EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN Washington, DC
Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
May 2018 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
May 2018
© EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN Washington, DC Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
Introduction Things have changed dramati- It has been more than three years cally in Yemen since 2014. And since the coup of September it is imperative to examine what 2014 that resulted in the take- had happened since then to over of the capital city of Sanaa. avoid mistakes and revive the And despite the Government’s peace process. sincere efforts and the inter- More Than Three Years Since national community’s backing the Coup and support for the United Na- Soon after the Houthis and their tions-led peace process, a politi- erstwhile ally, former president cal settlement to end the war has Ali Abdullah Saleh, had perpe- yet to be reached. trated a coup d'etat in September 2014, they hastily rushed to con- The humanitarian situation in solidate their grip on Yemen by Yemen has also been exacerbat- advancing to take over state in- ed ever since, and is, without a stitutions and invade the rest of doubt, linked to the current polit- Yemen’s governorates including ical stalemate. It is true that there the south. is no military solution to the Ye- meni crisis; but it is also true that The Houthis believed that they without any military pressure, could achieve by force what they the Houthis will never genuine- have failed to do through dia- ly accept a peaceful sustainable logue during the National Dia- political settlement, which is the logue Conference (NDC). They only option for peace. knew quite well that a democrat- ic system in Yemen will not serve 1 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
their interests, and that fair elec- They only needed to find a way to tions will not make them rule. legitimize this process and they They thought that if they, with will be set, or so they thought! the help of Saleh (who, back then, was willing to do anything to re- So, they tried at first to coerce turn to power), could succeed in President Abdorabbo Mansour overpowering their opponents by Hadi to issue presidential de- force, overthrow the democrat- crees to appoint members of ically elected government, and their movement to prominent maintain a de facto control over level posts, including to the of- state institutions in the capital, fice of the vice president, without then they would be able to derail regards to the political process as the transitional period and main- per the Gulf Cooperation Coun- tain the status quo thereafter. cil (GCC) Initiative that started
The closing session of the NDC in January 2014
2 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen the transitional period. But Pres- ritory in line with the outcomes ident Hadi refused and insisted of the National Dialogue Con- that they adhere to the Peace and ference.”1 Soon after that, the National Partnership Agreement President and the newly formed (PNPA) and its security annex government were under house signed right after the coup. After arrest. a new government was formed in November 2014 as per the PNPA, The Houthis, then, resorted to a the Houthis refused to fulfil their more desperate measure. They, part of the deal as stated in the on February 6, 2015, announced agreement’s annex which basical- what they called a “constitu- ly called for the “re-establishment tional proclamation”, abolished of state authority and the resto- parliament, and empowered a ration of control over all the ter- revolutionary committee to re-
A Houthis representative (Mahdi al-Mashad, current head of the so-called Houthi “Supreme Political Council”) is signing the PNPA agreement in September 2014: Reuters)
1. Article 1 of the Annex of The Peace and National Partnership Agreement dated 21 September 2014: < https://peacemak- er.un.org/yemen-national-partnership-2014 >
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place the government. Later that halt.2 And by March 2015, the month, President Hadi managed Houthis were inside the city of to escape to Aden. Not long after Aden at the southernmost tip of that, the Houthis initiated their Yemen. (As shown in Map 1) descent towards the south, and On March 26, 2015, the Arab started bombing their political Coalition led by the Kingdom of opponents including the resi- Saudi Arabia intervened, as re- dence of the President in Aden quested by President Hadi in ac- using Yemen’s air force. By that cordance with international law; time, the internationally sup- and a couple of weeks later, the ported transitional period (2012- United Nations Security Coun- 2014) had come to a complete cil (UNSC) adopted Resolution (Map 1: Areas under the control of the Yemeni Government as of March 2015)
2.Yemen Embassy in Washington DC paper: “Yemen’s Crisis and Threatened Transition”, Feb 2017,
2216 in which it reaffirmed the It wasn’t until April 2016 that the international community’s sup- Government, supported by the port for the legitimacy of Pres- Arab Coalition forces, was able to ident Hadi, condemned in the liberate al-Mukalla city and drive strongest terms the Houthis’ al-Qaeda militants out.3 actions, and called for the im- plementation of the NDC’s out- The UN-led peace process started comes and the return to the GCC in 2015 with a clear objective and Initiative’s process. mandate: to support “Yemen’s re- turn to a peaceful political transi- Meanwhile, al-Qaeda in the Ara- tion in accordance with the Gulf bian Peninsula (AQAP), seizing Cooperation Council Initiative, the moment, managed in April the outcomes of the National 2015 to take control of the major Dialogue; and Security Council port city of al-Mukalla in Hadh- Resolutions.” 4 ramaut governorate—the largest governorate in Yemen. AQAP However, all three rounds of was able to maintain its control peace talks, including the 115-day of the city for one year and man- session in Kuwait in 2016, failed aged to put its hands on substan- to achieve peace.5 This is unfor- tial amounts of resources by loot- tunate, because Yemen, unlike ing banks and illegally collecting other conflict areas in the region, taxes and fees from the city’s port. has all the components needed
3.Yemen Embassy in Washington DC paper: “Yemen Efforts in the Fight Against terrorism”, July 2017,
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to achieve a peaceful settlement. early 2018 that “[i]n the end of It enjoys undivided international the consultations, it became clear support, has no Sunni-Shia di- that the Houthis were not pre- vide, and has three agreed upon pared to make concessions on the references for peace. proposed security arrangements. This has been a major stumbling The Houthis in Kuwait during block towards reaching a negoti- the last peace consultation round ated solution.”6 refused to accept any initiatives presented by the UN envoy. In So yes, things have changed dra- fact, they announced the forma- matically in Yemen since 2014. tion of what they called “the Su- But to fully understand how preme Political Council” in Sanaa, these changes affect the future while their delegation was still at peace process, and how to avoid the negotiating table in Kuwait. repeating the mistakes of the This step made it clear that they past, it is important to examine were not ready for peace. A few thoroughly and understand fully days later, the last peace round certain developments and issues collapsed. in order to be able to revive the UN-led peace process. The former UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh The Houthis and Zaidiah7 Ahmed, stated in his last briefing Most of the Houthis are Zaidis before the UN Security Council but not all Zaidis are Houthis.
6.Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, “THE UN SPECIAL ENVOY FOR YEMEN BRIEFS THE SECURITY COUNCIL”, (Speech, NYC, February 27, 2018): < https://osesgy.unmissions.org/un-special-envoy-yemen-briefs-security-council-0> 7.Zaidiah or Zaidism is one of the Shia sects and is considered to be one of the closest Shia sects to Sunni Islam.
6 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
The Houthis have been described accurately called al-Hadawiya by many international media out- (or Zaidi-Hadawiya) which is a lets to be many things; a religious version of the original Zaidi sect sect, a tribe, and even a persecuted introduced to Yemen by Yahya indigenous population in Yemen! bin Hussein al-Rassi (known as And all these descriptions are not al-Hadi ila Alhaq who died 911 accurate, and some are just sim- CE). Some scholars argue that ply wrong. Almost all Yemenis “Most of the Houthis are are indigenous to Yemen; and the Houthis are no different. The Zaidis but not all Zaidis are Houthis are a military and ideo- Houthis” logical movement led by Hussein al-Houthi and inspired by his the Zaidiah original doctrines father Badreddin al-Houthi. The and jurisprudence, which could Houthis identify themselves as be found in various old literature, Zaidis but so do many others in differ from that of al-Hadawiya Yemen who oppose the Houthi —the Zaidi version practiced in movement and what it stands for. Yemen today.8 Others argued that the Houthis, in particular, Furthermore, the Zaidiah in Ye- are more lenient towards yet an- men is only one of the last surviv- other subsect of Zaidiah called ing subsects of the original Zaidi Jaroudiah which is closer in some sect attributed to Imam Zaid of its practices and beliefs to the bin Ali (died 740 CE). In fact, more radical Twelver Shia sect the Zaidiah in Yemen is more practiced in Iran.9
8.Ismail al-Akwa, “al-Zaidia: Its Founding and Doctrines” second edition, Aljel Aljadeed library, 2007. 9. Ahmed al-Dagshi, “The Houthis: A Comprehensive Methodical Study”, Arabic House for Science, Lebanon 2010.
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In any case, one needs to be very 1979. However, the movement careful not to blindly use gen- was transformed after a dispute eral labels or simply portray the between Hussein al-Houthi conflict in Yemen as one between and Mohammed Azzan. Azzan Zaidis, on the one hand, and wanted to keep the movement Shafias (Sunni sect practice by moderate and as open to others the majority of Yemenis) on the as possible, whereas Hussein al- other. Houthi wanted to transform the movement to a more radical and The Origin of the Houthis ideological one. In 1990, a movement called “al- Shabab al-Momen” (the Believ- Hussein al-Houthi had previous- ing Youth) was founded in Saa- ly traveled to both Iran and Leb- dah governorate. The goals of anon in 1994 with his father (the this movement at its early stage, spiritual leader of the movement) according to Mohammed Azzan and was captivated by the Iranian (one of the founders of the move- model under Khomeini and by ment at that time), were educa- Hizballah. So, by 1999, the move- tional, cultural, and religious in ment was split into two groups a nature. But it was also founded in moderate one under Azzan and a part to counter the presence of a more radical one under Hussein Sunni Salafi center established in al-Houthi. And by 2001, accord- Saadah by Muqbil al-Wadiai—a ing to Azzan, the two groups Salafi scholar from Saadah who were completely separated, and founded the Salafi Dar al-Had- later that year Hussein al-Houthi ith center in Dammaj back in dominated the movement.10
10.Ibid 8 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
By 2004, the movement under Iran, started embracing anti-gov- al-Houthi had been transformed ernment and anti-American so radically that a group of Zaidi rhetoric. Not long after that, the prominent scholars, in a state- first war between Saleh and the ment, warned against following Houthis broke out. Hussein al- him and stated that his teachings Houthi was then killed in 2004 have deviated from the doctrines during the first war; and his of the Zaidi sect in Yemen.11 brother Abdulmalik al-Houthi, the current leader, took over and The Houthis-Saleh Relationship continued the fighting against The Houthis and Saleh have al- Saleh. ways had a very peculiar relation- ship. From archenemies (2004- The Houthi-Saleh wars ended 2010) to unscrupulous allies in February 2010 after six years (2014-2017). and six rounds of gruesome fight- ing. Many accused Saleh of not In 2004, Saleh and the Houthis genuinely wanting to end the started the first of six wars after Saadah’s wars. On the one hand, the Houthis by that time had al- he wanted to wear out the First ready been transformed to a mil- Armored Brigade, which was in itary movement and started a re- charge of fighting the Houthis, to bellion in the northern province weaken its commander General of Saadah. Hussein al-Houthi, as Ali Muhsen al-Ahmar12 (whom the leader of the movement, and he perceived as a potential rival); after returning to Yemen from and on the other, he wanted to keep the Houthis at bay. 11. Ibid 12. General Ali Muhsen al-Ahmar is currently the Vice President of the Republic of Yemen 9 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
In 2011, the Houthis joined shaky alliance of convenience the Youth Revolution and later for the better parts of 2016 and joined the NDC process. Howev- 2017. After the August 24, 2017, er, they refused to change to a po- GPC’s huge rally in the capital, litical party and maintained their the Houthis were infuriated. They military capabilities. During the started to openly accuse Saleh of transitional period, the Houth- wanting to jump ship and switch is kept advancing methodically sides. And during the December towards the capital, even though 2017 Sanaa’s short-lived uprising, their representatives were in the the Houthis executed Saleh and NDC. a number of GPC leaders and members, including GPC Secre- Sometime in 2014, the Houthis tary General Arif Alzuka.13 and Saleh formed their alliance for the purpose of derailing the Sanaa’s Uprising transitional period, among other People in Yemen knew that the things. Saleh wanted to return to Houthis and Saleh alliance was power so he lent his support to doomed from the very beginning them and paved the way to the and destined to collapse. The capital. Not surprisingly, the First question was: How? And, most Armored Brigade Headquarters importantly, when? was one of their first targets in After tensions were building be- Sanaa in September 2014. tween the Houthis and Saleh in the so called supreme council and The Houthis and Saleh kept a the salvation government in 2017 over procedural issues at first,
13.United Nations, Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/RES/2402 (26 February 2018) 10 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
the two sides started to openly of corruption, committing arbi- criticize one another later that trary arrests, unlawfully changing year. On August 19, 2017, Ab- schools’ curriculums, hijacking dulmalik Al-Houthi, the leader state media outlets, and draining of the Houthis, officially accused the central bank’s reserves.15 16 the GPC leadership of stabbing And this was what the legitimate them in the back, among other government was saying all along. things.14 The following day in a rally, Arif Alzuka , the Secretary On August 24, 2017, the GPC General of the GPC, openly ac- decided to escalate and show cused the Houthis’ leadership their power and successfully or-
GPC’s rally Sanaa on Au- gust 24, 2017: Reuters
14.Abdulmalik al-Houthi, the Houthis leader, “Televised Statement in front of Houthis Supporters”, (speech, Yemen, August 19, 2017). 15.Arif Alzuka, Secretary General of the GPC, “Statement in a GPC Rally”, (speech, Yemen, August 20, 2017). 16.Please also see Embassy Report: “The Houthis Legacy in Yemen: Lasting Damage Internally and Looming Danger Interna- tionally”, May 2018. 11 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
ganized a massive GPC-only17 between the two sides. At first, rally to commemorate the GPC’s amidst the commotion, people in 35th anniversary. Although Saleh Sanaa did not know who is win- backed down and did not, as ex- ning and who is losing. And after pected, denounce the Houth- a short break in the fighting, peo- is publicly in the rally, tensions ple believed that Saleh has won. between the Houthis and Saleh, nevertheless, were still high. This news sent shockwaves across Yemen. In Sana’a, people took In late November and early De- to the street and celebrated the cember 2017, and especially when end of the Houthis by burning Saleh openly declared his inten- Houthis slogans and posters. In tions to switch sides and called other governorates, GPC leaders for a popular uprising against the organized take overs and con- Houthis, fierce fighting erupted trolled city halls and security of-
A man holding Yemen flag after crossing out the Houthis slogans
17. In the past the Houthis and Saleh would jointly organize rallies to show solidarity and dispel any rumors of frictions between them. 12 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen fices. Sanaa’s uprising was real, or the Houthis that perception is so many Yemenis thought! reality in Yemen, and that when they are perceived to be weak, the wind of change could blow them away in a matter of days. They also realized that they have lost the GPC political cover.
So, the Houthis decided to proj- ect their power by all means nec- essary. From blowing up GPC leaders residential houses, to pub- licly committing extrajudicial ex-
Anti-Houthis protests in Sanaa ecutions of GPC leaders (and in December 2017 : alarabiya.net some occasions along with their family members including chil- dren), to shutting down all GPC “Sanaa’s uprising made it clear Two days later, after using tanks and shutting down many neigh- for the Houthis that percep- borhoods, videos of Saleh’s body tion is reality in Yemen...” started to surface in social media and the Sanaa’s uprising was over. media outlets and newspapers, to massive arbitrary arrests. While Houthis’ Retaliations these repressive measures helped Sanaa’s uprising made it clear for the Houthis show strength and
13 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
crack down on any potential dis- the GPC’s future hanging. sent after Sanaa’s uprising, it left many GPC members and sup- The GPC’s Role and Future porters, whom otherwise were The General People's Congress supportive of the Saleh-Houthis party is the largest political par- alliance, totally enraged. ty in Yemen. It was established on August 24, 1982 and domi- Therefore, the Houthis attempt- nated Yemen’s politics and gov- ed to salvage their image and ernments until 2011. The GPC cover for Saleh’s death and other played a major role as a national atrocities committed against his party that does not exclude any supporters. They refrained from one based on specific ideologies, abolishing, officially at least, the certain geographical locations, or GPC party, and bullied the re- tribal and/or social affiliations. In maining GPC leaders and mem- short, the GPC for a very long bers to hold superficial meetings time was seen as an umbrella and pretend nothing had hap- party that covers a wide range of pened to the alliance. constituencies and the only ticket for many to be influential in the They also wanted to maintain public domain before 2011. the GPC, for now, to portray to the outside world that they are With the demise of the most in- still part of “a national partner- fluential person in the GPC— ship front in Yemen.”18 However, Saleh—the party’s future and many GPC leaders and members role are at jeopardy. The Gov- left Sanaa leaving the question of ernment knows this, and the 18.Saleh Alsamad, Houthis president of the so called the “supreme political council” (was killed on April 19, 2018), “Tele- vised Statement after Sanaa Uprising”, (speech, Yemen, December 5, 2018). 14 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
Houthis know this as well. For to conceal their atrocities against the Government, preserving the its members from the interna- GPC’s unity is essential to ensure tional community and to appease a healthy balanced democrat- the rising tension amongst the ic system after the transitional GPC’s many supporters in their period. That is why the Govern- areas particularly in Sanaa. ment is calling for all leaders and members of the GPC to unite President Hadi, as President of and preserve their party. For the the Republic and as Vice Chair- Houthis, the GPC is needed as man of the GPC, on December a political cover especially after 2 and 4, 2017, called upon all the killing of Saleh and the ris- leaders and members of the GPC ing level of resentments against to unite and join other political them in many areas under their parties to form a comprehensive control. For now, a Houthi-ver- national coalition against the sion of the GPC is kept in Sanaa Houthis. The Prime Minister, Dr. by the Houthis merely as a façade Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr, who
President Hadi meeting with his advisors December 2017: Saba Net
15 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
A GPC rally in the temporary capital city Aden on March 29, 2018: Saba Net
also is one of the leaders of the in March 2015 are losing ground GPC party, is reaching out to all (As shown in map 2). They were GPC leaders and members and pushed out of Aden and oth- is calling for consultations to be er southern governorates a few held within the party to choose months after the intervention. a new leadership in accordance The strategic Bab-el-Mandeb with the party’s internal rules and strait at the Red Sea was fully lib- procedures. erated by the end of 2015 and the city and port of al-Mocha in the The Houthis and Al-Qaeda are western coast of Yemen was also Losing Ground liberated by early 2017. The Houthis ever since the inter- vention of the Arab Coalition led By December 2017, the Houthis by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia fronts were crumbling almost ev-
16 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen erywhere. At the southeast front, the governorates of Saadah (the the district of Bayhan—an im- Houthis stronghold) and al-Jawf, portant smuggling hub for the which paved the way for more Houthis—was liberated. And advances towards the first district at the western coast al Khokha of Saadah from the east and se- and Hays districts were all freed, cured a major highway road. which are the first two districts of al-Hodeida governorate. At the The Government, supported by northern front, Yemen Armed the Arab Coalition, also initiated Forces, supported by the Arab a wide-scale military operation to Coalition, were able to liberate liberate the city and governorate a major military camp between of Taiz in January 2018. In April Map 2: Areas under the control of the Yemeni Government as of May 2018
17 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
(Hadrami Elite forces al-Misini Valley February 2018: Globalview)
2018, the Government forces cial units (Hadrami Elite forces) have also managed to liberate supported by the Arab Coalition Medi seaport and city—a major (Map 2). On February 17, 2018, smuggling point for the Houthis these special units launched a suc- in Haja governorate at the Red cessful military operation called Sea—and made major advances “Alfaisal” (the decisive) against in al-Bayda governorate, which is the AQAP remaining pockets in the center of Yemen and board- about 100 km west of al-Mu- ers eight other governorates. And kalla city in al-Misini valley. The by the end of May 2018, Yemen special forces first staged a siege Armed Forces, supported by the on the valley and then launched Arab Coalition, were able to lib- a massive attack supported by erate several new districts at the Arab Coalition’s airstrikes. In western coast and are now at the two days al-Misini valley was doorsteps of al-Hodeida city and under the control of the special port. forces. About 30 al-Qaeda mili- tants were killed in the operation Al-Qaeda was also targeted and large caches of explosives and and chased out of many areas weapons were recovered. in Hadramout by Yemeni spe-
18 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
The Southern Question state will enjoy greater autonomy The southern question was the and decentralization; and that most critical issue discussed and during the first election cycle, debated during the NDC process after adopting the new constitu- in 2013-2014 with the participa- tion, the south will be represent- tion of representatives from all ed by 50 percent in all leadership political parties and movements positions in the executive legisla- including the Yemeni Social- tive and judicial branches of the ist Party (the ruling party in the government. In addition, it was south before the unification of also agreed that the south vital 1990) and representatives from interests will be preserved after the Southern Movement (al-Hi- the first election cycle by adopt- rak) (formed in 2007 and called ing a mechanism to ensure that for the secession of the south).19 the south will have a veto pow- er and a say over issues that in- During the national dialogue volved, among other things, the 2013-2014, and as stated in the status of the south region or state. NDC’s outcomes document20 Accordingly, all these agreed pro- , it was agreed to resolve all the posals were in fact enshrined in southern grievances, as raised in the draft constitution that took the NDC, during the transitional months to prepare and was pre- period of the new Federal State sented to President Hadi in Jan- of Yemen. It was also agreed that uary 2015.21 But the adoption local governance within the new of the draft constitution along proposed regions of the federal with the transitional period pro-
19. The Southern Movement has many factions and is not a homogenous entity with a unified leadership. 20.The National Dialogue Conference outcomes document:
cess was stopped as mentioned rejected the appointment and earlier due to the coup of Sep- planned with others to form the tember 2014 and the events that so called “Southern Transition- followed it. al Council” (STC). So, on May 4, 2017, al-Zoubaidi and others The so-called “Southern Tran- organized a rally in Aden. After sitional Council” the rally, a document emerged, After pushing the Houthis’ forc- which they called “the Aden es out of the southern provinces historical declaration”, by which in mid-2015, President Hadi, in they claimed to receive a man- October 2015, appointed Ma- date from the people of the south jor General Jaafar Mohammed to form a new political entity Saad, who was assassinated two to “manage and represent the months later, as governor of south.”22 Aden. Then, President Hadi ap- pointed Major General Aidarus Later the Government, in May al-Zoubaidi as governor of Aden 2017, issued a statement reaf- in December 2015. firming the constitutional rights of all Yemenis to form and engage In April 2017, President Hadi in the political process including appointed Mr. Abdulaziz al-Ma- forming new parties and entities; flahi, a technocrat, as a new gov- however, it categorically rejected ernor for Aden, to help facilitate the formation of the STC which the recovery process and the re- was tasked unconstitutionally to turn of the much-needed public manage and represent the south. services to the city. Al-Zoubaidi
22. The “Aden historical declaration” text:
The Government stated that the Aden. The next day, January 30, formation of this entity contra- 2018, the presidential brigades’ dicts not only Yemen’s constitu- forces were able to stop the STC tion and laws but also the three forces and overtake some of their references for peace agreed upon bases in Aden. Later that day, locally, regionally and interna- President Hadi ordered all forces tionally; i.e. the GCC Initiative to adhere to a ceasefire and to end and its Implementation Mecha- all hostilities. The Government nism, the NDC’s outcomes, and forces complied and withdrew the UNSC Resolution 2216. from previously controlled STC Furthermore, many leaders of the locations. However, the STC, Southern Movement have also with external support, launched rejected and questioned the legit- yet another attack against the re- imacy of the STC. treating government forces.
STC Attempted Coup in Eventually the Arab Coalition Aden led by the Kingdom of Saudi In January 2018, the STC issued Arabia intervened and ended an ultimatum to President Hadi the violence. The Government to force him to change the gov- forces returned to all their bases ernment. President Hadi refused in Aden; nevertheless, the root to yield to such measures against cause of the problem is still not the government by an illegiti- resolved for the STC forces, to mate entity. On January 28 and this day, still operate outside the 29, 2018, the STC launched an legitimacy of the government of attack against government pres- Yemen. idential brigades stationed in 21 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
However, Aden unfortunate democratically elected president events in January 2018 proved of Yemen, and made a hard deci- that the STC is not the sole sion to call for help from Yemen’s representative of the south as it brotherly neighbors in the Gulf claims to be. The majority of the Cooperation Council to inter- STC’s leadership members were vene militarily and restore state not members of the Southern institutions and prevent Iran Movement to begin with. And from taking over Yemen after the many people in Aden are not Houthis’ coup. The Government holds firmly these objectives and “The majority of the STC’s appreciates the Arab Coalition’s commitment and support thus leadership members were far. It also hopes that the issue of not members of the South- Aden is resolved and that it won’t affect the coalition’s noble objec- ern Movement to begin tives. with.” Reviving the Peace Process and happy with having an entity rep- Supporting the New UN Envoy resenting them, which is not rep- The United Nations Secre- resentative of the south, is not a tary‑General António Guterres political party, and is externally appointed Mr. Martin Griffiths funded and influenced. of the United Kingdom as his Special Envoy for Yemen on Feb- President Hadi, back in March ruary 16, 2018. Mr. Griffiths has 2015, invoked his right, as the vast experience in conflict resolu-
22 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen tion and mediation as he served and handover of heavy weapons as the Executive Director of the in key locations together, togeth- European Institute of Peace, in er, with an agreement on the es- 2014, and as an adviser to three tablishment of an inclusive Gov- Special Envoys of the Secre- ernment, one which brings the tary‑General for Syria between parties together in a consensus to 2012 and 2014.23 build peace.”25
The new UN envoy has visited The envoy has also raised the the region and met with most of issue of the southern question the stakeholders of the Yemeni and stated that “there will be no conflict. He stated in his prelim- peace in Yemen if we do not also inary briefing before the UNSC listen to the voices of the south on April 17, 2018, that he plans and make sure they are includ- “to put to this Council within the ed in the political arrangements next two months a framework that end this war.”26 He further for negotiations.”24 He further pointed out that “stopping a war stated that “a political solution to is not at all the same as building end this war is indeed available. peace” and that “[w]e must first Its outlines are no secret: the end turn our energies to the business of fighting, withdrawal of forces of stopping the war.”27
23. Office of the Special Envoy of the UN SECRETARY-GENERAL for Yemen official website, “SECRETARY-GEN- ERAL APPOINTS MARTIN GRIFFITHS OF UNITED KINGDOM AS HIS SPECIAL ENVOY FOR YEMEN”, NYC, February 16, 2018: < https://osesgy.unmissions.org/secretary-general-appoints-martin-griffiths-united-king- dom-his-special-envoy-yemen> 24. Martin Griffiths, “MARTIN GRIFFITHS, SPECIAL ENVOY FOR YEMEN MAKES HIS FIRST BRIEFING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL”, (Speech, NYC, April 17, 2018):
The Government fully supports ons even though it was clearly the UN envoy and hopes that he mandated by the UNSC Resolu- would be successful in bringing tion 2216 under Chapter VII of a lasting peace in Yemen. And it the United Nations Charter. will spare no efforts in facilitating his work to end the war and reach In short, the Government can- a political settlement. not simply agree to legitimize the coup and form a unity gov- However, we need not to repeat ernment with the Houthis, like the mistakes of the past. For in- in 2014, without first making stance, the Government and the sure that the Houthis will not Houthis have already in Septem- once again renege on their com- ber 2014 signed an agreement mitments. This time, the Govern- (the PNPA) detailing the same ment will need more than just the steps Mr. Griffiths was alluding Houthis’ word. to in his remarks that included withdrawals, handing over weap- As for the southern question ons and forming an inclusive and realizing the aspirations of government. But, as mentioned the south, the Government, as earlier in this paper, all these mentioned in previous sections, steps, except for the formation of is keen on addressing all the the unity government, were nev- grievances of the south as per the er implemented by the Houth- NDC outcomes. The southern is. Since then, the Houthis had question, and many other critical never agreed to commit to with- issues, should and will be raised drawing or handing over weap- and dealt with during the build-
24 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen ing peace phase the envoy very el- and the assurances of unfettered oquently articulated. Otherwise, humanitarian access to all areas we risk transforming the UN-led in Yemen; peace process into a second ver- 3) Preserve the three references sion of the National Dialogue for peace; Conference, only this time we 4) Address the fragmentation won’t have the time, the capacity, issue of the GPC, especially af- or even the mandate to do it. ter the killing of Saleh, through encouraging the remaining GPC Therefore, to reach a political leaders outside the Houthis’ con- solution to the conflict these trol to gather and preserve the steps should be implemented: party’s unity; and 1) Focus on restarting the peace 5) Make sure the UN-led peace talks by engaging the parties process is to achieve its clear “whose decisions can contribute mandate to end the war and re- to bringing an end to this war”28 ; turn to the transitional process i.e. the government delegation on during which all critical issues, one side and the Houthis on the including the southern question, other; will be addressed. 2) Agree on confidence building measures including the reacti- The task before Mr. Griffiths will vation of the De-escalation and likely prove to be a tough row to Coordination Committee, the re- hoe. But with the international lease of all political prisoners in- community’s backing and support cluding journalists and activists, and given the current Houthi po-
28.Ibid
25 Reviving the Peace Process in Yemen
sition, the UN envoy has a chance to succeed this time. In the past, the Houthis’ false illusions of power were fed by their misper- ception of the sincere efforts and signals sent by the previous US Administration when they met them at a very high level. How- ever, the UN envoy, now, giving the strong positive position and signals sent by the current US Administration should be able to convince the Houthis that com- mitting to peace through negoti- ation is the only way out of this war.
Yemenis everywhere have the most to lose and are the first to suffer from prolonging the war. And hopefully, the year 2018 will be the year to mark the end of the conflict and the beginning of the much tougher work ahead—the rebuilding of the new Yemen and preserving peace.
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EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN Washington, DC
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