Second Evaluation of the Mae Chaem Watershed Development Project, Thailand
Prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development under contraci number PIC-1096.I-17-5049-00 Dr. Alan 1). Roth Mr. Paul Liou I)r. Chaiwat Roongruangsee Dr. Be (Ted) Cheng Sheng Dr. Benchaphun Shinawatra Dr. Aniruth Tengchai
June 1987
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PREFACE
This is the second evaluat ion of the Mae CIlaem Watershed Development Project (MCWDP). The project began in 1980 and was first evaluated in May 1983. This second evaluation was done when many activities were being phased out and tile project was about to be extended for another two years to finish the renmining activities and improve village capabilities foi sustainable growth.
iecause of the short time remaining in the project, the project managers and U.S. Agency for International Developitlent project officers had already made plans foi the two-year extension. The plhns had been approved at the provincial level and were awaiting approval at the national evel. The -ole of the evaluation team was to assess progrcss, examine constraints, aid provi6, guidance for decision making for the remaining years. The team found that many ke" issues haJ already been identified by project management and viable solutions were already being proposed. In effect, the team confirmed what project management already knew, and generally supports the solutions proposed.
This project is unusual in the level of management support it has received from the Royal Thai Government (RTG) and USAID. From the RTG side, much of the uccess can be attributed to the strong role of the Governor of Chiang Mai as Project Director. From the USAID side, capable project officers over the years have spnt -onsiderable time in the field working closely with project management.
The evaluation team benefited greatly from discussions with well-informed f roject leadeis and implementers. A weak point was an inadequacy of data to describe conditions in the project area. The result ,zi that the team had to depend . perceptions from the seven days it had in the field. This evaluation is therefore mainly qualitative, drawing on data when possible. To some extent it is anecdotal, although anecdotes, when used, are to illustrate general per,.eptions rather than to make conclusions that are based on only one or two cases.
To the extent that we have been able to accomplish our evaluation objectives, much can be attributed to the support we received. We woulu like to extend our grateful appreciation for the information and insight we received from the iroject Director, Governor Chaiya Poonsiriwong; the Ljeputy Administrative Director, Chom Kwandee; the USAID Project Officer in the field, Atisai Pangspa; a former Project Lfficer and now Director of the USAID's Agriculture and Natural Resources Division, David Delgado; and USAi'-s Evaluation Officer, Roger Montgomery. Kenneth Kampe, the MCWDP Train:ng Advisor, not only was a valuable resource for project information, but also was cf tremendous assistance with team logistics. The directors and staff of the various project components provided valuable assistance in discussing their activities and in accompanying the team into the field. 0 lul2i1 A~~liu LI mol i ll m~ l I V11,1Y ThU i9ul 10.11,iLIJluit J11I 1u1ffJ4 ]II Jd~ it fifuzam h1zt u hijow i nri~i il );I liI II lo in I1a atI~I Ij AmU l ibr u Ii n~u Iv I luo 11
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In the rul to produce a draft of the report in Chiang Mai, the team appreciates the assistance it received from translators Duangta Siiwuthiwong and Dr. Anurak Tanyanunrat, and from Kenneth Johnson, our English editor.
Alan D. Roth Team Leader Paul Liou, Agronomist Chaiwat Roongruangsee, Sociologist Tse (Ted) Cheng Sheng, Wateished Management Specialist Benchaphun Shinawatra, Agricultural Economist Aniruth Torgchai, Engineei
Washington, D.C. June 1987 wri~ i nitu
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE...... ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW ...... 2
BACKGROUND ...... 2 PROJECT MANAGEMENT ...... 4 U.S. ASSISTANCE...... 4 THE PROJECT AS A MODEL ...... 4 EVALUATION...... 6 MAJOR CONCLUSIONS ...... 6 Quality of Life ...... 6 Agri'!ulture ...... 6 Marketing...... 8 Infrastructure...... 8 Project Management ...... 8 Inteface Teams ...... 10 Forests and Watershed ...... 12 Opium and Drug Addiction ...... 12 MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 14 Overall ...... 14 Agriculture ...... 14 Marketing ...... 14 Soil Conservation ...... 14 Infrastructure ...... 16 Self-help Capability ...... 16 Training ...... 16 Information ...... 1P Forests and Watershed ...... 18
CONCLUSIONS AND RECONIMENDATIONS BY ISSUE ...... 20
QUALITY OF LIFE AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES ...... 20 1. Have Quality of Life Standards of the Various Groups Living in the Watershed Improved? ...... 20 2. Have the Rice Banks Provided a Viable Means for Improved Nutritional Security in Mae Chaem Villages? ...... 22 3. Has Integration of Ethnic Minorities and Womer, into the Social, Political, and Economic Life of the District Increased? ...... 24 4. Have the !F Teams Contributed Significantly to Achievement of Project Objectives? ...... 26 5. Have Villagers Learned to Solve Their Own Problems? ...... 28 6. Have Villagers' Drug Practices Been Decreased? ...... 32 vii
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PROJECT MANAGEMENT ISSUES ...... 32 7. Has tile Project Been Adequately Decentralized to Facilitate Field Coordination ,nd Promote Sustainability? ...... 32 8. Have the Project's Financial Planning and Management Systems Bnen Improved? ...... 36 AGRICULTURE ISSUES ...... 38 9. Has Rice Self-Sufficiency Peen Attained? ...... 38 10. Have Annual Cash Crops Beeii Adopted to Meet Project Objectives? ...... 42 11. Have Tree/Perennial Cash Crops Been Adopted to Meet Production, Income, and Sustainability Objectives of the Project? ...... 46 12. Has Land Terracing Met Objectives of Improve Soil Conservation and Improved Crop Yields? ...... 50 13. Have Water Control Structures Increased Land under Irrigation to Meet Project Targets? ...... 54 14. Has There Been a Decrease in Opium-Producing Areas and Production? ...... 58 15. Has the Mae Chaem Cooperative Met Farmers' Marketing Needs? ...... 60 WATERSHED ISSUES ...... 64 16. Have Forest Protection and Reforestation Activities Been Adequate to Prcserve the Watershed Now and into the Future? ...... 64 17. Are Road Objectives Being Met in Terms of Quality, Quantity, and Location? ...... 66 18 Are the Current Hydrology Research and Monitoring Acti,,ities Sound? ...... 72
FINDINGS BY ISSUE ...... 76
QUALITY OF LIFE AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES ...... 76 I. Have Quality of Life Standards of the Various Groups Living in the Watershed Improved? ...... 76 Project Objectives ...... 76 Evaluating Change ...... 78 Nutrition ...... 82 Health ...... 82 Educational Level ...... 84 On- and Off-farm Employment Opportunities ...... 94 2. Have the Rice Bani Provided a Viable Means for Improved Nutritional Security in Mae Chaem Villages? ...... 90 The Role of Rice Banks in Helping the Poor ...... 92 Repayment Rate ...... 94 The Project Reaction and Inputs to Rice Bank Operations ...... 94 ix
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10. Have Annual Cash Crops Be'n Adopted To Meet "lroject Objectives? ...... 160 Current Situation ...... 160 Phase IIArea ...... 162 Phase I Aiea ...... 4 The Roles of the DOAE and the DOA in Promoting Cash Crops .. 164 Constraints on Cash Cropping ...... 168 Potential Cash CLops in Mae Chaemn ...... 170 11. Have Tree/Perennial Cash Crops Been Adopted to Meet Production, Income, ajid Sustainability Objectives of the Projet? ...... 10 IF Team Efforts ...... 170 CARE Extension Program ...... 172 Previous Experience with Coffee ...... 172 RFD Community Forestry ...... 174 Department of Agriculture: Mac Chon Luang Research Station ...... 174 Constraints ...... 176 12. Has Land Terracing Met Objectives of Improved Soil Conservation and Improved Crop Yields? ...... 178 Quantitative Target ...... 178 Quality of Terraces ...... 178 Soil Improvement ...... 180 Use of Terraces ...... 182 Crop Production on Terraces ...... 182 Impact on Erosion Control and the Environment ...... 186 Labor Inputs ...... 188 Benefit-Cost Analysis ...... 188 Sustainability ...... 198 Alternatives to Bench Terraces ...... 198 Strategies of Other Projects ...... 202 13. Have Water Control Structures Increased Land under Irrigation to Meet Project Targets? ...... 202 Target Achievement ...... 202 Adequacy of the Waterwork Structures ...... 206 Benefits of the Water Works ...... 210 Sustainability ...... 214 14. Has There Been a Decrease in Opium-Producing Areas and Production? ...... 214 Background ...... 214 Current Production Levels ...... 216 Eradication Campaign ...... 216 Detoxification ...... 218 Prices ...... 21 Crop Replacement Programs ...... 220 15. Has the Mae Chaem Cooperative Met Farmers' Marketing Needs? ...... 222 Background ...... 222 General Performance ...... 224 Loan Repayment ...... 224 Long-term Viability ...... 226 Achievement of Project Objectives ...... 226 xlii
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Impact on Market Competitiveness...... 228 WATERSHED ISSUES ...... 2 8 ...... 230 16. Have Forest Protection and Reforestation Activities Been Adequate to Preserve the Watershed Now and into the Future? ...... 230 Forest Fire Control ...... 230 Road Erosion Control...... 232 Logging ...... 234 Community Forests and Woodlots ...... 236 Watershed Reforestation...... 236 Range/Pasture Management ...... 240 17. Are Road Objectives Beih~g Met in Terms of Quality, Quantity, and Location? ...... 242 Adequacy of the Road Network...... 242 Intended Stand,,rds of Rehabilitated Roads ...... 244 Quality of Roads Built ...... 248 Factors Affecting Quality of Roads ...... 252 Road Maintenance ...... 256 Road Erosion Control ...... 258 Impact of Roads on the Watershed Population ...... 260 Sustainability ...... 262 18. Are the Current Hydrology Research and Monitoring Activities Aciiis Sound?on"...... 262 26 Hydrology/Watershed Research ...... 262 Watershed Monitoring ...... 266
ANNEX A: VILLAGES VISITED BY EVALUATION TEAM ...... 271
ANNEX B: PARTIAL LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED BY EVALUATION TEAM . . 273 xv
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LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
I Some Selected Indicators of Quality Life in the Watershed, 1986 ...... 88 2 Estimated Percentage Distribution of Area Planted, 1985-1986 (rainy and dry seasons combined) ...... 162 3 Weir Distribution Sites ...... 206 4 Benefit/Cost Analysis of Waterworks Development ...... 212 5 Planned vs. Actual Road Rehabilitation ...... 244 1
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW
BACKGROUND
The purpose of the Mae Chaem Watershed Development Project (MCWDP) is:
to establish a self-sustaining upward trend in the real income and access to socioeconomic services for the rural households of Mae Chaem, with emphasis upon the landless poor, by methods whereby:
1) the people are their own planners;
2) environmental deterioration trend is reversed; and
3) replication in other watersheds is demonstrated as practical.
It was intended that this would "raise the quality of life of the occupants of watersheds in North Thailand in ways which support increasing environmental stability and which are self-sustaining." (Project Paper -- Logical Framework)
The project has completed seven years of implerentation. The first three years were troublesome, and little was accomplished. However, many of the. problems that held back progress were resolved and the past fou,- years have beea active and productive.
The watershed is located in an area that, until the start of this project, had received little development attention. Now that a decent road links the area with Chiang Mai, Mae Chaern has begun to participate -nore fully in Thailand's economic and political life. This shows most clearly in the main town, which has grown considerably since the early 1980s and now has shops selling televisions and refrigerators.
The diverse ethnic groups living in the watershed, and the many different ecological zones, present a challenge to any development effort. This project has used a phased approach, first wor:ing with the sub-districts (tambons) near the town that have a preponderance of lowland Thais, then moving to tL.e more remote areas. An unusual feature of the project is the provision of assistance to the lowland, upland, and highland (above 800 meters) populations. Most other development projects in northern Thailand do not include all three groups and therefore create hard feelings from the ignored groups. The more difficult to reach areas with mainly Karen hill-tribe villages were saved until last. The Christian Karen villages have had some successful development experience with missionaries, whereas the Karen who remain animists are not well organized and are strongly risk averse. ua
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PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Given this difficult envirorment, the c',.luation team found that the project managers from the Royal Thai G vernment (RTG) and U.S. Agency for International Developmtnt have provid.d exceptional leadership and have made things work when the odds were heavily against them. They have been creative and enthusiastic, and remain so even after four years of struggle. The project has achieved most of its output targets such as roads rehabilitated and bench terraces constructed, and has increased rice production to the extent that the area as a whole is now self sufficient in this important commodity. That it has still not achieved its more difficult objectives of behavioral and attitudinal change should not detract from credit due to this able project leadership. These latter changes take a long time. An extension of two years has been approved for the project, during which time the emphasis will be on attitudinal and behavioral change.
U.S. ASSISTANCE
U.S. assistance has been in the form of a grant, authorized at $10 million and obligated at $9.2 million. The grant provides for 45 percent of the toial cost, with the remainirg 54 percent coming from the Thai government. 1he grant funds are to cover specified percentages of the costs of equipme..L and commoditis, expatriate technical assistance, government staff support, construction cos watershed management activities, credit, and evaluation and research. The grant fund, also cover the total cost of the Project Operations Unit (POU), interface (IF) teams, rice banks, and construction of a trainiug center.
TIlE PROJECT AS A MODEL
This project is considered to be an important experiment in using development strategies that arc new to Thailand. The main innovation is the use of special tedms of project-trained field workers who have no institutional home outside the project. Vhe eams help coordinate the actions of the line agencies and facilitate communications between government agencies and project villages. These IF teams were designed to leave a sustainable level of activity at the village level.
Another innovation is the issuance crf land use permits to hill-tribe farmers. This was a condition precedent that was not quickly fulfilled. The oroject funds were frozen by USAID for nearly a year before the RTG complied through a Cabinet resolution.
Still another innovation of the project was to move its management to the Chiang Mai Governor's office, with operational management in the hands of a full-time deputy. This institutional structure is considered part of the model this project represents. The term "model" is used frequently by USAID and RTG officials in regard to the project. It is not clear, however, whether all use the same definition of it. Its meaning for most may be less a model for others to emulate and !5u~j imionim i flimii ii lu ~i-it. a iI1111IIlt'l It I lljThl U 11n CMIll--' %!IIt k
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more a shorthand way of referring to the innovative structure and strategy of the project. Although the project as a whole is difficult to use as a model, some of its components can provide replicable strategies for other projects to use.
EVALUATIOi-4
The project was first evaluated in 1983. Although little had been accomplished up to that time, the evaluation team found that the new management structure appeared viable, the various implementing agencies were cooperating and interested in moving ahead, and the IF teams had done considerable preparation work in the villages while waiting for funding to be restored. Among the team's recommendations was that the phasing and geographic scope of the project be ch:.nged. Many of the recommendations were accepted, and the project area was reduced to five tambons from six. This current evaluation is intended to provide a framework for !he remaining years of the project.
MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
Quality of Life
Overall, the quality of life of the watershed population has improved. Income has increased significantly in the Phase I area. The project has yet to have an appreciable impact on the hill-tribe villages of the Phase I area although work has been going on there for more than three years. Most of the physical work has been done in the two Phase I tambons near to Mae Chaem town. Effecting change in the hill-tribe areas is more .ifficult than in the lowlands, and, to make any changes sustainable, the project will need at least .he planned two-year extension.
Agriculture
The project has succeeded in achieving rice self-sufficiency for the project area as a whole. Through thp Accelerated Impact Prcgram (AlP), the project has increased irrigated rice yields in selected villages by 18 percent in 1985 and by 18.5 percent in 1986, the latter covering 1,500 rai. The AIP has had even more success in the uplands, increasing rice yields by 31 percent in 1985 and by 33 percent in 19R6, the latter covering 3,000 rai. It will now be a challenge to the project to extend this success to other area farmers. The uplands will be 'he most difficult due to the remote locations and the zultural barriers that must be overcome when working with the hill-'jibes who comprise the large majority of upland farmers. These farmers have had little to no education and are risk averse. The AIP has shown that change can occur in these villages with the right extension strategy and an appropriate technology package.
An intention of the project was to promote annual cash crops for 50 percent of the upland area under cultivation. The upland farmers prefer to plant rice for subsistence although some grrcw soybeans, corn, and some other annual cash crops for 7
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diversity. Lowland farmers have more readily adopted cash crops and grow a considerable quantity during the dry season. Agricultural technology is available for tropical, sub-tropical, and temperate fruit tree crops, but extension to hill-tribe villages is only beginning. These crops have considerable potential for sustainable growth. They provide economic benefits and protect the watershed, but they take a number of years to mature and require extension services to reach the more remote areas of the watershed. It will be a challenge to the project to make enough progress in the next two or three years so that agricultural growth for these crops can be sustained in the uplands in the post-project period. For soil conservation, the project has constructed over 15,000 rai of terraces. Activities were limited to construction of bench terraces, which have a positive benefit/cost ratio when benefits are calculated over 20 years. However, the terraces are too expensive for farmers to build on their own. The project has not provided farmers with available lower-cost, effective methods that would mote likely produce a spread effect from this activity. Many of the bench terraces constructed are of poor quality, and farmers have not been trained in how to use and maintain them.
Marketing
The project has provided marketing assistance focusing solely on the Mae Chaem Cooperitive, which now performs well. However, it has only 556 members (out of 6,338 families in the project area), and almost all are lowland Thais. The cooperative purchases only in large quantities in areas near to the town and has viable )peration a only if USAID-subsidized assets are not depreciated. The potential for it to serve the hill-tribe villages adequately is low. To do so would be uneconomic.
In'-astructure
The project's physical achievements (with the exception of waterworks) genea:ly surpassed planned targets. Project-constructed or -rehabilitated roads have facilitated implementation of other project activities and are already starting to benefit the project villages. However, the quality of construction of roads and terraces was such that many of them may rapidly deteriorate and benefits may not be sustainable without additional assistance. The waterworks have a high benefit/cost ratio (3.1) as a result of increases in irrigation water for paddy production. Village potable water supplies and sanitation facilities were successfully constructed and are being well used.
Project Management
The project has provided a number of valuable lessons in project management that will help other projects. One important element is the administrative jurisdiction of the project area. The project was originally to be implemented in two districts, as one tambon was in another district. However, this tambon was not included in Phase I and was removed from the project before implementation there A flum1lmUi ~ii t'ltoJLi lo L!JflUnnmmfl5~11~i~ (3 Li)
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could begin, mainly because of the potential difficulties of working in two districts. Some of the other area development projects in northern Thailand have been implemented across district boundaries and were more difficult to coordinate than MCWDP.
The project's management system has been effective in directing field activities and in providing for their coordination. This is a significant accomplishment. However, this success was heavily influenced by the personal interest and enthusiasm of the Project Director (the Governor) and his deputy for administration. Their organizing and leadership skills are exceptional. Although it is unlikely that this combination would be available for other projeccs and thus cannot serve as a model for other donor-funded projects, the province/dis.rict structure would be valuable for other projects to consider.
Although the management system was effective in achieving most of the project's physical targets, it was not successful in promoting the project strategies for achieving social and economic improvements. The implementing agencies remained concerned with the physical targets and not the effects of infrastructure on the local population. Many activities were not implemented in a way that enhanced local participation, self-reliance, and sustainability.
Despite the project's decentralization from the original management center in Bangkok to the Chiang Mai Governor's office, project management authority depended on an outside source of funds to provide leverage for coordination. The project has not succeeded in establishing an overall model for RTG-financed operations. The lessons learned are that the personal capabilities of the leaders and purse-string control are what count. Structure is of minor importance.
The project has been plagued by poor implementation of financial procedures. In its early stages, the problems were complicatl due to multiple sources of funding and different financial systems, compounded by RTG difficulties in meeting the conditions precedent. Many of these problems were resolved just prior to the 1983 evaluation, but the procedures of the Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation (DTEC) have remained extremely slow, and this situation continues to cause serious delays in implementation.
Interface Teams
The project intended to use the IF teams to develop a self-help capability in the project villages. This has been accomplished in the lowland Thai villages but not effectively in the hill-tribe villages, where a de!pendency on the IF teams has been created. The evaluat )n team believes that the IF teams stayed too long in lowland Thai villages at the expense of the hill-tribe villages. This was due, in part, to the phasing of the project and its slow start, which had the IF teams spending years in the lowland Thai villages where, in most cases, they were needed for no more than a year. The few years they have spent in the Phase II hill-tribe villages are still not enough to achieve the desired sustainability. Also, the focus has been on core villages and too little attention has been devoted to satellite villages. The IF team concept has proven to be valid for many project villages and is worthy of replication in other donor-funded projects. rj~ lol Inll~l1 .111 -AV.m. z526 MY)U~1flJ
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The POU has requested the implementing agencies to hire 49 IF team members for the project extension period. The salaries will continue to be paid by USAID. The objective is to give the IF people permanent positions with technical agencies. The POU has asked the agencies to make these positions available. The evaluation team sees value in providing the implementing agencies with personnel who can work closely with the project population.
Forests and Watershed
Forest protection and reforestation activities have been relatively successful. The Royal Forestry Department (RFD) has the technical capability to continue to carry out the fire-control work but may not have the budget to do so in the future. The evaluation team observed the following positive factors: the watershed does not have large contiguous tracts of destroy,', forest; very few forest fires, if any, reached crown level; and the project has initiated a new activity for -ange management. However, many of the project's forest protection activities will be significantiy reduced when project funds are no longer available. The issuance of land use permits has exceeded the planned target, but the evaluation team did not find that they were having a significant effect on farming practices. They covered an average of only 2.3 rai, which is insufficient for household self-sufficiency, and some permits were only for residences, not farmland.
The hydrology (watershed) research and monitoring activities have not yet obtained conclusive results because of the short time that these have been under way. The monitorin,, of land use changes is important and is not being done.
Opitm and l)rug Addiction
Thr. '1,4rcotic Detoxification Center, opened in early 1986, has treated 341 opium addicts. Despitc, a .'5-percent recidivism rate only two months after treatment, the evalu-tion team considers this activity to be successful and important. The center's zervice is in strong demand by the Karen population it 3erves and has a long waiting list.
The opinm- Vi1imrgi i 'yn)iujI (mia*,ii~fl) tkarmflloWl-Jt ombi fJiUlMMID 3 5 S flfi~tU~l~ L~JIEAIJI LL~Il a l. 25-29 i~uu 2.168 i 363 LrJnI0i) im u nhei J 16 timiw~ rN I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Jllvi~~lv~4fi VU(3c)Ii f~~ ~L~ li!~~61aa n iru lowuuIaIvuF4njv IIini :nnn Til~JIi'Lf(a6U I l 1 V~L~ T4 1htiU-0hlfi~m i iuz an Ilif ~ h~lilnh ifl~LvivMIIMVU -VM hLfLn~lunh'i 10 ~IOU L-U n-nUt niianl nin'lloijuii t I 1Il L lt lul~ flulr mi till i 1L ~i~~l lllu 1~Ju~J l5 I~nu u~i'~EiqilJ, ' tqi i ln I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Wl- ItV'liumliil~LlJh~fi.l14im1 imaz: ,o S. Il ~IIiltl.lfl i Li~ I-11J~J~l~15 .2L1lfl1 nlI~lL-5 n1 -i jltJ i 3i [w"IE)l t X 14 MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS Overall The project should be extended for three more years. The full $10 million authorized for the project should be obligated to provide adequate funding f , the remaining years. In addition, USAID shouli consider a follow-up project that is oriented to hill-tribe education, especially formal education in the lowlands for children to complete high school. The limited education they receive in the villages does not adequately prepare them for full participation in the Thai economy. Agriculture The project should dispense with its assistance to paddy farmers and focus on the needs of the uplands. Extension workers' time shoul be divided as follows: * 50 percent rainfed rice; e 30 percent annual cash crops; and e 20 percent tree and perennial cash crops. The Department of Agricultural Extension (DOAE) is encouraged to use its 15 IF team members to bolster the upland extension program. The DOAE's regular and temporary staff should be a part of the upland program to ensure continuity after the project. The extension program should bolster and expand the current AIP. More rigorous analysis of the results of the extension programs should be carried out with attention focused on extension methodology, adoption rate of new technology, socioeconomic and technical constraints, and sustainability. The project should provide some financial assistance and five IF team members to CARE International. This private voluntary organization has developed a viable strategy to provide agricultural extension services to Karen villagc- in the Mae Chaem watershed, and the evaluation team would like to see this work continued and strergthened. Marketing The project should hire a marketing advisor to improve marketing communications and promote and improve the access of private merchants to upland areas. No further assistance should be provided to the cooperative. Soil Conservation No more bench terraces should be constructed by the project. The targets for new road construction should be reduced, and no more large waterworks should be constructed. The focus should be on repair of completed, poor quality construction and on the development of a maintenance capacity among the local population. nllflaJlJ I I Im imi Al UMOAIJUk( fl UMflilfliW4fl I -JIFAJEJU fli O Zllfll iji,* LU U 1iJU12JT~b1JLt?1 LL'CtLUJJLl'Ii~f1UtIJLtJI v1ial 1.1 .5U1~v f 17 VltJ1 5 i- iE FA 'iIuFln9-11iM~ITn I -IUL 91 It tjil' T '.t h ~LiL~ilh'f VIL"lifl mn mini @m urni ?f1iii1Ji Lluiloi a LuE)iliL ?jat-iN u~uj Onfl I LIkl- i~ iAEl UIn-Itav l l bf~lil lil L il-tfl qn (n11.0-ill '34LiiiAJEll~ ll)4 'dIu 16 The project should work with villagers to adopt low-cost, effective soil conservation measures such as hillside ditches and contour grass strips. Estimating that about 17 person-days will be needed per rai, the project should pay 15 baht per day (cost sharing) or about 255 baht per rai. Small agricultural water-delivery systems should be constructed for upland areas already using soil conservation methods. Infrastructure The Department of Land Development (DLD) and the RFD should develop a capacity to work with villagers !o maintain waterworks and roads using help from former IF team members they hire (5 and 15 people, respectively). This will require a revamping of strategy and method to deal with uplaiid villages in a collaborative manner. The agencies will need to move away from using quantitative targets and start assessing quality, mantenance, and sustainability. These changes will not be easy for them to make and will require a strong commitment by the project. Self-help Capability New Lelf-help projects should be assisted only in a small number of upland villagers that exhibit strong need and a willingness to make a considerable effort of their own. The focus should be on villagers using their own inputs to help themselves. Self-help capability should be improved by more local participation in the continuing activities of the project's implementing agencies. The mobile IF teams will help with village organization, while the project should provide technical assistance and some inputs through agricultural extension (DOAE), community forestry (RFD), road maintenance (RFD), and soil con, rvation methods (DLD and DOAE). All subprojects should include considerable v;dager inputs and instruction for local maintenance to achieve sustainability. The IF teams should be divided up as follows: mobile teams, 15; DGAE, 15; CARE, 5; RFD, 10; DLD, 5; and Department of Non- Formal Education, 20. Training The change in emphasis from structures to people will require the field staffs of the implementing agencies to have some training in how to carry out this kind of development assistance. There will also be a need to continue training villagers. The IF team rmembers who are hired by the implementing agencies will reed technical training. The project should continue the scrvices of the training advisor through the next two years to plan and supervise this training. Institutions The role of the district office should be increased in POU meetings to help start the transition to the post-project period. The participating organizations should not be pressured to hire, at project completion, large numbers of IF team members who may not be as qualified as other job candidates. The IF team members 17 s mlUflllfJ ili'j 10 rnfl11nii fui-14 5 u n1 11w unhEJ4 0fl ,q Ima E) u YflZv #111j ~J1~1I~1'l1IIJ ~ 14f11IJ~L~J'l1 W.01I.2532 uazr H.O. 2537 fIl alIul t 14fln~lu) tM -fldo1i-5 t n lt~t fl1flIA Lfn- flinrAiflrantIIi1iJf LJ1 iirm1411lIJLL14in1O9111)UWUta49 1JLOL 1DIU; I i DIJ 18 should not be given the impression that the best future for them is in government service. They now have considerable technical, organizational, and leadership skills that will be valuable to the private sector and their home vi!lages. Information The project activities require more careful monitoring of socioeconomic change and of watershed characteristics. The project should incorporate the necessary information systems and use inem for evaluations in 1989 and 1994. forests and Watershed RFD should adopt a policy of not planting trees on land that has already undergone soil conservation intervention and is being properly mai: ,ained. The policy should be clearly announced to the watershed population. This would ensure farmers that their soil conservation efforts would be to their benefit over the long terni. The policy would rnt necessarily entail granting rights of ownership (land use certificates or other) as farmers generally fear losing the': land to the RFD tree planting p--gram and aot to others, given the traditional ownership practices of the area. 19 ufl ;b, 5)iXU 5no 20 EVALUATION CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY ISSUE QUALITY OF LIFE AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 1. Have Quality of Life Standards of the Various Groups Living In the Watershed Improved? Conclusions Since the MCWDP is not the only project working in the watershed, although it is by far the largest, the exact impact the project alone has had on quality of life is difficult to isolate. Overall, for the general population the quality of life has increased in the value of housing and household assets, nutrition, health, educational level, and on- and off-farm employment opportunities. But the lowland Thais have been the major beneficiaries of the project and enjoy a higher quality of life than upland and highland villagers who were the principal targets identified in the project plan. Improved access to potable water in hill-tribe villages has improved nutrition by facilitating household gardens. Health care improvements have resulted from increased services of health care agencies and some inputs from the project. Non-farir incoine of the watershed inhabitants has been largely generated from the project's activities, whereas other employment opportunities are rare. Recommendations Project resources should be focused on the poorer villages in the Phase II area. The project should be ertended three years to provide sufficient time to serve these villages and develop a sustainable level of growth. Quality of life standards for the people in the watershed should be further researched during the next two years of the project. A survey should be conducted to cover the issue of quality of life as well as details of the implementation process 21 LVL J q*_f rn i-~t!t nIi in o ivtii daiir mIT oiua on m51n m Et iou l ubSvn tl,)jluIfiJ LLIt Utn nrI1 - IMM5 T nI~woqzu~qI~v 11 kt :JOITI:Agnt ukzrkmi i u mi fl vI N rn 530 m~i'~lLtt-IjtJLjtmE31nu5u1 e L~UiL fh1 ~f i mwv uu Uyllj;S 131S Imirmi t ~funmna im'i u@i 1vi"utininml' 22 as experienced in the villages. Quantitative quality of life measures should be constructed in terms of income and the value of housing and household assets, nutrition, health, educational level, and on- and oif-farm employment opportunities. The research should be completed before the project ends, thus providing systematic data for evaluation at a later date. 2. Have the Rice Banks Provided a Viable Means for Improved Nutritional Security In Mae Chaem Villages? Conclusions The villagers, both lowland Thai and Karen, realize the benefits of rice banks and have a strong sense of commitment to their operation. The villagers use group pressure to ensure repayment with interest. In times of cash or household rice shortage, rice banks are a means to help poor villagers maintain their subsistence. At present, the scale of operations of most rice banks in the project area is insufficient to ensure the year-round consumption needs of most households. Loans from rice banks are usually very small due to an insufficient rice surplus in most villages. The project has provided some building materials to about 50 rice banks, but support for the banks in other aspects, such as rice supply or a revolving fund, has been minimal. Recommendations Through the activities of the IF teams, the project should continue to support the activities of the rice banks, especially in material supply for their construction. The project should use the same strategy for rice bank support that has already been used in the project. 23 i~7in -u - Ia I I 24 3. Has Integration of Ethnic Minorities and Women into the Social, Political, and Economic Life of the District Increased? Conclusions Social integration of ethnic minorities has been greatly facilitated by the composition and activities of the IF teams. Each resident team has one hill-tribe member, while 19 of 21 teams have a female member. The project has provided roads that bring the ethnic minorities more into contact with the lowland Thais. It is now common to see hill-tribe people in Mae Chaem town, whereas this was not the case only four to five years ago. Ethnic discrimination, however, is usually felt by hill-tribe people, who are looked down on by many of the lowland people. Unlike other projects in northern Thailand that work with hill-tribes, MCWDP had the novel concept of including provision of services to lowland Thais as well, to gain their support. Phase I focused mainly on lowland Thai villages. Phase II has mostly hill-tribe villages. These are more difficult to reach and develop. The project is being extended to provide an adequate level of services to hill-tribe villages for sustainable development to cccur. No gender-specific data on women are systematically available. The IF teams, especially the female members, have helped organize housewife groups in their villages. The education program includes hill-tribe women, few of whom have had any previous opportunity for education. The potable water systems installed by the project have reduced the time women spend in fetching water and have provided more opportunity for household gardens. Recommendations The project should be extended three years to provide adequate development services to hill-tribe villages so that benefits can become sustainable. 25 1AN -1 1MN i - 1J_ .' Ltlni 11 1_114f, L4o f~fI l 1~ 1Ill .J. I It, r1jII,tU71 t ),1,11 917:1 1w *11LVI t -LM2 t j %11, 1 I 4i) nIjCf~4 1 l, n Ii I~j 4I LI I J L 9 1111 ~ L Ij I ,W Lf ~ . ~lb L11 'N!I 4 1 Il-r, , I1t oN t'V- LV1 .4 ~i i n :ll~I-114 I)C -t ,L !J' _ ! B-1,V BJ - )-i 1 ' I l_ i''UL~ ~ 4lnt~ : v~iJ1U~11I' "WtU Li I L~.4 1 1~~~;~~Ii , U *: ~~i;~d0)h~ll 1'I IV Il ,'.1u10n ; 1 oliI11p'~ jI iIlliq t riliI li , 111 L u nj i4 I" IB-I ., l lI I1j l1) U T I f" I-tTi 4 111 A l r 26 4. Have the IF Teams Contributed Significantly to Achievement of Project Objectives? Conclusions The IF teams have fiifilled their assigned task in providing new development opportunities for villagers, especially in lowland communities. In the upland and highland areas, most core villages have noticeably benefitted from the presence of the IF teams in gainin greater access to public services. The IF teams have been able to provide nateria, support from the project, which helped gain villagers' trust and cooperation. The tanible results of the IF teams' presence are seen in terms of pl'ysical outputs such as rice banks, roads, and potable water systems. The social development work of the IF teams was strong in the early years of the project but became sidetracked when it started its big push ir, 1984 to achieve quantitative targets. The IF team mn mbers then became mainly agricultural extension workers, supplementing the activities if DOXE and implementing the All'. Although the IF teams made important contributions in a large number of villages, they suffered from inadequate leadership and communication with project management. They focused their attention on small projects that could have an immediate, visible impact; sustainability was not a guiding principle. They generally lived in and supported the larger, stronger, core villages, while often neglecting smaller, satellite villages, for which they were also responsible. The IF team rmo(' l is not likely to be replicable within the context of regular government services. Most agencies have specific technical tasks to perform and need personnel with a technical cducation, but most IF team members are generalists. lowever, the successful experience of the IF teams in living in villages and in dealing with villagers can be used to enhance the ability of government officials, especially those who serve at the tambon level. The application of the IF team concept will be beneficial for non-governmental agencies and donor-supported projects, as they have the institutional ti.-xibility to hire generalists to support and complement the work of the technical agencies. 27 L~l- I~ -II n I :ULWf r 1 cl114uii 1l L-14t bmtu nilLv i .12~1 l~~J 12(1jn1u~2L 14J1~1t4 U~L'114~ L4V1~21 ~~1'fl11 1T fl ato a uJ1al;;lJit:A ~~~14~~~~2ij~~~~~fl~~L( 1 ~ i UL.w1~lj~3 Jf'1 liJJ1lh ijaL du 11v " - .111~td l- KIM - .aA.. ~1 ~41~ L~:~iL 14E'J 114 '~iU~i1 UV~ .n1 L~~111~i 1~~)~ 114L I~ . ~ ~J9~ji11 I~i11~jfl~n~~j~m ill~2 ~~~a I Ent~L1~f1himlLoflta IUAUK IOU IS114 MU1JM NIEls1'ld lu,1~u 4loufh 62 0,~u ~11i,1V~lu 1'2141 UAWr11ZIUJ'Lj2~V2'"L4lhI~11L) 111411olqin fdlig l1nlibil 28 Recommendations The IF teams' work in the Phase I area should be terminated since adequate progress has already been made. For the Phase II area (Mae Na Chon, Mae Suk, and Ban Thap tambons), the IF teams should be restructured as mobile teams. The role of the mobile teams in the Phase II area should be continued for another three-year period. Their role should be changed from the traditional hand-out approach to generating community development programs. Satellite villages should receive greater emphasis. Financial and material support from the project should be made available only when villagers have a strong need and will supply free labor and local materials. The 1983 recommendation concerning the IF team monthly meeting (p. 99 of that evaluation report) should be adopted for the remaining period. The IF teams should be encouraged to participate in the discussion in the IF team meetings, and some of them should be invited to attend the district and POU meetings. When the 62 IF team members are transferred to the other agencies, they should still continue to meet monthly. This will be an important factor in maintaining their interest in working with villigers ard balance the more technical and infrastructure bias of these agencies. It will also facilitate coordination among the field workers rather than just the agency directors. Thiis should be the IF team members meeting with peer leadership rather than a "talking to" session. POU staff should participate. 5. Have Villagers Learned to Solve Their Own Problems? Conclusions Most lowland villages are well prepared to sustain themselves because they have strong village committees to manage thir local affairs. Self-help project targets have been realized in terms of physical quantity. They are visibly apparent in 29 ..- 4 f! IM I Ib 11 l~ ~ tl, ,u i--jl j ~ 1J~iLninUW~ nw i ezainIl -.,in i 1~~1.iin-i111fl j-n4' .- I i ra: I J'qiA ff iln L ll 1I1J I,I~~L I : Il ilki t,4I II1 in IM L'1 i' l1:9111j 30 frequently observed rice banks, potable water systems, etc. These projects have been initiated mostly by support provided by the POU through the IF teams. Village committees, in theory a conduit structure for carrying on the village self-help capability, have not been set up in satellite villages in the upland and highland areas. To an extent, a dependency of villagers on IF teams has developed. The weaknesses in developing a self-help capability in upland and highland villages have already been identified by the POU, and steps have been initiated to overcome the problems. One initiative is the Social Development Program to assist village leaders to realize the value of self-reliance through education. These activities have not been implemerted long enough to show iesults. During the remaining years of the project, 20 IF team members will be assigned to the non formal education program so that a more intensive effort can be made. RecUiiinmludations In :he Phase II area, there should be one team per tambon outfitted with motorcycles. Their tasks should be mainly to focus on satellite villages, motivating local leaders and potential leaders to organize themselves for village development work. In turn, these leaders should motivate their fellow villagers to maintain the project implemented infrastructure with limited support from the POU. The traditional liaison role of the IF teams should be discouraged so that they have more time to participate in building these local task forces. The IF teams transferred to other agencies (see Issue 4) should meet :'egularly with the mobile IF teams to coordinate their work and examine how well they are succeeding in developing self-help capabilities. The transferred teams should use strategies developed for this same purpose. These strategies should be developed by the POU. The IF teams (of all agencies) should have special training in how to implement the strategies. 31 V1aua 1ova4 thuiui'u~(-~n~mu-hJru 11 l L Ilj ,114 I-. u 1110flfJI~ 11 41UIlU ;a Laai hjiYM fl~l1U~f~U~JJ)1U1~ ~fl1~9 U1U~C*I~UU~i'~ ~J 1~1~l Lea 1 32 6. Have Villagers' Drug Practices Been Decreased? CLncluslons The Narcotic Detoxification Center has already significantly reduced the number of opium addicts in the watershed. The plans for the remaining project years indicate that all addicts in the watershed will be able to receive treatment. The availability of detoxification in the watershed has directly enhanced the quality of life of the hill-tribe people. The project's investment in opium detoxification is cost-effective. Recommendation The Narcotic Detoxification Center in Mae Chaem should be continued. The Mae Chaem lHospital should consider charging minimal fees for the addicts so they will value the treatment received more. The fees will also help cover the costs of the Center. PROJECT MANAGEMENT ISSUES 7. Has the Project Been Adequately Decentralized to Facilitate Field Coordination and Promote Sustainablilty? Conclusions The project was decentralized in 1983 when management was moved from the Projects Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) in Bangkok to the Governor's office in Chiang Mai with the Governor as Project Director. Although this has provided more localized supervision of activities, only three of the project's participating organizations have put their project operations within the regular district and provincal structure. For the other three organizations, the field managers report to regional or Bangkok offices. The Governor has authority over 33 n111 uh1.Aut a b ltailmJZiliIi tUuor ) l,)I uil~ll' ~ ?n ~f~lJ Pnual~Y~' f*7 flnllMY1Wf~ 'J L W J' iU 25-2 ,I i~imivT J14alip IT=01 -jI LMu' 1"61JNfi~li~,yN~~ LJl 11P Ifl 1m:31J I1 i W W LJ t i~I 11 l~iViP1J 01-IliaJ Faai 1I9jim LtI mfl ri~lli -I L1-w 1 I Ik ILl~J 1iI rfIi5J1$11 nmil u a 34 any operations in his province and thus can resolve serious problems when they arise. However, neither the project nor the district and province offices receive regular written reports from these agencies. The communications among the project's implementing agencies have improved since the 1983 evaluation but are still inadequate. Some coordination occurs as a result of the monthly POU meetings, but the annual thiee-day planning workshop has not worked to integrate agency plans. The agencies are more interested in maximizing the assistance they get from USAID than in learning how to improve the project. They see USAID as dominating the process. To the extent that the agencies do not adhere to the project philosophy (and they often do not), a strong USAID role is important. The project management system does not provide a fully replicable model for other projects, mainly because of the high skill level and development interest and philosophy of both the Governor and the Deputy Administrative Director. It is rare to find such talent in this combination. The reorganization plan for the two-year project extension may well alleviate some of the internal problems of the project but does not effectively deal with the problem of how the strategy and coordination function of the project can continue after it ends. The only organizational units that can oversee the work of the implementing agencies as a whole are the Nai Amphur and Governor's offices (especially the latter). The ability of these two offices to play this role effectively depends on the personal interests, management styles, development philosophies, and capabilities of the officeholders. Not surprisingly, the process :annot be institutionalized, given -he constraints of the Thai bureaucracy. It is unlikely that the selection of the individuals for these offices can be determined by those whose main interest is the project. Overall, the project has been effectively decentralized for the purposes of implementation. Coordination occurs both formally and informally at the field level. However, the decentralized structure is dependent on temporary factors that art. unlikely to exist after the project has ended. Sustainability of field activities in terms of leadership and direction has therefore not yet been achieved. 35 UU1U1 lI Et1 itu7,wu~ NU 1 IIJ iI Ln~h ,111 ;ii11 n;,i I 'i a iii -,~n J 'm tflin itm2 u -"J I-. S.~tFiII-.,1 IISi 1!~~?~~ l ~ - . - FtJJ-- i rii - l~ m I K Ll TI~~~~~~~~ 2i'~fL~1Il~'~ .J lW~~Uv~~I U I WAI~1.4 Y) Ii 11111fl '11I,i ) -4 W)016 1 fit rI~)f lu ij n FiJU Ivi Il1gA~UI 1 11J1~ 36 Recommendations The reorganization plan should be approved as is. Flexibility should be used in determining the best candidate for the job of Assistant Deputy Director for Agriculture. The project committee at the provincial level should remain after the project has ended. Even if the current Governor is soor replaced, many of those who have participated in the committee meetings may be present for a number of years. The project committee at the district level is the coordinating body for the post-project period, replacing the POU. The currert Nai Amphur should assign a senior deputy to attend all POU meetings as an active participant. This deputy should be relatively new so he would be in the district for a number of years to provide continuity. Although the Nai Amphur should chair the district committee meetings, the deputy would provide operational leadership. (Note: the RTG has been working to upgrade the district and provincial offices to plan and manage development activities better.) If the Governor leaves before the project is ,ompleted, he should carefully brief his replacement. The structural plan should remain flexible. Both the current and the new governors should discuss with AID the options for project leadership that are available at that time, with consideration given to the personal capabilities of potential candidates for project leadership. 8. Have the Project's Financial Planning and Management Systems Been Improved? Conclusions Although many of the financial problems that plagued the early years of the project have been resolved, there still remains the problem of a lengthy voucher audit process at DTEC still remains. This was supposed to have been resolved by having adequate funds available for large advances, but DTEC does not have enough funds to make the necessary advances. In the past year, the problem was compounded by a delay in USAID funding, while the POU "ieglected to include a 37 q jj ii 8. 1UJlf~l1Uiul~'uNh.l1 ~i1? L u9 l val l ll,156 t jIA L Th~fh1JLUnnJAfl~UL~U4L~WU~f 'L ~irI Liwumait-i ILL lfn IU6 -it'it ai~lruiun-!lifil;4 @ut aimmU L YMLOL J1PWmiUWi1 38 four-month budget plan to carry it past the end of the fiscal year (it had been including such a plan for a number of previous years). The POU was able to borrow DLD funds to pay salaries during the delay. It appears that the DTE2 audit process is not as stringent as it had been until about a year ago, but delays are still too long. It is unclear why DTEC must approve all vouchers before a next advance can be made. Any disallowed expenses could always be deducted in the future, at least until near the end of the project. Recommendations USAID should continue to press the RTG to provide DTEC with sufficient funds so that it can make the necessary advances. Although the long audit process at DTEC for every voucher appears overdone, it is unlikely that a recommendation will cause any changes. The POU should submit 16-month budgets to avoid cash-flow problems that may result from USAID funding delays. AGRICULTURE ISSUES 9. Has Rice Self-SuffIciency Been Attained? Conclusions A major objective of the project has been the achievement of rice self sufficiency for the area as a whole and for all individual farmers. The project has succeeded in achieving self-sufficiency for the project area as a whole. Within the area, most villages in the two Phase I tambons have achieved self-sufficiency. However, for most upland villages in the Phase II area, scif-sufficiency has not been achieved. Only 47.6 percent of all project villages have achieved year-rour.d rice self-sufficiency. With two to three years remaining in the project, it is possible that many of the upland villages included in tlfi All' will achieve self-sufficiency, given the significant increases in productivity that have been achieved by them. 39 ioh9F 4t ~ L vnti L i l1Il~I 1l 1-I 'ieiU tnIU Jt MU L tif 9.i~ ii lFvlflilt)ILVJ'iiiniid Li _ii& ij I I '19 tttv 0i1in L;V9 fhI; 111 t% I~~hI~ Tv3If"KuiLII5 '11;14a L_ 1---t 11 111'- -1 tia9.QVt L , 1; ,:1 i ;lifi uLutJ-, if n~ta !. 4 85 lit I',, IF'IS14 - 7 Io I - I" ; I~ V .L I;i..rli kl.'1' L '-rrj~ I 1V !JL 4 1 LLLIU o ,..' -- 40 An original objective was to increase land utilization from 85 percent to 100 percent by providing new, irrigated land and terraced rainfed land for land-deficient farmers. However, when tambon Ban Chan was removed from the project, little available land was left to be developed. The project therefore concentrated on improving existing agricultural land througn terracing and water control structures. For area cultivated for both irrigated and upland rice, the increase between 1983 and 1986 has been about 16 percent for each. The major gains in rice production have been through dissemination of improved technology packages. These packages were readily available for lowland, irrigated agriculture but not for upland rice. Only in 1985 did the POU take concerted action to promote upland rice production. It did so through the AIP, which has been largely successful in the participating villages. The AlP was developed independently of the DOAE program, which was not adequ.tely serving the uplands. For the AlP, the POU has hired its own technical staff to lead it. The program provides improved seed, fertilizer, other inputs (on credit), and advice for selected upland villages and for some villages with irrigated rice. The results have been ;npressive, with yield increases for irrigated rice oc 18-18.5 percent for each of the first two years, and for upland rice of 31 and 33 percent. The program covered 2,100 rai in year one and 4,500 rai in year two. Reconimendat ions The DOAE should use the IF team members it is given to support the AlP. The focus should be on expanding the coverage of the AlP to more upland farmers, especially :iose with terraces, as well as continuing the support for those alrc,.dy in the program. Since one key constraint will be credit, additional funds should be made available. As the revolving fund is expanded, attention should be placed on how tc maintain this credit mechanism after the project has ended. It is unlikely that the All' extension capability can be continued once tie project Las ended. Therefore, the project should develop a trategy to phase out government support in its last year and use the proposed marketing advisor to develop private sector mechanisms to meet farmer de,,ands for inputs. 41 7inJ lia t-11-1i L-)i , -1; 1a t 18fiIi 18.5flu lut1val J'~t 3110m~~uvu~Liar 33 ml1u~ihcU Imbil i Lnirn~AU-. S 1J1J~~~~~~~~th~~~~~~1~~vJ~~JY~~li L ~ U ~~ '1 11l1 L1hf~ Li au011 -, @1u1n1 j a 966aua ait ql .J 42 The project should approach the rice extension activities with more rigorous analysis. Chiang Mai University can provide technical assistance and field workers to survey villages for technology adoption rates and for current and potential social, economic, and technical constraints. Chiang Mai University can also advise on how the transfer of technology can be best sustained. 10. Have Annual Cash Crops Been Adopted to Meet Proj ;ct Objectives? Conclusions Farming of annual cash crops in MCWDP has been limited primarily to the Phase I project area with soybeans, corn, garlic, shallots, and some vegetables predominating. With the exception of corn, most annual cash crops in this area are grown in paddy fields in the dry season with irrigated water. Other minor cash crops found in the MCWDP areas, such as hibiscus, chili, red kidney bean, and potatoes, were a result of extension activities of projects such as CARE, -lighland Agricultural Marketing and Production (HAMP) (United Nations), and the Royal Hilltribe Project. The DOAE has concentrated its efforts mainly on soybeans. The Department of Agriculture (DOA) has a number of new experimental crops, bu! its linkages to the DOAE and to farmers' needs are weak. The POU has realized that the project has not succeeded in introducing cash crops in the upland area as a result of inadequate agrunomic information from the Mae Chon Luang research station and lack of attention from the extension program. In response, it has brought into the project services from ,other research stations and uses project personnel to promote selected cash crops. Although the results of these new efforts have yet to be realized, the evaluation team has found the POU to be moving in the right direction. 43 n ~- Uj %, U ,I I ia ]f~~iLlilt 4111ttt1 ~ u 4- .4 Inf1i~~VI ~ IJ Ln li~g1 ju i~i inni iivm Ji-- nv vlLjth1jl i flhtl r 1 . nL~f I h i Ftj~ Vn, 4fri , j-;,jU o ." i r~ l UE IIL i-Ui u4it ~ V,." iu j- u " l itt , l ,jial 1 P1L~~mL ,:Thtij~i l inUI irt vi( t)' IiU11Llh Ifh l flll111JJIZJIfh i9, JIt - 41 ,41-o) tiii; 51n lILn a L ~ JId Y1~iitLatiiiJ1 iu mi uiii ri oau 44 Recommendations The project should have a market advisor who would provide market information to farmers, especially for the uplands; advise the project on means to improve the marketing system; interact with the market to promote more interest in the uplands; and communicate with extension officers on cash-crop extension strategy. The project should step up its agricultural extension on cash crops through: e Training IF teams in specific subject matter in newly promoted cash crops; e Increasing the role of village volunteers and the IF teams in agricultural extension; * Sending 15 IF team members to DOAE for upland agricultural purposes; * Sending five IF team members to CARE; e Requesting DOAE to employ five more permanent tambon extension officers for the project area on the government's regular payroll and to assign them to hill-tribe villages according to villager needs with respect to farmers' backgrounds, capabilities, and geographic conditions; e Requesting DOAE to provide more agricultural extension for cash crops based on the conditions and needs of the Mae Chaem watershed; and o Providing financial support for the agricultural activities of CARE. In so doing, the project should encourage CARE to extend to tambons Mae Na Chon, Ban Thap, and Nlae Suk as well as to operate for an additional year (through 1989 instead of 1988). The project should promote the work of the private sector. 45 0 jLq'111U 1U)I 15~ i~ ~ 0 ol1A wraiL iniijII ~1flU'.iiiin~n Ub I I-rU1i~ iulutU tolffh1LLW *ji-i)n5flujif~ o lutUW14fVflIUWulP111 -m E)iitanlun i @F, 1w~ h um al I t~i.. . A viol 2531) I nIJ tai-i flllpf~hfll lJ2 34,588 AU4 ILi 46 The project should ask the DOA to have more training for and communication with the tambon agricultural extension officers and IF team members. The project training advisor should provide assistance to DOA in developing the training program, especially with regard to communication skill training. 11. flare Tree/Perennial Cash Crops Been Adopted to Meet Production, Income, and Sustainabllity Objectives of the Project? Conclusions The project has shifted the strategy for reforestation from woodlots to agroforestry, concentrating on fruit trees. Combining the tree distribution activities of RFD, DOAE, and CARE, 34,588 trees have been distributed by the project. However, the failure rate is well over 50 percent. Yet tl-s demand for fruit trees remains high. The IF teams have helped villagers : plant tropical and sub-tropical fruit trees in their household garlens. The RID community forestry program for the project focuses on mango and jackfruit tree pla.nting on hillsides. These programs have not been operating long enough for the trees to reach full production. Most are used now for village consumption. There is a need for more production to interest merchants. The price should be at a viable level as the trees generally produce after the lowland production has cleared the market. The highland area has excellent potential to produce temperate fruits. Much research has already been done, and some minor extension has already occurred for peaches and pass!on fruit. Since thee fruits are not prcduced in the lowlands but are in demand, the market potential is good. The project will not be able to make significant changes in fruit production in the short time remaining as the fruit trees require technology transfer and time to mature. Recom inend at ions The project should train those IF teams and extension workers who will be working in areas below 800 meters in the technology for tropical and sub-tropical fruit trees and in the propagation of seedlings. The villages should develop nurseries 47 lunii, an"t in U M f9 V(U Ia~~l IIIimit azuiwnlun iim~ Ii avui I un-,iN iijini ei lii0 t ru I~lJ Iiiu ~ iiijuai $itl h~10A ;aInu, t -t U1 04 isis im ~ i ii It q 1u13u1'-jIutUOU I 1lh nIiob woqihUUlJI n~1iti)I tjt1'rYijnhqiJ)dihjaUj- Y1 t, 48 so that they can be self-sufficient in planting new trees. RFD should continue to promote agroforestry and to extend in the areas above 800 meters with selected temperate fruit crops such as peach and persimmon (high rate of survival). The training should be oriented to temperate fruits. An effort should be made to start production in many villages so that the villagers Aill have a means to judge the results. The project should bring farmers to areas where fruit trees are being grown to show that good results can be had. Although the training center at Mae Chon Luang could be used to train farmers as well as extension workers and IF teams, a danger is that the farmers will see the gravity sprinklers and other sophisticated technology and believe that all this equipment is needed and beyond their means. The training of extension workers should include methodology in how to communicate with hill-tribe farmers and be sensitive to their needs. For the long term, merchants interested in securing significant quantities of produce may be able to help extend the technology, provide the necessary inputs, and do the marketing. The critical component for the project to provide is roads. The project should also provide communications. The proposed marketing advisor (see Issue 10) should survey area merchants (including Chiang Mai) to find those who 'ould be interested in investing in an extension, production, and marketing program. The advisor should develop a strategy that would create mutually beneficial partnerships between the farmers and the merchants. Even if little is accomplished at this early stage (as production increases will take a number of years), the initial effort may be the catalyst for long-term development. Consideration should be given to making use of some poorly constructed bench terraces in poor soil areas for tree crops, instead of upland rice or other annual crops, because of weed problems and low crop yield. The tree crops with deeper root systems could use up much more nutrients and moisture under ground. Thus, in the long run, villagers will benefit and continue to make use of the bench terraces, ,.aintaining them as necessary. 49 ~ ULnw i nu3~(~tiE~ 10LNi J) n fliVo13LmWU (11)p 1. M'4 wr15,60 n ~~L~ii yrl1J i9U4,ituIJ3 qt It bm la -)urC3!i~FlVyru L)Arf'i~ V 1.0U flMA I4 I -. I 50 12. Has Land Terracing Met Objectives of Improved Soil Conservation and Improved Crop Yields? Conclusions The evaluation team found that the target of land terracing was met (15,600 rai), but the quality of work was not up to standard. Although the terraces could become economically beneficial to the farmers and to the watershed environment, if they are not repaired soon they will not survive for long. The environmental analysis in the project paper assumed that DLD and RFD would ensure the proper construction and maintenance of land terraces. This has not happened. Soil improvement practices on the new terraces (including agronomic measures) have not been extensively used, and thus may greatly affect the terraces' productivity. The project failed to provide training for farmers in how to best utilize the terraces and how to maintain them. The demonstration terraces at tambon centers have not properly exposed to adequate numbers of farmers. A benefit-cost ratio over 1.0 (when calculated over 20 years) is attainable for the project's investment in bench terraces provided that agricultural extension helps farmers to increase upland rice yields, soil fertility, and rate of utilizaticn of these terraces. One example of the value of the terraces is if farmers were to start constructing them with their own resources. The team heard of farmers doing this but, upon investigation, found that they were constructing either irrigated terraces or, as part of the CARE project, contour ditches. The MCWDP paid farmers the full cost of their labor for the construction work. Had the project paid less, it could have obtained signs of farmers' interest in the terrace, not just in the daily wage. Some other upland and highland development projects have found contour grass strips to be most cost-effective. The farmers will construct these strips despite receiving incentives that cover only a part of their labor. 51 ~~J~n~~1 i~1J f '~I~ L ILLIAiJ 31J ID L 1hn -ILL1 -- C Iz--: 11IU*A~fl'fl1l;F~t; tamCjl) L'h al tl 'tl';7U4~Jl( 6 ,0 J-A tuiii n 'ilo m ifi ,16Wui r t iLtN~i i ~i ,~Wi ll4 Lk'~i14~ UflJ UataIYM'~l '4 im iS St(n l tl (ilt)4 LIW-if f it iud(99) MUU t't ( 1) ttnPIUJ~I-1'11 fl11~~EJL1JL~k~I~h1 i;~~ 3 ~tV~ u2 4~ ~~Z~i 6,0 m 52 Recommendations For the terraces already constructed, the most important work for the next two years is repair and maintenance. It is recommended that the DLD, IF teams, MOAC, and the project's range specialist jointly organize an extensive campaign to train farmers to: e Discontinue cultivation on terrace risers (banks); * Upgrade or repair terraces and risers; and * Plant perennial grasses, legumes, or other type of vegetative cover that has economic value on the risers for protection. It is also reconimendeJ that the project set aside at least 3 percent of the construction costs for this repair and maintenance work in the next three years. This proposed 960,000 baht, averaging 61 baht per rai, should be used to cover costs other than labor. For future sustainability, DLD, DOAE, and the project should establish one principal demonstration plot of 3 rai each and three to five on-farm demonstration plots of I rai each in the thrce tambons of Phase II to demonstrate: * Simple terraces with appropriate crops including a) contour burds, b) contour grass barriers, c) hillside dii..n.3, d) intermititnt and convertible terraces, and e) orchard !erraces (these are listed in order of steepness of land on which they should be used); and * Soil improvement and agronomic measures. In addition to demonstrations, a small budget fund should also be provided for those villagers who want to build their own simple terraces. This should be provided on a cost-sharing basis. It is estimated the soil conservation fund needed per rai is 255 baht (17 person-days at 15 baht a person-day). 53 vwuymiiL4u1rnl l'L ) LinW o fqu-'lU '1Ubm1'l 15 Urn4mfl) UIIM 13 rg4111,1tFjUiu gll1~i~liji~f ~,~fu ~iJi& I'uiitln mI ~ Iin t,) Liu AD 6i4&n'vwi7attitimlsAi 54 The DLD staff in the Mae Chaem Watershed should get proper in-service training in simple conservation measures together with land use planning, land capability classification, soil management and agronomic conservation measures, and maintenance to up-grade their technical capabilities. Some specialists from the former Mae Sa project a,J RFD should work with DLD headquarters to conduct such training. The project training advisor should plan the training and include socio cultural training in the prograrn. 13. Have Water Control Structures Increased Land under Irrigation to Meet Project Targets? Conclusions The number of waterworks completed is much lower than targeted. Most of the constructed waterworks were in Chang Khoeng, the area of lowest priority in tile project plan. A number of waterworks not in the project plan -- village potable water systems and reservoirs -- were constructed. Tile quality of the weirs constructed during the early stages of the project suffered as a result of inadequate engineering practices. Tile quality has improved to a satisfactory level as the DLID engineers became more experienced. Scouring sluices of most weirs have not been properly utilized. This results in an accumulation of sediment in the reservoir upstream of the weir, reducing the storage capacity of the weirs. The project plan was to construct new weirs for creating additional flood irrigated land. The target wtm 8,000 iai. Instead, the POU focused on rehabilitation of existing weirs. This increasea tile availability of watcr for dry season farming on existing flood-irrigated land. One reason for this change in emphasis was that the land identified in the project plan as available for conversion to flood-irrigated land was mainly in tambon Ian Chan, which was removed from the project before work there had begun. 55 nuu unnIn a 'tim i~~~~~w liT41lu41E Fi llilUZlf- flh PUalhifln luU L aUuu Li~1LfJUU U 4 56 Construction of earth embankments for reservoirs has not been satisfactory because of inadequate design and construction supervision. As a result, some reservoirs have not been able to retain water. Village potable water systems have proven to be beneficial to the population. However, certain improvements in the design are needed to solve problems caused by high sediment content in the water. Sustainability of the waterwork structures will not be a problem. Villagers are capable of and prepared to maintain the systems. Recommendations A reservoir project requiring high earth embankments should not be attempted again in this project. An earth embankment higher than 4-5 meters used for water impoundment, if properly designed and constructed, will be too costly for small-scale waterworks. The useful life of the reservoir will be relatively short because of the high rate of sedimentation. The project should attempt to construct more village potable water systems, especially in the upland villages. The problem of high sediment content causing frequent clogging of the filter can be partly solved by changing the design of sLorage tanks so that part of it can also act as a sedimentation tank. In villages with low-yield water sources and where construction of weirs for large-scale farming is not feasible, waterworks of smaller scale should be attempted. A small check dam could be built near a water source to raise the water level. The water will be transported by gravity through a piping system to be used on small farms and for plants that do not require much water, such as vegetable and tree crops. Rough calculations have shown that the investment cost of and a small agricultural water delivery system would be paid back within five years for a 30-rai farm planted with vegetables and tree crops, assuming that the water source is within 500 meters from the farm. 57 5,3 Js ~~jaa i rtihti Lukwlu2u/3 itY~IaP1fUJ1J1UU JliI Il kii (5 l-nm fl ii 1 ,-,1 L fijI ri i 1T~1II JL~l iLf viioi~i Fj,,a t I Z!lli)~ FLj 111 lrujvi.wu UanUirww iiiEUIUCIA o j I I I i12I ll~ I 1fi~ Ft i imomj o iv-ii 1141 529/30 imJfI'f~ICftlt: o'I#lVtJ J J ntJ23 il 30 VI 58 Villagers should be trained to operate and maintain the waterworks properly. The DLD should originally train the IF teams who will later train villagers. After training, there should be follow-up by DLD to ensure that the waterworks are properly maintained. 14. has There Been a Decrease In Opium-Producing Areas and Production? Conclusions There is no evidence to show that opium production has declined in the project area. The project paper noted that very few villages in ,Iae Chaem District produce opium and that the total was not enough to make opium replacement a major part of the project. lan Pui, the laige!t opium-producing village in Mae Chaem, was a key village of the U.N. Crop Replacement Program for 12 ye.,rs, and still receives assistance from th, Public Welfare Department (and thus is not a project village). The village is no,. the second largest producer of opiuri in Chiang Mai Province. In 1986/87, this village and two others in the watershed had 2,268 rai under opium production. The estimated yield was 2,835 kg, equal to 16 percent of the total production of Chiang Mai. About 60 percent of it was eradicated by the Border Patrol Police and local police just prior to harvest. The eradication program will help the crop replacement program as farmers have been unwilling to give up opium production and have used replacement crops as a supplement to opium. A nwb;,ib, of replacement crops are available. Sone of these provide only a small return ."ichas kidney beans), whereas perennial crops such as coffee and peaches can do better. All replacement crops have technical, logistical, and socio-cultural constraints. Some require sophisticated agricultural techniques that will be difficult for hill-tribe farmers to learn. S)nie require a high investment in inputs that few farmers can afford. Still others require considerable marketing assistance. If the eradication program is stepped up, the farmers will be impoverished before they can make the transition to other crops, and will have fewer resources to invest in these crops. 59 1,000 gu 6ul 89 bnlij) Aami UIAM 12.5 oil'a ullflYunli i oirrdijjinldU higumur . 5o luluMmimi n-.ulutnaaiAiA?'1v'i 44ivinmiu qt ? tvimillaimiRun'luatailm' fMIJItLZuuatj-;t:iivl'iluni74niiii-Anlm"yjw'frdn-MA4 IM iluilnlfminii uatmuAcmiuavnim' AlljAiu 4i ili'inllilL U4lUiDlUlUltUtUlI HatA"lulil -4t'y4llfl'luultlutu'qinamnim"I 3iinniitmmin-silit-B-11LAtIrnmlnl,-n ll iI u-iii "Uymwllfmlfaotmln invoiniAlunininiii4imn-im' uiluwaAj-)Nuu maim 60 The 1986-1987 opium crop in northern Thailand amounted to only about 23-30 tons. This amount is miniscule compared with the 1,000-ton crop estimated across the border in Burma. Despite this large supply, much of which passes through Thailand, the price in Chiang Mai has reiiainid high. The new opium detoxification prograin supported by the project is estimated to ha',e decreased local demand for opium b' about 12.5 percent (89 kg), and will decreae it further as more addicts are tre:,ted. Recommendationi Although some eradication of opium poppies is necessary to promote crop replacement, it should be no more Ohan 50 percent in project areas for the next few sea rs. More than this amount may impoverish the farmers to tie extent that they will not have the resources to invest in replacement crops 15. fias the Mae Chaem Cooperatie Met Farmers' Marketing Needs? Conclusions The project has provided consid"rahle financial assistance to the Mae Chaiemn Cooperative for storage facilities and equipment The esaluation team %.as impre ed by the high quality of the coperati' e, minageiert and h, its iiprv ed perfornian,:r Y'mt , hen t1 e entrit of ,tHiIdIlation t, %( "%4I)I and the l)s-partrnent ,perati', of (C v, r,Illotlf H . I, cat.n i'n.t, acco: u nt, long-term ,iahlulit.,o f ih.v co,J)erati, i (; i'iItii-all ni s r , c ITie nulter of . %.,. fli tnr:mi s svl k.v ,r t g, hut l,'a,tmnd p:idds rice farim-ers enJoy the heit its , the .lerm,,ip x eire than hill-trite and i- ld, farmers. the c(iperatu e's crht pli', I1ion and tin, Vratns tiiarmiI r the In rite easily accessed reas x here mel:tne, imt ulu tituie', c:ii t v Iouh I he mu1rv difficult t) reach upland areas, and sillage- that hae oml; )mall quantities to sell. are serviced by area merchants I he su sid irs of tie' co rperat ise allow it to 61 L i'3mTh inti IlUtiPl'L Ul7~IWIDu'flut W1fl IwIiiJ 'nqahloiniiAMUi ~ nuihhf IE,~1~)innla amlu iij U WU~lUI Ehinr~L fl~ iuiiiu~- i~v rU~1 rii~i i~fl~iw 62 purchase produce at higher prices than the merchants can afford. This may benefit the farmers who are served by the cooperative, but it raises the overall marketing costs of merchants who are left with the more difficult purchases. The project has not taken any initiatives to improve the marketing environr..ent for merchants as its focus has been the cooperative. If the cooperative succeeds, it will be one of the few in Thailand to do so. Despite its good performance to date, it is still not viable and the odds are against it succeeding in the long run. Recommendations The cooperative should make provision for depr,,:iating USAID-funded assets and use such provision for further reinvestment. Given previous subsidies by various agencies including the MCWDP, tile cooperative should operate with its own funds without further subsidy or heavy borrowing from the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) or DXOCP. Any potential plan of the project to subsidize the cooperative should not be made unless the facilities also serve the private sector, be it merchants or individual farmers, so that market competitiveness and the involvement of the private sector are maximized. To promote more competition in the marketplace, the cooperative should not compete with merchants by offering subsidized higher prices for produce than the merchants can rcasnnahlv offer. There should be a marketing adviser provided by the project to develo, market communications and to promote the marketing of existing and new cash crops with a view for long-term sustainability of private sector marketing services fhr the upland and highland project areas. 63 J thriflutnuinuaw 16. 4-iu a,4nuLat:,i-iuijan ilt'iiiiiiulij -metM'qAanIiirrdii3j%,I 0 1 an 11'Riun ii flit a ind ill'i v lilt I I'MAIIIJIquirrolollZ ;AqqvumIuIm&l@Iuflam 620 iiu*yiloit-;'3jl" te4ni)jOill'jtr, A-mul f9a i&Au ivvill'i i micnptnou4-mi=inIugimiu latituaUut: ;IoIqqtmonnAflai luou-lfm 64 WATERSHED ISSUES 16. Have Forest Protection and Reforestation Activities Been Adequate to Preserve the Watershed Now and Into the Future? Conclusions The watershed, in general, seems reasonably well protected, and the project has the technological capability to carry on the work. However, the fire control crews will be fewer due to budget cutbacks. The fires generally do not destroy tree crowns but remove the ground cover, thus facilitating soil erosion. RFD has tried to prevent fires through education and public-awareness campaigns. There is no evidence to show how effective these have been, but the evaluation team does not believe they have been effective. Unauthorized logging has exacerbated the deforestation problem, but no project activity monitors this activity and searches for sulutions. There is no evidence that swidoen agriculture is decreasing, but without basic data, the effects of the project on the watershed cannot be easily assessed. RFD has initiated an agroforestry program tha: has so far covered 620 rai. Another new initiative of RFD is a :ange/pasture development program that, while just starting, shows potential for protcctlng the fores;t from grazing animals. The watershed roads (including logging roads) contribute considerable sediment to the stream svstem. Currently, the project puts little effort on their erosion control. Recommendations For fire control, the project should heavily emphasize villager education and fire prevention to compensate for possible personnel cuts in the near future. Although changing peoples' behavior and attitudes toward forest protection and forest 65 4 ji numW~ut afl.h2irult 24 Wvjlu- ll0$ll"U in6FIUE')FJ 480 'ti (OJrli-Mnrn1luat 20 Ulu (1rtjull l00 l7) P.I i tIimiOs mil fllibim l) 22nu - -v -u Z @ 46 1 ~ t u i~ vt j i fl i i i t n i i i o v i u' i iJ in~~j~,nu~~fiq~i~~,tI~fillUlu1Jf1fh Dra IR~11~kL~Unml 66 authorities will take considerable time, the project, in the next three years, should use available resources to greatly strengthen publicity campaigns, village visits, school education, competitions, and voluntary patrolling. A practical program should be devised according to local needs, and a realistic target for fire reduction should be established. The Erosion Control Section should be more active in protecting roads, new and old. (See Issue 17 on roads.) Community forests (agroforestry) should be expanded to two dozen more villages in the next two years. Depending on the availability of fund-, at least another 480 rai (an average of 20 rai per village) should be established. Seedlings provided should be healthy and farmers trained in how to maintain them after planting. Once the village rangc/pasture L established in Mae Tan, the project should proceed to one or two hill-tribe villages to establish similar plots (about 100 rai) to test the villagers' reaction. The Fire Protcction and Erosion Control sections should be merged as one Forest Protection Section, and be given responsibility for other forest protection tasks such as overseeing logging and mining damage (if any) in the watershed and devising plans for rehabilitation. 17. Are Road Objectives Being Met in Terms of Quality, Quantity, and Location? Conclusions A total of 122 km of roads have been rehabilitated by contractors, 22 km more than targeted. llowe,,er, the locations for rehabilitation differed from the project plan. More kilometers were rehabilitate(] in tie lowland area than planned. The already rehabilitaf,'d roads c:,ltitute only a portion of tie roads serving hill-tribe villapes. Mcre than 100 hill-tribe villages still have no direct access to adeouate rnati, nn,i th..- r - . - 1 :..I -t :_ .., _ • .. .. 67 *~l4~1~Jq 10Ailugi i1n4ui tut i if'hi ivr, Ii aMuui Iisii ,qlnuu U-7i r ii n sOOamlji is q 0 A~llutDr4uu iuyWli 1 0"'Al~lh~r 12% l~flmiiilui~un-mLu 12% iiu AVU14MIBU3AMM4I-At AFA o f% - 12% Aivtfnii ivii fi A~~l4u1i ~nu)fi~tiiu'ii 6Y U4n~1AA&Zmiltoqlil4 68 Rehabili ition efforts so far have not fulfilled the project objective of increasing rcal in,,,.e, at least not significantly. Roads are still prone to damage due to water erosion and are not adequately maintained by a combination of hand and machine effort. However, the work to date provides a base for, and can lead to, longer term fulfifllrent of the project objective-,. Roads rehabilitated by RFD, even though still n-t satisfying the project objective, used little money. With certain improvements, it may be possible to meet the intended standard of the project plan, and remain within the uligin ly estimated 300.000 baht per km I ne road maintenance and erosion control program has not been -ffectiv, Most w rk is corrective rather than presentive. There also seems to be la'l. of undcerstanding of the principle of road maintenance using hand labor. Villagers have occ-.iJo:lly contrilhutj to thOwnitenarce "r.I. Villag-,ir ht.e little tef:it from ioads as users because roads are still in poor conJ ilior. and th, econornic .roAt i of the villages is still small. lnd;cation of indirect henwflitit'. liu, tve, ;uhttatial. Nlainteulalice c t'vs alle hi,',. It is urikely the RTG will he able to allocate suffi:ient furo- for this purp,,e. lhe only viable means to maintain these roads will he to acquireiinput, ftroi ,illagers w%'o are supposed to be the princip.1I road users. te co lr1:1 end at iioii I ads 2lread y rehabilitated oced i'urther improvement to put them in a condition that can he (-:',i,'l maintained by a combination of hand and machine effort. The follwir, irnploem.nr,? sAluld Ie attempted: K| ULt' Ie r fit ','t01 lctints to lell. thtan 12 percent by realignnent where,"er pt,, l. Ii," ',uJrl:iV Oit ',ectitns th1:1ttave tt he steeper th:in 12 percent lhoul,l I' rtotf -trd with tie kind of jerm:iineit coer such as asphalt sulaci~ig, AVIerated R ural I)eeltpment block rtaving, ~etc; 69 iallrulull t'14nuu luiiif; muaifl u (ifiunii 5%) mi-qt inilvo fi-xnaunim1flumue 4iuia4itu-itjuiyitjf)iiiinivi ugiunaii (irmii3 6 8%) o iamuluuitllnuu 1ui1q*43,j1Luvn14v11uin q '4 ui ilviiiinwinwA'utllu3jltlur4*IDUU 4iuiu luniialiouuOuni4 i1m4 03'UirAi1ma6iuvinuwAi min ail; tuon n miOlo'Wii 3jiual fliiunl)i4tel lqllqlnllqtl&Uir.:j-a 3 tupi uarrn q wirriiiJu3jim 2100 :uoi S Aivputa4 Vitt iniluy'li)4f4i-itlf*qlvijitlut qinnlil; tAtmi 4 41ulunil6DA14 1AVIAW11414 niumairrvisr 114nutt #i-)Ioiit uniilmult'iii4muttumXn tiat;1f'1amqvni& I#itjnlito ittut i,4inm iu4iuOl4 n fOUltaunli&luniinii4rmlmvliui44iunu tiu nulool A16 niWil'i nil %t"oIli lukulAul lm1unIiAl 4iuj itAtm IItlujur'oAM tgo q luni0ftlitiu tint i kimWic4nisjOilh A-i 70 o Surface of sections with a grade between 6 and 12 percent should be surfaced with laterite unless the i-3itPu soil is already a granular material. Sections with a grade of less than 6 percent need not be surfaced; * Side ditches of steep gradient sections (more than 8 percent) should be lined with concrete. Scar checks -- a stnall check dam in the side ditch -- should be provided for erosion control of side ditches at sections of medium gradient (6-8 percent). " Side ditches or long continuous sections should be provided with structures such as raitre drains or cros drains to remove water from the ditch, thus preventing overflowing; and " Adequacy of cult erto, at various .5ctions should be ensured. Drift structures -- a type of stream cro',J;ing ,,truc ture that allows overflowing of water - should be cin~id el in place (,fculverts where the anticipated flow is too large for econornicall, dt',ir:E(d culverts. More rehabilitarin i ill t iwedtel in areas that hae been neglected. Only roads of minimnum 1trd.,ut meeting the ab,,e requirmenent and built by RI), should be attempte IlPw 1 .J th s,h ull generally ei kept to about 3 meters with patsing ba, 5 net , I ev,,er) 2(.0Jmeter. At critic:l tion; (fir example, ;harp al lait'tm), ril i,'l T lull t.' M(AcrA:i!.d t) 5 i tvtr. R ID 'ho-ul le tAIIt Qml1m11 MI l'l~ 't I ; oit - 3 l 't l, , pIr ltl : tir'Il IIJ11,, - - (, 111,11 irill(to,, ( w 1, il~l , 1 'rq'llr ) - ,fit ,¢, "l,l , mMl, I vi(e1,,ife l et -)rl~t1 t i i, I (ii' Iff 11 11,n u l It, ' ut,lmlI I'' 1 t1 1 l (ihi t 'aAotrk i ,derd :ccriadjlri , mit I 1L,.ln,t 0i ) a ;r-kin1 11 c, t ''Ilg:er, s Alto will lrierli t I/tri rid, a '.h,21,}, r';l'n,t l ti [i,,,~litiI l,: ,? airitemhany vm h,'lul, t" i.0 r-ii r eivis and u-e only locally available ri~uilimielt lRII) should de'-elht a Lapabilily in this area by seeking advice from an ii", ifuch as the International labour Organization that have experience on Li, -baed road construction techniqzues. 71 IN Im"ifm4fl sit) o i-mrtjrniiiZu4iubJutIU o INBIOUBUut q 01 AfIllwim;nanit mtuh miNvamOlm'um -Aselm; lt h i#de 4imIvapiu'cmn!m-& mu igoniigrrdiNAnltyiale4niiiU'A'UUIIja4finiAniil;f*u o niihmi3juatimion imaaoiilmaul liuul 4UU44 40m it Altuatl vi 4lutia o ultulauntilmlItAmb uAtilullsoluiI4 q OWIlwAl 144ulltj AniuliW "Junilmll4goij 11jillu 2,000 IsIlligamls fill ittamiuJiv Ima'a linIni4nileulrrdALuinrmiflaitfuute4utom luaiu 72 RFD should develop a capacity, using help from 11 team nembers, to work %%ith the villagers to maintain the roads. In a situation in which villagers could percei've the roads to be their own, a certain le vel of free labor should be used for maintenance ta4s. Training should te provided to IF team mienibers and RII) staff in methods of working , ith villagers to maximize their self-help role in road maintenance. 18. At. the Current ll)drology Research and Monitoring Actliities Sound? Conclusions The current hydrology/watershed research and monitoring activities are generally sound. lloe~er: # The time is short for obtaining meaningful results; * The work is too heav.y for the current staff and sustainability will become a problem in the fuiur,; anti * Important monitoring activity of land-use changes is lacking. Recorn mendatlons In the next two years, efforts should be concentrated on the following work: * Scaling down the current hdro-meteorological net vork to a minirum h.level. I-or example, it tto neiu,hhoring rainfall %fattmr ,show sIMilIr results, one should be di.,tm tnue,, Any unreliMahle stititt., .htuld I,,, ellim nated [or gauging statimtow, tril the t:ijor ones anti th",e ih ftvrtel)]e land use changes should be pre'+er'el fur comparing helort ain alter eflect , 73 (i~U U 2527 -332) ~f~~~O ni~umutAWf n ul-qA1tj~-A j inou1 Wmipiii4onijais ni~uu ic~nbv1.n &vW1tutiflh1i#L~ mS1 1~UTJ~24~~rEV f 74 * Moniting of some run-off plots after this or the next rainy season. I hese should be concluded and final reports issued; and e Compiling and anlyzing data, and consolidation of past activities rather than starting any ne. kaork The project should purchase a personal computer and chart reader for data monitoring, compilatimn, and anal% is .,ork. :he coat is estimated at $2.500. Technical assit:rance should be sought from the All) regional ASEAN Watershed Project in personnel training, net ,ork rewe ng,, and data anal siN rhe project should eel, financial and teahn cal a%istamce to carr, out on land use bench mark surs.e u,,ing I.ANI)SA I data to detect change, bet Aeen a period o fin'.e years (for exanple, I Io.1 - I ) , I fie reults should again be used for fuluie monitoring. J he cot IS rtiughl> witmnated at $ 100,000, 1n,cludlng equipment, 1.ANI)SAT rapes, training, f-teld chec, iny, and inmaippig The new All) Natural Resurces Project should be examined as a possible source of financial assistance to allow monitoring actiities to continue be),ond MCW'P's project assistance completion date (PACD) mloljllfVluifjpAiilm4nii Riu ow IuUmAL nanaOonii i;ipiit4ueAO.A 4 iiErin; "Fjin iuin ... 140ow,3 iiA 'IunAmq tiuf inl=04pluijitiror X-ltu vinqu #in6liii t4ap iu 'miluriwir;4putom lutululAmmill! Falk O Ivui I -at IPAUUl UiD614thlo 44tu 14 lummAiD XstOuif44 ump4ilAiX4rmittmnmijivX-)M u Viumh*Au n-Uvrvjii niiAmAulqluirAm'a3N tipt uhAoOwn 76 FINDINGS BY ISSUE QUALITY OF LIFE: AND I)'LVI.OPMINT ISSUES 1. late )ualit) of Life Standards of tile Various Groups Living in the Watershed Improved? Project Objectibes The goal of MCWI)P, as stated in the project paper, is: To raise the quality of life of the occupants of watersheds in North Thailand in vav. which suppo.t increasing environmental stability and %hich are self-sustaining. The social soundness analksis in the project paper classified the inhabitants of Mae Chaem as "C!.y1i-.or ... Nearly half the .. villages have beer' rated by survey rCtim:ters among the ,ery poorest in I hailani" theIc roject plan Nas to focus att'ntio'l on the j)')) h'to,-ectrrvetthwl,.,, erpiliti,, equjt, throth+uJt, in. order ti ni.nilimize ,ocioecononii,: tratif iatj,on and naxiii it - .ha e% tlot continued oppoi tunlity to thte poor ... the poor r the [e'olc the mit'le lth,,A llLen l:tit." I Ihe most importatt rn . Ii % ftir eIj italhe !ijtrfliit, i I t riefts Ais to be through' in.easng,11 HO rr!-'tyMd Iland ,\ccrdrt [if' the pro)Ject pipe r, 'self suffici ml~JimuumSA-iizmut 2Ij~i)~u qu AimIimviiin ulh oeu 9,iWuiuunlh 14,000 'li MiIIlAfl it i o ni, uni,,iia o itn to)hw 78 The project paper mentioncd several measures of goal achievement: Incremental increases in area and productivity of land being cultivated in the northern watersheds would indicate tht the growth process was underway. Similarly, increasing incomes froia cash crops, local level decision making, and general levels of functional literacy/health sensitivity and knowledge would indicate a major improvement in the quality of life and living standards in the watersheds. Evaluating Change Evaluating change by land use can provide a good indication of benefit and equity distribution. Issue 13 on water control structures and Issue 12 on terracing provide details on land use changes. Generally, flood-irrigated land was not significantly increa,,d as the emphasis was ,a rehabilitating existing weirs and not on building new ones. The benefits of thi rehabilitation were mainly for dry season ayriculture and the berneficiaries were thse who already had flood-irrigated land, not the po)r. [or the moe than 1.1,000 rai of bench terraces constructed in the 'nlands, ,here was more opportunity for the poor to benefit, but data on benefit incidence were riot asailablc. The two socioeconomic surveys that have been conducted in the watershed were of little benefit to tthe evaluation team. lhe surveys were done by different ofganizatiOiis uing their own methodologies. I he resulting data were not comptarable, and th. evaluation team did not ,now which vas more correct. Some cornparaiie figures (1 tarbon income levels were available, and are presented in Table I (page 45). As a rvsult ojf the limited time aailible to the team for field invet,gation and a lack of reliable prior sursey da ita, thi; quality of life analysis is largely qualitative. A'though there is difficulty in au,ssing the contributions of the poje~t to the quality of life of' the population, the evaluation team hi s attempted to ascertain change in some quality of life indicators. lhi ases sment is basel o interviews with a number of villages and the review of availablc secondary information. s F. 4' 79 Uumu maimialuUtUuN (Amlii4 i) am"tiutlouh6oih Moilixim4ldiumn 10 qumalqqt lniiN1vvAjv o6i4linAmim 'iut1audIu1i44 lAu kulopm4molli tiu 1h UAVU4 u4mxv)lAivR4nt9v1onir&1uo1 AfAu 4ion0iiIii qinijiu i !out m iiu'iUYj1 vAu o6milm" But fivlu 1-UP011,3 a6luNilulutm mlaktilltrviluhlbiu 04 mkama iq inu%IBeni ffAj % * & t mlai)614UM af, ulvmiun i-wit-Ah Wligrrdl uavi-)&D NNt-r)tiu b4ZnljfA1l3hAnu'l AN43,jul at alip 1041ilui I rmmlugnktAj vullu 3 fz4iltUfm al&UMA1U'-1mh1"i1-u v-1 Ij-'UhikN'lumuuI lum 111FA but1104,3j iiimniiuitoi"vvbtjl4iiint^.itiutwiui^i, InUl Nniiihiu'lu vianuat&lpi (iiu v3j i vmv) 3rToVm 014 #1B uominuMwOuil NiminkniviumA uptinviuntulponomutu butcal 80 The quality of life standards of the Mae Chaem watershed population were determincd by: * The value of housing and household assets, including sanitary facilities; * Nutrition; # Health; * Educational level; and e On- and off-farm employment opportunities. housing Value, Asctei, anti Sanitary "acilities People who li~. in the Nite (Mhaemuvattstfied are culturally mixed (see Table 1), and their housing coinlitiut', CA[Inni, 1e similarly appraised. However, most houses, particularly in lit l- land, Ahre there is a high concentration of' natise Ihais, are built with dt ale ri.ttvtiii, -- A00d, corer[te, at g a flni,edl or tilte 1iting. Ihis situation ih in coltrat Nith tilantd ai i hitl;ta'd ll:it.i v.,tr thitch tt ts and bamr io ,aiik anid ft],',miee mter,illyI-otin , e,,teciA vlyiIlI , [t ll~ rit 1sitl.1t"t 1 AImi',t all ilIagi'" i% iIt1 .:1tIt i,d hIt, I iHilpilh,l ah Itntl! or into their hou,;c s eitttr t In itlit-ltr tip I it-oT tI r or 1)tInwtInt itini a nea rb)y A ell, or itI lea It Ias C ,, ti 3a i'1)y 'A,,. l Ii, project hi, .intri uhi,d to the villat vater lyset inS with ittitirtial 'Uj,)tt ,tI ,n '+It iolhl, l IIIrt Al t 1',.,i't:Ink , aindo orglaniiztio al he Itlt the 11tlllI ntl,. r, I intmcitu li s pt hli , ;tito ciome Itt other organi/atlot ;. A git'te ttnuinher (d Owlii ,ln',tint hiIla c Ictic kank , Utrt clean 'Alt, I durigt ht rairyrtIx,'n. II a few %iuage;, ut;tlIy %ery ;mnll villaIage atilltes, pIttatle %ttr lae, to be carried frot a distance and wahiig done in nearby 5!leure. Ite hmosingn comnpounds in most villages are neatly kept. lhe upland and highland villages have recently adopted the practice f rom. the lowland people of , fencing their house and sheltering their animnalh (pigs, buffalo, aid cows). 81 milmini-i witutlq3j aui4 n Vainiiijiulufl J b MUIPOPA4 unnmutdo4l4invit tit imijivult'niiialUgel vn4ml -I uatkoo#4Uanluumilit rit tit 01A tm6i" 0-lufiona0ari-ii 110 1i8i I I&;t0;wzn-) ilia nL in IhlAr4 uonRinu minniiMi ot ittmituilmA-tu vitt.ni 7uullt'irmiiUan&naiumi-) lubuOwl"R Icnionii3'J'U'i4imivoiidiitii4niurmin'tu r.iutuo4uiqinniiA3jitutmlm:jui'lt, IU'AU'V'IUF; Vji4lif'Miu ti'lln-mindium1m4wilain Pho6i4ttlu ttiih imliMut"oln-dilim h6piainiilu A "uviumifAtnii oqilj umimlnu AtU iwumd4 Opium has reportedly ben a traditional and sizable source of income for some upland and mnany highland villages, and, thus, assets are more visible. Motorcycles and pick-up trucks are increasingly found in highland villages, with access to roads. Nutrition It is apparent that rice is becoming more available to zatisfy primary food needs for people in the Mae Chaem watershed. The lowland inhabitants apparently have a higher ratio of rice sufficiency per hoisehold than those of the upland and highland areas. Substitution of other grains in place of rice for animal feed has consequently increased the amount of rice consumed by tribal people. Dry seasoi. crops that have been increasingly promoted in the area, especially soybeans in general and kidney beans particularly for the Ihniong, contribute to better nutrition, although the amount of the crop consumed is small compared with the amount sold. Although wheat is not a new crop to the hill-tribes, the project has been promoting it and, while production levels are still low, the potential for increase is there. Wheat offers another source of nutrition for upland villages. Fen-ing and piped water have enabled villagers to raise backyard gardens, providing vegetables for family consumption. Health The tribal population, traditionally believed to have poor hygiene, now has greater access to water for regular bathing using the potable water systems. However, bathing habits have not been examined. For health care, there is a trend toward greater reliance on modern medicine. For example, opium, once used to cure stomach sick-ness, is now believed inferior to modern medical treatment. However, when treatment at a hospital proves unsuccessful, villagers return to their traditional animist rituals. I I fIloili14L1 looi I if]I III i I o* I 1-Ido n 1IUJ Lrl 13 'IIltI1wlal 14lll id hi]IIm"ll~ 'i lifl 1 11~i1 ) 42111111 mimii1jil114Jbtmju I11~. 1 141411U I1h-m 111111,rflliI I Im iLJill Ii ni-16141 vIt.ill' 11 i0IIllnl ~1 l -41114II i iqfl Ii1 111 i('la q'1 Tv IVL1 1~ i1 II1l Julal1U t-I 111md I 11 l'ii~I IIJ JU.itIU~.k I 'al1~ilLj1l11II'T Iti -hJ11~~1LI i, [III i u I I 11ci4 114J1 fl~i I n a fp armi'Ii I triavo 114lt111 1i ') i I I 11f I11 Ii1UUiULUIi I IitAl1 i Mlld4l 'd@13 1 1114(ihJ~lJ414al11 VI1 1J114 IlI I 4I'Iui14 11141~~~~~~ 11i4If~i4 fifliu1)flliomb1ihnh'I~ I I fw; IO4 a~iu 11i1 IuI-uj@:'i~nT7n-l,1,IiI fi It -i Ii 1,15 It'. 1114f1~:i41~4i41 20 l1f11fTmlir~1lu~'1n~fnp IM IhI I14II ii u1 iwa fl qoomif11 M1f1t1dl1o IIUIi"iO1f1t)41i4Jf~ 1t4 Primary health clinics, operated by mobile teams of the Public Welfare Department, Ministry of Interior, satisfy immediate health care needs for some hill tribe villages. Many community health worker stations operated by the Ministry of Public "calth have greatly improved access to health services. The project has provided haeilth kits ror villages that have helped improve villager attitudes toward modern medical treatment. With fcw resource available, the IF teams were able to provide villagers with family planning information. Sterilization is increasing in popularity as a means of coatraception. Opium addiction is decreasing, especially among the hill-tribe groups, as attitudes toward opium, especially among the younger generation and addicts' family members, have become more negative. The presence of the 'F teams, and a scarcity of supply, have contributed to the changing attitude. The project, since 1985, has be:ome directly involved by setting up a detoxification center. A large number of a,idicts can now be treated. Educatio .al Level Formal schocling for the upland and the highland people is less available than for those in Z.- lowlands. However, children of ethnic groups in remote communities now have better access to formal educition. Schools have been increasingly allocated for these villages. Non-formal literacy training is one activity of the IF teams, especially in tribal villages. At present, it is always possible to find someone in a village who can read or write Thai. For the remaining years of the prolect, non-formal education will be an important project component. Twenty IF team memb'ers will be devoting their time to this. In addition, the project has requested 20 non-formal education teaci,rs from the Ministry of Education. On- and Off-farm Employment Opportunities The implementation of the project's road, weir, and terrace construction, ;eforestation, and fire prevention activities has been a major source of non-farm employment for villagers during the project life. This project banefit represents a ' III~I h1 101 1 IV[a lilt~Md iff~ii~1 4ma.Iii flII i 1iiJIINI IWii 111L jI'llUtv (,011 1. IOfljI 1 l I I iumt nutl oUlln mmilhI Qni-i zr tvn ~ I iiiUifl1n- LIfimmlc 1-i l on~Iiu1 il~1;,4 vll IN 0Vti~lCI.Mal tiUl 1.11.1 1I1.1 a1fluflfl 171J llfl 11, nattIUII)j tl li I atiaiJ -bfllIN lJ~u 161"6~111 h . . 2524 LiIJUl 0. 9 N1I1)1,T1h I till)IU .9 uuiih vu 2529 3. 3 28 9 uar-;Iini thrnA 61014 I11;41 ZIJt-YLQI II~v1.04101ilt 81n1Imm Y inni1,uFJr, IA I1 1 U~~I U~~1E~ - 741 ~mJh~u~m~ yiUlltv 2 '!qiIoA iD~tK41 - 67 1iJl fLihlIihlUU 11l0U Y'lail~vitu 1i n'biin-Iliii m rlr~Ei 2 vi ; Ut@Mt' -0 -27 IIS6St4 - 11 ~I~ I1J -,&Iil nI 1U311I I'll1VlLJtY211kfinim-Il a 3miU' a11j qI1E3U'L ltivzy) 1 4AL1D)JAIr 16 -25 itrW 5 - 12 (911,1-101- c:'iuv1 n -iiM-i i-m1Jd@13 I~~~~l1ulJIjnw'iinuIIU~liif ~~'~1i~h~~I1U ~~~ i'~ 116 one-time transfer. However, it has increased purchasing power that a',pears to have resulted in a larger market environment. To the extent that some of the funds wure invested in the area by merchants (for trucks, shops, etc.), and this seems reasonable, this investment could promote further growth. Off-farm employment opportunities other than from public works are rarely available. However, limited jobs such as farm preparation, planting, and harvesting are seasonally available. Livestock (cows, buffalos, and pigs) raising is another source of non-farm income as hill-tribe people earn their living from tending cows and buffalos for others. Labor required fur on-farm work has not significantly increased since new land is not available. The income tax revenue collected by the District Income Iax Office shows an increase from 0.9 million baht in 1981 to 2.9 million baht in 1986. This amount roughly follows the increase in income of the people in the watershed. Furthermore, the data on household income shown in Table I have indicated an increase, by tambon, from 1983 to 19E5, with a range of 3.3 to 28.9 percent. In both the Phase I and Phase II project areas, income from wage employment is still at a significanr level of 41-74 percent of total cash income in 1985. The Phase I area shows a higher percentage in income from wage employment and cash crops. The Phase I village households receive 55-74 percent of their annual income from wage employment, whereas the figures were 41-67 percent in the Phase It villages. From 20 to 27 percent of Phase I households have income from cash crops, whereas in Phase 11 households it is only 4-11 percent. From 16 to 25 percent of Phase II households have income from livestock, whereas the figures are only 5-12 percent in Phase I area. This shows the insignificant level of cash cropping as a means of income in the hill-tribe areas. The project has not yet succeeded in achieving greater equity among the various populations of the watershed. The major beneficiaries have been the lowland Thai farmers who had a higher quality of life standard than the upland people before the project started. 87 "I1I f )i1,l~ut A 0j l l -mqlll1 "11 1Im, w t ,,1 1 41[!14i1tf ~111II 1,4I.t il 0 . ...;1.} 1111tll 111C701 MAO1l S 71~II3L7128qi 113 30 719 (GO 4111-mil') I I Fll 1.758 1,578 f871 912 1.2119 -luluflti 8,424 7.907 5,119 5,910 7,7,23 % m1Urlqil IJ@ ,91.7 66.7 38.2 21.3 4.9 % nl.i1jJ. 8.3 30.6 55.8 58.3 71.6 :1 - 2.7 S.9 10.4 5.8 w: -q - - - 17.8 1l tO01Li 67 46 46 63 6 fU~i 61 9 1 1 - 21 18 10 21 2 1nPntJi 4 36 24 - 3 - 1i 97 35 21 39 11 7fl1tJ JU ) 433 251 40 85 8 l 16 t'h 25 2 7 13 - 1,206 881 495 510 354 212 29 3 22 - n"1EJur~j 239 112 63 121 42 or lJ1 31 23 11 31 4 332 48 47 2 1 mI U'u 391 53 - 3 - "ORIJ 409 54 - - 1 .L . 150 135 21 113 8 ttaL~1a'la, L 2684.7 2190.15 1605.67 1084.98 465.69 -4 1 Oil1A, 2684.7 893.19 492.93 1029.53 652.00 - 1iu'i h9 8663.5 6012.88 4760.50 2761.63 2622.60 -A-.. 2526 16603 8690 6553 7037 3231 -"t.1. 2528 17689 12076 9536 8813 5097 -% lilt1LVLt5Ja1 3.3 19.5 22.8 12.6 28.9 tJl~iq;irt'wi, v.A. 2526 tLatWvIAe. 2528 TABLE 1 SOME SELECTED INDICATORS OF QUAlITY LIFE IN TilE WATERSHED, 1986 ------Chang Tha Pha Mae Na Mae Suk Ban Thap Khoeng Chon ------ No. of villages 28 43 30 39 60 No. of households 1,758 1,578 871 912 1,219 No. u, population 8,424 7,907 5,119 5,910 7,723 % of native Thai 91.7 66.7 38.2 31.3 4.9 % of Karen 8.3 30.6 55.8 58.3 71.6 % of Hmong - 2.7 5.9 10.4 5.8 % of Lawa - - - 17.8 Household assets: 4-wheel tractors - 2 - I - Hand tractors 67 46 46 63 6 Water pumps 61 9 1 1 - Rice mills 21 18 10 21 2 Bicycles 36 24 - 3 - Cars 97 35 21 39 11 Motorcycles 433 251 40 85 8 Generators 25 2 7 13 - Radios 1,206 881 495 510 354 Televisions 212 29 3 22 - Sewing machines 239 112 63 121 42 Kcrosine lanterns 31 23 1! 31 4 Electric irons 332 48 47 2 1 Refrigerators 391 53 - 3 - Fans 409 54 - - I Sprayers 150 135 21 113 8 Expenditure (household average in baht/year) -for housing and household assets 2,684.7 2,190.15 1,605.67 1,084.98 465.69 -clothing 2,684.7 893.19 492.93 1,029.53 652.00 -consumption 8,663.5 6,012.88 4,760.50 2,761.63 2,622.60 Household income -in1983 16,603 8,690 6,553 7,037 3,231 -in1985 17,689 12,076 9,536 8,813 3,097 -% annual average rate of increase 3.3 19.5 22.8 12.6 28.9 ------..------.-.------Complied from The Mae Chaem Watershed Development Project Socioeconomic Data, conducted by the IF teams, 1983 and 1986. fifj mila I' m lHi ivo111 1u~~~ijiiiii~lfrI LIlflJL NIl!)ll 11' mlimJIJUL;m 11I )Jta711- 1 1 1 I hll1W .1k~k -A l vJlI I -IvI11 Isll11 )It 11E Jlt 1 JU1ll. L~1)ii I m1 l 1.5 'diij~i') 'I'.Llllrlljm 11-ll il t'iJfl1o1iI t 1-IIt iliinl , i jmfj 11jul 135 til I lk~ 6.110iIr hU.00o 1J '01I1'l 4 -1iv aniic I In m rnj1iji1 -i lool ALJni1~l1umidi l1111jf111 ~1pj~ t]JmJl 10 L rim3 ii alaI Lh.n1ri 91 ,)jI 4 fu u ii- ajrA dDiI1'.- Pi~l 1I,hlI lJI J11- dI' I go 2. Have the Rice Banks Provided %Viable Means for Improved Nutritional Security in Mae Chaem Villages? Background Rice banks in Mae Chaem District have been established by various agencies, the main ones being the Village Development and Protection Volunteers, Christian churches, the Border Patrol Police, and the project. The project has helped by setting up some 50 rice banks fro, 1982 to 1986. In the t.,iginal project plan, the intention was to use the rice banks for both consumption and input credit. The individual rice banks were to cover three to four villages. The target was to e::tablish 55 rice banks-cum-credit facilities, each "capitalized it an average of' about $25,000 which is considered adequate to fulfill consumption needs and allow for important production credit needs." Most banks have been built by villagers with local materials, such as poles and planks, while the project has supplied galvanized zinc, nails, and other metal materials for the buildings, but neither cash nor rice. The villagers have then organized to collect rice contributions, usually 1-3 tang per house or person, each household depending on the agreement made within the village committee. Approximately 100 tang has been initially deposited and administered by the village rice bank committee. When short of rice or cash, villagers come forward to borrow rice at the rice bank. Heavier borrowing is done toward the end of the rainy season before the next rice harvest. After the rice harvest, the farmers return the rice to the rice bank with an interest payment in kind of 2-3 tang for every 10 tang borrowed. In some villages, rice was initially given to the bank by such donors as the Border Patrol Police or a Christian church. In other villages, the farmers have used annual village development funds under the Village Development and Protection Volunteer Project (Or Por Por) to buy rice for their rice bank. ltvtiF0J11 111411 7~11 111 -j 141,911 11A IliJl a6I l 111FJI1J~ 111;41 mar1womrJU rl flIm1J?.wU)ofl 1 ~iLJ1f~d l~~f u9u1 ii afll 'l 151111fl 111 1 411~J1 1JLi~~~f "i-tN q.jL m I-. Ine Fi IJJY1fl'PifU kuhJ~lura(V1f1U.IU-)lul '-1ufiJ7 I wm Ulii 11,1 U v ~ 11U Lul1J11 Jl1 EjJi~V~~fI ~1 IL~s2 1J~flL~1UI~I1JJfJ1U~ 1h~flI l~ll~ lul@1J' Atuni tiuv'4=Uit; 92 The Role of Rice Banks In Helping the Poor The rice banks are seen to have helped the village poor who do not have enough rice from their own production to meet their subsistence needs. These people can borrow from the village rice bank when they do not have rice to eat or money to buy rice. Originally, they had to "beg-thy-neighbor" for rice or borrow it from merchants charging usurious interest rates. "Eating on credit" is a common phenomenon in places where there are no rice banks. An added problem is that many villages in the watershed are remote from merchants' shops. Those villagers who cculd afford it would buy rice by the sack and transport the sacks to their house, using the rice through the rainy season when roads to their villages are impassable. Those who do not have adequate cash to buy large quantities of rice are at the mercy of their relatives, neighbors, or merchants for their subsistence and pay the highest price for the rice they consume. Rice banks when operated successfully by the village committee can serve the village well and have the capacity to expand their services both in terms of the amount of rice lent per household and the number of members. This is through the accumulation of interest, rice, or cash. In one village, for example, during the first few years 3 tang of rice was required as interest for every 10 tang borrowed. After the rice stock reached a certain level, the interest was reduced to 2 tang of rice. In some other villages, the villagers reported that their rice bank had too much rice to be kept in the village storage facility, forcing them to sell surplus rice for cash and keep cash instead of rice for village subsistence or development needs. The evaluation team found no difference in the performances of the rice banks between those set up by different agencies or those operated by the lowland Thai or the Karen villagers. Although it would appear that village organizational skills play an important role in the success of a rice bank, the evaluation team did not find any villages that were too poorly organized to maintain their bank. This may be due to the limited sample of villages the team was able to visit. 911 ZimU11~1flL1in iiiiivmA fin UnUjb- 'LJIJhaUinmi2Jll )1i l flrl1uUirjna flJiII ,1 I~ ~~b~~l~i~TLu~u u Lt)uu41Th1fh i lJ n1L U11lou Uimuii ui ~ 't imwjun~~L 'L~uii m j~~j1~j 1(i1 ~ ijummui ~4J1Vl~hM2 F9@Jj~ C )1iL"F IiEiIfuni* ~. ~ !r~~~~~~~~~ju~ ~uld~ ~i INI11- *L NO-3 aFT11 94 Rer..yraelt Rate The repayment rate of rice borrowcl from the rice bank was found to be nearly 100 percent in every village the evaluation team visited. The villagers exert group pressure, on those who borrowed and expected repayment. If repayment in rice is not possible, they have to repay in cash or in other houschold items. But rarely have delays in repayment resulted in the committee confiscating household items. The lending of rice is not made beyond the potential repayment capacity of a person in the village. The success of the rice bank-, howeier, can be looked at in antther way. Farmers in a few villages reported that they could borrow only a maximan of 10 tang of rice per household. This 10 tang can approximately supply an average household's needs for one to t,,,omonths. If the household i; a large one and has a considerable rice deficit, the rice bank can sustain a household fiJr a short period of time, but often for not more than 20-30 percent of their arviual rice needs. In some villages where rice production is low, the contributions of rice banks to the villageis' rice needs become negligible. If rice self-sufficiency can be attained to a larger degree at the household level through increased production, rice banks can increase their role in helping the rural poor and sustaning its operation. The current situation shows the rice banks to be viable and successful with a large degree of village participation. The evaluation team did not find evidence of unsuccessful rice banks in MCWDP. The Project Reaction and Inputs to Rice Bank Operations In discussing rice bank operations with POU management personnel, the team found a degree of reluctance to -upport rice bank operations. The personnel seemed to conclude that the repayment rate to rice batiks was low; the rice bank operations were unsuccessful, and the popularity of the rice banks was undeserved. It vas believed by various groups, including the BAAC and project management, that rice banks could not be operated successfully in areas of widespread poverty and rice deficits because they would not have any surplus to repay their loans. However, one should realize that, although farmers are poor and experience annual rice deficits, Ilu )~i 1j'JI~it'uP i ilill- ii n A I11 A U i t ~11 1 1 h'fl & WqrihI va~trini i i '1 ~f1~~tItu i a uu1 1uYIwbiIJ1 in 1M50mu 1 Ol Olt Iumn~ni1 ~ ~hfi~i ri1-, a i~tiiia t :I'tIM I LlaUl JJI rilT utU h ?f1 1 jFJ fL 115OL I n61fl It'IOn II W I lflJ~a4FJLI 0q I-r1i mn -1411,ii vlatlb min ummi'iU2l1Im M~1~ (Mum~1.I J 1000 u1~1aSJ1~1 l v~~tlu ~l~I~iJ11 Ji1U11~I 1UU1III -II11Ui~ ~fhY5 L~Lil~~f1~l ~~itu~ht~~2Il1J]Th iri~ Ii~11~U~ilfl 'i1UIjim1111 hv l 1Ul21 111~1 IU ~j 1 ~IfI~I U~L~i 1 'illia ifl ~i~~l lt~1U~U1~11 1 h4 1~Ji~I4 ' ~Jl2Jflt~l ~1EJI ( Nu 96 they can repay in cash obtained from wage employment or repay in kind after their next rice harvest. Poor farmers, when they realize the benefits of rice banks, have an incentive to repay their loans and to maintain the rice bank operations. This incentive, combined with peer pressure, results in a high rate of loan repayment. It was explained later that the perceptions of rice banks were derived from a study of Dr. Chop Kachanun and Pinit Pichayakun (1980) that examined various rice bank operations in other areas. This study was not based on evidence within the Mae Chaem watershed area aiid was strongly affected by management inputs from other projects. Conceivably, if rice were given to the villagers without a sense of commitment by them and if rice loans were expanded too rapidly without adequate group pressure to repay the loans, rice could have been easily (,rained from the bank. This is in contrast with the strategy of slowly and steadily increasing the rice stock through interest repayment and growing villager contributions. Through the -village self-help projects facilitated by the IF team members, more "han 50 rice storage facilities were constructed by the villagers with the material support of the project. With these facilities, the villagers have the means to operate their own rice banks and most of them are believed to have done so. The project did not go further in helping to set up or to facilitate rice banks, especially in terms of a revolving fund for rice loans. Instead the project management has encouraged the buying and selling of milled rice by the Mae Chaem Cooperative. The project intends to give further support to the cooperative for the supply of rice for villagers' consumption needs. The team found the project's bias against the rice banks and for the cooperative as unjustified and not supported by sufficient communication with the villagers. The fact that villagers have used the Or Por Por annual fund (about 10,000 baht per year) to buy rice for the rice banks and that in some villages more than one rice bank (sometimes two to three rice banks) have been operating on a sustainable basis indicates the need for the project to support the rice banks. This would allow villagers to make a more long-term investment in productive inputs with their Or Por Por development funds. 97 3.~~~~~~~ &NiunuUh) 01,11iJNU-IZih~1nUO~U ~~ ~ vi.A1.2529 PLU LIIIwmUn vu~ i lEIC 'l u 3 uu~ui nnfu419ni liJU ' iju1U4 t~~.j' Jfl YJi1,585 0111 ~liJfli 7 MJI11 '3 En u@6oiim~'1 ~ 1w~n~~v~~h~ 91u 91 991 9 flr.J1UIJ1mfl l~Ih ri 1 nU-~1 MhlJl nii-mi int- J~~i~,u~~z~i1'i~~iuV~~ 'Lu uii un uniinT w u n u hiu J~flU~fl~1U~nrn1~LU14.~h1'nT1qn1'L-u~nn1 '~Ufl1uu01 W.A vlJ12-523J~A tiI m-'71(.1601AIAN~~9-i'l Iuhw91jaln -, arn6 a -1'I 98 3. Has Integration of Ethnic Minorities and Women into the Social, Political, and Economic Life of the District Increased? Inter-ethnic Group Relations Two major ethnic groups live in the project area of five tambons: native Thai (48 percent) and Karen (43 percent). The remaining minorities are the Hmong (5 percent) and Lawa (4 percent). Native Thais are heavily concentrated in the lowland tambon of Chang Khoeng -- where the government offices and commercial center are located -- and the neighboring tambon, Tha Pha. About one-third of the Karens live in 49 villages in Ban Thp. Seven villages of Hmon3 comprise 1,585 people, about one-third of Lhem in Mae Suk. The Lawa, who are located primarily in Ban Thap, have the smallest population. Native Thais have the highest population density per village, while the Karens have the lowest. Traditionally, some social integration among ethnic groups was facilitated by private employment although most barriers remained. Native Thais and Hmong villagers employed Karen and Lavia laborers to work in the fields and to tend livestock. An important concept of the project plan was to provide development services to lowland Thai as well as to the upland and highland hill-tribes. In this manner, no one group would feel deprived. During the first phase of the project, the major beneficiaries were lowland Thais. The project was to focus on the poorer segments of the watershed -- the hill-tribe villages. Phase II has mainly hill-tribe villages. Because these are more difficult to reach and to develop, and because the project had a late start in these villages, the project is being extended. Since 1980, project .,ctivities implemented in the area have provided greater opportunities for area inhabitants to have more contacts with people outside their own villages and especially with the town people of Mae Chaem District: 99 miUi~i uJf I1U~'t I~ ~ Ul ui -I~~ llI J I ut~zE)I uJ IU ' x11ll'i1ff Ro II a ' eu ii 9 ~n2 3 l~'au iY4UiyU i-u fl luu ltr'flhlv Ului 100 e Road networks have been rehabilitated and constructed to facilitate interaction among villages within the project area and between villages and outsiders (see Irsue 17). It is now very common to see hill-tribe people, especially merchants and government officials, in the town of Mae Chaem. e Massive labo, requirements for the project's activities have provided opportunities for social integration, especially between ethnic groups. lnsufficient local labor supplies for terracing work, for example, often required recruiting labor from outside the immediate villages, primarily among the native Thai, Karen, and Lawa. (The evaluation team learned that preference was often given to the lowland Thai with whom it was easier for the construction managers to work.) Diffusion and borrowing of cultures were therefore initiated. * The design of the IF teams, combining one tribal person with two native Thais to live in the village, set a model of mixed ethnic groups working together for villagers. Their coordination roles with government agencies in remote upland and highland villages have further facilitated closer contacts, which gradually reduce a sense of cultural alienation. Ethnic discrimination, however, remains evident from interviews with upland and highland inhabitants, mostly at an attitudinal level. The Karen and Lawa feel that they are looked down on by the native Thai as dirty and ignorant people. The team observed some Thai officials acting insensitively to the needs and culture of hill tribe people. Conflicts were occasionzlly reported by the Karen and -Imong over land disputes and thievery by the native Thais. Karen and Hmong are relatively helpless because they do not know how to pursue a court case. A Christian Karen man from a village accessible only by car diring the dry season complained that the normal peaceful life of Karen villagers was disturbed for three months by the Thai terrace construction laborers. fie cited an incident of thievery by a native Thai who was later arrested and jailrJ. Drinking and gambling among the Thais were also found in the Karen village during that time. 101 U L ~1~ ~J1U~l~'i~Il~f1~UWf1UiU'~ W L iliiu 1 VX 1jv1-A~lV1 Liao~~~Iaif~ ~ ~ ~1-1r-4 ut U71IJ1?1MOA~i1U1h7 nii ~1 UJlo:iiN jiuU-1U~JJl4 T~hLW1 n-mu-niti~~~9 itr iiEbnwu-A Eit aie m utuJ tau1 U114IU1U 4 I1-M 1frn'1~UL un1 10 m LVL~U1Llf~ ~~ ~62 P14bu bfiU1 JUU 21 16u1M LaP i m m J;lJ~~ 1n. gl 11 1 102 Sociopolitical Integration The evaluation team found that only in tare cases do hill-tribe people not have Thai identification cards. For example, a Hmong man complained that his wife, who cdme from another province in the north about a year ago, could not apply for a Thai identification card because she did not have a legal docum.nt necessary for processing. In general, people in the watershed have no difficulty receiving public services that require identification cards. Voter turn-out levels in the Mae Chaem watershed reached their highest point in 1986. Although a precise source of motivation has not been identified, the high voter participation, however, indicates a greater feeling of political responsibility by the villagers. The Role of Female IF Team Members The role of women has been an important focus of the project. The project paper states: • . . Interface Teams will include women men'bers (the aim is one per team) . . . it is expected that women will benei it as much as men in the Project. Interface teams will be trained in encouraging women's participation. To the maximum extent possible, health training, literacy training, etL., will be given both men .nd women .... At the time of evaluation, the team did not find gender-specific data systematically developed during the project life. This analysis relies mostly on field observations and interviews with IF reams and village key informants. Ten IF team members (five men and five women) work on four mobile teams serving in Chang Khoerng, Tha Pha, and Mae Na Chon. There are 62 IF team members, including 19 women, residing in 21 core villages in Mae Na Chon, Mae Suk, and Ban Thap. Almost all stations have one woman on the team, with the exception of three stations with no women and one station with two women. 103 I lii~~u flT71J~h71~~1f7fhriLRU fl ~lui ;4inni-O' Jfl11Tm1j IrlCu,n c wL~~2~Ji1~aUU1Iqn"LT U~U1 l t~1(wIm. j1 IVulUILmjo1iJtJ 1jITU; u t 1JI I'J 111-1 Lvju 11Th 1 ta IL 1 1UI1Ivl a tll1111 ~ nU~i~4 lol "m 11. ~ r ,il 6! I~- tll -)I -ltt 2n1.v I ~njinU11 t1 I-lm Ttal6tl -I~fd~-ill '1 JtJ1OumllU-2 n'flhv1iii u -u -u ill~ 1ilu 1:j1~11 Lriilvly IllfIoJ'41i-U I 2nur fi .01k1~uvu fi-ltj1 jrn lu 104 observed by the No sex discrimination in assignment of tasks has been as a team. However, IF evaluation team. In actual work, men and women function and cooperation from team interviews indicated that women gained more sympathy villagers and line agency personnel than did most ii,,!: Women's Participation In Familial and Communal Activities interviews, have become Family workloads in the watershed, according to the that the Hmong female more equally and mutually divided. A Hmong man explained men were spending time did more work than the male in the past because many At present, both men and smoking opium while women had to work in the field. A Hmong woman in a women work equally hard since fewer men are addicted. equally. However, a different village also commented that she and the men work equal workloads in the native Thai woman complained that she and the men have do not have. field, but she also must take care of household chores that the men water system, in The impact of physical development in a village -- the potable carr):ng water particular -- has been a reduced workdoad for women. Traditionally, was a time-consuming chore for women. baht lower than Women usually receive a daily employment wage of about 5 women workers 35 men. Most of the project's construction and repair activities pay in the watershed pay baht per day, whereas men receive 40 baht. Private employers less that the men, 25 baht for women and 30 baht for men. Although women cain larger numbers of the availability of project wage labor near villages hds permitted previously possible as women to earn income from off-farm sources. This was not this is a temporary jobs were mostly found in town far from the villages. However, situation as the project will decrease labor opportunities. husband and Decision making on family cultivation is mostly shared between women (the wife wife. During an interview of all members of a lowland Thai family, made comments and mother-in-law) did the talking while the husband occasionally especially the Karen, and corrected what they said. In hill-tribe villages, because many responsibility for selling produce still rests primarily with the men women are unable, or too shy, to speak Thai. 105 4. I11UJtJ1;141 4 Ll flfl11'TV 9) i~iinijiu~r~t~n tilr-Iiulu -A.01. 2524 '%UtV1ITJN1U 2525 nu 66 tuqzluLL1iU i.01. 2527 arll430 -,t4 72 Yqu (-.1flnjijain 25 flu nl Nail 31 flu n 16 cu1) L ~iiJ U1uL~~aL~42 U1--mLn q 1J~l~hln~nirU~]4~391~r41 ~4 %91M A4t!J 5 fm1 1v~jI 5 fu114 i'lU-fJ PO iW=1 ~L1>li~~~Lftr1~1L~lZU1u~' 9) 9,9 91iLfli U4 iUi141 ~ ~1l11 ~jI ~4J iJi~gfIi1414 21 11 2-u'luIjakt1l~r 9, 9, 9 914 11943911'~~9~U C~1litiim9'~uI111 F,2f4i~1 3l 19f nu fl Li 9b)V1 & Au1~1: 1iul-iU Lt't;4'iwIJ~imm2 9114~ Ilan~m1I~ 114131m1 3 i~~~~, VUMMlart9, r 'at~j i-i 106 Housewife groups are generally found in Thai villages. This group is mainly a creation of the Department of Community Development (DCD). The female IF team members also initiate housewife groups. Where DCD operates, especially in the lowland villages easily accessed by the DCD workers, the female IF team member facilitates the DCD's work by providing pre-information about the group, organizing meetings, and communicating information presented at the meeting. A common activity of these groups is cooking for communal or village feasts. Some groups generate income by preparing food for special events such as meetings and training. One Christian Karen village in Mae Na Chon is an exception among the upland and highland ethnic groups, reportedly having organized a housewives' group active in recreation activities. 4. Have the IF Teams Contributed Significantly to Achievement of Project Objectives? The design of MCWDP incorporated an innovative project component called the IF teams. The IF team function was designed to ensure close contact with the target population to promote effective local participation and help to establish a self-sustaining pattern of social and economic progress. Their main task was to act aq a liaison between the RTG agencies and the villagers. Before the IF teams were )ut into action, they were carefully recruited and trained in basic skills needed to wL.'k with villagers. The first group of IF teams comprised 35 persons working in the Phase I area -- Chang Khoeng and Tha Pha tambons -- beginning in 1981. IF team personnel were later increased by 66 ini 1982 and by an additional 30 in 1984. Currently, there are 72 IF team members (25 persons from the first group, 31 from the second group and 16 from the last group). There are two types of IF teams. The first type are mobile teams, which number four. The four teams combined have five men and five women, and serve tambons Chang Khoeng, Tha Pha, and Mae Na Chon. The second type, fixed-staion IF teams, live in the Phase II area in 21 core villages in Mae Na Chon, Mae Suk, and Ban Thap. The're are 62 IF 107 ~uttu~;A -1~L 1itS' Il W~ viuix nna F11U- 1fi)6U i1jI 1OUQArE61v ll -LL;1Afll'~1 Li$M LfliiJE - uIn ~ u mz vomutuu tt iu 2529 11tf 1Sl Uaj 1tJLt fJfill1 ~~SOf1 ~ ii1 S~UVSfhUt 108 team members, including 19 women, for core villages. Almost all stations have one woman on the team with the exception of three stations -- one with no women and one with two women. The IF Role In Preparing Villagers for Local Problem Solving According to the POU letter No. 35/2529, issued May 23, 1986, the IF teams' role is to generate a better understanding boween government agencies and villagers; to collect data on village economies, agricu:'ure, and other factors for use in economic and agricultural planning; and to stimulate individual and community self-reliance to attain government objectives. There are no specific guidelines for how IF workers will carry out tasks in the villages with the assumption that different villages have different needs. The flexibility allows the IF workers to work closely with villagers and to listen to their individual needs. They then help identify problems and formulate plans to solve those problems. The flexibility has, however, occasionally caused confusion and frustration for them concerning their roles. Monthly IF team meetings partly serve to summarize IF work, clarify some confusion and frustration, and provide a forum for participating agencies to propose field projects for the teams. The IF accomplishments have been mostly reported in physical terms such as rice banks, medicine banks, roads, and potable water system. Most success is credited to a team's ability to draw material support from the POU. Attitudes of Villagers Toward IF Teams The IF te .m presence in project villages, at the beginning, was a puzzle to villagers. They could not easily accept young men and women living together in a house without a conjugal relationship. Some of the IF team members looked too young to provide v.41agers advice on how to conduct their lives. Their ability was, however, proven over time through the IF team members' friendliness and helpfulness and, most important, their ability to deliver financial and material assistance. Casual and formal meetings with villagers provided opportunities to advise villagers on improving their living st-.ndards, such as informing addicts about opium detoxification. Consequently, it is not unusual now to hear the villagers citing the 109 1 14J a'winiJ G t a i m~ u irj; 111~ .1 mll 2 n in~ 1 i9 hi@i m"17EMI at: I) IJf II I J V)I11-:1Nu 1HI19 ,,f)iI I ~fQ4WIJ1J~U~1~ti1JLLW 1~II tJJifiu4fl Jmi-1AtY1-i I riuCJU I nja N~.A#. J Lai A~u) min nil V1LIJ l2 lpI~IVi 1 ijVt I J AM~ulamilum92 Ii~tun AW~'1vi ~ 4)44lVi~ 0141A ~ ~ 1~~~V1~ 110 name of the project and its role in development work in the watershed. They do, however, perceive the development project as a hand-out agency. IF team members themselves, according to a 1986 survey, cite agricultural extension as the most tangible change brought by the project. Villagers, especially in the lowlands, are now able to employ a wide range of modern agricultural technology. In the uplands and highlands, even a limited range of modern technology is still a problem, but fertilizer is now starting to be used. Daily work logs of the IF team members apparently facilitate the work of government agt-acies in villages. Government agencies often, mistakenly, feel that IF teams should carry out the agencies' duties since the team members are in the project villages. The interviews with line agencies and other government officiais in the district have consistently shown high praise appraisal for the IF teams' work in the villages. Thi-, iih turn, provides an excuse for some government officials not to visit those villages. The 1983 evaluation found that the IF teams were providing services that helped villages develop a self-help capability (more on self-help in Issue 5). Since then, however, the teams b',ve been used by the implementing agencies, especially DOAE, to do technical work the agencies did not have the human resources to do. The IF teams were thus distracted away from their intended role. The project's new Social Development Program is meant to reverse this. 5. Have Villagers Learned to Solve Their Own Problems? The design of the project emphasizes self-help, community participation, and decision making to initiate and sustain the economic development process in the Mae Chaem watershed. One important purpose of the project (included in the project's "purpose" statement) is that, by project comple:ion, "the people are their own planners." The project has set up a key and essential element in the project strategy, the IF teams, to help villagers organize themselves for village development (see Issue 4). The IF workers' creed is to "work themselves out of a job,' signifying their commitment to development and their overall strategy. I 2 2526 iA 7i flh. i-L tprbl~ o fi 1ULLM, ' wm -U1)1fl7 L Lukl~UAlLtIU fauuLJCJ1EJ mal u tu o N1'-1aIL U1 wiiinT) u 11,3 nwu)nuLU o fl~1jL1JW ' o uitifl4i1uI~v imn i ilq i~witfN~1a tmiu mu)u1al' 29lfl~l8~WChj U)Urli 1I t. ~1U11fU~lTIU 2527 zIm 102 Nnu-ikl (11 6N-ii I141U1Uu 2524 - 2528 '-11;'u 21 Nnii mimuin 1 5l~ 112 The Implementation of Self-help Activities The project laid out a procedure wherein IF teams assist village committees to plan self-help projects funded by MCWDP. Village committees then submit their proposals through their tambon to district authorities. The proposals are appr,'"ed on the condition that villagers contribute locally available materials and labor (and counterpart funds from other sources if available), while the project provides the other supplies needed (for example, galvanized sheets for roofing, cement, nails, and steel reinfoir:ement). The project has promoted self-help activities since 1983. The outputs of these were classified into four groups: e Community development and communication (development of village committees and groups, construction and repair of rice banks, schools, workshops, roads, etc.); * Development of agriculturai and potable water sources (repair of weirs, flumes, canals, head regulators, wells, potable water systems, etc.); * Sanitation development (construction and repair of medicine banks, public toilets, toilet seats, etc.); and * Agricultural and village development equipment acquisitiont (sprayers, carpentry and construction tools, etc.) The project paper identified indicators of project success related to the self help concept. These are: * "Ability to read simple directions among target group; o Beneficiaries able to relate basic health problems to their causes and with capacity to take preventive measures; and tLa I -5fii-iiiiiir4m E~i ami fl1Z'Ju -I~~111 L1 L 11C11 111,11E J n M4v UI q~Y lumy I l I3 t J 117L1I C-1-)L I-14 L O WnMU ti114vI1. bEW4rFl; 'J1u1J1-rfAJ j1 ~'r1-)lU IP1 L~~'V 1AEo i ii* n~ Lr 'tIU1U1nLL:IIl *-U Iim4~JJ1- flfl lEJ1 LJ1C1iiitm J lt4 5- jIiI I1l -7N1M1 l -1 L41U14 ii) n- ui j-U lJi I iwItFJn! I I -1 fl~lElfY1- i II IU rl 1i -jI'Iii )I L16.II ~IIIII .Uj ~ 11't JUWU 1 11Y I VJ1111-5 J1 T49FirI F inn ii I o- Iii' jiiF1 fl111 Ll:3'IU L Fi .1 1 ~ J1U1l ~ 6J~a1~lm liflhl L U5twofi 1L'lj'J1U U-;i uu11J1L%1fl1 kuJ1~~ff1~i umi4 Lnvo 114 9 Traditional as well as innovative (e.g., rice banks, adult education groups, etc.) socioeconomic organization institutionalized and in the hands of the local people, with broad participation by the poor sections of the community." The MCWDP Progress Report, FY 1981-1985, indicates that 433 self-help proposals were approved during 1983-1985. The total cost of these activities was 1,889,803 baht, 39 percent funded by the project. During FY 1984 alone, the project granted support for 102 activities, mostly for development of agricultural and potable water sources (76 activities). Twenty-one activities were related to community development and communication, and five activities to sanitation development. The evaluation team found that the self-help activities in the project area are also supported by other government and non-governmental agencies, sometimes funded jointly with the project. Ainong the development activities monitored by the Mae Chaem District officers is the work of four ministries (Interior, Education, Health, and Agriculture), and the Volunteer Village Development and Protection Program (Or Por Por). The major non-governmental organizations are CARE and the Karen Baptist Convention (KB). Village Structure: A Basic Consideration for the Self-help Concept A headman and village committee are basic village elements nationally established by the Ministry of Interior. Village committees in the Mae Chaem watershed are highly structured in the lowland communities because most vill.ue ZrC uniquely defined by their partcular geographic clusters. It is a different situation in the upland and highland areas where a "village" is a cluster of one core village and many small satellite villages. To provide a better illustration, the Department of Local Administration of the Ministry of Interior identifies only 66 villages (with official village numbers assigned) in six tambons of Mae Chaem District. The project, however, is meant to cover 226 villages in five of the six tambons. Apparently, the village committee in most tribal villages does not eyist to facilitate the flow of government information from the district office and to voice villagers' needs. A village support fund must be shared by an entire cluster of S1AO 4- uu , U & U I A~ w' -..-. ti ,%IA L -I W. I 5AIUOS4LE La: LLf - .%Io,@~.a lilruzif 1 1(1u ' Thfl17W1Jlh-51Ul1a~~U v W LVLf 2Vt2J1, UALW AA 530 I~mrsamnkMA lub "OnWr~m(nrMin "NO4W~Ji WKu)J immid 5 V~~~~2 ~~J9mu IWOt~ ~ mun melih 116 ;illages, and usually the core villages have better access to both government information and financial assistance opportunitie,. Consequently, the other villages are found to have fewer self-help activities. In some selected Karen villages where the KBC has been active, however, the evaluation team has found well-organized village structutes reflected in their socially accepted regulations -- for example, no drinking or drugs, and pigs s'.eltered. The results of the IF team self-evaluation survey conducted by the project in November 1986 .. dicated that the most cited change in their villages as a result of the project was agriculture. This change vas most cited by IF teams in Mae Suk and Ban Thap, while those in Mae Na Chon cited the general development of villages. The least cited change in three tambons was terracing. Although statistics .how many that self-help projects were initiated, villagers, especiall, in the upland an.I highland areas, remain unaware of potential self-help proje-ts that could improve their quality of life. One reason is that there are no village administrative bodies in many satellite villages and informal leadership in most villages has not been realized. Also, IF teams, the key mechanism of the self-help program, mostly concentrate their activities in core villages, paying less attention to satellites. In villages where the IF teams are available, the evaluation team found that a sense of dependency on the project's assistance prevails. For example, the team heard of cases in which villagers needed assistance from government and asked the IF team to make the necessary contacts for them. The IF team thus becoines the conduit for the village rather than helping the villagers to learn how to do this themselves. It is not clear yet how well village groups in the uplands and highlands will function once the IF team members are no longer available. In the Phase I area, the F teams had a long time to work with the villages. The mobile IF teams are still actie in that area. In 1986, the POU started to realize that self-help capability in many villages was not being attained. Project management consequently called for strengthening the program by implementing the Social Development Program as a test in three Karen villages: one each in Ban Thap, Mae Na Chon, and Mae Suk. Another three 117 -u I ,iUt@VUt I Fi Ft1jt4LILv-iilIi fl m , :i im ivhfi)fl- Iitfl -,J "I: -i JI 11W 4' i TL I rin I4 LL -1 15 5 5-. n4 I5 k . I I. nu - ft -. -14 .u. kiL Iti i~uriifL4'u3m t'~~Eui~ ~ h ij1. - 2529 t4 Ih1jL -1U .Iji huuhi 4ij ,'.,, 31 .F, n--1A r *.~ii Fit~t olii; nuacu 4. -u . 118 villages (two Karen and one Lawa) later followed in Ban Thap, Mae Suk, and Tha Pha in 1987. The Social Development Program was proposed to assist vi!lage leaders to realize the value of self-reliance by using education in its many forms as the principal method. In return, the program hopes to see that these leadLi-s will invest their skills and knowledge into their own village development work. Although the program staff feels that this program has been working well, it is too early to confirm this. The Social Development Program and the planned transfer of 20 IF team members to the non-formal education program should have a considerable effect on achieving the project's literacy and health education objectives. Sustalnability of Self-help Programs Sub-village groups were found primarily in lowland villages. Among them are village committees, rice banks, cow banks, young farmers, youth, village cooperatives, religious groups, recreation groups, volunteer groups, village development and protection groups, and housewife groups. The establishment of most groups can be attributed to outsiders. The IF teams, especially, play an important role in stimulating or coordinating outside agencies to organize groups in their village as well as in encouraging villagers to accept the group formation idea. Interviews with IF teams have confirmed that the upland and highland villages do not have as many groups established as those in the lowland areas. The village committee, which is ideally a village organization to ensure development, does not exist in most satellites of villages in .he uplands and highlands. The project objective of having broad participation by the poor sections of the community has not yet been attained. The IF teams often used the strongest leaders in a village to motivate other villagers. The strongest leaders were often the wealthiest villagers, and these would be the first to benefit. Most of the upland and highland villages must be considered poor so any development activities will necessarily include participation by the poor. Although most villages, especially in the upland and highland areas, have not demonstrated the potential for self-help projects, the IF teams felt that most lowland Thai villages are already highly capable of sustaining themselves after the project is completed, as evidenced in the 1986 IF team survey. Lowland villagers reported their 119 6. ? 19U90fl 252 .4O Y1 .. - .1 'A V1. Y1 VE1j. WL II -)i 1-1 .1 4 tk - Il n1 ~JZ ~ f~lf~~1ta 4j £1~U L4~~A~7~ Thji~VU35 fm4 .4m 341 lm i 7 ~ UUI1& kfT1l~1WUJ1 1 170 91u u V~ o t11 ~ ofrd 2I1U~1l11'VJuLJfU (Lur1vUfl 120 preparedness for taking responsibility for their own self-help programs in the post-project era. However, only 31 percent of all villages in the Phase II area reported to be prepared to carry out self-help activities. The evaluation team agrees with the results of the IF team survey. The team found villager preparedness was well established in the Phase I area, and observed that many villages in the upland and highland areas are less capable of coping with the withdrawal of the IF teams at present. 6. Have Villagers' Drug Practices Been Decreased? The Mae Chaem Narcotic Detoxlfication Center The Addict Assistance Program was initiated as a part the project in October 1985. The program was aimed at sending opium addicts for treatment at the Mae Rim Narcotic Detoxification Center. A survey of opium addicts followed, conducted by the IF teams in February 1986, showing that the opium addict population totaled 1,361 persons living in 59 villages of the watershed. Seventy-three percent were hill-tribe people. Only 7 percent of the addicts were female, all from hill-tribes. In August 1986, Narcotic Detoxification Center was established to accept Karen and Lawa hill-tribe addicts for a close-to-home treatment (native Thais were still sent to the Mae Rim center). The treitmeni period lasts 21 days, and the center does not accept more than 36 addicts at a time. It is free of charge, and addicts must request treatment. There is a large demand for treatment with many people on a waiting list. At present, the center is a part of the Mae Chaem Hospital, under the Ministry of Public Health. Financial support is mainly covered by the project. Through March 1987, the number of addicts treated at the center totaled 341. An IF team survey was done of 170 graduates of the treatment center. Of these, only 12 had returned to opium smoking. The low readdiction rate is considered by the project to be a result of four major factors: 121 o V -It~~~uuNFctJILU"fl1a l ntnf ok V V -II "'I %41S.C ~uii~50ll lnz 7251i1 =386,250 uiyi ll~liluc~al 403,950 Ulv1 122 o Villages are detoxified as a whole (all from the same. tribe, sense of camaraderie); o The treatment environment is supportive and friendly, with a nurse and the IF team member from the addicts' village in attendance for all 21 days of treatment; * Community and peer pressure during the post-treatment phase are supportive and employ informal sanctions; and a The price of opium remains very high. The IF teams gave examples of the sanctions. In one case, a small group of villagers destroyed the smoking paraheinalia of a detoxified addict when he tried to smoke in his own house. In another case, a womrn beat her once-detoxified husband and chased him from the house when she caught him smoking. He got a one-week supply of rice and went "cold turkey" in order to return to the village. An indirect consequence of having the detoxification center in Mae Chaem is that it creates an even more negative attitude toward opium addicts; addicts can no longer reason that treatment is too expensive. The increasing number of successful detoxifications gradually reduces the local demand for opium, but so far has not contributed to a reduction in production. Increasing the number of healthy family laborers necessary to share family workloads and provide adequate income for the household. Most addicts are not self-sufficient in opium production and must pay a very high price to maintain their habit. This takes away from their ability to provide food for their families. 123 WiloJ LLftl iii ifrdibin-h~ 500 oiu~a 325 114 qi (325 X 30 X 75 rU) = 737,250 tifln (1.5 Ilt~mt, 151:, uInI) = 2,669,063 U1VW , = 3,406,313 u1q1 17iLLTh!40i 1l = 8.4:1 7 72E3 0 U! ,Il 7 J~ A l7JU l I iLih ,dn iali 1 q nb 7 ti,i 2 00 fru t; ~ a ,, 124 Benefit-Cost Analysis of Opium Detoxification Costl'i 500 addicts at 772.5 baht each - 386,250 baht Administrative expenses (10% depreci.tion of assets) 17.790 baht "otal annual costs 403,950 baht tegits: The ber.efits are significant even using a high recidivism rate of 35 percent. If the center treats 500 addicts per year, 325 addicts would be successftily treated. It is estimated that an addict loses about 50 percent of his productivity as a result of his addiction. He would therefore gain the equivalent of al'out 75 more work-days at about 30 baht per day. Annual benefits from work (325 X 30 X 75 vork days)= 737,250 baht Annual cost savings on opium smoke (1.5 mu/person/day, @15 baht/mu)= 2.669.063 baht Total annual benefit- 3,406,313 baht The benefit/cost ratio, just after one year, is already a high 8.4:1 Demand for Future Services The demand for the center's services is high. During the April-July 1987, more than 200 addicts requested treatment. In the two to three years remaining in the project, it is likely that all addicts in the watershed can be treated. 125 ~~~ if Im~fl a1iIl~11~ua I vq1ifl1Lb~ ? ML JWEM in q ii1rinv 1U 1flU I. IIOU.252JllI rna~i AmI(Ijfl il1J1 1 -161 ML4J J4 l14Jf~z~11 ~aaUi nt11 1111 Lnufl1iim 1Uv1iul1flI rii ' i lji L11 ~~~~~j' 611 114Oil iamJ 126 PROJECT MANAGEMENT ISSUES 7. Has the Project Been Adequately Decentralized to Facilitate Field Coordination and Promote Sustainability? Start-up and Early Years The project was originally designed as an integrated area development project. It was to be implemented by four departments of the MOAC. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry had overall responsibility with adninistration being handled by the MOAC Projects Division. The Project Director had his office in the Projects Division in Bangkok. A field manager was to manage the POU staff in Mae Chaem an~d coordinate line agency activities in the field. During the first two years of project implementation, this structure was found to be inadequate. The Project Director was too far from operations to manage the project adequately while the Field Manager was not high enough ranked to influence line agency personnel. In June 1982 the Mae Chaem Administrative Committee was set up in MOAC under the chairmanship of the Permanent Secretary to provide a forum for coordination among the implementing departments. In July 1982, the Governor of Chiang Mai was asked to set up a Changwat (pruvialcial) Administrative Committee to oversee project field operations. In August, the Permanent Secretary designated the Governor as Project Director, with full responsibility and authority for project implementation at the field level. The Governor then appointed a Deputy Project Director to represent him in the field. Tne deputy had been a Nai Amphur in Mae Chaem and in other districts in Chiang Mai before retiring and was highly respected. The deputy came to the job with good administrative skills but lacked professional technical knowledge and the immediate support of line agency personnel. The situation made technical communications difficult, and in a few months the need for further change became apparent. The next restructuring took place in April 1983, when the Director of Northern Agricultural Development Center (NADC) was 127 ua.i3ni mui 9Jii .4nl~on im 'am~i Li11,ikL~111 1 a' h Il~ifl Lljfl VLt1Uh ~ lti U1 J J 1 In ,I n 128 appointed Deputy Project Director for Technical Affairs. He kept his position as Director of NADC and has given his attention to the project only as needed. The Field Manager reports directly to either deputy director. 1983 Evaluation The 1983 project evaluation was conducted shortly after these changes were made and concluded: Despite . . high-level support and a strong and interested governor as project director, management problems still remain. The two deputy directors have just begun to work together . . . also, each line agency has its own different hierarchical structure, making unified management difficult. Although the project had already been considerably decentralized, the 1983 evaluation team saw the need for even greater decentralization to the provincial level. The project staff considers MCWDP to be decentralized because authority was moved from the Projects Division in Bangkok to the POU with the Governor as Project Director. This evaluation will examine whether the project is decentralized in practice as well as in form. Change at the Department of Agricultural Extension 'The one change that has occurred since the 1983 evaluation is the integration of the project, the DOAE, and the regular district-level operations of this agency. In 1983, the Governor, who was displeased with the performance of the project's agricultural extension director, had him dismissed. The provincial chief agricultural extension officer became tiledirector of agricultural extension activities for the project. In this position, he i3 responsible to the Ministry for technical matters, but works under the supervision of the Governor. The district chief of agricultural extension operatcs as the field manager for the project's extension activities. 129 ,,11jut Ufada It lmu~ltim LfreW7 3 Iii l i5 Ufl1J da11J'11J1f , 1 It fld-1i~u nflflf uittt t J12 L~14 ~1ItflV~1J1~il H.yl. 2526 & WnlJ f t2l1 LW nIsivu.ii KLni~~whm Th-UR IN{rl C,~l-' Till~ 1-1 Sliniii-t i spSd wo cal L J tV "ath, fm1 I n11J1Y 1ELOVE~hm ioJlt apUn 5 ~Jt1~~1 . -i 12iLci um 1'ri arl1nj~ilhImfh-:'Uif ) -'.) ri- -iioi 11U- l i9U 2Uj ~hlJ.l~1~I ~~* i Emif"dm JtE'' U1 . 1V '1~ mii~~utymm Y40 22 M o ov aomi -nt imiavdm a- atUOvmu"0 130 Change at the Department of Agriculture The DOA operation has experienced considerable change during the past three years. In the early stages of the project, the focus of agricultural research was at the Mae Chon Luang Research Station. By the end of 1983, it became clear that the station was at too high an altitude to serve the needs of much of the project area. The range of project research needs was too broad to be served by one station. In 1984, five other existing centers (in Prae, Sanpatong, Mae Jo, Mae Hia, and Fang) were asked to join the project (see Issues 9 and II for details). At this time the project managers saw the need to reinforce the linkage between research and extension and initiated the AIP. This changed the way in which research activities were supervised and reported. A working group was established to oversee the activities of the AIP that included all the stations. The chairman of the working group was the project's deputy technical director. This working group also had direct oversight for farming systems research at Mae Ilia. Three other sub-working groups were established with responsibilities for rice, field crops, and horticulture. The deputy administrative director and USAID project advisor, as well as other project staff members, regularly attended these working group meetings. Livestock and the Cooperative In 1986, the Livestock Unit of the district office was added to the project. Because this activity was already decentralized, there was no institutional problem with it. The third project component that falls under the supervision of the distriht office is the cooperative. Technical supervision is provided by MOAC's Department of Cooperative Promotion. 131 n-riluilTUNM-1,9-1Lfl om rw1L rm4j1finh tUUl -aitJ1"i 1Ju li fl1UJ 1W ' LfIlU Lt L Tf n I I MOHR11r I E1, 11t-atJ2" I,. f'* ' " I i -- A-... I 4 ... -L)~ 115E NF UEhIJ I I fli 19il.1~ t .2 CX.1fl bJ.1!:2.~A . Ui '. itn,; w tmiV 1-iiin-i 132 Link with the District Office Because the Project Director is the Governor and because the deputy administrative director is a respected former Nai Amphur, it would be unlikely that the Nai Amphur, whoever he may be, would take issue with project strategy. Since the project was decentralized, there have been three Nai Amphurs and all have been supportive of the project. A special meeting of the project's District Advisory Board is held each month to keep the Nai Amphur ard his staff informed of project activities. Because it is an advisory board, the meetings are informational and consultative, although occasionally decisions are made. Lack of Provincial and District Line Authority Three major project implementing agencies are not part of the district structure. None of these three report to offices at the provincial level. As at the time of the 1983 evaluation, they are responsible to their respective Bangkok or regional offices. The;' are the DOA, DLD, and the RFD. All three send routine, periodic reports to their department chiefs in Bangkok and the project. They report to the project verbally in the POU's monthly meetings (with the exception of some DOA activities as described below). These verbal reports are iccurded at the meetings for project records. When problems arise, the Governor can request special written reports to respond to his questions. The Governor has de facto authority over all activities in his pruvince. He has direct communication with top-level officials in all agencies that work in the province, so the field officers take him seriously. In that sense, the Governor has enough influence to manage the project adequately and has used this influence effectively. Thus, decentralization of activities run by agencies that depend directly on central government departments revolve around the role of the Governor as Project Director. 133 - iu u -Il n. %u rtni -l El) -1- i L2 1.hW .t L1U1-u 4t *."I IFit, 7 11tnv1! 4Lvra1inii Ii if-hI I v L 11FC4Lj I1-t LZiLl~I 5aU~',L 114 f LI, 1 3 11Al'J fl'j '"uLlit ii I u L T lm I vjlft ailUUIvofl14nJ l-loi11 lJjl1PI~ IPVi Ij l lJ-It 134 Project Coordination The POU's monthly meetings represent an important forum for coordination. The meetings are mainly for the implementing agencies to report achievements, and problems are only occasionally mentioned. But some of the discussion revolves around coordination. The main coordination element is the construction or rehabilitation of roads by RFD to facilitate transportation of people and equipment to project work sites (especially for DLD crews). Roads are iniportant for maiiy project activities, and RFD tries to respond to requests for them from the other participating agencies. When one agency needs help from another, a request can be made in the meeting (which is not uncommon) or can be made informally before or after the meeting. The implementing agencies lend one another project money and vehicles, another sign that, within the project structure, the agencies help one another when necessary. The most active coordination in the project is done by the IF teams in the field. rhe IF team members generally have good rapport with the field staff of the participating organizations and facilitate their work in the villages. However, because of scarce project resources and only min'nal leadership for the IF teams at the POU (see Issue 4 on IF teams), they have often been frustrated in getting the support they need to have enough resources to coordinate. Each year, USAID has funded a three-day planning session in which all implementing agencies participate. This workshop does not provide an adequate forum for coordination. The discussion is mainly limited to the allocation of USAID assistance as the RTG budgets are dealt with individually by the participating government agencies. In the workshop, each participating organization is mainly interested in defending its budget request, especially for equipment items. The RTG budget is not a part of this planning process, although it must comply with the counterpart contribution requirements of the project agreement. USAID sees the planning session as important, as a unified annual plan is required for funds to be disbursed, but it is somewhat displeased with the attitude taken by the implementing agencies regarding their strong interest in commodity support (without apparent consideration of how this impacts on other aspects of the project). In contrast, the 135 i, ,Ian ui i n i5 ii ij1 I'j'n I ILah Mn1omtmW -1JJ19LV VIA 245. i IJI iimi iA to g I fI111V~UU 136 agencies are not pleased with the process which they see as dominated by USAID in which terms are more or less dictated rather than discussed. Generally, USAID does not agree to the many requests for equipment and commodities. Communications Since 1983, the POU has had its own compound in Mae Chaem. The 1983 evaluation team saw this as an important need to bring the agencies and the POU closer together. However, the compound has not effectively served this purpose. The directors of the various implementing agencies in the project do not spend much time at their assigned offices in the POU main building. This is because there is no room for their staffs. Thus they use other offices in town. Also, a number of the directors maintain offices in Chiang Mai as well and split their time between the two locations. Communications continue to be a problem for the project, and this hinders management. RFD has two-way radios in Chiang Mai and Mae Chaem so messages can be sent. There are also some relatively new telephones in Mae Chaem at various locations but not at the POU. Within the project area, a number of the agencies use low-powered radios for communication. The result is that there is much more communication than before the 1983 evaluation, but it is still difficult for the different agencies and the POU to contact each other. The evaluation team did not find any serious personal communication barriers among the directors of the implementing agency offices. They appeared to relate well to one another and are said to contact one another outside the monthly meetings when necessary to resolve problems. Leadership Ali implementing agency directors showed and expressec considerable respect for the deputy administrative director and the Project Director. The same two individuals have held these two positions since 1982. This was not expected as the Governor was scheduled to be transferred as early as 1984. Part of the authority of the deputy administrative director results from his close relationship with the 137 ~ ~ ~ fit iwimui fiLfifl~ffii UnlflhlliEt11W L wnio LLLI~1lo~1E~lmIIIJE1lhl L b~~llm'3lhi'Dn 2 i1I163 ,;J' it 3' Iai v mrifl~li~wt l 1Ummi ~U'~iiLu mimh~i muh it Fliin1V~4i ii q4 EII q U* lWuN mICJ ifll~u i lfl 1 tUl1N~ J i L~ ilLufni j I 'aIU1; fl~f~jJtTn~m t~uo-n~aiiii 138 Governor. Both individuals have a strong development orientation, are creative and share many of USAID's concerns and philosophies. This is a rare combination. The deputy technical director was added to :he project not only to provide a senior technical manager, but also to give the MOAC representation at the senior operational level. This may have met a perceived need at that time, but since then the need has disappeared. The services of this deputy were not in demand, and, once the project headquarters were moved to Mae Chaem, his time on the project averaged less than one day per month. His chairmanship of the accelerated agricultural research working group, has been his most important contribution. Two other project positions that were drawn from NADC: the Field Manager and the head of the IF-team operation. The Field Manager did not have adequate influence to be effective. This did not changL with the addition of the two deputy directors. In practice, the deputy administrative director has been an active manager of field operations. The field manager has maintained a strong interest in the project and spends considerable time in the field. Since his abiiity to manage the various agency activities has remained limited, he has focused his attention on the IF teams. He visits many project villages to speak with the villagers and to supervise the IF teams. The head of the IF-team operation for the project was also employed at NADC, but had specific responsibilities outside the project to the extent that he had little time to pursue his responsibilities in the project. The two NADC people use a top-down, directive style of leadership that employs punitive measures. The approaches and attitudes of both of these people do not always reflect those of the Governor or deputy administrative directr and are not in line with the project philosophy. The POU and USAID have developed a reorganization plan for the upcoming two-year extension. The plan has already been approved by the project committee at the provincial level. It still has to be approved by the project committee at the ministry level. The plan eliminates the position of deputy technical director. The deputy admintistrative director will thus become the only deputy. ie will have three assistant deputy directors: one each for agriculture, the environment, and social development. This structure is intended to facilitate coordination. Under the 139 IV 1qflfl l ImIai1 15UA1fl ~i141)14Y:14V11a6aul 411111Jljll IflliOF1N 01a ILL11u14t)309N IMIr~j)j=iafl@7LNi-LWU1I11UL1JL -1l1 091 ?li1'~larn1lUu 1111 1I~'Jf111~tI -i~1m 4 1 U9h1~1ahirlfl u" \1 Cl I - V- u. - C- . QM~1~J1 I in~~ 11 J~ln1I1-nT1Il1 tflltl jfl~1i1414l1Jwmt) u it)1 o'f 140 current organizational structure, the official lines of communication were not effective. It is thought that the deputy director could work more closely with the three assistants. Two of them would have a relatively easy task. The head of the Environment Section would be dealing only with RFD activities, as does the current RFD project manager. Only his title is changed. The Social Development Section includes only agencies that operate at the di.trict level so coordination can be reinforced by the Nai Amphur. The Agriculture Section will be more difficult to manage as it includes DOA and DLD, which are both relatively independent. It is likely that the current Field Manager will become the assistant for this section and may have the same problems as before. An important rationale for the reorganization plan is to facilitate the transition of the project from its status as a grant-funded, relatively independent entity to a part of the regular RTG bureaucratic structure. Neither USAID nor the Governor wants the project strategy and coordination to end. The Governor strongly feels that if the district went back to business as usual, the effects of the project would be short lived. He believes (as do many others who have worked with the project) that i lot of technical, attitudinal, and behavioral change is still needed before benefits can be sustained without extra support. The next two years will not be enough. One potential problem for the project is that the Governor may move to another assignment, and, at that time, the deputy is likely to retire. The Governor .,as said that he will encourage his replacement to be an active leader of the project. Even with this, a qualified deputy to be the onerational project leader will be necessary. One option is to make the Nai Amphur the deputy. However, the Nai Amphur would then have to appoint a deputy of his own since he already has a full time position. In this structure, the operational leader would be at too low a level to be effective. In another scenario, the Governor could appoint someone of his own choosing in whom he has confidence, but that person would be taking the position just as the project is winding down. If he were in accord with the project philosophy, the result might be positive. Without knowing who the individuals will be in any one position, the best approach cannot be identified. 141 nii~8. )u~i tva;4-nt n4iint iuinmTi l TihiN fillut1tm[=ia,"wqiil41Ul1L U flUl~ i1~ fll ~I ~ it nliihT L~flfl~i;'lgu'uy~~~ L r~n uj iii4fii leiirni 1; !. lvq-,I IiL-u1j 1 tN11 l iin- .- )11, ul lv.1 " ,14 U 142 8. Have the Project's Financial Planning and Management Systems Been Improved? Background At the time of the 1983 evaluation, the project was having difficulty managing the USAID grant funds while counterpart funds of DTEC were being used to cover delays in funding from the regular RTG budget. Also, DTEC was disbursing both grant and counterpart funds for line agency activities directly to the line agencies rather than through the POU, thereby diminishing the contrul of the agency activities by the POU. DTEC reported at that time that it was changing its review procedures to facilitate more rapid replenishment of funds for the POU, which was regularly out of funds as a result of delays. It was also planning to send staff to Mae Chaem to explain the changes and improve POU skills in preparing expense vouchers. Intended Changes Since then, the counterpart funding by DTEC has ended (as planned), and grant funds have been rechanneled to go through the POU. flowever, DTEC has not made the intended changes in its advance-funding system. The plan was for DTEC to advance grant funds based on a USAID-approved annual financial implementation plan, eliminating the use of a monthly financial plan. DTFEC would audit vouchers submitted on a monthls basis but would make the next advance based on the vouchers before audit. If any expenses are later disallowed, that amount would be deducted from the following advance. ITEC would make the same three-month advance as in the old s',stem but would be replenishing that advance ever,, month, so that the amount of money in l'OIJ and line agencv hands at any, one time would be more than needed. lloweser, if there were any unusually heavy expenses for any one three-month period, an agency could request that more money be advanced. 143 Y14.' 14u.4. im; -u.':nrnn~mni mit wui 1n~~L2~,~ I 1 1'411'u da L ihrniL i Ylwj ,cbk U ri;bu *Fu u 1~4 WlIU1 lJ~ 6f tL' 4 Su ZIA U~fZ ~ i'L IJ~lL CSLI J1~1I IU11tl 1VAU-11 w- nil - i i)1 ~L1l~i?11l~ ~iim ivvi~u tn ijI t Wfl1JiW91 u I A wilim vnim iflhl in 144 No Change Possible For the current evaluation, the chief of the AID section of DTEC explained that the change was not possible. RTG accounting practices require that vouchers be audited before Another advance can be made. If the submitted vouchers were all in order, the process would not be lengthy. Hlowever, the vouchers are never all in order, and every question must be answered before the next advance can be made. Until about a year ago, the accounting section at DTEC was exceptionally strict in its application of the rules. Following a shifting of staff, the accounting section has been somewhat easier to work with but vouchers still ra.;.e a long time to be processed. The advance system is constrained by the small amount of advance money that DTEC has available. DTEC has a fund of about 3-4 million baht for all USAID grant projects; USAID has requested that it be doubled. Contingency Plan that Did Not Work One way in which DTEC and USAID had facilitated disbursements at the beginning of each fiscal year, to avoid the delays that occur when annual plans have still not been approved, is to use a 16-month budget plan. The extra four months will carry the pruject over until funding is available. However, this system was not used this past year, and trouble developed. The POU submitted its last plan for only 12 months, and then the USAID/DIEC system ran out of funds earlier in the year than expected. USAII) approved the 6 million baht plan in October, but the POU received the first million baht in late March instead of November. This included salary for the POtU and the IF teams. Foriunately, the 1O. was able to borrow from the DI.) account as funds that were advanced for DI.D construction were not yet needed. Thi rmone', "as availahe because of the wa% in which joint funding is being carried out. The plan calls for USAID and the RTG to share equally the cost of construction. Instead of both sides paying 50 percent each sear, they are alternating years. The full cost for a year is paid at the beginning of the year, and DLD therefore would not use all the money at once. 145 ttyiu- lqri&IuL'E)u-Atio niFju i u U t!u4iu-)ullAqNl--)fljlunii 6 oil 1'-1,3 11114 1u-)ullllj 50 4qu-)UAII;4 -Ili IAug-111 hisid4lu qr4lt u nlit n4iulolmauf10 imiram Fini'Mum 1!1.1;4rl-lnii4iutluls'itinan;'4iid ,)oiiii lln 4 5 ifRi)U 41 -) %nmittrjunu V Lao louii-AthuV) nultrrmamnii n-itnn !;Ilea rN J ? 146 RTG Regular Budget Financing Financing of the operations of the various project implementing agencies using the RTG contribution has not presented serious problems as the agencies provide sufficient advance funding to take care of most needs. An exception is DOAB, which pays its temporary project staff once every four to five months, presenting considerable cash flow problems for the individuals involved. The POU sees DTEC as obstructing progress by its long voucher audit process. The AID section chief at DTEC explained to the evaluation team that DTEC is being critized although it is only following the required RTG system. AGRICULTURE ISSUES 9. Has Rice Self-Sufficiency Been Attained? Objective Rice self-sufficiency has been a major objective of MCWDP. In the project paper, rice self-sufficiency was considered a major indicator to be used to judge project success: Perhaps the most important indicator is that the watershed will achieve rice self-sufficiency and that the majority of currently land deficient (below rice subsistence production level) farmers will be producing all their own rice on their own land. . . . Marginal farmers at least have assured their future subsistence needs and may therefore begin to supplement their existence with cash cropping. The ,-1,jective was therefore two-fold: self-sufficiency for the watershed and self sufficiea for all the farmers individually. 147 f116FLV~tnSA MYIIP%'l I Ill 11F6l I s flftJ71ZL " L3 n1111t UUU 1" -,z -I.5 "V i:L LZ. - I li rp 7,_V1 It L) I mmi -) fl I -1 vi kr -UiI t4f I ,,141 ~ ;fIIn1AJ41 ~ -1i LJl~ltjI 1.It c ~OI11 I o11in,, L: , l L1E kJ I l~tMl I 1: .7141 1 I l I I -I I1:14m tI IlA t)o1iI I Uc,~f Ij I f i I I mi~r4il) 148 Strategy to Increase Land Utilization Irrigated Land The self-sufficiency objective was largely based on the estimated potential for a significant increase in land utilization. During the planning stages of the project, the planners estimated that only 85 percent of usable land was being cultivated. The intention was to increase th-is to 100 percent by the end of the project. Land development strategy included construction of terraces for rainfed agriculture and of weirs for irrigated agriculture. The most important part of the plan for increasing land utilization was based on estimates of land available, both for irrigated and for rainfed farming, in tambon Ban Chan. The project was to move 500 families with inadequate land resources, mainly in the Phase I area, to Ban Chan, where the project would provide them with newly developed irrigated land. The 1983 evaluation learned that the supposedly available land was not as others had already claimed it, and that land development in Ban Chan was already under way as a part of the Royal Hilltribe Project. As a result, the tambon was removed from the project. This reduced the amount of new irrigated land that could be developed. Instead of focusing on developing new irrigated land, the project emphasized improving weirs for existing irr;gated land. This approach benefited mainly dry season cultivation when cash crops are produced. Despite the elimination of Ban Chan from the project, irrigated land has increased in the five-tambon project area. From 1983 to 1985, there was a dramatic 16.2 percent increase in the area cultivated, with a slight drop off in 1986. The figures for irrigated land are as follows: 1983 18,741 rai 1985 21,772 1986 21,300 The evaluation team did not have information available to indicate how much of this change was due to the project. 149 in wiaut 16.2 LoWj1llll 2529 :4,ii S25216 4fT] 18,741 I L,528 ij 21,772 7 .1 -2 3.i minar4ii itwit C-V t~1Uh11~Fj -l - I- f-I . S L~~~flC~~~L bl flrlt -1-j ji~~ 2hI ~uit~e UJ LI 2L2 frtrF n"I V Vu iens. )FiA tS.lt~u i E5-iiim mil l ~ l~J ~JJJ 150 Rainfed Land For rainfed agriculture, land development activities have focused on constructing bench terraces. The intention was not to bring new land into production but to make existing agricultural land more productive and less erosive. Most of the terraces have been constructed since 1984. As a result of earlier delays in implementation, the project's financial resources had built up and, by 1984, project managers were interested in moving quickly ahead while the funds were still available. A large number of bench terraces were therefore constructed in a very short time. Tie evaluation team found that the project has yet to follow up the construction work with farmer training on how to best use the terraces and how to maintain them, with the exception of those farmers participating in the AIP. Also, the quality of terrace construction was generally inadequate (see Issue 12 on terracing). The full benefits of rainfed land development have therefore yet to be realized. An increase in rice production on upland fields is dependent on the degree to which the upland farmers desire it. The rice self-sufficiency objective is based in part on the theory that farmers give rice the highest priority and that they will plant cash crops only after they are self-sufficient in rice. The evaluation team's interviews with farmers in many different villages confirm that most will grow rice as their first priority. However, it was not clear how much rice farmers wanted to produce before they would plant cash crops. In the uplands, an important cash crop is soybeans. These are grown during the rainy season and are therefore a replacement for rice. Although reliable data were not available on the level of soybean production in the uplands, it is still minimal. In the project paper, while rice self-sufficiency was a priority objective, the plan for the uplands was to have 50 percent of developed land devoted to cash crops (see Issue 10 on cash crops). Data provided by the Mae Chaem Extension Office show that for upland rice production, between 1983 and 1985 there was an increase in upland area cultivated of 15.9 percent, similar to the increase in irrigated land. The figures for upland area cultivated in rice are: i Ln1 113EU Lih1v!J 50 'aYMU~au luloh 2528 tn ~~a ol~i~atia 15.9 ~'f~ 1Jf f1 S2528 luy 18,749 ' S2529 L'h~y- 18,749 ilirl-111 2524 fl 2-528 fl~ n.L~fLnf. ~ 258 i~~u453 fl.f. 2527 487 fl.f. l! 2E;25 475 n.n-. 11 2528 435 ri.fl. 11 252'6 li~i4L 45c, rii.. Wjllt3lj1~lflV21~t~f1~f~Jlf~iUf~f~~~LI~f~ 2528 1 M4I~lFJ LN Y~I~U~~fli~~If3Thi ~I~J'V 11L2Jfl1h~h~...t -' 152 1983 16,175 rai 1985 18,749 1986 18,749 Productivity Improvement Irrigated Rice It would be expected that the major increases in productivity would be in the lowlands on irrigated fields as the technology is more advanced for irrigated rice cultivation and the agricultural extension workers spend most of their time in the lowlands. However, the yields reported by the IF teams from 1981 to 1985 do not support this. The reported average yields in kg per rai are: 1981 453 1984 487 1982 475 1985 435 1983 450 The drop in 1985 was reportedly due to insects, a disease outbreak, and flooding during the harvesting period. Before the 1985 harvest, the USAID project officr;r reported, "The rice crcp in Mae Chaem valley looks better than last year. . . . Upland rice is as good as last year and in many spots considerably better due to good rainfall distribution." While the data do not reflect any gains from improved technology, a qualitative assessment shows that improved technology for irrigated rice is being used and that, despite some setbacks during the harvesting period that may be atypical, higher productivity can be expected in the future. The evaluation team was not able to obtain data for 1986 as they were still being processed. The team received some conflicting information about overall irrigated rice yields in Mae Chaem. Figures from DOAE show an average yield of 696 kg per rai for 1986. This is 60 percent more than the IF team average for 1985. The evaluation team has more confidence in the IF team averages as they appear in line with data the IF teams have generated from the AlP, in which data are carefully 153 MaUM~ 2528 uit ~iau~~Mau,~ 60 zJ Y(~ ~I~500 2725 - il7' .472 n.n.k'hi tn~n~ u U 1.500 Il S~~!ix~ 1,500 10 1xm~uu "e nu L M UAUMMIN Infl2'ul 2S27 MINQUAK' I :.;r~ I nil 4,L IlL ;E~v 1TI I tl 2528 1PflLi-a4 CI _ 225 nl.n. Pal-, 4t~al 2528 ~Jr~~IJt~U2S5 n.n. 6Oai miat"WIL 3!Jaz 35 "at ;lh MC InflhtlNt4916Uianam 3,000) 'i umbaw-aWANUMJ win 289 n.n. A385 fl.r,.kti LlJi~~ 93 154 collected and tabulated. Although the AlP is mainly geared to helping upland farmers, some of its resources are used for irrigated farming. When the AIP began in 1985, it covered 500 ra; of irrigated land. The average yield on this land in 1984 was 472 kg per rai. In this first year, the average yield rose to 557 kg per rai, a gain of 18 percent. In year two, the program was expanded to !,500 rai. Average yield (on the 1,500 rai) went from 520 kg per rai to 616, a rise of 18.5 percent. Upland Rice For upland rice, new technology has only just started to reach farmers through the AlP. This program was initiated by the Project Director in 1984. It was needed because the project's regular extension program -vas not reaching the uplands. The DOAE staff in the tambon offices were not making the necessary effort. The POU decided to take on its own extension activities with the AlP and hired three technicians to implement the program. In 1985, the AIP was implemented in 25 villages covering an area of 1,600 rai. The average rice yield on this land in 1984 was 225 kg per rai. In 1985, the average yield was increased to 295 kg, a gain of 31 percent. In year two, the program covered ',000 rai and average yield was increased from 289 kg to 385 kg per rai, a gain of 33 percent. Technology The tremendous success of the AIP shows the potential for increased production for the Mae Chaem area as a whole if the technology used in the AIP can be further extended. Among the technical reasons for the AIP success are: e Use of improved varieties; * Improved cultivation packages including plant spacing and fertilizer use; and * Greter understanding by farmers of methods of plant protection. LX.4 155 o mi f uvlmu-nlAiun-iiUTuUii o miU!uUiqttmniim iiwtliniiiJant&tnit&tu-)LLat:ni-71t u Imt; im-i win lm*-i o 9%1 Liarjujoi-an 9-miuIrg'-wrlu E,..m. uuna rju IUAB miripumulutiD un -n;3jRinaiiniruniitmtoiE)itnat I J O4trrd"imA4iuiu3jin J 156 Improved varieties of upland rice have been extended to AlP farmers. There are two varieties for lower elevations: Sui Mae Chan and Motosa. For high elevations there is Chao Ho, and for the very high elevations (highlands) there is Namru. The program farmers are learning how to use plant protection chemicals and the value of this use. In the lowlands, the paddy farmers can be expected to continue to use the improved varieties, fertilizer, and plant protection chemicals. In the uplands, it is a bigger technological jump for the farmers to use these inputs, especially when taking risk on the major input, rain. The excellent results to date are encouraging as they clearly demonstrate the viability of the new technology. Since the project provides program farmers with the necessary inputs on a credit basis, it is not clear how farmers outside the program will be able to obtain them. Credit For upland farmers, a critical constraint is the lack of credit. Except for the AlP, the project has not developed a credit facility that would work for the hill tribe farmers in the uplands. The only credit available is through the Mae Chaem Cooperative, which does not have the capability to provide credit to upland farmers. The evaluation team appreciates the difficulties in developing a viable credit program that could operate in the uplands where many farmers cannot yet operate viably. Yet without credit, it will be difl icult for many farmers to afford the improved seed, fertilizer, and other inputs that the improved technology packages require. In the project paper, the plan was to use the rice banks as the means to provide input credit. The rice banks do not have this function, and, if they were to have it, they might not be able to operate as well as they do (see Issue 2 on rice banks). At the time of the 1983 evaluation, consideration was given to having the BAAC provide a credit service using a loan guarantee fund frcm the project. The PAAC va; not c:.:uiastic, and the idea was not pursued. 157 IlqEi,3I:&@1U~q~u(Thfli~t 2 tfnJiuouimnit) t3'JamflflhidtuuJwfai wtolul 2526 'unimumtli~i.na. 7l~ flini"im gitqfuumu fmnil'1~noijmuutJI ~7 1~1A~tiLviflulmi auil23T LImflh1~rU tfljh@lfl .1uAiifl~u 4iuimu1 i4jjdii ";'u~iu ig,3J- 'ntIUhI1Wi25. ~ i29 OvfaiefLj' 1 4u MSl~ i-MA22 S)mu-xni~~i-F MA 2529UullrmlU mU IJ.)aN1 amafnait0tlim-qwIIl -mj~i 5w n.n 158 For the AIP, the project has created a revolving fund that, in the two years it has operated, has worked well. For 1Q87, the project is not expanding the fund, but is using tile money paid back after the 1Q6 harvest. Without credit avail:i'le hor mos't upland farmers, they cannot be expected to purchase inputs. One option tor them is to substitute compost for fertilizer. The DLD joined with I)O and )(.,\/ to demonstrate to iarmers; how the use of compost and new planting techniqucs ::in increase upland rice production on b'ench terraces. The demonstrations .ere carried ( ut in each of tht tamions ne:ir to the D)OA1 centers. In the de'rnonit Atlorl plot, seeding %.as inore cloel' spalced an1,1 I ton of ,:o inst wa s applied per iai. -Ihe demonstration , ars, ho" e%er. me uccessful for two reasons. First. I ton o compost per rai ":as inadequate to conpensate for a sho rt:ii, of ri'h top;,oil. . Approxinately 3 tos per rai wkould b'e ne,:essary. Second, on.Iderin, the difficult, in transporting compost, een the application of I ton e,,ceed transport cap:ibilitv as a result of the distances the compost would have to b)e intlued (a few kill in some cases). Self -Sufficiency The project appears to have met its objective of self-sufficiency for the five project tambons when taken together. The 1986 figures are only rough estimations as yields, especially for upland rice, are not well known and are difficult to estimate as upland fields have much wider variations in yield than irrigated fields. I-or irrigated rice, the I9, 6 data 4ere not vet available. The evaluation team used the IF team figures for upland rice Nield and estimated irriated rice yield to be 500 kg, given the results in the All' fields and prior area production les els. For area cultivated, DOAt dita were used. Area Yield Production Annual irrigated rice 21,300 rai 500.0 kg 10,650 MT Second irrigated rice 98 500.0 49 Upland rice [B.749 301.4 5,651 Total 40,147 rai 16,350 MT 159 21.300 Th 500 n.n. 10,650 amJfngli t71tE1 Ji xl 98 500 49 18.74 30 1.41. = :J 40,147 I16,350 :O nt 38,907 u "7,iThU 11.672 LI1,1t.1UJL~VU-5.flS'IU L tlh. tJ1 -9- nii 11A-, II m4 M14 1 'L .1 i t'i ii ij . .~U~ iJi ~ ~~' -L - . t ll* III * U j.ti .YW.m ---t.J Z.l 160 The POU estimates consumption for the watershed population of 38,907 to be 11,672 metric tons. In addition, losses during transformation, and rice for animal feed and rice seed, bring the total demand up to 14,135 metric tons. At a yield of 500 kg per rai for irrigated rice, tile surplus is 2,215 metric tons. Even if the yield for irrigated rice were 430 kg per rai, a surplus would stil be achieved. The project's self-sufficiency objective was al:o for individual farmers. No data are available to indicate the distribution of production among farmers. lowever, there is information to show how self-sufficiency varies by village. The IF teams surveyed individual villages on whether they had reached self-sufficiency (including surplus) and found that only 47.6 percent of the project villages have attained year round rice self-sufficiency. Most of the villages in ,he Phase I area, where irrigated agriculture is common, have achieved self-sufficiency. Very few villages in the Phase 11 area, which is mainly upland farming, have become self-sufficient. 10. Have Annual Cash Crops Been Adopted to Meet Project Objectives? Current Situation In the project plan, the emphasis in agriculture was on rice self-sufficiency. In lowland villages, irrigated rice is prevalent and self-sufficiency has been achieved. In the uplands, where most of the rice is cultivated on rainfed land, the project had a bigger challenge to identify and di.seminate viable technolog, to reach self sufficiency. While the project's AlP shows excellent results in selected areas, the self-sufficiency objective for most upland villages has still not been achieved. There is question about the proper role of cash crops in an environment where farmers are r,ot self-sufficient in their basic staple. In the project r er, the intention for the uplands was to have 50 percent of developed land de oted to cash crops. In the Phase I area, where lowland, irrigated farming predo ninates, cash crops represent about 40 percent of total area planted (see Table 2). In the Phase II area, where upland, rainfed farming predominates, the area planted in cash crops 161 1. MIAt ? f I I. t- I. I 1h 'D!. "to) 011%15 1 v.i''.v. V t'a,-I~iI f'i?.I I t- I 11 i - a - '45-- - t r Or U,13lhl WCM 1!si L t fl Irs," 162 ranges from about 3 to 13 percent. Thus, the evaliation team found that cash crop agriculture was well below the planned level for the uplands. Soybeans, corn, and some vegetables are increasingly grown where irrigation water and market access are available. Using the IF team's monthly reports and DOAE tambon-level statistics, the evaluation team made the following rice versus cash crop comparisons for the year 1985-1986. TABLE 2 ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF AREA PLANTED. 1985-1986 (rainy and dry seasons combined) Cash Crops Tambon Rice Soybeans Corn Other Total Chang Khoeng 57.8 23.9 8.5 9.9 42.2 Tha Pha 60.1 14.1 23.9 1.9 39.9 Mae Na Chon 87.0 7.4 1.2 4.5 13.0 Mae Suk 88.8 1.6 2.9 6.9 11.2 Ban Thap 96.9 0.1 0.1 2.8 3.1 Whole 78.4 9.3 0.2 5.0 21.6 Project Area Source: Calculated from IF reports, April 1986; and DOAE tambon-level statistics. Phase II Area In tambon Mae Na Chon, 7.4 percent of the area was devoted to soybeans while 4.5 percent was planted in sesame, peanuts, cabbages, red kidney beans, mung beans, and castor beans. Tambon Ban Thap was planted primarily in rice with a small portion devoted to red kidney beans. Red kidney beans were being grown extensively in a Hmong village where the previous Thai-U.N. Crop Replacement Program vnd later the HAMP project was operating from 1972 to 1984. The Hmong favor red kidney beans. A few Hmong villages have been able to obtain yields of 7 163 -q11' q 2 n 2528/29 k1) III_ _ _ _ ;1_ _110al _13 d1',L , 57.8 23.9 8.5 9.89 42.2 wqr4 60.1 14.1 23.9 1.9 39.9 LLU1q1 88.8 7.4 1.2 4.5 13.0 LJ~n 87.0 1.6 2.9 6.9 11.2 U llJ 96.7 0.1 0.1 2.8 3.1 • Llq;,~nl 78.4 9.3 7.2 5.0 21.6 (mu I nlhl q u14,JUU tlU'E 2529 m1m @ L~lt wnl 2 ,uu 7 J - 10. 5 : 17f6 ~f11,dL .~qtal J ~ alaltq4~4 013111 ] L13h 1 nuI iLnuiJ In114~m~vUt Wu4tJJ 1~an~JaMqn11jflh Lu ti' L llar141)fL flfl n I n LVPqn1 164 10 beans for every bean planted. The yield is more commonly about 5 to I when proper seed is used and much less than that when farmers plant seed from their previous harvest. In tambon Mae Suk, some potatoes and cabbages were reported to be grown in the Pang Ong village as part of the Royal Hilltribe Project. Phase I Area In tambon Tha Pha, extensive upland fields were producing corn. The farmers wanted to switch from corn to cabbages but had difficulty selling them at good prices. After a year of cabbage production, a large majority would like to return to corn production. Tambon Chang Khoeng has the most land dev%,ted to cash crops - primarily soybeans, garlic, shallots, chinese cabbage, and other vegetables. On the whole, about three quarters of the project area planted in annual cash crops is sown in soybeans and corn. Most of these areas fall within Phase I of the project area. Besides the MCWDP cash crop extension program, there have also been cash crop promotion activities under the management of the CARE Agroforestry Project. CARE extension officers have promoted the planting of hibiscus, castor bean, chilies, and pineapple with such tree crops as coffee, i.i.,o, and jackfruit. The rate of adoption of these crops is reasonable although production and market shares are not yet significant. The CARE project is working primarily with the Karen. Their Karen extension officers understand the Karen communities and communicate with them well. CARE also concentrates on using low-cost conservation practices and attempts to promote private sector involvement. The Roles of the DOAE and the DOA In Promoting Cash Crops Within the context of the MCWDP, the scopes of work and services of the DOAE and the DOA are not properly integrated. The DOAE is responsible for agricultural extension, whereas the DOA is responsible for agricultural research. While DOAE extension workers have focused their attention on promoting agricultural production in the lowlands and to a lesser extent in the uplands, the DOA research station concentrates its activities in the highlands. The DOA highland research station at Mac Chon Luang offers a variety of potential cash crops suitable for a 165 1~nh:~J:l q 11JV1.1~f ~~iJb~ ~lJ1 ~L LlI~~' I' fln~ i I l1~11 t~ll4~ ~ il~1~111'1'I~f11L 1~JI i0'ij i-z i -i flLE~ ~1 li UlU~ t~f ~ l11JL~ :IjL.:U~ii~ k1i1I-juu' -m -,ji n~l)I U~r'3fF4~fl 12 ~ fl~~T~.L L , UNia L aJ 14~3jL~I I1u FI NL;L I. l u-;h'in l ii z iaiiIfii- j n E): L II11Fli tljr - iin1.i~ii -II Ln-o, 'uLTi Lni ?l)-Ii VCrhj l 1~ibl'l)' Li-11IL iiJL Hn11 ~LJ4 IliLLJl)f'- 1U~iIL ~1J~UilJ1Ul~. il '1 lC~UL'1 li AMtI 1 k~112J L 1:1 -t 1 n J~ n tlL~rlYlU~iW'uiA Lt 1~ll~ jLht11'k? 'kitu hrnJlIJ 14i nii3ulunhl w 4inc im uv 1~?JflJfll"(n Y m I fiJLi -l ' 117IIii1 1llk ca 11J nt 1A' I O ri~D 3LJ Z11li-mg 166 highland conditions, and possibly but not necessarily for upland conditions. These include passion fr :t, potatoes, strawberries, macadamia, peaches, nectarines, coffee, tea, vegetable seeds, and ornamental flowers. Most of the research is done with a high level of inputs including water supply. The planting, maintenance, and harvesting methods for many of the crops are far beyond the technical and financial capability of most hill-tribe farmers. For the highlands, the research will result in identifying cash crops that will have significant value over the long term, but not in the time frame of this project. (Note: this issue focuses on annual cash crops, although other cash crops are mentioned. For a more thorough analysis of tree and perennial crops, see Issue 11.) The POU has realized the liability of concentrating the project's rosearcO efforts in a highland station. In response, it has reached out to other rese- ch stations to obtain agronomic information and seeds or seedlings to use or test in the project area. For soybeans and other field crops, the project has used the DOA research station at Mae Jo. For fruit trees, much of the information now comes from the station at Fang. Another resource has been the farming systems research institute in Mae Hia. The project provides some agronomists (Ct certificate level), per diem, travel, and vehicles to these stations to facilitate their interaction with ".ie project. Wheat is another potential new crop supported by the DOA but not yet adopted as one crop to be promoted by the DOAE. The DOAE is seen to be working according to centralized policies and is thus unnecessarily limited in its attempt to explore potential new crops for the watershed. The production of garlic, shallots, corn, and vegetables, for example, is largely unaided by the DOAE despite these commodities .gnificarce to the area. In general, the DOAE is too conventional whereas the DOA is too sophisticated in their lists of promoted crop:. 167 "1.111 1 EL).111 m~r 1r11Th~i n t fli 1Th1Vi b)a, (:Mnn liJ~~ltjIff1 L JULI 101 I iitylm l nk ni l5~y~lu 11;Ji.FV7i fl -w sLai11uJ E milruJy 2 %?lZi11fIU~(i~J]~~'UltvJlL11IU1 LLIA JL& L L iL 'miTin -j c41 ~~v~inL izn ~ iriJ~ri'u~iiutut i 1'flu L Lt~ I~fl 41 U I~r~LL ni -2ismyIif 168 Constraints on Cash Cropping From field interviews, the evaluation team found that constraints to cash cropping are numerous. Market accessibility is poor, especially in the Phase I1 project area, because of poor roads. Roads have been built and improved in the project area, but a majority of them are only dry-season roads. The evaluation team learnad of a few instances where the farmers' produce was left to rot because no merchants wanted to make the effort to get it. Cabbages and hibiscus were particular cases in ambons Tha Pha and Mae Suk. The soybean market is the only one found to operate with a reliable degree of competitiveness. Soybeans are viable as seed only for a few months. Since this crop is grown in the uplands in the rainy season and in the lowlands in the dry season, the upland soybeans can be used as seed and therefore have a premium market. In part, transport conditions should dictate what crops are grown. When this is ignored, the results can be disastrous for a village. In one instance, a highland village grew carrots as a cash crop only to find thati the price in the lowlands (25 to 50 satang per kilogram -- about $0.01 to $0.02) was lower than the transportation cost to get them tc the market. Except for soybeans, the evaluation team did not find an annual cash crop that promised reasonable yields and a secure market. For most cash crops, the risk was considerable. The Karen generally prefer to cultivate many crops, each in a small area. This diversification reduces the risK. Most upland farmers do not have access to irrigation water to cultivate cash crops in the dry season. In the wet season, most households prefer growing rice in both irrigated and upland fields for their subsistence needs. Farmers in the project area, especially in the uplands, rely heavily on livestock as a means to supplement their diet and income. Potential areas for cash cropping, even with water, are kept as grazing areas. Lasdy, communications with hill-tribe people are difficult as significant cultural barriers must be overcome. The project has shown that hill-tribe field workers can 169 ii Fpiik~ Fi n 71h-,i-u-rL U iaivviTfI i intU1tLmu I ItlS.ulm u .IIi Nwuh 1".oa14 IIIU. 7 fh1uuiiT1)W iilm infii 1Ai" fZ:;~ F.l III 41J Iul~l1 iU141151 I .:lllt) 'i'l MtOIU1i~hfh ai.Im inn a a a~ Aoiiu&; Xu tvm 11. UfliiflUur211-Jt) h1a J flflA 1 J1fLI Ui'tu ~1) ~~U I fE~~l~L U mnm~n ~~~ 0911JLUNULFIM1iI 'fiU i 1iU L ih iElitiZ LfL1hhIL 2526 1 UhC Jrn~n~t~r~ul'~ht ~ I dUt yoi?hi -wLU1L I 170 help overcome these barriers. CARE uses Karen field workers to serve Karen villages (some of the workers were IF team members). The POU intends to transfer a number of IF team members to DOAE for the remaining years of the project. This will give to DOAE personnel who know how to oeal with the hi!l-tribes and who will take more responsibility for upland agriculture than the current DOAE personnel. Potential Cash Crops In Mae Chaem Given market access, adequate promotion, and research, potentially important annual cash crops for the Mae Chaem population include soybeans, garlic, shallots, peanuts, red kidney beans, wheat, corn, potatoes, mung beans, chilies, hibiscus, and ginger. Such crops have agronomic and economic potential in some parts of the watershed as well as in other parts of northern Thailand with similar conditions. Marketability will be thc main obstacle to most cash crops grown in the watershed. 11. Have Tree/Perennial Cash Crops Been Adopted to Meet Production, Incom,, and Sustalnability Objectives of the Project? In the original project plan, the cash crops considered were all field crops. Agro-forestry was not included although village woodlots were. The 1983 evaluation found that villagers had little incentive to maintain the woodlots when there was still no shortage of wood nearby. The project cancelled this component and saw benefit in supp,rting an agro-forestry program. IF Team Efforts Various kinds of tropical and sub-tropical fruit trees have been extended to farmers through the project using the IF teams. Seedlings have been produced by the project, and villagers have paid part of the cost for the seedlings they receive. A total of 19,930 trees were distributed in 1985 and 1986. Most of the seedlings so far distributed have been for household gardens. Very little technology and no fertilizer were made available to the participating -.ouseholds. These fruit trees, mainly mango, jackfruit, tamarind, citrus, and lychee, are all grown under rainfed 171 14 05r1f h~f ~hli~ ~ I ~ u ij -J'~ _19- illi ~ u ; I I l j I1 2~j~f z :f la'f rIIhI-I I10 j I T" I 1l -Fl k i 1* t I~zoyI ulf i yII ol .:1o (01 ; 11h12' cil WL 1 tV4Th1UM%41 1 l t w vna kirm C10viA4 1 1-4 :-1 ata1Yl 111 I :-1ii r-' j iqC rIl- I 'DX1 45 i, I litU I2e , 120 X~ L(." i4jt:ii I 4 duuc .I iu It L 11: 1 11FL hl 1-]Wfl 1I~Lfl TJ ll L 11,ila -i~PImn i'f i i fii lhJ tL1LI -yu JEVi a 41nl iol Ir'I im f.;1-i l iii I IIII r i) 172 conditions. Since the trees have only recently been planted, crop yields have been low and most of the fruit has been consumed by the villagers with some small quantities marketed. Because most project villages are at higher elevations than typical lowland villages, the trees set fruit slightly later than lowland trees. This allows these villages to market the fruit after the regular fruit season is over. Off-season fruit can sell at a higher price, which should at least compensate for the more difficult transportation required from the upland areas. However, marketing will depend on having good quality fruit in quantities that provide for an economy of scale. So far, very few of these fruit trees are in full production. The project has not approached fruit tree production as a major activity. The small number of seedlings distributed will not create an adequate scale of roduction. The household gardens help nutritionally, but the potential for significant economic gain from fruit trees is not yet being realized. CARE Extension Program CARE has worked with villagers to plant fruit trees intercropped with chili, pineapple, hibiscus (prices dropped znd viliager- lost income), and castor bean (271 rai of castor bean have been planted by villagers with a market and price guaranteed by Siim Castor Oil Co., Bangkok). A part of the CARE technology for these crops is to construct contour ditches to control soil and water erosion. The program is also helping the villagers to establish low-cost nurseries for frvit seedling propagation. A total of 457 households in 22 villages have received 8,130 fruit trees (mango, jackfruit, guava, lychee, and papaya). Although the CARE program receives no financial suppirt from the project, a CARE representative regularly attends POU meetings. Previous Experience with Coffee The U.N. Crop Replacement Project introduced coffee to two highland villages (Ban Pui and Pang Hin Fon) in 1974, and they, as well as some missionary villages, continue to produce it as a cash crop. However, very little effort has been devoted 173 it auflimnL J2FCufltL1 *W4Jh(4 W1iUi4) 4~~l4 11W llfltla ln19J1".1. 25 AssuJmUUm4111i4 f1aff1LV wti A im-. It)w ii-ij n i Ji l .l1JV 1Ru f I 1kU)11W1) 44~UIf I 1 *i 1 mJidif llll l llfl l14hIa z UtAoi.-1i rjlil1 YvJi-iLmJ#VI "SlL j11lj Lz'1jtict~lit j~ri-4UJJhl lu Jtwm m dihm imi Sandil1UJ~~auhui11 -11jvdiu" 0l 1i nv iyz%-1n11 r6 Lur -ii14 -irj1f1 fl1nit iflii -1i 1 m J lju~au' ' riitl4iIli IWMMnhr4 174 to pruning and fertilizing the plants. Reiently, high coffee prices have raised villager interest, and some of the villages are increasing their production of seedlings. The interest in increasing production has not yet increased interest in plant maintenance. The hill-tribes apparently do not think of maximizing the yield but use coffee as a low-input, secondary source of income. With the current increased enforcement of the ban on opium production, the need for income from coffee could change attitudes about maintenance. One of the U.N. villages, Ban Pui, has been receiving development assistance for 15 years and has a sizable coffee crop. Yet in 1986, it had the second largest acreage in opium in Chiang Mai Province. The Hmong farmers the'e hire labor from outside the village to handle the large production (coffee, opium, and red kidney beans). RFD Community Forustry A new RFD program is cal.ed Community Forestry and is oriented to agro-forestry. It helps farmers who wish to grow tamarind, cashew ntut, coffee, eucalytus, mango, and jackfruit on hillside land. RFD chose these types of fruit trees because os:their high survival rate and their market popularity. Department of Agriculture: Mae Chon Luang Research Station In the higher elevation areas, a native low-grade peach has been traditionally grown by the Hmong as a cash crop. It is sold to the lowlands for pickling. The Mae Chon Luang Research Station has made a considerable effort to grow a higher quality (Florida variety) peach and now has about 20 ha that have just started to produce fruit. They have helped a number of Hmong farmers to convert the traditional-variety trees to the high quality peach by grafting. The Florida peaches sell in the Chiang Mai market for about $0.75 to S1.0O per pound. This would provide a significant income to the highland ftrmers even though prices would fall with increased supply (no demand figures are available), and there is considerable loss during transport because of the mountain roads. The Mae Chon Luang Station uses small cardboard boxes that hold about 10 peaches to protect them during transport. The Hmong farmers have not yet been able to reap the benefits of their new peaches (except for home consumption) as they do not know of the fresh fruit 175 -55 uir d11 -t1 uY~lktJh1"rIMLL t 1TVflln1t -n1 ?fl-1 1LL~f mI hI IF1E ; . it u6 ii Ii ac NIfiL~~Im~:~i I~fiii . Jt.i s-i I L4 Ei1 f - I tl, 'A I .,;U1Eui i vi 111P~ J -,III 0 i 1i1'. lItibf1llt1XiIIil9 k L1~Uq.. 10 , li- t-4 v I fUr~ 1;;J~ IfI, ~ lj- 11 toi tli 1i. "l~9II. bi I ojj,- I~llf;tIfil1l I o;1 alj La if1 t149Z miivi.dJI t-mJ1i mffl1 -Yilmt ijinv in iS.' ja iid~n r a; a Lta L>t~ 1 11J1 (Ej6II7nqI~ ~La ti c EJJ 4 m UR"1 i tj l at jlulli6;41~~; I11,111 -1 mullIl t l o mI M t loi tt m v a v; a;a 176 market. They send their peaches to the local pickling plant in sacks (causing considerable damage to the peaches) and receive only a little bit higher price per pound than the traditional variety. The Mae Chon Luang Station has tested a number of potential fruit crops including plum, Japanese apricot, nectarine, passion fruit, pear, apple, and persimmon. Some nut crops are also grown at the station for observation. The passion fruit has had considerable success, and some of the hill-tribe villages have started to grow it. One advantage is that it has a thick, tough skin and therefore travels well. The price, however, is considerably lower than the peaches but still appears viable. Cor..traints The hill-tribe farmers are still hesitant about making any considerable investment in tree crops although they express interest. The farmers have a number of questions that need to be answered, mainly related to te:hnology and to the market. Because of the climatic conditions at the higher elevations, the highland farmer has a considerable advantage in being able to grow crops that cannot be grown in the lowlands and generally are -known to be of interest in lowland markets. Some varieties will have only a limited market, at first catering to the expatriate community and tourists (both in large number in Chiang Mai and Bangkok). However, the market can be expected to expand as more Thais have exposure to the new fruits. Already, imported apples, pears, persimmons, and plums are popular in Thai urban markets. There has been inadequate communication between the research people and those responsible for extension. Thus, even those fruit varieties that are now technically viable are not known by the agricultural extension workers and IF teams working in the temperate zone. The majority of extension workers and IF teams work below 800 meters, which is below the temperate zone. Not more than 30 percent of the Mae Chaem farmers work above this level. 177 *iEj~2ii 30 ta-imi n luhlm inl11I1:1I iiI ifI~ S. 1V~lUfv N~'timn11' -iiL i u aan('1o Ytuai Utl1 jujljNj , nI rivv)i ni l iIllaitai-vWUt -NVJ, I~Th1(IL~ 30j ' ,I 4,400IVLi "1, nil E)I FA'lI-N'j , tjU1J1''ii.'f I t - a iJlL-i- it aU1ir1 riQi ',In am11it iJ 11.J)J a wiifI -in firJ~i f12. ~~~Z J iJK JV1V1Vl11I1n1'UQU1t4J~ ?~ LiwvquLt~ iimi~IJlj 1U (i l11 ~ 57 V2Jj 3i )JIJ1!jl- (1 ahi li anU1U-jl11im-i itfl im 1 5 -1 1~1 51 LiY L MA~oooFJYI~lM i nr i i-sjV II-1iu-11 ~ AIJlmuI 178 The highlands could support a much larger population if the area were covered in fruit trees. The key to future expansion of tree and perennial crop production appears to depend on two factors: the transfer of technology and roads. It would be difficult for the project, in the two years that remain, to make more than a start in extending fruf . trec technology. Even this will be difficult given the need for considerable training. After the project, the tambon agricultural extension service will not have the resources to do much extension in the highlands. 12. Has Land Terracing Met Objectives of Improved Soil Conservation and Improved Crop Yields? Quantitative Target The project's terracing target of 15,600 rai was met. All terraces were bench terraces. .Areas covered ranged from 30 to 4,400 rai, distributed throughout 47 villages. Since all the work was done by hand, and considering the tremendous organizing and supervision efforts, the evaluation team was impressed that the target was met in such a short time (mostly since 1984). However, the project paper did not require all the land be put into bench terraces. It allowed for "various forms of terraces," including many types of simple terraces. Quality of Terraces Partly because of rushing and partly as a result of the supervisors' limited training, 1 all the bench terraces the team visited in three villages (Na Hong, Mae Na Chon, and Tung Kae) were not up to standard. The major faults the evaluation team observed on all terraces were: 1Most of them have only one weck training in this type of terracing work. 179 o iiaiiilv4-i - LN q L Oua -I~ivL uv Lmqjm1 m Ii IJ~L1l~'~'L~1J ~ ~ aJ~1-)iJ4r'~~l~I tif UTn11 i FilUi1,1111 W1f2i I lot9l l .NJ11" 'i Ltwi lli~iJ ILL L-i1~ n~'- l lv'6llA11P I 7twil VIE')M.I L6 I wr~fT~~tlIt i ~ I im183 ti~~b ~ I ~~hij i~i ji L JFnmN ul a:t4' iuL21ll~lrr .mi mLui m ~ fl 7 - 13 ~ ~ll~) ~ YhfiiiJL1Ji' Aiua q ihua 180 * Inadequate reverse slope (usually 5 percent); e The fill parts of the terraces and the risers (banks) were not properly compacted, and no grass or other veg"tation was planted on risers for protection (some terraces had just been completed); @ No topsoil preservation (optional); * No waterways; and e No evidince of proper maintenance. These faults, plus the farmers' practice of clean cultivation everywhere including the risers, have seriously damaged the terraces. If this is allowed to continue without repair and maintenance, the damage by animals to terraces will cause them to erode and gradually disappear. MCWDP and this evaluation have bcnefited from the research on soil conservation conducted by David E. Harper for a Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Hawaii. Harper compared soil conservation activities at three project sites, the Thai-Australian Agricultural and Social Development Project, the Mae Sa Integrated Watershed Development Project of the United Nations Development Programme, an.I MCWDP with two non-project control villages. Some of his findings are cited below. Among them was that Mae Chaem had the wide range of soil erosion reduction (7 183 tons per ha), suggesting "that many plots have terraces of questionable performance." Soil Improvement Because all the terraces were built without topsoil preservation, soil-improving practices such as composting, proper tillage on cut parts of the terraces, and mulching become more important if expected production levels are to be attained. These practices, with other agronomic measures (for example, crop rotation, 1 1711111;1Jn 11 t5 a I ijI tII1j ikwu -4' lw3 1111i~ 1 1J(aW)..IINtUI i t~ I1 111aa I1j 1ill,I I navallm a iJn hrw ui, - '4tu ' -ii i - .~lJTL 5PJU DUIll nw4 ~ptUlJ1~~IJ1 1Uz~fiU11 r1i~ D~JE~t 111IIU'lL w~l1~~ji!h~tl lj ' u ~flI~~ J~1~U1JrJEJ?Th~hI~i1fl1ttIJ1 ~ J1'NUi a4111U11f11VM60 o Nl .4114 111,41 19 4 q4 182 intercropping, and cover crops), are normally considered as an integral part of a conservation program. The team found little evidence of soil imp:ovement activities or agronomic measures on the newly built Ifrraces. Only a few farmers have used chemical fertilizers to improve soil fertility. Some farmers were practicing crop rotation, planting soy and mung beans two to three years after terracing. Most of the te.raced land seemed infertile, with poor soil structures and a lack of organic matter. The effec of DLD's demonstrations on soil improvement have been minimal. Use of Terraces The team found differing responses on the use of terr,:.es. Farmers in some villages use the terraces as swiddens while others have used terraces continuously since construction. The difference may result from their farming habits, land availabilit,, and to some extent the natural fertility of the individual land parcels. The,e are no figuies showing what percent of the terraces are being properly used (goc ! agronomic and soil conservation methods). One major impediment has been the lat..,f t,"ining provided by the project to farmers whose land has been terraced. They require training in how to use the terraces, not only in how to maintain them, but also in how to practice better agriculture on them. According to Harper: Even if farmers understand and implement structural conservation, thele is no assurance thai their yields will improve. Conservation packages for extension in LDCs must focus not only upon reductions in soil movement, 2 but also -- even primarily -- upon yield improvement or stabilization. Crop Production on Terraces Crop production on terraces is a subject of debate. Newly built terraces around the world usually produce less as a result of exposed sub-soils, unless proper soil improvement measures (such as those mentioned above) are undertaken. This is why 2 Harper and EI-Swaify, p. 19. 011 1~1flVIUMAiJ1 11a 17,1141'It) 1;1Pi2aaI I *[NI iiI ifIII2 -13J1l Jr)I "IIJ1)lIIw 1ILI1AV J lliOJif11 ~J~h)11I~I~41i~II1 '2 J~j1tJ11flUfl~ Itiu~~u . 60 ill (2,6u00 Tl11-ii) T~~ 300 ?i~(3.000 i~~ij ii~ I~ I~LflfUf~11 1 35.~Iyfl'fllV10 I41iwI~iU 11N1l-ti5Jj2flllaixJi~lJ i 2,ln1RoN, mlit 9.i -w-n;;-xnJ&)iy1~i1 LLat i iuiii' aw -I - ai 5)5 -o - I '.4i I1VNaI ll I011ni1T '3~ ii~t~i1'hiVI~UUU'~1 fl4~ illf LL 11ll1TflitlJ1lf? ib2IIINII11f l]Wi ;v nhJI ri'i uh :r mh'nI N u I I -l'r ur-1Iiian'I wll('2 LLI fl('iijuiiini t ILL.;\1~ui1 -ID1-I ~~l~i I Ili TJIIU 1fwinaJ l IJ "Sustainable Agricultural Developmnent in Northern Thailand: Soil Conservation as a±Component of Sucess in Assistance Projects" litU1AE) 'tnI gar.1II E)ai n il-EmimFl uiItzi v iiA0, 22-27 MnuIfu 2530, Iluflu, lao In,-.u'lj~uunu~*7)l' 81kliu l1 n60~UI~~IL~fi~E 184 many countries offer incentives to farmers at this stage to compensate for their losses or additional inputs. After a period of several years, dependin,, on soil management, the productivity of terraces can be much improved through tillage, fertilizer use, structural improvement, and moisture retention. According to some research results, upland rice is more responsive to moisture than to fertility. This may help illustrate the importance of bench terraces for upland rice. The team J'd receive some positive responses from farmers. At Mae Na Chon, one farmer said his pre-terrace rice production was 260 tang (2,600 kg) from 8 rai. After terracing, the same area has produced 300 tang (3,000 kg) for each of the last two years. He said he used chemical fertilizer after terracing and had confidence that the fertilizer would not be washed away. Two other farmers were also happy with improved production and told the team "terraces keep water" and "terraces work easier." At Na Hong, a farmer told the team his average rice production before and after terraces was 20 tang (200 kg) per rai and 35 tang (350 kg) per rai respectively. by using fertilizer and close planting. An increase in rice production on bench terraces may be due to a combination of factors and cannot be attributed to terracing alone. A big problem for farmers cultivating upland rice on new terraces is that after struggling to raise yields the first couple of years when the soil needs to be regenerated, they then start experiencing difficulty with weeds. Since labor is in short supply during the period that weeding must be done, the weeds end up decreasing yield. In swidden agriculture, a field is abandoned when the weed problem becomes too great. Some farmers are abandoning the terraces in the same manner. Farmers who can afford to purchase herbicides can avoid the problem. Most upland farmers cannot afford herbicides and must find other ways of managing the weeds or turn the terrace into a swidden. The project may be able to find ways for farmers to manage the weed pro'jlem, but labor shortages may remain a major impediment to a solution, to the extent that the AlP credit program cannot be expanded. (v4L~l'aal-Aml-i185 a - 33.5 1. (43 X 1.78 =33.5 U) ; R3,70 h ; frkv-ji2,50L 91i 1'7,600Ii)a61,1,1(9. L~U~7~J1LL15.5 -i141(~ iLfi il n-1n~a aon-n ih~ u--inltu ii W Iigin ifrt;mw'luLH?,Jumi iin-mo ;u 33. 1fliat1' iw'i AumiTr~jilu 1 U] (25 1J.:1. ) ; .nnomnnjhifl *. 10 1 ~~~lU tiaIM15 IaM11 u LUrb111JrMU1Wlh 1 10 ~ 25,000 t~vwm' (sila 156,250 Ii~) Dui'1hn&imj 186 Farmers in the Mae Chaem watershed were surveyed by Harper about their opinions on crop yields from bench terraces. The results were that 21 percent tiought crop yields were "improving a great deal," 60 percent responded "small to moderate impovement," 8 percent said "no improvement," and another 8 percent felt "yields declined."4 Impact on Erosion Control and the Environment According to a study of the Mae Chaem watershed by DLD (using the Universal Soil Loss Equation), the average erosion rate of the watershed is only 43 tons per ha per ycar. This average figure can be used until the project finds its own figures from the run-off plot studies. Normally, properly constructed and maintained bench terraces can reduce erosion 90-95 percent. The East-West Center found that the erosion reduction rate of Mae Chaem terraces was 78 percent. This may be a good first approximation. It means each ha of terraces saves 33.5 tons of soil per year (43 x 0.78 - 33.5 tons). A total reduction of 83,750 tons annually from 2,500 ha (15,600 rai) can be reached, provided the terraces are repaired and maintained. Even so, considering the total soil loss from the watershed is 15.5 million tons (estimated by DLD), this figure is in.ignificant. However, from environmental and ecological points, it may be significant. First, 33.5 tons per ha saved in terms of soil depth is approximately 2.5 mm. Without terraces, every 10 years an inch (25 mm) will be washed away which may need more than 100 hundred years to rebuild. Second, according to thg. East-West Center, I ha of permanently cultivated rainfed land could take 15 ha of swidden land out of use. 3David E. Harper and Samir A. EI-Swaify, "Sustainable Agricultural Development in Northern Thailand: Soil Conservation as a Component of Success in Assistance Projects", paper presented at the Workshop on Soil and Water Conservation on Steep Lands, March 22-27, 1987, San Juan, Peurto Rico, p. 7. 4 Harper and EI-Swaify, p. 14. 187 nfIA1A u IIi $Iqd'I L ~LUti 614l LbJYIMi -IMALJ~ I~1 'h~ h~~ iAI1U 1a~lninon ii fulnUh4 1~'T~11 1tii~11 -irZLTh 53 ft- U vw~.2525 2528 ~ir~i~ "-8,673,350 tjm 'h~fl1~u~u~1 14,052 1i LO.i!Jul'I 2,040 nrkl8'i 1 iU L u Ln@Efl 1,548 li1i1UhJf t-lUU llfUt~ul~ LI~i M~liQNb 6 11Uit:JIN 207 n- 6I MAfU; W IUI uL 877 W.J.11. @LflfIOMI 'Ii6 3 li1 bfkl4,MUMUAN0;uI - LL -1 -1. 47M±A'1MI' IIE 2,14 ufl11 lt i 24u n ('ii 188 The evaluation team believes that 1:10 may be the right ratio. If this is used, the 2,500 ha of terraced land could eventially replace 25,000 ha (156,250 rai) of swidden. Of course, all of this would depend on the terraces being repaired and maintained. Labor Inputs No data were provided by DLD on actual labor inputs to construct these terraces. However, an average of 2,000 balit was budgeted and spent fer construction of I rai of terraces. If the average payment per-person day was 38 baht, then 53 person days were used to construct I rai. Benefit-Cost Analysis From 1982 to 1985, a total of 28,673,350 baht was spent on building 14,052 rai of bench terraces, averaging 2,040 baht per rai. No actual cost figure was available for building the remaining 1,548 rai. Assuming a similar unit cost, the total construction costs could have reached 31,831,270 baht. Land slopes, width of terraces, soil types, presence of tree stumps, and labor efficiency are the determining factors of terracing cost. If an average slope of 20 percent is used .or building 3-meter-wide benches (flat part), the column to be cut and filled is calculated at 877 m s per hectare or 140 m3 per rai. Supposing the site 3 has few stumps, has medium textured soil, and a skilled worker can cut and fill 3m a day (85 percent efficiency), a rai needs about 47 per.son-days to complete. A total of 53 person-days per rai is acceptable because tree stumps usually existed in these areas and the workers were unskilled. Therefore, 2,014 baht is used as a unit cost figure per rai. Base Statistics The following is basic information from the IF team and DLD information sheets used in the calculation of the cost-benefit analysis of bench terraces. The year 1983 was used as the base year for the analysis. 189 ~--~2526 2528l ~ sf~i 25,m 208 258 3166 V7 7 136 188 3337 LL1U71 283 239 3233 ian 200 193 4555 il7uAu 153 230 1339 15630 qE~22~ a~4 b'4 , L~ral~71gl au~~e (aonuan n19Ja 190 Upland Rice Upland Rico, Bench Terraces Tambon Yield in 1983 Yield in 1985 Completed 1985 Chang Khoeng 208 258 3,166 Tha Pha 136 188 3,337 Mae Na Chon 283 239 3,233 Mae Suk 200 193 4,555 Ban Thap 153 230 1,339 15,630 Assumptions The evaluation team found it is necessary to make certain assumptions concerning upland use patterns, upland crop yields, and rate of land utilization. The assumptions are based on likely trends given past and current situations. a. Assumptions on land use patterns for upland terraced fields. Percentae of AUeas in Rate of Land Rate of Land Upland Soybeans Corn Utilization Utilization Tambon Rice in 1983"" 1984 and (%of land) onwards*** (I'o of land) Chang Keong 40 20 40 75 90 Tha Pha 90 10 - 75 90 Mae Na Chon 100 - - 30 75 Mae Suk 100 - - 30 75 Ban Thap 100 - - 30 75 ...... Not including land in the Land Settlement Cooperatives, a large corn producing area. * Approximates swidden type of agriculture. * Approximates more permanent type of agriculture. 191 n) JEiJJ1 tt 1 ftIIll1IifIii' %111 2526 MAUEjm i1'3L1' 40 20 40 75 90 wlr 90 10 - 75 90 ulqU1f 100 - - 30 75 LUJ~f 100 - - 30 75 1uiJ 100 - - 30 75 IM UivumiU Ina'I fltu'3flIflhl litflmLu' V FlT WASh L"M~irtn JiViflW3 uki iotaU 11MAVWY3 IA50, 1A~ut10 - 2~5 moritu zmaunl1Lfv~Jfhia=J 25 - 70 ('11i1L)1JZiJfL it was found that even on terraced land farmers allowed some fallow, but it is conceivable that fallowed areas on terraced land can be decreased to a minimum of 10-25 percent, considerably lower than the estimated 25-70 percent before terra,.ing is undertaken. b. Assumptions on increase in yields of upland crops. Percentage Increase in Yield over the Previous Period 1986- 1987 1988 onwards Phase I Area Phase I Area No further increase' 10% increase and Upland rice sustaining Phase If Area Phase II Area 15% increase 15% increase and sustaining ...oybeans...... no.....increase...... no.....increase...... Soybeans no increase no increase Corn no increase no increase * A 25-35 percent increase already achieved during 1984-1985 period. Discount Rate and Project Life A discount rate of 9 percent is used with an estimated project life of 20 years. 193 i ajj'f u tif] l rfjf4i.iTi i 1 II j~~J(I2J ~Vla - (3230~E- 2 tillu VU~Pllu)' II t FI1., 1 1 'b4 4J4 fli1 t u lonrulii - 25 -35 It hll a1 2S27 2 9 fl1~LL~' 11flU20 194 Direct Benefits (baht) ------Annual benefits from Upland rice* Other cash crops i. Increase yields 1984-1985 358,420 1986-1987 578,930 1988 and onwards 1,001,018 - ii. Increased rate of land utilization 1984-1985 1,288,894 273,880 1986-1987 1,457,994 273,880 1988 onwards 3,334,975 273,880 ...... * Priced at 2.5 baht/kg. ** Valued at 1,137.5 baht/rai for soybean, and 573 baht/rai for corn. At a discount rate of 9 percent and a 20-year project life, the direct benefits of bench terraces are estimated to be 239 million baht at 1983 prices. Direct Costs a. With 15,630 rai terraced at a construction cost of 2,014 baht per rai (53 person-days at 38 baht per person-day), the total cost of construction would be 31.48 million baht (1983 prices). b. If bench terraces can be constructed at a more efficient rate of 47 mandays at 27.5 baht per person-day (market wage rate for men - 30 baht, women - 25 baht per day), or 1,293 baht per rai, the cost of the construction would be reduced to 20.2 million baht. 195 2527 - 2528 358,420 2529 - 2530 578,930 2530 uTt 1,001,018 2527 - 2528 1,288,894 273,880 2529 - 2530 1,457,994 273,880 2530 kt~iU'lIJ 3,334,975 273,880 lMfl 2.5 uwvfl~ani ' aI:~l' 1,13-7.50 Ulola'li' Ikti-MIW"[ I&I 573.00 Ll'l'/A601i' vl7llaluaJ aat 9 unaLL- lomrln 20 IMI/7LIAIN 33.95 a7UUT1 17117IlA 'NlA. 2526 n. I'u.3r MA UJN IA u 15,630 Ii "la l ,,l~ 2,014 UrI-A6D!. (53 V U 6 U 38 'U-Y161E)'U) rtnVlmAL!U 31.48 5MIJtIV (fflIIJ11011 ".A . 2526) tA',1u 47 Fll-lU 011:11 Uta 27.5 uqlraflu ( 17 L L1. JW1J1U at 30 u1lJ ai U rua25 IJIn) laLtu1Th 1,293 ITlVI ia'li nllUUU 'l~U1'~ W11fl1'flh iL1J'120.2 i'V1UJ11 196 Indirect Benefits and Costs Indirect benefits of bench ten aces include such intangibles as quality of environment and a reduced rate of soil erosion. On-site benefits of a reduced rate of soil erosion are included in the increased value of production on farmers' fields. The direct benefits are also a result of the inseparable contributions of increased agricultural extension activities. The team will treat both intangible benefits with respect to environmental quality arid soil erosion, as well as project costs associated with agricultural extension activities as indirect benefits and costs, which will not be included in the benefit-cost ratio calculated in the next section. Benefit-Cost Ratio a. At 2,014 baht/rai, the benefit-cost ratio . b. At 1,279 baht/rai, the benefit-cost ratio - 1. Discussions on the Benefit-Cost ,AHtio of Bench Terraces The above analysis shows that, considering only direct costs and benefits, bench terraces would pay for themselves in 20 years only if agricultural extension activities can be intensified to ensure that farmers can increase, on a sustainable basis, the rate of land utiliation to about 75-90 percent rather than the previous rate of 30-75 percent. Moreover, the benefit-cost ratio is achieved on the assumption that, on average, about a 30-percent net increase in upland, rice yield is attained (after already allowing for increasing fertilizer costs). The benefit-cost ratio is imprcved if bench terraces can be constructed at 1,280 baht per rai rather than at 2,014 baht per rai. Tdie evaluation team found that the bench terraces could be constructed using 47. person days per rai at 25-30 baht per person-day. The fact that the DLD has been spending an average of 2,014 per rai shows a project subsidy of 721 baht per rai exceeding the potential long-term direct benefits to the farmers. Such an excess can be justified either by environmental or by welfare concerns. Conceivably, the direct benefits can be increased if farmers 197 watt~ UY1' ~E14,011U~1~lL~LI U~Y1 5' .7 -1w ,)uy -KM nl. Ll UU Uf 2,014 UiT11Dli 1JLllUl = 1.08 ?J.fl~~ 1U~U~J~UI1~1.279 U16@14L O7iCJ~uL1ThE tilu = 1.68 ')il11lm u~m1riafflutmflbfflh1 kndinaiinbiilU5.tt'-) lf~iaa 75 90 u Yltl 30 - 75 m~iEaukun~UL ~L 1Um~ a1'MN1UUlU, 100;WTII~IU'liatZ 47 P14-1U itat-IJ -IL 'T,1t 25 -30 U111~Jflu bI1lll ~ll21 11oiall f11 fJLYUU1lVI12lfli fro -n 11t 1J11 mh fi1 IJ-lI-lithut J11'k (lJ1JEl1111aflo1l1J1ltil 198 adopt more cash crops on the terraced land, but the evaluation team found no signiicant trend towards cash ,ropping in the uplands (see Issue 10 on cash-cropping). Sustainabilty The evaluation team has looked into two issues of sustainability: 1) the sustainability of the terraces already completed (for example, whether they have been or will be maintained), and 2) whether the villagers will build additional terraces by themselves without project fundinp. The team could not find any examples of good maintenarce on new and old terraces. For the second issue, the team also could not find any villagers who had built this kind of bench terrace on his or her own despite going to villages where this was said to have happened. However, the team did see some newly built paldy-type terraces in Mae Long. This should not be surprising because paddy terrace construction has been going on in northern Thailand for several hundred years. The major incentive is irrigated water and stable, diversified agricultural production. The construction of upland or rainfed bench terraces is different. The potential for yield increases is much less. The new bench terraces also need more inputs to restore soil fertility. Apart from DLD's direct hiring of villagers, there is no other incentive or cost-sharing program that can help the farmers build terraces. A major problem is that such terracing work needs a high initial investment that farmers cannot afford. There is no demonstration in the watershed to show that the cost can be paid in a short time. Harper reported that in Mae Chaem the major reasons for not undertaking conservation measures were lack of money and lack of labor. Alternatives to Bench Terraces The evaluation team did not find alternatives to bench terrace provided by the project in the watershed (the CARE project uses contour ditches). The only reason given by DLD for this sole focus was that bench terraces provided a possibility for 199 noladIaA 4EuIMIuhUli Itut I0,niUq'jluuuniuni 'Uhull,n~ sitn~i WatW l J ni :~ij,-n-ii yi ru nY1 TlwarJ&z 1 n4Uh1J211jvJ q'A17WJ N11J .US t(im-m'unitii'~ ~lJL~ fl 11y LaLflhl 11 IJ Flhl II~J1Yl L U i~ui-uuhL U~JuA~~~~~~~~~~~~~17 1M1UDViii IifsimiI 200 irrigation in the future. The team did not fin ' any evidence that irrigation potential was used in selecting sites. Also, there was little evidence that water sources would be available. Although bench terraces havo many advantages over other types of land treatment, such as to facilitate irrigation, they are not usually applied to slopes below 12 percent (for economic reasons) and above 35 percent (for maintenance reasons). The team, however, did find slopes outside this rangc bench terraced within the project area (for example, in Mae Nan Chon and "Tang Kae). This may be due to improper planning. On slopes below 12 percent (and occasionally up to 20 percent), contour bunding, hillside ditches, and contour grass ba,'riers can be effective in erosion control. According to a study in zhe Mae Sa watershed, contour bunding and hillside ditches were found almost as effective as bench terraces in reducing erosion -- 80-90 percent of the effectiveness of bench terraces at one-fourth the cost. On slopes of 35-50 percent, fruit trees and agro-forestry are the alternatives to upland rice and bench terracing. Individual basins and :,,.hard terraces can be used for effective erosion control. Their combined cost is about one-third of bench terra.ing. For mid-slc.-es (12-35 percent), intermittent terrm ces or convertible terraces, which alternatively terrace one-third of the slope and leave two-thirds at the original slope have been tested in the Mae Sa watershed and found very effective in controlling erosion (80 percent of the effectiveness of bench terraces). The cost is only one-third of bench terracing. There are also two types of bench terraces. In low rainfall areas where soil infiltration rates are high, level bench terraces with a 15 cm dyke on the risers (such as paddy, can absorb all rains, providing moisture for crops. At piaces where rainfall is high and intense, reverse-sloped bench terraces are built with proper reverse slope (5 percent), horizontal slope (below I percent), outiets, and waterways for safe disposal of excess runoff. All the new bench terraces built in Mae Chaem are of this type, but no waterways have been installed. If irrigation is possible, the paddy type should be constructed. 201 na IIMI3 rcflUL)J'Lfat 0 InZJ1f3fl-1 35% - wwlrll3fW111,fV(13L -II- nlfl1 iMA-A- IL3 thr 1iuriuri1an'12(.-4 lui I 20% Wi'i3 lll U~1I~Tau T~1L1 f11UU1t@1JJ-tiLN'L LU'A1iC *JE)m1Jd1 f 3U3J'3.t1 ~-WET'P111 fli~ ~3~ IJ?14U Il 1JIutpr I Fju1i o0 - g0 iL~ lvVU3.J%IN1~tJV~LI)n -11 M M110 i 3 3 50 I-Eti U'~W1lu 3 t'f2 tta ,rnu C11,1M- If'-11 S Iiuu If%5% .r iI1,IlL t a 11Ei J3Jlitl1161U M *: -mThniLr AJntjl11U ii w4si-.!JWA I k lli'l a iivtn a1u 5- cS i ii 5 - jr. S'tu a- I -II-II t;jj-I all.11 Su ~~~~~~~~aju226viifi' l i3~i ~uI~dJ~}~I12~ ~ i n~u Tuvi3t-2U 'uiiii mI1 faim~T~12 11s4 iruL 202 Strategies of Other Projects MCWDP was intended to provide an example for other watershed development projects to follow. Most other projects that could learn from MCWDP have iot been set up as waterzhed projects but as upland and hgidiand area development projects. Their objectives are similar to MCWDP, but their strategies are different. Each project appears to be less interested in what it can learn from the other projects and more interested in developing its own strategies and providing examples for others to follow. The same can be said for MCWDP. It had the lengthy and carefully studied experience of the Mae Sa Watershed Development Project to use as an example. Yet the lessons learned about soil conservation in that project were not applied in MCWDP. The other projects have approached their work in a manner that allows lessons to be learned and communicated. Their approach was much more analytical than that of MCWDP. The evaluation team found a number of studies that have been conducted by these projects on soil conservation and farming. In general, the findings of the Thai-Australian Highland Agricultural and Social Development Project, the Thai-German Highland Development Programme, and the Thai-Norwegian Church Aid Project showed that contour grass strips were the most cost-effective form of soil conservation. All three projects have been successful in getting farmers to adopt this method, albeit with varying amounts of assistance, but none paying the farmer and other laborers the full cost of their labor. 13. Have Water Control Structures Increased Land under Irrigation to Meet Project Targets? Target Achievement The project had planned to construct 102 small-scale waterworks to increase available water supplies to existing flood irrigated land as well as to facilitate additional flood-irrigated and non-flood-irrigated cropland. The waterworks actually constructed can be compared with those planned in the project in term of quantity 203 13. ~ l~i~ J111 ilM 21" U~4Ll~" 1WU~12U ?l VE o ~ ~ ~ 2 Mi A lL 35~'iIt'fU13 l Uliihiui 4 LM' mu mmmu 2" 3914JI11 I~U71N ~ ~ l1~l1:i~6 J1~fl1Aut- - UrnJiu1~~T'lUL~JU 1J~141U 13 uait 15 tii 'lc 1i IU 1JV1 ' N 'j1 1J2J 1~.'li(Lu 31Jf ~J lhaUL9l1i'l~Jrf 13 u I A 1U1T O1ulu 7 uWIV 2 I 9l 204 * Rehabilitation of 31 weirs, short of the 35 planned; * Construction of five ponds, as planned in the project (small water impoundments); * The 62 new weirs planned have not been constructed; @ Items built, but not in the project plan, are three small reservoirs and four potable village water systems. The rehabilitation of weirs also includes rehabilitation of 62 water-channeling structures such as flumes, canals, and pipe culverts. The actual construction fell far short of the target. One reason for this is that the 39 waterwork projects planned for tambons Ban Chan and Bo Sali were canceled when these tambons were removed from the project. Another reason could be the unanticipated high construction costs. Rough calculation indicates that the construction cost of the 43 waterworks (62 water channels are considered to be part of the weirs) totals approximately 30 million baht. This cost does not include the feasibility study, design, and overhead costs of the DLD pcrsonnel involved. The project plan estimated a total cost of 59.3 million baht for the 102 waterworks planned. ,till another reason for the targets not being met were that the POU did not see them because other organizations including the Royal Irrigation Department were also constructing waterworks in the area. A comparison of planned distribution and actual construction in the various tambons is shown in the following table. 205 11'r 3 i-lua lju ~u 3,800 3,900 30 a1JU1 1 3,300 2,100 13 9 u1n 1,500 900 15 2 taaa 1,100 700 9 - Yiwq1: 5,300 300 19 4 1UU 900 100 4 3 5,800 - 7 13 97 31 ,j I n1YIIJ1qU,1' lui -1vt ri'utlaln ll'infunLI i n Lu@qinrnmn-m@u auu f111 LIJu14IqtjvIUmf-l4J tJU 206 TABLE 3 WEIR DISTRIBUTION SITES Existing Wet Potential No. of Weirs Tambon Rice Area Increase in (rai) Wet Rice Area Planned Actual (rai) Ban Chan 3,800 3,900 30 - Mae Na Chon 3,300 2,100 13 9 Mae Suk 1,500 900 15 2 Bo Sali 1,100 700 9 - [ha Pha 5,300 300 19 4 Ban Thap 900 100 4 3 Chang Khoeng 5,800 - 7 13 Total 97 31 Mae Na Chon and Mae Suk had nine and two waterworks constructed respectively, short of the planned 13 and 15. Chang Khoeng, where there seems to be abundant water supplies and no potential increases in irrigated land, was supposed to have only seven waterworks but had 13 constructed, a similar situation as in the road rehabilitation program. In the Phase 11 area, water was less available and a lack of roads made it difficult for DLD to access the area. It is doubtful whether the major project concern, ". . .that the truly poor inhabitants of the watershed receive a fair share of the benefits," has been fulfilled. Adequacy of the Waterwork Structures Good engineering practices had not yet been established in the engineering division of the DLD during the initial stages of the project. Proper site investigation was not performed before the design work. Important information necessary for constru :ion control was not included in the design plan and construction supervision was poorly organized. As a result, there have been many problems with waterworks. Water leakage through weir foundations and abutments were reported in the early stages of the project. A timber-stone weir at Ban Mae Pan settled so much that it covd no longer be used. Two reservoirs at Ban Pang 207 U 10~, in~iiUt Wil Im m Ii lo1 'liILL 111 VIL'1114: ' -11l~ t ImVI 10 v WfJW tmJ11 1Tho-,n I1 E,-,-liiIL~f 5,0 - 4091in a i tI i-ii E n-Iil1UiIc,~o i iii n-51t; a i j t E F uun a 61 O1 iium7 hf - Il'n I1Ia~ivi~ I'l1~1~11I0.0umhi~-11 1n I f1- ru t Yil. Fi II 14~lJ1J z~JUU1 rU I4 1nil iv 0f-1&J l1 0 .f IV 1)'1l1 InV~li t 601'111 VIJ150n~1 a lJZ I ' (L J0 1101 L o~UJCk~Uo ,l l *I L,011fl 6111 ,jI fl41 T 1 3 X 11 10 L lJ 1 .5- - - . 11UI1: 1W'l 1 1017 flE1I1101111trL.t I n0IJI1II1 zit9J1 t WiJIII llII i E h U 91 'O9l 5 11--3 208 Hin Fon and Ban San Pa Tung could not hold water as a result of it seeping through the embankments. The situation improved in later stages of the project as DLD engineers learned from their experience. As in road construction, contractor inefficiency contributed to the poor quality of work. One problem for the contractors in this case is that it is difficult in the watershed area to find the large number of skilled laborers required for concrete works. Most of the weirs constructed were of the stone masonry type, an appropriate choice since stone and sand are available at most construction sites. The only major construction material transported to the sites was cement; very little reinforcing steel was required. The construction method used, however, was not labor intensive as intended. The contractors usually used a back-hoe to do the foundation excavition. On average, for a weir costing about 600,000 balit, approximately 5,000 person-days of labor were used, amounting to 30-40 percent of the total cost. Sediment is a major problem for all weirs in Mae Chaem. The weirs constructed had no excluder system. Even if they had, it would not have been effective since the rate of soil erosion is very high. Instead, the weirs were designed with one or two scouring sluices through their body to facilitate removal of sediment in the reservoir upstream of the weir. Large accumulations of sediment in the upstream reservoir of all weir , visited indicate that the scouring sluices have not been properly operated. The sluices necd to be kept ooened as much as possible during wet seasons when large amounts of sediment are carried into the streams. Village potable water systems designed by the DLD are an almost complete system. A system for 50 households, costing about 120,000 baht, consists of a storage tank and two filter tanks. Villagers have to supply and install the pipe themselves. There is still, however, a problem with this system. The water sources usually come. directly from streams or irrgation channels. 209 L Iiio 'lul V luit I1lu mht'aui 4 i-i 2 - 3 L101 1% 1:JUJI11 146 fl 11JlW)(UI 0. 12 Mo fill 2 13ill 300 -400 1bu Iii' luI i~rni120 ~u~ ~111ULL~ iii1~rJ-~ThgillT L' lrILU M Lir rVlUY3o7 L~cau.~UY1~flUhm.Lc'1j J'~46tlflut a ML4I~Efl l a)iu ~J~572iEf1 LU 3754 finjiJ'1)Vktli ciU'1 JWciflT IIiiLJ ~~~~~~~4 M~ 1ai il~L 1~r~&~l4f4L~ 2.0LCt6.0 1-Y'0i ,n ; tln1tmJall~Im lil~J911ll IVS)L ll '3TI1 tJ 52 flU 11i 252L lj14nIavori o~ v' 210 During wet seasons, the sediment is so great that the filter tank quickly clogs. All systems have been provided with back-flush valves for washing out the trapped sediment, but it has never been used successfully either as a resu" of product ineffectiveness or mishandling by the villagers. In some villages the filter is taken out for cleaning, and in other villages the water is just allowed to bypass the filter tank, causing slow damage to the pipes and outlet valves. Benefits of the Waterworks Besides providing more water to the irrigated fields, rehabilitation of the old weirs has provided other benefits. Old weirs, usually bamboo-log-crib type, have often been washed away during heavy rain. If not, they have to be torn down and rebuilt every two to three years to replace the rotting timbers. An old hand in the area told the evaluation team that, to build a weir I meter high and 3 meters wide, 300-400 timbers 0.12 meters diameter and 2 meters long, and 120 person-days were necessary. Weir rehabilitation benefits dry-season farming more than wet-season farming. In wet seasons when there is an abundant amount of water in the streams, efficiency of the systems is not a problem. Therefore when considering the benefit of a weir, emphasis should be placed on the potential for dry-season farming. A weir would not be of much benefit to rice paddy land in the highlands where the water is too cold for a second crop and in streams that dry out in dry seasons. Village potable water systems seem to have the most impact on the daily life of the population. Water is used for many purposes: drinking, cooking, bathing, and washing. A villager i.: Mae Malo told the evaluation tean. that he uses the water fir his coffee plantation near his house. The benefit/cost ratio of the waterworks cv:., be estimated by comparing the increase in the Lultivated area of irrigated land and the increase in yield on existing irrigated land with the total cost of the waterworks. The increases in cultivated area and yield are obtained from the IF team survey report. Only benefits from wet 211 S2528 4,10111"Nt I'rMMA4 II d11U !v'nqj 0.72 fl 11.1qllixjq1Jftgq fl nu 3. 10 v,=JIuLTAIMn t: niil 4 22526 2528 12,153 12,904 -51 4,314,315 ..238 4,454 216 1,073,930 .:, " , 388, 2-'5 rJ~Jt I~!i~t9 Ui 1~20 'UIlfU53,918,815 11111 22526 1 2528 L I .J~~ 10 11f1r4'iuI mi 17 15,787,039 llULLun71n3. 101,578,704 7I17 117,365,743 8e 7eS 8 =3. 10 212 rice and soybeans are included; benefits due to other crops are considered negligible. Yields for wet rice and soybeans are assumed to be 572 and 375 kg per rai, respectively. The increase in the yield of irrigated rice paddy is assumed to he 140 kg per rai, v id no increase in the yield of soybeans ;s asumed. In the uplands, soybeans are planted in place of rice rather than as a second crop. Unit prices for ricc and soybeans are assumed to be 2.5 and 6.5 baht per kg. The total cost of the waterworks is the sum of contract prices of all waterworks cc ipleted from 1983 to 1985 plus a 10-percent allowance for overhead, operating and maintenance costs. The figures from the project's 1985 prosress report show a much larger increase in benefits than the figures from the IF team survey repurt. The benefit/cost ratio is 0.72 with figures from the IF team report and 3.10 with figures from the progress report. The evaluation team believes that the figur.s from the IF team report are more reliable. TABLE 4 BENEFIT/COST ANALYSIS OF WATERWORKS DEVELOPMENT Crop Paddy Area Paddy Area Paddy Area Paddy Area in 1983 in 1985 Increase (rai) (rai) (rai) (baht) Wet Rice 12,153 12,904 751 4,314,315 Soybeans 4,238 4,454 216 1.073.930 Total 5,388,245 Assumes a 33 percent increase in yield for rice that is maintained over time. Total benefit at 9 percent discount rate per year for 2C years is 53,918,815 baht. Cost includes the contract price of all waterworks between 1983 and 1985 and 10 percent of this figure for operating cost and overhead. Contract price 15,787,039 Operating cost/overhead 1.578.704 Total cost 17,365,743 Benefit/cost ratio is 3.10. 213 ~ T I1r'1uJ1tI Visil -u~fJUI iltj 1J 11 )'nin1 Ufl~t i -i i ih4''i(ii 1E i e6~J-111 ~1J3ULiiV~1 Pffl~lh.~h1rJ~L E1 HA~1~~14~L 91Lfl~i -1V)!M1 11! 1. m ta tua. i-an- ? .5 I. - a u %I VL~~I~V.~1 l91~L91 ~ flfl.~~jlV iil f1 .6fuiliLLun 14. Ik&fuimuda au'~iL~flth 214 Sustainability Sustainability is not a problem for the waterworks constructed. A water distribution system is a life-line to villagers; they have shown the interest and willingness to keep it running. The concrete weirs are robust. What little maintenance is needed is within tile capability of most villages. The problem of sediment accumulation in the reservoirs upstream of the weirs can be easily solved if villagers schedule water usage and regularly operate the scour sluices. The potable water systems are more troublesome and often need repair. However, most villagers realize this and are prepared to look after the system themselves. For example, a committee has been set up in Mae Malo to look after their village potable water supply. Each household is charge I baht per month, set aside as a maintenance fund. 14. Has There Been a Decrease in Opium-Producing Areas and Production? Background The opium poppy has a long history of cultivation in the Mae Chaem watershed. It is an important crop to highland farmers, both in meeting an immediate consumption need and in serving as a cash crop. Although the hill-tribe farmers have long dominated poppy cultivation, some lowland Thai farmers have been shifting up to the highlands after their rice-planting season (August and September) to benefit from the high prices that opium obtains. 215 i,)mvwj-m ni wu i-L.ui wfIjIuI- 3 1I-,11n UilnolhV,)DIflFul VI11114 1IfL lwUIN01N1431ili ~ -uJ I IIJWU 11j luhjlf L~ ~lTP Iulul I MW 1 LO.Iu~an( . 13~ - 57 l11JfU ~~~~~~(2I~~l 90P.I uh *' -''6 tS '1 3 160F o -~ - C - S S 5 -- n- u n -- m. ou '.9.2 -4 W UiiU 1) ;vUn nu~ bYU U~~~h~~~nniWUU~~~21Twil1L~lUl1tvJ ~Ektarn lf l'll *u-4jipi 09.l4-o i j tt n r3 ru l ; in LLF4 iJTUULA 216 From the beginning, MCWDP has not intended to tackle the opium cultivation problem. The project paper reasoned that ". . . opium production in the Mae Chaem represents only a small fraction of the total output of North Thailand and relatively few of the watershed's inhabitants are engaged in opium-poppy cultivation." Rather, the project aims to provide ". . . a range of income-producing alternatives to the villagers: it is believed that both the short-term and long-term effect would be to decrease opium production." Current Production Levels Three Hmong project villages have significant opium production, whereas many othcrs, including Karen villages, produce mainly for local consumption. The largest of the three, and the second largest opium-producing village in Chiang Mai Province, Ban Pui, was a key village of the United Nations Crop Replacement Project for 12 years (1972-1984). Because of this long history of development assistance, and because the Public Welfare Department still provides special assistance to the village, it was not included as a part of MCWDP. Although thi3 is a Hmong village, a large number of lowland Thai farmers also use land in this area for opium production. A survey of the three major opium-producing villages in late 1986 showed that opium was still being produced in large quantities. The producing area in Ban Pui covered 1,205 rai (193 ha), in Pang Ong 793 rai (127 ha) and in Mae Waag 268 rai (43 ha) for a t ,tal of 2,268 rai (363 ha). Pang Ong is the third largest opium producing village and is also not a project village due to its inclusion in the Royal Hilltribe Project. Without counting the smaller production areas in the watershed, the production level is 16 percent of the total estimated production of Chiang Mai Province. Eradication Campaign The eradication campaign in early 1987 destroyed about 60 .,ercent of the opium crop in Mae Chaem according to district authorities. The Third Army had contracted the Border Patrol Police to eradicate 40 percent of the crop. The district police 217 ,v~~tI~ ~ ~~1 flu-i 341 viii 1~h fL~U f111i 65~ tjiljllm 1flT tjit Liuk 1.25 521~ i uI( -50. 341 -,r n" ~r~i~ L ~L~171 o'fl i2J 'L1Jfl4.5 a 1fti ifiunii60 191tt ai mju~flnla 9 2 J1~~LJ 4~CJUJ 9-u IliaE ",.f. 2528 mJim 38 UL 1U14U 23 -30 gu lu "i.91. 2529 (fltnuA-flul'ui 2530) aJJtj-ilnm13j J4 EU1iL J1fllPI 1,000 .~S-. - ~ - ±!j ~~~~U~~ JI1J(~1~VlL~q1~11 i~~~Li~Iu~~I1uL UU1- n~~i Ih 9-9 n 9- V-9 218 funds from the volunteered their help (with some minor expenses covered by personal help that pushed up project's deputy administuative director). It was this volunteer for the villagers' on the eradication figure the extr, 20 percent, leaving the rest that the available budg,-t use. The 40 percent target was estimated from access of the crop in Pan would have allowed. The RTG plans to eradicate a large portion assistance. Pui this coming year as result of its long histoy of replacement crop Detoxification project has likely The drug detoxification progirm being implemented by the and this may have had an effect, albeit a minor one, on local demand for opium, of 341 persons have slightly reduced the current amoun cultivated. A total in a number of villages graduated from the Narcotic Detoxification Center. A survey drug free. If two months after graduation showed that about 65 percent remained average consumption per addict is 521 grams per year (a very conservative estimate), 710 kg, which the addict population of Mae Chaem of 1,361 persons would consume at 1.25 kg per rai). required about 568 rai to produce (average production estimated treated, there would If the center had a 50-percent success rate for the 341 persons equal to 89 kg of be 171 fewer addicts and a decrease in demand of 12.5 percent includes coverage for opium and about 74 rai. The project extension plan further decrease local detoxification of all addicts in the project area, and this will opium demand. Prices they receive. An incentive for the farmers to grow opium is the very high price price this year Fourteen years ago, the price went as low as about $19 per kg. The reports of sales was estimated at about $196 per kg at a minimum. The team heard At this high made at almost double that price, but this could not be confirmed. may conclude price, no legal replacement crops can even come close to opium. One program. that the high price reflects the low supply as a result of the eradication 23 to 30 tons Production in Thailand was about 38 tons in 1985 and perhaps between is estimated in 1986 (harvested early 1987). However, production next door in Burma country. Since to be as much as 1,000 tons, one of the largest harvests ever in that 219 r~fuoilolli ~ ni 1li~al'3iuum ~illJf~ 15 LA-1f~~ 1~n ~11Y~ iJori-rnw) I r% -i-iNy tIliuniAJ;1- l~hin9 mi mi -iiwn ,1-urnzn-7hn111UAUIIUA S. S . 5- 5- -Ili-it- S., r~~ ~nu i 9hiwi1jirni Y1 rnnNta u'l191FhIFl4 111"n imal NlU i I'9 9 J9 ri fil vi 05-- 1 M ) iF 1m inl iIioi b.E 9' 1,jloflL7 - 10 Lir1 9 9 n1LVJL l~si 'mLnt~fIJ1~1~NJfh1 LL~ mm U~~ ~hii~I0if Vr olm1Y mlivthtlmli iIFJIt -iltiulmi 1 nnil U~uufa iii~i') li jly) ;Ll~ flJ 220 much of this flows through Thailand, local production should not be affecting price. The evaluation team was not able to clarify why the opium price was so high, given the large supply. Crop Replacement Programs Crop replacement programs have been operating for 15 years, but, without enforcement of the opium ban, many of the farmers have used the replacement crops to supplement their opium production. The Hmong hire labor for opium and cash crop production. The major constraint is land, but apparently there is still enough available to handle increased production. Swiddens may be left in fallow for shorter periods and this can reduce yield, but not to the point where it is not economically viable. Some swikden land is lost each year to RFD tree planting. There was little to no enforcement of the ban on opium production until two years ago as the RTG acknowledged that the farmers had little else to plant. The RTG did not want to impoverish the farmers to the point where they would actively fight for survival. The current eradication program is not strongly supported by the RTG as crop replacement has still not had much success. The program is, in part, a reaction to U.S. government pressure. Although Thailand has its own drug abuse problem, eradication of the local opium crop will not change the drug abuse situation because of the enormous quantities available from Burma. For the Mae Chanem addicts, eradication will force them to buy imported opium at higher prices. There is alreajy a waiting list for the detoxification program so the higher prices will not directly affect the number of addicts being trL-ated. The eradication program may affect the crop replacement program. Annual crops have not been found to produce much income and are generally unreliable. Kidney beans and coffee have been the mcst promoted. The yield of kidney beans is low with many areas reporting about five beans harvested for each bean planted. In the Ban Pui area, the yield is 7-10:1, which is, although still low, enough to make it worth planting, but far from the return achieved from opium. Coffee is a potential 221 ot u1@mamiUani-ivii1U4 '"1V5L1h6r 1nLi~iniuli~~vnsn fl1Wfli~flhLL~JIL~ ~~U'b v~1.2520 fLflh lflTi i~A11 1.1.2520 -2525 mUrUrij!hIfflLU ohO :527i kNU~IiflhUDI)1N in5I iiOJfl 6 b.0. 2523t~wiSIh,V wj 1n U 5. 2llfljJFI 1 Iu~ ~f Ll ".9~53i~1. 2127U 1111 I m~MVInV J I ir sIIIY61 !mwAIIIV' . ). 0.Iflf ' VA. 2528 ~ JISL 1 . 1U1 iia 1.t-Z 404 jyl lihtVt.1. 2,30 aLit91 I1(-1u 800,000 ~u 1 iC11'y r61 2527 -2529 K imllrifit u l' iL u~nufli1' toii-jamiu 'mnvi l 1?'3 t &JU-111JL-1 L ~qV8 l~~l1 t~nbvmatl iUi riY11 222 replacement crop but requires considerab!e labor to obtain the full benefit. Most hill-tribe farmers grow coffee with no inputs, getting the minimum yield which, although very low, is cost-effective given the low cost. (See Issues 10 and 11 for more information about cash crops and tree crops.) The eradication program is likely to change farmer attitudes about opium production. The risk level has increased, changing the economics. The potential return will need to be very high to compensate for potential loss. Many farmers are afraid tl.ey will lose their entire opium crop, but they have little choice but to cultivate at least some land for opium as the lack of viable replacement crops leaves them with no alternative. They are more interested in replacement crops and will likely use resources to plant coffee or othcr perennials to reduce their dependency on opium production. 15. Has the Mae Chaem Cooperative Met Farmers' Marketing Needs? Background The Mae Chaem Cooperative was initially set up in 1977 with 183 members, mostly from tambons Chang Khoeng and Tha Pha. From 1977 to 1981, the cooperative struggled in its operations because of inefficiency and corruption. In 1982, the Department of Cooperative Promotion (DOCP) instituted a program to upgrade the cooperative by: s Employing three full-time direct hire personnel (a manager, an accountant, and a credit officer); and * Supporting the cooperative financially. An amount of 5.2 million baht was approved as a revolving fund for buying and selling rice after 1984. The cooperative ha also been supported by BAAC, which has been providing credit at a low interest rate since 1980. The amount borrowed from BAAC totaled about I million baht annually from 1980 to 1984. BAAC loans to the cooperative increased to 1.45 million baht in 1985 and 1.9 million baht in 1987, and 223 L i141~fl'v~ ~Jc V. f1. 2626 J1UI u~i~r~nAU L' UflJ1UIW 1.3 auY lrJtixPl Wu M.O. 2529 11fIiU14556 riuL 1fl)i 4 lu~rnl vi.O. 2527 - 2529 ny1fif1W f1LV22flU Lf1 f'14 mwa 2524 - 2526 't,UN--uUm1dflu'I i1T! iJt1aUl1t1.l114Inflf~ 1.& 2529h 0'Ulf1 ' 1-4J uE~tflU14fliUl uvirq1. 2525l ~fl1V1~1~i'14Tli 2523 - 252@F5ful VIA.~U~41~2525 ainm' 1Tl ~L~IJ16- 0 ~~jl~l~1 L~'l4~2527- 25291l1~1LLiJJ4 1 I@Uat 80 - 85 T~a'11411' i4' nicuj1f1Wil-i -arn UlJ1h1~h14l1 u . - 224 are expected to increase to 2.14 million baht in 1988. BAAC and DOCP loan, are serviced annually. However, BAAC debts each year have ranged from 800,000 to I million baht from 1984-1986. However, the cooperative has managed to completely repay all loans from DOCP on an annual basis. This is a rare achievement for cooperatives in Thailand. During the first few years of MCWDP operations, the project did not support the cooperative operations because USAID did not approve tl"e project's subsidization of the cooperative. As a result of a change in management strategies and constant demands from the cooperative, the project finally agreed in 1985 to provide necessary storage facilities and equipment totaling approximately 1.3 million baht. General Performance The performance of the cooperative has improved gradually through the years. The number of members increased to 556 in 1986 with about 20 percent being residents of tambons Mae Na chon and Mae Suk. The cooperative profit-and-loss statement showed increasi,;g profits from 1984 to 1986, reaching a peak of 193,062 baht in 1986. The profit increases were initially slow because the cooperative had to cover previous losses from 1981 to 1983. The cooperative has expanded its operations in credit, markLting, and the cooperative shop, as well as in a saving program by members. By 1986, it had nearly 1 million baht in savings deposits from its members. Loan Repayment The cooperative has provided loans to its members under two conditions: first, by demanding land titles as collateral and, second, by demanding five-person (minimum number) group guarantees on repayment. Loans to members in 1982 amounted to 361,000 baht, increasing every year thereafter, reaching 1.5 million baht i'i 1986. Loan repayment rates from members were low during 1980-1982, ranging from 16 to 50 percent of the amount due. From 1984 to 1986, however, repayment rates improved to 80-85 percent. The cooperative management reported that a small 225 ~i~fl~YJ111 11~J21527 -2529 1 U 11t LfrnJ' 1~a~jUJ~fnl1 L mjU~E.,vm(U.1 0j,11ii 't EMOMI1? L 1m ll lumaJ1 Lou n ~~~ ~ ~ i , i I) j nia t- .11. .. 't - 252 orV1. 6i l - l t M 1 S - &,iinI Iit t, I i i I-.io v~~uflL11t L~L ,'ri'd1 114V 140 I ij,4F TIVIJ~rI'kL1 * ~~,It u oltvlftm~f ni tyr TlU:lwi L kai ~ Ln614 vaiiiL 226 proportion of loans to be repaid were delayed, but all members repay their loans with some grace period (with interest) allowed. As for the repayment of BAAC loans, the cooperative was able in 1984-1986 to repay the previous year's debt. The outstanding debts to the BAAC were usually current debts borrowed during the particular year and not yet due. Long-term Viability A closer examination of the cooperative's financial statements revealed that, despite the apparent improvement in the cooperative management and performance, the question of its long-term viability is still open to discussion. Two items are worth illustrating here. The accounting profits that were shown in the cooperative profit-and-loss statements were arrived at without making deductions for subsidies from DOCP (amounting to about 60,000-70,000 baht in 1984-1986), and depreciation of USAID-funded assets. When these items are taken into account (that is, exclude the DOCP subsidy, include the depreciation of USAID-funded assets), the cooperative, although it is improving its performance, has not enjoyed any profits since 1981. Without carrying forward the resulting losses in 1984-1985, it just about broke even in 1986. Although for RTG technical reasons, these items are not to be deducted from annual profits cf the cooperative, one should allow for them. In the long run, the cooperative must be able to survive on its own funds and be able to generate profits to replenish depreciated assets. With careful management, the cooperative can further improve its performance and profit situation. The higher risks and expenses of its rapidly expanding credit and marketing programs, as well as its growing administrative expenses (consisting mostly of salaries of cooperative employees), could conceivably undermine its potential success. Achievement of Project Objectives The cooperative was supported by project management to provide a means whereby the project population's transition to cash cropping cou!_ be facilitated, 227 L nuti, lrj3Ui i inPo 1 fl'j, 1Ln1iir AM \ in,'Li~i~jih nhi~U~Th10 "'~1~ll~mn~x~ I~iflfl-)111l'1 In .' LuFJ E jiii t-m ii- Nn.,fl5- - tau Uat.ll..~lllX t t ly.4l1 lii@j ml) oj m t~i-u~ n-i-cu1 br W-~ th i1MIt ll@lck~ 1 'h m6lniiim . StS. v inaa ;Fi ; ur.u nb± li'm~ L.. I~ S.mwii LaU t on4 I1~kifY~L n~~D~~J~Wf1IJ' 228 soybeans, garlic, and corn as well as providing agricultural inputs for improved production It has engaged, to a certain extent, in the marketing of milled rice and household consumer goods to its members as well as for the larger population of the project. The cooperative has, however, been caught in a dilemma between serving a wider population and sustaining a successful operation. At present, the vast majority of the members are lowland Thais and are concentrated in tambons Tha Pha and Chang Khoeng. Considering tile whole MCWDP area, the cooperative can serve less than 10 percent of the population in terms of credit provision. In terms of the marketing of cash crops, coverage is greater than 10 perceut, however, as non-members can also enjoy this service of the cooperative. It is mainly the larger soybean, garlic, and corn growers who benefit from the cooperative's services. To the extent that farmers cannot grow these crops (for example, because of the lack of irrigation or sufficient accessibility) and to the extent that farmers are Karen, Lawa, or Hmong, the benefits from the cooperative are negligible. Impact on Market Competitlveness The cooperative buys from farmers in relatively large quantities and will not serve a village where only small quantities can be purchased. The merchants have been providing service for these small amounts. The result is that the cooperative has a less costly operation and, with its subsidy, can afford to pay higher prices to farmers. The merchants, for whom capital is much more expensive, cannot compete with the cooperative and must settle for the small and muoe-difficult-to-reach purchases. The evaluation team heard many complaints about the lower prices p;aid by merchants when comparing them to the cooperative. Yet the real cost of marketing services may be reflected by the merchants' prices. Since the project has focused only on the ctoperative to facilitate marketing in the project area, nothing has been done to facilitate marketing for a large majority of the project population. For long-term, sustainable service, the private sector offers the most promise. 229 o i'iniui'vii8 sUJ U1J1i14l'l 15 M1 o Nil~~lUVIII ltbtvill 130 ?filjo Mln 11U1Ufl!~ft~f~f~~bL~2528 qufli 2530 I'lkw 2528 4114UNIu~l 2,240 A 2529 4111UNIulvi 1433 Al 19MMIUM111 20,000 'l' 2530 ( l 25 L~rIMU) 4ThuIIIIIWII 1,712 fAl t~o"IUJt3U 20,000 li W1J1l M ll 1UJd'llll7flmh li il± U.1looJ LYYnU 230 Farmers are well served by merchants when -they operate in a competitive environment. The project has an important role to play in creating this type of environment. WATERSHED ISSUES 16. Have Forest Protection and Reforestation A.tivities Been Adequate to Preserve the Watershed Currently and into the Future? Forest Fire Control One of the important forest protection activities in the watershed is forest fire control. The dry dipterocarp forest that covers a large part of the watershed is extremely susceptible to fire hazards. The project's major activities in fire control are in this area and include: e Establishment of 10 look-out towers for fire detection; e Employment of eight crews of 15 persons each for fire fighting; e Organization of 120 volunteers for routine patrolling in dry seasons; * Regular villager visits and meetings from three fire control sub-stations; e Occasional fire prevention campaigns including a public awareness campaign that used posters and signboards in villages and along roadsides; and e Construction of 130 km of firebrakes each year. The results from 1985 to 1987 were reported as follows: 1985 2,240 fire occurrences 1986 1,433 fire occurrences Appro. 20,000 rai burned 19870 1,712 fire occurrences Appro. 20,000 rai burned *up to April 25, 1987 231 'I4U~Iijl~hft 1-hAjinn-)1 60 Il iAI,'JNN011 tLu'luuiL 1i II1'0)1L g iwlmuo ll, l u ~'A0 1L~ir LU~L Jl n A i f11-~a o1'r2ii YnInI~anuvol LinltA i tI' U W1I 3 VlLW I 2 959 232 The reduction of fire occurrences has somewhat stabilized. The largest area burned according to the officer in charge was not over 100 rai. Fires were extinguished by the crews in a reasonably short time, and most of them could be reached. Also, most fires were ground fires; the trees will eventually regenerate themselves. The fire control crews have extinguished more than 600 fires each year. However, the ground cover of the forest floors is more important than their canopies in this kind of deciduous forest. When heavy rains occur in May, erosion will be much more serious on bared floors than where leaves and grasses remain to protect the soil from splash erosion. According to the preliminary results (1984-1986) of the run-off and soil studies conducted by the project, the annual burned plot produced 700 percent more sediment than the control (unburned) plots. A discussion with RFD staff on future sustainability indicated that. " The current installations and equipment for fire control are sufficient, and there is no need for imlmediate increases; and " When the project is phased out, the government will reduce the fire crews to probably four because of foreseeable budget limits. The reduction of one-half of the crew members will no doubt affect the RFD capability to control fires. Fire prevention and education can help, as many of the past fires were started without any apparent economic reasons (that is, not for clearing fields). The evaluation team witnessed a fire along the road to Mae Na Chon started by a group of children, apparently for enjoyment. The current education activities consisting of only regular meetings with villagers twice a week in each of the three sub-stations appear to be inadequate. Road Erosion Control Road erosion is a major problem in the watershed. The amount of road erosion control work needed depends on a road's layout and construction. The evaluation 233 flhl~fll~fhUU~lU L~1'UOVIU 2 LON t UD Y 1,140 L JJ (MilUUL1eJ' U 5Iat 6)otHflQ2529~ buiu~ld2 WOU' 9.2~00~ 1,14&SUBMIM (1,170J n15 m~um521) UU l ffiI -1-fiWIT1 AMINn t ~m5IIIIflU-,57 i1I :4j1f4okaniW30h flm1fluJpAJ Itoh fqt n1TlLW; 1JizJ-1 t1 L&=-nu u± '.5 naiiuliu3 234 team found that erosion control has not received enough attention in RFD's road rehabilitation and construction program. A considerable amount of erosion control work on cut slopes, fill slopes, and drainage ditches still needs to be done on recently built roads. Old roads need to be rehabilitated urgently (see Issue 17). Logging Currently, in the vicinity of Mae Na Chon village, two sites (No. 15 & 16) totaling 1,140 km 2 have been licensed to private loggers since 1986. According to RFD's regional office in Chiang Mai, in a one-year period 9,200 trees with a total volume of 11*,700 m3 have been logged. It is reported that this is a controlled and selective logging of commercial species. The trees were marked by forest officers, and, in principle, only 50 percent of the commercial species should be marked for cutting. The evaluation team learned that the loggers have taken much more than was allocated. The logged area would then be left for natural regeneration, which should take about 30 years. In addition to a stumpage fee, the logger is ,equired to reforest certain acreage to compensate for the cutting but not necessarily in the same watershed. An unknown length of logging roads was constructed by the loggers in the watershed. Since the roads are temporary, the standards are low. When the operation is completed, the roads are usually abandoned without maintenance and this may cause considerable erosion. The RFD's regional office indicated that it has no plans to maintain them. Because this operation is governed directly by the regional office, the project has had little knowledge about the logging process and operation, let alone its control. 235 O'LLAI 2526 rianiJ4L ~'1 U U'h1 526 375 l7 (7 V~tU1U) Ii 2528 375 Ai (3 n1) 1INIIhIJ~U 2529 420 li (15 ~r14 2530 200 7(l U '1) U~fln11~LiinTUJ. i.5z.. 2526 -Iflfl-1'1flTdfl il I 42 tV 6mi'n:VtA ~ 1J~nuijan -u - * t III'l ~U~1LU~f1h ~ lb20 9~JJ11th fl1ThdI I~J~iU1~ ~ L1~ &~u I V Vin 236 Community Forests and Woodlots Since 1983, the project has completed the following: Village woodlots: 1983 375 rai (7 villages) 1985 375 rai (3 villages) Community forests: 1986 420 rai (15 villages) 1987 200 rai (being done) The 1983 evaluation report recommended that the woodlot program be eliminated since the viliages did not see the value of it when sufficient trees are all around them. Instead, agro-forestry or community forestry should be emphasized. The project responded to the recommendation in 1986 by initiating a Community Forest Project involving 15 villages and 420 rai. The species included many fruit trees and agro-forestry tree crops (such as jack fruits, mangoes, tamarinds, cashew-nuts, coffee) in addition to forest t.-ee species. The land of each village was jointly selected by the community, IF teams, and the project's foresters. Seedlings were provided by the project, and the villagers planted them under technical supervision. The villagers have responded enthusiastically. The evaluation team checked two villages (Na Hong Tai and Mae Moom) and found that protection and tending were satisfactory (one with fences). Replanting may still be needed in considerable numbers due tu many unhealth) 'eedlings. Watershed Reforestation The project and RFD, using government funds, have both carried on a watershed reforestation program with mostly pines (Pinus Kesiya). The project's work since 1984 is as follows: 237 ThtJ~~~r73J1tn ~4Thfl L4~l4i 'PIllus Keslya) i -iun An tLun-ri1W1'ILA 2527 19ik~ltiu w.ff. 2527 I30' -6. 1. 2530 (4i1~itumflT) 300 t1 1fik'~llkatUJE8' CL41 ~iuJ~jrJui 75 Vt 1i~fllflh11 ~84) 1 mV 1V 11uamLwmhmuiini MJ'7l1i it a ;ui-i-irj ~l'miw 5tnt Thlfl h. lnila 'u - 2518 umut1J~ )U8 11 i1wj ~f11J~1 ~i~H J~'f~1)U L 1 ;iin fli'ita n0 k l lt IU 400 - 600 'ti6rn LOUO iiL4 2526 -2530 ThU1L~unfl-1U tualAr41lu 26, 050 li tiil 5,210 1i 'i®y 1JLUU1UhnTfL2 ntv 238 Area Covered Village 1984 150 rai King Ton Moung 1986 300 rai King Ton Moung and Mae Long 19870 30 rai -same- Total 750 rai in progress The evaluation team has visited the Ban Mae Long site and found last year's survival rates are very good (reported at 84 percent). A small nursery has been also established near the planting sites. The plantation sites were found and suggested by the IF team. The sites are situated on steep slopes where swiddens have been abandoned. Asked whether the people will come back to the sites for cultivation, the official answer was "no." Many government foresters believe that once plantations are established the people view them as government property and usually do not bother with them. However, the land may be a swidden in a fallow state. In a number of cases in the past, RFD (outside the project) planted trees on farmers' swidden land, only to find soon after that the trees were burned, probably by the farmers who lost their land. The evaluation team did not learn whether the Mae Long land was truly abandoned. The RFD's Watershed Development Office has also carried on a reforestation program since 1975 through its 11 units in the Mae Chaem watershed. According to their reports, each unit plants 400-600 rai each year. The total area planted from 1983 to 1987 was 26,050 rai, averaging 5,210 rai a year. It is not known how much of the new plantings are burned each year. The evaluation team saw a number of areas where RFD pine trees were de3troyed or partially destroyed by fire. The current reforestation rates are far from sufficient if 80,000 rai of forest lands are eing destroyed annually in the watershed (according to the figure quoted in 1983 evaluation report). Assuming all plantations are successful, the reforestation rate amounts to only 7 percent of the forest destroyed each year. 239 8j t 14f -lit ;F1 Il LflF~~iLUflhh~2530 13" iruwmu lo~1it UL ltu 100 11 - -i-,jjamn' -I *ii" (urochiana ruziziensis) tiUam ni~ l fi~ '~1~i1~iL1JmJhl Il~iu v qu ~'aniLA~J iiL~iW17,500 l4mi1wo'u oil-IliL ;1J'l~Uf)Wali -fl fluIaJLviiU 1lt2AJ1tF A'u'-I mamvirflioniil I ul u ot2 Lo~u. IOl.111I tr~ 111 ~LULIJ~LL1L~1JdL~lf~~'1 *l 2 q 240 The direct cost of reforestation per rai is reported by the office to be 1,900 baht. It includes 1,100 baht for first year establishment followed by five years of tending at 160 baht each. At 40 baht per person-day, this 160 baht provides only enough for 4 person-days of tending. The low labor input for tending may seriously affect the survival rates of the new plantations. This could further keep the forest destructi.n and reforestation ratio out of balance. Range/Pasture Nianagement Range/pasture management is a new activity started in 1987. A 100-rai area was prepared at Mae Tan by the villagers, and a small plot was planted in Ruzi Grass (urochiana ruziziensis) with contour furrows I meter apart. The grass is growing vigorously with some watering. In the coming rainy season, Centrosema (a legume) will be interplanted as a mixture to reduce fertilization and provide varieties of forage for cattle. The work is supervised by a specialist from RFD's Mae Sa Project. According to project statistics, the Mae Chaem watershed has 17,500 cattle and buffalos. In dry seasons when paddies are not planted, they graze on the paddy land. As soon as the rice is planted and the rainy season starts, they are mostly turned loose to feed in the nearby forest. This damages not only young tree seedlings but also eliminates the vegetation on forest floors and compacts the soils. If community range/pastures could be eventually established at each village, for even supplementary feeding, the forest and hydrological conditions of the watershed would be greatly benefited. 241 17.. MUWilflhi0411914i L Ifl t252 ~~~uJ~7rnnI100flA~j1~l~lJ~fl30n~h ~ l aw~~44 4 fiJ.'Uatlor 80 taquir 15 ~~ ~ ~ n.~ ;rn l.2.14 ij wihULJiY11 -lLf~lu~1 ail l tU1'Urtll 11L~ MA~iL 122l n tij. n hinit 021 ~. Uf~f 92 fl~u. Uan. 242 17. Are Road Objectives Being Met in Terms of Quality, Quantity, and Location? Adequacy of the Road Network Before the project, it was estimated that by 1980 roads built by various agencies would be serving about 86 percent of the watrshed population. However, hill-tribe villages were being served mostly by forest roads that were badly eroded. Therefore, rather than construct more new roads, the project planned to rehabilitate the already exi;ting RFD roads. The roads that have been rehabilitated, however, are only a portion of the existing forest roads. More than 100 hill-tribe villages still have no acce;s to good roads and therefore have very little share in the benefits of the project. The project planned to have about 100 km of roads rehabilitated by contractors: 30 km in tambon Ban Ch:n, 45 km in tambon Mae Na Chon, 15 km in tambon Mae Suk, and 10 km in tamb,)n Ban Thap. No renabilitation was planned for tambons Chang Khoeng and Ta [lia. The roads actually rehabilitated by contractors total 122 km. The most rehabilitation was in tambons Chang Khoeng and Ta Pha, where most of the population is noei,,ern Thai (about 92 percent). Tambon Mae Na Chon, the main focus of the project, had only 1'P km rehabilitated. Apart from the project's road rehabilitation by contractors, the RFD has also rehabilitated 92 km of roads. 243 ~~J~wh 30--- Lfl145 17 5875 mAn 15 12 - 12 10 23 30 53 -21 - 25 49.J1 - 4 "a 105 92 224 t 11'alhThuiJ f 1U nP 1u - L J1ffLi4v na 3~it~ tr.i-u ~omitai ria uuU~mr~T 244 TABLE 5 PLANNED VS. ACTUAL ROAD REHABILITATION Actual Km Tambon Planned Km Contract RFD Total Ban Chan 30 - - - Mae Na Chon 45 17 58 75 Mae Suk 15 12 - 12 Ban Thap 10 23 30 53 Chang Khoeng - 21 4 25 Ta Pha 49 - 49 Totals 105 122 92 214 Intended Standards of Rehabilitated Roads The intended standard of rehabilitated roads is described in the project paper as follows: . . .to put them in a condition where they can be maintained by a combination of hand and machine effort. . . . the primary function of the roads component is to meet environmental concerns of the project and not to improve road standards to facilitate a larger volume of traffic. . .. no attempt is being made to address the typical concerns of road projects s'ch as laid out in FAA Section 611. Such an expense is neither nece: -ary nor practical for the type of soot improvements expected under the pro, 'ct. 245 o m ll11 Ili~ Thoj'l~t~illruI ~ i~ o ~ ta 'ADV 'L ~ffi l alib~~J I u .1" S.v n lr M j1. S FIT"f 0. Ar tha m i F m- Im-~ 5il S.ij 4 t i* ICUS. ~alwaj(fl Limm1~a 300,000 U-Mv U1J~U~l Vat4LiLlJIJ7, !j'l L ra m ll~il aii l J'V1(1Vi. ) ULJ~i~t~LItJ1Jf) I~1U~~V~ ~ LE~l~ ~L~Ulu'L~ 1 Ili 12 11 )IIi l % k 246 Thus, the requirements of rehabilitated roads can be summarized as follows: * Can be used mainly as access roads, serving very small traffic volume; e Can be easily maintained by manual labor with little use of heavy equipment; * Only spot improvements of existing road are necessary; and * Soil erosion from road surfaces and drainage structures is to be kept to a minimum. To achieve the above requirements, the emphasis was on providing adequate drainage structures and keeping the maximum grade to less than 6 percent. It must not be ,istaken that, by keeping the roads to a very low standard, the project plan concerned itsei," only with environmental aspects and development activities during the project. A low standard road that is environmentally stable and can be maintained by a combination of hand and machine effort is sustainable because it is within the villagers' maintenance capabilities. Its serviceability may be relatively poor, but this is economically justified because minor social and economic growth is expected during the project life and the period immediately following. When greater growth occurs, the roads can be upgraded. The design of the project roads did not follow the project paper. There seems to have been a misconception among project personnel that the roads were supposed to be all-weather roads. The emphasis was put on improving the riding quality of the roads by grading, compacting, and laterite surfacing. The cost of this earth work made up the major portion of the budget allocated (300,000 baht per km) and left too little for adequate design of drainage structures. As a result, many sections of roads were seriously damaged by water erosion, making them impassable after only one wet season. 247 im. .4,Ojc iimifL U iflmut) -I I I lj;Inil -C~l 4 tDIU M I MitfI flLi iffh JJ'J JU1 ill9iI' Uflilhl1' fu ~fL a1 0u~li~t ~f~~i ~ 9u~9r~11IL~ilJ9li o Ulflftl1iJ o. au~u. Lu~~~JL~~uWI31U' L n f'~l lli1(hh~iITJlLU1lh utflnu3 qi a- '11 11LiI kZV D t' IU tU1 ' h l in IS~ -i- ~iu q S S .- 4~I 248 The budget was not large enough to construct all-weather roads with good riding quality. One security road in Mae Chaem (visited by the evaluation team) was constructed by the ARD at a cost of about I million baht per km (more than three times the cost of project roads). The road has a gravel surface and is intended to be all-weadier. Even at this high cost, the evaluation team noticed extensive damage to various road components as a result of water erosion. Interviews with villagers indicated that passability was very difficult during wet season. An ARD engineer responsible for the maintenance of this road reported that the road needed to be repaired yearly, at a cost of about 10,000 baht per km. Quality of Roads Built All roads built by the RFD or by contractors are designed by RFD engineers. Such activities as conventional route surveys, design of typical cross sections, estimation of si2es and locations of culverts, and design of bridges are performed prior to construction. There are, however, differences in the standards used because of the large differences in budgets allocated. For examp!e: " There is no laterite surfacing for RFD roads; " Conventional standards are used for the design and installation of culverts and bridges for roads built by contractors. As for roads built by RFD, installation of culverts and bridge constructions are unconventional and occasionally substandard; and • Compaction equipment has not been available for RFD-constructed roads, but funds have been requested for 1937. Because of the project's emphasis on environmental concerns, RFD has become more sophisticated in the design and construction of roads. Road structures include side ditches, concrete pipe culverts, and bridges. Heavy construction equipment consists of one D6 tractor, one D4 tractor, one motor graderg, three dump trucks (six wheels) and one wheel loader (I cu meter shovel). Fifty to 60 hand laborers are employed for excavating side ditches, laying culverts, and building bridges. The 249 50,000 U11NNowTlJ1~lf Ul1fU~11LLfh t'u 'LU 1A.M~. 2529 U m~LUt1~n1l~ n iiw14,500 IJIYh k~~;j~,I 1 'Ulci 20~ ~uiiutnn~h1 ~50,000 ~ = *., -r lit 77,400 bvrn I-1mllluillliin 300,000 I 50C,ODC tin Lh J1n1ud-. net - V- Im4 09.Ui~~12S27l~gL~1~ U1 U~~ S - - - - 1~mtUL4 ~U1U YU u~~vrr~ U V 11M~ 1614floji9 l l ~ U71~UJ~1'J L f~ L ~ J~Jft'f~~17L187.41 U DRUM Numaumin1~ j I~~~~i m127 ~ '~ JW ~ijLtj~ um 250 project was able to minimize construction costs by developing simple construction techniques and using cheap locally available construction materials for road structures; a timber crib wall made up of timber felled during clearing operations and stone; a gravity wall built up with plastic bags filled with a mixture of sand and cement; wooden bridges built using timber felled during the clearing operation. Plants were set up in the project area to make culverts on site instead of purchasing and transporting them from Chiang Mai. Sme of these developments may not yet be perfected, but, with further improvement, they would prove very cost effective for forest road construction. Under RTG funding regulations, the budget for RFD road construction is 50,000 baht per km. This is insufficient for the kind of road standards attempted in MCWDP. Therefore, in 1986, USAID agreed to augment the RTG regular budget with 14,500 baht per kra to provide for drainage structures. Assuming 20 percent of the funds are spent on equipment maintenance and overhead costs -- covered by the project's operating budget -- the budget per km of road built by the RFD in Mae Chaem would be: RTG regular budget - 50,000 baht USAID - 14,500 baht 20% maintenance and overhead - 12,900 baht Total - 77,400 baht The cost of roads rehabilitated by contractors and supervised by RFD engineers ranges between 300,000 and 500,000 baht. Even though there is a large difference between the budget allocated to the RFD and to contractors, there does not seem to be a large difference in road quality. When traveling on the Ban Hui Sai Luang-Ban Pa Tung road built by a contractor in 1984, the evaluation team observed many steep grade sections. Bad erosion suggested it would be very difficult to use during wet seasons even by 4-wheel drive vehicles. Concrete pipes that slid away from road sections were a common sight. Villagers reported that every wet season they must repair the road to make it passable. 251 o flnilr qL nu -" diwa,'inj~winfls-oiv DIU,~12I 11UmvWl ttatWalI I fl lm~Igu IUL4 -IIit1UV qn i~~W'lo?1JfU 0 tuooiiuuuiinu ant N11J Untu"i~mnizjiunlqi nul' i9afhna wriU'-u C, I uniuvt. -nnU' .un-i - ,tra1 4tui 11J!4ll oitiul Uarwilu~fii U.r rmiudu Illl iI7 flT1h 1fl7J i tfhtfiltTm3 it3is'uni3t-niin-nniiatiuunmiuati 252 The problems of the roads can be summarized as follows: @ Many sections of the roads have grades steeper than 12 percent, the maximum normally adopted for earth or laterite surfaced roads, some sections even have grades up to 17-18 percent. All these steep sections are badly eroded, the laterite surfacing had washed away. During the wet season, these sections are very difficult, if not impossible, to pass, forcing drivers to use tire chains, thereby further damaging the road surface. e Soil around culverts at many sections has been washed away as a result of inadequate scour protection around inlets and outlets, and possibly of culverts not having been properly installed. At some sections the size of the culvert provided was not sufficient for the amount of flow that occurs during heavy rain. Culverts were left out at many sections where roads cross small gullies. e Side ditches were not adequate for draining water away from road surfaces. Soil erosion around sections of lined side ditches indicates the water has overflowed the culverts. Facto.s Affecting Quality of Roads Terrain Conditions To minimize construction costs, sections of steep gradients are unavoidable. Roads in hilly terrain also have to cross many streams and gullies thus requiring many more culverts and bridges, expensive items in road construction. Decomposed granite soil that is highly erosive covers most of the project area. Considerable effort is therefore required to protect road surfaces, side ditches, and surfaces of cut slopes from erosion. 253 n i a u li1SrII h n.ok) II - I'..5. in v~Jiji1 ~~jLi L -,l~i yIi rw. r.j;i -i ini'u'?rv~ntthI tmi ilnhj birk-, S iJO J ,1US 5- 5LW L~~14L ~ ~tI 1~ltu~ 1.)~ ~~.. ~ il1~1 11 JIAiIm 1. '11U~oilviwiIL(J 254 To the best knowledge of the evaluation team, no standards for forest roads, satisfying both economic and engineering considerations, have been developed for the conditions of northern Thailand. Little knowledge has been accumulated because of a lack of engineering input in the past. A designer has to depend on his own experience to produce an appropriate design. Environmental Concerns By staying within the old road alignment as much as possible, clearing was kept to a minimum, thus reducing the amount of soil uncovered and trees felled, both potential erosion problems. Following the old roads, however, has a negative effect on the road design. A considerable amount of earthwork is required to reduce the grade line to an acceptable limit, and in many situations it is impossible. The road is forced to climb up and down steep grades within a short distance instead of having a single lower grade in one direction. Contractors The efficiency of the contractors involved in the construction appears to be low. Construction work usually started much later than scheduled, leaving too little time to perform a quality job. Work sometimes had to be extended into wet seasons when working conditions are very difficult. Information from various sources indicated that the contractor awarded a job usually subcontracted the work to a less experienced contractor. M-! of the contractors awarded a contract had no experience working in the project L.-. Jiey had not anticipated the high costs of difficult working conditions and poor transportation. The ARD engineer who chaired the committee for inspecting road construction work in the project reported that unit costs of various items shown in bidding documents seemed too low for the Mae Chaem watershed area. 255 ~jE~~bl~u ii ujnani lu m U- ujn'Lout iuwji cj- ra2I 14 nhqfiiAauiimn .ujtni~l~i ufcul niiEm-dnud)u-ntiliii guium iio i t MAI'fhJiW ~ U~fhf1U'1~'3f''fh 1~I 4UL9I 256 The contract payments are usually awarded in lump sums. Adjustment of contract prices is not possible in cases where changes in construction plans are necessary to improve the work, making it difficult for construction control. Social Problems Construction work was sometimes delayed by land rights questions. Hfill-tribe farmers, although without legal land rights, sometimes have not allowed construction crews to work on sections close to their farmland, afraid that their nearby crops and farmlands will be destroyed. The person responsible for construction has had to find oiays to compromise and sometimes compensate the farmers before beginning construction. The team heard stories of roads damaging paddy land and blocking irrigation channels. In at least one case, the contractor made financial restitution. RFD Experience in Road Construction Designing and constructing roads with special attention to environmental concerns are still relatively new experiences for RFD and are not receiving much attention. Unless this is changed, it will be difficult to build up the capacity of RFD in this area. Road Maltenance Road maintenance is the responsibility of RFD's erosion control units specially set up during the project. There are eight units, each with 15 crew memLers recruited from villages. These units are also used as fire-fighting teams. The crews are employed on a full-time basis. The maintenance is perfori.ed primarily with manual labor and simple hand tools. RFD maintenance has been corrective rather than preventive as intended in the project paper. In wet seasons, the maintenance crews have been too busy repairing road sections washed away during heavy rains to perform any preventive maintenance work such as clearing blocked drains and adding more culverts. Damage is so 257 i~tnutonn t it gumu uitihuh r~uh Y,n n14~ Lo iin~u.1uwutifi9 nii umsitnt i ItJ 2530~ ~ I&il-~l 35 77,00 ivLfhlUln'h*LltltZ 258 extensive that the crews cannot attend to all of it. Badly eroded surfaces at many sections of the Mae Wak-Mae Malo road rehabilitated just over one year ago indicate that the crews were either too busy fighting fires or not making much effort to perform adequate maiatenance work during dry seasons. There seems to be lack of understanding in the basic principle of road maintenance techniques using hand labor. While traveling on the Mae Wak-Mae Malo road, the evaluation team saw a maintenance crew repairing a badly gullied section of road. Soil was excavated from the road side to fill in the gully to make tile surface look smoo h. No compaction was performed. This loose fill will be quickly washed away during the first few rains of the coming wet season. This repairing activity should be performed right after the last wet season so that the fill has a chance to be compacted by traffic before having to withstand water erosion. The maintenance budget is enormous. In the fiscal yeir 1987, 770,000 baht has been allocated by the RTG for the maintenance of 70 km of road in the project area. In addition, USAID is helping by paying temporary wages of the er3sion control crews, totaling 826,200 baht. Therefore the total budget for maintenance work in fiscal 1987 is: RTG Budget 770,000 baht USAID Budget ,26,200 baht Total 1,596,200 baht Road Erosion Control Apart from trying to stabilize mass soil movement at culvert outlets, no other erosion control measures nave been seriously attempted. Erosion on road surfaces and side ditches is common. Maintenance has been minimal. According to an estimation, such unattended roads in northern Thailand can produce up to .50 m 3 of sediment per km annually. 259 iJm latiulat1 3i U J '3~fflf Ia:1AU'tMIDWIt;lfl10 20 ~jlutii nuutoLufllww tumitmu bo'tueonnti nuw: 260 According to an RFD official in charge of the erosion control units, staking and grassing were tried as a protective measure for soil surfaces on the cast slope. The attempt was not successful because the stakes and grasses dried off in the heat and bush fires in the following dry seasons. The cut slope of the road was set at about a 2:1 to 3:1 ratio. At a few sections where the cut is very high, it is benched. No measure was taken to protect the integrity of the cut surface. Occasional soil mass movements in the cut were observed where the cut was higher than 4-5 meters and the in-situ soil is decomposed granite. Impact of Roads on the Watershed Population Most people of the watershed iave so far gained little direct benefit from the road rehabilitation program. Even though vehicle ownership has apparently increased, the level of road use is considered minimal. Only a few private passenger pick-up trucks operate on routes along the rehabilitated roads. Passenger fees are relatively high due to the poor road conditions. Villagers reported that passenger fees during dry seasons range between 1-3 baht per km per person, increasing 10-20 percent in wet seasons. Road construction is an important preliminary step in the development process, providing a catalyst for further development. The impact of the roads can be expected to grow over time as long as they are maintained. Indirect benefits gained by the population are, however, obvious. The rehabilitated roads made various development activities possible, thus initiating improvements in social and economic conditions of the villages. Villagers at Mae Mu told the evaluation team that, since the completion of the road into their village, merchants who bring in supplies and groceries visited the village mole frequently. A village headman at Ban Mae Wak reported betzer prices for soybeans paid by merchants because of the improved road conditions. More and more, villagers have become dependent on the roads, illustrated by the fact that villagers themselves often repaired damaged road sections to make them passable again. This is an important demonstration of village capability and interest. 261 Uv~Jfl11J11fl~i~~fl71TI ~L11,000 I1~i f L~1 '~JIU ~t911-j~f~1I. ~d1 ih~0.-1 2,13 X 11,000 8 01,900 U-1) 1J. t ~ b~~-uiain -IL 1Ju1 Via -11 Mi 1u ,sj-ny1f1JiU'-VU1oi -aIt Uq1Y1LjIfliijUif t1j0tEh(UtU1ZUL~it 1ICA Lob -ULfluL4 Qi lm.f1. 2527 L~inih ~ ~ ~~U 3 nal i~Lofltn1JjtLfEjj i o L IPhi'J 'V'Thl1I LI'4.t1 Jf1 4 1 JtI1U-ifL o ~1f1~if~UUltLimnUirU1kr1~Y1f1UU1tU-~L~Z 262 Sustainability By the end of this project, at least 243 km of roads in the Mae Chaern watershed will have been built or rehabilitated. These roads need maintenance to be kept passable. According to an RTG budget regulation, maintenance costs of laterite-surfaced roads is 11,000 baht per km, not including wages and salaries of personnel involved. Assuming 30 percent of roads need to be maintained annually, the budget requirt. to maintain these rehabilitated roads is 0.3 x 243 x 11,000 801,900 biht annually. This is almost one-third of the developing fund currently received by the entire Mae Chaem District. It is unlikely that the RTG will be able to set aside a special fund for the maintenance of these roads either through RFD or any other agency. 18. Are the Current Hydrology Research and Monitoring Activities SR,'nd? Hydrology/Watershed Research Run-off Plots The main objective of the run-off plots is to use small, homogeneous plots to compare run-off water and soil losses under different conditions or treatments. This kind of research with little investment can usually obtain useful results in a short time. Since 1984, the project has set up three sets of plots, each with a control as follows: * Burned and unburned (control) plots under Dry Dipterocarp Forest to assess the impacts of burning on soil and water losses; 263 inii 1 niiiwnllq til 257IU' a~JllAIU110f'0 7 0.6 1 -5~11J -I r I Io 1, ., out MNIint l Wft~iI.infI Am juiml AQU71 hiAri I ll~ 2uL 1ji1Jl1~VJhIJfl1J I tAIM~Il-fl' I IJUIIAni hn-nwUN 264 " Bench-terraced and unterraced (control) plots to compare erusion and run-off rates; and * Forest (control) and swiddening plots to detect the differences of water and soil loss and the rates of forest succession. After each run-off-producing storm, the collecting tank at the end of each plot is monitored to measure the total quantity of run-off water and sediment. Sediment samples are then collected and sent to a lab in Chiang Mai University for aralyzing their dry soil contents. The results of these plot studies should interest watershed managers, planinrs policy makers, and farmers. For instance, preliminary results in burned plots showeu 700 percent more sediment than unburned ones, illustrating the importance of fire control for this kind of forest. However, up to now, data analysis and reporting have not yet been completed on any of the plots. It is anticipated by the Watershed Research S.-ction that the work and reports of one or two plots will be completed by the end of 198?. Paired Watershed Research Since 1984, three small watersheds of 0.7 km 2 , 0.6 km and 0.1 km have been selected for studying water yield and water quality. The construction of the last weir (90 V-notch) for measuring flows was just completed this year. The watersheds need at least several years of calibration, and after that one or two watersheds will be treated, leaving one for control. The treated watersheds will be contrasted with the control on water yields and quality. All three watersheds were planted with Pinus Kesiya. No definite plans have been made Gn when and how the forest is to be treated for comparison. 265 -~J111 Fl1YIJ L,tflV MEi-It E)IUI IfJODWM iLfh11-fi)I1 ol no ioLu i ~1~Jfli~fl26ju f1li1.11,111,16 Mi I Ii u 266 Water Quality Studies At the sub-watershed of Huai Mae-Pan, intensive water-quality studies have been made including analyzing physical, chemical, and biological qualities of the stream flow. The study has been carried out at one tributary where camps aie expanding. The results will be compared with those o" another undisturbed tributary mostly under forest cover. Water samples are also sent to Chiang Mai University for analysis. No conclusive report has been issued since the study was started a year ago. Other Related Research The Research Section also conducts pine and eucalyptus spacing trials on soil loss and run"-off and will begin road erosion observation in the near future. Watershed Monitoring Hydro-meteorological Network The project has established a network of seven gauging stations and 26 climatic stations for monitoring the meteorological and hydrological conditions of the watershed. The gauging stations are all equipped with automatic water-level recorders and staff gauges, and the flow velocities have been measured weekly by the project staff with a current meter. Also, each week water samples are collected from each station and sent to Chiang Mai University to analyze sediment contents and other qualities. Up to now, rating curves (curves to show the relation of water level and velocities) for such stations have not yet been established nor has the relationship between streamflows and sediment contents. Normally it requires several years to obtain reliable results. 267 L1 R4Blil-it 2- ,- 9 5 Mn b WJ,-ll 1, I INf i At F11l-1,I:qIa ,. l4 1. tk w -,I-, I l ondloUj 'lmii~- A~'1 254fHUhIL fhNf JUlaIJOIfLIl I- -l~..m - 268 Most of the 26 climatic stations are equipped with standard (non-automatic) rain gauges and maximumn-minimum thermometers. Automatic rain gauges and additional instruments are installed in eight stations. The maintenance and recording work are mostly taken care of by nearby people such as school teachers. Each year the data are roughly compiled, but further analysis such as making a rainfall isohyetal map and establishing rainfall intensities and frequency curves was not carried out, due to inadequate time. Although several stations have longer records available (for example, Mae Chaem station has rainfall records since 1952), the project's intention is to collect data from more stations and thereby construct a better rainfall picture of the whole watershed. Because the whole hydro-meteorolgical network was established only recently and data are just being collected, no meaningful evaluation can be made currently on the impacts of watershed management on water resources. For the time being, accurate data collection and compilation remains the main task. Monitoring Land Use Changes Monitoring land use changes is important for a project such as this that is concerned with the rate of deforestation, swiddening, and the development of stable agriculture. Yet such monitoring work s lacking. As a result, when asked whether swiddening is increasing or decreasing, most foresters thought it was increasing while the DLD people thought it was decreasing. Nobody in the project can offer a convincing answer, let alone maps and data. There is only scattered information relateo to land use. DLD had a study in 1985 using LANDSAT data to investigate land use impacts on the Mae Chaern watershed. The report did not give conclusive data on land use changes and trends. In 1980 and earlier, both DLD and RFD produced some information on land use but the methodology and criteria used wore different. A sound comparison cannot be obtained unless established survey procedures and unified classification standards are used. 269 an-mJ~alr~un r~uiu3 ;1u14 uU~~ W l. k. I -l IuI; 270 Sustalnability of Work The Research Section has one chief, three associates and four field assistants. Except for the chief, the others are temporarily employed. For such a diverse job, covering a huge ,atershed, they are overloaded at present. This is one reason why they have little time for analysis and reporting. The sustainability will be greatly hampered if the staff were reduced after the termination of the project. 271 ANNEX A VILLAGES VISITED BY EVALUATION TEAM 272 ANNEX A VILLAGES VISITED BY EVALUATION TEAM Tambon Chang Ihoeng Mae Pan San Nong Mae Uam Tung Yao Pa Thur Chang Khoeng Mae Ming Pa Tung Tor Rua Ton Tarn Tambon Tha Pha Pa Dad Kong Khaeg Mae Moom Hiong Pong Tambon Mae Na Chon Mae Chon Luang Khun Mac! Wag Sob Wag Miai Pattana Santi Mae Hoi Mae Na Chon Mae Wak Mae Malo Mae Mu Tambon Ban Thap Hor Bon Na Mae Boa Pang Hin Fon Ban Pui Tung Kae Mre Kbi Mouk Ban Thap Mae Long Tambon Mae Suk Na Hong Na Hong Tai Huay Yao Mae Suk Kong Kan 273 ANNEX B PARTIAL LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED BY EVALUATION TEAM 274 ANNEX B PARTIAL LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED BY EVALUATION TEAM Governor Chaiya Poonsiriwong, Project Director, MCEDP Chom Kwandee, Deputy Administrative Director, MCWDP Atisai Pangspa, USAID Project Officer Kamol Chantunamate, USAID Project Officer Narong Jedsadapan, Field Manager, MCWDP David Delgado, Director, USAID Agriculture and Natural Resources Division, former MCWDP Project Officer Kenneth Kampe, MCWDP Training Advisor Roger Montgomery, USAID Economist and Evaluation Officer Douglas Clark, Director, USAID Office of Technical Resources Ed Ploch, USAID Program Officer Pol. Maj. General Chavalit Yodmani, Office of Narcotics Control Board Richard Mann, Advisor, Thai-Norwegian Church Aid Project Atchary Yuhtanandana, Director, USAID office of DTEC Prasit Piruncharoen, USAID office of DTEC Rangsat Bandhukul, Evaluation and Report Division, BOB Kowit Ponyatrong, Watershed Development Division, RFD Udomporn Anatiwong, Road Construction, RFD Chaleo Khanchan, Reforestation, RFD Sakolsak Wachiranuwat, Fi . Control, RFD Amizarch - , Erosion Control, RFD Paiboon Maharaksit, Waterwork Design, DLD Poowadol Kaiyarithi, Waterworks Construction, DLD Jermsak Klunleoungsang, Land Terracing, DLD Sakrawee - , Land Terracing, DLD Manop - , Roads, Waterworks, NADC Vilailuk Charoenkul, MOAC Vichai Cheepetch, Road Design and Construction Muangkeow Chaisuriya, DOA Suraphol Nisakronkrangdah, IF Team Supervisor, MCWDP Prasopchai Indrayodhin, DOAE District Officer Pangsak Kantima, Personnel Officer, MCWDP Witoon - , Director, Mae Chon Luang Research Station Sarote Roskunpanit, Project Manager, CARE Project Samyng - , Deputy District Officer, Mae Chaem Wassana - , Mae Chaem Cooperative Prayoon - , Teacher Training College Wimon - , Tambon Officer, DOAE Somsak Pamae, IF team member Rossukon Pankam, IF team member Arkom Jansuwan, IF team member Pongpan Promchana, IF team member Mairara Tasujai, IF team member Somsak Kangyang, IF team member Surapon Yawirat, IF team member Seela Jansopit, Village Committee Naewa Ngernsaptawon, Village Committee Pa-ude Panakitpraiwan, Assistant Village Head