The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion

The European Security and Defense Policy NATO’s Companion —or Competitor? NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Robert E. Hunter The research described in this report was conducted jointly by RAND Europe and the International Security and Defense Policy Center of RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies under Contract DASW01-01-C-0004. ISBN: 0-8330-3117-1 RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND® is a registered trademark. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. Cover designed by Stephen Bloodsworth © Copyright 2002 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2002 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 201 North Craig Street, Suite 102, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] FOREWORD Few issues have been more vexing to American policy analysts and political leaders than the emergence of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the last two-thirds of the 1990s and con- tinuing into the new century. The United States has long advocated the development of a European “pillar” within NATO—in essence the idea that a politically and economically strong Europe should con- tribute roughly equal military capacity as the United States to mutual security. But there have been two ideas embedded in the pillar con- cept—not only military strength, but also strength within NATO, not outside it. The Europeans are critically important security partners of the United States. Almost no conceivable security task can be handled without their help, especially in and near Europe, but also well beyond it. Americans have long been concerned that European military weakness is harmful to NATO and to the United States, to say noth- ing of the Europeans themselves. Since the 1999 war with Serbia, most European leaders and analysts now acknowledge (sometimes grudgingly) that Europe’s military capacity is too weak. For this rea- son the emergence of ESDP ought to be a welcome development to the United States. Perhaps the pillar will finally be erected. But the ESDP process has turned out to be a bittersweet development. It has been fraught with political maneuvers that raise ques- tions of whether ESDP will be within NATO or outside of it. The worst possible outcome from an American point of view has seemed possible—a continuation of European military weakness (as European defense budgets remain tiny) and a separation of Europe from NATO. This would mean a net decrease in American security because iii iv The European Security and Defense Policy NATO has proved a valuable instrument in the post–cold war era: The political-military structures and habits developed within NATO have been essential to military success in the Balkans and in the 1990–91 Gulf War. This is a complicated subject. Politics, economics, national cultures, and numerous institutions are intertwined. The subject has become even more complex following the attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, and the first-ever invo- cation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty the following day. It is hard for American observers (even for European ones) to get a firm grip on these developments and their implications. In this book, Robert Hunter provides the best chronicle yet of the emergence of ESDP and its shifting relationship to NATO. He is well placed to do so. From 1993–98 he was a direct participant in the unfolding story as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, and he negotiated for the United States the basic arrangements between NATO and the Western European Union, then the custodian of ESDP. Since then, as senior advisor to the president of RAND, he has kept a watchful eye on ESDP and NATO. Robert’s is clearly an American perspective. But readers, both American and European, will benefit from both his assessment of the past and his recommendations for the way forward. They are aimed at both American and European policymakers. In fashioning his recommendations, Robert has taken careful account of European security interests and political concerns. This monograph was com- pleted prior to September 11. Robert has included an Afterword to indicate in what ways the debate over ESDP has changed since then, what has not changed, and what should be done in the new circumstances to ensure that this European Union effort to forge a European pillar does, indeed, strengthen transatlantic relations. Not all North American and European readers, including this one, will agree with every point contained herein. But all will come away with a better understanding of this complex subject and with work- able policy ideas for the future. James Thomson President RAND September 2001 PREFACE This study is the product of more than two years’ research and writing as part of a wider National Defense Research Institute–financed project on overall U.S. engagement in European security and institutional arrangements across the Atlantic. It relies heavily on the author’s background, which includes a doctoral dissertation at the London School of Economics (1969) on the origins of the Brussels Treaty—the forerunner of Western European Union1 (WEU) and, hence, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); responsi- bility for both NATO and European community affairs at the National Security Council (1977–79); and service as U.S. ambassador to NATO and representative of the United States to the WEU (1993– 98), during which time the author played a key role in formulating U.S. policy toward the European pillar and negotiated for the United States new arrangements between NATO and WEU—as the then ex- ecutive agent for what is now called the European Union’s ESDP. This study should be of interest to a wide audience, including those interested in the evolution of U.S.-European relations, especially in, ______________ 1The first post–World War II Western security institution was Western Union (WU), created in 1948; this was enlarged and renamed the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954. During 2000–01, the WEU was in the process of being absorbed within the European Union (EU). Regarding nonmilitary European integration, the first formal institution was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951. Following negotiation of the Treaty of Rome in 1956, it was supplemented by the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). These became collectively referred to as the European Communities, or European Community (EC). In 1992, the three institutions were integrated and renamed the European Union. v vi The European Security and Defense Policy but not limited to, the security field; the development of institutional relationships; and key choices that lie ahead regarding U.S.- European relations. For students of process and Atlantic Alliance his- tory, this study lays out the development of what NATO has called the European Security and Defense Identity and what the European Union calls ESDP. For policymakers—on both sides of the Atlantic— this study provides an essential background for understanding how security issues between NATO and the European Union are being raised for the early part of the 21st century. These include the new circumstances following the terrorist attacks in New York, Wash- ington, and Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001. For policymakers, this study also provides guidelines for helping to ensure that the creation of ESDP—including a new European rapid reaction force— can strengthen the Atlantic Alliance overall, and especially relations with the United States. The study seeks to be comprehensive—as befits any effort to delve deeply into the reality of policy discussion and decision—and includes analysis of burden sharing, influence within the alliance, the role of various allies and the two basic institutions, and the ways in which both institutions can and should develop a relationship (quite different from the cold war years) that can be mutually beneficial. This research was conducted jointly by RAND Europe and the International Security and Defense Policy Center of RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies. CONTENTS Foreword ....................................... iii Preface ......................................... v Tables.......................................... xi Summary ....................................... xiii Acknowledgments................................. xxv Chapter One BACKGROUND ................................ 1 Chapter Two INTRODUCTION .............................. 7 Chapter Three THE GRAND BARGAIN OF BERLIN AND BRUSSELS .... 13 Chapter Four BEYOND BERLIN: DEVIL IN THE DETAILS (I) ......... 21 Chapter Five ST. MÂLO AND BEYOND ........................ 29 Chapter Six THE THREE Ds—AND

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