercise has been

useful in suggesting ways in which we can consider the politics ofimagining nations, and

has also pointed to factors in nation·building that need more attention. In the final • sectio~ 1sugge51ed a new approach that considers points drawn from existing theories, and suggests ways ofdealing with the weaknesses ofsorne accounts. My main interest is

to determine how culture and politics are used to the benefit ofthe O8tio08li51 project.

The neX! step ofthis thesis is to tum to real·life experiences ofnationalism in

Scotland and Quebec. My objective is to see whether the hypotheses ofscholars of

nationalism, including my own, are applicable to, or feasihle \VÎthin, real·life cases. This

will enable us to address the interplay ofculture and politics in modem nation-building.

• 36 ------

• CHAPTER TWO: NATIONALISM IN SCOTLAND

My goal in this chapter is to expand and apply the approach ofimagining political

communities to the experience ofnationalism in Scotland [ will explore how JXllitical

and cultural images ofnation are used in the assertion ofmodem Scottish nationalism,

and detenDine the relationship between the two. In order to do so, 1begin by looking at

various expressions ofcultural nationalism in Scotland before the rise ofthe Scottish

National Party (SNP). The next section scrutinises the political nationalism ofthe SNP,

whose images ofthe nation are analysed in section three. Lastly, l consider how cultural

and political images ofthe nation co-exist and compete with one another, and the effects

this has had on the desire for Scottish independence.

ln the first stage ofthe discussion, l investigate Scotland's 'national culture'. • According to authors, there bas been a long history in Scotland ofinventing traditions, creating heritage and manipulating cultural artefacts. This amounts to what Tom Naim

has coined as Scotland's "vast tartan monster. nSO 1seek to explain the development of

culture in relation to nationalism before 1960, in order to determine its inherited form in

modem Scotland This is linked back to normative theories ofnationalism explored

above, in particular, theories ofimage-making and cultural design.

In the second stage, 1provide an account ofthe SNP's rise to power. A brier

overview ofthe group ideology, membership and organisation, leadership and electoral

performance ofthe Scottish National Party \vill be offered. This will establish where the

SO Tom Naim, n,e Break-Up ofBritain: Crisis alldNeo-Natiollalism. (London: New Left Books, 1977), p.162.

• 37 SNP places itselfwithin the national environment, and how it is able to adapt to changing • political circwnstances. In particular, 1 bighlight the SNP's chosen 'break' WÎth cultura1 images ofthe nation in order to create a new political sphere ofimagining the nation. The

popular success ofthe party indicates bow weil il is able to construct the political nation,

and how convincing tbis is in the eyes ofthe population.

This last issue - ofthe credibility ofthe SNP's images ofnation - is explored in

the next siage ofanalysis. How has the political party changed the way in which we

perceive Scotland as a nation? How has it changed the configuration ofimages ofnation

from cultuml to political, and how has it changed the boundaries ofpolitical images of

nation from the UK. to Scotland? Importantly, [examine howdevolved powers in

Scottish society (the 'Holy Trinity' ofeducational, legal and religjous systems, the

national media and govemmental bodies) benefit the national project. Lastly, 1consider

how the affluence ofnational institutions has become related to the health ofthe SNP. • Finally, l comparatively review cultural and political nationalism in Scotland. 1 argue that although political images ofthe nation have been separated from existing

cultural images, each is dependent on the other for the realisation ofnational autonomy.

The marked competition between cultural and political creations ofthe national image is

akin to a 'Jekyll and Hyde' national consciousness. Scots have two separate concepts of

what it means for Scotland to he a cultural nation and an imagined political community. [

consider what needs to he done to overcome this sense ofnational schizophrenia.

ln this chapter, [wish to use the experience ofnationalism in Scotland as a means

to clarify how images ofnation are seeped with politieal as weIl as cultural meanings, and

a \vay to test out this argument against nationalist conduet. This exercise suggests that

• 38 cultural and the political images ofScotiand compete for the attention ofmembers. • Moreover, these images are shaped byaetors for goals tbat relate to nation-building. The realisation oftheir aims depends on a combination ofpolitical and cultural images of

natio~ which ties emotive attachments to popular mobilisation.

I. CULTURAL NATIONALISM BEFORE THE 19605

In Scotland there is an abondance ofcultural images ofthe nation. One only has

to walk down Princes Street, the main thoroughfare in Edinburgh, to he bombarded by

bagpipers, kilts for hire, haggis teddies, and books about Scottish casties, Celtic myths

and the Loch Ness Monster. Many would argue that this Highland Scotland iconography

is on show onJy for tourists - external appearances, as it were. Yet we also have to

consider how these images ofnation gel with the Scottish people. Are such images • accepted as part ofa kitsch post-modem segment ofScottish popular culture? Or are there deep nationalist emotions lurking behind the pseudo-Braveheart, tartan-clad, Saltire-

painted faces ofScottish football supporters?

David McCrone et al believe that there have existed two important cultural

discourses in Scotland before the 1960s: Brigadoonery and anti-Brigadoonery.51 The

fonner is based on the centrality ofromantic Celticism (derived from Highland history)

SI Brigadooll was a famous Hollywood movie that was set in the Highlands ofScotiand. Rather, it was set in a movie studio because the film director, upon visiting Scotland to get a gist orthe misty landscape, retumed home disappointed because he '''went to Scotland but [could find nothing that looked like Scotland.~ Quoted in David McCrone, Angela Morris and Richard Kiely, Scot/alld- the Bra"d: The Making ofScollish Heritage. (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1995), p. 49. Today's equivalent ofBrigadooll would likely be Bravehearl, the story ofthe Highland rebel William Wallace, which was produced by an American film country, filmed in Ireland and Hollywood. led byan Australian film star, and consisted of only a handful ofminor Scottish aetors. • 39 in representations ofScotland, and has come to stand for the Scottish stereotype and • tourist knick-knacks described above. Womack charges that '~e know that the Highlands ofScotland are romantic. Bens and glens, the lone shieling in the misty island, purple heather, kilted clansmen, battles long ago, an ancient and beautifullanguage, claymores and bagpipes and Bonny Prince Charlie - we know ail ofthat, and we also know that il's not real.~2

This tradition ofviewing Scotland through a Gaelic light have also inspired two dominant waves of.ideological' cultural formation: 'tartanism' and 'Kailyardism'.53 The anti- Brigadoonery that McCrone refers to is, ofcourse, a reaction to such 'unreal' sentimental

representations ofScot]and, such as 'Red Clydesideism'. These three strands ofScottish

cultural formation are, ofcourse, only a tiny glimpse ofthe larger picture. They are

chosen here because the images they conjure are focal points ofdiscussion for scholars.

To begin with romantic images ofScotlan~ we can differentiate between the

usage oftartanism as symbols representing, and Kailyardism as narratives of, the nation. • Tartanism can he loosely defined as a set ofsymbols relating to Highland culture and traditions that are considered to be overtly sentimental and superficial. Angus Calder, for

instance, derides this cultwal phenomenon as a "celebration ofnon-existent nationhood

through bogus symbolism.,,54 Tartanism has it roots in eighteenth-century Scotlan~ when

Sir Walter Scott encouraged King George IV, in his visit to Scotland, to wear a kilt with

~2 Peter Womack./mprm'emem andRomance: COIIsrructillg the Myth ofthe Highlands, (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 1. ~3 "Kailyard" means cabbage-patch in Scots. AJthough the word 'taJtanry' is commonly used by Scottish scholars to describe a Scottish cultural phenomenon, 1agree with [an McKay in that the word 'tananism' better conveys the gravitYofthe impact ofHighland Scotland images on the nation, and is somewhat less flippant. See lan McKay, "Tartanism Triumphant: The Construction ofScottishness in Nova Scotia., 1933­ 1954," AcadiellSis, (Spring 1992), p. 6. ~4 Angus Calder, RevolvillgOI/tllre: Notes/rom the Scoltish Repllhlic, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1994), p. 95. • 40 pink stockings. This spurred a popular craze for the now ~gentrified~ gannent that was • unrelated to the original incarnation ofthe kilt as a Highland military costume.ss . This recreation ofthe kilt relates to the notion of 'the invention oftradition'. In

fact, Hugh Trevor-Roper deals specifically with the invention oftartan. However, he does

not explain the crucial point ofwhy this cultural invention has such powerful appeal.S6

Traditions and myths are potent forces, argues Smith, being constantly reworked

accordin!(to societal change. Furthennore, there was a need for Scotland to differentiate

itselftrom England Scottish Lowland culture, in its similarities to England, could not

fulfil this task. As such, Uthe Highlands acquired the role ofrepresenting Scotland "for

the English.,,57 Highland tartans were to he reappropriated in ditferent fonns throughout

the next two centuries. Ofnote is a 1920s phenomenon now referred to as 'Harry

Lauderism'. The original Lauder was a Music Hall entertainer in Glasgow, who bedecked

himselfin tartan and referred to life in the Highlands. His perfonnances were a popular • success not only within Scotland, but also across the UK. It seemed that one only had to put a piece ofplaid on a person to create an instant symbol ofkitsch Scottishness.

Another way in which Scottish intellectuaIs differentiated their culture from

England was through a Lowland vemacular school ofKailyard-writing that emerged in

1880-1914. Kailyard writers are known for their idyllic country-village settings, 'simple-

minded' characters, and religious idealism. The latter is especially important, as Ministers

wrote Most ofthese texts. Although the content ofsuch novels seems hannless, critics

decry such 'narratives ofthe nation' as a "hegemonic discourse' which subverted the

55 See John Prebble, The Killg~' Jaulll: George IVin ScOI[QJId. /822, (London: Collins, 1988). '6 Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Invention ofTradition: The Highland Tradition ofScotiand' in Hobsbawm and Ranger, The I"velltioll o/Tradition. 51 Womack.lmprovemem andRomallce, p. 148. • 41 Scottish mentality. These sentimental tem bave infected Scottish consciousness with a • narrow-minded parochiali~ from which Scottish cultural foons have never recovered. Tom Naim, for instance, is scathing in bis indictment ofwhat he caUs ....sub­

cultural Scotchery~.58 He claims that "Kailyardism' does not represent a form ofcultural

nationalism, which could he used to develop national consciousness in relation to the

state, but is an ersatz type ofsub-cultural nationalis~ whose romantic visions of

Scotland were intentionaUy divorced from the modem reality.....Cramped, stagnant,

backward-looking, parochial...deformed [as it is, the Scottish sub-culture] constitutes

none the less a strong, institutionally guaranteed identity."s9 Here lies the problem, says

Naim. "Kailyardism' and tartanism provided a bonafide identity for Scots, one in which

images ofnation were romanticised, de-nationalised and set apart from the state.

Fintan O'Toole agrees with this analysis, stating that ....what is remarkable about

Scotland is not that outsiders have made a dreamland ofit but that Scots themselves • sometimes see it in the same way.',6() The question here is why Scots are content with a romanticised, deformed cultural identity that is divorced from any modem reality. Cairns

Craig tries ta explain the non-nationalist character ofScottish culture:

"'Tartanry and kailyard are the joint creations ofan imagination which, in recoil from the apparently featureless integration ofScottish life ioto an industrial culture whose power and whose identity lies outside Scottish control, acknowledges its own inability to lay hold ofcontemporary reality by projecting itselfuPOn images ofa society equally impotent before the forces ofhistory.,t61

58 Nairn. n,e Break-Up of8rilaill. p. 158. 59 Ibid., P131. 60 Fintan O'Tooie "Imagining Scotland'" in What Happelled ta Us? (London: Grant~ Winter 1996), p. 67. n 61 Cairns Craig. ··Myths against HistoI)': Tartanry and Kailyard in nineteenth-century Scottish literature in C. McArthur. ed .• Scotch Reels: Scotlalld ill Cinema alld Tele",'isioll, (London: 8Fl Publishing. 1982), p. 13. • 42 The crucial question here is why Scottish society, the bearerofsuch unrealistic culture, is

50 "impotent". Craig aUudes to the answer in bis examination ofthe relationship between

• ~industrial the hegemonic culture' ofthe United Kingdom, and the stateless nation of

Scotland The latter is burdened with sub-cultural nationalism, that is, a deformation of

Scottish culture, because there is no state to defend the nation from the industrial culture

ofthe UK state, or to exercise control over the means ofits own cultural reproduction.

We can take this further and argue that culture arising from civil society has been able to

drift nationalist-Ies5 because there was no political conduit for cultural expression. Whilst

cultural images ofScotiand were apolitical, images ofScotiand as a political nation were

firmly subsumed by Scotland's place within the British nation-state.

There have been anti-Brigadoonery attempts to show the 'realistic' and political

side ofScottish culture before the 19605. For instance, ~Red Clydesideism' portrayed the

rebellious culture ofthe working-classes in Glasgow during the politically heightened • period of 1914-22. Glasgow was, and still is, a staunch socialist area., and tbis means that images ofthe Govan fratemity were entrenched in British (or international) socialism,

and not framed in tenns ofScottish nationalism. They too were aooft from images ofthe

Scottish nation, that is. a cultural nationalism able to portray Scottish culture and its

manifest problems in Scottish terms. As suc~ McCrone thinks that Brigadoonery and its

antithesis were "simply two sides ofthe same coin...all contribute to the image of

Scotland as a single theme park.,,62 And this theme park had., proverbially speaking, no

nation-state to construct the shows, control the rides or colleet the fees.

We caR surmise that cultural nationalism in Scotland before the 19605 was not a

mobilising force for the modem nation. Rather, it was an attempt to resurrect a non-

• 43 national image ofScotiand from selected historical symbols and romantic narratives that • became an 'escapist' cultural outlet ftom the political reality ofstatelessness. Authors argue that there is more to Scottish culture than the mythic structures oftartanism, the

Kailyard and Red Clydesideism, however the search for a non-defonned national culture

63 has been 50 dominated by such myths that they cannot he avoided. 1will reconsider

below whether cultural (5Ub-) nationalism bas been altered by the efforts to obtain greater . autonomy in political matters, which has a direct bearing on cultural production. But

before doing so, we ought to examine the main bearer ofthe national ideal in a culturally

inadequate and stateless nation - the Scottish National Party.

II. THE ADVENT OF THE SCOTIISH NATIONAL PARTY

The Scottish National Party's origins May be traced to a number oforganisations • at the tum ofthe 201h century advocating independence. In 1934, the most successful of these groups, the National Party ofScotlan

Scottish Party, despite different political aims. The result was the establishment ofthe

Scottish National Party (SNP), which remains to this day the leading nationalist party in

Scotland. In this section, 1will examine the rise ofthe SNP in British politics, its party

platforms, membership, ideology, and electoral performance.

In the early years ofthe SNP's existence, cultural symbols were used as a means

for attracting public attention to the goal ofScottish independence. For instance, the

William Wallace sword was stolen from Stirling Castle, Union Jack flags were removed,

62 McCrone, Morris and Kiely. Scot/and - the Bralld, p. 50. GJ McCrone. Ulldersta"dillg Scotland, p. 175. • 44 with Saltires flown in their place, and the Scottish Stone ofDestiny was ~Iiberated' ftom • Westminster Abbey and hidden in Scotland. This tomfoolery was clearly a method of drawing media focos to the new political party. In reality, the SNP made its daim as an

explicitly non-eultural organisation. Its purpose was to challenge the legitimacy ofthe

UK State and restore to Scotland its state and Parliament.

The SNP won its tirst by-election in Motherwell in 1945. This was to he a short­

lived affair, as Labour recovered the seat during the General Election that year. The

SNP's own electoral booty hovered around the 8-10% mark from 1945-1955, during

which period "the party had changed little... [it was] a resilient little sect, rather than a

political movement.~ Yet political nationalism, ifmarginal and factional, was persistent.

While electoral support began to rise in the 1950s, the SNP's evolution as a national party

fighting most Scottish seats occurred in the late 1960s. At the begjnning ofthe decade,

SNP membership totalled 1000, but by 1966 this figure had risen to 125,000.65 The SNP • had the largest party membership in the OK. During this time electoral targeting and party political philosophy were honed in a bid to attract new voters.

The philosophy behind the SNP was and is to win self-detennination for Scotland,

whereby Scotland means 'anyone living in Scotland' and self-detennination is to be of

the decentralised, social democratic type. The SNP's inclusiveness bas a broad appeal

across classes and transcends societal cleavages. In particular, first-time voters, the

youn& and socially mobile are sympathetic to the SNP's vision ofbeing a catalyst for

democratic change. These goals were aided by the communications revolution in the

1950s and '60s. The new party did not have to tread the path through the 'political

64 Harvie, ScotlalldandNatiollalism, p. 169.

• 45 undergrowth' as did other established parties, as it obtained rapid prominence through the • media This was evident when an SNP candidate won a by-election inHamilton in 1967- a 'safe' Labour constituency. MP Winifred Ewing was signed up for a weeldy column in

the Da;/y Record whilst the Dai/y Express avidly covered ber activities at Westminster.66

The real breakthrough in political nationalist consciousness, however, occurred in

October 1974 when the SNP polled 300A. orthe General Election vote in Scotland In the

previous year, oil was discovered in the North Sea adjacent to Scotland. The new treasure

was exploited brilliantly by the SNP during the election campaign. uIt's Scotland's Oil"

sang out the party's propaganda machine. 'Scotland', which was then ooly a sub-cultural

entity, could perhaps become a politico-economic entity. "The real purpose ofthe oil

campaign was to convince Scots that ail made independence both economically possible

and politically necessary.,,(,7 The image ofa self-sufficient nation was sealed with the

reassuranc~ ofnon-UK subsidised wealth. In an election survey pub~ished later that year, • public endorsement ofthis image was confinned. It was found that 76% ofScots believed that the existence ofthe SNP and its electoral victories had been 'good for Scotland' .68

Yet the oil campaign was not the ooly basis for SNP success in the 19705. As

noted before, the party had augmented its political identity. The SNP portrayed itselfas

the voice ofa Scottish community (under threat) as weil as a political movement. The

move to populist nationalism coincided with the party's move to leftist politics. The SNP

played upon anti-Tory sentiments, which was part ofa larger strategy to fight Labour on

the grounds that Scotland was a 'working-class' area. Party platforms stated "the SNP is

65 Michael Cunningham, "The Parties ofScotland~ Wales and Northem Ireland:' in R. Garner and R. Kelly, 005., British Political Parties Today, p. 190. 66 Harvie, Seo/landandNa/iollalism, p. 179. 67 Miller, The EndofBrUi.rh Politics'? p. 60.

• 46 a democratic left-of-centre political party committed to Scottish Independence.,,69 The • party was DOW located "onthe left and the electioD ofAlex Salmond as leader in 1990, the first self-professed socialist, symbolised this orientation.,,70

This fixed ideological stance rankled the Labour Party. Labour had been the

dominant party in Scotland since the 1950s, and faced its greatest threat in the fonn of

political nationalisme The SNP knew that to win seats in Scotland, it had to cast policy . issues in a light that would appeal to Labour voters. But whilst the SNP fought Labour on

the grounds ofworking.-elass support., Labour fought the SNP on the grounds ofpro-

devolution support. Historically, Labour has supported a measure ofHome Rule in

Scotland.71 With the Tise ofthe SNP, devolutionary measures were strengthened to curb

the nationalist challenge. Two devolution referendums were organised by Labour in 1979

and 1997, the latter ofwhich overwhelmingly indicated that Scots wanted sorne degree of

politicaI autonomy. Devolution would "kill the SNP stone dead" said a Labour MP • during the referendum campaign.72 But with the new Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh, and ,vith the SNP as official opposition, it appears that the independence-as-next-step

idea has gained groun

Having briefly examined the advent ofthe SNP as a major plliticaI player, let us

now tum to the more normative questions ofthe SNP's character and purpose. In receRt

literature. attention has been paid to the overtly civic character ofthe SNP. Paul Hamilton

argues that Scottish political nationalism is a model ofassociative identity-politics in

68 Ibid, p. 71. 69 See the SNP's 2001 party platform at www.snp.org.uk. 70 Cunningham. "The Parties", in British Political Parties Today, p. 188. 71 Alasdair Gray, with regard to the pro-devolution founders ofthe Labour Party (i.e. Keir Hardie and Ramsay Macdonald), exclaims, "the British Labour Party was created by people who wanted Scottish self­ tovemment." AJasdair Gray, Why Scots shollldnlle Scotlalld, (Edinburgh: Canongate Books, 1997), p. 83. The MP in question was George Robenson. • 47 Europe,73 whilst Tom Naim believes that the SNP bas succeeded in recapturing the • democratic voice ofScotland Throughout its existence, the SNP bas exhibited an 'incontrovertible rationality' in its civic breed ofnationalism.74 ~'The SNP cannot appeal

to any one segment ofthe population at the risk ofotTending basic customs ofliberal·

democratic politics. For this, and for tactical reasons, it has avoided appeals to an

articulated Scottish identity/experience in order to rise above various social cleavages.~75

This avoidance ofpanderiog to social strata has paid off: as proven in the electoral coup

in Glasgow Gova~ the heartland ofCatholic Labour, which voted in an SNP candidate in

1988. Therefore, the inclusive and unpartisan nature ofthe SNP means that the 'tariff' for

being a nationalist is quite low. One does oot have to speak a certain language, partake in

a certain religion orculture to he a Scottish Nationalist. One only has to live in Scotland.

However, the exclusively 'civic' character ofthe SNP has weaknesses as weil as

strengths. In the last section, we outlined how culture in Scotland has been recendy • disassociated from politics. In an analysis ofthe SNP, we can detect that their brand of nationalism has been intentionally separated from culture. Beveridge and Tumbull state:

"'Suspicious ofconcepts like 'tradition' and 'identity', Many tough-minded left­ wing nationalists were even prepared to abandon the cultural argument entirely. Scottish nationalism's cultuml-intellectual base was therefore altogether too narrow for the nationalist challenge to he sustained over any extended period.,,76

The SNP has distanced itselffrom cultural concepts ofthe nation to accord with the

'civic' brand ofnationalism. This was done not because Scottish culture is 'deformed' 7

but because the SNP intends to appeal to the widest voting electorate. This includes non-

73 Paul Hamilto~ "The Scottish National Parado~" Callodion Review ofSludies ill Natiollalism 26 (1999). 74 Tom Naim. After Bri/aill, (London: Granta., 2000), p. 201. 7' Hamillo~ uThe Scottish National Paradox.,., Calladiall Review ofSIl/dies in Naiiolla/ism, p. JO. 76 Craig Beveridge and Ronald TumbulL 11le Eclipse ofScottish Cu/lure, (Edinburgh: Polygo~ 1989), p. 4. • 48 . native born or blood descent Scots~ which is demonstrated by the SNP~s recent coalition

otTspring: Scots Asians for Independence (SAI).

• ~ethnic' This is a reasonable strategy. Any hint of nationalism would discredit the

movement irrevocably. "F~ from ethnie infatuation having infonned ~e rise ofScottish

political nationalism since the 1960s, the contrary is closerto the truth."n Cultural

nationalism bas been shunned by the SNP in a bid for civic inclusiveness. But one

question r~mains. How does the SNP deal with cultural imagery ofScotland in relation to

a political sense ofScottishness? This is important when cultural imagery, providing

huge emotive appeal~ is so embedded in the people's psyche. Fintan O'Toole, for

instance, believes that "the problem for political nationalism is that romantic notions of

the country have become a crucial constituent ofthe way Scotland sees itself.,,78 It seems

that the SNP's greatest challenge is to overcome the voter's ambivalence between being a

cultural nationalist and voting for the national party. David McCrone suggests that

"one ofthe most interesting developments in the last two decades has been the way that • the Scottish National Party bas tumed a rich and diverse cultural meaning ofScotland into a politically charged one. The party's problem for long enough was that it could find no way ofchanging the idea of'Scotland' into one ofa politically independent nation. 'Scotland' remained associated with the music hall, tourism and cultural organisations.,,79

III. IMAGINING THE POLITICAL NATION

By merely existing, the SNP has contributed to the political image ofScotland.

And as David Miller points out, a majority ofScots have identified the Scottish National

77 Nairn, After Bri/ail1, p. 244. 78 O'Too(e, "Imagining Scotland," p. 69. 79 McCrone, Umlerstalldillg Scot/alld, p. 31. • 49 Party with the Scottish people.8O The idea ofScotland as a nation bas become politicised • Yet this distinct political image ofScotland bas been created through no single deed of the SNP. The political differences between Scotland and the rest ofthe UK aids the

development ofthe concept ofScotland as a political entity. However, we cannot

correlate this political imagery with a developing sense ofcultural nationalism. In fac!, as

McCrone states, "the (cultural) idea that Scotland is a land out oftime chimes with its

political status ofa stateless nation.,,sl This observation has been challenged by an image

ofScotland that proposes that it is a modem nation, and that this nation requires astate.

Before the advent ofthe Scottish National Party, civil institutions contributed to a

political image ofScotland, even ifthe national coosciousness they fostered was divorced

from considerations ofchaUenging the state. Famously, Scotland retained a distinct civil

society after the 1707 Treaty ofUnion which comprises the Church of Scotlan~ a

separate educational system, and Scots law. These institutions differentiated Scottish • political values and behaviour frOID those ofthe centre. The Kirk in particular advertised itselfas keeper ofthe nation's soul and has oflate shown sympathy towards sovereignty.

"Kirk., law, local govemment and education had tmditionally protected the nation.,,s2

These core bodies were joined by an abundance ofother institutional bodies, councils,

boards, societies and committees that were explicitly 'Scottish' and thus fumished a

distinct political identity. Ofutmost importance, the Scottish Office (established in 1885)

allowed people to imagine Scotland as a meaningful political unit. '4The whole logic of

the Scottish Office has made it a basis for separation, even nationalism."IB

80 Miller, The EndofBritish Polilics? p. 91. III McCrone, U"derstanditlg ScotlQluJ, p. 205. 82 Hame, ScotlatldandNaliollo/ism, p. 138. 83 Miller, The EJuJ ofBritish Politics? p. 8. • 50 Miller argues that there is another equally important set of4separatist' national • institutions inScotland that have advanced the political ditferences between Scotland and the UK: the press. Scotland is famously a newspaper...reading country. The Scottish news

media bas ditTerentiated Scottish politics - not because it is pro-independent, but because

it reports largely on Scottish affairs and caters to a Scottish audience. This has enabled

Scots to sec their nation as a distinct entity, demonstrated during a campaign to install a

'six o'cloêk news' on BBC Scotland This project gained overwhelming support from

Scots, even re50lute Unionists. But why bas trus taken 50 long to happen?

Naim believes that the attainrnent ofa Scottish Parliament in 1999, on a surge of

popular nationalism, took sa long to happen because ofthe Treaty's preservation ofan

institutional national society. "Nationalism was slow to evolve there for a perfectly

obvious reason: in Scotland, there was no 'nation' to he built, redeemed, 4imagined' (etc.)

by means ofthe usual fonnulae. The nation was there already.',84 After 1945, however, a • Scottish nation detached from political nationalism was no longer feasible. Since World War II, Scottish politics and voting behaviour have diverged from

the rest ofthe OK.. In addition to the Tise ofthe SNP, there has been a consistent decline

in support ofthe Conservative Party. This came to a head during the 'Thatcher years' of

1979-1992. Many Scottish people saw"something fundamentally wrong with a system

where there's been 17 years ofTory govemment and the people ofScotland have voted

Socialist for 17 years and had a Tory govemment.n85 Anti-Thatcherism crystallised

during protests against the test introduction ofthe poil tax in Scotland. The poli tax

debacle further indicated to Scots that the Tories are an 'English' party. For instance,

R4 Nairn, AfterBrifaill, p. 140. ss Sean Connery, interviewed in Le Figaro Maga=illt!, (20th April, (996). • 51 Hobsbawm at the height ofthe Tory years believed that Scottish nationalism was "plainly • a reaction ta an ali-British government supported bya modest minority ofScots, and a politically impotent ali-British opposition party.~ This tide, ofan English Party that

does not cater to Scottish needs, bas been compounded by the Tories' consistent rejection

ofconstitutional change. The 1997 general election was significant because the Tories -

the only party to oppose plans for devolution -Iost ail their seats in Scotland. [fwe

couple anti-Tory sentiment with a renewed political nationalism, we cao say there is a

considerabl.e guif between British and Scottish national consciousness.

The SNP, on the wave ofthis Scottish-UK political divergence, "has tumed into a

detenninant ofnational existence...the artificer ofstatehood.,.,87 In its 2001 party

manifesta, the SNP stated 'We stand for Scotland'. This is hot a 'Scotland' ofLoch Ness

monsters and Highland rehels, but a Scotland that wishes to have autonomy in its

political affairs. This political message has been diffused through the Scottish media to • voters, whilst 4:'the political parties have used the media to reinforce the nation ofa separate Scots politics.',sg In addition to this, the SNP has benefited from the different

political mechanisms in Scotland - ofparties distributing separate election manifestos

and broadcasts. The SNP hatttes on Scottish turf, where il has an intrinsic advantage of

being the 'only real Scottish party'. This is compounded by the recent tum in ideology of

New Labour. The party traditionally claimed the title of'Scotiand's Party' because ofits

disproportionate (working-class) support there. However, with 'New' Labour's centre-

political agenda, it is now seen "by many Scots as an English phenomenon with no

16 Hobsbawm, Natiolls alldNaliotlalism silice 1870, p. 179. X7 Naim, After Bri/aill, p. 117. 88 MilIer,11re EJ,da/British Pofilies? p. 7. • 52 relevance to Scotland and also as the direct descendent ofThatcherism.,,89 These

sentiments have cleared the road for the SNP to represent itselfas being the only party in

• 90 Scotland that caters to Scottish interests.

The Scottish National Party has disseminated a pmicular message to Scottish

voters, which amounts to a 'political image' ofScotland. This image plays primarily

upon the political gulfbetween Scottish and UK national consciousness. The message is

that Scottish people need to imagine a national Iife and identity outside Britain. This does

not equate to imagining a cultural community and civic institutions. Rather, the SNP's

main aim is to convince Scottish voters to imagine possible legal and political statehood.

In sociological tenns, this requires setting new boundaries ofthe imagination. Whereas

the old boundaries rested on imagining culture in Scotland and imagining the political

realm ofthe UK, these new boundaries require imagining a politicallife as weil as a

cultural identity within Scotland. • Indeed, Scotland has had no problem in imagining a national community in the past But, as was pointed out previously, this imagined community rested on a dubious

heritage, and its power lay in its historical and cultural appeal. The SNP proposes that we

need to change the scope, content and limits ofwhat we imagine, by adding a civic and

political dimension. 'Civic' not in sense ofthe Holy Trinity, but in how we go about

expressing nationalisme 'Political' in the sense that statehood is achievable, meaning

Westminster is not where our politically imagined community should be. The SNP

believes that our political community cao he Scotland. In order to succeed in creating a

political image ofScotland, support for the Union must be tempered, ifnot nullified.

8

• 53 Poils on national identity preference, taken by the Scottish Election Survey in • 1997, indicate that people living in Scotland give priority to being Scottish.91 In Scotland, there is also a heliefthat there is "a more collectivist political culture, compared with

England"92 This suggests that there is a cognitive bias amongst Scots that their identity

lies in the image of"Scotland.n However, this unique Scottish political culture bas

always been a part ofthe UK. political arena. For the SNP to succeed in its goals, Scots

must imagine a political community within the limited, territorial boundaries ofScotland.

The SNP is not the only party in Scotland to realise that political images ofthe

nation now resonate with Scottish voters, and pay offin electoral terms. In attempts to

capture the 'imagination' ofthe Scottish national community, other political parties have

been pandering to nationalism.93 This May seem tautological considering the new

Scottish Parliament But British parties have traditionally refrained from speaking ofthe

defence ofthe Scottish nation. The Labour Party in 1997 posed a referendum question in • favour ofScottish devolution.94 However, there are now hints that the Scottish Labour Party will separate from the main branch ofLabour to fight on Scottish grounds in the

Parliament. As for the Scottish Liberal Oemocrats, Home Rule has always been a policy

item; in fac!, they proudly state that their support ofdevolution predates that ofthe SNP.

90 A June 1998 poli by MORI found that 77% ofScots saw the Scottish National Party as standing for Scotland, compared to 43% only for the Scottish Labour Party. Quoted in The Scotsman~ 5th June 1998. nd 91 Alice Bro~ David McCrone and Lindsay Paterso~ Po/itics andSociety in Scot/and, 2 edition, (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 209. 92 Cunningham. "Political Parties", British Po/itica/ Parties Today. p. 188. 93 For an in-depth anaJysis ofthe Scottish Labour Party's graduai transformation into a more nationalist party, see Jack Geekie and Roger Levy, "Devolution and the Tartanisation ofthe Labour Pany," Parliamentary Affairs 42 (July (989). One may also refer to the SNP's charges that the Labour Party has stolen their policies. [n a campaign advertisement during the June 2001 General Election, Scottish National Pany MSPs John Swinney and Fiona Hyslop declared that the New Labour govemment had "swindled" ten ofthe SNP's policies. Information is taken from the SNP website: www.westandforscotland.co.uk 94 Despite the fact that Prime Minister Tony Blair likened the Scottish Parliament to a ·Parish Council'. • 54 It appears that almost ail parties in Scotlan~ except the Conservatives, are DOW • fighting among themselves to win the ~national' vote. Because ofthis, "in an important sense, we are ail nationalists DOW," says McCrone. However, this newly politicised image

ofScotland bas "brought into focus the problematic character ofScottish culture.,,95

N. JEKYLL AND HYDE

Many Scottish writers make note orthe 'Jekyll-and-Hyde' character ofScottish

national consciousness. This tenn origjnated in the imagination ofR. L. Stevenson, born

in Edinburgh. 115 meaning can he loosely translated into a mental state ofschizophrenia -

that one person has more that one identity - and these identities are harmful in their

incompatibility.96 Recently, this tenn has been resuscitated by academics to describe

elements ofthe Scottish national psyche. (Anderso~ l'm sure, would he pleased to find • that 'narrators ofa nation' can have such long-lived resonance.) This may be explained by the fact that Scotland has recently seen a revival ofboth cultural and political

nationalism. However, there is very little correlation between the two. The juxtaposition

ofcultural and political images ofnation has created an irreconcilable dualism in Scottish

nationality. In this section 1examine the actors responsible for cultural and political

images ofnation, and consider the effects oftheir work on Scottish society. The main

result of'JekyIl and Hydeism' has been a fracturing ofthe will to statehood.

95 McCrone, Understanding Scot/and, p. 173.

96 The StraJ.ge Case ofDr. Jelcyll QlJdMr. Hyde (1887) was inspired by Robert Louis Stevenson t s experiences in Edinburgh. He was interested in the juxtaposition oftwo areas in the ci!y - the New Town, which was conventional. religious and civilised. and the Old Town, known for its brothels. shadiness and dark history - and how these contrasting images ofEdinburgh represented the duality ofhuman nature. • 55 Before delving into this section, let us take a look at what Scottish scholars have • been saying about lekyll-and-Hydism. William Macllvanney thinks that there is an l;'ambiguity in the nation's sense ofself' and a Udichotomy" that is both cultural and

political in nature.97 He argues that this is because Scots are divided between materialist

anglophone confonnists and radical non-materialist separatists, ofwhich he favours the

latter. Christopher Harvie tums this concept upside do~ and defines Scots as belonging

to one oftwo camps - cosmopolitan or parochial~ ofwhich he favours the former. Thus,

we have two scholars who have identified two similar traits in the Scottish character and

who disagree with which camp is best: material/cosmopolitan or separatistlparochial. If

we briog another view ioto the picture, more light is shed on the Scottish national duality.

Tom Naim thinks that Scots have suffered from two visions ofScotland, which constitute

the drab poverty-stricken realism and the Highland fantasy. This reality/fantasy divide is

c10sest to the original incarnation ofJekyll-and-Hydeism. It implies that there is a bipolar • way ofthinking about Scotlan

As Alan Patten aptly points out, one does not have to believe in the goals of

cultural nationalism to believe in the goals ofpolitical nationalism~ and vice versa.98 [n

Scotlan

any cultural ';(oots', whilst culture itselfhas been steadfastly non-political. This fits with

the portrayal ofScotland as a schizophrenie country - a diagnosis advanced by Scottish

97 William Mcllvanney. Surviving the ShipK'rec/c, (Edinburgh: Mainstream Press, 1991), p. 139. 98 Alan Patten, ·The Autonomy Argument for Liberal Nationalism'. Nations and Naliolla/ism 5. (1anuary 1999). p. 2. • 56 psychiatrist Karl Miller when he theorised on the social origins ofschizophrenia in • relation to one's native land.99 Let us examine the symptoms ofthis national duality. Since the 1960s, people have been paying more attention to how cultural images

ofScotland are constructed, and especially, who is involved in this construction. For

instance, in an examination ofthe salience ofmodem 'heritage' in Scottish society and

politics, McCrone el al describe the role ofthree major institutions in Scotland's heritage

industry ...: the Scottish Tourist Board, the National Trust for Scotland, and Historie

Scotland. These players have benefited from cultural representations ofScotland since

the 1970s and 80s, when tourism became the second largest industry in the {JI(, and

Scotland was subsequently tumed ioto a cultural 'theme park'. But 'heritage' is not only

materially driven. Il is also used to bolster a faltering Brigadoon-esque image ofScotland

for expatriate Scots as weil as those living at home. As such, it has had a profound impact

on the way Scots view thcir nation and their identity within it. • McCrone et al stress, however, that the revival ofcultural imagery ofScotland by heritage bodies has not translated into support for Scotland as a political nation. In fact, il

would seem that the contrary is true. The protection ofScotiand's 'heritage' in the British

Slate is, for Many cultural advocates, anathema to Scottish secession. This is more

poignant considering that avid cultural connoisseurs are commonly Conservative voters.

In a sUlVey ofthe cultural and political values ofLife Members ofthe National Trust for

Scotland, it was found that whilst many considered themselves to he Scottish patriots,

their greatest political antipathy was toward the SNP. A typicaI response was "Weil

[heritage is] not political, ifs not the SNP! [don't like them but l think ofmyselfas a

rd 99 Christopher Harvie, No Gods œldPrccious Few Heroes: Twclltieth CClltury Scot/and, 3 ed., (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p. 157. • 57 Scottish patriot."100 A cultural commitment to Scotland does not translate into a political • one. Although the National Trust portrays itselfas "acommunity [acting] 'for the benefit ofthe nation,mlOI its members distance themselves from the SNP. There are two bodies

here - cultural and political-that claim to he the keepers ofScotland's'national soul'.

Underlying McCrone's analY5is orthe actors involved in the making ofScottish

heritage is a very strong political argument. Culture, it is asserted, is deformed because

Scotland is a stateless nation, with no control over its own cultural reproduction. The

heritage industry, largely funded by the OK govemment, is reifying such a distortion of

images ofScottish culture. By logical deduction, the existing English-dominated union,

through centralist institutions, is carving out a financially profitable Scottish culture

business that inadvertently shapes Scots' sense ofself-identity within the UK. The SNP

aims to change this by gaining control ofthe state. However, the SNP does not control

cultural images ofScotland in the \Vay that governrnent-funded heritage institutions cano • Images ofthe nation are distorted between a centralist cultural realrn and a Scottish pany opposition based on civic/political images ofwhat the nation is and ought to be.

The solution to this national conundrum, as common sense indicates, would he for

the SNP not only to seek control ofthe state, but also to wrest control ofScotiand's

national culture from centralist institutions. This would require the SNP ta shape cultural

images ofthe nation, and al50 for the SNP ta convince cultural nationalists that astate is

necessary to ensure full control over Scotland's cultural production. However, there is a

problem with this hypothesis. Whilst cultural nationalists in Scotland (iflife members of

the National Trust are any indication) appear ta resent the separation-drive ofthe SNP,

100 McCrone el al, Scot/and - the Brand, p. 169. 101 Heritage Scot/and 10, (Summer (993), produced by the National Trust for Scotland. p. 10. • 58 Scottish nationalists have distanced themselves from the 4defonned' culture ofScotland. • Further, the SNP's main goal is to enable Scots imagine their country as a modem self­ sufficient political nation, and not to glorify the cultural heritage (or baggage) ofa

suppressed state. It will therefore he no easy task to translate cultural nationalism into

political nationalism because ofwariness on both sides ofthe divide.

Kedourie argues that eultural nationalists are not hostile to independent statehood

and are f(equently driven into state politics to defend the cultural autonomy ofthe nation.

However, the cultural autonomy ofScotland is not seen to he under enough threat for

cultural nationalists to pick up the gauntlet. Despite academic efforts to raise awareness

ofthe 'bogus' character ofScottish culture, resulting from its stateless chameter, Many

Scots understand that their 'defonned' culture is still markedly ditTerent from the rest of

the UK. Perhaps the SNP need to facilitate a campaign about Scotland's forged culture

for cultural defenders to feel that the nation neeels astate to remedy the tartan monster. • This discussion points to a crucial question in the crisis ofnational dualism. Is a possible means ofnationalist electoral success the appropriation ofcultural indicators by

the SNP? How else can the SNP tum self-proclaimed Scottish cultural nationalists into

SNP voters? "No one reaUy thinks that the shade ofWilliam Wallace wiIl reappear al

HoIly\vood," says Nai~ in defence ofScotland's civic nationalism. 102 However, Naim

has not considered that this might be a drawback. For ifpolitical nationalists in Scotland

did situate their civic goals within a cultural setting, even ifthis does mean reminiscing

about Scottish rebels ofthe past, SNP popularity would undoubtedly soar. ft would also

mean that the tradition ofviewing Scotland in a bipolar light might he coming to a close.

• 59 • V. CONCLUSION What 1 have tried to demonstrate in this chapter is that there are two streams of

nationalism in Scotland - cultural and political - that are not correlative. On one hand

there exists a cultural nationalism that is divorced from any political will towards

statehood. On the other is a political nationalism that bas repudiated cultural images of

the nation in favour ofa civic approach. Both types ofnationalism have drawn on the

(re)-construction ofimages ofScotland as a natio~ which have been facilitated by certain

actors for either cultural or political goals. The contlicting images ofwhat ~nation' means

in Scotland have (ed to a polarised sense ofnational identity. 1have equated tbis with a

~ Jekyll and Hyde' national phenomenon. [ have also made a suggestion that to overcome

the national duality, cultural and political images ofnation must he synchronised.

A crucial point ofthis discussion is that there exists in Scotland a political side to • imagining the national community. This is evident in two ways. Firstly, there are actors involved in the construction ofimages ofnation. Although their objectives may not he

'politicar per se - that is, they do not want to achieve political power, the cultural

hegemony created by their actions is political in nature and has political repercussions.

Secondly, one set ofthese actors - the Scottish National Party - has tried to create a

political image ofthe nation. lnstead ofimagining the UK as the basis ofScotland's

political arena, a new image has been presented that demonstrates how Scottish politics is

distinct, and how Scotland is capable ofobtaining its O\\i1l political self-determination.

This political image ofScotiand, however, owes much orits plausibility to civil

society institutions that have long separated Scottish society from the rest ofthe UK.

102 Nairn, AfierBrifai", p. 263. • 60 Although these institutions helped to preserve a distinct culture in Scotland with noo- • political ,mdertones, the fact that there existed a blueprint that illustrated how Scotland is 'different' has eased the transformation toward imagining that Scotland may also he

politically differenl Cultural images ofScotland bave since 1707 remained distinct due

to the autonomy ofcivil societaL The next step for the SNP is to construct a politicaI set

ofnational images in order to sever Scottish political identification with the OK State.

Vêt, the problem identified here is that the proposed political imagery ofScotiand

has been divorced from Scotland~s distinct (although centralist-propagated) cultural

imagery. This has hampered the collective will toward independence, as cultural

nationalists have been divorced from the SNP's electoral considerations. Furthermore, a

purely civic-political nationalist rnovement in Scotland has not realised that cultural

imagery provides popular emotive appeal. This culturallpolitical dichotomy needs to he

addressed for the SNP to surpass its 30% share ofthe popular Scottish vote. • Tom Nairn thinks that "to make a new Scotlan~ the old one must he unmade.,~I03 This will require a political strategy to deal with cultural concerns. [n other words,

Scotland requires a 'new' political self-determination to overcome the 'old~ defonned

cultural imagery ofScotland by controlling the means ofcultural reproduction. Nairn's

sentiments echo those ofQuebec nationalists during the Quiet Revolution. The prevailing

opinion ofJean Lesage and his colleagues was to erase the past traditions and institutions

ofQuebec in order to build a new modem nation. Yet whereas it is ooly no\v

'''certain... that Scotland is moving towards an imagined independence ofthe mind"l04 in

Quebec, this certainty became politically apparent at a much earlier stage.

103 Ibid. p. 223. 104 Hassan, "Scotland: an unwon cause?:' ReneK'a/. p. 12. • 61 ------

• CHAPTER THREE: NAnONALISM IN OUEBEC

ln this chapter 1investigate the politics ofimagining the nation in Quebec. As

with the Scottish case-study, 1aim to explore whether the notion ofpoliticised imagined

communities is a realistic assessment ofthe impact ofthe national party on the 'nation as

landscapê ofthe mind'. Furthermore, 1seek to explain the relationship between political

and cultural images ofthe nation, and their effects on the Québécois national identity.

The first stage ofthis discussion focuses on Quebec culture before the 1960s.

Primarily, 1focus on the role ofthe Church and traditional institutions in maintaining a

distinct, yet insular, Quebec nationalisme The national culture advocated by these actors ­

the Catholic faith, the French language, love ofthe land - were framed within the

dominant ideology ofla survivance. 1examine the impact ofthis ideology on Quebec • society and politics. It is clear that these images were fonnulated to maintain the power of an entrenched elite, and can thus be interpreted as centralist or pro-status quo in nature.

ln the second stage 1examine the development ofpolitical nationalism in Quebec

post-Quiet Revolution, in particular the spectacular rise to power ofthe Parti Québécois.

The organisational characteristics ofthe PQ are analysed, as are its membership base,

leadership, electoraI history and party platforrns. Significantly, 1rocus on the PQ image

as a 'new party' that, in ail appearances, jettisons links \Vith pre-1960s traditional

nationalism, yet still plays upon the French language as a political mobilising force.

ln the third stage, [examine political images ofthe Quebec nation. Although

Quebec has never possessed 'statehood' as Scotland once did~ the political institutions in

• 62 . Quebec have enjoyed far more autonomy afterConfederation than Scotland after the

Treaty ofUnion. With the metamorphosis ofFrench Canadian to Quebec nationalism in

• 1960, Quebec can not only he addressed as a province, but as a nation with delineated

(although highly contested) territorial and political borders. This image ofQuebec as

constituting a political entity has been advanced through the PQ's period in govemmental

office and through its proposed civic...political images ofpossible statehood.

In .the final stage ofthis discussion, l review the ~traditional' and ~modern'

manifestations ofnationalism in Quebec. Central to this discussion is the question of

whether or not the Quiet Revolution was such a break \Vith the past that it appeared to be.

We leam that language has been seminal to both images ofnation - it has been linked to

cultural survival as weIl as poIitical progress. Despite the PQ's advocacy ofassociative

civic nationalism, however, its failure to develop a multicultural vision ofQuebec

society, unilinguallanguage policies and occasional ethnie references to ~old stock

Québécois' have alienated many non-French speaking citizens in Quebec.

• U "Jel-yll and Hyde is a more complex phenomenon in Quebec than in ScotIand,

largely because ofQuebec's lack ofa poIiticised civil society before 1960 and the

ambiguous effects ofthe symbolic 'revolution' thereafter. Four paradoxes ofnational

duality are explored, which can he related to the unclear relationship between language,

politics and culture in Quebec nationalism since the Quiet Revolution. [ argue that the

PQ, in order to appeaI to more Quebecers, must put less stress on linguistic and cultural

elements ofnationalism which have been carried over since 1960, and more emphasis on

the political image ofthe nation in a modern multicultural setting.

• 63 • 1. CULTURAL NATIONALISM BEFORE THE 1960s Traditional nationalism prevailed in Quebec with remarkable fortitude throughout

the period 1840-1960. 105 This has been called 'French-Canadian' nationalism, to

distinguish it from post-1960s 'Québécois' nationalism. In this section 1examine images

ofthe nation propagated before 1960, which were cultural (expressed through religion

and language) and non-political in fonn. Moreover, (look at the role of'traditional'

actors in constructing these cultural images, and their effects on French Canadian society.

Two features, according to authors, circumscribed pre-1960s French Canadian

nationalism. 106 The tirst, 'la survivance', was a notion grounded in the struggle ofFrench

Canadians to maintain their distinct ways oflire following the British Conquest in 1759.

ft attributes a spiritual significance to the 'miracle' that French Canada narrowly escaped

the perils ofthe French Revolution of 1789 and assimilating thrusts ofthe English, • embodied in the Durham Report of 1841. 107 The 'overcoming' ofthese threats generated the feeling that the French Canadian collectivity was the bearer ofa blessed culture to he

protected at ail costs. This culture was comprised primarily ofthe Catholic religion and

the French language, and augmented by a number ofrural and conservative traditions.

lOS The Act ofUnion in 1840 marked the establishment ofa single govemmental authority for both Upper and Lower Canada., which thereafter became "Canada East" and "Canada West" (now Quebec and Ontario, respectively). The year 1960 marked the onset ofQuebec's"Quiet Revolution." 106 Please see Kenneth McRoberts Quebec: Social Chalige Q/lli Political Crisis, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 84-89; Marc Levine The Reconquest ofMOfllrea[: lallguage Policy aJld Social Cha/Ige in a Bilillgllal City, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), pp. 32-34; André Larocque "Political Institutions and Quebec Society," pp. 71-74 and Dale C. Thomson "Introduction," pp. 9-25 both in D.C. Thomson, 00., Qllebec Societyœ'" Politics: ~7ews/rom the lnside, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1973~ • 107 For an excellent account ofthe clerical argument tbat French Canada had been preservOO by divine providence first from the godless instigators ofthe French Revolution and second from the assimilation of the non-Catholic English, the plans for which were elaborated in Lord Durham's Report, see Susan Mann TrofimenkotT, 1he Dream ofNatioll: A Socialalld/mel/ectllal HistoryofQlIehec, (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1983). • 64 Importantly, la survivance reflected a desire to proteet French Canadian culture against

the value systems ofAnglo-Saxon 'foreigners', which implied a rejection ofthe forces of

• industrialisation that "embodied alien values and could ooly weaken the nation".I08

The second premise oftraditional nationalism, 'anli-étatisme', signified a strong

distrust ofthe state, including the Quebec provincial govemment with its Anglo-Saxon

heritage. Anti-étatisme deemed that the state must he restrained to secure the survival of

traditiona! French-eanadian culture. Political modernisation was seen as the principle

threat to la survivance. Furthennore, the state was considered an inadequate institution,

as francophones defined the nation in tenns ofa French Canada that existed beyond the

boundaries ofQuebec. It was deemed saferto relyon French-Canadian institutions (the

Church) to address social problems, whilst economic problems were to be managed

through private sector growth as opposed to 'corrupt' state intervention.

As we can see, the two founding images oftraditional national culture ultimately • served to maintain the status ofthe Roman Catholic Church and clampen imperatives toward political modernisation. The Church proclaimed its role as guarantor and principle

defender ofFrench Canadian culture, language and values. It did 50 through its control of

social services and unionisation. In particular, the Church's ability to propound its

ideology through public schooling and higher education was critical ta its sustained

authority. Civil society in Quebec was explicitly non-political, which would have been

considered as a threat ta the Church's authority. These traditionalist beliefs, importantly

the fear ofmaking a break \Vith the past, persevered for an astonishing duration despite

intermittent attempts to assert a political nationalism against the state. As in Scotland,

cultural nationalism in Quebec \vas not a mobilising force for the modern nation, quite

108 McRoberts. Qllehec: Social Change alldPolitical Crisis. p. 84. • 65 the opposite. [t was a method ofpreserving a profoundly anti-poiitical image ofQuebec

to maintain the standing ofthe Church in French Canadian society. In its anti-political

• cultural images ofthe nation, we can sunnise that the Church politically prO-status was

quo, which cao a1so he interpreted as pro-centralist The Church., in its assertion of

cultural nationalism, by no means sought political autonomy for French Canada.

lt is necessary to dwell on how the Church was able to control French-Canadian

culturallife. National identity was as closely linked to Catholicism as it was to language.

The greatest protagonist ofChurch nationalism at the beginning ofthe 20lh century was

L'abbé Lionel Groulx. Groulx edited a popular revie\v called L'Action Française in the

1920s, which propagated a nationalist doctrine based on the social teachings ofthe

Church. [n his essay 'The First Obligation' (1943), Groulx became one ofthe tirst

historians to portray the French-Canadians as a potent national entity. He states: "In

Quebec let us he strong with ail our strength... Let us exact ajust retum from those who

live and grow rich from our expense. Let us not abandon our workers to leaders from

• n 109 beyond our borders or elsewhere who ask nothing better than to sell us a Trojan horse •

However, Groulx's patriotic pleas were not political in nature - rather, they

alerted French Canadians to the fragility oftheir culture and language. The primary

culprits ofminorisaJion - English-Canadian and American economic and cultural

influences - were attacked by L'Action Française. The Church played upon French

Canadian hostility to being "a permanent minority (in Quebec) where their rights and

powers were subject to the actions ofthe Anglo-Canadian majority".11O The solution \Vas

109 Lionel Groubc, "The First Obligatio~' Editions de''Actioll Nationale, (1943). quoted in William Dodge. ed., BOlmdaries ofldelltiry: A Qllebec Reader. (Toronto: Lester Publishing Ltd.• 1992). p. 32. 110 McRoberts. Quebec: Social Change andPolitical Crisis. p. 53. • 66 for French--Canadians to embrace Church philosophy and rescind the evils ofpolitics and

Anglophone-driven socio-economic change.

• The resentment aroused by Church institutions against the anglophone ~Other'

followed a line ofthinking emulated in 19th century French Canadian literature. Writers

such as Chaveau had compared Englishmen with disguised devils in their novels (Charles

Guérin, 1853). Other writers, including Garneau and Crémazie, founded a literary salon

in the 18~Os that would enable them to "show at least the passionate resentment ofa

people anxious to redress the humiliation inflicted on them from an outside power".III

The nationalist ideas ofthese authors gave the people ofQuebec a vocabulary with which

to describe a felt reality, in accordance with Anderson's arguments, whilst their

elaboration ofold folk stories ensured the survivaI ofQuebec culture. The Church and

other conservative intellectuals would appropriate this vocabulary for the purposes ofthe

traditional nationalist ideology ofla survivance and an/i-étatisme. Cultural nationalism • here did not emerge with the decline ofChurch institutions and rational secularisation, as Anderson argues. Contrarily, the Church asserted itselfas the prime bearer ofthe nation.

During the 1930s, another Jesuit organisation, L'École Sociale Populaire,

assumed responsibility for disseminating the social doctrine ofthe Church. The group's

self-proclaimed task was one of"propaganda, education and social improvemenf,.112

Their activities included the distribution ofweekly newsletters to ail newspapers in

Canada; the opening ofa Jesuit school to train 'speakers' to spread their word; and the

III Ray Conlogue. Impossible Na/ioll: The LOIIgillgjor Home/and in Canada and Qllebec. (Toronto: The Mercury Press, 1996), p. 61. 112 Sheilagh Hodgins MiIner and Henry Milner, 111e /Jec%lli:alioll ojQuebec. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976). p. 112. • 67 .1·

publication ofthe review L 'Ordre Nouveau. By this, the 'new order' meant a Quebec

state organised hierarchically according to the social doctrine ofthe Church.

• W3S, The Church nevertheless, not completely divorced ftom politics in Quebec.

In fact, the main reason why the Church was able to dominate French Canadian society

was because ofa backhanded 'non-aggression pacf with anglophone economic elites and

francophone politicalleaders. The Church had always supported the Confederation

process, 3Jld pledged loyalty to the British Crown. This gamered much respect amongst

anglophone circles. 115 primary interest was in preserving French Canadian traditions (i.e.

itselt), thus leaving the economic power ofthe province in the hands ofthe English and

the political authority ofthe province in the bands ofpro-centralist politicians. This 'deal'

provided the key target for the newly emerging political nationalist movement.

The Churc~ because ofi15 desire to maintain a privileged status through eHte

accommodation with (economic and political) centralist institutions and actors, inhibited • the development of'positive govemment' and a modem political nationalism. However, in the post-WW2 years, urbanisation, industrialisation and a concurrent decline in Church

authority meant that French Canadians were no longer isolated from central political and

social processes. The death ofMaurice Duplessis in 1959, and thus the end ofthe pro-

Church, pro-status quo Union Nationale regime, created an institutional void that was

filled by the instigators ofthe Quiet Revolution. A fundamental tenet ofthis revolution

was a growth in political national consciousness. As Meadwell states, this period saw

"the end to the cooptive arrangement and ushered in a new bargaining relationship

benveen state and cultural groups." 113 The new negotiators ofQuebec's state and culture

li) Hudson Meadwell. "Forms ofCultural Mobilization in Québec and Brittany, 1870-1914," ComparaIÎ"'#! Po{ilÎcs 17 (July 1983), p. 410. • 68 would he political nationalists, whose primary goal was to challenge the leverage ofthe • Church, and to increase that ofthe Quebec State. The old values ofan agrarian, conservative and Church-dominated society could no longer ensure their survival as a

coUectivity. The solution to French Canadian oppression was no longer la survivance, but

assertive political action to maintain and develop their distinct sense ofnationhood.

U. THE ADVENT Of THE PARTI QUEBECOIS

The Parti Québécois (PQ) was bom in 1968, absorbing a handful ofsmaller

nationalist groups. The PQ endorsed a secular and political nationalism aimed against the

values ofthe Church. Yet, the civic-minded PQ did cany over one lenet oftraditional

cultural nationalism - the preservation ofa French collectivity. The PQ's linguistic

absolutism, and the effects ofthis on the PQ's claim to a territorial Quebec nationalism • that has broken with traditional (and ethnie) conceptions ofthe natio~ are examined. The Parti Québécois was formed under the leadership ofRené Lévesque, a media

spokesperson and former politician in Lesage's Liberal govemment. Lévesque called for

a 'new society': a form ofparticipatory social democracy that would Iead to a revoit

against ail outdated and rigid socio-economic and political structures. This vision of

Quebec rejected previous cultural images ofthe nation. "None ofGroulx's ideas or

writings find their way into Lévesque's speeches. It is almost as if: as far as Lévesque is

concemed, the thousands ofbooks and pamphlets that have been produced by Quebec

nationalists over the years had never been written.,,114 Lévesque argued that Quebec's

114 Peter Desbarats, Relié: A COllodio/l in Search ofa COllllt~·, (Toronto: McClelJand & Stewart. 1976), p.9O. • 69 survival depended upon its becoming a sovereign state within a Canadian Union, an

option that ran coURter to the anJi-étatisme sentiments oftraditional ideology.

• Independence with an economic union was the only solution for protecting the interests

ofthe francophone collectivity. 115 This new political agenda was weil received by the

Québécois. Soon after its incarnation, the PQ had an estimated 25,000 members.

The Parti Québécois had Many attractions for voters dissatisfied with the Liberais.

It was ne\y, with no clear links to entrenched political parties. As in Scotland, the absence

ofa political nationalist tradition was a source ofstrength - the new movement was seen

as a catalyst for change. It enjoyed a 'social-democratic' or at least populist social

program. It was not beholden to any corporate interests, thus claiming greater credibility

than most traditional political parties. It enjoyed the sympathy ofQuebec's media, and its

leader had "a reputation as a sound and progressive politician. ,,116 As such, the PQ was to

drawa broad range ofsocial groups into its ranks. • The PQ came to represent not only a movement for Quebec sovereignty, but also a party ofand for the Québécois people. Lévesque ··united the Quebec separatist

movement, gave it respectability, and brought it electoral success". 117 His popularity as a

spokesman for the Quebecois hastened the triumph ofhis, and later the PQ's, political

philosophy in 1976 when the party assumed office. Its growth in support is astounding.

The PQ rose from 24% ofthe popular vote in 1970, to 30% ofthe vote in 1973, to 41% in

II~ Lévesque said in a summary statement: "ft is up to us to choose the political status which suits us best... First~ we have to rid ourselves completely ofthe thoroughly-out-dated federal regime. The problem cannot solve itselfby the continuance or modification ofthe status quo...That means that Quebec should become a sovereign state."~ The speech was published in Le Devoir, September 1967, pI9-21, quoted in John Saywell, The Rise of/he Parti Qllebecois /967-/876. (roronto: University ofToronto Press, (977). p~. 11-13. 6 John Saywell~ n,e Rise of'"e Parti Ql!ébécois, p. 1. 117 Richard Cleroux, "Separatism in Quebec and Alberta," pp. 105-118, in Larry Pratt & Garth Stevenson, cds.• Westenl Separalism: 71le My/hs, Realities andDangers, (Hunig, 1981). p. 111. • 70 118 1976, and to 490..10 in 1981. Lévesque's emphasis on the 40 mandate, which would he • decided in a referendum assuaged Quebecers that a vote for the PQ was not automatically a vote for independence. Instead, PQ voters were led to believe that their vote was against

the traditional (federalist) parties and their inability to solve Quebec's problems.

[t has been generally agreed that the Parti Québécois emerged as a middle class

party.ll? The largest group - professionals - formed the basis for Quebec's francophone

lOnew midsUe classes'. This class played a key role in the PQ.120 At the same time, Daniel

Latouche finds that the party ~lOhad a particularly strong appeal among the lower incorne

groupS".121 Furthennore, the PQ contained blue-collar workers who sought to strengthen

the party's relationship with the unions, and francophone managers and administrators

who supported the prospect ofincreased economic power in a sovereign Quebec. Thus,

the Parti Québécois, somewhat like the SNP, espoused a populist social program that

gained support from ail classes in Quebec. The PQ "can best he characterised as a • broadly based coalition ofsocial forces, dominated by elements ofthe new Middle class, which was united by the goal ofQuebec independence along \Vith an ideology combining

beliefin the technocratie state with a populist social program.,,122

However, unlike the SNP, the PQ's appeal to ail classes eannot be said ofits

appeal to ail societal cleavages. Despite the PQ's emphasis on civic-political nationalism

118 Figures taken iTom John F. Conway. Debts la Pa)': A Fresh Approach 10 the Qllebec Questioll, l'li! ed., (James Lorimer & Co., 1997), p. 71; McRoberts, Quehec: Social Change andPolitical Crisis. p. 237; and William Coleman, 1he lndependence Movemellt in Quehec /9-15-/980, (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1984), p. 221. 119 This is evident in tte social charaeteristics and occupations ofilS members: 37.2% were saJaried professionaIs; 22.1% were 'white-eollar' workers; 12.6% were 'blue-colIar' workers; 14% came from students; and 8.90;'0 were housewives. Statistics, released by th~ PQ in 1971, are taken from McRoberts, Ollebec: Social Change andPolincal Crisis. p. 242. no For example. trm'aillellrs dulallgage strongly influenced PQfrallCÎsarioll policies to promote the p:rominence ofFrench and French-language institutions. 21 Daniel Latouche. "The Independence Option: Ideological and Empirical Elements" in Thomson., Qllehec Society andPolilics: Viewsfrom the illside, p. 185. • 71 l-.----~-~------

and its claim to be blind to ethnicity, non-francophone groups were excluded trom the • new nationalism. The PQ's fight to ensure that French became the official language of Quebec resounded against the rights ofanglophones, under the Official Languages Act,

to communicate in English.ln The PQ also declared that immigrants would be required to

attend French-language schools. This conflicted with the desire ofallophones to

assimilate into anglophone society, which culminated in a schooling crisis that divided

English- and French-speaking communities in the heavily Italian-populated municipality

ofSt-Leonard in 1967. Whilst the PQ opposed the clerical nationalism ofthe pre-1960s,

then, it strengthened the linguistic element ofnationalism. This strategy won the

francophone vote, but to the anger ofnon-French speaking groups who have "begun to

feel the same ~'siege mentality" as the white population in South Afiica.',ll.J

This brings us to a crucial normative point in the discussion ofmodem Quebec

nationalism. How does the French language fit into the PQ's vision ofassociative, civic • nationalism? If language can exclude sorne citizens ofQuebec, does this imply that linguistic nationalism can he defined as an ascriptive type ofcultural nationalism? And if

it can, does this correlation undennine the PQ's claim to a civic-political nationalism?

For many authors, language became the cultural identifier ofQuebec after 1960. Yet we

would he hard-pushed to conclude that this amounts to the ethnically defined French

Canadian identity ofthe pre-1960s. In the PQ's White Paper, the nation is defined by

political criteria: the residents ofthe province ofQuebec are Québécois. The Quebec

National Assembly furthermore defines the nation as "a modem, multi-ethnic

122 McRoberts, Quebec: Social Challge a"dPolitical Crisis, p. 242. 12J Although it must be mentioned that the anglophone minority in Quebec enjoys a larger range ofrights and services than any other minority in Canada.

• 72 community, founded on shared common values, a normal language ofcommunication, • and participation in collective life."I25 It would appear thatthe PQ is trying to facilitate an ideological shift in national identity. The ethnic designation ofFrench Canadian is being

surpassed by a new identity resting on the territoriality ofQuebec and its institutions.

At the same time, it is generally accepted that the French language defines the

Quebec identity and images ofnation. Let us retum to the National Assembly's mention

ofUa nonnallanguage ofcommunication~'in Quebec. It was hoped, with the enactment

ofBill 101, that non-francophone minorities would integrate into a French-speaking

Quebec, as non-anglophone minorities integrated in English-speaking Canada Outside

Quebec (COQ). The Québécois are multi--ethnic in composition., and would be able to

participate fully in a 'melting pot' French-speaking community. Civic nationalism

welcomes anglophones, native peoples and immigrants to participate in the Quebec

nation, whereas an ethnically-defined nation could oot. Ifone ooly leamed the French • language, one could subscribe to any aspect ofQuebec life, including civic nationalisme Thus, language became the only barrier to becoming a Quebec politicaI nationalist.

Ofcourse, voting statistics indicate that this is more a hypothesis than a reality. [26

Despite the existence ofsome non-French members ofthe PQ, non-francophones

generally do not vote for the PQ, and Quebec nationalists have been "slo\v to open their

12.. Edward A. Tiryakan. "Quebec. Wales and Scotland: Three Nations in Search ofa State." Illtenrariollal JOllnral ofComparative Sociology 21, no. 1-2. (1980). p. 9. 125 Assemble NationaJe, 1992, p. 10, quoted in Michael Keating. Nalionsagainst the State: 1he New Po/ilics ofNaliolla/ism ill Qllebec, Ca/a/ollia alld Scof/alld.~ (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 72. 126 In a survey published in 1992. it was discovered that no non-francophone Quebec respondents believed in independence, whilst ooly 6% would choose sovereignty-association. André Blais and Richard Nadeau,

"To Be or Not ta Be Sovereignist: Quebeckers' Perennial Dilemma.n CallaJiall Public Po/icy - Alralyse de Politiques 18 (March 1992). p. 91 . • 73 ------.------1.

nationhood to anglophones and newly migrated people."127 Afso, the PQ bas had to back- • pedal agaiDSt cultural nationalists in the party. With the references to the Québécois' long history ofcultural oppression and ~ old stock' Québécois, there is a smack ofethnic

sentiments in PQ discourses. This exclusive notion ofthe French-Canadian/Québécois

struggle to maintain a distinct identity, and the idea ofQuebec as an exclusive ethnic

"homeland" for ail French-speaking Canadians, discourages non-francophones from

supportin~ the goals ofthe PQ.128 SO as Keating says, "while civic nationalism is the

official doctrine ofthe political class and MOst intellectuals, it still competes with an

ethnically-based form.,,129 The idea ofQuebec as a civic territorial nation, and not a

cultural-linguistic one, still has a long way to go.

But to offset this argument, it is worthwhile looking at what culture means in

modem Quebec. What has the PQ done to substantiate the claims ofcultural nationalists?

Let us bear in mind, with Meadwell, that (political) nationalists "might be contemptuous • ofthose in the cuitumi group who do not share their values and disdain contact with them.',130 William Coleman argues that with the collapse ofa clerically-defined French

Canadian culture in 1960, successive Quebec governments have achieved little to fill the

cultural vacuum left behind and, as such, "a new distinctive culture has not arisen to take

the place ofthe old.,,131 Although the Department ofCultural AffaiTS was established in

1965, its activities deal mainly with education and language. Culture was defined

127 Louis Balthazar, "The Faces ofQuebec Nationalism" in Alain-G. Gagnon. 00., Québec - Stale and Society. 2nd ed., (Ontario: Nelson Canada), piS. 128 Gertrude J. Robinson argues that the idea ofthe nation ofQuebec as being a French Canadian "4ethnic" horneland was spearheaded during the Parti Québécois' campaign in favour ofthe referendum on sovereignty-association in 1980. Gertrude 1. Robinson. COIIstniclillg the Qllehec Referelldum: French and EJlg/ish Media Voices, (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1998), p. 36. 129 Keating. NatiollSagaillSllhe Slale, p. 73. 130 Meadwell, "4Cultural and Instrumental Approaches," El/mie a1ld RacialSilldies, p. 318. 131 Coleman, nie IIltiepelldellce Movement, p. 135. • 74 nebulously by the Department. as argued by Richard Handler, with the French language • heing the defining characteristic.132 Fewattempts have been made by the PQ to develop a cultural image ofthe nation

that reflects the diversity ofthe Quebec populatio~and the modernisation ofQuebec

society. Quebec's national culture continues to he promoted by traditional organisations

such as the Société Saint Jean Baptiste, whilst attempts have been made to revive

traditional folklore and customs, in other words, the "authentic" culture ofQuebec.

Handler argues that the failure ofsuccessive PQ govemments to develop a modem post-

1960s culture was masked by 'empty' definitions ofthe cultural nation, such as that in the

1978 White Paper, in order for nationalists to define the nation politically. Despite tbis,

traditional cultural representations ofthe nation persist in Quebec, which have been

divorced from the political realm. 1 argue below that this scenario is a result ofthe way in

which the Quiet Revolution signified a departure trom Quebec's non-political image, but • alas did not signify a break with the traditional cultural image ofQuebec. The PQ, we have thus seen, did not attempt to develop cultural nationalism to

back up the political issue oflanguage. Like the SNP, Quebec political nationalists have

eschewed previous cultural representations ofthe nation and have not fostered the

development ofa modem national culture. It is now difficult to defi ne Quebec's modem

national culture outside oflanguage. Attempts to control cultural development have been

half-hearted, in accordance with the PQ's territorial definition orthe nation. In this sense,

the PQ is similar to the SNP - neither party developed a cultural image ofthe new nation

132 Handler states that "at the time ofthe creation ofQuebec's Ministère des Affaires culturelles, there was no consensus as ta what constituted French-Canadian culture." He goes on to highlight the weaknesses and disorganisation ofthe Depanment, which were in no way remedied by the PQ's period in govemmental office. The PQ's Green Paper. he argues. "did not fonnulate a theory ofQuébécois culture." Richard • 75 they were seeking to build. Linguistic nationalism fell onder an explicitly political, not • cultural, image ofthe nation.

UI. IMAGINING THE POLITICAL NATION

In order to examine how Quebec developed as a political nation, 1will take the

Quiet Rev.olution ofthe 1960s as my starting point. During this time, the Quebec Liberal

Party, under Jean Lesage, succeeded in banishing the traditional clerical images ofnation,

and set Quebec onto the path ofideological and institutional modernisation. The Liberais

pursued a strategy ofmoderate nationalism from a federalist perspective. The state

assumed the responsibility ofbeing guarantor ofthe Quebec nation. French Canadians

defined themselves provincially - as Québécois. This was accompanied by a more radical

set ofpolitical images ofthe nation propagated by the Parti Québécois. Quebec was no • longer a culturaL backwater - it was a highly modem state capable ofself-detennination. "The tenn Quiet Revolution refers to a series ofs\veeping reforms legislated

during the tirst halfofthe 1960s:,133 However, the importance orthe Quiet Revolution

cannot be reduced to effects ofgovernmental policies, although they did encourage state-

centred nationalist sentiments. Rather, the prominent outcome was an overhaul in the way

French-Canadians viewed themselves. Kenneth McRoberts maintains that in order to

understand the true meaning ofthe Quiet Revolution, we must look not to the state, ~~but

Handler, Natiolla/ism and the Politics o/Cultllre in Quebec, (Madison: The University ofWisconsin Press, 1988), p. 107 and p. 124. 133 Ralph P. Güntzel, 'Motivational Sources ofMainstream Québec Separatist Nationalism: A Reevaluation', Calladion Review ofStlidies in Natiolla/ism. 26. (1997), p. 45. • 76 ------

to ideologies, Le. heliefs about the purpose and chameter ofsociety and polity.,,134 It is • within this sphere, he argues, that we find the ~revolutionary'aspect of 1960s Quebec. ~-Francophones began to think ofthemselves not as a French-Canadian minority, seeking

merely to establish equal rights for French alongside English, but as a Québécois cultural

-majority' with certain -nonnal' majority prerogatives." 135 These sentiments were

captured by the Quebec Liberal Party slogan: --Maîtres chez nous.~

nie years 1960-66 marked the massive expansion ofthe role ofthe provincial

govemment in Quebec society, economy and culture under the Lesage administration.

This was part ofa strategy for the Quebec State to replace the Church as the bastion of

francophone power, and to challenge the dominance ofanglophone institutions. The

Quebec State hastened the adoption ofcapitalist values to ensure that the francophone

community would benefit fully from that system. Within the framework ofthe British

parliamentary system, Quebec adopted its first set ofpolitical and administrative • institutions, and the Liberais undertook sweeping reforms in education, health and govemment administration. They championed a new political vision ofQuebec, which

saw the state as an active, dynamic force in Quebec society. In Lévesque's words, who

was a Liberal politician at the time, the state should be --one ofus, the best amongst

US.,,136 With major state innovations in the public sector, French Quebecers responded

with "a spirit ofcollective strength, ofcooperation, ofa general will to move forward

together.,,137 Importantly, this was a 'move' to political-linguistic definitions ofthe

nation, and away from clerical-cultural nationalism. This is evident in three ways.

134 McRobens, Quebec: Social Change aJll1 Polilical Crisis. p. 128. I3S Levine, The Recotlquest ofMontreal. p. 48. 136 Quoted in McRoberts. Quebec: SocialChange andPolitical Crisis. p. 173. 137 Coleman., The brdepelldellce Movemelll, p. 218. • 77 Firstly, French-Canadian nationalism was recast as a distinctly ~Québécois' • nationalism. In a surge ofreactionary 'étatisme', the boundaries ofthe province were to henceforth define the nation, whilst the provincial govemment ofQuebec was to become

the nation's central institution. This line ofthinking was spearheaded by Lesage when he

proclaimed in 1964 ~~Quebec bas become the political expression ofFrench Canada and

plays the role ofa homeland for ail those in the country who speak our language."138

Secondly, Quebec could no longer be regarded as a province Iike ail others, since

the Quebec govemment saw itselfas the new spokesman ofthe Québécois - a sentiment

captured in Lesage's statement above. The state's primary mission was to ensure the

survival ofa francophone community through the exercise ofits ownjurisdictions. As

such, the term ~province' fell subject into disrepute, as the Quebec government was

viewed from the 1960s onward as a ~national' state. This was due in part to Quebecers'

alienation from the federal government. By refusing to merge their identity with Canada, • the Québécois rejected the tenn 'French Canadian'. Thirdly, the ~conservationist' conception ofla survivance was replaced with a

more radical conviction ofrattrapage. Traditional Church-endorsed values surrounding

the concept ofan idyllic pastoral society were in sharp contrast to the reality ofliving in a

highly industrialised society dominated by the anglophone economic establishment. The

realisation ofthis required a new line in thinking. Rattrapage means the need for Quebec

to ~catch up' with its North American counterparts, both socio-economically and

politically. These goals ofQuebec nationalism were to he achieved through the state.

lJi Quoted in Louis Balthazar, "Quebec Nationalism: After Twenty-fivc Years," Québec Stlldies 5 (1987), pp. 29-30. • 78 As a consequence ofétatisme and rattrapage, uQuebec became the "focus" and

the "locus" ofFrench-eanadian assertiOn.,,139 The political activities associated with the

• Liberais during the Quiet Revolution were simultaneously the product ofearlier attempts

to challenge the status-quo, and the catalysts offurther action. This action was initiated

by a burgeoning political nationalist movement that aimed not only to wrest Québécois

control ofthe provincial state, but also to pry the state away from Canada.

Tt!e Parti Québécois. as elaborated above, became the party ofQuebec. Within its

tirst tenn, the PQ implemented a series ofreforms designed to preserve Quebec~s unique

cultural and linguistic identity. The French language became a sacrosanct element of

Québécois nationalism. [t was natural that, upon coming to power, the PQ govemment

should initiate a policy to affirm the pre-eminence ofFrench in Quebec.

The Charter ofthe French Language, or simply Bill 10 1~ etTectively brought the

francisation principles and procedures ofits precursor, Bill 22, to their conclusion. It • dealt specifically with two core issues ofthe French language agenda: access ofEnglish- language schooling in Quebec~ and the province's language ofwork and communication.

The PQ govemment 50ught to make French the official language ofQuebec. 140 The new

language policy would "accompany, symbolize and support a reconquest by the French-

speaking majority". 141 Bill 101's program for Iinguistic national ism is now ~~perceived as

the solid armour ofa French Québec".1.J2 Since the establishment ofBill 101, and with it

.39 Ihid, p29. •40 The PQ proclaimed that "there will no longer be any question ofa bilingual Quebec ... The Quebec we wish to build will be essentially French. The faet that the majority ofits population is French will be clearly visible - at work, in communications. and in the countryside." Gouvernement du Quebec, 'La politique québécoise de la la"guefrançaise', 1977. p35. is quoted in Marc Levine, "Language policy and Quebec's visage francais: New directions in La question linguistique,n Québec Siudies 8 (1989), p. 7. '4' Gouvernement du Quebec. 'La politique quéhécoise de la la/lgue frQJlçaise '. 1977, p. 34, is quoted in Levine. The Reconqllesl ofMontreal. p. 112. •42 Balzahar 'Quebec Nationalism', Québec Studies, p. 37. • 79 the curtailment ofthe threat to Quebec's main cultural asset, the nation bas been • plrtrayed by the PQ as a territorial collectivity, with Many communities sharing the French language. The French language is central to a pllitical definition ofthe nation.

However, the PQ's ultimate goal- the creation ofa sovereign Quebec state - bas

not been realised. [t is argued that the success ofBill 101 has contributed to a decline in

nationalism. Now that French Quebecers can control their own political institutions, de

facto indépendence is unnecessary. "Rather than providing the springboard to a resurgent

nationalism, it has removed part ofthe spring which is its impetus."143 ln the 1995

referendum, Quebecers narrowly voted against sovereignty. The final tally was 50.6% for

'No' against 49.4% for 'Yes'.144 However, with a difference ofooly 53,000 votes out of

4.8 million cast, and with 60% ofFrench-speaking Quebecers voting 'yes' to sovereignty,

the threat ofseparation has become a reality.

However, this possibility may be rendered impossible ifthe Parti Québécois does • not heed the interests ofail Quebec voters. Quebec is no longer the ethnically homogenous nation that was the focus ofnationalists before and even during the Quiet

Revolution. For instance, Claude Morin's assertion that "Quebec is the national state of

French Canadians" must he nuanced in contemporary multicultural Quebec. [45 With high

numbers ofimmigrants, the decision to choose sovereignty rests in the hands ofnoo-

French non-English Quebecers. PQ leader Jacques Parizeau made the party's position

regarding non-francophones in Quebec extremely precarious when he said that the 1995

referendum failed because of4money and the ethnie vote'. It will require a great deal of

143 Michael Macmillan, •Quebec" in Michael Watson, ed., COIl/emporary Millorily Naliollalism, (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 130. lh I-H Statistics recorded in lime magazine, 13 November, 1995.

• 80 appeasement to bring Quebee's "ethnie voters' into PQ ranks. As Taylor wams, sueh

comments retlect a "blind commitment to the Jacobin model, according to which

• "ethnies' are considered Québécois to the extent that they vote for "our' national dream.

Their only role in this drcam is to sing along in the chorus."1<46 It is necessary for the PQ

to cleanse itselfofsueh ethnie sentiments. Otherwise, its version ofcivic nationalism in

Quebec williose ail credibility.

III. JEKYLL AND HYDE

Modem Quebec nationalism is not a singular movernent. Rather, it is a multi-

faceted phenomenon that takes as its base a political definition ofthe nation. However,

this over-arching politicised image ofQuebec is circumseribed by contending notions of

what it means to be Québécois, ranging from the linguistie and ethnie to the ideologjcal. • Ofinterest here is that cultural nationalism is not prevalent, despite incessant references to "Quebec culture'. lneach attempt to define the political nation, there are anomalies that

undennine the daim in question. In this section, 1look at four paradoxes present in

definitions ofthe modem nation. [ argue that such inconsistencies are present because the

Quiet Revolution was not the break with the past that it appeared to be. These paradoxes

amount to a multitude of"JekyIl and Hyde' methods oftrying to imagine the nation.

The tirst paradox we can identify surrounds the place ofethnicity and language in

a civic-based nationalism. J.W. Berry posits that "while sorne claim that a "Québécois'

14S Claude Morin, adviser to Premier Jean Lesage. drew up the Quebec Yearbook (1963) from which this statement is taJcen, quoted in Peter Desbarats. The State ofQuebec, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965), p. 181. 146 Charles Taylor. "Sharing Identity Space." in John E. Trent, Robert Young and Guy Lachapelle. 005., • 81 identity is in essence a pluralistic 'civic' or 'territorial' identity, and not Iimited to a • single (i.e., French) ethnic-origi~ it is not clear that this transition from an ethnie to a civic identity has yet been accomplished.,,147 The Parti Québécois advocates a territorial

conception ofthe nation, whereby anyone living in Quebec is a part ofthat nation.

However, the party has exhibited a tendency toward an ethnic definition ofthe 'Quebec'

people that involves more than speaking French and living in Quebec. Nationalists often

refer to tlieir historic struggle against assimilation, symbolised in the province's slogan

'Je me souviens'. This ethnie identity is tied to a linguistic identity. The "survival ofa

national identity became identified with the survival ofthe French language in

Quebec."I48 However, language and ethnicity are exclusive. Nationalists in Quebec tend

'''to exclude, in deed ifnot in ward, those not considered as real French Canadians.,,149

The Quiet Revolution, which precipitated Quebec's transition to political national

consciousness, was "Iaunched and led by francophone Quebecers: Anglophones did not • take an active part."lSO The French language became the principal 'carrier' ofQuebec identity and the PQ's political nationalism. The ascriptive linguistic backdrop ofthe PQ's

c1aims undermines its civic-political image ofthe nation. This has created problems for

immigrants, native peoples and anglophones who are excluded from the linguistic

definition ofthe nation, and for Quebec federalists who believe that a bilingual Quebec

can exist in a multinational Canada. It is argued that "this new nationalism may be seen

QlIéhec-Callada: What is the Path Ahead? Novema sellliers vers l'avellir? (Ottawa: University ofOttawa Press, 1996), p. 123. 1-17 J.W. Berry, "Canadian Ethnie Attitudes and ldentities lnside and Outside Quebec", in Trent, Young and Lachapelle, 005., Quéhec-Cœroda: What is the Path Ahead? Noveallx seflliers vers "avellir? (Ottawa: University ofOttawa Press, 1996), p. 228. 148 Peter Woolfson, "Language Poliey in Quebec: La survivallce. 1967-1982," Québec Silldies 21 (1984), p., 57. 49 Louis Balthazar, "The Faces ofQuebec Nationalism" in Gagnon, ed., Québec - Stail! aJld Society, p. 15.

• 82 as a continuation ofthe traditionai French-Canadian ideology. It is dedicated, as much as • the latter ifnot more, to the preservation ofa francophone nation in North America.n151 This leads us to the second paradox, which amounts to the correlation between

French unlingualism and Quebec independence. Conceptions ofthe sanctity ofthe French

language were tied to the need for political statehood. Ifthe French language - the

determining characteristic ofQuebec ~culture' - came under threat, there was an uptum

in politicâl nationalisrn, signified in the overwhelming francophone support for Bill 101.

Ifit is not threatened, i.e. through advancements in making French a pennanent fixture of

the province, it becomes questionable whether sovereignty is necessary. For example, one

voter in the 1995 referendum intimated that he voted ~no' to the pursuit ofindependence

"because [ no longer feel that my French culture is threatened".152 This implies that only

a crisis in linguistic/cultural security can secure a majority 'yes' vote for sovereignty. A

recent repon ofthe 'estates-genera[', however, indicated that this required 'crisis' might • he far off: it concluded that the French language is no longer under threat in Quebec. IS3 The third paradox is the capability ofQuebecers to be both Quebec patriots and

Canadian federalists. For Kellas, the Quiet Revolution represented a 'regime change', an

act ofLiberal state-building, which intended to keep Quebec finnly within Canada. More

recently, the federalist-driven 'No' campaign during the 1995 referendum was carefully

\vorded to suggest that a vote against sovereignty was still a vote for Quebec: '4Mon NON

est québécois." ln political rhetonc, everything is now couched in Quebec terms. "Other

political parties can capitalise on nationalism and engineer regime changes which satisfy

1'0 Rocher, "Beyond the Quiet Revolution," in Meise4 Rocher and Silver, As1 recall- Sije me souviens bien, p. 206. 151 Balthazar, 'The Faces ofQuehec Nationalism," in Gagnon, Quéhec - Siaie andSociety, p. 7. lh IS2 André Leroux, Quebec businessman, quoted in Time magazine, I3 November, 1995.

• 83 moderate nationalist feeling and keep the nationalist parties out ofpower."154 This bas • contnbuted to competing visions ofthe nation. One cao he a federalist and still he a Quebec nationalist An interesting aspect ofthis duality is that some civic nationalists,

who have been influenced by the political images ofnation, are tao civic to vote PQ.

Daniel Poliquin, for instance, argues that many political ~tionalists are '~oo independent

to want the independence ofQuebec" whilst cultural Dationalists do not necessarily vote

for the PQ.lSS The PQ's vision ofthe civic-political nation may be considered as

anathema to their cultural attachments to the nation, which are traditional in scope.

This brings us to the fourth paradox, which lies in the realm ofQuebec culture.

Many Quebec nationalists take as their starting point ofthe defence ofthe nation Quebec

~culture~, as indicated in the voter's comments above. However, national culture in

Quebec is poorly defined, and sorne have argued, poorly developed in the face of

increasing threats ofAmericanisation. Coleman, for example, believes that '~as Quebec's • francophone community has come to participate more fully in the continental economy, its culture has become more similar to others active in that economy. In the viewof

Many, this had led to a situation where that inner quality buming in the hearts of

Quebecois will soon be extinguished. [fthis does happen, then the nationalist movement

in Quebec will have failed and May itselfdie.,.,lS6

Thus, whilst the sanctity ofQuebec culture is often used to justify nationalist

arguments, a new cultural definition ofQuebec has not been developed since the Quiet

Revolution. Political parties have not advanced cultural development. This is not ta say

lSJ "!he Ecollomisl, June 16-22,2001. IS4 Kellas. The Po/itics ofNa/iolla/ism QJJd E.tJu,iciLy. p. 118. ISS Daniel Poliquin, III the Name ofthe Father: Ali Essay ofQllf!bec NatiOllalism. translated by Don Winkler. (TorontoNancouver: Douglas & Mclntyre, 2000). p. 24.

• 84 ------

that Quebec does not enjoy impressive cultural achievements. From the mid·1960s • onwards, Quebec began to produce a relevant and coosciously Québécois art and music ofits owo. However, this culture has not been framed in national lerms, which could

replace pre-1960s traditional culture and to satisfy the 'inner quality' ofQuebecers.

The PQ refused to endorse the old culture ofQuebec; however, it also refused to

develop a new cultural definition ofthe nation. As such, many individual beliefs of

Quebec cülture ufall back on the traditional ethno-linguistic definition ofwho the

collective 'nous' includes,,,IS7 which also helps to explain the ethnie strand ofQuebec

nationalism. "Where we expected a cosmopolitan pluralism, we have seen the resurgence

ofthe old tleur-de-lis banner, seized by young hands and waving in thousands. Sorne will

say that we are still repeating old fonns ofnostalgia."I58 This indicates that it is important

for Quebec to develop a pluralistic culture in conjunction with its political nationalism.

• v. CONCLUSION

This discussion demonstrates that there are a number ofcontradictory images of

the Quebec nation within the post-1960s political nationalism ofthe Parti Québécois. 1

have suggested that one explanation for the plurality ofimages was the failure to make a

certified break with sorne elements ofpre-1960s cultural nationalism, over and above the

continuation ofthe French language as Quebec's cultural identifier. This analysis coneurs

with Dumont's observation that "radical breaks occurring in the history ofcultures never

156 Coleman, The /Ildepelltlellce Mo,,'emelll. p. 228. 157 Daniel Latouche, "'Québec, See Under Canada": Québec Nationalism in the New Golden Age," in Alain-G. Gagnan, ed., Québec State alldSociety, 200 ed., (Ontario: Nelson Canada, 1993), p. 60. 158 Fernand Dumont, n,e VigilofQuehec, (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1971), p. 51. • 85 take the form ofa total winding up followed he a fresh departure.nl59 In particular, an • ethnie conception ofQuebec persists, and is occasionally evident in the unoffieial rhetorie ofthe PQ. This ethnic conception has skewed images ofthe modem nation,

whieh have resulted in a Jekyll and Hyde national psyche. In theory the PQ is a eivic-

associative national party, but in reality its support base is primarily linguistie-ascriptive.

These findings indicate that Quebec political nationalism is often exclusionary.

PQ supporters have a strong ethno.linguistic (i.e. French Canadian) dimension, regardless

ofthe party's official ideology. This goes back to the political nationalism that emerged

in the 1960s, which was facilitated almost exclusively by French-speaking Quebecers.

Protection ofthe French language js correlated with Quebec nationalism. Despite this, the

PQ offieially welcomes ail ethnie groups to partieipate in Quebec nationalism. The extent

to whieh the Iinguistic factor ofQuebec nationalism undennines the civie-associative

philosophy ofits PQ proponents must be addressed to seeure the non-francophone vote. • There is nevertheless a strong politieal image ofthe nation ofQuebec. In faet, this political image takes precedence over ail others. This is principally due to state-

building efforts ofthe Liberal govemment in the 1960s and success ofthe PQ as a

significant political force. Most Francophones view Quebee as their primary political

community, and as an eminently French society. 160 We can rearl from this that PQ

nationalism is linguistically political. The partis suceess rests on its ability to seeure

strict policies to proteet the French language (although this success has also precipitated a

decline in the will towards independenee). The PQ does not appear to be cultural·minded

159 Ibid. 160 A survey in Le Devoir in April 1991 showed that 62% ofFrancophones in the province consider themselves to be "Québécois.'· Hudson Meadwell, "The Politics ofNationalism in Quebec:' World Politics 45 (January 1993), p. 218. • 86 -_._------.._------"-

at ail - the traditional cultural nationalism ofthe Church has been rejeete~ whilst there • are very few modem cultural images ofQuebec that ref1ect its diverse population. During the Quiet Revolution, the object ofQuebec nationalists was to build a

modem, secular, urbanised society which broke with the past traditions and culture ofthe

Church. ln other words, for the new nation to he buitt, the old Quebec had to he remade.

The political nationalism ofthe new nationalist party seemed to encompass tbis vision

and theseamodem nation·building goals. However, there were two strands ofthe old

Quebec that were not "remade', officially and unofficially. The first was the French

language, which united French-speaking Quebecers in a push for institutionallinguistic

security, and excluded non-francophones from the new vision ofQuebec. The latter was

an ethnic conception ofthe Québécois, which spoke oftheircollective memories, ofthe

Conquest and their struggle to survive as a linguistic minority in North America.

These two elements ofpre-1960s cultural nationalism continue to hamper the • civic-associative goals ofthe PQ, which are to include every citizen living in Quebec under a sovereign nation-state. Dumont has acknowledged this problem: ""since we have

defined ourselves as Québécois a new responsibility has become ours: that ofentering

into a new kind ofdialogue with other Québécois who are not French-speaking.,,161 In

order to realise the goal ofpolitical nationaHsm, that is, for the "old' Quebec to he

unmade and a new modem nation built, there is an urgent need for Quebec nationalism to

he more territorial and less ethno-linguistically based.

161 Dumont, The Vigil ofQuebec, p. 48. • 87 1­ ! • CONCLUSIONS

This project bas outlined an instrumentalist and contextual approach to the

pllitics ofimagining nations in Scotland and Quebec. 1have focussed on the role of

nationalist political parties in shaping images ofthe nation. My goals, as admitted at the

outset, ar~ ambitious in scope. Yet 1hope they provide a reasonable attempt to consider

how political nations are constructed in the eyes ofmembers, what agents are involved in

this construction, and how political images differ from cultural images ofthe nation.

To conclude this discussion, 1offer a briefsynopsis ofthe main points ofthe

argument laid out in the preceding chapters, and evaluate the comparative case-studies of

nationalism in Scotland and Quebec. 1also consider the implications oftbis account and • ho\\' this project May contribute to the study ofnations and nationalisme /. Review ofargument

[ would like to review the main points ofthis discussion to see how 1reached an

understanding ofimagjned political communities.

1began with a critical review ofnonnative approaches to nation-building. A focal

point ofthis discussion was the 'imagination' ofnations, a concept first elaborated by

Benedict Anderson. 1found that this and other cultural theories could not account for the

role ofactors in nation-building orexplain the need ofnations to have astate. Contrarily,

political approaches to nationalism examined here overlooked the emotive appeal of

cultural attachments to nation. An evaluation ofinstrumentalist theories indicated that

• 88 .._._--_.- -~-~--_.._-_. __ ._._------

cultural images ofnation might be manipulated for political goals, drawing elements of • cultural and political approaches together. Lastly, an analysis ofthe civic-cultural dichotomy demonstrated that these concepts, and thus approaches to nations and

nationalism, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The findings ofthis discussion

implied that a new 'holistic' angle to the question ofcreating nations would not be amiss.

In identifying the weaknesses ofthese sets oftheory, 1suggested that a new

approach ihat accounted for the politics ofimagining nations. This perspective differs

from existing theories, in that cultural conceptions ofthe nation are acknowledged in a

political analysis, elements of'design and deliberation' in national image-construetion

are considered, and both cultural and political images ofthe nation are seen to exist

together (which [have termed a 'Jekyll and Hyde' phenomenon). Yet my over-arching

claim is that prevalent images orthe modem nation are civic-political, not cultural.

This approach to nation-building was then considered in relation to some specifie • cases involving nationalism. A standard methodology was employed to examine the experiences ofnationaIism in Scotland and Quebec. Taking each case-study separately,

the discussion proceeded in four sections. 1began by evaluating cultural images ofthe

nation before the advent ofpolitical nationalist parties. l then examined the performance

ofthe Scottish National Party and the Parti Québécois, and how their representations of

the nation differed from those ofcultural nationalist institutions. Following this, l

considered how modem political images ofthe nation are constructed. Finally, the

relationship between political and cultural images ofthe nation in Scotland and Quebec

was posited ta have created a 4Jekyll and Hyde' national consciousness.

• 89 The experience ofnationalism in Scotland and Quebec provided an opportunity to • assess ideas about imagined political communities in actual natiooalist conduct. Inthe Scottish case, the SNP proposed an inclusive civic-political type ofnationalism that

rejected previous ~defonned' representations ofthe nation. However, this strategy came

at the expense ofcultural nationalist support and thus is considered to lack emotive

appeal. In the Quebec case, the PQ similarly proposed a civic-political nationalism that

was aimeo against the traditional nationalism ofthe Church. However, the maintenance

ofascriptive Iinguistic elements ofcultural nationalism prolnbited actual associative

nationalist claims, i.e. excluding non-francophones from the political-Iinguistic nation. At

the same time, the failure ofcultural development in Quebec after the 1960s enabled

traditional cultural images ofnation, divorced from politics, to persist. In both cases it

was found that contending images ofthe nation have resulted in a dualism or pluralism of

national identity. This means that cultural national identity does not necessarily translate • into a political national identity that aims at state control. In this discussion my principal aim was to assess how national political parties

portray themselves as bearers ofthe 'national project', what this national project means,

and how it differs from other conceptions ofthe national project. ft \Vas discovered that

there is more than one actor vying for the attention ofthe nation'5 imagination. Other

political parties have framed theiT arguments in a nationalist vein, as have government

and civil society institutions. The images ofnation they present are competitive - he they

cultural, linguistic, myth- or memory-based, unionist or federalist. This competition has

weakened national political party attempts to create a purely political image ofthe nation.

• 90 The conclusio~ to which my researcb on imagined political communities has 100 • me lo, is that images ofnation may he political as weil as cultural in scope and forme Neither set ofimages occurs unconsciously in the minds ofmembers, but are eonstrueted

and propagated byactors for political orcultural goals. 80th sets ofimages and ways of

imagining May exist together, but as they differ in objectives, their rivalry bas hindered a

general will toward statehood. It bas also created more than one way ofimagining the

nation, whieh authors have termed as dualistic or schizophrenie, and [ have dubbed

4 Jekyll and Hyde' in my own Scottish narrative tradition. To overcome this duality or

plurality ofnational consciousness, certain strategies May he undertaken by nationalist

political parties. These proposed strategies differ in the cases ofScotland and Quebec.

2. Comparing Scotti!J-h andQuebec nalionalism

1notOO at the outset that Scottish and Quebec nationalism were not considered to • be the same. Important differences in the images ofnation led to different conclusions in each case. l would like to briefly outline the difTerent contexts and fonns ofcultural and

political nationalism in Scotland and Quebec. Next l evaluate how the objectives of

nationalist political parties correspond. l then contrast how party strategies, obstacles to

political goals, and methods ofovercoming the'Jekyll and Hyde' complex differ.

In each ofthe case-studies, 1was interested in the relationship between cultural

and political images ofnation; how they are used to further the goals ofmodern

nationalist movements and how they affect national identity. In Scotland, cultural images

ofthe nation rested on Highland iconography - presented here in the forms oftartaniam

and 'Kailyardism' - which was propagated by British government-funded bodies such as

• 91 the Scottish Tourist Industry, and conservative institutions such as the National Trust for • Scotland. The centralist orientation ofactaIS involved in the construction ofcultural images detennined the non-political value ofsuch images ofScotland The SNP

intentionally separated ils goals ftom these images, which are considered 'defonned' due

to the fact that Scotland had no means ofcontrol over them as a 'stateless' nation.

InQuebec, cultural images ofthe nation before the Quiet Revolution were shaped

by traditional institutions such as the Church. The vision they propagated ofQuebec

society - religious, linguistic, conservative and ruraf- amounted to an ideology ofla

survivance. An important part ofthis ideology was a refusai to change the status quo

(which kept the Church in power and federalisrn unquestioned) and a distrust ofpolitics.

Thus, cultural images ofnation promoted not only a non-political image ofQuebec, but

rather a steadfastly anti-political one. Again, the new nationalist political plrty broke

with, in fact, challenged such cultural images ofnation by its Mere existence. 80th the • SNP and PQ, in tuming their backs on the cultural nation, 50Ugbt to present a oew political image ofthe nation. This involved attempts to change the national thinking of

the population from cultural (and centralist) to political (and sovereignist).

The political images proposed by the SNP and PQ had in common an interest in

fostering a civic nationalis~ based 00 constitutional grounds, for separating the nation

from the central state. 80th political parties characterise the nation territorially - anyone

cao consider rnmself or herselfto fonn that nation by living in it and sharing in its

institutions and society. The SNP and PQ therefore officially eschewed any cultural or

ethnie definitions ofthe national community. The applicability ofthis definition,

however, was subject to different degrees oflegitimacy in Scotland and Quebee due to

• 92 different socio-economic and political contexts. In Quebec. the maintenance ofparticular • eultural traits afier the Quiet Revolutio~ primarily language butalso an underlying collective memory ofethnic struggle, was an obstacle to espousing a purely associative

version ofnationalism. Although language became the prime carrierofpolitical

nationalism, the~ it still had its roots in pre-1960s cultural/ethnie nationalism. In

Scotland, this was not a problem as English is now overwhelmingly the dominant

language orthe nation. Language was not a 'barrier' to heing a nationalist and thus the

SNP could promote civic-associative nationalism without the threat ofostracising English

settlers in the nation.

Language, then, is the main factor differentiating the political goals ofScottish

and Quebec nationalism. However, there are other considerations in this divergence.

Scotland, since the Treaty ofUnion and aided by the Scottish Enlightenment, has

benefited in its political images ofthe nation from a strong and politicised civil society. • Scotland's 'Golden Age' occurred during its partnership in the OK State, at which time Scotland was at the centre orthe industrial revolution. In Quebec, the institutionalisation

ofa political civil society occurred during the 'Golden Age' ofthe modernising Quiet

Revolution in the 1960s, when ~rattrapage' became a central concem ofnationalists.

Previously, politicaIly centralist institutions such as Church dampened any impetus

toward political modernisation. However, the Quiet Revolution, in its break with the

political and socio-economic past, did not constitute a break with Quebec's cultural pasto

The result ofthis was a plurality ofnational paradoxes ofhowcultural, linguistic and

political images ofQuebec fit into the modem nationalist project. Therefore, whilst both

Scotland and Quebec have witnessed the development ofpolitical nationalism since the

• 93 1960s, the U]ekyll and Hyde" national duality in Quebec is more complex than that of • Scotland because ofthe unclear relationship between this modem political nationalism and traditional cultural nationalism since the Quiet Revolution.

Whilst the goals ofthe SNP and PQ coïncide, then, the political contexts of

Scotland and Quebec have necessitated different strategies to achieve these goals. In

Scotland, [ suggested that a method ofovercoming national duality is the appropriation of

modem ctdtural images ofnation, which retlect the population, to give emotive appeal to

the civic goals ofthe party. In Quebec, 1see an opposite problem. The emphasis on the

French language is a banier to civic nationalism, and must give way to a stronger

associative territorial nationalism that can serve the needs ofnon-francophone minorities.

In either case, each party has to propose a vision ofthe nation that is pluralistic and

multicultural, and which rests on the common institutions and society within the territory

to make self-determination a credible option for ail voters. • This comparative evaluation thus indicates that the two constructions ofpolitical images ofnation in Scotland and Quebec are not so much distinct types as mirror images

- the SNP and PQ aimed at the same end, i.e. political control ofthe state, but pursued

different means to achieve this end. The proposed image ofnation no longer rests on a

culturally imagined community bound by a vemacular language, but by a civic and

territorial definition ofnation in which ail ethnie groups can participate and that aims to

achieve self-determination for that nation.

• 94 3. Implications ofimag;ning the politicaJ nation • 1would like to consider the implications ofacknowledging nations as political as weil as cultural constructs. This leads me to contemplate where further researeh is needed

to complete this aœount ofthe politics ofimagining nations. In particular, the difficult

matter ofapplying this normative argument to other cases must he addressed.

The principal implication underlying this research is that nations are remade and

reconstrueted to suit the interests ofnational members and institutions in changing

political contexts. Images ofthe nation cannot he seen as static orentrenched - either

eulturally or politically. For instance, the nations ofScotland and Quebee have

progressed from an ethnie characterisation ofthe nation to a territorially defined one.

Funhermore, political images ofthe modem nation have been developed to legitimise

claims to independence. Nations can he construed in ditferent lights by ditferent peoples

and actors. Thus, we must account for the array ofimages that constitute the nation. • This discussion also implies that national members may have more than one sense ofnational consciousness. We cannot write offnationalists in any given community as a

homogenous mass, with only one set ofideas about the nation. It has been demonstrated

that there is a multitude ofeonflicting images ofthe nation, propagated by different sets

ofactors for different purposes, which vie for attention in the mind ofnational members.

Thus, members May have a dualistic or pluralistic sense ofnational identity that does not

simply correspond with an attachment to the nation and an attachment to the state.

To consider the implications ofthis research more substantially, further work is

needed in two areas to complete this account ofthe politics ofimagining nations. First,

• 95 ------

the contribution ofpolitical actors otherthan nationalist parties must be exami~ and • secondly, the feasibility ofgeneral application ofthese arguments must he dealt with. 1noted at the beginning oftbis thesis that due to space limitations, [ would not he

evaluating the contribution oflOnon-nationalist' political parties to the political images of

nation. 1have increasingly reaIised throughout tbis research that tbis important issue must

he addressed to explain the unionistlfederalist-propagated images ofnation. 1have

touched dn the role ofother political parties in shaping images ofthe political nation

here, yet 1believe this subject ofa thesis unto itself. Therefore, we need a more precise

examination ofhow ail parties differ in theirelaboration ofthe national community. This

is no inconsiderable task, and goes beyond what 1set out to do in tbis project.

This account ofthe politics ofimagining nations also caUs on us to considertenns

ofapplication. To he complete, we would need to he able to say with more precision what

indicates the existence ofpoliticaI images ofthe nation. 1 have examined to what degree • politicaI images ofnation differ from cultural images ofnation, but more attention must be paid to how these images, and others, co-exist. We should also he able to articulate

how political and cultural images ofnation are in tune with the pop!tlation's

circumstances. For instance, in the case ofQuebec more attention is needed to explain

native peoples' images ofQuebec as a nation. And in Scotland we have to contemplate

how people living in the Orkney and Shetland Isles, who have threatened separation from

an independent Scodand, view the nation and their place within it.

There is considerable scope for further research on the topic ofimagined political

communities. This research is by no means complete. However, 1would like to think that

• 96 a better understanding ofthe politics ofimagining nations could at least provide a starting • point for further efforts.

4. Conclusion

1began this project with an inclination that more than one image ofthe Scottish

nation existed in my mind. This duality, 1assumed, was the result ofcompeting cultural

and politital images ofthe nation. l have since leamed that this dualistic sense ofnational

identity was not confmed to the wanderings ofmy mind orto the nation ofScotland

itself Rather, 1have discovered that the ~ JekyIl and Hyde' national mentality is a tangible

concept, and can he explained through detailed examination ofthe interplay between

culture and politics within the modem nationalist setting. In the case ofQuebec, dual

national consciousness seems to have been transcended by plural national consciousness

due to a variety ofconflicting images ofthe nation. • These findings indicate that nations are protean creatures - they readily adapt their shape to fit the circumstances. But such a metamorphosis does not occur without the

help ofinterested aetors in the construction ofimages ofthe nation. In order to realise the

full implications ofthis we must hybridise out approaches - cultural, political,

sociological, historical and psychological- to nations and nationalism. A refusai to

acknowledge the interdependence ofdiffe rent aspects ofthe nation May invariably

undermine the building blocks upon which the nation rests. As argued throughout this

exercise, 1believe that the politics ofimagining nations is one such building block.

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