Policy Brief 179 July 2021

ORSAM POLICY BRIEF 179 JULY 2021 THE WHEAT AND BREAD CRISIS IN SYRIA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE POPULATION Suhail al-Ghazi INTRODUCTION gime’s loss of control over the governorates of eastern Syria have exacerbated this crisis he regime-controlled areas are fac- in recent years with bread queues spreading T ing a bread and wheat crisis as a re- throughout the areas under regime’s control, sult of an economic crisis that affects resulting in increasing discontent and anger the living conditions in Syria. Several factors among citizens toward the regime and its such as drought, corruption, and the re- failure to address the crisis. The Wheat and Bread Crisis in Syria and its Impact on the Population WHEAT CULTIVATION farmers prefer to cultivate oth- IN SYRIA er crops like citrus, and the climate is not suitable for wheat Wheat production in Syr- production.2 ia increased from 2.3 million tons in 1990 to about 5 million Wheat farmers depend on tons in 2006, before declining the Ministry of Agriculture to to 3.7 million tons in 2009. This assist them with certain re- increase was mainly thanks to quirements such as subsidized the expansion of wheat fields prices; supply of seeds, fertil- from 1.2 million hectares in izers, pesticides and irrigation 1990 to 1.9 million hectares in equipment. Farmers have also 2009 as well as irrigated ar- relied on ICARDA’s Agricul- eas, in addition to the use of tural Research Centre in the new varieties of wheat and countryside of Aleppo since the provision of chemical fer- 1977, which supported farm- Syria has been tilizers. Syria was able to meet ers through the improvement affected by a dire the internal demand of wheat of seeds, farming methods, wheat crisis for estimated at 3 million tons be- and pesticides; but the center more than a decade. tween 2005 and 2009 and be- was closed in 2012 due to war, This policy brief gan exporting large amounts which limited the support pro- looks into the of wheat between 2000 and vided to local farmers3. present situation, 2008.1 its military and THE IMPACT OF economic causes, The governorates of Ha- DROUGHT AND and possible future sakah, Aleppo, Raqqa and GOVERNMENT implications. Deir ez-Zor are considered to POLICIES ON be the most suitable and fer- PRODUCTION tile areas for wheat production in Syria. The total area of Before 2011, the annual do- wheat fields cover 65% of the mestic consumption of wheat four governorates, producing had increased to about 3 mil- about 62% of the country’s to- lion tons, and the per capita tal output. Wheat production is share had reached about 221 lower in other regions such as kg, which resulted in surplus the countryside in Damascus to be exported. This increase and coastal governorates, as was offset by a decrease in 1 Ibrahim Saqar, Muhsen Jahjah, Manaf Asad, Tishreen University Journal for Research and Scientific Studies, Wheat“ production and its implications for achieving food security in Syria” vol.34, No.1 2012 2 Ibid 3 Abdel Karim al-Thalji, al-Jumhuriya, “Agricultural Research Returns to ICARDA” , M a r c h 20, 2019 2 policy brief 179 Suhail al-Ghazi Humanitarian Relief in Aleppo. production between 2006 and 2008 due to a decrease in rainfall rates in the four main drought, but as the private sector continued governorates, from about 4.9 million tons in buying Syrian wheat and exporting wheat- 2006 to 2.1 million tons in 2008, before in- based products such as pasta, Syria’s wheat creasing slightly to 3.7 million tons in 20095. reserves decreased4. After 2011, the reserves According to some studies, the drought kept diminishing as more areas were freed in Syria was not only due to climate, but also from the regime’s control. to bad government policies6. For example, Syria suffered one of the worst droughts poor government response to the outbreak between 2006 and 2010. Many studies ar- of yellow fungus reduced wheat production gue that the drought, which mainly affect- in 2010 to about 3.5 million tons. Govern- ed the rural areas in northern and eastern ment’s unjust decisions to reduce subsidies Syria, was among the causes of the Syrian to farmers in terms of fertilizers and fuel, uprising as the Syrian government remained coupled with the drought and the failure to ineffective and failed to implement policies adopt a realistic and well-planned policy to aimed at supporting farmers or residents in protect water resources against excessive the affected areas, resulting in a marginal- consumption, led to a decrease in the per- ization in these areas. This was evident in the centage of cultivated lands and thus to a decrease of wheat production, caused by decrease in production. The government’s 4 See note 1 5 See note 1 6 Colin P. Kelley, Shahrzad Mohtadi, Mark A. Cane, Richard Seager, and Yochanan Kushnir, PNAS, “Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought” March 17, 2015 www.orsam.org.tr 3 The Wheat and Bread Crisis in Syria and its Impact on the Population favoring of high-profit crops Army forces control the north- such as cotton and sugar ern parts of the governorates beets, which require greater of Hasakah and Raqqa, and amounts of water, can be con- most of the countryside north sidered as the best example in of Aleppo. Therefore, the As- this regard. sad regime finds itself unable to benefit from the areas rich THE CAUSES OF THE in wheat. CURRENT CRISIS However, this is not a re- The current crisis has sev- cent situation, as the Assad eral causes, but the most im- regime has been unable to re- portant factors can be summa- capture these areas since the rized as the inability of the re- beginning of the conflict. Ad- gime to manage wheat crops ditionally, the fact that these and to deal with the difficulties non-state actors can capitalize Decisions taken faced by farmers that pushed on wheat production in these by the regime them to abandon cultivating areas is not only thanks to their to address the wheat, which are explained in territorial control, but also to wheat and bread detail below: their economic policies that crisis remained benefit farmers. Indeed, the a. Loss of control over ineffective and forces controlling these areas, areas where wheat is affected the food the Syrian Democratic Forc- produced security of the es and the Interim Govern- majority of Syrian Wheat cultivation is con- ment/Syrian National Army, people. centrated in four governorates, attracted local farmers and namely Hasakah, Aleppo, Deir bought their crops at higher7 ez-Zor and Raqqa. The Syrian prices than the Assad regime. Democratic Forces and the In 2020, the regime govern- Syrian branch of the Kurdistan ment set the purchase price Workers’ Party control the en- of wheat from farmers to 225 tire Hasakah governorate, ex- SYP/kg in March before rais- cept for residential areas inside ing it to 425 SYP in May. How- the cities of Hasakah, Qamishli ever, even though the YPG/ and Tell Tamer; in addition to SDF initially set the price to most of Deir ez-Zor gover- 225 SYP/kg as well, it raised norate north of the Euphrates it to 315 and then to 490 SYP, and large parts of Raqqa and but distributed 100 SYP as pro- Aleppo governorates. On the motion. On the other hand, the other hand, the Syrian National Interim Government, which is 7 Enab Baladi, “Three Prices to Buy Wheat from Syrian Farmers”, April, 4, 2020 4 policy brief 179 Suhail al-Ghazi Wheat harvest in Damascus. affiliated with the National Coalition, set the The regime found itself in a precarious price of wheat to 200 dollars/ton, or about situation with respect to obtaining or pro- 400 SYP/kg, before it reached 600 SYP/kg ducing wheat, which was exacerbated fur- due to the exchange rate of dollar, which re- ther by the YPG/SDF decision in June 2020 sulted in the highest price compared to that to prohibit the sale or transfer of wheat out- of the regime and of the YPG/SDF regions. side the areas under its control. However, The farmers benefited more from selling the YPG/SDF later reached9 an agreement wheat to the Interim Government, which in- with the regime to sell about 50 thousand creased selling and transferring activities to tons of its wheat. Idlib from areas under National Army con- The race to increase prices to attract trol. Turkey was in favor of this situation and farmers also continued in 2021. In the early provided support through its Turkish Grain summer of 2021, the regime’s Ministry of Ag- Board (TMO)8. In this context, the inability riculture set the price of wheat to 900 SYP/ of the regime government to purchase at a kg (about 30 cents) to attract farmers, but higher price prompted farmers to sell their the YPG/SDF set it to 1,150 SYP/kg, which crops to the YPG/SDF areas or to the Interim is about 7 cents more10. The interim govern- Government. 8 Bir Gun, “209 tonnes of Grains Bought from War-Torn Syria”, June 19, 2021 9 North Press, “The Autonomous Administration Reveals Negotiations with the Syrian Government to Export Surplus Wheat”, July, 15, 2020 10 Enab Baladi, “250 Pounds Higher than the Price of the Regime, Autonomous Administration Sets the Price of Wheat”, May, 15, 2021 www.orsam.org.tr 5 The Wheat and Bread Crisis in Syria and its Impact on the Population ment also set the price to 325 to 193,000 SYP13.

Load more