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Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN Washington, DC Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen May 2018 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen May 2018 © EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN Washington, DC Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen Introduction Things have changed dramati- It has been more than three years cally in Yemen since 2014. And since the coup of September it is imperative to examine what 2014 that resulted in the take- had happened since then to over of the capital city of Sanaa. avoid mistakes and revive the And despite the Government’s peace process. sincere efforts and the inter- More Than Three Years Since national community’s backing the Coup and support for the United Na- Soon after the Houthis and their tions-led peace process, a politi- erstwhile ally, former president cal settlement to end the war has Ali Abdullah Saleh, had perpe- yet to be reached. trated a coup d'etat in September 2014, they hastily rushed to con- The humanitarian situation in solidate their grip on Yemen by Yemen has also been exacerbat- advancing to take over state in- ed ever since, and is, without a stitutions and invade the rest of doubt, linked to the current polit- Yemen’s governorates including ical stalemate. It is true that there the south. is no military solution to the Ye- meni crisis; but it is also true that The Houthis believed that they without any military pressure, could achieve by force what they the Houthis will never genuine- have failed to do through dia- ly accept a peaceful sustainable logue during the National Dia- political settlement, which is the logue Conference (NDC). They only option for peace. knew quite well that a democrat- ic system in Yemen will not serve 1 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen their interests, and that fair elec- They only needed to find a way to tions will not make them rule. legitimize this process and they They thought that if they, with will be set, or so they thought! the help of Saleh (who, back then, was willing to do anything to re- So, they tried at first to coerce turn to power), could succeed in President Abdorabbo Mansour overpowering their opponents by Hadi to issue presidential de- force, overthrow the democrat- crees to appoint members of ically elected government, and their movement to prominent maintain a de facto control over level posts, including to the of- state institutions in the capital, fice of the vice president, without then they would be able to derail regards to the political process as the transitional period and main- per the Gulf Cooperation Coun- tain the status quo thereafter. cil (GCC) Initiative that started The closing session of the NDC in January 2014 2 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen the transitional period. But Pres- ritory in line with the outcomes ident Hadi refused and insisted of the National Dialogue Con- that they adhere to the Peace and ference.”1 Soon after that, the National Partnership Agreement President and the newly formed (PNPA) and its security annex government were under house signed right after the coup. After arrest. a new government was formed in November 2014 as per the PNPA, The Houthis, then, resorted to a the Houthis refused to fulfil their more desperate measure. They, part of the deal as stated in the on February 6, 2015, announced agreement’s annex which basical- what they called a “constitu- ly called for the “re-establishment tional proclamation”, abolished of state authority and the resto- parliament, and empowered a ration of control over all the ter- revolutionary committee to re- A Houthis representative (Mahdi al-Mashad, current head of the so-called Houthi “Supreme Political Council”) is signing the PNPA agreement in September 2014: Reuters) 1. Article 1 of the Annex of The Peace and National Partnership Agreement dated 21 September 2014: < https://peacemak- er.un.org/yemen-national-partnership-2014 > 3 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen place the government. Later that halt.2 And by March 2015, the month, President Hadi managed Houthis were inside the city of to escape to Aden. Not long after Aden at the southernmost tip of that, the Houthis initiated their Yemen. (As shown in Map 1) descent towards the south, and On March 26, 2015, the Arab started bombing their political Coalition led by the Kingdom of opponents including the resi- Saudi Arabia intervened, as re- dence of the President in Aden quested by President Hadi in ac- using Yemen’s air force. By that cordance with international law; time, the internationally sup- and a couple of weeks later, the ported transitional period (2012- United Nations Security Coun- 2014) had come to a complete cil (UNSC) adopted Resolution (Map 1: Areas under the control of the Yemeni Government as of March 2015) 2.Yemen Embassy in Washington DC paper: “Yemen’s Crisis and Threatened Transition”, Feb 2017, <http://www.yemen- embassy.org/news/newreports/final-pol/> 4 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen 2216 in which it reaffirmed the It wasn’t until April 2016 that the international community’s sup- Government, supported by the port for the legitimacy of Pres- Arab Coalition forces, was able to ident Hadi, condemned in the liberate al-Mukalla city and drive strongest terms the Houthis’ al-Qaeda militants out.3 actions, and called for the im- plementation of the NDC’s out- The UN-led peace process started comes and the return to the GCC in 2015 with a clear objective and Initiative’s process. mandate: to support “Yemen’s re- turn to a peaceful political transi- Meanwhile, al-Qaeda in the Ara- tion in accordance with the Gulf bian Peninsula (AQAP), seizing Cooperation Council Initiative, the moment, managed in April the outcomes of the National 2015 to take control of the major Dialogue; and Security Council port city of al-Mukalla in Hadh- Resolutions.” 4 ramaut governorate—the largest governorate in Yemen. AQAP However, all three rounds of was able to maintain its control peace talks, including the 115-day of the city for one year and man- session in Kuwait in 2016, failed aged to put its hands on substan- to achieve peace.5 This is unfor- tial amounts of resources by loot- tunate, because Yemen, unlike ing banks and illegally collecting other conflict areas in the region, taxes and fees from the city’s port. has all the components needed 3.Yemen Embassy in Washington DC paper: “Yemen Efforts in the Fight Against terrorism”, July 2017, <http://www. yemenembassy.org/public/> 4.Office of the Special Envoy of the UN SECRETARY-GENERAL for Yemen official website, “Mandate”: < https:// osesgy.unmissions.org/mandate > 5.Yemen Embassy in Washington DC paper: “Yemen’s Crisis and Threatened Transition”, Feb 2017, <http://www.yemen- embassy.org/news/newreports/final-pol/> 5 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen to achieve a peaceful settlement. early 2018 that “[i]n the end of It enjoys undivided international the consultations, it became clear support, has no Sunni-Shia di- that the Houthis were not pre- vide, and has three agreed upon pared to make concessions on the references for peace. proposed security arrangements. This has been a major stumbling The Houthis in Kuwait during block towards reaching a negoti- the last peace consultation round ated solution.”6 refused to accept any initiatives presented by the UN envoy. In So yes, things have changed dra- fact, they announced the forma- matically in Yemen since 2014. tion of what they called “the Su- But to fully understand how preme Political Council” in Sanaa, these changes affect the future while their delegation was still at peace process, and how to avoid the negotiating table in Kuwait. repeating the mistakes of the This step made it clear that they past, it is important to examine were not ready for peace. A few thoroughly and understand fully days later, the last peace round certain developments and issues collapsed. in order to be able to revive the UN-led peace process. The former UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh The Houthis and Zaidiah7 Ahmed, stated in his last briefing Most of the Houthis are Zaidis before the UN Security Council but not all Zaidis are Houthis. 6.Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, “THE UN SPECIAL ENVOY FOR YEMEN BRIEFS THE SECURITY COUNCIL”, (Speech, NYC, February 27, 2018): < https://osesgy.unmissions.org/un-special-envoy-yemen-briefs-security-council-0> 7.Zaidiah or Zaidism is one of the Shia sects and is considered to be one of the closest Shia sects to Sunni Islam. 6 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen The Houthis have been described accurately called al-Hadawiya by many international media out- (or Zaidi-Hadawiya) which is a lets to be many things; a religious version of the original Zaidi sect sect, a tribe, and even a persecuted introduced to Yemen by Yahya indigenous population in Yemen! bin Hussein al-Rassi (known as And all these descriptions are not al-Hadi ila Alhaq who died 911 accurate, and some are just sim- CE). Some scholars argue that ply wrong. Almost all Yemenis “Most of the Houthis are are indigenous to Yemen; and the Houthis are no different. The Zaidis but not all Zaidis are Houthis are a military and ideo- Houthis” logical movement led by Hussein al-Houthi and inspired by his the Zaidiah original doctrines father Badreddin al-Houthi. The and jurisprudence, which could Houthis identify themselves as be found in various old literature, Zaidis but so do many others in differ from that of al-Hadawiya Yemen who oppose the Houthi —the Zaidi version practiced in movement and what it stands for.
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