Chad: Extremism & Terrorism On April 20, 2021, President Idriss Deby—Chad’s president for more than 30 years—died due to injuries sustained in battle fighting against the Libya-based Islamist rebel group, Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), in northern Chad. Deby, who was declared the winner of the presidential election the day prior, often joined soldiers on the battlefront. On April 11, 2021, hundreds of FACT forces launched an incursion into the north of Chad to protest the April 11th presidential election. The group attacked a border post at Zouarke. However, no casualties were reported. Following the Zouarke ambush, Deby joined Chadian soldiers to repel FACT forces from advancing on N’Djamena. On April 17, two FACT convoys clashed with government forces on the way to N’Djamena, killing five Chadian soldiers and injuring 36 others. Among those injured was Deby. Deby’s son, Mahamat Kaka, was named interim president by a transitional council of military officers on April 20. (Sources: Reuters, France 24, Al Jazeera, Reuters, Bloomberg) On February 15, 2021, leaders of the G5 Sahel—Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger—attended a two-day summit in N’Djamena. At the summit, Deby announced that more than 1,200 troops would be deployed to combat extremist groups on the Sahel border zone between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Deby urged the international community to increase its funds for development to prevent the continued rise of terrorism and reasons for radicalization in Chad. Chad’s increase in deployment comes a month after French President Emmanuel Macron suggested that France may “adjust” its military commitment in the Sahel following attacks that increased the number of French combat deaths to 50 in Mali. (Sources: Arab News, Al Jazeera) Overview Chad has been subject to multiple armed conflicts since its independence from France in 1965. Following independence, political control of the country went to the prosperous cotton-producing majority-Christian south, leading to revolts among the northern Chadian tribes against the southerners in 1966. The cycle of civil conflict between the two regions has been continuous—albeit, with unstable moments of peace from 1990 until 2004—but has been aggravated by the neighboring civil war in Sudan. In the past decade, extremist groups—which sourced many of their early weaponry from ammunitions circulating in the country from Chad’s previous conflicts—have begun to make a mark on domestic security. Accordingly, the number of confrontations between insurgents and Chadian soldiers tripled from 2018 and 2019 alone. There were seven armed confrontations in 2018, with the figure jumping to 21 in the following year. Additionally, in 2019, civilian communities were targeted by Boko Haram and its ISIS-affiliated splinter Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) insurgents at least 15 times, leading to dozens of casualties and abductions. (Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, International Crisis Group, International Crisis Group, Global Policy Forum, Africa Center) Since early 2015, the primary terrorist threat in Chad has been Boko Haram and ISWAP. The extremist groups—which operate throughout the Lake Chad region—have killed hundreds, led to the fleeing of 20,000 Chadians, left over 200,000 Chadians internally displaced, and has caused immense challenges to regional stability as they launch attacks in the neighboring countries of Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger. Initially, Boko Haram’s presence was limited on the Chadian side of the lake. Following the increase of attacks by Boko Haram throughout Nigeria, the Chadian Armed Forces were given the right to mobilize against the extremist outfit by Nigeria on January 16, 2015. Violence peaked in 2015 with suicide bombings in the capital N’Djamena and multiple attacks on villages that were partly in reaction to the intervention by Chadian forces in neighboring states, but never reached the levels of attack that were seen in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger. Although attacks in Chad began to diminish in 2016—despite the creation of ISWAP in August of that year—Boko Haram has since adapted its strategy and as of 2020 began to intensify their attacks against Chad and Cameroon. (Sources: International Crisis Group, Refugees International, Cairn International, International Crisis Group, United Nations) In 2016, Boko Haram split into two rival factions—one loyal to Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau, and the other to ISIS-appointed leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi. Upon the creation of the rival insurgencies, ISWAP took control over the Lake Chad Basin area, which lies primarily within Chad. Although still a threat in Chad, Boko Haram now targets and controls land in central and southern Borno State as well as the Sambisa Forest, both in Nigeria. The Lake Chad area—which is a magnet for migrants from all over the Sahel who seek opportunities in agriculture, pastoralism, and fishing—has led to conflict regarding control of resources. Furthermore, the Chadian Army’s heavy security response imposes restrictions on the movement of the traditionally mobile population that is heavily dependent on cross-border trade. As the insurgencies continue to grow, local self-defense militias have been created and have provided additional protection for communities against the jihadist groups. Given the geographic diversity of the lake, Boko Haram and other extremists have sought refuge among the many islands in the area to evade detection from military forces. (Sources: Economist, Committee on Armed Services, International Crisis Group, International Crisis Group, Combatting Terrorism Center) Only in recent years have national authorities coordinated longer-term counter-extremism strategies for the area. Although national action remains focused on military intervention, some operations have been carried out to prevent Boko Haram’s influence on the civilian level. Launched in 2017, Operation Rawan Kada, was the first phase of a civilian-focused military offensive by armies in the region. The offensive focused on implementing stabilization programs, restoring state authority in areas affected by Boko Haram, and assisting Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees to return to their homes. Accordingly, Chad has yet to establish the appropriate legal responses to try and punish Boko Haram and ISWAP members who have been captured on Chadian soil. Allegedly, extremists have been imprisoned for long periods without trial, and the Chadian government and has been accused Chad: Extremism & Terrorism of corrupt and inhumane behavior towards detainees. (Sources: International Crisis Group, Just Security, African Union) Radicalization and Foreign Fighters Recruitment From the outset of Boko Haram’s founding, nationals from Chad, Niger, and Cameroon have traveled to Nigeria to join the jihadist group. Partly due to small loans offered to recruits, Boko Haram also exploited the cultural, ethnic, and religious ties that Chad, Niger, and Cameroon shared with northern Nigeria. According to the United Nations, extremist groups have sought to recruit young people by leveraging several factors such as geographic proximity to conflict, economic vulnerability, social or political marginalization, permissive family and social networks, and exposure to violent extremist propaganda. Geographic proximity to violent extremist groups is also a significant risk factor for voluntary and forced recruitment into terrorist groups. Given the number of ambushes and kidnappings carried out by Boko Haram, youth in particular have been prone to joining vigilante groups in response to deteriorating safety conditions within their communities. However, some of these self-defense groups have begun to align with violent extremists given the military’s lack of response to stemming terrorist violence. Additionally, former Boko Haram fighters in Chad stated that lack of hope and income opportunities persuaded them to join the insurgency. Given the Chadian government’s minimal rollout of social amenities or safety nets for vulnerable youth, the promise of food and shelter has tempted young fighters to join extremist ranks. (Sources: United Nations, Humanitarian Practice Network, Youth4Peace) Boko Haram Boko Haram is a Nigeria-based terror group that seeks to rid the country of Western and secular institutions and to resuscitate the Kanem-Bornu caliphate that once ruled over modern-day Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon. The group was founded by a Salafist cleric named Mohammed Yusuf in 2002. Yusuf opened the Ibn Taymiyyah Masjid mosque in Maiduguri and developed a significant following among disaffected youth in the area. Many of these followers went on to become Boko Haram militants. The extremist group, which allegedly procured the majority of its initial weapons from Chad—due to a surplus of weapons that have circulated in the country following several civil wars since 1965—has also exploited the cultural, ethnic, and religious ties that Chad, Niger, and Cameroon share with northern Nigeria. Along with extensive cross-border smuggling of weapons and supplies, Boko Haram has recruited fighters from neighboring countries to fill its ranks. (Sources: Brookings, Al Jazeera, Oxford Research Encyclopedias, BBC News, Humanitarian Practice Network, International Crisis Group) In 2009, Yusuf was killed by Nigerian security forces and Abubakar Shekau became the leader of Boko Haram. Under Shekau’s leadership, Boko Haram has grown more militant and has developed a reputation for mass violence. In addition