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; A G.P G

(20 Sep 44.-3 Dec 44)

REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

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r Whitehouse Leather Products Company, Inc* 360 FURMAN STREET BROOKLYN, N. C-807 (20 Sep 44 - 3 Deo 44)

REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

At the beginning of Sep *44, the German troops with­ drawing from southwestern and southern France and from the Paris sector came under the control of A Gp G, Genobst Blaskowitz, i'he Army Group was composed of First Army, Fifth Pz Army, and Nineteenth Army,

The retreating First Army managed to form a thin line at Neufchateau—Longuyon**Briey, with bridgeheads to the south at Metz, Pont-a-Mousson, and Nancy• Nineteenth Army began to re­ assemble in the vicinity of Dijon and Belfort, Fifth Pz Army was to concentrate for a thrust into the deep flank of the American force advancing along the line Luxemb our g-*Metz—Nancy,

On 10 Sep 4-4, the Americans penetrated the line at Longuyon on the right flank of First Army, The LXXXII Inf Corps was forced to withdraw behind the Moselle, Throughout Sep 44, the improvised Div .Nr 462 succeeded in repelling strong enemy attacks on Metz, An enemy bre-akthrough at Luneville toward Chateau-Salins in the middle of Sep 44 created a large gap between First Army and Fifth Pz Army, Nineteenth Army was forced to fall back to the line Charmes—Epinal—west of Belfort because of the threatening situa­ tion on both its southern and northern flanks.

At that time, the most important objective of A Gp G was to re-establish contact between First ^rmy and Fifth Pz Army, The German attack on 21 Sep 44 succeeded in restoring a cohesive front line, but the forces available were not sufficient to drive the Americans back across the Moselle, Thereafter Array Group .con­ centrated on holding and fortifying the existing front.

During Oct 44, the American forces appeared to be resting and preparing for a large-scale offensive, A Gp G peised the opportunity afforded by the lull in the fighting to form a panzer reserve, construct defensive positions in rear areas, and bring up -ii~

additional replacements# The condition of personnel and materiel in A Gp G was, in general, very critical, since Army Group was com­ posed for the most part of units withdrawing from France. Minor enemy pressure along A Gp G front during the latter part of Oct 44 was a prelude to a major offensive®

The fighting in Lorraine and the Vosges was decisively influenced by preparations for the counteroffensive in the Ardennes and by the desire of OKW to create a strong QKW reserve for this operation. A Gp G was ordered to hold rigidly in its existing position, but was not authorized the additional forces necessary for this purpose. A Gp G, anticipating that the main effort of the imminent enemy offensive would be at Metz, granted First Army priority on replacements, supplies, and rehabilitation of units.

During the period 8 ~ 16 Nov 44, there were four distinct enemy attack groups in A Gp G sector. The first had established a bridgehead at Kerling, northeast of Metz, and was driving toward the Orscholz switch position, The second attack group was heavily engaged in a concentric attack on Metz. The third group had established bridgeheads across the Nied at Hari-sur-Nied and had captured the important road junction at Moerchingen. The objectives of this group were apparently Saarbruecken and Saargemuend. The fourth attack group was directed toward, the Saverne Gap from the Blarnont area. In brief, the main effort of the attacks on A Gp G was obviously- located in Lorraine, with the objective of breaking through to the Saar ar e a -~s irnu 11 aneously with a concentric attack on Metz.

At the end of this period, ^ Gp G ordered First Army,"to withdraw from Metz'aid from the Moselle. Nineteenth Army pulled back to prepared positions in the Vosges,in the face of a large-scale attack on the Belfort Pass.

On the southern flank of Nineteenth Army, French forces penetrated the narrow passage between Delle and the Swill frontier and by 21 Nov 44 had reached Muelhausen. At the same time, Belfort fell into enemy hands. Nineteenth Army was in danger of encirclement by First Fr Army through the Belfort Pass and Seventh US Army pushing across the Saverne Gap.

Hitler ordered A Gp G to restore the situation at Belfort by counterattacks and to yield not an inch of ground at Saverne. H0wever no additional forces were allotted to Army Group for this difficult double mission. -iii-

Fierce fighting raged in the Saverne, Gap from 20 23 Nov 44, Repeated German counterattacks failed to halt the ad> vancing enemy* On 22 Nov 44, Saverne capturedj aiid .IiXXXIX Intf Cojrps and the fighting 553 Volks G|*en;l3iv were eiiCirClecL On 23 Nov 44 those encircled units managed to break through tb Bit&ch. Saarburg was lost on the same day.

In the Metz sector, First Army had withdrawn firam. Metz., leaving a garrison to defend the city,, '-The command post of the Commandant of Metz fell into enemy hands on. 21 Nov 44, Therewith &11 resistance came to an end, with the exception of a few forts which held out until early Dec 44.

Attacks by Pz Lehr Div on 24 Nov 44 to restore the situation at Saarburg failed after some initial successes. Liken wise, the attack of 106 Pz Brig on 25 Nov. 44 to drive the French / from the Muelhausen area also failed.

On 28 Nov 44, A Gp G situation was as follows: There had been no activity on the right flank of First Army in the Orscholz switch position for several days# Army Group proposal for a concentric attack on Saverne was rejected by 0KW». The reinforcements necessary for this attack were needed for the Ardennes offensive. The threatened Nineteenth Army could not be withdrawn behind the Rhein because it was fixing considerable enemy forces which might otherwise have been used elsewhere.

At the end of Nov 44 fierce fighting developed in the vicinity of Saarlautern, American forces had orossed the Saar and had captured a few bunkers in the West Wall. A double envelop­ ment was threatening as a result of heavy pressure both at Saarlautern and Saargemuend. Farther south, the threatened encirclement of Nineteenth Army was minimized by regrouping units and shortening the front line.

As a result of the arduous battles in Lorraine, in the Vosges, ana in Alsace, in Nov and Dec 44, the troops of A Gp Q were virtually exhausted.

ROBERT C, DART 1st Lt FA Historical Editor

Oct 15 1947 -iv-

M3 # A-999

Title : A Gp G (20 Sep - 8 Nov 44")

Author i Genmaj von Mellenthin, Fr i ec.rio h~¥iIhelin

Position : C of S, A Gp G

Date of MS v i 11 Mar 46

Place i ITSFET MISCj Oberurselj Germany

Prepared for j Capt. F. C. Mahin

Translator 5 , Mr# E. W. Sprenger -v-

KS # A-OOG

Title A Gp G (8 - 16 Nov 44)

Author Genmaj von Me1 lent hi n,, Friedrich Wilhelm

Position C of S, A Gp G

Date of MS 10 Apr 46

Place USPET MISC, Oberursel, Germany

Prepared for Capt P. C# Mahin

Translator Mr* ¥• B. Ross

(! -vi**

MS # B-078

Title ; A Gp G (16 Nov - 3 Deo 44)

Author } Genmaj yon Mellenthin, Friedrioh-t/ilhelm

Position s C of S, A Gp G

Date of MB i 6 Jun 46

Place : USFET KI3C, Oberursel, Germany-

Prepared for t Capt P« C# Mahin

Translator : Mr, fi, B. R6ss «vii~

MS # B-018

FFI Operations, Southern France and Lorraine

(Jermiaj von Mellenthin, FriedricMYilhelm

C of S, A Gp G '

29 Jun 46

DEFE 20, Allendorf, Germany

Gapt B* §• Bazata

Mr9 H. At Heitman ~viii*«

Preface

A GP G

(20 Sep 44 r 3 Deo 44)

REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

About 20 Sep 44, the 0ommander (Genobst Blaskowitz) and the Chief of Staff (Genmaj von Gyldenfeldt) of Army Group G were simultaneously and rather abruptly relieved. Von Melienthin, pre­ viously C of S of Fourth Pz Army in southern Poland, then succeeded von Gyldenfeldt. Von Mellenghin, in turn, was summarily relieved in early Dec 44 and subsequently assigned to 9 Pz Div as a regimental commander. He has explained this event as follows: "At the beginning of Dec 44 I was placed on the Fuehrer Reserve (officer pool) list.. The reasons for this action were not known to C-in-C 'i/vEST "(Genfldm von Rundstedt) nor to his C of S .(Genlt Westphal), According to statements by the Ic (Obst Thien) of A Gp G and the Ic/Prop Offz (Assistant Ic for Propaganda), the reasons were political in nature® My promotion to generalmajor scheduled for the end of Nov 44 was withheld# On 10 Dec 44 I was ordered to report to the C of S of OKH (Genobst Guderian), was reprimanded for criticizing his actions, and confined to quarters for seven days. All army group and army chiefs of staff were informed, in writing, of this reprimand, and I was dismissed from the Generalstab (General Staff Corps)*" On 28 Feb 45, von Mellenthin was transferred from. 9 Pz Div to become C of S, Fifth Pz Army® He was promoted to generalmajor on 1 Apr 45* .

The episodic character of von Mellenthin1s service with A Gp G naturally made it rather difficult for him to prepare a comprehensive and completely accurate report of operations* Furthermore, during the period in which he prepared the three manuscript's which make up the bulk of this report (MSS $ A-999, A-000^ and Bf078) much of von Mellenthin*s time was occupied by his duties as spokesman in personal and administrative matters for .the other inmates of Florida House (a small Historical Division "enclave" within US FEU? MISC, Oberursel, Germany). Although many key officers of A Gp G were not available to the author for consultation, he did receive assistance from Gens Botsch (C of S, Nineteenth Army), Hoernlein (Cnidr, LXXXII Inf Corps), Priess (Cmdr, XIII SS Inf Corps), and Bruhn (Cmd.r, 553 Volks Gren Div). Von Mellenthin also had access to the daily situation maps of 12 A Gp. , -ix*

App 1 o? MS # A-999 and Apps 5 & 6 of MS # A-00<5 were actually prepared by Gen Hoernlein, App 9a was prepared Tjy von Mellenthia with the assistance of Gen Oberhaeusser (Chief Signal Officer, OB "WEST),

MS # B-018 was prepared by von Mellenthin at DEFB 20,. Allendorf, Germany, with the assistance of Gen Botsch,

During the editing of these four manuscripts it has not been possible to completely solve two major editorial problems, The lack of adequate gazetteers in the European Theater has precluded perfect accuracy in the spellings of the names of many small towns and villages along the Franco-German border, where most localities have both German and French names. Nor has it been possible to dew termine the exact dates on which individual German infantry divisions were converted to volks grenadier divisions} however, it is known that there were never, at any one time> both an infantry and a voiles grenadier division bearing the same number# -X-

A G P G

(20 Sep 44 • * 5 Dec 44)

REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Page

Chapter One * PREPARATIONS FOR A DEFENSIVE STAND IN LORRAINE AND THE VOSGES

Retreat to Lorraine and the Vosges 1

II, Formation of a Cohesive Line of Defense (mid-Sep to early Oct 44)....««..9

i ' Chapter Two « STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSIVE FRONT

I. Defensive Measures Undertaken in the Quiet Period »...... 15

II. Condition of Personnel and Materiel ...... 18

III, Replacements and Reorganization ... 21

IV, Gp G Operations (Oct 44) ...... a,..., # 24

Chapter Three •? COMBAT FOR METZ AND THE SAVERNE GAP

I. A Gp G Estimate of the Enemy Situation (early Nov 4-4) .... 31

IIf A Gp G Situation (early Nov 44) 33

III» Combat in the MetZ Area (8 » 16 Nov 44) 40

IV* Developments in the Situation (ll - 13 Nov 44) ..«.. . 47

V. Developments in the Situation (14 •» 16 Nov 44) ...... 53

VI, Beginning of the Offensive Against the Saverne Gap en -16 Nov 44) • ..rrr,,...•rrrrrT' 60 ~xi~

?age

VII, Estimate of the Situation, A Gp G, Afternoon 16 Nov 44-~ Decision to ^vithdraw~from Metz ,,.T7777...... 7717777. . 65

Chapter Four LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS IN LORRAINE AND THE YQSGES

I, Beginning of the Attacks on the Belfort Pass ••••• 75

II, Breakthrough into the Saverne Gap (17 - 20 Nov 44) ...... 79

^ Developments in the Metz Area (16 ~ 20 Nov 44) 86

De"v"e^°Pirien^s in A Gp G Sector (22 - 2€> Nov 44) 92

Developments in jfche Situation (25 ~ 28 Nov 44) • 98

VI, Developments in the Situation (29 Nov .44^ - 5 Deo 44) •«,» 106

VII, A Gp G Estimate of the Situation (3 Dec 44) •••••••»••••• 111

VIII, Cone lusions ...... f * 118

Annex - FFI OPERATIONS - SOUTHERN FRANCE AND LORRAINE 129-^' A G P G

(20 Sep 44 - 3 Dec 44)

REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF MS # k-999

Chapter One

PREPARATIONS FOR A DEFENSIVE STAND IN LORRAINE AND THE VOSC'EB

It Retreat to Lorraine arid the Vosges

l«v In the beginning of Sep 44, Armeegruppe G, Genobst

Blaskowitz, engaged in the southern sector of the German Western

Front, was reconstituted as Heeresgruppe G,* Armeegruppe G had cam-*

*Ed: In the Wehrmacht, an Armeegruppe was normally a temporary, pro­ visional organization, intermediate in status and responsibilities between a Corps and an Army. Armeegruppe G^ however, was an exception to this general rule, for it corresponded very closely to a Heeresgruppe the equivalent of an American or British Army Group, prised the troops withdrawing from southwestern France- (LXIV Inf Corps)

/ and southern France (Nineteenth Array), These troops, together with those in retreat from the Paris sector (First Army) and the newly formed Fifth Pz Army, were incorporated into Heeresgruppe G#

20 Aided by a several days* halt in the American advance.

First Army, during the early days of Sep 44, succeeded in building up a thin defensive front along the line Neufchateau--~Longuyon~~Briey9

Strong bridgeheads were held west of the Moselle at• Metz ^ Pont*~a-Moussonf and Nancy (see App 1«) About 10 Sep 44, an American force, with ap­ proximately 60 tanks, broke through the thin line near Longuyon and penetrated to the area west of Luxembourgf Here the enemy force was MS # A~999 -2~

checked by 106 Pz Brig, This brigade-, recently arrived from the Zone

of the Interior, was first committed in early Sep 44 in a counterattn -

near Briey^ From there, it was sent -"o the Luxembourg area to check 4

American tank breakthrough, The enemy brea'rbhrough near Longuyon suc­

ceeded because. 48 Inf Div, like most of the forces coming from France

could not be considered a compact unit® The Division has no artille:.;"

or antitank guns and only a few vehicles; its infantry was understren^ v averaging some 8Q~100 men per battalion# With this development in the.

situation, L'XXX.11 Inf Gorpe withdrew within First Army sector in two

night movements^behind the Alzette River, lo/ll Sep 44c, and behind the

Moselle., Il/l2 Sep 44, The 106 Pz Brig, in the area east of Luxembourg,

made the withdrawal possible by preventing any further advance of the

enemy.

3, On 7 Sep 44, the XIII SS Inf Corps was assigned the

Metz—Nancy sector. The Corps staff, formed in Breslau three weeks

previously, arrived without a naohrichten (signal) battalion and assumed command with a provisional nachrichten platoon. The 559 Yolkc

Gren Div, newly arrived from Germany, had succeeded by counterattacks

in preventing further enemy advances north of Ivletz, This Division,

like 553 Volks Gren Div (in action at Nancy), had beexi formed about fo weeks previously in a training center. Although both divisions had adequate materiel and personnel, they had not experienced any unit

training,

4, The battle of Metz had to be fought with improvised

regiments of candidates from officer and noncommissioned officer schools MS # A-999 -5-

because 17 SS Pz Gren D;.v, assigned to this sector upon withdrawing

from Verdunj was no longer fit for combat., This Division, assembled

northwest of Metz at the beginning of Sep 44, had lost nearly all its

vehicles and has suffered excessive casualties. Its remaining tanksf

about, five, were committed in the Metz sector^ where the staff of

Div Nr 462* had assumed tactical command. As its name indicates, thi-.

*Ed: MS j}= B-042 (Genlt Erause, Walter) says that as late as 18 Sep 44 the Metz Divisipn was referred to as Div Nr 462. MS =fj= B-079 (Genlt Kittel, Heinrich), states that Div Nr 462 was in the process of con­ version to 462 Volks Gren Div during the entire month of Oct 44* The Division was more or less informally called a "reserve" infantry divi- • sion by the staff of First Army. Genmaj von Mellenthin has explained orally that the term was probably used because in Sep and Oct 44- this Division was not a normal infantry-type division. In this report, the Division is referred to as Div Nr 462 until 31 Oct 44 and thereafter as 462 ¥olks Gren Division#

staff was not prepared for the tactical command of a division* (?or

ivl the tactical situation at Fortress etz, see App 2#) The defense of

Metz was divided into three ^regimental" sectors.. On the right were

two battalions of a noncommissioned officers school, consisting of

noncommissioned officers and candidates from Wehrkreis XII—very good

troops* The 1010 Sicherungs (security) Regt (Obst Richter), comprisirc,

two battalions,- was in the center and was composed largely of older

men previously used for guarding bridges, etc, in rear areas. The

armament of the Regiment was only improvised. One regiment of the.

Metz Officer Candidate School (Obst von Siegroth), on the left, had

a strength of about 1100 men and was also heterogeneously equipped.

The mobile artillery consisted of one battalion^ with MS # A-999 ~4~

one German and one Kussian light field howitzer battery and one flak

battery. At that time only two of all the fortress batteries .could >e

made combat serviceable^ namely those batta-ies in the southern part ^ •;

the Fortress "Crown Prince." The fortress batteries were equipped with preWorld Mar 1 guns whose breechblocks and. firing tables were

missing,# There were only about ten antitank guns available# These

were hastily placed in position along with the five tanks of 17 SS

Pz Gfren Div. ^he Metz SS Nachrichten (signal) school (over 1000 men^ . was able to reinforce units with nachrichten platoons and combat troops

This school made the first reconnaissance in the direction of Verdun

in personnel carriers equipped with radios (PIW^Funk)#

5* Throughout Sep 44, the improvised Div Nr 462 succeeded

in repelling strong American attacks, resulting in only minor enemy

penetrations. This defensive success reflects credit upon the high

morale of the Metz Officer Candidate arid .Noncommissioned Officer

Schools# during the first weeks of Sep 44, the main effort of the

American attack was near Amanvillers along the Verdun-r^ietz road#.

Later, the attacks shifted to the Gravelotte sector, where the enemy

succeeded in entering the town. Several times during the day the line

of the officer candidate companies was overrun by enemy tanks#. The

American infantry, however, could be checked# Tanks penetrated to

our rear at night and were destroyed or forced to withdraw by officer

candidate1 assault teams armed with panzerfausts (bazookas)# Farther

south, the enemy penetrated Fortress "Crown Prince" between 25 and 30

Sep 44# The defending garrison held out in one section of the

fortress, .and,* after a bitter battle which lasted a day and a half, MS A«999 the American forces were ejected# ^'he central sector, due to the natu

of the tarrain, was relatively quiets Because of its low combat ef­ ficiency, 1010 Sicherungs Kegt had been as,signed to this sector© By

20 Sep 44, enemy pressure in the right sector had increased^ especia'M

at Maizieres-lesrMetz• The open teirain iir thij area was favorable

to the employment of tanks®

As a result of their high morale/ the defenders of

Metz. dominated the situation and repeatedly confused the enemy in reu," areas by spirited counterattacks. For example, on 10 Sep 44, a recon­ naissance patrol composed of one officer and seven officer candidates was ordered to conduct a night reconnaissance in the vicinity of

Am.anvill.ers. -&t dawn, they surprised an American company which had

just been lined up in a town, ^y opening surprise fire with their machine pistols, the patrol overpowered the company and returned with their prisonersrrtwo officers and 96 men.

6« Nineteenth Army, retreating from the Mediterranean coast, was in Lyon, with its divisions, by the beginning of Sep 44$ and by 8 Sap 44 was situated below Dijon, facing south, with its left wing south of Belfort (see App 3)* The LXIV Inf Corps, coming from th

Biscay coast, arrived in the area west of Dijon* vdth its mingled units still arriving, LXVI Inf Gorps (Ed; LXVI Inf Corps, not LXIV

Inf Corps) began to establish a thinlyrheld security position along, the line Neufchateaur-Chaumont^~Chatillon^surrSeine» A Gp Gr had received instructions to hold in the vicinity of Dijon under all oondi tions, since this was to be the assembly area for all available panzer MS # A-999 -6« divisions and brigades in the West. The panzers were to be employed • a strategic thrust into the deep flank of the Americans advancing , toward the line Luxemb our g^Metz^-Nancy.

7. A. Crp G intended to rally Fifth P& Army west of EpinrT by assembling 21 Pz Div, 15 Pz Gfren Div, and,- subsequently, 111, 1]X:, and 113 Pz Brigs* However, on 7 - 8' Sep'44-> the deep southern flank of Nineteenth Army was dangerously threatened by assaults near Besanoci and east of Baume'^les-Dames * These attacks were checked temporarily by 159 Inf Dly and the fighting 11 Pz Div. The latter had. carried the burden of the withdrawal from southern France and, in spite of long marches and heavy engagements en route, had retained its fighting capacity. On 10 Sep 44, Nineteenth Army was forced to shorten its frontage by a withdrawal to the line Langres-<~Gray in order to reinforce the southern flank. On 11 Sep 44, a Fuehrerweisung (directive from

Hitler) was received ordering A Gp G to hold in this area and not to allow itself to be forced away from the Swiss border. To cope with the threatened encirclement east of Besancon, Fifth Pz Army planned to assemble beginning 11 Sep 44 in the vicinity of Remiremont• From there, it was to push through Pontarlier and Lure to Baume^-lesHDames, thus protecting the menaced southern flank of A Gp G. This intention of Fifth Pz Army (see App 3) was just as impossible to carry out as the intended, thrust from the area west of Epinal toward the north.

Developments in the enemy situation forced new decisions.

8.® The enemy crossed the Moselle southwest of Luneville about 12, Sep 44. At the same time, "Vesoul was lost on the southern MS # A-999 -7- frcntd Also on 12 Sep 44, the enemy took Charmes from LXVI Inf Corps and pressed toward Epinalo The 16 Inf -^iv* still intact, was in danger of being surrounded in a few hours^ since 1 Armd Div (Pr) had pierced the line east of Rimaucourt and had pushed east behind the

Division* The LXVX Inf Corps proposed withdrawing 16 Inf Div while the possibility still existed, but the proposal was turned down. The

Fuehrer insisted that the area held by A :Gp Gr not be reduced further©

A relief attack was launched by 113 Pz Brig in the direction of Mire- court, but without success. A subsequent order to 16 Inf Div to fighi; through in the direction of Epinal came too late. Several days later., we located about 500 men from: this Division, without any heavy equip­ ment or weapons. The Commander, 16 Inf established a new security line west of Epinal with remnants of the Division, one Luftwaffe nac'h- richten regiment, and several polizei (police) companies• The situa­ tion of Nineteenth -Army on 14 Sep 44 had again become very critical: the forces west and southwest of Epinal were in danger of being destroy- completely by enemy thrusts from the north and.south. Therefore, the

Army request on 15 Sep 44 to fall back to the line Charmes--Epinal-*- west of Belfort was granted.

9. At the same time, Fifth Pz Jtrmy received orders to attack the flank of the enemy advancing on Luneville (see App 4).

The XLVTI Pz Corps assembled 21 Pz Div and 112 Pz Brig on 17 Sep 44 and counterattacked from the vicinity of Baccarat for Luneville. The initial assault made good progress, but 112 Pz Brig,stopped just southeast of Luneville,-and 21 Pz Div' could penetrate only into the MS # A-999 -8- southern section of the oity. By th.^ attacks of XLVII Pz Corps and

LVIII Pz Corps (comprising 15 Pz Gren Div, defending south of Dieuze., and 113 Pz Brig, from the area southwest of Saarburg), those enemy forces which had already penetrated beyond Lunev'-Ile in the direct:'.' ': to of Avricourt were forced southwest back/LunevilleP The XLVII Pz

Corps, having been attacked on the flank at Gerbeviller by new enemy forces penetrating the weak security line at that point, stopped its attack and reverted to the defensive between Luneville and Bruyeres*

10• On the south wing of First Army the situation had developed as follows:

About 8 Sep 44, the 17 SS Pz Gren Div, which had r« tbed only three or four days northwest of Metz, received orders to break, out from the Metz bridgehead, advance on Briey to the northwest, and drive back the existing enemy assault wedge. On 9 Sep 44, however, enemy tanks forced a crossing of the Moselle just north of Pont-a-

Mousson, and XIII SS•Inf Corps was forced to commit 17 SS Pz Gren Div in this area. We did not succeed in. throwing back the enemy forces, but we could at least contain their bridgehead*

Due to advances on 12 Sep 44 across the Moselle south­ west of Luneville, the. enemy was- already deep in the flank of First

Army, Therefore, 553'Volks Gren Div, on 13 Sep 44, received permission to evacuate the bridgehead at Nancy and to withdraw behind the Meurthe*

The left flank of this Division, southeast of Nancy, had no positive

contact with the adjacent army® The enemy occupied Luneville on

16 Sep 44, so that the southern wing of First Army had to fall back MS # A-999 - -9- still farther to the northwest of the oity„

II. Formation of a Cohesive Line of Defense (mid-Sep to early Oct 44)

11• Oil 20 Sep 44, Gen Pz Balck assumed command of A Gp G>

(For the front lines, trcop dispositions, and order of battle of

A Gp G, see App 5 and App 6C) The enemy situation, 20 Sep 44, was as follows*

a0 On the Moselle front between Trier and Metz, the enemy followed up with only weak forces« Our bridgeheads west of the

Moselle were held against little pressure from the enemy. Our own reconnaissance had penetrated 20 to 30 km westward without encountering important enemy dispositions0

b. During the first half of Sep 44, Fortress Me'tz had repelled several strong enemy attacks and had inflicted heavy losses upon the attacker.

c. Tne bulk of the American forces, about three armored divisions and six infantry divisions, seemed to be concentrated for.a thrust across the line Metz—Nancy—Luneville on Saarbruecken* The enemy, south of Metz had established only a small bridgehead at Pont-a-*

Mousson, but, just north of Nancy, strong American armored forces had crossed the Moselle and sent advance elements to Chateau-Salins» Enemy units, having advanced through Luneville to the vicinity of Avricourt during the period 16 - 18 Sep 44, had been forced to fall back to

Luneville by a successful counter-attack of XLVII Pz Corps against the enemy southern flank® MS # A-999 -10-

cl® In the nineteenth Army sector, enemy pressure ex­ isted east of Epinal, and near Remiremont and Lure, but no important penetrations were reported„

12, A Gp G situation, 20 Sep 44, was as fellows:

a. On the right wing of First Army, LXXXII Inf Corps, on the west (sic) bank of the Moselle, faced a relatively weak enemy force which had established bridgeheads at Remich, Contz, and Berg*

In the middle, of Sep 44, the 19 Volks Gren Div had been transferred t :•

Seventh Army's LXXX Inf Corps and had participated in a successful counterattack to eject the fotce which had pehetrated the West Wall at

Echternach and to reoccupy the West Wall fortifications. In the evening of 20 Sep 44, it was decided to return this Division to its former Moselle sector as soon as possible, thus relieving the tempo­ rarily committed 559 Yolks Gren Div for A Gp G reserve. The situation of fortress Metz was unchanged.

b« In XIII SS Inf Corps sector, the commitment of 17

SS Fz Gren Div had prevented the enemy expansion of the bridgehead established on 9 Sep 44 at Pont-a-Mousson.. The 553 Yqlks Gren Div was committed southeast of Nancy on the left wing of XIII-SS Inf Corps.

Due to the enemy threat on its left flank, the Division had no contact with 15 Pz Gren Div fighting northeast of Luneville. About 18 Sep 44, the enemy had established a bridgehead north of Nancy on the southern flank of 3 Pz Gren Div, which was occupying the Moselle sector between

Pont-a-Mousson and Nancy. This Division had launched an immediate counterthrust which hit the oncoming attack of an American armored MS # A-999 -11- group„ The enemy armored group had. then carried out a daring raid be .

553 Volks Gren Div,, and had penetrated toward Chateau-Salins, which was defended by rear echelon units of 3 Pz Gren Div. The 553 Volks

Gren Div, activated only a few weeks previously,, had had no combat

i experience and was unable to withstand this development in the situal

Although the division front was not threatened and Corps was taking acJ against the tank advance toward Chateau-Salins, 553 Volks Gren Div had abandoned the Nancy salient and shifted r^orth to the area southeast of Pont-a-Mousson (see App 5)„ The ^hateau-Salins—Moyenvic sector was secured by rear echelon units of First Army. Between the left flank of First Army, west of Chateau-Salins, and the right flank of

Fifth Pz Army there was a 15 km gap in which about 60 enemy tanks were situated*

c. About 18 Sep 44, LVIII Pz Corps had begun to assemble

11 Pz Div and 111 and 113 Pz Brigs in the area southeast of Moyenvic.

d. The XLVII Pz Corps, whose successful counter­ attack at Luneville had been checked by an American thrust into its flanks at Gerbeviller, had been forced to take up defensive positions.

On 20 Sep 44, with 15 Pz Gren Div on the right and 21 Pz Div on the left, CDrps:.-d@fended the..sector northeast of Luneville~-Rambervillers 0

e. During the last few days, Nineteenth Army had lost no important ground. It was holding on the general line

Rambervillers-~east of Epinal—east of Remiremont—east of Lure. We had been fortunate in withdrawing the bulk of Nineteenth Army from southern France as well as substantial cconbat forces of LXIV Inf Corps • MS # A-999 -12- from the Biscay front,, '^he condition of these troops—Y/hich was . rather poor—will be discussed more thoroughly- later, The combat strength of the infantry in LX7I Inf Corps had b.een reduced to 600-70C men,, with only a few heavy weapons and antitank guns. Corps had scarcely three batteries of artillery.

13. Judging from the enemy situation* it could be assume.• that the main effort against A Gp G was at the junction of First Amy and Fifth Pz Army$ hence there was a danger of a strategic enemy break­ through toward the Saar area® On 20 §ep 44, A Gp. G received orders from OB In/EST to drive back across the Moselle the enemy force advancing in the Luneville area and to regain the sector Nancy-*~5harmes. The following units were available to A Gp G for a. counterattack:

• From First Army—-559 Volks Gren Div (relieved from the Moselle front north of Metz on 20 Sep 44.by 19 Volks Gren Div) and 106 Pz Brig,

From Fifth Pz Army—11 Pz Div and 111 and 113 Pz Bris^. all under LVIII Pz Corps.

XLVII Pz Corps east and southeast of Luneville was engaged in defensive action* The main body of 11 Pz Div had already been taken from

Nineteenth Army sector and no further weakening of this.front could. be tolerated. The assault group at our disposal—one panzer division, one infantry division, and three panzer brigades—was not sufficient for a thrust to regain the Moselle. More important was the imminent danger of a breakthrough in the gap between First Army and Fifth Pz

Army. Therefore, in the evening of 20 Sep 44, both armies received the following orders: MS # .-1-999 ' -13-

a. CI use the gap in the area of Chateau-Salins by attacking with the inner wings of both armies in the direction of

Moyenvic.

b.. Commit all available First Army forces, includ\-,j those- which can be made available by weakening the Moselle front north of Metz.

c. Discontinue the counterattacks against the enemy bridgehead at Corny arid add the forces now employed there to the atta

14. The attack to close the gap at Chateau --Sal ins - progr-e as follows:

Sine 559 Volks Gren Div could not be assembled bef or

23 Sep 44, it was excluded from the attack. The XIII S3 Inf Corps attacked in the morning of 21- Sep 44 with one regiment of 559 Volks

Gren Div, supported by five or six tanks from 17 SS Pz Gren Div. Thi attack was directed from the north astride the Moerchingen--Chateau--

Salins road. After bloody fighting, the enemy was cleared from the area north of Chateau—Salins and contact was established with our troops still in the town.

About 23 Sep 4-4, the entire 559 Volks Gren Div and

106 Pz Brig (only some eight tanks) were committed in an attack from the area west of Chateau—Salins. ^he mission was to occupy the Fore of Gremecey and secure the Seille sector to the south. After initial success in two days of bitter fighting in this forest, the attack was called off, and orders were issued to occupy positions on the north­ east edge of the Forest of Gremecey,

By 21 Sep 44, during the corresponding advance of MS # A-999 -14-

Fifth Pz Army with 11 Pz Div and 111 and 113 Pz Brigs, we had succe: in retaking Moyenvic and re-establishing contact with First Army. i:.. the following days, heavy fighting occurred in this area, especially for the towns Xanrey, Juvrecourt, and Rechicourt© In the course of one day, our own and enemy attacks alternated,, The losses within panzer units—especially in, tanks—due to enemy air attacks and to battles of attrition with 4 Armd Div (US) were not insignificant,

15• Continuation of the counterattacks ordered by OB WEB to reoccupy the Moselle on both sides of Nancy might well have proved fruitless—especially if we should have lost the strength necessary for future defensive action, OB WEST promised additional reinforce­ ments for the counterattacks, but these never arrived* One panzer brigade, en route to reinforce A Gp G, was rerouted to Arnhem for

defense against an enemy airborne operation. Army Group concluded that the forces available were too weak to attack Nancy, and proposed to OB WEST the elimination of the small enemy bridgehead at Pont-a-

Muusson with all available forces * Afterward we could pinch off in

detail the units in the larger bridgehead at Nancy—Luneville0 In the last days of Sep 44, the situation in the Aachen sector became

considerably more critical® Therefore, at the beginning of Oct 44,

OB WEST ordered 3»and 15 Pz Gren Divs to be transferred to A Gp B in the.Aachen sector* .Since the only replacement which had arrived was

416 Inf ^iv from garrison duty in Denmark, all intentions for a furthsr

attack had to be abandoned. Army Group concentrated on holding and fortifying the existing front, which had finally been linked together

in the Chateau-Salins area. MS # A-999 15-

Chapter Two

STRENGTHENING THE-DEFENCE FRONT

I. Defensive Measures Undertaken in the Quiet Period

16* During the middle of Sep 44, Third US Army had estab­ lished a large and a small bridgehead south of Metz and had defended them successfully against the counterattacks of First Army and Fifth

Pz Airmye In the first weeks of Oct 44, however, it appeared that the

American forces were being rested and rehabilitatedo Radio intercept v. or. and statements by American prisoners confirmed reports that replace-* ments were continually arriving in the Metz—Luneville sector. We also learned that the rest areas for the armored units were in the vicinity of Nancy® A Gp G estimated that, it would take at least three to four weeks to refresh the American forces and to bring up additional, enemy reinforcements and supplies. We believed that the enemy, upon completion of this rest period, would begin a new operation in A Gp G sector, with the main effort on both sides of Metz and directed toward the Saar area, ' ' •

17. Due to the transfer of two motorized divisions (3 and

15 Pz Gren Divs), the attack against bridgeheads south of Metz and east of Nancy could no longer be carried out. At this time it was of greater importance to strengthen the defense by erecting fortifications rather than to weaken our forces by further attacks. All panzer«-type MS # A-999 -16- units were disengaged and withdrawn 'behind the front» After the transfer of 3 and 15 Pz (Treri Divs to A Gp B, there remained, as mob±. reserves, 11 and 21 Pz Divs and 106 ?z Brig- The two panzer divisions were to be employed in the defense against -':he expected enemy thru nr. in Lorraine; 106 Pz Brig remained to protect the Belfort Pass*

18o Each stellungs (static) division was -ordered to c.rean- a reserve of infantry regimental strength. In this way^ the infant,'vj divisions were compelled, despite the great width of their sectors, t _ echelon their troops in depth. Moreover, they could trrin those elements in reserve, as training was still an urgent necessity for new replacements. The divisions were further ordered to prepare a main battle position against the expected enemy major attack*

19, Defensive fighting in the East and demonstrated that troops occupying the forward positions for many weeks—positions which become known to the enemy in detail prior to a major attack—are so- crushed by artillery and air attacks that they cannot defend themselve against the advance of enemy tanks or infantry. Army Group directed, therefore, that upon recognizing an enemy major attack, the main body

of the troops should fall back two to three km into prepared positions,

leaving only security forces to occupy the front lines. The artillery

likewise, was to displace to prepared positions deep in the main battle

position. These tactics would cause the' enemy to unleash his destruc­ tive fire on an empty area and our troops would be preserved for

defensive combat, The difficulty lay in recognizing the right moment

of the enemy major attack and in regrouping, our forces. MS # A-999 -17-

20. The higher commands knew that the West Wall situator to our rear had not been improved since 1340* As a matter of fact, some of the guns had been removed and sent to the Atlantic Wall.

Actually, the West Wall had become outmoded. These positions were o. psychological danger to the troops, who eyed the West Wall to their rear and expected it to be impregnable. Thereforeit was the intenti • of Army Group to delay and wear down the expected enemy thrust by the erection of additional fortifications in front of the West Wall (for the-map of the positions see App 7). OB T/ifEST had ordered the troops to construct positions as far back as Corps rear boundaries. From there on* construction was to be undertaken by higher headquarters«

This latter construction was under the direction of the General der

Pioniere (Chief Engineer) of OB WEST. We planned to reinforce the

Vogesen Kamm Stellung (Vosges Ridge Position) with fortifications concentrated principally at the Belfort Pass and the Saverne Gap.

For technical reasons, construction could not be started before the end of Nov 44. Therefore, the positions could not be fully utilized.

21. During Oct 44., Army Group received about 20 additional, battalions, which were distributed as security garrisons among the

West Wall, Maginot Line, and Vosges positions. These battalions were partially equipped machine gun and infantry units3 composed—in part — of older men with stomach and ear ailments. Consequently, these troops had a low combat efficiency# This was an unfortunate situation, but the weakness of the forces at the front caused us repeatedly to commit the bulk"of these security troops in the front lines. Army Group was MS # A-999 -18- • aware that these immobile units, placed in .positions known to them ii.v the Maginot Line and in the ?¥osges, oould perform much better than they could in the unfamiliar terrain of the forward area* An added difficulty was the inadequate antitank defense. Amy Group,, however, had no alternative due to the lack of reserves.

II. Condition of Personnel and Materiel

LXXXII Inf Corps (First Aimy)

22. The 416 Inf Div arrived at the beginning of Oct 44 from Denmark, where it had been stationed for two years. It had nob yet had any combat experience and its men were relatively old# It had two full strength infantry regiments, but only one light artillery battalion. One of the. original tv/o artillery battalions had been, reorganized by LXXXII Inf Corps as a 75 mm antitank battalion. This

Division received the nickname "Schlagsahne (whipped cream)" Division.

It was good only for defensive combat.

23. The 19 Yolks Gren Div had suffered losses of 15 to 20: percent of the personnel and materiel in its two regiments. The

Division still had about ten heavy antitank guns, one medium and two light artillery battalions in good; condition, but no self-propelled assault gunso It was a battle-tested division.

24* The Div Nr 462, at the request of OKH, gave up all its valuable officer and noncommissioned officer replacements. Two regiment? were practically dissolved by this measure (for the reorganization of . MS # A-999 -19- this Division, see par 37).

XIII SS Inf Corps (First Army)

25. The 17 SS Pz Gren Div, during its retreat from Frai.oo

saved only a negligible part of its personnel and materiel. By the

beginning of Oct. 44, both infantry regiments had been brought up to

strength* The Division combat efficiency, however, was greatly reducer:

because of inexperienced replacements and the loss of about 100 non­

commissioned officers as cadres for other units. The artillery was intr

The Division received no tank replacements, and since it had only six

tanks, it was suitable for defense only* ^

26. The 3 Pz Gren Div had two panzer grenadier regiment::,

of which the average company strength was 40-50 men. The artillery, flak, and pionier (engineer) battalions were intact. The panzer battali

had 15 vehicles; the panzerjaeger battalion 12 heavy antitank guns.

This was a battle-tested division, suitable for attack.

27 a The 553 Volks Gren Div had "been activated a short time

previously. It had seen action in the Nancy area; its personnel and

materiel were considerably reduced. At the end of Sep 44, the Division

received 3000 replacements from the Luftwaffe. During, the heavy Anericn

attack on 4 Oct 44, southeast of Pont-a-Mousson, the Division lost near"..

all its infantry, including the staff of 1121 Regt. The staff alone of

1119 Regt was barely rescued by a counterattack* The Division was not

capable of defense action at this time.

28. The 559 Volks Gren Div, also newly activated, had MS # A-999 -20- suffered losses north of Metz and in the Chateau-Salins area. Its artillery was in gbod order. This division performed well and was suitable for defensive action.

LYIII Pz Corps (Fifth Pz Army)

29. '^he 11 Pz Div, in spite of servere decaying actions i: southern France and west of Belfort and losses suffered at the end oi

Sep 44 near Chateau-Salins, still had its cadre personnel, its excep­ tionally we 11-functioning repair service, and at least 3000 men of the best replacements of Nineteenth Army (air force, and naval troops).

T'his Division, which was to be relieved, would have been a good assaiil4: division in a few weeks.

30. The newly organized 361 Yolks Gren Div arrived from

Germany at the end of 0Gt 44. It had the normal two infantry regiments, three artillery battalions, and one sturmgeschuetz (self-propelled assault gun) battery. So far, it had not been in action.

XLYII Pz Corps (Fifth Pz Army)

31. The. veteran 15 Pz Gren Div had arrived in the Metz area from Italy in the beginning of Sep 44. This Division, in spite of a 15 percent loss in personnel and equipment, was still in very good condition. It had about 20-30 tanks and its complete artillery. It was a suitable,assault division.

32. The 21 Pz Div had arrived from France in very poor condition, having lost nearly all its artillery. In the middle of MS f A-999 -21-

Sep 44, it had only one weak panzer grenadier regiment. In the begin­ ning of Oct 44, a second panzer grenadier regiment was assembled and weakened Division slowly regained its full strength* For the time being, it was suitable only for defensive action.

Nineteenth Army

33, Since most of the divisions of Nineteenth Army had lost a part of their equipment during the withdrawal from France,

Army combat efficiency fell to a minimum, The LXVI Inf Corps strength in infantry was approximately 600-700 men® It had one artillery battalion and a few heavy weapons and antitank guns. Kfgr von Oppen- in action in the Belfort pass, consisted of one ersatz (replacement) regiment from Wehrkreis V and one air force regiment. The latter also included naval unitsa The Kampfgruppe equipment and weapons were completely heterogeneous„ There was a critical shortage of heavy weapons and antitank guns.

34o Generally the condition of personnel and materiel in

A Grp G was very grave, > since Army Group was comprised for the most parr of units which at the beginning of Oct 44 were withdrawing from France

(For the Nineteenth Army situation in artillery personnel and materiel at the beginning of Oct 44, see App 8. For A Gp G wire communications net, see App 9).

III. Replacements and Reorganization

35o In the quiet weeks of Oct 44, we succeeded in reinfo? MS # A-999 -22- the divisions with new personnel and materiel® All gaps were filled from additional ersatz battalions. These replacements> however, were varied, as they were composed partly of young men selected from the air force and naval units and partly of unwilling older men frofai the zone of the interior. All, of course, needed basic training• The materiel of the artillery was quickly replaced# 'Aie tank situation improved as a result of the efforts of the dependable repair shops and because of replacements from the interior. By the end of Oct 44, the panzer and sturmgeschuetz situation had improved. Every panzer division was reinforced by about 30-50 armored vehicles, while every third infantry division was augemented by eight to ten self-propelled assault guns each.

36. Organizational measures were necessary to strengthen the front, Due to withdrawals and improvisations in defensive fight­ ing, units became partially mixed with one another or weakened greatly by heavy losses in personnel and materiel. It did not pay to reform these divisions.

37o At the temporary cessation ®f the fighting at Metz at the beginning of Oct 44, OKH requested the speedy withdrawal of all officer and noncommissioned officer replacements„ Army Group was forced to relieve several sicherungs (security) battalions from their West Wit11 and Vosges positions and send them to Metz under

Div Nr 462, This measure was necessary for the reorganization of the three regiments of the Division resulting from the transfer of the excellent, battle-tested officer and noncommissioned officer replace- MS # A-999 -23- ments. The defensive strength of the Metz garrison was reduced, not numerically, but in fighting efficiency#

38. In Nineteenth Army, some of the understrength divi-sions had to be combined® Also several Kampfgruppes were combined to form divisions. We began to organize a festungs (fortress) brigade in

Belforto The LXVI Inf Corps Headquarters, no longer required at the front, was ordere^ to supervise the duties and training of sicherungc battalions in the 'West Wall and Vosges positions.

39. The A Gp G panzer brigades (111, 112, and 113 Pz

Brigs—improvisations like the newly organized volks grenadier divisions) comprised one panzer battalion of 50 tanks, one panzer grenadier battalion equipped with armored personnel carriers, a panzerjaeger company, and a pionier company. These brigades had"no opportunity for unit training before going into combat. The troops had Arrived to fight for.the first time. Most of the commanders had not seen one another before. Therefore, it is not strange that these brigades did not prove effective, but even their composition was impractical. These brigades were an acknowledged compromise solution*

Consequently, at the request of A Gp G, all three panzer brigades were disbanded and were absorbed by panzer divisions. The only unit remaining intact was 106 Pz Brig.

40. In Bitsch and Colmar, Army Group began the construc­ tion of training camps for the half-trained air force and naval units.

After a four to six weeks1 training course, these troops were sent to the field as ersatz battalions. MS # A-999 -24-

IV. A Grp fe Operations (Oct 44)

41. Along the Army Group front during these weeks, the situation in general could be termed "quietIt was that lull in the fighting which the enbmy Required fbr resting units, bringing up additional forces, and preparing for the next operation* Still, the .small engagements along the front caused us enough difficulties.

(For the order of battle, and withdrawal and transfer of units during

Oct 44, see App 10. For the front lines and dispositions of First

Army and Fifth Pz Army, see App 11.)

42. The LXXXII Inf Corps Moselle front on both sides of

Thionville was suspiciously quiet. Corps outposts still remaining on the west bank were gradually pushed back. One of our strongpoints at

Contz-les-Bains was able to hold out until 7 Nov 44. About the end of Sep 44, Corps began to recieve a continuous flow of stragglers in both snail and large groups (up to 100 men), some of which had experienced many adventures. On 1 Oct 44, the 416 Inf Div, transferred from Denmark, relieved 48 Inf Div on the right wing of the Army Group..

The combat-exhausted 48 Inf Div was pulled back to an area north of

Delrne i^idge for a short rest.

43o In the Metz bridgehead, no extensive fighting occurrec during these weeks. As previously stated, the officer and noncommis­ sioned officer cnadidates had been hastily trnasferred. Since the new replacements were considerably weaker in fighting quality, our troops encountered great difficulties with every local enemy thrust* We ordered the abandonment of the positions in front of the fortress in MS # A-999 -25-

order to give the weak garrison a better hold in the permanent forti • fications to the rear®

44. On 20 Oct 44, enemy pressure increased in the vicinity

of Maizieres-les-Metz* LXXXII Inf Corps assembled an artillery grouL.

of about three battalions northeast of Metz to combat these attacks *

In spite of excellent targets along the entire Army front, the artillery

was forced to conserve ammunition0 ^he Army Group standard allotment for a light field howitzer was one and a half rounds of ammunition per day, and for a medium field howitzer, one round per day© Most ammuni­

tion trains went to A Gp B, which was engaged in heavy defensive fightingc.

A Gp G distributed its limited supply of ammunition at points where Hremy

power was being concentrated, and managed to conserve a certain amount for the expected enemy major attack. By the beginning of Nov 44, Army

Group had collected about two issues* of ammunition. In Oct 44, no

*Edl The German term is "Munitionsausstattung," which seems to cor­ respond, to the American term, nbasic load/*

extra ammunition supply for Fortress Metz was brought up.

45. A Gp G visualized the Metz bridgehead with its obsole1:^

fortifications as the key area for the imminent battle© Army Group

intended to exhaust the enemy major attack in new static defenses betweei,

the existing main battle position and the West Wall (see App 7). If

the first MLR should be lost, forces in Metz were to fall back to the

next line of resistance. A large gap, difficult to close, would be

created if the Metz forces were surrounded. However,, at the beginning

of the ^enemy attack south of Metz we changed our plans to comply with thf MS # A-999 -26-

orders of OKW to defend Metz to the utmost. This operation will be discussed later.

46o By order of OB WEST about the end of Sep 44, XIII f!S

Inf Corps released 3 Pz Gren Div to A Gp B. The 17 SS Pz Gren and 51V'-

Yolks Gren Divs extended their lines to fill the gap* The 553 Volks

Gren Div, badly mauled by oombat in the Nancy area, thus had to take

over an additional regimental sector from Momeny to south of Eply.

*he Division sector then extended west of Clemery—Manoncourt^-sur-Seil L

Lixieres—Serrieres-^Sivry—high ground at St Jean Toulon—Moivrons —~

Ajoneourt*-Han-*Malaneourt. At Malancourt the Division had contact with 559 Volks Gren Div.

47« Following local enemy attacks and our own counter­ attacks at Sivry, an attack began at 0630 on 4 Oct 44 against 553 Volks

Gren Div. About one infantry division and one armored division (6

Armd Div (US)) launched this attack. The 553 Volks Gren Div suffered very high casualties—approximately 2000 men. By the evening of the S^LG day, with supplemental Corps reserves, the Division stopped the attack just south of the former Division command post at Letricourt. During this dangerous situation, XIII SS Inf Corps requested permission to recommit 3 Pz Gren Div, which Was awaiting, transfer0 ^he request was

denied because the serious situation at Aachen demanded the immediate transfer of this Division. In the following days, several enemy attacks in XIII SS Inf Corps sector were repulsed; then the fighting in this

sector abated. Apparently -the enemy had launched the attack with only

a limited objective—the elimination of the German salient southeast MS # A-999 . / -27- of Pont-a-Mousson, a measure considered as the introduction to the major enemy assault.

48. '^he 553 Volks Gren Div was relieved between 13 ~ 15

Oct 44 by 48 Inf Div. This latter Division., which had arrived from

France almost completely destroyed, had received only a ten-day rest period* One regiment was reconstituted with fully trained men from a marsch (replacement transfer) battalion and was in action by 13 Oct 44.

The second regiment consisted of untrained Luftwaffe replacements which had to be given 14 days of training before commitment; The 553 Volks

Gren Div, which had sustained heavy losses on 4 Oct 44 and was still badly shaken, could not be granted even one day of rest. This Division had to relieve 15 Pz ^ren Div, urgently needed by A Gp B in the LVI.II

Pz Corps sector, and the transfer had to be completed by 18 Oct 44e

The 15 Pz Gren Div, from the beginning to the middle of Oct 44, exper­ ienced continuous heavy fighting in the Parrcy Forest# Here, the enemy succeeded in advancing slowly, and only after heavy losses on boty sideso The relief of 15 Pz Gren Div by 553 Volks Gren Div was carried out within the prescribed time, between 15 and 18 Oet 44. On 18 0ot 44, the 15 Pz Gren Div was transferred to A Gp B0 Simultaneously, 553 "Volks

Gren Div, in position, was reinforced with several festungs (fortress) infantry units and flak batteries, which were absorbed by the grenadier regiments. These troops had been destined to become security forces for the West Wall and V0SgeS positions and v/ere not suitable for front­

line fighting. At the end of 0ot 44, the 553 Volks Gren Div sector was

enlarged by taking over a part of the 11 Pz Div sector in the north and MS # A-999 -28-

a small part of the 21 Pz Div sector in the south* As a result, 553

Volks Gren Div had a frontage of almost 35 kilometers. It had no

self- propelled assault guns and only limited antitank defenses. The

artillery had four or five medium field howitzers and 14-16 light field

howitzers,

49# The newly organized 361 Yolks Gren Div arrived from

Germany at the end of Qdt 44. It relieved 11 Pz Div about the begin­

ning of Nov 44 so that an Army Group reserve could be established*

The 11 Pz Div was sent to the area northeast of Metz, where it could

support LXXXII Inf Corps on the Moselle front or XIII SS Inf Corps

south of Metz. The staffs of Fifth Pz Army and XLVII Pz Corps were

transferred to A Gp B on 6 and 10 Oct 44, respectively. The LVIII

Pz Corps was subordinated to First Army; and LXXXIX Inf ""Corps, which

on 16 Oct 44 had assumed command of the divisions formerly under

XLVII Pz Corps, was subordinated to Nineteenth Army® Because of the

transfer of the above named staffs, the already strained signal com­

munications situation became even worse (see App 9),

50*' In general, the enemy facing First Army was inactive

during Oct 44* In Nineteenth Army sector there were no particularly

large-scale attacks, but in seme places there were constant samll

attacks. At the end of Sep 44, after failing to push through the Bel-

fort Pass, the enemy shifted the main effort to the Middle and High

Vosges in order to push from there with battle-seasoned mountain

troops through the passes to Alsace, Enemy pressure continued at

Bruyeres (which was taken by the enemy on 16 Oct 44), Le Tholy, and MS # A-999 -29-

Le Thiloto In this period, Nineteenth Army managed either to hold its positions or to give up ground step by step* Only at Le Thilot did the enemy push into the so-called Vogesen SteHung (Vosges Position) during Oct 44, At that time 106 Pz Brig was committed*

fclo At the beginning of Nov 44, Nineteenth Army was re­ inforced by the arrival of 269 Inf Div from Norway0 This division was committed in the area of previous enemy pressure on. both sides of Le Thilo1 during the withdrawal of 338 Inf Div0 ^he latter Division was then employed in the southern sector of the Belfort Pass with the mission of absorbing all the scattered units there* The front was strengyhened by the addition of several stellungs' (static) battalions, artillery battalions, and medium and light festungs artillery battalions®

The festungs artillery battalions could be employed only in the Vogesen

Kamm Stellung (Vosges Ridge Position) because they were not mobile

(see App 8). It was expected that 708 VoIks Gren Div would arrive from Slovakia at the beginning of Nov 44. This Division was intended to replace 21 Pz Div, which was urgently needed as a reserve in Lorraine to repulse an expected major attack. MS # A-000 -50-,

Chapter Three ,

COMBAT FOR METZ A3D THE SAVFJRME GAP

52. The deeper implications of the fighting in Lorraine

and the Vosges can be properly understood only in relation to the

intentions of CKW and OB WEST at that time. Summarized* these inten­

tions were (a) preparation of our counteroffensive in the Ardennes and

assembly of the required forces and (b) formation of a strong OKW

reserve (premature commitment of these reserves would endanger our

attack plans). Everything was subordinate to this project; even

terrain losses were to be accepted. Each division on the Western

Front in OKW reserve could be committed only after the personal ap*--

proval of the Fuehrer. Because of this situation, A Gp G was obliged to prevent a breakthrough with only the weak forces under its control®

No additional reinforcements could be expected. On the contrary, we

had to expect the loss of the highly mobile divisions (11 Pz, 21 Pz, and 17 SS Pz Gren Divs) which were to be committed on the Ardennes

Front after a short rest. The general situation could be met only by an elastic, not by a rigid, defense. It was necessary for A Gp G to yield ground, while conserving its fighting potential as much as

possible. MS # A-000 -31-

I. A Gp Gr Estimate of the Enemy Situation (early Nov 44)

53. Opposite First Army and the sector previously.occup* ed by Fifth Pz Army, the enemy was strikingly quiet during the first half of Oct 44. Continuous relief and withdrawal of enemy divisions along the entire front confirmed our belief that the American forces were being rested and rehabilitated on a large scale.

54. During the second half of 0ct 44, the picture changed to a considerable extent* On the Moselle front, unusually quiet until then, our combat outposts on the west bank of the river were driven in.

Enemy artillery became noticeably more active (registration fire).

In the Thionville sector, prisoners from 10 Armd Div (US) were brought in. Ferrying equipment was observed on the river bank. Aie main con­ centration of the enemy forces in this sector was recognized to be west of Sierck and in the vicinity of Thionville.

55* In the Metz-Luneville sector also, enemy preparations again became more liv@ly,in the latter half of the month. Here, there had been two American attacks which were of special significance in the light of the campaign as a wholes

a. The attack on 9 Oct 44 southeast of Pont-a-Mousson with the objective of driving the German salient behind the beille.

b» The battle extending over a period of three weeks in the Parroy Forest, from which place our forces were still echeloned to the west.

These two offensive operations were considered preliminaries to a much larger offensive0 ^heir objective was to smash the two main anchors of MS # A-000 -32- the German front so tha+ the main drive through De?jne to Saarbruecken. could be carried out without a threat to the enemy flanks.

56. Farther north, enemy activity indicated a push from

Thionville in the direction of Bouzonville, with the objective of breaching the Maginot Line from the rear® We did not believe that

Metz would be attacked with heavy forces, since the direction of the thrusts indicated that the city would be by-passed,,

57. ^he enemy preparations took longer than had originally been estimated. It must be borne in mind, however, that exceedingly carefull preparations requiring considerable time are necessary for an attack against a known, strongly integrated defense system, with numerous fortified positions* This defense system included the Maginot Line, the dominant positions 03. the heights above the Saar, and finally, the

West Wall. 1

58* In contrast to the situation of First Army, there was no period of quiet in the Nineteenth Army sector during the month of Oct 44. After frontal attacks at the end of Sep 44 on the Belfort

Pass east of Lure had been repulsed, local but nevertheless fierce fighting occurred in the middle and latter part of Oct 44 in the vicinity of the most important entrances to the Vosges valleys. Mountain- troops attempted to push toward Le Thilot in order to open the Belfort Pass from the north. This attack, however, gained little ground. No special preparations for a large-scale assault on the Belfort Pass could be noted at the beginning of Nov 44. Nevertheless, there was a possibility of redoubled enemy pressure in this area, since the First MS # A-000 -33-

Fr Army still had two arnored divisions at its disposal,

59# In spite of the complete lack of air reconnaissance;, the German command knew in advance from active combat reconnaissance and, above all, from radio interception that an"enemy attack in the general area of Metz was impendingComparing the enemy situation to that at the beginning of Oct 44, we observed that, besides the . rehibilitation of known divisions, the enefciy had been 'reinforced by the addition of two infantry divisions and one armored division®

II. A Gp G Situation (early Nov 44)

60.. First &rmy had to absorb the force of the expected enemy attack in the Metz area, whereas in the Nineteenth Army sector west of the ^osges, there was no indication of an attack in strength®.

For this reason, the threatened Fj_rst Army received priority on rest­ ing troops and on reserves—as mush as our limited means would, allow•

(For the order of battle and situation of A Gp G ±n early Nov 44, see

App 1 and App 2).

61. The LXXXII Inf.C orps, whose remaining combat outposts west of the M0selle had been withdrawn north of Sierck on 7 Nov 44, had noted since the beginning of Nov 44 that enemy forces were concen­ trating southwest of Sierck and Thionville. This concentration was confirmed by interrogating prisoners. Moreover, river-crossing equip­ ment had been observed in readiness. Therefore, 416 Inf Div had

occupied the sector on both sides of Remioh with weak security forces and had concentrated the bulk of its troops on the left flank. Two MS # A-000 -34- artillery battalions of 416 Inf Div and three of 19 Voiles Gren Div hit. been massed along the boundary between the -two divisions® The LXXXIJL"

Inf Corps sent a panzer-zerstoerer (antitank rocket launcher) battalion to the area south of Sierck. This battalion contained three companios, each equipped with 50 ofenrohren (Ed: stovepipes—slang term for raketenpanzerbuechse9 rocket launcher)• Over 20*000 mines were laid fr om this area to suuth of Thionville, Army Group had allotted a large percentage of its available mines to LXXXII Inf Corps to block the expected enemy attack northeast of Thionville and to LXV (Eds LXXXV")

Inf Corps to secure the Belfort Pass. The 416 Inf Div had only one battalion in reserve behind its left flank; 19 Volks Gren Div had one regiment in reserve south of Kedange. Corps had no available tanks®

The 19 Volks Gren Div had one sturmgeschuetz (assault gun, SP) battery with a new consignment of 11 guns. A new arrangement was adopted whereby eight infantrymen were assigned as support for each gun and were forbidden to leave ntheir gunn for any other mission® From experience, sturmgeschuetz crews had learned the dangers of fighting with support infantrymen unknown to them. In the area west of • Merzig, a flak regiment was assigned the mission of protecting the Saar crossing from air attack and was at the same time incorporated into the artillery fire plan*

62. The situation in the Metz bridgehead had been compara­ tively quiet during the previous weeks, with the exception of enemy

pressure on Maizieres-les-Metz• Although Div Nr 462, allotted this

sector, was numerically up to strength; its troops were older men, MS # A-000 -35- poorly trained, and inadequately armed. The transfer of officer and noncommissioned officer candidates had been completed* Six battalions were committed and one was held in reservee The artillery consisted of two battalions with 32 fortress guns and one flak battalion# The::e were no tanks or sturmgeschuetz. As previously mentioned, we did not intend to utilize Metz as a fortress, but merely to incorporate it as a strongpoint in the existing defense system# No preparations were made to erect fortifications east of Metz, The only additional re­ inforcement was carried out with the means at han&. In general, the troops had artillery ammunition barely sufficient for one day. Army

Group had only one-half to one dayfs issue on hand—completely in­ adequate, of course, to cope with the anticipated large-scale attack,

Consequently, ammunition could often not be made available,.even for missions which would have proved worthwhile.

63. Opposite XIII SS Inf Corps at the end of Oct and the beginning of Nov 4-4, there was very little enemy activity. Interro­ gation of prisoners and the results of ground reconnaissance revealed, however, that there was•considerable replacement and reinforcement of enemy troops. whereas the Moselle Mver as the MLR in LXXXII Inf Corps sector was a considerable barrier, the Seille. Rive in XIII SS Inf

Corps sector could be considered as only a partial barrier and not a definite, continuous line of defense against oncoming tanks. There­ fore the defense in the latter sector had to be extended in greater depth* The main battle position was limited in the rear by the Delme

•^idge positions. Enemy preparations gave evidence of a strong .thrust MS # A-000 -36-

northeast toward Saarbrueoken. Replacement of materiel and men was undertaken to a certain extent in 17 3S Pz Gren Div and 48 Inf Divj the 559 Volks Gren Div was allotted only one ersatz (replacement) battalion. The artillery of these divisions was again complete, witn the exception of 48 Inf Div, which was short one battalion, ^he only division equipped with sturmgeschuetz was 17 SS Pz Gren Div, which had been allotted about 14 guns. In addition to the division artillery, two non-mobile battalions equipped with Russian 75 mm antitank guns were assigned to Corps. These battalions were to move into position behind the Delme Ridge0 The flak regiment assigned to Corps was lo­ cated about eight to ten km behind the MLR and was considered part of the artillery and antitank defense plan. One regiment was withdrawn from each divisions as an infantry reserve on orders of .^-rmy Group.

Because of the width of the division sectors in XIII SS Inf Corps area, only one battalion per division, with the exception of 17 SS Pz Gren

Div, could be released as a reserve* The reserve regiment of 17 SS

Pz ^ren Div was near Chericey, southeast of Metz0

64. The enemy situation opposite LXXXIX Inf Corps was similar to that opposite XIII SS Inf Corps. At the end of Oct 44, the

LXXXIX Inf Corps occupied the sector held previously by LVIII Pz Corps, the latter Corps having been transferred to A Gp B. At the end of

Oct and the beginning of Nov 44, the 361 Volks Gren Div, newly organized in the zone of the interior and composed of unseasoned troops, relieved

11 Pz Div south of Chateau-Salinso The adjacent 553 Volks Gren Div, to the south, was settling into its new position and filling up gaps MS # A-000 -37- in men and equipments This Division was not allowed a single day!s rest for trailing or preparation for the difficult mission before it.,

The Division possessed its organic antitank weapons> but had no sturmgeschuetz • The 361 Volks Gr'en Div^ on the other hand, had orie battery of sturmgeschuetz «>

650 The 11 Pz Div, which so far constituted the only res^:'^ . of A Gp G, was assembling northeast of Metzo Thiis Division reconnoitev in preparation for possible counterattacks in LXXXII Inf Corps sector on either side of Shionville, in XIII SS Inf Corps sector, and along the boundary between XIII XX Inf Corps and LXXXIX Inf Corps * Unfortunately* it had not yet proved possible to withdraw 21 Pz Div, on the right flank of Nineteenth Army., and to send it to Lorraine as a reserve for

A Gp G, as had been intended®

66. "In the Nineteenth Army sector, unlike the situation in the First Army sector, which was comparatively quiet during the entire month of Oct 44, there was always something going on. As previously mentioned, there was increased enemy pressure at certain points, principally against the mountain, passes, where the main effort frequently shifted. Nineteenth Army, too, seized the opportunity to carry out a large-scale regrouping of forces even though inactive sectors had to be recklessly uncovered,, '^he 106 Pz Brig, weak as it was in tank strength, acted as the "fire department"• Thus, the Nineteenth Army, despite the exhausted condition of many of its troops, succeeded again and again in preventing a threatened breakthrough and managed to hold the front before the Vosges fortifications* Constant fighting had been detrimental to MS # A-000 -38-

the recuperation of the troops involved, in the withdrawal from

southern France. Although it was possible to reinforce the divisions

with ammunition and personnel (see MS A-999, App 8), the continues;

heavy defensive fighting, especially the combat :n the woods near

Le Tholy, resulted in considerable losses on our. side. The replace- inents> inadequately trained; were quicikly used up;

67. Ihe condition of the Nineteenth Army divisions at

beginning of Nov 44 was briefly as follows:

a. The 21 Pz Div (to be withdrawn to Lorraine as

Army Group reserve and replaced by 708 Volks Gren Div) still had about

20 tanks. The Division had three artillery battalions equipped with

miscellaneous French and Russian guns. Therefore, ammunition supply

was &'distinct problem. The panzer grenadier regiments were complete

and adequate for a limited attack.

b. The 16 Inf Div, hit hard northwest of Epinal, had

received additional replacements, but still lacked heavy weapons#

The Division was suitable for limited defense.

c. The 716 Volks Gren Div had been so badly mauled in

southern France that it was only a weak Kampfgruppe.

d. The 198 Inf Div was the best division in Nineteenth

Army, but had suffered many casualties at Le Tholy. The artillery,

however, was in good condition.

e. The 184 and 338 Inf Divs were only weak Kampfgruppe

The former was due for relief# The 338 Inf Div, actually the Division

staff and a few remnants, was transferred to the Army left flank to MS # A-000 -39- absorb the scattered un^ts therfe and to reorganize in the Belfort an-.

fo The 269 Inf Div had been reconstituted with th.. >. regiments and the corresponding artillery from Norway a This Division was sent to the ifrost threatened sector 011 both sides of Le Tholy. was completely lacking in combat experience^ but was serviceable for defensive -combat.

g. The 159 and 189 Inf Divs in the Belfort pass s.> •[ had managed to fill up the gaps in their ranks caused by the fighting the Lure sector during the previous weeks. This replacement was pos­ sible because the division sectors were quiet. Both divisions were suitable for defensive combat.

After the transfer of 21 Pz Div and 106 Pz Brig to Lorraine, Nineteenth

Army had only one to one and a half sturmgeschuetz batteries, with a total of 10 to 15 guns,

68c A final survey of the troops strength available to A

G would lead to the following conclusions;

On the nine divisions controlled by Nineteenth Army,, only three, as far as strength and combat experience were concerned, were worthy of the name. The others, in general, were equivalent only to reinforced regiments. The situation in First Army was somewhat more favorable. Five of its nine divisions were suitable for defensive combat, and about two of these could be employed in a limited attack.

The condition of First Army was better because of ouv belief that the enemy intended a large-scale attack in Lorraine.

Therefore iirmy Group had quite deliberately made the First Army sector MS # A-000 -40- the focal point for replacement and recuperation of troops and had assigned, with reluctance, even 21 Pz Div and 106 Pz Brig to Lorraine for the impending defensive battle. Because of the general situation^

Army Group could not expect further support, and therefore decided to weaken Nineteenth Army in order to build up a defensive concentration in the First Army sector. First Army, on the whole, had completed its defensive preparations. However, it was impossible to withdraw

21 Pz Div from the front line at the same time as 11 Pz Div. The transfer of the former to the Metz sector before the enemy attack was launched was necessary if this front were to be defended successfully.

The disastrous consequences of the late arrival of 708 Volks Gren Div, destined to replace .21 Pz Div (on the boundary between the two armies!) as soon as the former completed its march from the Eastern Front, will be discussed later.

III. Combat in the Metz Area (8-16 Nov 44)

(The readerTs attention is directed to App 1 - A Gp G Order ,of

Battle, 9 Nov 44; App 2 - A Gp G Situation, 7 Nov 44; App 3 - A % $

Situation, 8 & 16 Nov 44; and App 4 - First Army Situation, 8-16

Nov 44)..

69. On 8 Nov 44, after a heavy artillery barrage lasting several hours, American infantry and tanks began to attack about 0800 on a broad front in the 48 Inf Div and 559 Volks Gren Div sectors and on the right flank of 361 Volks Gren Div. In. spite of our information obtained from prisoners, radio interception, and ground reconnaissance MS # A-000 -41- that the attack was scheduled to begin about this time, the enemy had made his final preparations with such cleverness and with such excel- local lent deception, that our/forces were taken by surprise.* Thus, the planned regrouping of units in the main battle position, discussed above, could not be undertaken. Nevertheless, the troops held up well under the assault. However, by the end of the day they had sustained numerous casualties as a result of the preliminary artillery barrage and the clever teamwork of the enemy infantry and tank groups, com­ prising some 30 to 40. tank's each. At the end of the first day, the enemy had penetrated our line in some areas to a depth of two or three kilometers. It was possible for us to prevent a complete breakthrough.

Army Group considered the most threatened point to be the junction between XIII SB and LXXXIX Inf Corps. Strong American tank forces had been committed at that point. T^e enemy succeeded in making a deep penetration, capturing Chateau-Salins; by the evening of 8 Nov 44 some elements had pushed forward through Moyenvic and had taken Marsal®

Army Group decided at this time to commit 11 Pz ^iv, located northeast of Metz in Army Group reserve, in a counterattack along the boundary between XIII SS and LXXXIX Inf Corps.

70* During the night of 8/9 Nov 44, the left flank of

17 38 pz Gren Div, which until then had not been attacked, was turned by a penetration to the Sehnen Stellung ("Tendon" Position) at the base of the salient in the 48 Inf Div sector at Louvigny—St Jure— southern edge of Bois de Secourt. The 559 Volks Gren Div, which had also been pushed back to the Sehnen SteHung on 8 Nov, moved its MS # A-000 -42- reserve battalion to Morville-les-Yie on the night of 8/9 Nov 44.

This battalion was to counterattack on 9 Nov 44 in order to regain the high ground to the south* Here the battalion met a group of enemy tanksas the Americans had continued the attack in the early morning hours of 9 Nov 44 against what, till then,, had been our center of gravity. 'Our counterattack was thus disrupted* The enemy widened his zone of attack to Louvigny in the 17 SB Pz &ien Div sector. The attack was supported by heavy air formations which rendered the move­ ment of our reserves almost impossible during daylight* Therefore, the counterattack by the reserve regiment of 17 SS Pz Gren Div to regain Louvigny and St Jure became unfeasible. Actually, the reserve regiment had to be committed to compensate' for the casualties sustained in the St Jure sector. By evening, XIII SS Tnf Corps had been driven back to the Delme Ridge positions at the rear of the main battle position and was holding on the line Sillegny--Vigny—Moncheux.—

Cote de Delme—»Tincry—Yaxy—north of Chateau-Salins, the latter town having been lost*

71. On 9 Nov 44, enemy pressure along the boundary of

LXXXIX Inf Corps was not as strong as that of the previous day* By evening of 9 Nov 44, the enemy situation seemed to have changed so that the most endangered locality was the point where the enemy had penetrated 559 Volks Gren Div and had taken Yiviers and Fonteny.

First Army had originally intended, to assemble 11 Pz Div northeas of Chateau-Salins for an attack in the direction of Moyenvic. The reinforced aufklaerungs (reconnaissance) battalion of the Division had MS # A-000 -43- already moved during the night of 8/9 Nov 44 to the area south of

Hampont ill order to secure the assembly area. Because of the threaten­ ing situation in 559 Volks Gren Div sector, the main body of 11 Pz

Div was ordered (in the late afternoon of 9 Nov 44) to move during the night of 9/l0 Nov 44 into the Foret de Chateau-Salins and to be in a position to attack towards the east (sic) on the following day#

A reserve regiment of 553 Volks Gren Div was moved to the right flank of 361 Volks Gren Div.

72. In the morning of 9 Nov 44, the enemy began a large offensive north of Met-z against LXXXII Inf Corps (see :App 5). After laying down a heavy artillery barrage at Sierck and north of Ihionville the enemy, with the aid of assault boats, established a local bridge­ head at Mailing* In this instance, too, the enemy had obtained tactical surprise. Against increasing resistance on the first day, the enemy strengthened the bridgehead and captured the villages of Mailing,

Hunting, Metrich, Kerling, and Koenigsmacher» '£he fort at Koenigsmacher was still holding out. Late in the afternoon, we counterattacked the bridgehead from the northeast with one battalion and from the southeast with two battalions supported by about ten sturmgeschuetz• ^he objective was to throw back across the Moselle &iver the enemy troops in the bridgehead, which at that time consisted soley of infantry.

(See App 6.) This counterattack confused the enemy somewhat but did not succeed in its purpose because of the effective and coordinated fire of the American artillery#. Losses—both in personnel and equip­ ment—in the attack force due to enemy air action, even while assembling MS # A-000 -44- for the attack, had net "been inconsiderable.. Some of the sturm- geschuetz were also put out of action. An added difficulty was that the preceding American attack was launched against the_boundary between 19 Vclks Grren and 416 Inf Divs. Theref O'-e, it was not easy to ^ provide sufficient troops for our own counterattack, which had to be directed by Corps, ^he enemy also entered Uckange on our side of the

Moselle, but we were able to prevent an expansion of this local crossing.

73. After the failure of our counterattack, it was clear to Army Group that First Army lacked sufficient forces to eliminate the eneijiy bridgehead at Metrich. A request was therefore made to

OB WEST for another panzer division to perform this mission. After more than a day of wrangling with QKW, we were allotted Kfgr 25 Pz

Grren Div, which had been resting east of Trier. The Kampfgruppe could not be expected to arrive before 11 Nov 44«

74. During the night of 9/l0 Nov 44 and on 10 Nov 44, the enemy reinforced the bridgehead at Mailing. We harassed the movement somewhat by artillery fire on the crossing, and the enemy was not able to widen the bridgehead to-any considerable extent. The fort at

Metrich, which had been able to. hold out behind the eneray lines until this time, was finally taken. Enemy troops forced their way into the fort at Koenigsmacher, although some of the German troops in the casemates there continued to defend themselves. Several enemy attempts to make a crossing in the Thionville sector were effectively repulsed,

The situation at Uckange remained unchanged. The LXXXII Inf Corps MS # A-000 -45- :

further v/eakened the Moselle front north of the large enemy br idgeh^F 1

by the withdrawal of more troops. The only forces remaining in this

sectoi*> as far north as the Army boundary., were security troops in

battalion strength;

75. The situation of XIII SS Inf Corps on 10 Nov 44 war. a?

follows s

There was no action on the right wing and in the cen'ze

of 17 SS Pz Gren Div. The left wing had been pushed back to the line

Si1legry—Goin. Opposite 48 Inf Div, which had been hard pressed

by the heavy defensive fighting of the two previous days, the enemy,

apparently with the assistance of fresh tank forces, had penetrated

about six km in the direction of the Nied crossing at Lemud. The

villages of Vigny, Buchy, and Soigne had been lost. The 48 Inf Div

on the Delme &idge was overrun by this tank attack and was more or

less badly mauled. The counterattack by the main body of 11 Pz Div

from the Foret de Chateau-Salins made good progress at first. Viviers

was retaken, and about 30 enemy tanks were knocked out during the

engagement# However, the attack had to be suspended that evening

because strong enemy armored Elements had pushed in rear of the

Division. The Division was obliged to withdraw to its original

position. In general, 559 Yolks Gren Div had been able to hold its

position ahainst strong enemy attacks.

76. The A Gp G situation in the evening of 10 Nov 44 was v. as . follows:

The large enemy bridgehead at Mailing was being MS # A-000 -46- constantly strengthened* It could be presumed that the enemy would goon construct a bridge across the river in order to send strong tan. , forces from this sector to the east., Therefore it was Urgent to launch the attack of Kfgr 25 Pis G^en £>iv as quickly as possible.

Unfortunately, however* this force was held up by lack of fuel. Since the first elements could not be expected to arrive until the next morning, our counterattack could not begin until late afternoon of the next day. As vjas to be expected, the situation in the Metz sector was still quiet. The intention of the enemy to take the whole of this great area from the south could be clearly discerned, for south of

Metz new tank forces had attacked the Delme &idge position in the direction of Lemud, on the Nied, The defeat of 48 Inf Div had rendered the situation at this point very dangerous, It was surprising that the enemy did not push farther ahead during the afternoon, of this day of bad luck for 48 Inf ^iv, since there were very few troops to stop the advance. The 106 Pz Brig, arriving from Nineteenth Army, was available to close the gaps. Having only two or three serviceable tanks, this unit could be regarded only as a mobile aufklaerungs

(reconnaissance) battalion, Nineteenth Army was ordered to relieve

21 Pz Div with the advance elements of 708 "Voiles Gren Div which had arrived on 9 Nov 44* We intended to transfer 21 Pz Div to XIII S3

Inf Corps, but the division could not be expected to arrive in that sector before 12 Nov 44, Strong enemy pressure northwest of Chateau-

Salins was partly mitigated by committing the battle-seasoned .11 Pz

Div, The first local enemy thrusts (10 Nov 44) in 553 "Volks Gren Div" MS # A-000 -47-

s-e.ctor (near Leintrey) and heavy artillery fire during the evening were evidence of an imminent lai^ge^soale attack* No Special troop movements or othei* signs of a proposed attack could be detected

opposite Nineteenth Army.

IV, Developments in the Situation (11 - 13 Nov 44)

77, The enemy apparently succeeded during the night of

lo/ll Nov 44 in throwing a bridge across the Moselle to the bridge­

head at Mailing, for on 11 Nov 44 tanks made their appearance for the first time at this point. Enemy pressure became noticeably stronger*

and the bridgehead was expanded, At the same time* the decisive heights

north of Kerling'as'well as the fort at Eoenigsmacher were lost. The

Kfgr 25 Pz Gren Div, urgently needed for our proposed counterattack,

arrived piecemeal because of a shortage of fuel for vehicles, so that

the attack had to be postponed until 12 Nov 44, A reconnaissance was

made on 11 Nov 44 in preparation for the counterattack. Budling was

selected as the assembly area of the Kampfgruppe, The front lines at

Thionville and Uckange remained unchanged—our defense had stiffened*

The drain on the ammunition supply of LXXXII Inf Corps, by this defense

was considerable. There was no activity in the vicinity of Metz that

day,

78. In the XIII SS Inf Corps sector, the enemy made a

heavy tank thrust against 106 Pz Brig (which had been committed in the

gap previously occupied by the battered 48 Inf Div) on both sides of

Buchy, and against the left wing of 17 SS Pz Gren Div, The enemy MS if A-000 -48- then succeeded in deepening the penetration already made in this area and pushed forward, through Beux^-iitibs almost as fa £ as the Nied south of Sani^y^sur^Niedo However, the set or on both sides of Groin was able to hold out against weak attacks toward the north* Farther north, the situation was quiet» The first elements of 21 Pz Div arrived on

11 Nov 44, about evening• Under the command of 21 Pz Div, these elements,, together with 106 Pz Brig, were dispatched to Sanry-sur-

Nied—-Han-sur-Nied, with the mission of holding the bridgehead south of the Nied,

The counterattack of 11 pz Div in the direction of

Delme made no progress on this day, but it did keep the enemy from, making any headway in the area west of Foret de Chateau-Salins• On the other hand, an enemy push along the Seille in the direction of

Moerchingen reached Haboudange—'Conthil, The left wing of 559 Volks

Gren Div sustained heavy casualties in this engagement.

79. Only the right wing of LXXXIX Inf Corps has so far been attacked# The reinforced aufklaerungs battalion of 11 Pz Div and;, adjoining it on the south, one regiment from 553 Volks Gren Div

(this regiment under the command of 361 Yolks Gren Div) were on the line Lidrequin, six km south of Moerchingen—due east of Chateau-Voue—

St Medard—Juvelice.

80® In our estimate of the situation on the evening of

11 Nov 44, we had to bear in mind the following developments:

a-* A deep penetration had been made by enemy tanks at Aube, on the Nied, Here, the first elements of 21 Pz Div were MS # A-000 -49-

already arriving*

b. -he enemy puah of that day along the Seille in

the direction of Moerchingen and against the boundary between XIII

SS and LXXXIX Inf Corps had breached the line south of Moerchingen.

We regarded this situation as the most critical at that time. We

decided to withdraw 11 Pz Div from northwest of Foret de Chateau-

Salins and attach it to LXXXIX Inf Corps for a counterattack on

12 Nov 44 in order to restore the situation south of Moerchingen.

Since 559 Volks Gren Div could not hold the' salient in the Foret de

Chateau-Salins alone and unaided, it was ordered to withdraw to the

line Fremery--Dalhain.

c, The large-scale attack by Seventh US Army began

on 11 Nov 44 in the Saverne Gap after heavy artillery preparations,

^he 553 Volks Gren Div was able to maintain its position in general.

On the other hand, farther.south, the enemy succeeded in driving a wedge deeper into 708 Volks Gren Div, which had just relieved 21 Pz

Div.

&rmy Group, however, decided to carry out its original decision to

make the vicinity of Metz the main point of. concentration for the

defense. In any case, A Gp G had no more troops available to reinforce

the newly threatened areas.

81« In the LXXXIIInf Corps sector, Kfgr 25 Pz Gren Div

assembled in the vicinity of Budling during the night of ll/l2 Nov 44.

This Kampfgruppe was composed of one panzer battalion with about ten

tanks, two panzer grenadier battalions, and two artillery battalions. MS # A-000 -50-

The counterattack launched by this Kampfgruppe in the morning' of

12 Nov 44 recaptured Kerling and pushed on to Petit Hettange. At

Petit Hettange, however, our attack met an American counterattack by- tanks and infantry, and our troops were driven back to Kerling. The enemy artillery fire was very effective and caured the Kampfgruppe a great many casualties. About noon the enemy resumed the attack on a broad front in this bridgehead* The attack was directed south and captured the villages of Valmestroff, Elzange, and Oudrenne. At

Thionville, also, the Americans were able to enlarge their local crossings and to take Fort Juitz.

82., In the XIII SS inf Corps sector17 SS Pz Gren Div was withdravm to the line pournoy la Chetive— Pournoy la Grasse—

Orny—Sorbey in order to effect an economy of forces. This line was held against weak enemy attacks on 12 Nov 44. During the night the

Americans seized the bridge at Sanry-sur-Nied undamaged and estab­ lished a bridgehead extending to the edge of the "woods two km north­ east of Sanry-sur-Nied. The enemy was driven back, to some extent^ by the counterattack of 17 SS Pz Gren Div early on 12 Nov 44, but heavy artillery fire prevented our troops from reaching the bridgehead. At about 2200 hours on 12 Nov 44, a German combat patrol penetrated into the village of Senry-sur-Nied, but was unable to blow up the bridge as ordered. The advance elements of 21 Pz Div arriving during the night

of ll/l2 Nov 44 had to be committed.at onoe to defend the northern: bank of the Nied in the sector on. both sides of Lemud. The aufklaerungs troops of 106 Pz Brig still holding in the Reuiilly area, were driven MS # A-OOO -51-

back over the river on 12 Nov 44. Opposite 48 Inf Div, the enemy was

able to build a local bridgehead on the Nied at Han-sur-Sied and

Vatimont. The 559 Volks Gren Div, in gene;:ali maintained its positions,,

83* In the LXXXIX Inf Corps sector, k counterattack by

11 Pz Div, laundhed from the Moerchingen area^ reoaptured the villages

of Haboudange and Conthil. The Divisions destroyed many armored per­

sonnel carriers and closed the gap between XIII 8S Inf Corps arid

LXXXIX Inf Corps .by this attack. Only local action took place in

the 361 Volks Gren Div sector#

84. On 13 N0v 44-, Kerling-, in the large bridgehead, was

lost. Because of the large expansion of the enemy bridgehead, LXXXIX

Inf Corps was able to engage in local counterthrusts only. The enemy

succeeded in linking up the large bridgehead with the crossing site

at Thionville-#

85. During the night of 12/l3 Nov 44 the sector from the

Moselle at Corny up to ahd including Bois de l'Hopital, which had been

occupied by festungs machine gun battalions (up till this time under

17 SS Pz &ren Div), was now subordinated to the Division at Metz. The

new boundary between 17 S3 Pz Gren Div and 462 Volks Gren Div was

along the Metz—Chateau-Salins road. This road was included in the

sector of 462 Volks Gren Div. The enemy had apparently withdrawn

sizable forces during the night of 12/l3 Nov 44 from the Nied sector

and had regrouped these troops in the area south of Bois de I'Hopital,

because an attack to the north was launched for the first time in

this area with strong forces early on the: morning of 13 Nov 44. The MS # A-000 -52-

Americans pushed back our forces to the line Cuvry—Pouilly—norther;.i parts of Bois de I'Hopital—Sorbey. Opposite 17 SS PE Gren Div, which had been engaged in very fierce fighting on the two previous days at Sanry-sur-Nied, the situation was comparatively quiet on

13 Nov 44. The left wing of the Division was at Bazoncourt.

86. All the elements of 21 Pz Div had arrived by this time. The Division was in poor condition,. having just sustained very heavy casualties in the withdrawal from the sector south of Saverne.

By an unfortunate coincidence, the withdrawal had occurred at the moment the Americans attacked in force in the Baccarat sector and north thereof. The 21 Pz Div had arrived with eight tanks, only thre of which were serviceable. The four panzer grenadier battalions had been severely beaten; the strength of each battalion was only about

60-70 men. The Division was able to hold its position on 13 ^ov 44 against a fairly weak enemy attack, but had to pull back its left wing to the southeast edge of Bois de Censitaire, as the enemy had considerably enlarged the bridgehead in front.of 48 Inf Div by taking the villages of Han-sur-Nied, Herny, and Vatimont. Therefore, 559

Yolks Gren Div had to "withdraw to the line Lesse-Outremont Ferme--

Brehain—Dalhain. On the afternoon of 13 Nov 44, the first elements

(one battalion) of 36 Volks Gren Div (transferred from Holland by

OB 0EST) arrived and were sent to the .area southwest of Falkenberg.

We intended to commit this Division in a counterattack with the

objective of regaining the Nied sector at Han-sur-Nied.

87. In the LXXXIX Inf Corps sector, 11 Pz Div was able MS # A-000 -53- hold its position, with th6 exception of Haboudange, which was l®st to the enefriy© Only local fighting took place in the woods at Neu

Koecking. The 48 Inf Div and 550 Volks Gren Div has suffered most by the large-scale American attack. All that remained of these divisions was one weak regemental group each,, These groups were combined to form Kfgr Muehlen under the Commander of 559 Volks Gren Div* The

Division staff and supply troops (Versorgungstruppen) of 48 Inf Div were withdrawn#

V0 Developments in the Situation (14 - 16 Nov 44)

880 "Within, the large Moselle bridgehead north of Metz the enemy was comparatively quiet on 14 Nov 44. It appeared that more tank units were being brought up and prepared for action. On 14 Nov 44, the re&l attack on fortress Metz began after strong enemy forces had worked their way foreard from the south to within six km of the out­ skirts of the city. (For the strength of the garrison, its condition, and the tactical operations see MS jf' B-079, Genlt Kittel, Heinrich.) .

In the opinion of A Gp G, Fortress Metz was obsolete, ^he fortifications for the most part dated back to the year 1944, Most of the artillery protected by armored cupolas had been sent to the Atlantic Wall in 1940. fAiere were only about 30 of these guns remaining in the entire fortress* The fortress works themselves were used more for the storage of guns than for the purposes of modern warfare. In addition, the individual works were not integrated into a defense system* For these reasons, Metz was not a fortress whose facilities would permit a MS # A-000 -54- weak force to hold out against a strong force for a protracted period it was not really a fortress at all, in the true sense of the word#

A Gp G had intended, therefore, to use Metz only as a strongpoint in the existing system of fortifications; and* in case of a withdrawal along the entire defense line, to abandon Metz« Consequently, the supply plan for Metz was the same as for the other sectors of Army

Group. It was only after the enemy attack had already been launched

(about 10 Nov 44) that the Fuehrer ordered the fortress to be held at all costs--to the last cartridgee Only then was Metz organized for all-around defense and the other fortresses to the east of the city prepared for fierce resistance* It was evident that no really thorough changes could be made in the few days remaining# Therefore, we at­ tempted to furnish Metz with rations and ammunition sufficient for three to four weeks of resistance. It was possible to arrange for two issues of ammunition to be made to the artillery, although the infantry did not fare quite so well in the way of munitions. On 14 Nov. 44, a supply train arrived with rations sufficient for three or four weeks.

Owing to developments in the situation, however,... the neecied supplies could be delivered only to certain forts. St Privat, for example, had supplies sufficient for only eight days. Ihe 462 Volks Gren Div, which garrisoned Metz, had been reconstituted with festungs machine gun and festungs infantry battalions after the transfer of the officer and noncommissioned officer candidates. The Division was now complete with men and equipment, but it lacked the necessary training and combat experience. On 12 Nov 44, three additional festungs machine MS # A-000 -55- gun battalions were subordinated to 462 Voiles Gren Div on the southern front, so that, with a Reichsarbeitsdienst (Reich Labor Service) battalion and a Volkssturm battalion, the combat strength of the. garrison was about 10,000 men, No mobile a;roup of tanks or sturm- geschuetz was allotted, as Army Group was unwilling to lose unneces­ sarily the service of such mobile and very valuable units0 For anti­ tank defense there was one antitank battalion and only one flak battalion.

The artillery consisted of two artillery battalions and 3.0 turret guns0 In addition, 48 German and Italian heavy ingantry

T howitzers arrived on 15 I\ ov 44 and were sent to the southern front0

On the whole, the measures instituted for a protracted perimeter defense at Metz were initiated in earnest only a few days before the

American attack started, and, therefore, the defense was inadequate in every respect„

89o After Maizieres-les-Metz had been taken by local assaults in the first few days of fighting, the main attack on Fortress

Metz began on 14 Nov 44, from the north, The enemy gained control of the Fever Ridge, which commanded the area. Extensive use of smoke by the enemy, aided by the" misty v\reather, made it almost impossible for our artillery to intervene effectively. An enemy pushed from the west captured the Manee'mill shortly before midday. Enemy forces of battalion strength infiltrated through the terrain, which was almost impenetrable to the eye* The villages of Ouvrages de Jussy and St

Hubert, which had not been occupied by our own troops, fell into the MS # A-000 • -56- hands of the enemy. The Commandant of committed a fusilier

(infantry) regiment which had been held in reserve; the sector commaii. had been unable to clear the area because of insufficient troops, Jn the meantime, however, the situation in the northern sector of Metz grew progressively worse. The enemy penetration-—in places several kra deep—was sealed off only after it had reached St Remy—Bellevue,

By this time it was evident that the concentric attack on Metz was meant to be started on 14 Nov 44, for in the forenoon of that day

American troops moved in from the south against the city, The attack, however, gained ground very slowly,

90, In the right sector of XIII SB Inf'Corps, where 17 S3

Pz Gren and 21 Pz Divs were located, only local thrusts were carried out. These were repulsed, In the 48 Inf Div and 559 Yolks Gren Dis­ sectors, however, the enemy continued heavy attacks and took Many,

Arraincourt, Brulange, and ^arthille. In the 11 Pz Div sector of

LXXXIX Inf Corps, Moerchingen was lost about noon. On the evening of

14 Nov 44, Corps,, with 11 Pz Div on the. right and 361 Volks Gren Div on the left, held a line north of Moerchingen—west of Bensdorff— west of Dieuze—Gmmeray, It was clear that the enemy main effort was in the right sector of LXXXIX Inf Corps, The fighting in the wooded, terrain northwest of Dieuze was only local in character and the situa­ tion was relatively quiet on the left wing®

91, The main body of 36 Volks ^ren Div was at that time- assembled southwest of Falkenberg, The movement of this Division was a considerable achievement for the ro.il system, which, in spite of MS # A-000 -57- repeated and heavy enemy air attacks, had contrived-to bring the trco to within a few km of the front liner A Gp G ordered 36 Volks Gren

Div to counterattack in close formation at Han-sur-Nied and southeast thereof and to retake this area. However, the main body of the

Division was already engaged in protecting the unloading of troops at

Man and was very hard pressed. A Gp G finally consented to allow the

Division to be used for defense. On the night of 14/15 Nov 44 the

Division was allotted the sector previously occupied by 48 Inf Div— from Foret de Remiliy (excl) to Thionville (incl). The remnants of the almost annihilated 48 Inf Div were assigned to 559 Volks Gren Div

(Kfgr Muehlen.)

92e The situation at Fortress Metz was deemed very serious

By concentric attacks from the north, west, and south, the enemy had achieved many penetrations, especially south of Maizieres-les-Metz•

The 38 Pz Gren Regt of 17 SS Pz Gren Div (released the previous night) was subordinated that afternoon to the Commandant of Metz, with the mission of clearing the area south of Maizieres-les-Metz. As only a few vehicles were available, the regiment was transported to Metz after a delay of several hours• On 15 Nov 44 enemy v.ank formations attacked from &erling, in the direction of Merzig, but gained only about three kilometers. Otherwise the situation in this large bridge­ head remained unchanged* In the northern sector at lvietz the situation remained strangely quiet, in spite of the notable success of the enemyo It was then possible, with the aid of elements of 38 Pz ^ren

Regt from 17 S$ Pz Gren. Div, one Reichsarbeitsdienst battalion and a MS # A-000 . -58- polizei (police) battalion, to build up a new front on both sides of

Woippy* To the west of the fortress,, attempts by the enetiiy to establish contact with the troops surrounded at St Hubert 'were repulsed. Heavy enemy pressure on the southern front of Metz continued unabatede

Pouilly and Mecleuves were captured* In the evening, American infantry, supported by small 'detachments of tanks, pushed into Augny. In the same manner, the enemy took possission of Bois de Crepy and Fort

Chesny-Nord.

The only contact of 17 SS Pz Gren Div with the attack on Metz was by increased enemy pressure in the north--Sorbey was lost©

Otherwise, the situation of 17 SS Pz Gren Div and 21 Pz Div remained unchanged. On the other hand, the enemy attack in force along the line south of Falkenberg—•*Moerchingen, in the direction of Saargemuend, continued unabated. The 36 Volks Gren Div bore the brunt of the attack*

Personnel and materiel losses in. this Division were exceedingly high.'

However, in general, we were able to maintain our position.by counter­ attacks. Only Thicourt and Thimonville were lost* The 11 Pz Div, in the LXXXIX Inf Corps sector, was able to maintain its position.. This battle-tested division fought as valiantly as always.

93o On 16 Nov 44, the enemy succeeded in widening the northern section of the bridgehead north of Metz. By evenings the enemy had reached the line KIrsch-les-Sierck—Evendorf. The 19 Volks

Gren Div also reported increased enemy pressure from Thionville and

Uckange toward the southeast. This division withdrew all available elements from the Moselle front in order to absorb the force of the MS # 4-000 -59-

; enemy pressure along the line Buding— Metzervissea Weak security forces were left at Argency and -Antilly. This meant that a direct threat to Metz from the northeast had already developed*

94o It was not until afternoon that the enemy began an attack in battalion strength on Metz from the no.'th—from Le': Maxe,

The attack was repulsed. As a result,of an attack in strength north

of Woippy directed to the west, the villages of Norroy, Plesnois, and

Vignuelles were lost* This situation, constituting a threat to the rear, rendered the position of 1010 Sioherungs Regt, occupying the sector to the east and northeast, untenable# Therefore, the Com­ mandant of Metz ordered a withdrawal to the line Plappeville-—Leipzig

Farm, The withdrawal was to take place during daylight, the weather and the densely wooded terrain favoring the movement# Woippy was lost that evening# South of Metz, Marly was lost in the morning. With the. aid of the Voikssturm and elements of a festungs machine gun battalion, the line St Privat--8eille—Schleife was sealed off at Magny. Farther west,, Fort Verdun was surrounded. An American attack from Augny toward the north threatened the position of the machine gun battalion at that al point, A counterattack by a bati^-on of 38 Pz G-ren Regt disengaged this machine gun battalion, which was then able to establish a new front along the railroad embankment just north and southwest of Metz.

During the evening, the enemy penetrated into Magny and took the village

of Peltre. Because of the confused situation northeast of Metz, a

newly arrived festungs infantry battalion was dispatched to Fort

St Julien as security troops. The 38 Pz &ren Regt, with all its US # A-000 -60- elements, was withdrawn from Frontigny and reassembled at Fort

Bellecroix in the eveningo

The situation of XIII SS Inf Corps remained unchanged.

Unusually heavy pressure was felt in the sectors of 36 Volks Gren

Div and &fgr Muehlen. No change occurred in the situation of LXXXIX

Inf Corps. s

VI. Beginning of the Offensive Against the Saverne Crap (11 -» 16 Nov 44-.)

95. During the first days of the heavy defensive battle in the Metz area, the Nineteenth Army front remained comparatively quieto

In the middle Vosges and in fthe vicinity of the Belfort Pass no fighting of any particular significance took place. However, a great defensive battle, lasting all day of 10 Nov 44, commenced in the area

Baccarat-~St Die—Bruyeres. The enemy moved forward very slowly. It was possible to withdraw forces from less threatened areas and thus prevent further penetrations.

96. On 11 Nov 44 the enemy began the large-scale attack against 553 Volks Gren Div sector and against the former sector of 21

Pz Div* The newly constituted 708 Volks Gren Div, formed in Slovakia, had arrived in the Baccarat sector during the night of 9/10 Nov 44 to relieve 21 Pz Div, urgently needed for the defensive battle south of

Metz. The arrival of 708 Volks Gren Div at this particular time had a

disastrous effect on the situation along what had been the First Army—

Nineteenth Army boundary. The 553 Volks Gren Div consisted for the

most part of untried replacements (five battalions in all), since it MS # A-000 -61- had been required to transfer a regiment to 361 Volks Gren Div on

8 Nov 44. Reconnaissance by 553 Volks Gren Div discovered extensive enemy preparations in the woods southeast and east of Limevilie. The replacement of 79 Inf Div (US) by 44 Inf Div (,US) was discerned at the end of Oct 44, and Array Group concluded that 79 Inf Diif (US), after a rest, might be employed in the great attack on Lorraine. The many forays carried out on 10 Nov 44 in the sector Blanaont—Baccarat by enemy combat patrols and the increase in intensity of the American artillery fire in this sector during the evening left no doubt in our minds that a large-scale attack was about to be launched here as -well*

The fire of. the enemy artillery continued during the entire night and increased to greater violence towards morning, between 0700 and 0800,, on

11 Nov 44# Surprisingly, however, it was not until about 1000 hours that the enemy infantry started to attack at several places (at each place in the strength of one to two battalions) with the main effort west.and southwest of Blamont, Only southeast of Leintrey did they manage to penetrate our line, which was restored by counterattack„

By the evening of 11 Nov 44, the 553 Volks Gren Div was in control of its MLR*

97• Less favorable was the situation on the right wing of

708 Volks Gren Div, which had been engaged at the start of the enemy attack of 11 Nov 44* Relief of 21 Pz Div was not yet completed, so that the- enemy attack was launched against troops who were not only unprepared for defense, but were also without battle experience. The relief., which was to take place on the night of 9/10 Nov 44, was MS # A-000 -62-

delayed because one regiment of 708 Volks Gren Div, through an oversigir;

had been sent in to the line on the left wing of 553 Volks Gren Div.,

This regiment was withdrawn as speedily as possible on the night of

ll/l2 Nov 44 in order to relieve the remaining elements of 21 Pz Div

(see MS =jj= B-379, Genlt Bruhn, J.ohaimes)«

98. ^he enemy made deep penetrations near Reclonville

and Hablainvillej the village of Ogeviller was lost# The American

attack at Herbeviller, supported by tanks, was repulsed* After

delivering harassing fire during the entire night of 11/3.2 Nov 44, the

enemy artillery concentrated its fire 011 our MLR in the morning of 12

Nov 44e In the late morning, the attacks continued at the previous

points of pressure® After 553 Volks Gren Div had repulsed several

attacks of battalion strength, the enemy succeeded about noon in

widening the salient east of Leintrey by about two km, but penetrated

only a few hundred meters deeper into our line# This salient was

narrowed slightly by our own counterattacks. On the other hand, the

situation of the northern elements of 708 Volks Gren Div became more

criticalo Here, the enemy gained more ground on 12 Nov 4-4, through

Vaxainville and to the east# The right wing of the Division was

pressed back to the line Herbeviller-Migneville• In spite of the

fact that 553 Volks Gren Div in general maintained its position on

this day and achieved defensive success, the situation, nevertheless,

grew more and more critical because of the constantly increasing losses

in personnel and equipment# This was especially true in the right

sector of 708 Volks Gren Div, whose untried troops suffered particularly MS # A-000 -63- heavy losses in the first few days of the defensive fightings

99, On the night of l£./l3 Nov 44, the sector of 553 "Vo'-ks

Gren Div was extended slightly., about two km, toward the south so as to create a rigid, unified command at this dangerous point of pressure

The new boundary line between 553 and 708 Vclks Gren Divs was through

Harbouey—-Reclonville* '^he elements of 708 Volks Gren Div still engaged here were subordinated to 553 Volks Gren Div* As no reserves were available, this Division had to rectify the situation by regrouping and by using demolitions and artillery to strengthen the antitank defense of the Demevr.e area.

100. In the morning of 13 Nov 44, the artillery of 553

Volks Gren Div, by observed fire concentrations, contrived to wreak havoc in the enemy assembly area (Herbeviller) and to repel several attacks• That evening, the MLR remained unchanged in Division hands„

In contrast, the situation of the adjoining 708 Volks Gren Div— particularly its right wing—had become threatening# Exact details, however, were net known• However, considerable enemy progress in the direction of Ancerviller"Badonviller could be discerned# Therefore, to ensure unity of command at the point of the enemy threat,, at that time the junction of First and Nineteenth Armies, 553 Volks Gren Div v/as transferred on the afternoon of 13 Nov 44 to LXIV Inf Corps of

Nineteenth Army, Thus, the entire First Army was concerned only with the mission of defending the Metz area.

101o On 14 Nbv 44 the situation on the left wing of 553

Volks Gren Div was restored by an early morning counterattack from MS # A-000 -64-

Demevre with one battalion and a few sturageschuetz• Also on this day numerous enemy attacks in the division nector, especially on the

left wing at Mignoville, were thrown -back. It was here that 79 Inf

Div (US) first reappeared. We believed that the enemy was seeking to

exploit his initial successes in the 708 Volks Gren Div sector by a regrouping of forces and by.bringing up more troops * On this day, the enemy pressed forward as far as Ivlontreux and Bremenil. This drive placed the left wing of 553 Volks Gren Div in an untenable position. This hard-hitting Division, which had fought well in spite

of the lack of personnel and materiel, received permission during the night of 14/l5 Nov 4-4 to withdraw to prepared positions along the line

Bois de Albe—Chazelles—Barbas—Harbouey.

102. As was expected, the enemy continued the attack on

18 Nov 44 with the main effort south of Biamont. An assault to the north near Domevre was repulsed by 553 Volks Gren Div. Likewise, tank-infantry attacks on Blament were thrown back, Strong concen­ trations of tanks south of Barbas were effectively fought off the the attack from here toward Blamont was repelled. Thus, 553 Volks Gren

Div mastered the situation on this day, although with heavy casualties.

103. However, the situation of 708 Volks &ren Div 011 15

Nov 44 had a deteriorating effect on the German situation in general0

The inexperienced troops of the Division were no longer able to acpe with developments. The retreating elements of the Division were assembled at Cirey and Petitmont by liaison officers from 553 Volks

Gren Div and subordinated to this latter division. By leaving the main MS # A-000 -6 b- body of the Division in the former position., the left flank was with­ drawn somewhat on the night of 15/l6 Nov 44 and a new front was create i along the line immediately south of Blament— northeast of Harbouey— south of Cirey.

104. On 16 Nov 44 the enemy continued his concentric attack on Blamont. The attack ma.de no headway despite the fact that it Y/as supported by tanks, artillery, and aircraft^ -Elements of 553 Volks

Gren Div held the village by exerting their last remaining strength#

In the other sections of the Division front, several weak enemy attacks were repulsed. At dusk, the %iericans penetrated into Cirey (708

Volks Gren Div sector). In the evening of sorely pressed 708 Yolks

Gren Div held the line Cirey—Petitmont—east of Badonviller—Raon l'Etape. To be sure, the enemy had gained some ground west and north­ west of St Die, but had done no more than to push our troops back into the prepared positions in the Vosges, along the line Raon l'Etape—

St Die*

VII. Estimate of the Situation, Gp g, Afternoon 16 Nov 44— Decision to Withdraw from Metz ™

105. On the afternoon of 16 Nov 44, the ninth day of the

American attack in force on Lorraine, A Gp G had to come to a decision which had far-reaching effects on subsequent events.® Army Group estimated the situation as follows? ^'he enemy intention at this time was obvious. Four separate attack groups were distinguished.

a. One group, consisting of one armored and one MS =tf= Ji-000 -66- infantry division, was in the bridgehead northeast of .Metz. This grci had maintained the local bridgehead at Kerl:>ng against German counter­ attacks and had reinforced the position during the last few days by bringing up the main body of both divisionsQ The thin security line of our own forces threatened to collapse any minute at one point or another® The main effort of this enemy group was directed toward the east astride the Kerling-*-Merzig •roadr- no doubt with the objective of capturing the crossing at Merzig, We noted a simultaneous strong drive, with corresponding gains.,, northeast toward the Orsoholz switch position. This threat had not been anticipated, since such a push had first of all to overcome the Orscholz switch position and then the

West Wall.

b. The second attack group, at Metz, consisted of two

American infantry divisions with tank support® Prior to the frontal attack on Metz from the west and northwest, 95. Inf Div (US), by establishing bridgeheads at Uckange and Thionville, and 5 Inf Div (US) by a push south of Metz to the: northeast as far as Aube (on the ified), had gained jump-off positions for a concentric attack on Metz, This attack commenced on 14 Nov 44, 95 Inf Div (US) attacking from the north with themain effort astride the Moselle and 5 Inf Div (US) pressing from the south and southeast. Army Group had not considered the possibility of strong enemy forces being withdrawn from the main offinsive in the Saar for this attack on Metz, (See section I, above,

. c. The third attack group (two American armored divi­ sions and one to two infantry divisions), by pushing to th^ortheast MS # A-000 . ' - -67- with the apparent objective of taking Saarbruecken and SaargemuendL, had established bridgeheads across the Nied near Han-sur'-Nied and hat" taken the important road junction at Moercii: ngen0

d« The fourth group (two American infantry divisions and one French armored division) launched an attack a few days later and made a penetration at Blamont and southeast thereofe This push and another weaker thrust north through Avricourt was directed at the

Saverne Gap.

On the Vosges front no important action had as yet taken place, except near Raonl'Etape and St Die, where enemy infantry had gained several km without, however, making any deep penetration. Also on this day, the anticipated enemy attack on the Belfort Pass began. By mid—Nov. 44 the main effort of the attack on A Gp G was obviously located in

Lorraine, with the objective of breaking through into the Saar area- simultaneous ly with a concentric attack on Metz.

106. The LXXXII Inf Corps, over-extended along the Moselle front., was unable to prevent the establishment of a local bridgehead at Keriing. Corps reserve was hastily committed in unsuccessful counterattacks. . Likewise, the counterattack, of Kfgr'25 Pz Gren Div a few days later failed. The attacks of Corps reserve on the first and second days failed because (a) the enemy bridgehead at the junc­ tion of 416 Inf and 19 Volks &ren Divs hindered a unified control of the division reserves, (b) constant enemy air attacks on our approach­ ing troops inflicted heavy losses in men and materiel, and (c) the extremely concentrated and cleverly directed enemy artillery MS # A-000 -68- fire from the bridgehead smashed the individual countertforusts.

107 • The commitment of Kfgr 25 Pz Gren Div was two days late I One day was consumed in obtaining the Kampfgruppe from OKW and another in securing necessary fuel. The Americans gained valuable time to strengthen the bridgehead so that whan we counterattacked on i

Nov 44, the enemy was reinforced with tanks—we were too late,

108, During the next few days, the bridgehead expanded, farther and our cordon around it became thinner and thinner. After the fusion of. the large bridgehead with that of Thioriville, 19 "Voiles

Gren Div was compelled to shift more troops from the Moselle front to the Kedange sector in order to prevent an enemy breakthrough to the east or southeast. This regrouping north of Metz had so weakened our security forces by 16 Nov 44 that they were actually incapable of resisting a serious enemy push from the north in the direction of Metz

When this attack occurred, Metz was threatened for the first time both from the north and the northeast. Also threatened in the rear was

XIII S3 Inf Corps fighting south and southeast of the city. The con­ centric attack on Metz had been underway since 14 Nov 44. As the

Fuehrer's order to defend the city to the last cartridge had been received only a few days before the attack, it had not been possible to supply the city with the personnel, equipment, and rations necessar for a protracted defense. By 14 Nov 44, the "outer ring" south of

Metz had already fallen into enemy hands, and.a deep penetration had been made at Woippy, north of Metz. fie had to consider an immediate threat from the northeast as well, since 19 Volks Gren Div had with- MS # A-0.00 -69- - drawn the bulk of its troops from the Moselle^

109« A fairly continuous front was built up by XIII SS and LXXXIX Inf Corps against the enemy push from northeast of Nancy :;n the direction of Saargemuend andSaarbruecken* Hie enemy had driven our troops back to the German part of the N? ed and had formed a largo bridgehead in this sector in the direction of Falkenberg* '^he right wing of XIII SS Inf Corps north of Lemud and Aube, at first endangered by the large-scale enemy offensive, had for several days been threaten

A less seriously,, since on 13 Nov' 44 merican troops had shifted the attack from the dangerous northeast to the north, against Metz•

However, the attack severed contact between 17 SS Pz Gren Div and the garrison at Metz» '^he main weight of the enemy push had been directed for several days against the sector Falkenbert—Bensdorf* The heavy a fighting around, the Deline Ridge had practically wiped out 48 Inf Div and had seriously weakened 559 Yolks Gren Div, Afterward, 36 Volks

Gren Div (newly arrived from Holland) was located southwest of

Falkenberg,' and 11 Pz ^iv was still defending itself valiantly in the sector north of Moerchingen.. The.fighting quality of both these latter divisions had been so greatly impaired in the last few days of strenuous- battle that we were unable to throw the enemy forces back to the Nied,

110•. Before the great Lorraine attack began, Amy Group had believed that the'Americans would by-pass Metz and throw all their, forces north and southeast of Metz into, a concentrated attack to break through into the Saar. area., We had also thought that the enemy had grouped his forces for a push through. Dieuze.. in the direction of MS # A-000 "70*

Saarunion, Here, however, the enemy apparently attacked with only weak forces so that opposite 361 Volks Gren Div the situation was noi notably changed0

111* The fourth group, attacking far the first time on 11

Nov 44 west and southwest of Blamont toward the Saverne Gap, hit the junction of .^irst and Nineteenth Armies, At this time, 21 Pz Div was being relieved by the newly arrived 708 "Volks Gren Div0 The diffi­ culty of control on the ^rmy boundary and the shifting and commitment of this inexperienced Division, unfamiliar with- its sector, had a disastrous effect on the fighting here. Unified control was ensured on 13 Nov 44 by transferring 553 Volks ^ren Div to Nineteenth Army*

The 553 Volks Gren Div fought bravely up to 16 Nov 44 and its performa exceeded all expectations. The enemy attack toward Avricourt had a managed only to push the right wing of the Division back/few kilometers * The center and the left wing had to be withdrawn-about eight to ten km because of the serious situation of the division on the left. However, in spite of heavy attacks, the Americans had not managed to achieve a breakthrough at Blamont., Nevertheless, the combat efficiency of 553 Volks Gren Div had been strikingly diminished®

/ Serious developments ensued in the south, because 708 Volks Gren Divr due to its unfortunate relief commitment, was not in a position to absorb the force of the enemy push. The enemy had penetrated to a depth of over 20 km between Blamont and Bardonviller, We seriously doubted that the remnants of 708 Volks Gren Div would be capable of handling the expected attack by strong armored groups (200 tanks) MS # A-000 -71-

located south of ^lament,

112. Farther south, in the area Baccarat St lHe--Bruyeres,

Nineteenth Army prevented any deep penetration. But even here and

in the region of the Belfort Pass the situation had. become acute. This

hitherto unthreatened front had been weakened to puch an extent that

it could no longer be held effectively. On 16 Nov 44, the expected

attack on the Belfort Pass began after a strong artillery preparation.

No further details were known at that time.

113. After an estimate of the over-all situation, A Gp G

concluded as follows:

In the First Army sector, Metz could no longer be

included in one continuous front, for enemy troops pushing south and

southeast from the bridgehead ;iorth of Metz might appear at any hour

in the rear of XIII SS Inf Corps and disrupt the First Army front. A TO Sehnen Stellung ("Tendon" Position) was created east of Metz at

£ Lauterfangen—Falkenberg® Thus, the gap in the defense system caused

by the abandonment of the Metz garrison could be filled by 347 Inf

Div, which had arrived from Holland on 15 Nov 44 and had closed at

Bouzonville. At the time of the withdrawal from Metz, it was necessary

to form a mobile reserve $ we could not expect reinforcements because

of the imminent Ardennes Offensive. Fortunately, 21 Pz Div was then

only lightly engaged because enemy forces on its front had been shifted

toward Metz. The LXXXII Inf Corps was located in well fortified

positions north of the Orscholz switch position. Corps was protected

by concrete emplacements and had a machine gun battalion as security® MS # A-000 -72-

The Kerling- bridgehead threatened the rear of the Maginot Line; and, since the Line faced east anyway, its installations could be used cnly for billets. The Saar Hohenstellung (Position on the Saar heights) consisted of fire trenches, antitank gun emplacements, and deep tank traps (see MS jj= A-999, App 7). There were neither concrete emplace­ ments nor security troops in this Line, (For the defensive positions deeper in the rear of XIII SS Inf Corps and LXXXI7. Inf Corps, see

MS =jf= A-999, App 70)

114. Army Group considered the proper mission of First Army to be as follows:

First Army was to withdraw from Metz. The movement was to be concealed in order to gain time for the organization of a new defense line. The defense should continue west and southwest of the West Wall by the exploitation to the utmost of the fortified positions already referred to. Proposals for an immediate withdrawal to the West Wall were rejected because the obsolescence of the defense arrangement of this series of fortifications constituted an immediate threat to the Saar area.

115. The greatest pressure to which Nineteenth Army was subjected during these days was on its right wing (in the area of

Blamont, assigned to Army only a few days previously). There had been hard fighting, in the center as well, but the danger in this area had been overcome. The large-scale attack of the refreshed and reconstituted

First Fr Army began on the left flank of Nineteenth Army. Since we could not reinforce Nineteenth Array, we ordered on 13 Nov 44 that Army MS # A-000 -73- shorten its lines in the Middle Vosges by withdrawing to the Vosges

Vorstellung (Advance Position)® This withdrawal would straighten the salient west of Gerardmer and release the wuary 198 Inf Div. Array

Group intended to commit this Division lat 3r-: The movement was carried out according to plan without any serious er.emy pressure© The large- scale attack against the Belfort Pass had begun* On 16 Nov 44, we ordered a withdrawal in this sector to the ^csges Vorstellung in order to conserve our forces® j\t this critical time, OB WEST ordered the transfer of the headquarters of LXXXIV Inf Corps to A Gp 3 for the

r Ardennes Offensive, This movement, to be described later, had a dis­ astrous effect on the battle of the Belfort Pass, -

Army Group could make the decision to withdraw Nine- teenth Army to the ^osges Vorstellung with a clear conscience. These positions, although not fully prepared, were in favorable terrain. .

They contained numerous, well-constructed, mutually supporting strong points; continuous lines of obstacles such as a double-apron tactical wire, abatis, and barbed wire entanglements; a few shell-proof shelters; and previously prepared road blocks and village barriers®

116« On the evening of 16 Nov 44, Army Group issued the following instructions (after receiving necessary authority from

OB WEST) * During the night of 16/l7 Nov 44, First Army will withdraw from Metz and the Moselle to the line Dalstein-^Hinckange—Nied sector—

Falkenberg, carefully concealing its movements from.the enemy as much as possible. The 347 Inf Div (assembly aroa-^Bouzonville) will be made available for use in a new position. T^e 21 Pz Divwill be MS # A-000 -74- relievod during this genaral movement and will assemble behind the junction of LXXXII Inf Corps and XIII SS Ir..° Corps. The 106 Pz Bri will be transferred by rail to Nineteenth Ay-ry. MS # B-078 -75-

Chapter Four

LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS IN LORRAINE AND THE ¥0SGES

I. Beginning of the attacks on the Belfort Pass

117. In accordance with instructions from A Gp Grs Nineteenth

Army began the withdrawal of its center to the "^ogesen \forstellung

(Vosges advance Position). This movement began on the night of 14/l5

Nov 44 and was to bo completed in throe days, by which time two divisions were to have been freed for the use of Army Group. In this particular sector, the movement was conducted according to plan.

The enemy followed up in only a hesitant manner.

118. On 14 and 15 Nov 44, First Pr Army began its expected attack on the left wing of Nineteenth Army in the area of Belfort.

The bulk of the enemy forces, about two armored and throe or four infantry divisions, were concentrated for a drive with the main effort toward Delle, south of Belfort. The sector of the newly reconstituted 338 Inf Div received the weight of the blow. On the very first day of the attack, the French drove a deep wedge in our line

between the ^oubs River and the Swiss border. The division Commander,

Gen Oschmann, was killed in the front.linos, and Obst von Oppen, formerly commander of F'estungs (fortress) Brig Belfort, assumed

corijmand* The 189 Inf Div, likewise sorely pressed, was forced to

retreat. On the night of 16/17 Nov 44, the entire left wing of MS # B-078 -76-

Nineteenth ^rmy was withdrawn to the ^ogesen Vorstellung \Vosges

Advance Position), which extended to the Bel.;'ort switch position.

During the withdrawal, 338 Inf ^iv neglected to place a strong enough security force in the new position. Mobile trench forces noached the new position almost at the same time as the retreating Division* On

18 Nov 44, the French broke through to the Swiss frontier at Delle.

On the following day these forces pushed into Upper Alsace and drove to the Phein, north of Basel,, against negligible resistance.

119* On 21 Nov 4-4, mobile forces from First Fr -^rmy forced their way into Muelhausen. This clever thrust, carried cut with one armored division, was a'success because Nineteenth ^rmy had no avail­ able forces this deep in the combat' area.. A ^p G- had taken the only

Nineteenth Army mobile reserve (106 Pz Brig) to cope with the threaten­ ing situation in the Metz area at the beginning of Nov 44. The enemy funneled more forces on 19 Nov 44 through this narrow passage at D0ii0 to the vicinity of•Muelhausen. The situation of Nineteenth Army was by this time exceedingly critical. The first objective was to utilize all means to prevent any widening of the breach. The LXIII Inf Corps accomplished -this objective and simultaneously fought off heavy frontal attacks against 'Bolfort*

120a On 20 Nov 44, this city was still in our possession,, after having changed hands several times, but on 21 Nov 44 it was definitely lost. On 19 and 20 Nov,44, the following measures were taken to stop the enemy and seal off the penetration into the ^hein

Basin® ^he construction staff nCorps iLlifelu (Hoeheres Kommando I

MS # B-078 -77-

Eifel) was committed on both sides of Altkirch, with 30 SS Inf Div

subordinated,,. This was a foreign (Russian) division with a cadre of

German troops of no more than regimental strength* Northeast of

Muelhausen, uStaff Hafner" was committed to prevent a further enemy

advance to the northwest. Under this staff were three ersatz (replace­ ment) battalions from Wehrkreis V« Simultaneously, troops of the

Armeepionierschule (Army ^ngineer School), one motorized battalion from Wehrkreis V, and one sturmegeschuetz (assault gun, Sp) cpmpany were committed offensively in the Forest of Hart, The mission of

this group was to throw back weak enemy forces which had crossed a branch of the Huening Canal and.had pushed to the north# We had

available 198 Inf -^iv, two battalions from the Ersatzheer (Replace­

ment ^raining Army), and 654 Panzerjaeger (AT) Bn (Hv) with about 30

antitank guns. These troops were to seal off the narrow passage near

and east of ^olle, -^uring the night of 19/20 Nov 44, they were

hurriedly transported in trucks and by rail by LXIII Inf Corps in the

area southwest of Dammerskirchcn, Their mission was to attack from here toward Delle and east thereof to the Swiss border and. to cut off the enemy in the vicinity of Muelhausen* This attack force was not to wait fro the arrival of 106 Pz Brig, which was scheduled to mop up the Muelhausen area when the push to the Swiss border succeeded,

121 u The 198 Inf Div, reinforced by a panzer jaeger- battalion,

attacked on 20 Nov 44 west of Saurco toward Delle and east thereof as

scheduled. The difficult terrain prevented the attack from making any

headway. The soggy ground on either side of the road southwest of MS # B-073 -78- 1

Saurce was almost impassable for attillery and antitank guns* finally the attack had to be cancelled and reconnaissance was order d for a fresh attack from Saurce southwest toward Rochosy~-3wiss frontier*

122* Army Group estimatod the situation in the '^osges on

20 Nov 44 as follows:

It was clear that the purpose of the pincer movement

being executed by Seventh US Array through the Savorne (Zaborn) Gap

and by First Fr Army through the Belfort Pass was the encirclement and ultimate destruction of Nineteenth ^rmy* Considered independently, the narrow channel made by the enemy breakthrough could surely have

been closed .again and the French armored forces in the vicinity of

Muelhausen destroyed by the attack of about two divisions• The opera­

tion would have proved worthwhile if the necessary forces had been available at once. The counterattack of 198 Inf ^iv against Dolle had not succeeded because of the difficult terrain. The 106 Pz &rig, which was en route from First Army to Nineteenth Army at the time, was not expected to arrive before 22 Nov 44 e The situation by this time (20 Nov 44) in the area west of ^averne was extremely critical because of the. deep penetration made at Saar.burg* Here., too, Army

Group had decided that a break in the front" was to be expected daily.

A Gp G was not in a position to release troops to reinforce the front in the Saverne ^ap and at the same time to restore the situation at the Belfort Pass* Therefore,. Army GroUp requested permission from

OB WEST to give up the Belfort Pass and to withdraw the left wing of

Nineteenth Army to the area north of Muelhausen® This movement MS # B-078 -79- would free about two divisions for use elsewhere0 Together with the troops already available (198 Inf Div and 106 Pz Brig), they could be transferred en masse to defend the Saverr.e ^ap«. Army Group be­ lieved that this measure would ensure cohesion between First and Nine teenth Armies at Saverne and protect Strassburga 'However, this proposal was rejected by the fuehrer Hauptquartier (Hitler's head­ quarters in the field), and we were order&d to restore the situation at Bolfort by counterattack and to relinquish not a single foot of ground at Saverne» No additional forces were allotted to Army Group for this mission*

123,. The decisions made on the basis of this peremptory order and the measures inaugurated wore as follows:

a. Counterattacks wore to be made on 21 Nov 44 with

198 Inf Div, 654 Panzer jaeger Bn, 30 SS Inf -^iv (regimental strength) and two Ersatzheer battalions from ^ehrkreis ^'hese attacks wore to be carried out from Saur-ce in the direction of -^echesy*

b# On its arrival, 106 Pz Brig was to be employed in coordination with the above troops to mop up in the vicinity of

Muelhausen*

II. Breakthrough into the Saverne ^ap (17 - 20 Nov 44)

124* As mentioned previously, the front at the junction of First and Nineteenth Armies was strained almost to the breaking point by the steadily progressing attack of Seventh US Army in the direction of Saverne. ^he inexperienced 708 Yolks Gren Div had MS # B-078 -80- failed to prevent an enemy breakthrough south, of ^clamont toward the northeast* Tbid division was forced back to the edge of the ^osges between 17 and 18 Nov 44, and, on 20 Nov 44. was in position along, a line south of St Quirin—east of Val de Chatillon--oast of Badonvillori

It was ordered to block the mountain passes and to maintain contact with 553 VoIks Gron ^iv to the north. The latter division was with­ drawn during the night of 16/l7 Nov 44 to more favorable defense positions because of the© threat to its deep southern flank in the area south and southeast of Bolamont and because of strong enemy pressure in the Avricourt sector.. These positions wore only a few km farther to the rear, along the heights two km east of Mousson—road from Igney to 3-epaiz—northeast outskirts of Be lament—La "Vezouse-— sector Val de ^hatillon. The northern elements of 708 Volks Oron

Div were located in the vicinity of "^al de Chatillon.

125. In the morning of 17 Nov 44, enemy attempts to cross the VGZOUSC sector oast of Blamont were repulsed, and enemy infantry which had pushed into Fremonvillo about midday were driven back. On the other hand, the enemy penetrated with infantry and tanks northwest of ^irey and reached an area about 800 meters south of TaI1C0nville.

In the Avricourt sector, also, enemy pressure continued throughout the day. Here, the enemy had not at first recognized our retrograde movement for what it was and had been busy in the forenoon pounding our artillery positions with heavy counterbattery fire. In the afternoon, the enemy, with air support, penetrated the positions at

Avricourt and Igney. No reinforcements wore available for this MS # B-078 -81- threatened sector. The exhausted troops (the combat strength of one regiment was no more than four to eight men per company)-were per­ mitted to withdraw only a few km during the .night (17/18 Nov 4-4) to the line Toule-ray—Tanconville—1>500 meters south, of Bortrambois*

The already strained left wing of 361 Volks Gren fiv along the

Rhein-Marne Canal was stretched still more tautly by this withdrawal*

The division flank wag threatened,.although there was comparatively slight enemy pressure on the front* The division could not withdraw because to do so would have broken contact with, First Army at ^ieuze*

126V. The withdrawal to a position slightly farther to the rear created a breathing spell for 553 Volks Gren f*iv on 18 Nov 44#

The enemy was delayed by minefields', so that it was not until late afternnon that contact was made with our troops. The MLR still re­ mained in our hands# On this day, 553 Volks G-ren %v received an ersatz battalion numbering about 600 men, which, however, was not. sufficient to make up for the large infantry combat losses. We anticipated that the enemy would continue .the attacks on 19 Nov 44 through Tanconville in the direction of Saarb.urg and that the northern wing of 553 Volks Oren -^iv would be in danger of encirclement« There­ fore this wing was to be pulled back during, the night of 18/l9 Nov 44 to prepared positions about five to six 1cm farther to the east along the general line west of ^ondrexon--St Gorges-~Richeval„ The left . wing of 361 ^olks Gren Div, not under strong enemy pressure at that moment, was .still at the canal crossing two km east of Mousson* Any further withdrawal of this Division would moan an extension of ^irst MS # B-078 -82-

Army front. Army Group ordered elemonts of the -Division to withdraw

in order to cover the southern flank, which was then only "a fow km in

dep^h* The bulk of the division was to remain in position.

127« The retrograde movement scheduled for the night of

18/19 Nov 44 in the right sector of 553 Voiles Gren Div was carried

out according to plan* In contrast to what had happened on the

previous day, the enemy started to exert pressure with strong tank

forces before noon on 19 Nov 44, The main effort was against the line

Ibigny—Richeval. A deep penetration was made in the direction of

S-fc Georges• Sturmgeschuetz were shifted from 361 Yolks Gren D>iv to

do&ay further enemy advances, but were unable to prevent St ^eorges

from being taken about noon® About 1500, the first enemy tanks appeare

at Lorchingen and A.spach. Bertrambois, on the loft wing of the

Division, was lost to the enemy in the afternoon, deeper penetrations

wore made, in our lino at Tanconvillor*. As twilight fell, the division

headquarters personnel were engaged in close defensive co-bat against

enemy tanks which had broken through at Foerchingen. On the afternoon

of 19 Nov 44, constantly supported by largo formations of planes, the

enemy broke through the front of 553 Volks G"ron ^iv. The latter was

exhausted by over a week of heavy defensive fighting. The division

attempted to establish a new defense .line during the night from

Loerchingen--west of Nitting-~west of St ^uirin,

128* That same night, Army Group attached 553 Volks Gren

Div to LXXXEX Inf Corps (First Army), as contact with LXIV Inf ^orps

(Nineteenth Army) was becoming more and more difficult to maintain MS # B-078 , • . ' . . '• " -83- ^.

because of the intervening hills., First, ^rriiv had been ordered to shift

one regiment from 361 ^olks.&ren ^iv during the night of 19/20 Nov 44

to support the sorely pressed 553 Yolks G-ren ^iv. ^ho 3.61 oiks C'ron

Div was to withdraw. during the night behind the Saarkbhlen Canal.. . In

the meantime, about 600 men from the.training'school'at B-itsch were

sent to 553 Volks Gron ^iv#

129. On 20'Nov 44/a force of over 100 enemy, tanks moved . /

out from the vicinity of St Georges in front of 553 Yolks Gron ^iv,

through Heming and toward Saarburg (Sarrobourg). The security forces

left at the cnnal at Homing by 361 .Volks Gron "^iv were'suddenly " .

attacked by enemy troops' supported by elements of the local population.

The security forces virere- overcome, . arid Saarburg was lost« Tho main

body (two battalions) of .the1 rop;iment from. 361 Volks firdh Div/ en route

to 553 Volks Gron was at this time in the. vicinity of Saarburg.

Elements of these troops were used'to block the advance.of the enemy

.just oast of the city. ^ reinforced battalion of .the regiment had

already marched south, thrciugh Saarburg and upon arriving in/553 Volks

Gron Div sector was Immediately committed in the. vicinity of Nitting,

on the right wing. T here• the battalion assisted in the repulse of.

several attacks made by the .enemy on 20/Nov 44. • '^he situation1 grew/

more critical.on the loft wing of .563 Volks &ren -^iv,. situated in the

wooded terrain of St Quirin, where any observation was difficult#..

During the afternoon, "ftelhqr was lost. ' The division command post, at

Hartzviller was engaged in close combat.' "Also in the afternoon, an venemy tank group forced its way into ^reibrunnen,. and elements of the

group pressed as far,, north as the C'anal south of Saarburg,_ Ihus 553 MS# B-078 r -84-' .

Volks (^ren Dj_v was finally encircled. .

130. Army Group regarded the Division as lost> in spite of,., its heroic battle of the previous ten days. However, during the night

bf 20/21 Nov 44, the discreet and'energetiS Commander-.assembled the

Division northwest of Hartzviller and rescued it from encirclement.

(Soe App 2#) In heavy rain and in pitch darkness, the Division marched in close formation with all its equipment and weapons 'a- few. meters from

American sentrie-s* By forcing the pace, it reached the vicinity of

Arzviller just at dawn on 21 Nov 44# Here> on the independent decision

of its Commander, the Division was once again to contest the push towajrd

Sa verne*

: 131. It was clear, to A; Gp G in the estimate of the situation

on T>he night of 20/21.1\fov 44 that about one armored division and two

D infantry divisions had created at deep broach at aarburg. ^his meant

that the cohesion of the-^rmy G'roup was seriously threatened at- the r ..." " ' • ' junction of First-and Nineteenth Armle.s. OB FEST ordered. Pz Lehr Div

to close the gap,. However, the Division could not.be expected to

'attack before 23 Nov 44, Army Group intended., to hold in the left

portion of the ^irst Army sector (361 Volks Cren Div on the ^hoin-

Kohlen ^anal) and to seal off the deep penetration .east and northeast

of Saarburg with Pz Lehr Div, attacking from Saarunion (Sarre-Union)

toward Saarburg*. Simultaneously,, a Small assault group from Nineteenth - 1 • • v' '. ' • : ... - - , .

Army was to attack from south of St ^uirin to the north, against Saarburg

to' restore contact between the two armies.. In accordance with these

instructions, First Army committed its last available reserves^-troops MS 3-078 , ' -85- ^

from the Armeewaffenschulo (Ed; A branch school for.both officers

and enlisted men) and one pionier (engineer) battalion--*fei the

threatened sector north and northeast of ^aarburg during the night of:

SO/21 Nov 44. 'Army Group sent its own sicherungs (security) company

and one marsch (replacement!transfer) battalion to Saverne to assist

in scaling off the- penetration* The- coramand post of L2EXIX • Inf -Corps

was transferred to .Saverne. , , 1 " • . - • ' ./ 132* On the morning of 21: Nov 44, the enemy tank group

which had taken Saarburg. on the previous day broke through1 our weak ^

security forces to the northeast.. Shortly before noon, these tanks

\ . . .1. • were reported to be in the, vicinity of 'Mettingen - and • Pfalzweiler and

moving- east. At that time'553 Yolks Gren Civ was fighting off.enemy

attacks at Arzv^oiler/(Arzviller) and GunZweiler (Guntzvillor). ^ue

to the development in the situation north of Pfalzburg (Phalsbourg),

this division was , ord^re'd to move .out immediately,''during daylight,

to the line Pfalzburg—Lutzelbourg. Here/ the ^avern Gap was to be

sealed* off against the enemy. ™he movement of the division ^as carried

• out In the afternoon according to .plan. About/the same times a strcpg

onc.iy tank group succeeded in. finding trails across the mountains south'

'of the Save me Gapo '^oak local security forces/offered'negligible . ' . • ' . . •- ' • • , ' \ . j resistance.' About 1700, rear elements of. Nineteenth Army .in Maurs-

muenster were already being attacked by enemy- tanks.- It was clear on .

the evening of 21 Nov 44, that fairly strong enemy tank forces, ifi

conjunction with continued frontal attacks on the, Saverne Gap, had

smashed their way through the weat security forces north-and sputh of ' I • I " - /•> - .. .

/ ' ". • • .

1 ; MS # B-07.8 . • f ' -86- -

the Gap and* after taking Savern-e, intended.to seize the narrow, passage from the rear, • Array Group had no forces with which to plug this gap, which was affecting the over-all. situations Advance elements 'of 256

Volks &ren -^iv, ' starting, their 'movement during the night of 21/22 Nov

44, were en route to.'Hagen.au, but those for.ces,. like Pz Lehr' Div, could not be expected to arrive before 23/24 Nov 44.

. .. 133# About 1000, 22 Nov '44, Saverne was. attacked, from both north and south by enemy -tanks which, pushed through the weak .roar ' elements and captured'the city about noon.' The staff of LXXXIX Inf

Corps.:^at Saverne had managed to'break through only a short time 'before to 553 Yolks Gren^ Div; This division, on its last day of combat,,

.repulsed frontal attacks by-the Americans at Lutzolbourg; and knocked out .a number, of enemy tanks«- In the' afternoon,, tanks-frem the vicinity of Saverne - .attacked rear elements" (flak troops) of the Division*' but ' they were able to make only slow progress# The Commander of.LXXXIX . inf'Corps decided to break out to the north with separate groups of

553 *"Vblks Gren Div dur ing, the night of 22/23 Nov . 44. At 2300, the '/ movement" started. The Division- broke out with the bulk of the, troops and pushed on'through ^immenau to Bit-s-ch,'. where" it was reassembled.

Advance elements, had.;arrived--there on the. evening of 23 Nov 44.

! ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - ' " 7 >

III* Developments in the -Metz Area (16 — 20- Nov. 4-4), : ' ^

. • f • •• • / (See App i and.App 5%) In the Army Group sector during this period, events'in the Metz area wore oT secondary .importance, inasmuch as the enemy had made -two decisive penetrations, at Saarburg and in MS # B-078 -87-

• the vicinity of'the Bolfort PassIn the Metz area, as I have mentioned

„-previouslythe order had been given- oil' the night of 16/17 Nov 44 to.

pull back- from, the Moselle and from Metz to'the line Dais toin-- . /

Hinckange-—Noi'd sector--Falkenberg, in order to assure- a cehensive front

in -F.ir.st Army sector* ^This order had a considerable effect on the

First Array situation during-the foilovang few days: .' '' - •

134* In LXXXII Inf- 'Corps . sector> 416 Inf .Div, underv continued

• ' ' i- - • • } • enemy pressure, pulled back a few km north to the Orscholz switch.., .

position.' There, on 19 Nov 44, relatively'weak hostilo attacks were

repulsed* The defenses in the Orscholz switch/position, like those ,-

in ;the. West Wall,-were built of 'concrete and wore, therefore, greater

protection to the troopsi Moreover., a machine gun battalion, located

there as security,, assisted the withdrawing troops in occupying the

position. On 20 Nov 44,,, enemy pressure against the Orscholz switch

position increased# Apparently the main body of 10 Armd Div (US.)

had beon^ommitted at this point.with the mission-of capturing the

n Saar^ crossing at Saar Durg# Our forces occupying the Orscholz'position.

were not considered strong on'ough to repel a concentrated hostile

attack* The 21 Pz ^iv,.available because of the retrograde ^movement

-from the Metz-front* had been- assembling east of Bouzonvilie since

17 Nov 44* This division, therefore, was'committed in the Orscholz

switch'position* *

£35 0 Strong enemy pressure from the.former bridgehead at

Kerling was directed,against Merzig* Hore, Kfgr 25 Pz Gren Div had

gradually been driven back to the' Sacir Hoehenstell'ung (position on- MS # B-078 < • -88- the Saar heights) on 17 - 18.Nov 44« In contrast to the Orscholz position, this line had no concrete"works. It consisted only of fire - trenches, antitank gun positionsy'and tank traps. On'20 Nov 44, the enemy penetrated this Saar position east of Launstroff. Hostile' infantry • ! and tanks crossed the tank ditches and pressed on into the woods south - ' f ' • '4* ofs Buedingen# ' A counterthrust\by 25 Pz Gren' Div sealed off the penetration. The hasty '•'bridge built by ,the .Americans over the tank ditch one km south of Buedingen was destroyed by- a^pionier stosstrupp

(engineer assault detachment) which had moved to., the rear, of the •

AmericanSo. ' Further progress off the enemy was. therefore delayed*

.136. The 19.Volks -Gren Div had intended to withdraw,from , the enemy bridgehead north of Meta andvfrom the Moselle to an inter- mediate position' at Dalstein--Hinckange*. The Division'was not even

.-/bleto form a line at this point. "In their hurried withdrawal to \ the south bank of- the Hied River during 17- and 18 Nov 44, the -battered regiments were continually pressed by the'enemyo< The Division was disposed for defense in the ^aar Hoehonstellung on 19 Nov 44. ^he right'wing was at ObereSch, tod the left at Bouzonville (incl). On ' . . 1 i . ' ' • \ •• . • > 1 ' '• ' / that day, . the main force of. the hostile attacks 'was at Fuerweiler, where we had to counterattack several times.©• However, the MLR*still remained in our hands* ' •-

137. Fortress Metz succeeded in ..fixing, enemy forces during the withdrawal of First Army. We had rradio c.entact .with "the garrison up.to^ 20 Nov 44. The situation at Metz developed as follows: .

As a result'of its withdrawal to the east during the night of'16/l7 Nov 44, First Army had voluntarily abandoned the area •" MS# 3-078 ( ^ -89-

east of Metz to the enemy. During- the night of- 16/17' Noy:'44, the

Commandant of Metz had placed the staff of >-2 Festungs (fortress)

Inf ^egt in .Charge of his eastern defenses ,.••(Abschnittskommandour y0st).

The Regiment had arrived only during the last few clays /

In this sector, the village of G-rigy fell into the. hands of.. the ^ enemy at 0800 : on 17 Nov 44* The 3'8 Pz Gren'Regt of

17 SS Pz G-ren -^iv, which wa& to remain in Metz' as a garrison reserve, independently or on prders, from the division, retreated to the east ^

on the night of 17/18 Nov 44:. This Regiment had been scheduled to assist in the fighting in the eastern sector. By. the forenoon,. the

enemy had already reached the eastern section of Metz Plantiere.s•. ' ^rom

Tromery, to tho' northeast, kn enemy armored group pressed forward on.

Metz, but was hold up-temporarily by the hasty commitment of flak troops ^lorig the lino Charly—-Malroy* .However, these troops were forced-to withdraw.at night to Fort St Julien. •In the evenings there

was street fighting in the northern suburbs of Motz-sur-la ^iviore--

Sansonet. To the west and south of the-city, the situation was.un­

1 changed.° ° • i ' '. . \ , . .. - On tho following day, enemy attacks at Plappeville and -

Fort St Julion wore repulsed.' -Both the village and the fort,of St

Privat *wore held, against enemy attacks from the- southeast.

A cohesive defense in the Metz area was.no longer

possible because of the general'development in., the'situation. • The

commander of the,regimental groups ordered the troops to allow them­

selves to be encircled^inside the forts» Enemy infantry,were now' MS # B-078 - . . -90-

l withir^the area of the' barra cks in the nor thorn part - of the city# ^

During the afternoon, -enemy- tanks from the northeast crossed the

Soillo bridge and reached the Haoseler Barracks# Fort St Julien 'was

lost that evening. . ; \ 7

On 1.9 Nov 44, -American forces convdrgod simultaneously

from scvkraT different directions on Metz' and forced- their way into y . ' ' ' ' the city. .By evening, resistance in the city was .only sporadic,, -On

the other hand, it was possible to absorbo the regimental groups within

the, individual forts according to plan.' The command post of the Com­

mandant of Metz fell into1 enemy hands on 21 Nov 44, and therewith all

resistance within the city came to an end.. . The forts' of St Privat and

Haeseler held out until 29 Nov 44;' St Quentin,•^riant,- and Plappoville

'.m.til 8 Dec 44; and Jeanne d*Arc as long as 13 Dec 44» ' '

.) 138. A G- did, not intend initially that Fortress Metz • .

should allow itself to be encircled and carry on an independent'fight ' , L • . '' . •' J* , v against an enemy coming from' all- directions. Orders were received

,'rom the highest authorities at 'the beginning of 'Nov 44 to defend the '

-city tq the last cartridge. The order came much too late for adequate

supplies to be brought in and .for ,an efficient system of defense works,

particularly to the easta to.be erected. In the..following weeks both

commanders and troops in. tho Metz area did. their best, and, fighting

under the most arduous, conditions, managed to 'fix a'considerable

number pf enemy troops by their valiant resistance. It was due

/-\ '• • - directly to their efforts^ that -the/withdrawal of-First Army and the

formation of a new defense front was at all possible. *^or instance. MS # B-078 1' - ; , -91- / •

XIII SS .Inf Corps—since' the'pressure against its right•wiftg and \c enter

was comparatively s-light^was able to "withdraw most of its forces to a

•new defensive front, meanwhile maintaining ' firm contact with LXXXII. Inf

-Corps- at Bouzonville, (The right wing and center of lIII .SS Inf Corps

comprised 347 Inf Div,- behind the German part of the Nied &iver • 17

SS Pz Gron Div on the lino Hinckange — Falkonborg; and 36 V61ks &ren

Div, south of St Avoid*) Simultaneously/ it was possible-to disengage.,

\21 Pz Div. This.'/Division was then assembled in the vicinity of'

Bouzonville and placed at the disposal of First Army*

• 139#' Although., enemy pressure on 347. Inf. Div and 17 S3 Pz

Gron Diy remained comparatively slight until 20 Nov 44, the .36 Volks^

Gron Div was driven steadily'back to just south of St Avoid by continu­

ous enemy attacks'. At the same time, largo enemy tank formations

thrust against 11 Pz Div sector on the, right wing of' LXXXIX Inf Corps*

JHho hostile-main effort, was along the. road Moerchingen^-Puettlingen

.and astride the railroad Bo'nsdorf—Saaralbe*

The 11. Pz Div was. covering a sector about 20 loin wide . .

against an enemy-attacking an force#' The Division -utilized a flexible.,

.elastic defense, rather than attempt to hold a'' rigidly defined .line

with its inadequate forces. Behind a thin shield of. security and'

observation posts, there, were, stationed small, mobile pa.nz.er and

panzer grenadier forces. By making sudden assaults against the •

flanks or rear of the attacking enemy'formations, those armored

elements prevented many breakthroughs in this sector. By 20 Nov 44,

this Diyision was along the approximate line -• Hblliuie.r--iTellingen-- MS # B-0781 . ' . • -92-

Mue n s t er ~ -1 n s YTG i 1 O r, 1 -

Developments in A G-p G- Sector (22!- 24- Nov 41-) ' ,

140* In Nineteenth Army sector/ tho reinforced 198 Inf Div

attacked once mere.on 22 Nov 44 to restore the situation in thq

vicinity of ^the Beifort Pass, The objective was' the/Swiss ..border, -

After the first-attempt had failed because of the difficult terrain > " • 1 ' • • . / east of Do 116;, this now' attack was directed to the southeast astride

the road S.aurce—Rochesy. After heavy fighting on-23 Nov 44, Rechesy

was: captured, .and the advance of the enemy was blocked as far as the

! ' Swiss border, French armored troops operating in the Muolhausen area •

were cut off. We anticipated that the. enemy woui 1; try with all the .

moans at his disposal to break through this barriero During the next

few days, fierce and bitter fighting developed at this, point,

141,' On 23 Nov 44, the 106 Pz Brig arrived by rail from

First Army '^rea and. detrained in the vicinity of Colmar, . ^he intention

of Nineteenth Army 'vns to brings up the Brigade- south of Dammerskirchen

and join -it to the, attack group there, so. that1 it might be possible to

wipe out the Muolhausen pocket by a coordinated attack from the south­ west, .Toward midday, a-'report came in. to Nineteenth-Army that, enemy

forcos were withdrawing from the area northeast of Muolhausen and were

crossing the. branch of the Hueningen Canal to the south, • It, seemed

possible that this retrograde movement could-bo related to. our successes

at the Stiss border oast of Delle, The report added that our own weak

forces had moved in pursuit and had been able to. set up avlocal MS ;# B-078 - - " " •' ' "< -93- bridgohead south of"the canal# The Coramevnder, A'Gp- Cr, happened to be at the Nineteenth Army command post at that time* On hearing'this

• news. he immediately gave the order .for 106 Pz Brig' not. to "novo toward'

Danmer-skirchen, but to exploit uhe possibilities of this temporary, success by attacking as speedily as possible ;iicrtheast of Muelhausen.

The Brigade was to thrust forward from this area to Altkirch^ The attack was.to be carried out with as much.speed as possible, because/

106 Pg ' Bi*ig was already scheduled to be transferred to' First Army at

Saverne in'the evening of thq d^y of"the attack# The Brigade movernont ,

V and its subsequent assembly for attack were to bo completed by 24 Nov 44

,30 that it could be committed on the following day. On 24 Nov 44, no

.information could ,bo obtained{ from the ror:imontO of 198 Inf Piv engagedOO

.at the Swiss border. It was feared that the enemy had managed to fight through to those . forces at Mue.lhausen# Nevertheless, Army still adhered to its prior arrangement foruthe attack. The .106 Pz.^rig was brought up by rail and assembled according to plan.

' . A 142 c Events had moved quickly in the, area of . Saverne after the breakthrough by. enemy tank forces, which had grossed the Vosgos, south of Saverne, on the a-fternoon of 21 Nov 44 and had reached

Idaursmuenster • Since ' Nineteenth Army ~ had committed all available forces to clear up the situation^ at the Belfert Pass, no- satisfactory peasures could be taken to restore the- situation on its "right wing.

The 708 Volks &ren ^iv (right flank division of Nineteenth Army) was situated, at the northwest exits to the Middle Vosgesj approximately along the line south of St ^uirin—east of Badonviller.. Supported by MS # B-078 -94- . \ weak forces of LXIV Inf Corps, this Division was fighting to prevent the enemy from gaining access to the mountain pas -;es« Along the remainder of the Vosges front—whore the troops had moved back, in accordance with orders, to the Vogoscn Vorstellung ^'Vosges Advance

Position), pulling out 198' Inf Div in the process--uho enemy began a frontal attack, but fortunately not in any groat strength, so that in general we were able, to hold our own* %- 2 3 Nov 44, enemy tanks moving out of the Savorne area had already pushed their way into

Strassburg.. The 708 Volks Gren ^iv on the Army right flank was pushed back steadily until the morning of 24 Nov 44, when it occupied the sector on both sides of the Donon ^iver* • Because the counterattack of

°z Lehr Div was scheduled to begin.-from Sarrunion (Sarro«Union), on

~4 Nov 44 and to move in the direction of Pfalzburg (Phalsbourg),

;irmy Group had ordered Nineteenth ^rmy on the evening of 23 Nov 44 to halt its right wing and to attack north through St ^uiriri .on 24 Nov

44o Nineteenth Army was no longer in a position to launch a worthwhile northward attack from its right wing, since at that particular place it had lost the favorable defensive terrain in the V'osgos. a • ow days previously, sorely pressed as it had been by the heavy attacks of the. enemy in the region of Blament.

.143, After the enemy breakthrough in the direction of

Strassburg, the deep northern flank as well as the rear of Nineteenth

Army was in a precarious situation0 For this reason Army set up a staff, under Obst iG Michel, to sup jrvise the construction of a new defense lino south of Strassburg, between the &hein and the Vosges* MS # B-078 -95-

The personnel of the "Nineteenth Army Engineer School in the Forest of

Hart, northeast of•Muelhausen, and a few tanks from the Wehrkreisschule

(Wehrkreis V School)together with all the rear echelon troops in the area, were assembled and subordinated to this staff * Ine head­ quarters of LXXXIX Inf Corps had been encircled by the successful enemy maneuver that had also encircled 553 Vo'lks Gren ^iv, as I have pre- . viously described, and had separated First and'Nineteenth Armies,

During the night of 22/23 Nov 44 the staff of "Corps Vosgesft (Hoeheres

Kommando Vogesen), previously a construction staff, was subordinated directly to A Gp G, The mission of this staff was to erect a now defense line west of Hagenau--Brumath—west of Strassburg. Its command

^ost was set up in liagenau. ^he following wore subordinated to the.

-taff:

a. The 256 Volks. Gren ^iv, which.had been on route by rail from the Netherlands to Hagenau since 22 Nov 44*

b». The Kampfkommandant (combat commander) of Strassburg*

c* Elements of the former - anzortruppenschule ^est

1 ?anzor Troop School, West), with a strength of about one. panzer grenadier battalion,,

144. We did- not succeed, in getting a suitable defensive front constructed by 23 Nov 44# .Our weak sucurity line was pierced, in the early hours of this day by a strong group of enemy tanks at

Brumath and south'thereof# During the same morning, the enemy captured

Strassburg without appreciable difficulty. The troops previously MS # B-078 • -96-

occupying the city consisted of only two or three static flak battalions

and approximately the same number of .kande-sschuetzon (local defense)

battalions. Training units from Wohrkreis 'V had. been transferred from

the city to the area east of the Rhein several weeks previously* The

Commandant of Str-assburg, subordinate to Wohrkreis "V, most probably

had not previously given serious thought to the defense of the city.

In any case, even if he had thought about it seriously,, ho had not the

materiel nor the personnel for a successful defense.

145,. With the loss of ^trassburg, all contact between First

and Nineteenth ^rmies was definitively broken. A, Gp G did not believe

that the enemy forces which had broken through to the city were in any

considerable strength* The length of the enemy supply lines constituted

another great weakness. Consequently,. we maintained our intention to

attack with Pz Lehr ^iv against Pfalzburg from south of Sa&runion;

our objective was to close the gap at Savorno". At noon 24 Nov 44,

?z Lehr Div was assembled south of Sa amnion for the attack. The events

and outcome of this attack will be described later« The 256 Voiles Gren

Div,~ which was just arriving in the Hagenau sector, was to be available

for the attack by 25 Nov 44. Furthermore, 245 Inf ^iv was supposed to

arrive in the vicinity of Wessenberg on or about 25/26 Nov .44.

146. Despite the critifcql.situation'of A Gp G—both near

oaverne and in the vicinity of Belfort,. whore the enemy had just made- a

decisive series of br e akthr ouglis—do fensi ve success was still possible

.on the right wing. Eere, on 19 and 20 Nov 44, the enemy hack already

made weak- reconnaissance thrusts against the ^rscholz switch position*' MS # B-078 -97-

On 21 Nov..44, strong American forces moved in to.attack# The 21 Pz

Div,. extracted during the general withdrawal east of Metz on IS/17

Nov 44, arrived just in time to assist 41G Inf ^iv, which was fighting

manfully to seal off the local penetrations made by the enemy on this

day* On 22 Nov 4-4, the, Americans attacked once more-, • with the main

effort near Butzdorf and north of 'Borgi Again the enemy attacks wore

thrown back* On the' following day, the enemy succeeded in entering

Tottingon* These local ponentrations, however, were successfully chocked,

and further hostile attacks were thrown back.. On 24 Nov 44, only feeble attacks against the ^rscholz position wore reported; the enemy

roomed to be regrouping. The 19 Yolks Oren • Div fought off small local

assaults during these, days arid was able to maintain its existing

positions• ^Iso ground was lost only very slowly between 20 and 24

:^GV. 44 at the former, points of enemy pressure in the Qll S° Inf

Corps sector* The 17 SS Pz Grron Div, freed for other duty after

evacuating the salient southwest of St Avoid, relieved the completely

exhausted 559 Voiles Or en ^iv southwest of the city during the night

of 22/23 Nov 44 (see App l)0. The latter "Kampfgruppe" was to spend

a short time in the region southwest of Saarbruockon for rehabilita­

tion. On the right wing of A Gp'G, enemy attacks.on the Orschc.-lz

switch position had stopped. Tt was now possible to withdraw the main

body of 21 Pz E>iv from this sector* ^ho .19 Yolks &rcn Div southwest

of Merzig likewise experienced comparative quite during these days0.

Therefore, it was possible to extract Kfgr 25 Pz Oren ^iv on the night

of 2.3/24 ^ov 44 by extending the sectors of 416 Inf and 19 Volks ^'ron MS # 13-078 "98-

Divs. This Kampfgruppe was urgently needed to strengthen the counter­ attack of ?z Lehr Div south of Saarunion. (For the commitment of this

Kampfgruppe, see below.)

V« Developments in the Situation (25 - 28 Nov 44)

147* In XIII S3 Inf ^orps sector, strong hostile attacks commenced on 25 Nov 44 B"outh of Bouzonville. During the two days which followed, the enemy managed to effect a deeper penetration there, capturing the villages of Volving and Fallc. On 27 Nov 44, the attack was extended to the north as far as Bouzonville* Here, strong tank forces appeared, coming apparently from the. Orscholz position, and captured Bouzonville® Hostile tanks penetrated our line at Vfroelfl'ingen and drove the loft wing of 19 Yolks ^ren back from, the Nied sector practically to the German frontier west of Saarla.utern„ This situation constituted a direct threat to Saarlautern itself. Therefore,.21

Pz was withdraw from the' right wing of -^irst ^rmy during the night to restore the situation. west of Saarlauteril. However, this attack could not be expected to materialize before 29 Nov 44. In the me'antime,

Kfgr Muehlen (559 Yolks G'ren ^iv) was committed on the left wing of

19 Yolks Gren -Div to bolster the front in this sorely pressed sector.

The exhausted Kampfgruppe had to forego the badly needed rest it had been promised.

148o At this time, St Avoid, on the left wing of 36 ^olks

Gren ^iv, was lost to the enemy. between 25 and 28 Nov 44, there was not so much pressure on 17 SS.Pz Gren ^iv and 11 Pz Div ;•;s there had MS# B-078 -99-

been previously. The latter division was situated behind a compara­ tively great natural barrier, a stretch of ground under water for more than 100 meters as a result of the overflowing of the stream between

Puettlingen and Saaralbe; Here, it appeared tho.t the enemy had with-,

drawn some forces to oppose the counterattack of Pz Lehr Div on 24 Nov

44, This attack had begun about 1600 hours from south of Saarunion.

Pz Lehr ^iv had been re-equipping and reforming its units since the beginning of the month in the vicinity of Castellaun--Buchenbeuren-- .

Morbach. The ^ivision was alerted on 22 Nov 44 and, by order of A Gp G started its march to the area between £>t Wen del and St Ingbert, being subordinated to First Army on its arrival. At that time, the Division was in the midst of.reorganization and was only half ready for combat, it had two weak panzer grenadier regiments, one moderately, strong aufklaerungs (reconnaissance) battalion, 30 tanks and tank destroyers, and 208. Voiles Art Corps, (five battalions). Because a French tank force had broken through to S'trassbur^ on 23 Nov 44, the original atta< plan of Pz Lehr Div on Saarburg s abandoned, and the ^ivision was ordered to push to the area west of Pfalzburg and block the narrow passage into the.Saverne ^ap. A Gp ^ was well aware that the ^iiision forces w©re not sufficient to guarantee any decisive success in that area. Therefore, orders were issued to accelerate the arrival of '

Kfgr 25 • Gren ^iv, which could be expected, on about 25. Nov 44.

149. Pz Lehr Div launched a double attack (see App 4).

Kfgr I (902 Pz Gren ^egt, 12 tanks, and one artillery battalion) MS # B-078 -100- pressed south through Wolf s'kirchen and on tho morning; of 25 Nov 44 forced its way into Postroff and Baorendorfc Tho Kampfgruppe seized tho village of Rauwiller and captured one battalion/ Kfgr 11.(901

Pz Gren ^egt, 20 tanks, and ono medium artillery battalion) drove through Eywiller and Hirschland as far as tho heights north of Schalbach, although this village itself could not be taknn* As early as 25 Nov 44, a strong enemy reaction began:- to exert its influence on the counter­ attack of Pz Lehr Div. A rather strong Augrican combat group, apparently

4 Armd Div (US), rolled over the weak security forces of 361 Volks

Gren Div at Mittersheim and pushed through ^instingen (Fonotrange) toward Baorendorf. As this latter village, was covered only.by weak security forces on the flanks of Pz. Lehr Div, it was captured by tho

Americans* .^he attack of z Lehr Div was threatened in its deep flank by superior enemy armored forces* The enemy was being continuously reinforced at Drulingen. ^hen a renewed attack by rz Lehr %v on

•Schalbach failed to make'headway on 26 Nov 44, A Gp G decided to give • up the operation because no.additional forces were available. Kfgr

25 Pz Gren Div, duo to arrive about 25 Nov 44, eould not support the attack because it was. urgently needed to stop the enemy push from. .

Drulingeric Pz LGhr Div was threatened with encirclement by enemy forces from Baerendorf' and Drulingen.. therefore the Division, was pulled back to the north. On 27 and 28 Nov 44 it was still possible to hold the line Wolfskirchen~«Eywiller~~Bottwiller---Ticff enbach*

150. The staff of TTCorps ^osges" .(Hoehores Kommando "^ogesen), active in the. sector Ingwei1er--Nag enau—the P-hein since 23 Nov 44, was MS # B-078 ' .-101- ' relieved by LXXXIX Inf Corps, which had btoken cur, of the area west of

Saverne and had reached Wimmonau with elements of 553 Volks Gren

The formation of a new front took place as follows;

The 361 Volks Gren Civ, which had been fighting south

and southwest of Saarunion until 25 Nov 44, had. b -on disengaged as a result of the commitment of Pz Lehr Div. On the same day, 361 "^olks

Gren Cj_v was sent to the sector ^icffonbach (exel)—Y/immenau ahd east thereof, with the mission of blocking the road to Bitsch. ^y this time,

256 Voiles Gren Div had arrived, but was forced to defend itself against initially weak enemy attacks from the south end-southwest in the sector near and south of Hagenau. ^he Ingweiler—-^orzweiler sector between .

361 and 256 ^olks (jren Divs was covered by the aufklaerungs battalion

of ?z Lehr Div. '^o.rps headquarters was at Weissenburg®

On 27 Nov 44, the first elements of 245 Inf"Civ arrived near Weissenburg and were committed the next day in the sector covered by the aufklaerungs battalion of Pz Lehr Div. ^he 361 Volks Gren Civ was a combat-experienced division, still preserving some- degree of order in personnel and materiel. The 345 Inf Civ, however, v/as a weak

division"equipped with Russian guns without adequate.ammunition0 The

Division had just arrived,' badly mauled, from Holland.

Those elements of 553 Volks Gren'Civ which had broken out of the Savorne area assembled in Bitsc'h. The troops had only small arms—no heavy weapons or other equipment. How-over, it was. still possible to build up a thin security line.'betv.roon the foothills of the Vosges and the -*%ein e*ast of Hagenau* MS # B-078 -102-

151* ^he situation of Nineteenth Army dovelopod as follows between 25 and 28 Nov 44:

In spite of the breakthrough of enemy tanks to Strassburg on 24 Nov 44, which placed Nineteenth. Army in danger of encirclement from the north, Army still maintained the plan to attack the Belfort

Pass. The reinforced 106 Pz Brig attacked early cn 25 Nov 44 oadt of.

Muelhausen. The Brigade drove southwest along the southern bank of the 111 River, with the objective of rolling up the enemy front in that sector• After reaching Altkirch, the Brigade was to be sent to the sector south of Strassburg# The attack moved forward no more than a few,km and came to a dead halt before the high ridge near Pixheim, which was occupied by the enemy infforce. On 25 Nov.44 the enemy

advanced against the obstacles erected south of Strassburg; and penetrated

Hperrverfoand (ir Blocking Unit'1) Michel# because of the threat constituted by enemy tanks south of Strassburg, 106 Pz Brig .was ordered to this point as quickly as possible. On 25 Nov 44, Obst Michel's force was able to hold the advancing hostile tanks, on the line Eschau—Fogersheim--.

Mo1 sheim—MutzigThis stand was possible through the use of tank obstacles,.the destruction of bridges, and an.active antitank defense employing antitank teams equipped -with Panzerfaousts and ^'nnzerschrecks

(bazookas) on Volkswagens# Advance elements of 106 Pz Brig, reinforced by one heavy panzerjaeger battalion, arrived north of Schxettstadt on

25 Nov 44. The main body of the -Brigade arrived the next day. A rolling up of the front occupied by the weak security elements in the

Phoin BftgirL south &nd southwest of Strassburg had been averted for the time being* MS # B-078 -103-

152,. After tho successful enemy breakthroughs at Salerno

and Bel'fort, tho pressure began to increase in several ^esges sectors#

About 25 Nov 44, the completely exhausted 708 Volks G-ren Div was forced

back across the Breusch Valley toward the southeast* It appeared that

the enemy was anxious to push east through Schirmock and establish

contact with those forces fighting at Molsheim# Hore, and in 16 ^olks

G-ren Div sector to tho south, our troops wore driven back from the

Vosgos positions. The enemy captured Markirch in an attack apparently

directed against Schlettstadt# Farther south, particularly in the

269 Inf Div sector, weak enemy thrusts wore driven back at every

point# This Division was covering a front of about 40 kilometers#

OB WEST approved the withdrawal of the front line to the Vosgos

positions# The front near the Bolfort Pass was withdrawn oast of

Illfurt, on the 111 River (see App 5)#

153# The 198 Inf Div was the first to be freed for duty elsewhere bv this shortening of tho front. Although this Division had already suffered severe losses during our attacks east of Delle and elements of one regiment had had to cross the Swiss border after q hopeless battle, tho Division could not be allowed a breathing spell# t was immediately shifted to LXIV Inf Corps,, south of Strassburg, yo assist in plugging tho gap made by the enemy drive to tho south©.

Advance elements arrived on 27 Nov 44-* The withdrawal of 198 Inf Div and the occupation of a now defense line was carried out according to plan in spite of heavy enemy pressure# ^cre, LXIII Inf Co^ps scorad a defensive success, under difficult conditions• Corps was MS # B-078 • -104- able both to build up the new defense front on the lino envisaged and to release 198 Inf Div for the defense of the threatened northern front. On 28 Nov 44 alone, 64 enemy tanks were knocked out in LXIII

Inf Corps Sector#

154# (For A %> G- Situation, "28 Nov 44, see -dpp 5*) Since the situation on the right wing of First Army in the Orsoholz position had; been fairly quiet for several days, 21 ^iv was withdrawn and sent to 'fche sector west of Saarlautern. Its mission was to absorb the increasing force of the enemy attacks, which had been continuing for three days• We launched a counterattack hero on 29 Nov 44 which temporarily averted the threat to the West Wall at that point.

Relatively strong enemy pressure in the direction of ^aarbruecken and

•laargomuend, against XlH SS Inf Corps,, had become slightly weaker in the last few days. Here, the enemy was able to gain very little ground. Apparently the enemy was regrouping the forces at this point after the counterattack of ^z Lehr %v# This division had failed to attain its main objective (the Saverne ^"ap), but had greatly relieved the pressure on XIII Ss Inf Corps. Because of the failure of the' counterattack, the enemy was able to reinforce continually the

Strassburg area of penetration. We estimated that about two armored and two infantry divisions were opposing us in this sector® Wo feared that the enemy would either assemble these forces at Br aunath t

"smash through the West Wall at Weissonburg or move in force from

Strassburg to the south to encircle and destroy Nineteenth «army. In these extraordinary days of tense.anxiety, we managed to. stave off MS # B-078." -105- this threat for a few days at least. In the Nineteenth Army sector, forces south and southwest of Strassburg were freed for strengthening the front by discontinuing the counterattacks and by shortening the • lines in the ^elfort Pass area. Enemy pressure was greatest through

Markirch in the direction of Schlettstadt. ' The LZXXIX Tnf Corps had erected a continuous defense line, not very strongly occupied however, between the Vosges and the "^hein. The line extended from Ingweiler through Hagenau and lessened the threat to the West TTall in that aroa#

Of course, A Gp G was well aware that this front would not be able to withstand a heavy enemy attack any more than would the bridgehead of

Nineteenth Army. However, the vulnerable deep flanks of the enemy forces in the breakthrough area between Saverne and Strassburg presented very favorable opportunities for attack.

Therefore, A G-p G suggested to OB "TEST that a concentric attack bo made toward ^averno from northwest of Hagenau and from south of

Molsheim. This attack would re-establish contact between Nineteenth and First Armies® A request was made for one panzer division and two infantry divisions—or, alternatively, two panzer divisions—to be brought up immediately for this attack* However, since-the Ardennes

Offensive wa^ imminent at that time, the proposal was rejected. Hitler was so absorbed with the idea of this offensive that ho preferred to see more ground lost in Alsace-Lorraine, rather than to give up forces envisaged for the Ardennes. Nineteenth Army could not be withdrawn behind the ^hein because it served to tie down considerable enemy forcese

If Nineteenth Army.had been withdrawn east of the river, the hulk of the MS # B-078 -106-

enemy forces would then have been freed for other purposes — such as a

push from the area north of ^trassburg through the Most Wall and into

the ^hein Basin*

VI# Developments in the Situation (29 Nov 4-4- - 3 Dec 1-4)

155. On the right wing of & Gp G the situation remained

relatively quiet between 29 Nov and 3 Dec 44. On the other hand, 19

Volks Open ^iv was driven back from the Saar Hoehonstellung (position on

the Saar heights) into the West Wall on either side of Merzig. The enemy

penetrated the Saar Hoehenstellung near Mondorff, ^'erlfangen, and in the.

direction of Siersdorf» % the end of the month, the enemy had reached the Saar ^iver between the bridgeheads of ^remersdorf and ^eckingen*

The 19 "^olks Gren Djattack'to restore contact "between these gwo bridge­ heads was unsuccessful. At the beginning of Doc 44, tho.se local bridge­ heads had to bo evacuated.

1569 Fierce defensive fighting developed west of ^arrlautern.

On 29 Nov 44,- the enemy reachod Gisingen and took &to Barbara Hill.

The 21 Pz ^iv assembled during the night of 28/29 Nov 44 in the wooded terrain ten Ion south of ^a'arlautern. On 29 Nov 44, the division attacked the south flanks of the enemy moving in on Saarlautern and managed to slow their advance. On 29 and 30 Nov 44, heavy, fighting developed around

Altvorweiler and ^erus. On h DqC 44 American armored forces entered the

s western suburbs of aarlaut4rn. Since the counterattack of 21 Pz Div southwest of ^aarlautern made no headway and was unable to prevent the advance of "American. forces on the city, the ^ivision was'" withdrawn behind MS # B-078 . -107-

the Saar during the night of 1,/2 Dec 44 and was or cared to hold the

West Wall on cither side of the town* About 3 too 44, the Saarlautorn

bridge fell undamaged into enomy hands• The regimental commander in

charge Was in a local bridgehead west of the bridge When the incident

happened, and a pionier unit was present to blast the bridge on the

approach of thQ enemy. Suddenly, an armored half-track, which the bridge

security thought was a German vehicle from 21 Pz Div, appeared near the

bridge. The vehicle was actually American, and its occupants over­

powered the security and captured the bridge» On the morning of this

same day, American infantry crossed the Saar ^ivor in assault boats

north, of Saarlautern. Here the first ^est Wall bunker in ^ Gp G sector

was captured. While fighting still continued in Saarlautorn itself, tho

enemy also crossed, tho river south of ^aarlautern, near Lisdorf, in the

late afternoon of 3 Dec 44, ^his assault captured ^nsdorf, along with a

few bunkers on the eastern bank. ^*he LXXXII Inf Corps was ordered to

counterattack with elements of 21 Pz and 719 Inf ^ivs and to seal off

quickly the first two penetrations of tho West Wall on either side of

Saarlauterne, ^he 719 Inf ^iv had been assembled north of °aarbruocken

after its arrival from Denmark in early Dec 44. It was full strength

in personnel, but was poorly equipped and inexperienced in combat#

157. An explanation had to be made to Hitler how a West Wall

installation could fall so quickly into anemy hands. The West WalL had

been hastily rearmed during the preceding weeks. The original guns had

been sent to the Atlantic ^all9. ^he new weapons which had been installed

were supplied with ammunition sufficient in ordinary circumstances for MS # B-078 -108-

about 14 clays. There was no barbed wire and most of the telephone lines

were unserviceable* The occupying troops wore inexperienced Landesschuetz

Yolkssturm, or ausbildungs (training) battalions-«unfit for combat®

158. The 347 Inf and 36 Volks Gren Divs of UlI SS Inf Corps

wore in position we.st and south of the Warndt woods* There was no groat

enemy pressure at that point. On the other hand, there were strong

American attacks astride the road toward F'orbach. Here, at the end of

Nov 44, a counter attack by a panzer force of Lehr Div brought some

relief.. %" the beginning of Dec 44, ,the battered forces of 17 S3 Pz G-ren

Div had been driven back from Puettlingen to the area west of Saargemuond

The 11 Pz Div was able to hold the sector on either side of Saaralbe

until the end of Nov 44 because of the favorable terrain. This Division

on 29 Nov 44 even recaptured and temporarily held Saarunion, which had

been lost by Pz Lehr- Div. 'However, the town was lost again the. next

day. On 30 Nov 44, 1.1 Pz Div was on a line just south of ^aargemuend

(.Sarregueminos)--east of Herbitzheim--0ermingen. The P'z Lehr Div was

immediately adjoining on the line Voeller dingen-~Domf essel—Lorentzon.

On this day OB T7EST ordered Pz -^ehr Div to be withdrawn from the line as

quickly as possible during the night of 30 Nov/i Dec 44, The division was to be used in the Ardennes Offensive. yiith a heavy heart, &rmy

G-roup. ordered 11 Pz ^iv and 25 Pz Gren ^iv to extend their sectors still farther to permit • the .withdrawal of ?z Lehr Div* In the evening of 30 Nov 44> in Pz Lehr Div sector, Domfessel and Voellerdingen were captured by the enemy. Elements of 11 Pz and. 25 Pz Gren Jivs relieving

Pz Lehr Div were instructed to occupy a shortened position between MS # B-078 -109-

Vermingen~-Dohlingen~~north of Buetten. Pz Lohr L':1T was to novo rapidly to Kochom (Eifel) for a "rapid rehabilitation" before participating in the Ardennes Offensive#

159o On 1 Dec 44, the main body of 11 Pz Div\? with Kfgr 25

Pz Gren Div attached, was along the line Wittringon—Achon—Biningen-*-

Bois de Hoiligenbronn (Maginot Line). Only weak security posts wore in the previously mentioned shortened position. On the same day strong enemy armored forces advanced astride the Lorontzon—Biningen road toward

Bitsch* The ground on cither side of this highway was an ideal route of approach for tank formations. The German troops had expected just such an American attack and had emplaced antitank weapons on both flanks of bhe approach. Armored elements were in support, ready to counterattack.

One flanking groun (from 25 Pz Gren -^iv) was assembled in the v/oods southeast of Biningen. The 11 Pz and 25 Pz ^ren Divs intercepted the

American armored column southwest of Biningen by flanking fire, which inflicted heavy losses in the enemy ranks. Of about 70 attacking tanks, approximately 30 wore destroyed.

160* At that time, LXXXIX Inf Corps was being attacked along a broad .front*. The 361 "Volks Gren Div, committed in the Lower 'Vosges and fighting stubbornly, was driven north only a few km to the line

Lemberg—Mutton—Zinsweileiv The adjoining 245 Inf Div>- less experienced in combat did not perform so well. In this sector, the enemy ma de such a deep penetration in the direction of Reichshofen thr-.t its .sealing off required great effort indeed. On the other hand, 2 56 Volks Gren Div fought-well in the Hagenau sector. Because of the critical situation of MS # B-078 , -110- the division on its rights 256 folks &ren Div had to protect against encirclement on that flank;. The wooded terrain south of Hagonau was lost on 3 Dec 44 after bitter fighting*

161® Oh the right wing of Nineteenth A..;riiy, heavy fighting developed between 198 Inf Div (from Muelhausen) and. xlmorican arid

French armored and infantry troops. The enemy, with the main effort along.the ^hein, reached Rheinau by 3 De£ 44* ^e had to abandon the

Erstein sector, which was outflanked on one side by the enemy advance to ^heinau and on the other by the attack across the Middle Vosges toward Sch'lettstadt.. The Americans broke through the massif on the. heights west of. Barr. In addition, fighting fiercely without pause, the enemy crossed the Markirch Valley and captured the massifs on the heights west and northwest of Schlottstadt* Colmar was threatened in the beginning of Doc 44 by a drive west of ^appoltsweiler* during this period the enemy succeeded in considerably reducing the Alsace bridgehead by attacks from, the north and northwest. On the left wing of Nineteenth Army, French forces had crossed the branch of the Huening

Canal during late Nov 44#. ^he 139 lnf Div vjas rapidly shifted to the endangered area and was able to prevent any further progesss® On

3 Dec 44, the French. were thrown back across the. canal® A &p Oberrhein, formed at the beginning of Dec 44,. assisted in the combat east of

Muelhausen by making available normal replacements and also several

SS battalions, ^he mission of this Army Group was to organize and build up the defense of the Upper Rhein®, MS # B-078 -111-

VII-* ^ Gp G- Estimate of the Situation (o Dec 44)

(Obst iG von Me11 enthin replaced by G-enmaj °taedtke)

162 0 The successful enemy breakthrough at Saverne toward

Strassburg had destroyed contact between -^irst and Nineteenth ^rmies«

The two panzer divisions and one infantry division necessary to close the gap were, not made available to A Gp G by OB/. As a results -^irst

Army was fighting in, and in front of> the West Wall between the

Orscholz switch position and the Khein, while Nineteenth Army was still holding the bridgehead in Alsace* Between the two armies and also behind Nineteenth Army was the newly-formed ^ Gp Oberrhein. Thi

Army Group intended to build up a security front along the ^hein between ^arlsruhe and Loersch, utilizing security troops (sicherungs- verbaenden) and units from the Ersatzheer* Since the beginning of

T Dec 44> First Army s LXXXII.Inf ^orps had been fighting in the West

Wall® At that time, enemy pressure was strongest in the Saarlautern sector* Here the Ximericans had captured by surprise several West

"17a11 installations north and south of Saarlautern^ ^he XIII Ss Inf

Corps still held a long curved front, forward of the West. Wall* south and southwest of Saarbruecken* A double envelopment was threatening as a result of heavy pressure at Saarlautern ana at ^aargemuend, wher the enemy had almost reached the West Wall* The enemy had neglected to exploit the surprise breakthrough to Strassburg by making an immediate supplementary push farther north toward Weissenburg

Therefore, LXXXIX Inf Corps had managed to build up a defensive front by the end of Nov 44* Almost daily there was the threat of a breaks MS # B-078 -112- through in 245 Inf Div-sector northwest of Hagenau* As a matter of fact, this Division had already been so mauled before it was committed here that any strong enemy thrust in its sector would almost certainly have resulted in a breakthrough toward Weissenburqv, The threat of double envelopment of Nineteenth Army was minimizod by regrouping units and by shortening the front line in the area southwest of

Muelhausen. ^he Alsace bridgehead had also been contracted by the enemy push from the north along the he in to ^heinau in early Dec 44.*.

Enemy troops had crossed the Middle ^osges from the north and northwest and were exerting strong pressure in the direction;of ^olmar. This push constituted a threat to the only line of communication with those elements of Nineteenth Army still holding out in the Upper Vosges*

(For the Order of Battle of A Gp G at the beginning .of Dec 44, see

App 6•)

163* The condition of the ^ %>divisions after weeks of

constant fighting was very poor® This situation resulted from the

order of 0K17 to rehabilitate only those divisions destined to take part in the Ardennes Offensive.. For months, A Gp-& had received only meager reinforcement, both in personnel and materiel* The over-all losses in men and materiel could not be replaced. A largo number of

divisions had been in combat continuously since the beginning of the invasion, ^ome. of these were 11 Pz Div^ 21 Pz Div, 17 Ss Pz Gren ^iv, and the infantry divisions which fought under Nineteenth Army in southern France and had marched northward on foot. Although the troops maintained a high morale, they were no lonp^er an effective fighting MS # B-078 -113- force. It must be acknowledged that in spite of everything, the

contribution of each soldier, whether hardened in babtle or inexperienced,, was magnificent* All had endured never-ending hardships and depriva­

tions,, They saw some success as a result of their sacrifices., Stilly

there was the perpetual, disheartening shortage of heavy weapons and

ammunition, which had to be allotted in small quantities® In addition,

there were the cares and worries, manfully borne by all, imposed by

the Anglo-American air supremacy®

164. The combat efficiency of each division at the beginning

of ^ec 44 was approximately as follows:

LXXXII Inf Corps (First Army)

416 Inf Djv—Arrived from. Denmark, with little combat experience.

bought well in the Orscholz switch position. Losses suffered were replaced in the vfost Wall by sicherungs battalions-. Division suitable for defensive combat.

19 Volks Gfen Dj_v—Suffered heavy losses of men and materiel on the

Moselle, during the withdrawal to the Itfied, and on the Saar heights.

Encircled once and badly mauled, losing weapons and equipment. Troops

physically exhausted. Still had most of its artillery, but very few medium antitank weapons. Replacements consisted for the most part of

troops from Landesschuetzen and sicherungs battalions, with hardly and infantry training. The few veterans of the Division were always used for attacks and difficult missions; soon there were very few left.

Because of excessive casualties, which were replaced by poor quality MS # B-078 -114— troops, Division suitable for defense only in an. emergency*

21PzDiv-~In the line continuously for over three weeks; participating both in defense and in offense* Performed very well_, on the whole, but high losses reduced efficiency* Panzer grenadier regiments not more than 50 percent of authorized strength* Panzer regiment had only about seven tanks fit for combat* division suitable for limited attacks®

719 Inf ^iv—New division from Denmark* Numerically strong, but ,

•still untried in battled

XIII SS Inf Corps (First Army)

347 Inf Piv—-Mediocre static division# Brought from the ^if8i area in

•;he. middle of Nov 44. "Very poorly equipped, no medium antitank weapons, artillery below strength* Suffered heavy casualties in previous weeks*

Suitable only for a limited defense,

56 Volks ^ren Div--Severe losses in the area Falkenberg—St Avoids but still a good division for defense*

559 Volks Gren ^iv—Badly mauled at the beginning of the major offensive virest of %euze.a Losses made up to a certain extent from remnants of

48 Inf Piv, which had likewise taken a severe beating. Division had very few antitank weapons, remaining; average strength in artillery.,

'vombat value adequate with first-class leadership. Suitable for limited defense#

17 SS Pz Gren Div—In the line since the start of the invasion® -^ad changed commanders several times e Composed mostly of poorly trained MS # 0-078 • -115-

Volksdoutsch (Ed: racial Hermann from foreign countries)* Suffered severe loss3S, as was; tp bo expected* Mad JQT,y f JW antitank weapons^ but fair artillery, Suitably for. a limited defense.

11 Pz Div—Bora the brunt of combat in the Meta a~-ea • Lost a great many men, about 2^000 in the previous three weeks,, Strength of companies not more than 30 to 50 mon^ despite a continuous flow of replacements in the last few weeks» ^anzer regiment still had about 20 serviceable tanks* Artillery was good* ^Hifklaerungs and pionier battalions had suffered heavy losses# Still about 2,000 men remaining in the feldersatz

(field replacement) battalion, but these were not sufficiently trained*

Division suitable for limited attack*

-'"fgr 25 Pz Gren Div—Consisted of one regiment v/ith about eight to ten tanks. Duitable for United attack only.

LXXXIX Inf Corps (First Army)

^61 Volks ^ron Day —Greatly weakened by losses in men and materiel**

Good artillery,. Combat efficiency relatively high. Suitable for defense#

245 Inf Div—Only about 300 exhausted men remaining in the infantry

Division equipped with ^ussian artillery,, but virtually no ammunition.

Suitable for limited defense in an emergency.

256 Volks Grqn Div—Heavy personnel losses south of Hagenau* infantry especially weak.. Good artillery, including a fev^r sturmgeschuetz*

Division was of good fighting quality. -Suitable for defense. MS # B-078 -116-

LXIV Inf ^orps (Nineteenth Army)

198 Inf Piv--Lost one regiment as a result of the counterattack at

Delle* division itself suffered heavy losses in personnel and equip-

mento Division exhausted, but still, retained a nucleus of good

troops© Suitable for defense*

716 Volksr Gren ^iv^-Only about one regiment remained. Completely

exhausted, ^o be absorbed by 708 ^olks ^'ren Div„

708 Volks ^ron Di-v--Inexperienced troops. While relieving 21 Pz Div

had been faced with the repulse of a heavy enemy attack. Had suf­

fered heavy losses in personnel and materiel. Division was exhausted,

Suitable only for limited defense,

16 Volks &ren Div-.~Sufferc;d comparatively few losses, and these had

already been replaced to some extent, Suitable f0r defense,

269 Inf Div—A fresh division. Had been,in a quiet sector of the

Upper Vosges, Suitable for defense,

159 Inf %v-—Heavy losses in the forests west and shothwest of ^hann.

Companies had a strength of about 30 to 50 men, Artillery still

complete with one German battalion, one Polish-Russian field gun

battalion (four "^ussian medium howitzers) and one Prench field gun battalion, Very short of field wire and radio equipment (the general

G s condition throughout A Gp ), uitable for defense,

538 Inf %v~~Depleted by constant fighting in the Belfort area*

Suitable for limited defense®

30 Sg Inf Djy~.A foreign division with a German nucleus of regimental strength, German elements scheduled to be withdrawn. MS # B-078 -117-

189 Inf Div—Same condition as 159 Inf Div<>

The exhausted condition of all divisions was repeated­

ly stressed by A Gfp G in its reports to higher commands0

A 165e The tactical situation of Gp Gs early Dec 44 a. was

briefly as follows (see App 5)r

In heavy defensive fighting, First Amy had been able

to prevent an enemy breakthrough in Lorraine, although nearly the

* entire province, along with fortress Metz, had fallen, into enemy

hands, ^he situation of ^irst Army, fighting within and in front of

the West "Wall, was critical, ^here were no more reserves# LB a

matter of fact, even 11 Pz Aiv wa.s scheduled to be withdrawn for use

in the Ardennes Offensive, although at this time the division was

engaged in heavy fighting southwest of ^itsch. ^he ^aar and Pfalz

areas were directly threatened*

The Nineteenth Army situation was no better# At any

moment an'enemy breakthrough would seal the fate of the exposed

bridgehead. If the Army were to be withdrawn behind the &hein, the

a iemy would have a large number of divisions free for other missions.

Nineteenth Army was left in this dangerous position to fix the enemy

forces#

166.,. ^ brief comparison of the strength of First ^rmy with

that of the -sanerican forces opposing it would be somewhat as follows:

Ten American infantry divisions and three-American

armored divisions (incomparably stronger than German divisions)

opposed eight exhausted German infantry-type divisions (roughly

equivalent to three infantry divisions) and three highly mobile MS # B-078 -118- units (approximately equivalent to one and a half panzer divisions).

The Americans had 700-800 tanks,, against 90 German tanks and sturm- geschuetz, .. In the Nineteenth ^rmy sector, the odas were about the same®

In summarizing, it should be emphasized that the unspeakable, arduous defensive battles of A Grp G in Lorraine, in the

Vosges, and in Alsace--Nov and Dec 44-~can be properly assessed only in connection with the preparations for the Ardennes Offensive* By the end of Oct 44., 0K1T had already decided upon an offensive in the

Ardennes. «&s a consequence* all new forces were reserved for this great attack, and. A Gp Q had to Sarry oil its fight with completely ina de qua te me ans6

7III# Conclusions

167# Experiences of Strategy

a« ^ifth Pz -^rrny was to assemble on the Plateau de

Langres during early Sep 44. The Army mission was to attack north toward Pheims and hit the deep flank of the ftmerican forces moving toward the German frontier# . By this maneuver the German command i • hoped to regain the initiative* The Americans, quite correctly, relentlessly followed up the German forces committed on their front.

Once the enemy had established a large bridgehead on the Moselle between Nancy and Luneville, Pifth Pz ^rmy had to be committed piece­ meal in order to close the gap® MS # B-078 -119-

If the attacker fully exploits his successes, he

will maintain the advantage -and will be in a position to dictate

every movement of the enemy, forced on the defensive©

b0 The first attacks against Met?, were correctly

launched by units on the march, without assembling,: in an attempt to

take the city wixh one bold stroke., These attacks were repulsed by

the. German garrison., It ought to have been quite clear to the enemy

that there was a strong occupying force at Motz, yet it would appear

that obvious conclusions wore not drawn from this fact. The enemy

•should have made a systematic reconnaissance and have carefully placed

his forces in position for a strong attack on a fortified position*

lowover, in Sep 44, the enemy continued the same method Of attack®

wach attempt was repulsed with heavy losses to the attacker,

c« At the end of Oct 44 and beginning of Nov 44 the

German troops in Lorraine and the ^osges were fighting for time. The

defense had to be maintained, even with heavy losses in men and in

ground, to prevent a breakthrough until the Ardennes Offensive should

jring long awaited reliefs But Hitler did not realize the full

implication of this secondary effort, this delaying action. Otherwise,

the order to hold every inch of ground would have been modified*.

Hitler sometimes was forced to consent to a withdrawal, but only when

the withdrawal was an actual fact and would have taken place, order

or no order, Strategy can never be rigid even in a delaying action.

It must always remain flexible«, Only after much warngling did Army

Group receive permission for the First Army withdrawal, ^y this MS # B-078 ' -120- withdrawal, A Gp G managed to preserve the integrity of First ^rmy and prevent a decisive breakthrough into the ^heir. Basin. The

American and Fr0nch forces made breakthroughs at relfort and at

^averne because Hitler had ordered the German forces to held in both places and net to retreat an inch* 0W rejected the proposal of A Gp. to withdraw* to the H; okor switch, the forces on the ruptured Belfort fronte. This movement would have released throe or four divisions for the defense of the oaverno Gap. It was due directly to this rigid defense that ultimately.both Upper ^Isace and Strassburg were lost©

d« A Gp b- not plan to hold at fortress Metz if bhe front should have to bo withdrawn. For that reason no special preparations were made for an all-around defense. N0 reserve supplies of food or ammunition were built up beforehand. ^ Gp G did not feel that it could afford to leave behind any forces to allow themselves to be encircled* When the ^merical large-scale atiirack began in Nov 44j litler ordered the fortress defended to the last round of ammunition© w-dov,s of this nature could not be given on such short notice with any. hope of their being effectively carried out. In the few days remaining, no thorough preparations for supply and occupation could oe expected. American preparations for a large-scale attack in the

Metz area were quickly recognized, timely notice from a strategic point of view.was given to us both by radio monitoring and by our agents, However, nothing detailed was known of the plan of operations

Ct would have been unfortunate for the German command if the enemy MS # 33-078 -121- forcos slated for the concentric attack on Metz had, in coordination with the bulk of the troops, broken through into the ^aar area, This maneuver was threatened initially south of the city as far as tho

E ied.j By the enemyT s diverting troops toward Metz, a perceptible -7/^ decree of relief was felt in the center bf .^irst & *my* It was to our advantage that American tank formations from tho Kerling bridgehead t.A* advanced on Merzig and also against the ^rscholz switch- position# .

(The latter advance was directed toward Saarburg*) This direction of advance meant that tho v.rioan tanks had. to overcome not only the

Orscholz position but the Most Wall at tho Saar as well#

o* >Tnfortunate for tho Gorman command was' the execution of the American offensive in Lorraine and the Vosges# This large-scale strategic operation was carried out in..successive phasos#

The few reserves available to A Op G had already boon committed in the Metz area by the time the attacks southwest of Savorne and in the

region of the Belfort Pass were s.tarted# Difficult for us also was

:.~/he manner in which the main elfort of tho American attacks was shifted f^om one point to another with great skill and rapidity# ^ or instance^, between (20 and-24 Nov 44> the enemy attacked in strength on the

Orscholz position# Then, on 25 Nov 44^ the attacks shifted to either side of Bouzonville in the direction of Saarbruecken# The ruthless stripping of ]uiot sectors (for example, along the Moselle north of <, r < f Romich, where actually only isolated posts remained) was too much of :; a burden to the German troops© \ ; MS # B-078 -122-

168. Lessons in Tactics

ac From a tactical viewpoint, the battle in Lorraine yroxrod conclusively that a rigid defense is faulty* With up-to-date military weapons, any defensive system can be reduced to such chaos in so short a time that all that need be done is for the troops of tne victor to walk in and occupy the area*, ^f. it has been decided that a system of positions is to be held at all costs, something like the following plan, which proved its effectiveness on the Eastern

T?rontmust bo followed?

As soon as it has become clear that the enemy is preparing to attack on a large scale, the bulk of the defending troops should be withdrawn to prepare positions two-three km in the rear*

?-nly weak security forces should be loft in the former line, ^he

•.jurpose of such a procedure is to induce the enemy to waste his most destructive artillery fire in a nearly unoccupied area and thus to save men for actual defensive fighting# The difficulty lies in

<>oing able to recognize correctly, and. in time, just when the enemy cttack begins• One has to consider regrouping forces several times*

b# The strongest form of defense is still "delaying resistance" (kinhaltende Widerstand)• In the Saverne £ap, for instance, 553 T^~oIks ^ren %v, unsupported, held up a strong enemy attack for many days* This,was possible because at the end of a day of fighting, the Division -withdrew to a new defense line only a few km in the rear,, a pssition which had been, surveyed and partially builfi up. The Americans over and over again dropped their shells., on • MS # B-078 -123-

the old positions, whore thore were only weak security forces• Thus,

precious time was gained. The decision to use such tactics cannot !

be left subordinate commanders* Both battalion and company 1

rrornmande^s must be concerned.wholly with their defensive missions* !

Ce Higher commands had detected, principally by moans

of radio interception, the approach and concentration of the American

attack formations for the assault against Metz from, two sides® nevertheless, the troops themselves-.were,- to some extent, taken by

surprise when the attack actually started at the beginning of Nov 44#

This surprise was achieved perhaps because of a weakening of our

tactical observation* However, the preparation for the attack and the

routes of approach were excellently concealed by the Americans*

d# The striking successes achieved by the Americans in the early stagers of the large-szsale attack on Metz (especially

south of the city, whore the enemy overran the positions on the

Delme&idge) were, in the opinion of the Gorman intermediate and lower

commands, directly traceable to the close support of "tank packs#"

Each "pack/1 or task force, consisted of 30-40 tanks and an infantry battalion® On several occasions we noted with surprise the failure to exploit properly certain successes achieved# This failure resulted from inadequate combat reconnaissance--reconnaissance which would have told the oneray that no German forces were then in front of them.# I shall give an example of this:

On 10 Nov 44„ American forces overran the position on the Delme ^idge# The 48 Inf Div was decisively beaten by the enemy MS # B-078 -124-

tank forces® No sizeable German forocs remained on the ridge to j\

impede the advance of the enemy to the Nied,/ j •V. e* It proved very advantagoous to the enemy to

attack against the boundary between two fairly large units. As an

example, on 9 Nov 44 the ^mfcricans established with little difficulty!

the bridgehead at Kerling north of Metz—-along the boundary of 416

Ixif and 19 Voiles G-ren Divs, ^his made a unified control of the

•reserves for counterattack extraordinarily difficult® Even more |

disagreeable and more baffling to the German command was the Asner^cari I

attack in 553 and 708 Volks ^ren -^iv sectors toward Saverne. This. j i attack struck the boundary betwoen First and Nineteenth Armies• )' v ^ • V ij

Boundary linos between units act as barriers to the troops which they j

separate.^ This is particularly true in the case of larger .units® |

16 9 f Commitment of &rmor

a. Disastrous for the German situation in Lorraine

and the Vosgos was the fact that 21 Pz Div could not be disengaged

at the proper time because there was no replacement for it^ Before

any attack, it is absolutely imperative that panzer divisions bo

disengaged from the front for rest and rehabilitation^ Modern defense

does not consist of rigid and blind resistance, but of delaying

action coordinated with counterattacks into the flanks of the attacking

enemy# American domination of the air proved in the combat in Lorraine

that a coordinated attack by our tank formations was not possible^

1 contrary to our experiences in the Eastf For instance, 11 Pz Div

made a tank assault of this type in the Moyenvic area toward the end MS # B-078 -125- of Sep 44« The Division lost 20 out of a total of 25 tanks due to enemy air action#

b, In general., therefore, on the basis of similar experiences, tank formations thereafter did not exceed ten tanks. '

This does not mean that the tanks of a panzor div?sion should be distributed among the forces of an infantry division in its sector#

On the contrary* splitting a panzer division should be avoided* Only the unified attack of an entire panzer division is effective# The inclement weather during the entire month of Nov 44 ^turned the naturally soft ground in Lorraine into a quagmire, assisted the defense, and greatly slowed down the movements of the American tanks» Since . low areas, for instance, were flooded at that time, only well constructe roads and some high ground were suitable.for the passage of the

American types of tanks# These areas were defended to advantage by concentrations of tanks and antitank guns# The 88 mm guns were particularly advantageous because of their long range®.

c0 Experiences in Lorraine proved that the German T

Mark T«' (Panther) because of its broad tracks and powerful engine, was j . more maneuver able than the American Sherman tank, which had rubber . • tracks# Also, the gun of the Sherman tank was inferior* On the j other hand, the bherman was superior to our Mark IV tank, which was less maneuver able#.

170* Air forces

\ Because of American domination of the air, any sizeable movement or any attack during daylight was out of the MS # B-078 -126-

question in good weather, All our attacks,, as a rule, ha,d to be

carried out either at dawn or at dusk, '^'he enemy artillery observe.ro tiever but of the air^ interfered with the movement of even the

smallest unite Any change of position or snifting of our batteries

in the combat area was immediately caught and shelled by American

artillery. The Anglo-American-air superiority had an ever increasing

influence on the morale of our troopse

171c Flak

Army Group was aided by having a comparatively adequate

number of flak troops—in the important defensive sector of Metz,

one flak regiment per corps« Because of excellent coordination, it

was possible to employ these units both as field artillery and as

antitank defense in rear areas* However,, flak units, were actua ny

part of the Luftwaffe, so that it was not possible to place them under

tactical control of divisions* We could only request that they

cooperate closely with the latter® Consequently, the degree of

cooperation depended mainly on the good-will between individual

commanderso For instance, at a critical moment in the battle for the

Saverne Gap,the flak unit committed there was withdrawn for another

mission on orders from a higher flak authority. This withdrawal

greatly affected t he fighting at that point.* In combat„ flak units

near the front must be subordinated to the commanders of the ground

forces,

172, Supply

Every military operation stands or falls by the degree MS # B-078 -127- of efficiency of isupply. The American forces opposite A Gp G had to break off their activities during the entire month of Oct 44 in order to bring up supplies® A Gp G likewise experienced difficulty during this period in building up reserve supplies for the coming battle*

The center of gravity on the Westetn Front ?.ay in the A Gp B sector and the bulk of the ammunition and fuel moved toward that sector0

The meager allotments received by A Gp G- were sent to those points on the front line where the main effort of American attacks was expected. In order,to build up a reserve, the amount of ammunition allotted to each gun on any given day was strictly, controlled. By the time the enemy attacks commences, each gun had about one and a half days supply—pitifully inadequate, of gourse.

173. Organisation

During the defensive fighting, A Gp G learned certain lessons in organization* It is not feasible to maintain a large number of battered combat divisions as independent units because to do so requires an uneconomical proportion of rear echelon and service troopso In Nineteenth Army area, remnants of divisions were combined to form new units. Thus the rear echelon troops were transferred., to

OKH for reorganization and reassignment®.

The panzer brigades brought from Germany at the beginning of Sep 44 did not prove efficient. They had not received sufficient unit training and their organization was faulty. Each brigade consisted of one panzer battalion with 50 tanks, one. panzer grenadier battalion, one panzerjeager company, and one pionei.r MS # B078 -128-

company,. The units lacked the artillery necessary for an independent

military operation.

The machine gun and sioherungs battalion brought from the zone of the interior could, not be used independently• The^e

battalions had to furnish replacements for the battered divisions.

Of particular value were the Army and Army Group Vvaffenschules which

attempted to train the young officers and noncommissioned officers.

The more the war progressed, the more the German -Army strove to improve

the scant training of the recruits and VoIks sturn, upon whom we

depended to master the situation® It was evident to us that modern

technical warfare, in which materiel dominates, requires properly

trained and experienced soldiers0 These troops can only be derived from a good standing army. MS #B018 -129-

Annex

FFI OPERATIONS— SOUTHERN FRANCE AND LORRAINE

It After the beginning of the invasion, the activity of the terrorists and guerrilla bands increased steadily in southern

France, '^heir actions were characterized by scattered attacks on individual cars, trucks, and horse-drawn vehicles and on small units*

Open battles on a small scale sometimes developed with partisan groups, whose, members wore civilian clothes and fought from ambushe

The FFI operated principally in the Rhone valley, between Valence and Avignon; astride the important Bordeaux—Carcass one line of com­ munications; the Tarbes area; south of Clermont— Ferrand; and in the vicinity of Grenoble and south Geneva,

2. Rail traffic became increasingly crippled by the demolition of tracks, and highways® Passenger and express trains (Avignon—Lyons) were attacked; troop trains, however, were not fired upon0 Since railway security forces were practically non-existent, the coastal defense had to be weakened by withdrawing troops for the security of the line of communications. This security was restricted to only a few main routes, such a.s Tours—Bordeaux—

Bayone and Dijon—Lyons--Avignon,, Consequently, the bulk of the

French rail net could not be utilizedo Even on the routes that MS # B-018 v" -130- were to be held open, traffic was often interrupted by sabotage* As a result, traffic was limited fcr the most part to escorted convoys.

These interruptions also considerably delayed the transfer of troops to Northern France, a delay sometimes, as.much .as two weeks• Moreover, the supply situation was seriously affected

3.. The signal communications system, based on the existing

French installations3 was critically hampered0 The trunk lines, which crossed guerrilla territory, were continually severed* Army, corps, and division signal communications nets were almost totally paralyzed by mid-Aug 44* Because of the lack of equipment, the radio net was an inadequate.expedients

4o Although the FFI greatly influenced combat operations in the kouth of France, the movement found little favor among the population in Northern France® In Lorraine, for example, only a few isolated acts of sabotage on the telephone system occurred during the same period this movement was active in southern France. The population was passive, and only in very isolated cases were they active in direct collaboration with American troops0 One instance was the over-powering, with the assistance of elements of the population, of a division security detachment on the canal bridge near Hemmingen

(50 Km west of Saverne). In general, however, FFI operations in all of Northern France, except Brittany, were of little importance* Appendices

A_ £ P G '

(20 Sep 44 u 3 Dec 44)

REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

MS # A-999

App 1 s A Gp G ! Situation DCC-'II Inf '-'orps i Approximately 5 Sep 44

App 2 : A Gp (j : Tactical Situation - fortress Metz : 10-20 Sep 44

APP 3 : Nineteenth Army : Situation : 8 Sep 44

App 4 : A Gp G ! Situation : 16 - 18 Sep 44

\ App 5 : A Gp G : Situation : 20 - 22 Sep 44 o App 6 : A Gp G : Order of Battle : Approximately 15 Sep - 1 o r'r

App 7 ! . A Gp G : u yetem of Berense ; Oct - Nov 44

App 8 : NINETEENTH ARMY ARTILLERY I# Condition of Artillery Units (Got 44-) II* Supply and Replacement Problems III#- Employment of the Artillery IV# Condition of Artillery Unit (mid-Nov 44)

App 9 s SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS (Oct 44)

App 9a : A Gp G : Mire Communications ; 5 Oct.- 14 Dec 44

App 10 : A Gp G % Order of Battle : Oct 44

App 11 ! A Gp G s Situation : First Army and ^ ifth Pz Amy ; 4 Oct 44

-2- MS # A-000

App 1 A Gp G : Order of Battle : 9 Nov 44

App 2; A Gp G : Situation : 7 Nov 4

App 3 A Gp G- s Situation : 8 & 16 Nov 44

App 4 First Army : Situation ; 8 - 16 Nov 44

App 5 LXXXII Inf Corps ;• Situation : 7 Nov 44

App 6 LXXXII.„.Inf Corps : Situation : 9 Nov 44

MS # B-078

App 1 A Gp ^ j Situation : 20 NOT 44 (Evening)

App 2 Breakthrough to Saverne : 20 - 22 Nov 44

App 3 LXXXII Inf ^orps s Situation : 8 - 17 Nov 44

App 4 Pz Lehr Div : Operations : 24 - 30 Nov 44

App 5 A G-p G t Situation i. 28 Nov & 3 Nov 44

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• MS # A-999 -1-

NINETEENTH ARMY ARTILLERY

IJP Condition of Artillery Units (Oct 44)

1* 716 Volks Gren ^iv—-The artillery lacked three light

batteries in all--one in each light battalion. *^he medium battalion

lacked two batteries. Operations were considerably handicapped by

shortages in men> officers, and noncommissioned officers for forward ob­

servation^ and also by the lack of telephone and radio equipment* There

was a great need for horses and harness both for the available horses

and for future replacements. ^Hie -fc0 vehicle shortages, ammunition'trans­

port caused difficulties for the Division. 'Aie artillery was composed of

a regimental staff with three light battalions (averaging two batteries k each and varied in the number of guns) and one medium battalion with only

one battery ('French, medium field howitzers).

2. 16 Inf Div-*-Of the artillery regiment only the regimental

staff, two battalion staffs, and four light batteries .remained. The

shortage of communications equipment was acute.

^-98 Inf Div-frThe artillery of this division was the best

equipped in Nineteenth Army. The regiment was still complete with three

light battalions. One battalion was often sent to critical points in

other division sectors^ since the regiment still had great mobility. In

accordance with its T/o, the division did not have a medium battalion.

-13- App 8

MS # A-999 -2-

4.. 184 Inf -Artillery consisted of ono light battery from I Bn, 28 (?) lies i^rty Regt. This ono battery (fully equipped except for telephones and radios) was inadequate oven to support the battered remnants of this Division, artillery support from o the ID divisions and from fleer artillery was always necessary in this sector*

5* 338 Inf Qjy--Arti11ery consisted of only two light battalions with weak batter ios;, no m.odium batteries, and no regimental staff®.

61 Kfgr Kimpfle'r--The Group had one light field howitzer battery (Btiry C) formed from artillery replacement units of Yiehrkrois ^9

Its communications equipment was almost non-existent. The artillery had limited mobility and'no organic ammunition transporte Artillery support for heavy fighting in this sector required bringing in additional batteries from other sectors.

The more the tactical communications met was disrupted by harassing fire on the roads, the more extensive was the use of the permanent commercial wire not* (This -expedient was, on the whole, seldom used in the. Army area. Th-o onomy harassing and interdiction fire caused too many breaks in the permanent linos. Equipment and personnel to serYice the wire were not available! the troops were not sufficiently trained for this purpose,)

7. 159 Inf %v and 189 Inf ^iv—The 28 Res Arty ^egt was with one of these divisions, which, although they were battered and mauled remnants, were still bravely struggling. The Artillery Regiment,

(less one battery—see 184 Inf ^iv) had two organic light batteries and App 8

MS # A-999 -3~ one attached light battery, composed of school troops from the Artil­ lery Officer Candidate" School at Anten. The 159th Inf ^iv had, as nearly as I can remember, one or two light batteries* These batteries had been formed from the remnants of those units partially destroyed,in ( Belfort and were reorganised, trained, and equipped with materiel found in repair shops in that city# Their combat efficiency was limited#

.8# Brigade von Oppen—This Brigade had no organic artillery, but had attached 961 Arty (Mod)--Hear Artillery, three batteries of

Russian 120 mm guns* These guns had little ammunition and were difficult to move'with the • few obsolete motorized prime movers available. Another difficulty with these? guns was that their flat trajectory did not permit adequate coverage of the front, ^or this reason they were placed far to the rear in order to reduce the dead space in front of our troops#

Replacement or exchange of artillery equipment with that of other sectors within,the V*rmy area was impossible. Artillery materiel was 'limited; it was tied down by ever-increasing enemy attacks,, with a constant shifting of the main effort on two-thirds of the Army front. The artillery was limited, sometimes entirely lacking, in mobility. It lacked suitable foreign transport materiel to displace the guns for timely support#

Thus, Nineteenth Army was compelled to take into consideration the weak­ nesses of the artillery on the left wing.

II# Supply and Replacement Problems

9# After Oct 44, some of the artillery elements received

.-15- App 8

MS # A-999 , -4-

personnel replacements from the Ersatzheor. Artillerymen wero assembled and-trained as follows:

Thore was a special light battery at the replacement,

collecting, and training camp of Nineteenth ^rmy in Colmar, This

li&ht battery, after training, was to be transferred without equipment

to 338 Arty Rcgt ©r to 189 Inf -^iv in the second half of Nov M» A

light artillery battalion could be formed for 189 or 159 Inf -^iv from

personnel and..equipment in Bolfort. This unit had been designated as a

light artillery battalion since the latter part of Oct 44, However,

communications personnel and equipment of the battalion were seriously • inadequate until inid-N.ov 44, The time this battalion would bo ready for commitment could not be predicted* In Colmar and Belfort, many flak artillerymen (mostly from the Luftwaffe) and even naval artillerymen had to be retrained.

10, Replacements for guns and communications equipment begam arriving in mid-Oct 44, The guns woro numerically sufficient., but were without the necessary accessories. Their distribution to the troops, was delayed as much as ten days until the most critical accessories arrived. The distribution of guns to the troops without the necessary accessories was useless, for the troops were short of these items- also#.

In spite of the great need, supply of guns to the front was slow, since there was also a shortage of both notorized and horse-drawn prime movers.

These were used simultaneously for hauling ammunition,

11# The shortage of field kitchens could be filled almost completely. There was. hardly any supply of clothing- and equipment for

-16- App 8

MS # A-999 -5- men and •orses# What oould be delivered was so little that it could not noticeably increase the fighting strength and tactical flexibility of the command. The supply of wire communications equipment could ihot equal existing shortages arising fmm. daily combat losses# The status of radio equipment became more and more acute because of increasing shortages and insufficient replacement. Supplies and replacements moving on roads and railroads from Army depots.were hindered on clear days by enemy fighter-bomber activity. The disruption of the few railroad linos available to Army meant interruption of transport* The railroads could be used only at night# Arrival of ammunition became more regular in midget 44, although there was still a shortage of ammunition for modi inn caliber guns-fGerman as well as foreign makes. Sqveral times there were shortages in annumition even for German light caliber guns, a situation which, in all cases, was soon felt at the front.

Ill#- Employment of the Artillery

12# The fighting during Oct 44 and the first part of No*r 44 had to be conducted with artillery vastly inferior in number and caliber of guns and in communications to the American artillery. The extent to which ammunition .had to be economized, necessitating detailed orders for its expenditure by caliber and quantity--often deviating from reasonable practices—-emphasized the difficulties which had to be overcome by the weak German artillery in the very difficult' mountain terrain* In spite of all these limitations and difficulties, we managed to repulse again App 8

MS # A-999 *6- and again the American attacks in the west and in the Vosges.- OuF success .was achieved through the timely employment of artillery fire, which frustrated enemy attacks soon after they wore launched. Our artillery was not adequate to enable our own counterattacks to succeed*

Due to numerical shortages, lack of observers iii the front linos and in observation posts, inadequate wire and radio communications, and in­ sufficient -ammunition* our artillery was not strong enough to bo employed for flank protection and for counter-battery missions*

15. Beginning in mid-Oot 44, Army was continuously re­ inforced by stellungs (static) artillery battalions and light and medium festungs (fortress) artillery battalionsf In the Vosgos, these battalions ooul& be committed only in the Daram Stollung (Ridge Position)*

In the Belfort Pass area, they could be committed only in the continuation of the Damm 3te living of the rear positions extending west past Giromagny and west and south past Bolfort* Those artillery battalions had the mission of garrisoning the defense zone, of being always ready to execute fire missions, of receiving the forces withdrawing from the MLR lying to the west, and of providing artillery support for the withdrawing forces after the latter had occupied the .Kamm SteHung and had assumed res­ ponsibility for its defense* (Ed: The preceding German passage is obscure and involved to an unusual degree*) It was strictly forbidden to move any of these battalions, or even a battery, into position forward of the Damm 8tellung~-or far enough forward so that they could support the fighting on the MLR* Only in 716 Volks ^ren ^iv sector and near

Giromagny did Army Group* upon recommendation of Nineteenth Army, approve the displacement of the Artillery .just forward of the Kamm Stollung* -18- App 8

MS # A-999 -7-

The artillery located in this area was actually too weak, and artillery

supporr from adjacent sectors was inadequate or lacking entirely*

, 14. The festungs (fortress) artillery battalions were im­

mobile and varied in the number of batteries and guns (light batteries

had up to nine guns). Communications personnel and materiel wore poor*

The actual strength and also the T/0 strength of these battalions in

personnel of all grades was generally very meager and varied according

to the special T/0 set up for them* k further significant feature was

that each festungs artillery battalion was authorized a single, very

large allotment of ammunition* % mid~Nov 44, however,., the light

batteries had received little or no ammunition* The ammunition

actually received had boon expended immediately and could not be re­

placed because of shortages* Light and medium caliber batteries

utilized captured materiel from all the enemy countries. Since firing tables were missing for most guns, indirect fire.was impossible. Even as

late as the middle of Nov 44, some firing tables wore still lacking*

15* The stellungs artillery battalions, in contrast to the festungs artillery battalions, had a limited degree of mobility

(enough horses or trucks to move two guns simultaneously)* ittmaunition

could be sup ."lied from, the zone of the interior. lis of the end of Oct 44 and the beginning of Nov 44, the stellungs and festungs artillery battalions were in position behind 716 -Volks &ren ^'iv; in the areas of

Col du Bonhomme and ^arkirch; north, oast and just south of St Die (the battalion south of St Die fought effectively in the action of 16 Inf

Div west of the city (see par Chapter One) and was attached to the

-19- App 8

MS # A-999 - -8-

Division ; east of tho pass at Kreuth; east of Pass; near and

south of G-iromagny (light batteries); and west and so&thwest of Belfort

(light battbries)i ^arts of the light batteries werej according to

orders, .employed only for 5loSe-ranr>:e antitank defense on roads and

behind possible tank approaches#

16# For artillery observation Army received the following:

a# By tho end of Sop 44 or the beginning of Oct 44,

the static 52 Boobachtungs (Obsn) Bn (Light) was in position west and

northwest of Belfort#

b*: About the beginning of Nov 44, the 4 Boobachtungs

Bn (Light), fully jpotorized and well equipped-with men and materiel,, was

employed first on both sides of St Die, Later, with the.shift of the

enemy main effort to tho area northwest of St.Die, the bulk of the

battalion was moved north of the town. The battalion performed very well

Efficient artillery observation throughout tho fight i ing detected and. reported changes in ememy artillery positions after an

objective had becpri taken by the enemy# The direction of future attacks

coulU be predicted by these movements# Often, however, the battalions

could not recognize a largo-scale shifting of the artillery to support

the main effort because the artillery did- not fire from its new positions

until the beginning of the attack#,

17# Counter-battery missions were carried out as long as tho

situation of infantry troops did not require the support of artillery

batteries# Ammunition, however, was insufficient for an effective

shelling of tho enemy artillery# ^or this reason, counter-battery fire

-20- . App b

MS # 1,-999 -9-

was seldom employed*

IV* Condition of Artillery Units (mid-Nov 44)

18# 716 Volks Greru^iv~A limited issue of accessories did

not increase the flexibility and the efficiency of the horse teams.

The artillery regiment was only partially mobile. Batteries were low

in men. and, to some extent, in,guns* The regiment was short one light

battery and one medium battery, ^ho medium battalion (l¥ Abt) was com­

mitted with two medium batteries, ^he shortage of communications

equipment of all kinds, in spite of replacements* still remained critical*

The Division was in the thick of the fight and every few days was pushed

farther back; there was a cortinuous expenditure of communications

equipment (wire) as a result# Loss cf wire resulted also from enemy

fire.

19* 16 Inf -About 20 Oct 44, the artillery regiment was

reorganized into two battalions with six batteries in all. The' units

m were very weak in men and materiel, yet they performed well* heir

1 performance was the result of the determination and the sense, of duty of

the troops and the tactical judgment and energy of the regimental com­

mander, an Obstlt cf Reserves. Organizational and tactical gegrouping

was carried out in spite of heavy defensive fighting in the difficult,

wooded, mountain terrain west of St Die. ^he Staff of the II Bn had been

the staff of tai infantry howitzer training battalion; two batteries had

been infantry howitzer replacement companies of the Ersatzheer (Replace- i.pp 8

MS # A-999 -10- ment Training ^rmy). These training oompanies, which we usod only for artillery missions, wore well adapted to artillery tactics and performed

JJ efficiently®. The ivision was also - supported by festungs artillery®

(l have forgotten the number of the battalion, but it had six; batteries and none of the essential communications equipment®)

20® 198 Inf -^iv«—No change®

21® 184th Inf Div-—As £ar as I know, the remnants of this

Division were absorbed by 189 or 159 Inf Div and perhaps by 338 Inf

Div® The I Bn, 28 Res Arty Regt, was supposed to be taken over by 338

Arty Regt. This transfer was not accomplished, however, because the distance was too great®

22® 338 Inf ^iv—Two light artillery battalions were on hand the •regimental staff was being reconstituted® The third light battalion was to be re-equipped and, upon completion of its training in the Qolrnar replacement camp at the-end of 1944, was to rejoin the Division®

23® 263 Inf Div--This division was scheduled to be brought from Norway about the beginning of Nov 44® At the time of its transfer, the ratillery regiment was required to send personnel of all grades and one or two complete light batteries to the Eastern Front® The medium battalion (iV.A^t) remained in Norway; a new medium battalion was being organized in Denmark® Gaps j_n the light,battalions were filled by troops--even if not fully trained—from the Ersatzheer® Thus far, the regimental staff and two light battalions had arrived and had been com­ mitted® Arrival of the missing light battalion was expected shortly, but the arrival of the medium battalion could not be foreseen® The

-22- App.8

MS#A-999 -11-

difficulties of terrain and of artillery methods wore at first much too

great for the regiment*

24* 159 Inf -^iv and 189 Inf ^iv—Each of those divisions had

an artillery regiment of two battalions. The artillery regimental

staff of 159 Inf ^iv was being reformed* The second artillery

battalion of 189 Inf ^iv was still training in Bclfoirt and was scheduled

for commitment by the end of Nov 44.

25, Former Brig von Oppen—I-t had at this time 961 Arty Bn

(Med)• ^Tiere were no notable improvements in its condition*

26, Fostungs Brig von Oppon—Its fostungs artillery was

employed in the vicinity of ^"iromagny and Belfort (two or throe bat­

talions with a total of eight to ten light batteries)*

27, The formation of three light gebirgs (mountain) batteries

was started in the beginning of Nov 44 in a town near Hartmannsweiler,

with two officers, about 12 noncommissioned officers, several mountain

guns (model 1915), and a few mules. From the beginning until the middle

of Nov 44, the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Nineteenth Army was

still in full swing. Communications personnel (officers and noncom­

missioned officers) and training could not be brought up to standard for

a long time.

-2 3- App 9

MS .# A-999 -1-

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

(Oct 44)

Tactioal Communications Net

a. Wire connections from OB WEST to Army Group and.

Army headquarters were based on the trunk cable net (see. App 9a). In

spite of considerable disruption of cables by bombs, telephone and

teletype communication with the armies was always possible because of

the multiplicity of lines and alternate routes. The wire net was

supplemented by a radio net which worked very well, without exception#

Furthermore, radio teletype was used between Army Group and OB WEST,

b* Signal Officers:

Army Group G.0#0 Genmaj Meissner

First ^rmy.• o-Obst Dummel

Fifth Pz Army...... Obst Steininger

Nineteenth Army*•..•»Obst Kutscher, then Obst B rdusch, and later Obst Stach

2. Communications Personnel and Materiel

The communications personnel and materiel situation was

critical during the retreat from France. Most units and higher head-

quarters on the Western Front had only the minimum strength which a

"bodenstaendig,? (static) force would normally have. Therefore, they were App 9

MS # A-999 -2- hampered in their flexibility* First and Nineteenth Armies had only weak "bodenstaendig" nachrichten (signal) battalions instead of nach- riohten regiments* Corps and division nachrichten battalions> oven those newly organized, were of static force strength and were too weak to function with a mobile command, The situation became bettor day by day as the nachrichten units of the Military Commander for France (staffs and static construction and operational units) and several companies detailed from OKH could be used for reorganizing and reinforcing the nachrichten units of A ^p Ge In the end, & Gp G and First and Nineteenth Armies were able to maintain nachrichten regiments—even if these were somewhat weaker than those in the East® Corps and divisions had nachrichten bat­ talions of nearly normal strength* To some extent, replacement of materiel kept up with replacement of personnel* Elements, of railway signal units and signal intelligence units were committed in A Orp G sector. The Fifth Pz Army had a panzer army nachrichten regiment of T/o strength and mobility#

3# Signal Intelligence

Our signal•intelligence discovered all lerge-scale movements of the Americansj and especially those which occurred before the beginning of the attack on 8 Nov 44. The enemy traffic control radio net located in the rear transmitted its messages so plainly and so completely that American movements could be followed very accurately# A GP G WIRE COMMUNICATIONS Du«s*#k*orf 5 OCT-14 DEC 44

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