Bangladesh in 2001: the Election and a New Political Reality?
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BANGLADESH IN 2001 The Election and a New Political Reality? M. Rashiduzzaman Though some scattered incidents of violence took place, the Bangladesh election of October 1, 2001, was, relatively speaking, a peace- ful event, especially against the backdrop of galloping strife in the country in recent years. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its three coalition partners won 216 seats in the 300-member Jatiya Sangshad (national parlia- ment), and Begum Khaleda Zia became prime minister of the new BNP-led government. Both the Election Commission and the constitutionally man- dated caretaker government earned admiration at home and abroad for con- ducting a successful poll and transferring power to the newly elected leaders. However, the Awami League (AL), the BNP’s predecessor as ruling party, accused the BNP and its partners of a “crude rigging” of the election in con- nivance with the nonpartisan interim government and the Election Commis- sion.1 Periodic political and communal violence after the election forced the new government to promise an “intensive drive” against lawlessness, which included the dramatic move on Khaleda’s part of suspending the Chatra Dal Central committee of the BNP’s student front. 2 Confident after her landslide victory, Khaleda then made appeals to her political rivals for peace and coop- eration and called for all to work for the prosperity of Bangladesh. 3 M. Rashiduzzaman is Associate Professor in the Department of Politi- cal Science, Rowan University, New Jersey. Asian Survey , 42:1, pp. 183–191. ISSN: 0004–4687 2002 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704–1223. 1.Anwar Hashim, “Post Election Stance of the Awami League,” Independent (Dhaka), No- vember 25, 2001. 2. Bangladesh Observer , Dhaka, November 19, 2001. 3. Dawn (Karachi), October 4, 2001. 183 184 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2002 Problems of Governance and Pre-Election Maneuvering From early in 2001, the AL faced public anger over the government’s inabil- ity to contain the ongoing spiral of criminal activity and violence. Indeed, the government acknowledged its own failure in maintaining law and order, but Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina blamed it on the opposition, out to destabilize her government. Periodic gun battles rocked Dhaka and most of the coun- try’s urban centers throughout the year, and for several months the police seemed to unearth caches of arms and bombs almost daily. Yet the AL re- gime remained in power and Hasina continually reassured her partisans that she would be able to ride out the discontent and win the election. Partly a casualty of their tactical miscalculations, the BNP and its allies failed to make the lawlessness the focus of their antigovernment campaign, though the sagging governance became a key issue later in the election offen- sive. The billowing unrest in February brought Hasina close to a serious political crisis. As the nation waded into near anarchy, Hasina used the situa- tion to justify introduction of the Public Safety Act, opposed by the AL’s rivals and human rights activists. The bill was passed by an opposition-boy- cotted Sangshad and the president signed it into law. But rather than to com- bat the violence, the government used the restrictive law to arrest rank-and- file opposition party members and even some leaders. Subsequent frequent reports of corruption, assassination and counter-assassination, vigilante jus- tice, illegal occupation of state-owned properties, and forcible captures of private property reduced trust in governmental institutions. Indeed, it was the growing perception of the “five-year misrule” by the AL that such behavior evidenced that led to the party’s “crushing” defeat later in the year. 4 Having survived the crisis, Hasina declared during an early March visit to the holy city of Medina that an election would be held during the summer, raising expectations of an early poll. Stepping down early would have given the AL a little higher moral ground to call for fresh elections with the opposi- tion boycotting the legislature. But it did not take long for Hasina to change her mind. On her return from the pilgrimage, she launched a two-pronged attack on the BNP that saw verbal assaults and a fresh spate of politically inspired cases—many under the Special Powers Act—issued against leaders and members of the opposition. Soon Hasina maneuvered to neutralize the BNP-led opposition, applying the principle of “divide and rule.” For her, the most vulnerable target was General (retired) H. M. Ershad, the Jatiya Party (JP) leader who was already on parole from his earlier conviction in corruption cases. Hasina sent Ershad 4.M. Maniruzzaman Mia, “‘People’ Power vs. AL’s Misrule,” Dhaka Courier , October 5, 2001, p. 16. BANGLADESH IN 2001 185 back to jail, but then released him on the understanding that he would quit the opposition alliance. Once out of jail, Ershad refused to support the BNP- sponsored protests and fired those of his confidants who disagreed with him on the issue. The anti-AL coalition was shaky for awhile and it was feared that the Jamaat, the largest among the right-wing parties, might also withdraw from the coalition. But the BNP-led coalition did not fall apart, despite Er- shad’s departure and Hasina’s coercive tactics. With few options left, the BNP and its coalition partners opted for street actions against the AL govern- ment, but the BNP soon realized that the old-style politics driven by hartal (work stoppages) had lost their resonance. All in all, the BNP’s subsequent electoral victory was a consequence of the negative implications of Hasina’s coercive tactics having outweighed the opposition coalition’s inability to mount a convincing counteroffensive. The political volatility further escalated from April to June as the AL and opposition leaders issued ever-more strident challenges and counter-chal- lenges. Khaleda accused Hasina of shady dealmaking aimed at sowing divi- sion among the opposition. Numerous AL opponents faced trumped up court cases whose overall purpose was to tarnish the opposition. 5 The renewed conflict produced a new standoff between the ruling AL and the BNP. The Interim Government Apparently, Hasina feared that stepping down early would cause her party to lose face, which the opposition would then exploit. A tug of war between the president and the opposition ensued over the exact timing of the scheduled mid-July transfer of power to the chief advisor of the caretaker government, confusing many in Bangladesh. Finally, on July 15 President Shahabuddin Ahmed swore in retired chief justice Latifur Rahman as the chief advisor of the new nonpartisan govern- ment. For the next three months, the president, the chief advisor, and the chief election commissioner stood as Bangladesh’s power triumvirate. Soon after his inauguration, in a newspaper article Rahman announced a major reshuffle of the bureaucracy’s upper echelons, a step that immediately gave the new government an identity essential to a fair election under the Election Commission. Such steps allayed opposition fears that Hasina had placed par- tisan officers in strategic positions before leaving office who could have swayed the election results. Rahman also took the opportunity to refute 5.Alliance Will Form Govt: Khaleda,” New Nation (Dhaka), September 13, 2001, <http:// www.nation-online.com/200109/13/n1091301.htm>. 186 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2002 charges of exceeding his authority over the bureaucratic adjustments he made.6 But the further changes in different layers of administration that soon fol- lowed were reflexively opposed by the AL. Both it and the BNP were testy with the fall election in the offing, and the cockiness of both sides could have easily overwhelmed the caretaker government. Any steps the caretakers took to change the status quo grabbed headlines as they could be interpreted as challenges to the ex-AL regime and its supporters, which made them edgy in their dealings with the chief advisor and his staff. The AL’s visibility had already dropped in the first few weeks since the caretaker government came into being. The BNP asked the chief advisor to withdraw approximately 50,000 politically inspired cases against its party members, including more than 200 charges filed against four of its top leaders. 7 Overall, there were fears that the chief advisor would not be able to fully satisfy the two sides, which could have produced an inconclusive election that neither the AL nor the BNP would accept. The October 1 Election With 74,709,678 voters, the October 1 election was Bangladesh’s largest po- litical event of 2001. The country’s 300 constituencies were contested by 52 parties, most of which were little more than personalistic groups. 8 There were 1,933 candidates, 1,449 representing parties and the remainder running as independents. 9 Both Khaleda and Hasina predicted victory for their re- spective parties, but most observers thought that it would be a close contest most likely producing a hung parliament. Ershad predicted that neither the AL nor the BNP would be able to form a government without his faction in the Sangshad. But in the end, the BNP-led coalition won 215 out of the 300 seats in the Sangshad and the AL won only 62. Among the coalition part- ners, the BNP took 192 seats, Jamaat won 17, the JP (Naziur) got four, and Islamic Oikya Jote (IOJ) won two. Of the other non-AL seats, Ershad’s JP 6.Latifur Rahman, “Election-2001 Was Fair and Credible,” Independent , Dhaka, November 16, 2001, <http://independent-bangladesh.com/news/nov/16/16112001pd.htm#A1>.