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ABSTRACT Author's Name Jack Glazbrook Title of Thesis Berkeleyts ABSTRACT Author's Name Jack Glazbrook Title of Thesis Berkeleyts Analysis of Science Department Philosophy Degree M.A. Summary The purpose of this dissertation is to examine Berkeley's philosophy of science in the context of his general philosophy (Part One) and to trace the influence of his analysis of science on later ~hought (Part Two). Part One begins by reviewing the influence of other think­ ers - Locke, Newton and r~lebranche in particular - after which his rejection of abstraction is taken up as a prelude to an examination of his metaphysics. The opening discus­ sion of Part Two concludes that Berkeley's philosophy of science is well integrated into his philosophic system. His two main critiques of Newtonian theory, the doctrine of motion and the calculus, are examined as part of his theory of scientific methodology and his concept of nature. The influence of Berkeley's analysis of science is pre­ sented less in its direct impact on individual thinkers than as a contribution to the general intellectual climate of later scientific thought. Short Title BERKELEY'S ANALYSIS OF SCIENCE BERKELEY'S ANALYSIS OF SCIENCE by Jack Glazbrook, B.A. A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of ~~ster of Arts. Department of Philosophy, McGill University, ...... r1ontreal • March, 1970 , (e) Jack G1azbrook 1970 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface i Part One. Berkeley's Philosophy in General Chapter 1. The Context of His Philosophy l Chapter 2. His Rejection of Abstraction 12 Chapter 3. On Physical Objects 22 Chapter 4. On Spirits 33 Part Two. Berkeley's Philosophy of Science Chapter 5 • The Relation of His Philosophy of 45 Science to His Philosophy in General Chapter 6. His Critique of Absolute Space, 56 Time and r1otion Chapter 7. His Critique of IvIathematics 73 Chapter 8. Scientific r1ethodology 83 Chapter 9. The Influence of His Analysis of 92 Science Bibliography i PREFACE The purpose of this dissertation is to examine Berkeley's philosophy of science in the context of his general philosophie position and to trace the influence of his analysis of science on later thought. Part One provides an account of his philosophy in gen­ eral and Part Two offers a detailed analysis of his philosophy of science. Time has been kind to Berkeley. The origi­ nality of his thought and the freshness of his style are revealed in his works as much today as when they were written over two centuries ago. Nor has the large volume of commentary dimmed his light. On the contrary, l have found even those interpretations with which l take exception to be valuable and stimulating. Without ignoring Locke, l have presented Berkeley in terms of a Newton-Malebranche axis: from Newton, the new science, from Malebranche, a divine inspiration. This cornes out in his life, guided by a sense of divine purpose, but influenced by a feeling ii of concern for his fellow man. It is reflected in his philosophy with its respect for science in its study of God's world for the benefit of mankind. Berkeley appears as a very human person, who must, incidental­ ly, have been deeply wounded by the attacks of his contemporaries and especially by their reluctance to even try to understand him. An account of Berkeleian philosophy can con­ veniently begin with his critique of abstraction, from which there are many strands leading in particular to his philosophy of science. His metaphysical system is divided, as iS customary, between his treatments of physical objècts (~ is percipi) and spirits (~ is percipere). Professor Bracken's "intentional tie" thesis has proven helpful here as it permits an expla­ nation of Berkeley's linguistic approach to metaphy-, sical problems that does not make him a phenomenalist. Bridging the gap between the general philo­ sophy and the philosophy of science at the beginning of Part Two poses little difficulty since Berkeley himself integrated his analysis of science well into his whole system despite, and even perhaps because of, his careful separation of science from metaphysics. 1 iii Further, there is no need to complicate the matter by talk of development in his writings because Berkeley reached his conclusions early in scientific theory and stuck with them. Central to Berkeley's analysis of science is his criticism of Newtonian physics. In retrospect, we can recognize Newton and Berkeley as the two great protagonists in scientific theory in the early eigh­ teenth century. Protagonists they were, but not an­ tagonists. B8rkeley, a more enthusiastic supporter of the new science in its results and even in its theory than could be justified today, criticized Newtonian physics in order to make its foundations philosophically impeccable. In kinetic theory, he accepted the value of Newton's laws of motion, but rejected the notions of absolute space, time and motion as illegitimate and unnecessary. His critical arguments are now substan­ tially accepted, and new positive doctrines have been developed to preserve the first and second laws of motion - the status of the third law is more debat­ able - in the more restricted context made necessary by the introduction of relativity theory. His criti- iv cism of the notion of the infinitesimal in calculus is generally agreed to be correct as far as the New­ tonian or Leibnizian formulations are concerned. How­ ever, subsequent mathematical theory has found an answer to Berkeley in a revised formulation in terms of a theory of limits that preserves the value of the calculus as a method. Berkeley's scientific methodology clearly represents an early reaction to the essentialist view of science. To what extent he contributed to the views of science which replaced essentialism is more questionable. Certainly, he anticipated Mach in the rejection of essences and of infinitesimals, but it does not follow from this that Berkeley anti­ cipated ~~chean instrumentalism, positivism or phe­ nomenalism. Further, when recent research has raised question on the influence of even the "crucial" Michelson-Morley experiment on Einstein, any claim that Berkeley through Mach influenced Einstein should be subjected to very careful re- . examination. The valuable contribution of Berkeley's analysis of science seems to me to be best regarded as an influence on the general intellectual climate PART ONE BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL 1 l Chapter 1. The Context of His Philosophy. In this outline of Berkeley's philosophy in general as a prelude to an examination of his analysis of science, it will be useful to examine his general philosophie position in its contexte To do this, we will consider in order: (1) the influence of other thinkers on his philosophy (2) the connection between his life and his philosophy (3) the response of his contemporaries to his philosophie proposals. During his years at Trinit y College, Dublin, Berkeley became well read in philosophie works in Latin, Greek, French and Hebrew, and became especially familiar with Plato's Dialogues, Malebranche's Recherche de la Vérité (1674-5) and Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). He had also studied the Newtonian science and the mathematical calculus which dominated the scientific thought of the early eighteenth century;l that Berkeley gained a thorough gasp of these disciplines will become apparent when we turn in Part Two to his analysis of science. His attitude to earlier thinkers is best summarized by two remarks recorded in his early notebooks, written in 1707 and 1708 and not then intended lG.J. Warnock, Berk\eley ("Pelican Books"; Harmondsworth, 1953), p. 15. 2 for publication, but published first in 1871 by Professor A.C. Fraser under the title Commonplace Book of Occasional Meta­ physical Thoughts and in revised forro in 1948 by Professors A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop as the fhilosophical Commentaries: Entry 266: Mem : that l was distrustful at 8 years old and Consequently by nature dis­ posed for these new Doctrines. Entry 682: l must acknowledge my self behold­ ing to the Philosophers have gone before me. They have given good rules tho perhaps they do not always observe them. Similitude of Adventurers who tho they them selves attained not the desir'd Port, they by their wrecks have made known the Rocks & sands, whereby the Passage of aftercomers is made more secure & easy. Pref: or 1ntrod: 2 This combination of respect mixed with criticism is most apparent in Berkeley's response to Locke, who is the sub­ ject of over seventy of the ' entries in the Philosophical Com­ mentaries, most of them sharply critical. Locke's influence on Berkeley has been so frequently recorded by commentators that Professor Frederick J.E. Woodbridge claims it to be exaggerated,3 and Professors G.J. Whitrow and Jessop insist 2George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, ed. A.A. Lüëë and T.E: Jessop (London, 1948 ), 1-,-33, 83. (All references to Berkeley's works are to this edition. Subsequent footnotes refer to Works and indicate the shortened title and Berkeley's section numbers, if any). 3Frederick J.E. Woodbridge, "Berkeley's Realism," in Studies in the History of 1deas, ed. Department of Philosophy of Columbia University (New York, 1918), 1, 188. 3 that Newton's influence was at least equal to Locke's.4 Despite sorne reservations - as to the nature of space, for exarnple 5 - Locke substantially accepted the Newtonian science and atternpted, with a good rneasure of success, to formulate a philosophy co~patible with that science. As a result, both the strengths and weaknesses of Newtonian science are reflect- ed in Lockean philosophy. While Berkeley acknowledged these strengths, he concentrated on tllose weaknesses which his contempories seemed ready to overlook, his attack being di­ rected against Newton when the views of scientists or rnathe­ mati cians were primarily in question and against Locke when the philosophers were the target.
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