International Conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION Vol

International Conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION Vol. XXIII No 2 2017

THE STRUCTURE AND METHODS OF GRUPPE 6 E FROM GERMAN SECRET SERVICE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Marian ZIDARU

”Andrei Saguna” University, Constanta, Romania [email protected]

Abstract: In this paper I present the general background picture of the development of Gruppe (group) 6 E from German Secret Service. As a result, for the personal interest of Ernst Kaltenbrunner in the work of the Gruppe, 6E developed a working basis which differs from the normal functioning of the other Laendergruppen (groups of countries), a tendency which became more marked after the transfer of the central office from Berlin to Vienna in 1943. A liaison officer only remained in Berlin. This paper presents the final structure of the Gruppe and the leading personnel, and it is under this final organization that the work of the Gruppe in the Balkan States. The Gruppe maintained liaison officers with the Herman Neubacher and Altenberg Dienststellen (Altenberg offices), these liaison officers being directly subordinated to the Gruppenleiter (Group leader). In common with the outside offices, with which he kept in personal contact, and an Auswerter (analyst) responsible for the evaluation and dissemination of information. The Referate (Abstrat) conducted their operation through the Hauptbeauftragte (Chief Comissioner) working in the various countries under suitable cover.

Keywords: Referate, Kaltenbrunner, Balkan states, Gruppe 6 E

1. The Origins was concerned solely with the security of The Sicherheitsdienst (SD-Security German industry. In this capacity it worked Service) was created in 1933 by Reinhard in close collaboration with Abteilung Heydrich as the intelligence service of the (Department) III of the Abwehr (German NSDAP (Nazi Party). In the early stage the Military Intelligence) and with the SD did not operate completely Gestapoamt (Gestapo Office). The independently of the party as its early Abteilung developed gradually, and by functions tended to overlap with those of 1937 became, in the reorganization of the other sections in the party, which did not SD-Hauptamt (main office from SD), Amt welcome its creation. The following (Office) III. The new Amt III was itself account therefore of the development of SD subdivided into three section of which activities tends to be misleadingly Abteilung (Department) III/3 contained the simplified, and this factor should be borne germ of the subsequent Amt (office) VI of in mind. It is only at a much later date that the RSHA (Reich Main Security Office). the SD as an Intelligence service became clearly defined and separated from the other 2. The Development of the Work activities of the Nazis parties. By 1934 of Abteilung III/3 Heinz Jost, later to become Amstchef (chief Amt III functioned in its early stages of office) VI, had been given the task of through the then existing SD organization setting up what became Abteilung of Oberabschnitte and its subordinate (Department) VI of the SD-Haupamtan- formations throughout Germany. The Abteilung (Haupamtan Department) whose development of its work was most marked function was essentially a security one and in Eastern Europe where it gradually

388 assumed a more positive role in German of the Anschluss to the future of the SD was industry acting latterly as a positive that it represented the first offensive espionage service as against security operation undertaken by it, and the Service, and was able to provide the SD- significance of this success was not lost on Hauptamt (SD-main Office) with a fairly Reinhard Heydrich. Equally important, picture of the German industry and its though the importance was not immediately productive capacity. This development of apparent, was the effect of the Anchluss Amt (office) III work was a general one (Austria Annexation) on the subsequent throughout Germany but in the East a history of Gruppe (group) VI E. Prominent further line of development was taking among the figures who had played a leading place as early as 1937. The Oberabschnitte part in the underground movement in (Upper sections), in Eastern Germany Austria prior to the Anschluss were Ernst began to act as collecting centers of Kaltenbrunner and Hermman Neubacher, information on political trends in those both of whom were to be closely identified countries sharing a common frontier in with the work of VI E subsequent to Germany but in the East, especially Heydrich late in 1942. In addition, the SD- Czechoslovakia and Austria, where the Leitabschnitt (SD-guide section) which was large pro-German minority groups served set up in Vienna immediately after the as a source of information the constant Anschluss had among its personnel some passage backwards and forwards across the offices who were to become leading frontiers. members of VIE. It was in fact the It was these two tendencies in the work of Anschluss which gave birth to the ‘Austrian Abteilung (Department) III/3, its ability to Group’ which was to play an important part act as an espionage rather than a security in the subsequent history not only of service, and the readiness with which it Gruppe (group) VI E, but in the could extend its could extend its interest development and dissolution of Amt from Heydrich to the extent of instructed (office) VI. Jost to prepare the foundation Abteilung The fundamental change of policy which III/3. In this Jost was merely given his this new departure involved was that the general conception being that Jost should new service should work quite exploit to establish good contacts in independently of the existing business circles and to develop the facilities Oberabschnitte (Upper sections), which which the Oberabschnitte near the German would confine themselves to their normal frontier provided for espionage activities SD functions. In their place it was proposed outsides the Reich. to set up the so-called Blockstollen (block The factor however which had been chiefly tunnel) to act as the focal points from which instrumental in influencing Heydrich’s the envisaged espionage activities could be decision to attempt directed. In point of fact only three such Auslandsnachrichtendienst (Foreign Blockstollen were created-at Hof under intelligence service) was the part played by Hans Christian Daufeldt (later to become the SD in the Anscluss (annexation) with Gruppenleiter (group leader) VID), at Tilsit Austria in March 1938. The role of the SD under Heinz Graefe (later Gruppenleiter was a prominent one, though the direction VIC), and at Vienna under Hastuf (captain) of its activities had be from a very much Groebl (later employed by Amt (Office) VI higher level than Jost as Leiter (leader) of as its representative in Switzerland and Abteilung III/3. The SD had functioned as subsequently in Rome). But even these the liaison between the underground Nazi three Blockstellen had been set up only in Party in Austria and the governmental the face of considerable opposition from the authorities in Germany, but the importance Leiter of the SD- Oberabschnitte, who

389 regarded themselves as the proper channel intelligence services) based on Jost’s for SD reports, irrespective of the extended Abteilung III/3, the new service becoming scope of the, new stations. The Blockstellen Amt (Office) VI. The creation of Amt VI were not destined by the subsequent course was in fact a recognition of the work of of events to have a long history, but they Amt III in the preceding year; the security played an important part in the events functions of Amt III in the new Amt TV leading up to the creation of Amt (Office) and Amt VI became an offensive and not a VI. defensive service. It was Werner Goettsch who acted as the The General Position in the Early Stages: It intermediary between the Foreign Office will be appreciated from the account given and Jozef Tiso in accordance with the plan in Part 1 that of the new Grupped formed previously conceived by Ribbentrop for the under Amt VI that dealing with South- political crisis. The information received Eastern Europe was in the most favorable through the Blockatlle (Bloc cat) at Hof, position for beginning the new tasks where Daufeldt had been working in anointed to: the Landergruppen dealing collaboration with Sturbanfü hrer (major) with the far East ,the Near East, Western Hermann Rossner a special assignment, Europe, and the western Hemisphere, had showed that by February 1936 a more virtually to begin from scratch, while the active participation by the Germans was Gruppe responsible for the Balkan had the possible. Werner Goettsch and Oswald advantage of experience in the type or a Kraus operated under the orders of the certain amount of experience in the work, Foreign Office, while and whole enterprise and, probably most important of all, the was directed form Vienna where Walter territory which it had to exploit lent itself to Stahlecker had become Leiter. Goetsch and exploitation in view of the active SS-Standartenführer (colonel) Dr. Edmund subversive groups already in existence in Veesenmayer now established contact with the Balkan States. The General effect of this the Slovaks themselves, and it was Goettsch position was that while the other to whom Tiso send his letter addressed to Laendergruppen of Amt v1 in the early Hitler requesting German intervention in stages spent the first months of their order to maintain Slovak independence. existence in efforts to estabilish a suitable Apart from the SD, the incident is of note working basis, work in the Balkans as it represents one of the very few occasion continued under the original impetus of on which Ribbentrop not only asked for the previous SD-Leitabschnitt (leading section) help of the SD, but took the advice it Vienna. This previous activity had now to offered. The same measure of collaboration conform itself to the general organization of between the Foreign Office and the SD was Amt VI with the installation of the directing singularly lacking after the creation of Amt Gruppe in Berlin and the dispatch of special VI in 1939. representatives to the various countries-For a time in the Balkans the two systems 3. The Position at the Outbreak of war worked together side by side, the SD- The creation of the RSHA coincided almost Leitabschnitt Vienna pursuing its former with the outbreak of hostilities; Heydrich activity side by side with the creation of the now assumed command of the Gestapo, the central office in Berlin. 2. Organizational Kripo (Criminal Investigation Department) Changes: Referat: VI D1 Hungary and and the SD-Hauptamt, which services now Slovakia Hastuf Karl Hanke VI D2 became separate ammeter of the new Iugoslavia VI D3 Roumania organization. This major change was the Oberstürmbannfuhrer (lt. colonel) Wilhelm opportune moment for creating the new Wanek VI D4 Bulgaria and Greece Ostuf Ausland’s nachrichtendienst (Foreign Ernst Langlotz VI D5 Turkey and Near East

390

Hastuf Walter Hagen It will be noted that in Hauptbeauftragte (chief Comissioner) this organization Gruppe VI D was also working in the various countries under competent for Turkey and the Near East. suitable cover. The Amt was reorganized in 1941 when The outside organization of Gruppe 6 E Gruppe VI E was renamed V (groupe took two forms, as in addition to the Leader) I B with Stubaf Hermman Rossner Hauptbeauftragte, the Gruppe also had and Gruppenleiter, and the Referent representatives in the various BdS including such officers as Stubaf Waneck, (counterespionage) set up in the countries Stubaf Goettsch, Stubaf Wilhelm Beissner, of South-Eastern Europe at different times. Hastuf Hoettl, Hastuf Groebl, and The BdS normally had a small Abteilung 6 Hauptsturmführer Otto von Bolschwing. under the control of a Sachbearbeiter (clerk) Details of the breakdown of this Gruppe VI if the territory controlled by the BdS was B are backing, but it is known that Gruppe important enough to warrant it. The BdS was still responsible for Turkey and the himself worked more closely liaison with Near East. Amt VI than was the case, for instance, in Comparison of the personnel in the period Western Europe, were the Bds normally 1939-41 with those still working under VI showed himself uncooperative and E at the end shows that the Gruppes unsympathetic to Amt 6 work. The reason maintained a remarkable degree of of course lay in the relatively much stronger continuity of personnel. position of 6 E in South-Eastern Europe. As a result, for the personal interest of Kaltenbrunner in the work of the Gruppe, 4. Channels of Communication 6E developed a working basis which differs The normal means of communication was from the normal functioning of the other of course by W/T, but after the transfer to Laendergruppen, a tendency which became Vienna, the other common channel used more marked after the transfer of the central was the couriers of the Lufthansa. The office from Berlin to Viena late in 1943. A Hauptbeauftragte were also required to visit liaison officer only remained in Berlin. The the central office at least once every two final structure of the Gruppe and the months in order to submit special reports leading personnel, was established in 1943 and to attend conferences under the and this was the final organization that the Gruppenleiter, and occasionally under work of the Gruppe in the Balkan States. Schellenberg. Likewise, the Referent also The Gruppe maintained liaison officers paid frequent visits to the outstations to which the Neubacher and Altenberg make personal contact with them? Dienststellen (Department), these liaison The liaison by Gruppe 6 E with other officers being directly subordinated to the agencies operating in the countries within to the Gruppenleiter. In common with other the control of the Gruppe was also much Laendergruppen each had a Referat with a closer than in other Laendergruppen. The referent an user whose duty it was to act as reason for this cooperation lay in the the collecting point of information within strength of Gruppe 6 E itself. The tendency the Referat, but who in VI E also acted as was especially marked in the case of the liaison officer with the outside offices, with Foreign Office, Ribbentrop though this was which he kept in personal contact, and an not due to any official policy laid down by Auswerter (analyst) responsible for the Ribbentrop, but to the personal evaluation and dissemination of relationships established with the Foreign information. In addition, there were Office representatives themselves. Another subordinate Sachbearbeiter working under important close relationship between their direction. The Referate conducted Kaltenbbruner and Neubacher of the their operation through the foreign office, who had been active whit

391

Kaltenbbruner in Austria in the days prior The relations between Ribbentrop and to the Anschluss. Neubacher were not cordial, as the former was jealous of the Foreign Office in 5. Gruppe 3 B of Amt 3 Romania, and by 1942 had been given the In territory occupied by German forces Amt appointment of special envoy and 3 maintained its interest through Gruppe 3 plenipotentiary in South-Eastern Europe B which was responsible for the whit the special assignment of dealing with supervision of German minority groups in partisan activities in Greece, establishing South-Eastern Europe. The spheres of contact with Draza Mihailovic in interest between 6 E and 3 B of course Jugoslavia, and suppressing communist the overlapped, and 6 E was responsible for Balkans. passing to 3 B information concerning such minority groups without giving details of its 6. The Romanian Crisis own intelligence activities within these In August 1944 Christescu, the head of the groups. The most prominent minority Romanian Secret Service, reported to Amt groups operating in South-Eastern Europe VI on the impending crisis in Romania. were the Andreas Group in Roumania, the Eugen Christescu also established contact Janko group in Serbia, the Altoayer group with Manfred von Killinger, the Foreign in Croatia, the Basch group in Hungary, and Office representative, and warned him of the Karmasin group in Slovakia. the possibility of Romania `s defection Similarly, there was much closer from the war, but the Foreign Office cooperation between 6 E and 6 S than refused to take the reports seriously. The existed between 6 S and the other actual defection there for a took the German Laendergruppen of Amt 6, liaison which government by surprise, and hurried had two fundamental causes. This rules arrangements were made to take counter applied to Leitstelle 2 Sud-Ost for similar measures. It was Dienststelle Altenberg. reasons. Official liaison was maintained Altenberg had been the Foreign Office through the person of Hastuf Gerhard representative in Greece until his retirement Muller Mandal, who in December in 1944 from that country in November 1943. In was given the special appointment of September 1944 Altenberg was given the Referent 6 E/S, in which capacity he acted assignment of creating a Dienststelle whose as liaison officer for Gruppe 6 E to special function was liaison with the Skorzeny. In the latter stages too Roland various exiled Balkan governments, the Gunne in Roumania was responsible for Stelle having its seat in Vienna itself, where sabotage operations in that country in it remained until early April 1945. The cooperation with Dienststelle 3000 under Dienststelle consisted of some eighteen Begus. people and had its own w/t set. Altenberg The liaison with Neubacher, who acted as was responsible for recruitment of special Foreign Office representative in the volunteer legions of Bulgarians and Balkans, was a close one, and was due in Romanians in Germany, and for their the first instance to the close association ideological training. Contact between 6 E which had existed between Neubacher and and the Dienststelle was not so strong as Kaltenbrunner in pre-war days in Austria. that with Dienststelle Neubacher. Kaltenbrunner had a high opinion of Nevertheless, the Stelle was a source of Neubacher ‘s ability and knowledge on information to 6 E, to which organization it Balkan affairs, and the policy was laid passed its reports based on information down by Kaltenbbruner himself that 6 E obtained from prisoners and persons should cooperate fully with Neubacher, crossing into Austria from the Balkans. irrespective of the attitude of Ribbentrop. Hastuf Zeischka was appointed as official

392 liaison officer between the two March 1945, when the situation was rapidly organizations. Scandinavia and Italy being deteriorating, the first approach to the dealt with under two Gruppen to with them Allies was made by Hoettl - an approach of latterly belonged. which Kaltenbruner was aware, though he instructed that it should be made to order to 7. The Role of Gruppe 6 E in the Final obtain information only, and not with a Stages view to any commitment on the part of The tendencies which were noticeable by Germany. [1] Hoettl worked for 1944 became more market in the early part Kaltenbrunner and Himmler and had their of 1945 when the situation became more protection at all time. He was influential in averse to Germany. Resistance as Hungarian making policy because of his symbolized by the activities of Gruppe VI S backing. He made everything in his power Otto Skorzeny became increasingly to prevent Szalasi and his Arrow cross party important to the biter-enders Gruppen 6 B to gaining access to power. [2] and 6 D, and to a lesser extent 6 C, had Kaltenbrunner meantime left Berlin at the become largely ineffective, and end of April armed with authority granted Schellenberg was new natively engaged in by Himmler to act as plenipotentiary for opening up lines of approach to the Western Austria, and was responsible for all future Allies. Gruppe 6 E, the only Laendergruppe resistance in that area, an ambition realized, to liaise effectively with 6 S, was however though rather late in the day. The split in meeting with growing threat the Gruppe Amt 6 now became complete; learning that was able to maintain its networks, with Walter Schellenberg in the North was however a purpose in view. Gruppe 6 E left already arranging this surrender to the Vienna in March, evacuating in turn to Allies through Sweden, Kaltenbrunner Steyerling, to Kremsmuster, and finally to dismissed him from office, and in the Alt Aussee. Now two lines of development subsequent reorganization of the Amt, emerged. Kaltenbrunner and Skorzeny still appointment Waneck as Amt Chef 6 and actively pursued their Redoubt plans for Skorzeny as Chef of the millitary Amt. The continued while VI E became independent Austrian Group were now in full command, in independent approaches to the Western and with Kaltenbrunner officially recognize Powers with a view maintaining its own as plenipotentiary for Austria, the Triumph organization intact. of the Austrian Group was now complete. As early as 1943 SS-Sturmbannführer, Events however proved too much for Wilhelm Höttl had been actively engaged in Kaltenbrunner the rapid advance of the making contact with those circles in Austria Allies into the Redoubt area made any plans favoring the independence of Austria from for continued resistance invalid, and some Germany. This contact with the Austrian sort of compromise between the ‘bitter- Freedom Movement had not been without enders’ and the 6 E approaches became Kaltenbrunner knowledge, who indeed necessary, the compromise being encouraged it. But, whereas Hoettl had the Kaltenbrunner’s ‘Austrian Solution’. conception of developing these contacts with a view to obtaining for Austria some 8. Arrests of Gruppe VI E degrees of favorable treatment when the Most of the leading personalities of Gruppe inevitable end came, Kaltenbrunner, a VI E have already been arrested and the confirmed ‘bitter-ender’ who did not depart Gruppe can be considered as effectively from his conception of a Gross-Deutschland liquidated. While, however, information on with its center of political gravity in the the structure, personalities and working of South-East rather than in Berlin, regarded VI E is fairly complete, the Special the maneuver merely as a penetration of Agencies are still interested in more opposition groups within Germany. By

393 detailed information on the activities of the Gruppe VI formed under Amt VI that Gruppe within the Balkan countries dealing with South-Eastern Europe was in themselves, for which purpose special the most favorable position for beginning briefs may be submitted from time to time. the new tasks anointed to: the The War Room however does not require Landergruppen dealing with the far East anything more than notification of the arrest ,the Near East, Western Europe, and the of any other leading characters. [1] western Hemisphere, had virtually to begin After the war Hoettl cooperated with CIC from scratch, while the Gruppe responsible Army of the USA in the framework of the for the Balkan had the advantage of network Mount Vernon. This network was experience in the type or a certain amount described generally as a network of of experience in the work, and, probably Austrian informants operating in the most important of all, the territory which it Russian occupied zone of Austria who are had to exploit lent itself to exploitation in charged with reporting all information that view of the active subversive groups would be of value to the US Armed Forces. already in existence in the Balkan States. Their mission was penetration of the KPOe Gruppe, 6E developed a working basis Comitee (Communist Party of Austria) the which differs from the normal functioning KPOe itself, the Cominform and all other of the other Laendergruppen, a tendency Communist organizations, espionage of all which became more marked after the soviet activities to include industrial, transfer of the central office from Berlin to information, scientific and military. Vienna in 1943. Gruppe 6 E left Vienna in American secret services evaluation about March, evacuating in turn to Steyerling, to Hoettl was: during the period he has been in Kremsmuster, and finally to Alt Aussee. At contact with CIC, he has proven to be an the end of the war most of the leading excellent source of ideas and he evaluated personalities of Gruppe VI E have been incoming reports on the Soviets with arrested and the Gruppe can be considered complete accuracy [3]. as effectively liquidated. Some of the officer worked for the American Secret Conclusions Services.

References [1] Public Record Ofice, Kew Gardens, KV 3/101, A MI5 Report from 9.11.1945. [2] Hoettl Wilhelm vol 3-0061.pdf. [3] https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ARMY%20CIC%20NETS%20IN%20E ASTERN%20EUROPE_0002.pdf accessed 12th April 2017 [4] Army CIC NETS IN EASTERN EUROPE_0002pdf. specialCollection/nwcda8/192/ARMY CIC NETS IN EASTERN EUROPE/ARMY CIC NETS IN EASTERN EUROPE_0002.pdf accessed 12th April 2017

394