ACCESSION NO U<;®I a GP G (20 Sep 44.-3 Dec 44)
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Property oi ARCHIVESj • - !' H ' ::: !' :: —•' C&GSC F:.. enworth * - IACCESSION NO u<;®i ; A G.P G (20 Sep 44.-3 Dec 44) REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF ' is : w/Appendices p',+ " BwjgBPiPIciSlsii '• mMmm : ":'r.SB : ' * I1:' *%J9 :n: ;, : : ; : • • . • .• ••••• ' r Whitehouse Leather Products Company, Inc* 360 FURMAN STREET BROOKLYN, N. C-807 (20 Sep 44 - 3 Deo 44) REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF At the beginning of Sep *44, the German troops with drawing from southwestern and southern France and from the Paris sector came under the control of A Gp G, Genobst Blaskowitz, i'he Army Group was composed of First Army, Fifth Pz Army, and Nineteenth Army, The retreating First Army managed to form a thin line at Neufchateau—Longuyon**Briey, with bridgeheads to the south at Metz, Pont-a-Mousson, and Nancy• Nineteenth Army began to re assemble in the vicinity of Dijon and Belfort, Fifth Pz Army was to concentrate for a thrust into the deep flank of the American force advancing along the line Luxemb our g-*Metz—Nancy, On 10 Sep 4-4, the Americans penetrated the line at Longuyon on the right flank of First Army, The LXXXII Inf Corps was forced to withdraw behind the Moselle, Throughout Sep 44, the improvised Div .Nr 462 succeeded in repelling strong enemy attacks on Metz, An enemy bre-akthrough at Luneville toward Chateau-Salins in the middle of Sep 44 created a large gap between First Army and Fifth Pz Army, Nineteenth Army was forced to fall back to the line Charmes—Epinal—west of Belfort because of the threatening situa tion on both its southern and northern flanks. At that time, the most important objective of A Gp G was to re-establish contact between First ^rmy and Fifth Pz Army, The German attack on 21 Sep 44 succeeded in restoring a cohesive front line, but the forces available were not sufficient to drive the Americans back across the Moselle, Thereafter Array Group .con centrated on holding and fortifying the existing front. During Oct 44, the American forces appeared to be resting and preparing for a large-scale offensive, A Gp G peised the opportunity afforded by the lull in the fighting to form a panzer reserve, construct defensive positions in rear areas, and bring up -ii~ additional replacements# The condition of personnel and materiel in A Gp G was, in general, very critical, since Army Group was com posed for the most part of units withdrawing from France. Minor enemy pressure along A Gp G front during the latter part of Oct 44 was a prelude to a major offensive® The fighting in Lorraine and the Vosges was decisively influenced by preparations for the counteroffensive in the Ardennes and by the desire of OKW to create a strong QKW reserve for this operation. A Gp G was ordered to hold rigidly in its existing position, but was not authorized the additional forces necessary for this purpose. A Gp G, anticipating that the main effort of the imminent enemy offensive would be at Metz, granted First Army priority on replacements, supplies, and rehabilitation of units. During the period 8 ~ 16 Nov 44, there were four distinct enemy attack groups in A Gp G sector. The first had established a bridgehead at Kerling, northeast of Metz, and was driving toward the Orscholz switch position, The second attack group was heavily engaged in a concentric attack on Metz. The third group had established bridgeheads across the Nied at Hari-sur-Nied and had captured the important road junction at Moerchingen. The objectives of this group were apparently Saarbruecken and Saargemuend. The fourth attack group was directed toward, the Saverne Gap from the Blarnont area. In brief, the main effort of the attacks on A Gp G was obviously- located in Lorraine, with the objective of breaking through to the Saar ar e a -~s irnu 11 aneously with a concentric attack on Metz. At the end of this period, ^ Gp G ordered First Army,"to withdraw from Metz'aid from the Moselle. Nineteenth Army pulled back to prepared positions in the Vosges,in the face of a large-scale attack on the Belfort Pass. On the southern flank of Nineteenth Army, French forces penetrated the narrow passage between Delle and the Swill frontier and by 21 Nov 44 had reached Muelhausen. At the same time, Belfort fell into enemy hands. Nineteenth Army was in danger of encirclement by First Fr Army through the Belfort Pass and Seventh US Army pushing across the Saverne Gap. Hitler ordered A Gp G to restore the situation at Belfort by counterattacks and to yield not an inch of ground at Saverne. H0wever no additional forces were allotted to Army Group for this difficult double mission. -iii- Fierce fighting raged in the Saverne, Gap from 20 23 Nov 44, Repeated German counterattacks failed to halt the ad> vancing enemy* On 22 Nov 44, Saverne capturedj aiid .IiXXXIX Intf Cojrps and the fighting 553 Volks G|*en;l3iv were eiiCirClecL On 23 Nov 44 those encircled units managed to break through tb Bit&ch. Saarburg was lost on the same day. In the Metz sector, First Army had withdrawn firam. Metz., leaving a garrison to defend the city,, '-The command post of the Commandant of Metz fell into enemy hands on. 21 Nov 44, Therewith &11 resistance came to an end, with the exception of a few forts which held out until early Dec 44. Attacks by Pz Lehr Div on 24 Nov 44 to restore the situation at Saarburg failed after some initial successes. Liken wise, the attack of 106 Pz Brig on 25 Nov. 44 to drive the French / from the Muelhausen area also failed. On 28 Nov 44, A Gp G situation was as follows: There had been no activity on the right flank of First Army in the Orscholz switch position for several days# Army Group proposal for a concentric attack on Saverne was rejected by 0KW». The reinforcements necessary for this attack were needed for the Ardennes offensive. The threatened Nineteenth Army could not be withdrawn behind the Rhein because it was fixing considerable enemy forces which might otherwise have been used elsewhere. At the end of Nov 44 fierce fighting developed in the vicinity of Saarlautern, American forces had orossed the Saar and had captured a few bunkers in the West Wall. A double envelop ment was threatening as a result of heavy pressure both at Saarlautern and Saargemuend. Farther south, the threatened encirclement of Nineteenth Army was minimized by regrouping units and shortening the front line. As a result of the arduous battles in Lorraine, in the Vosges, ana in Alsace, in Nov and Dec 44, the troops of A Gp Q were virtually exhausted. ROBERT C, DART 1st Lt FA Historical Editor Oct 15 1947 -iv- M3 # A-999 Title : A Gp G (20 Sep - 8 Nov 44") Author i Genmaj von Mellenthin, Fr i ec.rio h~¥iIhelin Position : C of S, A Gp G Date of MS v i 11 Mar 46 Place i ITSFET MISCj Oberurselj Germany Prepared for j Capt. F. C. Mahin Translator 5 , Mr# E. W. Sprenger -v- KS # A-OOG Title A Gp G (8 - 16 Nov 44) Author Genmaj von Me1 lent hi n,, Friedrich Wilhelm Position C of S, A Gp G Date of MS 10 Apr 46 Place USPET MISC, Oberursel, Germany Prepared for Capt P. C# Mahin Translator Mr* ¥• B. Ross (! -vi** MS # B-078 Title ; A Gp G (16 Nov - 3 Deo 44) Author } Genmaj yon Mellenthin, Friedrioh-t/ilhelm Position s C of S, A Gp G Date of MB i 6 Jun 46 Place : USFET KI3C, Oberursel, Germany- Prepared for t Capt P« C# Mahin Translator : Mr, fi, B. R6ss «vii~ MS # B-018 FFI Operations, Southern France and Lorraine (Jermiaj von Mellenthin, FriedricMYilhelm C of S, A Gp G ' 29 Jun 46 DEFE 20, Allendorf, Germany Gapt B* §• Bazata Mr9 H. At Heitman ~viii*« Preface A GP G (20 Sep 44 r 3 Deo 44) REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF About 20 Sep 44, the 0ommander (Genobst Blaskowitz) and the Chief of Staff (Genmaj von Gyldenfeldt) of Army Group G were simultaneously and rather abruptly relieved. Von Melienthin, pre viously C of S of Fourth Pz Army in southern Poland, then succeeded von Gyldenfeldt. Von Mellenghin, in turn, was summarily relieved in early Dec 44 and subsequently assigned to 9 Pz Div as a regimental commander. He has explained this event as follows: "At the beginning of Dec 44 I was placed on the Fuehrer Reserve (officer pool) list.. The reasons for this action were not known to C-in-C 'i/vEST "(Genfldm von Rundstedt) nor to his C of S .(Genlt Westphal), According to statements by the Ic (Obst Thien) of A Gp G and the Ic/Prop Offz (Assistant Ic for Propaganda), the reasons were political in nature® My promotion to generalmajor scheduled for the end of Nov 44 was withheld# On 10 Dec 44 I was ordered to report to the C of S of OKH (Genobst Guderian), was reprimanded for criticizing his actions, and confined to quarters for seven days. All army group and army chiefs of staff were informed, in writing, of this reprimand, and I was dismissed from the Generalstab (General Staff Corps)*" On 28 Feb 45, von Mellenthin was transferred from. 9 Pz Div to become C of S, Fifth Pz Army® He was promoted to generalmajor on 1 Apr 45* . The episodic character of von Mellenthin1s service with A Gp G naturally made it rather difficult for him to prepare a comprehensive and completely accurate report of operations* Furthermore, during the period in which he prepared the three manuscript's which make up the bulk of this report (MSS $ A-999, A-000^ and Bf078) much of von Mellenthin*s time was occupied by his duties as spokesman in personal and administrative matters for .the other inmates of Florida House (a small Historical Division "enclave" within US FEU? MISC, Oberursel, Germany).