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For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: [email protected] warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications Effective Altruism and Extreme Poverty by Fırat Akova A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Warwick September 2020 Table of Contents Acknowledgments vi Declaration viii Abstract ix Introduction 1 What is effective altruism? 1 What are the premises of effective altruism? 4 The aims of this thesis and effective altruism as a field of philosophical study 11 Chapter 1 13 The Badness of Extreme Poverty and Hedonistic Utilitarianism 1.1 Introduction 13 1.2 Suffering caused by extreme poverty 15 1.3 The repugnant conclusions of hedonistic utilitarianism 17 1.3.1 Hedonistic utilitarianism can morally justify extreme poverty if it is without suffering 19 1.3.2 Hedonistic utilitarianism can morally justify the secret killing of the extremely poor 22 1.4 Agency and dignity: morally significant reasons other than suffering 29 1.5 Conclusion 35 ii Chapter 2 37 The Moral Obligation to Alleviate Extreme Poverty 2.1 Introduction 37 2.2 How should we interpret moral significance? 42 2.3 How can the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice be one of the premises of effective altruism? 51 2.4 The permissiveness objection 56 2.4.1 Lavish pursuits 56 2.4.2 Unjustifiable broadness and comparatively unjustifiable burden 62 2.5 The source of responsibility objection 72 2.6 The lack of rights objection 83 2.6.1 Absolute moral rights 85 2.6.2 Relational moral rights 87 2.7 What can effective altruists learn from these objections? 95 2.8 Conclusion 109 Chapter 3 111 Effectiveness 3.1 Introduction 111 3.2 Understanding effectiveness 113 3.3 Justifying effectiveness 119 3.3.1 Justifying effectiveness through an outcome-based principle 119 3.3.2 Justifying effectiveness through an obligation-based principle 126 iii 3.4 Effectiveness and fairness 133 3.4.1 Unjustly favouring the well-off 135 3.4.2 Unequal stakes and unrestricted aggregation 145 3.4.3 Perpetuating the unequal luck distribution across the worst-off 151 3.5 Conclusion 166 Chapter 4 168 The Systemic Change Objection: Low-Risk Actions versus High-Risk Actions 4.1 Introduction 168 4.2 The criteria for designating effective charities 171 4.2.1 Limitations of GiveWell 179 4.3 Empirical research on extreme poverty 182 4.3.1 Illicit financial flows 185 4.3.2 Foreign debt 188 4.3.3 War and military spending 190 4.3.4 Inheritance laws 193 4.3.5 Colonialism 198 4.3.6 Malaria 202 4.3.7 Neglected tropical diseases 204 4.3.8 Overview of the empirical research on extreme poverty 207 4.4 The systemic change objection 209 4.4.1 The systemic change objection and its three propositions 210 4.5 Low-risk actions versus high-risk actions 216 4.6 Conclusion 246 iv Chapter 5 248 The Systemic Change Objection: The Future Extremely Poor and the Non-Identity Problem 5.1 Introduction 248 5.2 Future people and the future extremely poor 252 5.2.1 The time-insensitivity of the moral value of a given amount of welfare 254 5.2.2 Rights continuing ad infinitum 256 5.2.3 The importance of decision-making design for the future extremely poor 258 5.2.4 Where does effective altruism stand? 266 5.3 Charity or systemic change? The case of the future extremely poor 269 5.3.1 Numbers and fairness 269 5.3.2 The distribution of utility 275 5.3.3 The non-identity problem: a challenge to the systemic change objection? 277 5.4 Conclusion 292 Conclusion 295 Bibliography 300 v Acknowledgements At the outset, I should acknowledge that I am one of the luckiest people in the world, although I did not deserve this luck more than anyone else. In a fragile world like ours, I have had the health, time, financial support, and freedom needed to undertake this sort of adventurous and rewarding work. I have promised myself to use this luck to improve the world to the best of my ability, and this work is just a drop in the ocean in that regard. I am indebted to my supervisors. I immensely benefited from Patrick Tomlin, who has always been sharp-witted and provided me with invaluable suggestions and insights. Felix Pinkert also massively helped me, with whom I felt like I was dwelling in an infinite horizon of intellectual roads. I also thank Fabienne Peter, for my initial transition to doctoral life. I feel a great urge to thank Kimberley Brownlee for being exceptionally open, caring, and empathetic. Beyond being my Graduate Progress Committee member and giving me constructive feedback, Kim is an inspiration. I also thank my other Graduate Progress Committee members, Mathew Coakley, David Bather Woods, Eileen John, Christoph Hoerl and David James for their feedback. I want to thank Kübra Arkalı who read, archived, and commented on my work with utter diligence. Our regular or spontaneous discussions triggered by curiosity demonstrated rigour, passion and humility. Kübra's dedication to pursuing an ethical life and preparedness to unboundedly serve the worst-off has always amazed me and corresponded to the raison d'être of this work. vi I thank my Poedat friends. Our never-ending intellectual exchanges are their signature. I owe a lot to effective altruists and the wider effective altruism community—this work would not have existed without them and their contributions. I am grateful to my family, Akgün Akova and Özlem Akova, for recognising my desires, believing in me and supporting me. I thank my sponsors who financially supported me. Finally, I thank anyone who was not mentioned here but contributed to this work, however infinitesimally. vii Declaration I declare that this work is my own. I have not previously published any part of this work. I confirm that this work has not been submitted for a degree at another university. viii Abstract Effective altruism is a movement which aims to maximise good. Effective altruists are concerned with extreme poverty and many of them think that individuals have an obligation to donate to effective charities to alleviate extreme poverty. Their reasoning, which I will scrutinise, is as follows: Premise 1. Extreme poverty is very bad. Premise 2. If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it. Premise 3. Individuals ought to choose the effective option in preventing very bad things. Premise 4. Donating to effective charities is one of the best ways to alleviate extreme poverty. Conclusion. Individuals ought to donate to effective charities working towards extreme poverty alleviation where doing so does not require them to give up anything of moral significance. I will scrutinise each of these premises in turn. ix For Premise 1, I focus on hedonistic utilitarianism and criticise its outlook on extreme poverty. I claim that hedonistic utilitarianism might be problematic for effective altruism. Premise 2 is Peter Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. I introduce several possible interpretations of it, and press several objections to it by stressing overpermissiveness, luck, and rights. I defend strengthening the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice without making it overdemanding. I claim that Premise 3 can be attractive to both consequentialists and non-consequentialists. Nevertheless, by showing that effectiveness sometimes violates fairness, I propose a method which avoids always helping the greater number and always giving everyone equal chances of being helped, which is compatible with effective altruism. Against Premise 4, I assess the systemic change objection, which states that effective altruism unjustifiably distracts individuals from systemic change. By considering risk and the moral standing of the future extremely poor, I claim that the systemic change objection is partially successful, but cannot undermine effective altruism. After analysing all of these, I argue that individuals have an obligation to donate to effective charities to alleviate extreme poverty where doing so does not require them to give up anything of moral significance. x Introduction What is effective altruism? Effective altruism is a philosophical approach which commits itself to find the effective ways to do the most good. It is also a social movement because many people promote and practice the tenets of effective altruism in their everyday lives. Effective altruism has two components: effectiveness and altruism. Effectiveness is mostly linked to cost-effectiveness in the context of effective altruism. It reflects the idea that the success of interventions not only comes from their ability to solve problems but also their ability to solve problems with as few resources as possible. Altruism stands for the practice of being concerned with others' lives and improving them, as opposed to egoism which mainly emphasises self-interest. Effective altruism merges effectiveness and altruism, which makes it a distinct philosophical approach. Effective altruism has different cause areas. One of its cause areas is the focus of this thesis, namely, extreme poverty. Effective altruists are concerned with the conditions that the hundreds of millions of extremely poor people across the globe are subject to, who have to live on just under US$1.90 per day.1 According to the most recent estimates, the number of extremely poor decreased from 1,895 billion in 1990 to 736 million by 2015.2 Effective altruism 1 World Bank Group, "Piecing Together: The Poverty Puzzle," Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2018, 1.