J. Rousseau Iban inequality

In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 136 (1980), no: 1, Leiden, 52-63

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Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 10:22:24AM via free access JEROME ROUSSEAU

IBAN INEQUALITY

Appel1 (1978: 61) reflects the view of many social scientists when he points out that some of the societies practising swidden agri- culture "have essentially egalitarian social systems, while others have highly developed systems of social stratification". I argue that the contrast between such societies has been overemphasized. In particular, the Iban have been seen as a paradigm of egalitarianism, but if we analyse their social structure, we can see that inequality is present to a significant extent, and that they are much more similar to the stratified societies of Borneo than is superficially evident.' The following argument5 have been presented to show that the Iban are egalitarian: 1. The Eban are essentially in a state of anarchy: "Jurally, each bilek- family [domestic unit] is a power unto itself, managing its own affairs and acknowledging no other family to be its superior, or master" (Freeman 1970: 129). 2. "There is no institution of leadership" within the cornmunity (Preeman 1970: 129). (An Iban village consists of a single divided into apartments, one for each domestic unit or bilek. Iban long- houses contain on average 80 or 90 people; cf. Freeman 1970: 62; Jensen 1974: 31.) To be more exact, "under Iban adat a tuai rumah [longhouse leader]

JEROME ROUSSEAU took his Ph.D. at the University of Cambridge and is at present Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology at McGiII University. His main fields of interest are social inequality, cognition and ideology, with special reference to insular South-East Asia. His principal publications are The Peoples of Central Borneo, ed. Kuching: Museum, 1974, and 'On estates and castes', Dialectica1 Anthropology 3: 85-95, 1978. Dr. Rousseau may be contacted at: Dept. of Anthropology, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke St. W., Montreal, Que., Canada H3A2T7.

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has no authority to command other' members of his community, nor are they, in any marked sense, his personal subordinates" (Freeman 1970: 113). The position of tuai rumah is elective, not hereditary (cf. Freeman 1970: 111). 3. There are no supra-local leaders: "The Ibans had no clear concept of regularly constituted leadership beyond the village-longhouse level" (Pringle 1970: 35). Because of this stmctural weakness, disputes could be solved by agreement only if the parties were relatives, and even in those cases, the decision was often reached by ritual means (diving contests, cock-fighting, ordeals by boiling water) or by club fights, rather than by negotiation (cf. Freeman 1970: 110; Heppell 1976). "Between tribes whose members were not linked by ties of kinship there was no mechanism for dealing with disputes, and in these cases a state of feud (with head-hunting) was endemic" (Freeman 1970: 111). 4. This is linked to an ideology of egalitarianism and an absence of ranking: "Under Iban adat al1 men are equals . . . Iban society is class- less and egalitarian - and its members, individualists, aggressive and proud in demeanour, lacking any taste for obeisance" (Freeman 1970: 129). Individuals can improve their status, but prestige is entirely the result of one's own activity: 'During his lifetime a man may acquire high prestige and become an honoured leader, but rank is not in- heritable" (Freeman 1970: 129). The egalitarian social structure is explained in part as a consequence of the ideology (cf. Freeman 1970, parsim; Pringle 1970: 28; Sutlive 1978: 59), but other factors are also adduced: the absence of unilineal kin groups "in itself, precludes the possibility of there being any kind of highly developed leadership, or chieftainship" (Freeman 1970: 111 ) . In addition, Sutlive (1978: 59) argues that there could be no full-time politica1 leaders because of the inadequacy of agricultural surplus, and thus that supra-local leaders could not exist. These arguments do not hold if we compare the Iban with other Borneo societies, otherwise similar to the Iban, which demonstrate the presence of a marked structure of inequality, such as the Kayan (cf. Rousseau 1979). The Kayan and the Iban have the same technology: they are shifting cultivators of rice and live in . Both have a cognatic kinship system and a similar family and household structure; both groups used to be headhunters, sometimes against each other, 1 and at some periods of their history they both engaged in territoria1 expansion, invading areas previously occupied by other groups; they

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 10:22:24AM via free access 54 Jérôme Rousseau also share a nurnber of cultural traits. However, Kayan society is divided into four hereditary strata: the ruling stratum (maren), the "lower aristocrats" (hipuy), the commoners (panyin) and the slaves (dipen). The cornmoners constitute approximately 70 OJo of the population, and the other strata 10 O/o each. Chiefship is transmitted hereditarily and is restricted to the ruling stratum. There is a preference towards stratum endogamy, but inter-strata marriages occur. The "lower aristocrats" and commoners perform corvées regularly for the ruling stratum; the latter also control the labour of the slaves. The Kayan lack unilineal kin groups in the Same way as the Iban do, but this has not prevented the formation of hereditary leadership and strata. Also, the absence of regional political leaders among the Iban cannot be explained by the inadequacy of agricultural surplus: the amount of food production among the Iban and Kayan is very similar (see Freeman 1955 and Rousseau 1977), but the Kayan chief appropriates enough of the surplus to free himself almost completely from productive activities; furthermore, some Kayan village chiefs become regional leaders.' The only remaining explanation is that the Iban are egalitarian because they have an egalitarian ideology. This hardly constitutes an analysis. While ideology can have a significant effect on the social structure, it is necessary to specify the circurnstances and the ways in which it wil1 do so. But are the Iban really egalitarian? This has been taken as fact primarily because of Freeman's ethnographies. These are undeniably of high quality. However, as Pringle (1970: 28) points out, Freeman overemphasizes the democratic aspect of Iban society. To a large extent, this is a consequence of his frame of reference. He concerned himself almost exclusively with the Baleh Iban during the period 1949-51. But the Baleh is a pioneer area, populated by migrants from the Second Division at the period of the quasi-colonial Brooke Raj. If we study the long-settled areas, and go back in time to analyse Iban society before and at the beginning of Brooke rule, Baleh Iban egalitarianism is shown for what it really is, i.e. the result of specific historica1 circum- stances which superficially hid a structure of inequality inherent in Iban society. This in turn made it easier for some authors to over- emphasize some egalitarian traits?

The longhouse leader The founders of a comrnunity and their descendants form its core- group. When the longhouse leader dies, his successor is chosen by the

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 10:22:24AM via free access Iban Inequality whole community, including those who joined it after its foundation, but "the core-group. . . is always able to exert the most influence, and it is always one of its members that is chosen" (Freeman 1970: 111). Freeman shows that jurally, the position of the Baleh Iban tuai rumah is very weak: even if leadership is limited in practice to the core-group, this in itself does not produce a sharp differentiation within the community, because any of its male adult members can theoretically become tuai rumah. Thus, within broad limits, the office is elective, not hereditary; it als0 lacks any form of supernatural sanction (cf. Freeman 1970: 113). Finally, it does not by itself provide any authority or means of coercion. In order to carry out his main duty, which is "to watch over conduct, and to safeguard and administer the customary law" (Freeman 1970: 115), the tuai rumah has to resort to "persuasion and admonition, for he knows that his position is dependent on the continued goodwill and approval" of the other members of the long- house (~Freeman1970: 113). But are longhouse leaders really in the unenviable situation which Freeman describes? It is clear that Iban custom defines only the minima1 features of the office: "It frequently happens, of course, that a tuai rumah is als0 a man of considerable personal prestige. He may, for example, be a successful headhunter, and have sealed his renown by performing a number of rituals (gawai) which rank so high in Iban estimation. Again, being a tuai rumah does mean that a man becomes widely known, for it is usual for an Iban community to be called after its tuai rumah" (p. 113). The more prestige the leader has, the easier it is for him to impose his will. To increase his influence, the tuai rumah can also become the religious leader. The tuai burong, or augur, has a prestigious position and plays a major role in the organization of the agricultural cycle. In the Second Division, the Same man cumulates the offices of tumai rumah and tuai burong in approximately two-thirds of the longhouses, and "in the past, while . . . migration was a recurrent event thought to depend for its success on spirit favour and the correct response to spirit guidance, the tuai burong was almost invariably als0 tuai rumah" (Jensen 1974: 61).4 This illuminates Freeman's comment that "the tuai burong is regarded as the jun rumah, or founder of the longhouse" (Freeman 1970: 121). Thus, the office of tuai rumah provides little power, but for this very reason, longhouse leaders strengthen their authority by other means: they gain religious legitimation by becorning tuai burong, and they seek to obtain the prestige that strengthens their influence. In order

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to understand this aspect of Iban society, we must distinguish between jura1 mles, for which the roles of tuai rumah and tuai burong are distinct, and the actual social system, where they are integrated. In other words, the assumption of priesthood by tuai rumahs and their quest for prestige cannot be explained simply in terms of individual behaviour. They are part and parcel of the institution of leadership. Also, we must not overlook ideological features which put the tuai rumah in a unique position. As Freeman mentions, the community is normally named after him. Traditionally in the Second Division, he used to keep a part of the fines imposed on culprits (cf. Gomes 1911: 90). Also, if a family left the village, he received a compensation from them (cf. Howell 1898: 35). His status was also recognized in other ways: "if a wrong is done him or his family he has the right to demand a bigger fine than ordinary folks" (Howell 1898: 35). Thus, the tuai rumah was more than a primus inter pares. We saw that in the Baleh, succession to leadership is fairly democratic, as any member of the core group can be elected to the office. The Same democratic principle is found in the Second Division: "any adult member of the Ionghouse can, in theory, become tuai rumah" (Jensen 1974: 26). But the reality is very different: in 25 out of 40 cases, the tuai rumah has been succeeded by a member of his own household and, in 14 out of the 15 remaining cases, by a relative (Table l).' This implies a very significant limitation in the democratic bases of leadership and the supposedly egalitarian ideology.

TABLE 1 Succession to the office of tuai rumah in longhouses of the Ulu &/Delok, Lemanak and Undup areas, Second Division. After Jensen (1974: 27).

by cognate by affine unrelated TOTAL

From the same bilek 18 7 - 25 From different bileks 9 5 1 15

TOTAL 27 12 1 40

Supra-local leaders In traditional Iban society, there was no long-lasting group with stable boundaries that would form a political unit beyond the village. How- ever, supra-local leadership did exist, both in war and in peace. The

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tau serang (or tuai serang) was the war leader who organized expedi- tions, and he could recruit warriors from several communities. One could become a tau serang only through personal ski11 and bravery; supernatural sanction in the form of dreams was also necessary (cf. \ Pringle 1970: 33, 220). However, despite the emphasis on personal qualities, the function was often hereditaxy. Indeed, in the Saribas, "it was taken for granted that the position of chief and wdrleadei should pass from father to sony' (Morgan 1968: 146; see als0 dandin 1966: 104). Given the importance of warfare and territoria1 expansion in traditional Iban society, it is not surprising that there should be a relationship between war leadership and permanent authority. At the regional level, there were also influential leaders, called orang kaya (cf. Freeman 1970: 110; lit. "important, rich person") or tuai menoa (cf. Sandin 1970: 89; lit. "area leader"). Although ethno- graphies are vague on this point, it is probable that only tuai rurnahs could become regional leaders. As Sutlive (1978: 32-33) notes, they were in many respects similar to Melanesian big men, in that they had to maintain their prestige and must compete in order to have a following. The fact that from an individual viewpoint their position was unstable does not negate the importance of their role in Iban society: they constituted the supra-local level of leadership without which migrations and warfare would have been much more limited. They also contributed to reducing hostility between neighbouring cornmunities, for instance by discouraging battles with clubs between relatives or neighbours. "A third force would be organized and armed and would separate the rivals and force them to accept their mediation" (Heppell 1976: 213). The importance of supra-local leaders in traditional Iban society may not have been fully recognized by outside observers because in historica1 times many of them had Malay titles and their authority was legitimated by the Sultanates of and Pontianak (and later by the Brooke Raj)? But while these titles clearly were the result of cultural borrowing, they were applied to pre-existing roles. The terminological change is significant: the readiness of Iban leaders to adopt these titles suggests that they found it to their advantage to gain some outside means of legitimation. Nevertheless rhe latter-day regional leaders have to be understood not as a creation by outside forces, but as the transformation of a traditional structure. Some traditional aspects do remain: while the office of penghulu (regional leader) has been elective since 1902, more than 25 O/o of the present-

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day Eban penghulus are directly related to their predecessor (as sons or sons-in-law), and an additional 25 % are members of prominent families which have produced other penghulus and longhouse head- men (cf. Sandin 1970).

Social differentiation The presence of the core group establishes some social differentiation. More irnportantly, Freeman shows that while in theory al1 Iban are equal, some of them manage to attain situations of prestige and in- fluence. Pioneering, continuously successful farming, participation in warfare and successful were the main avenues of prestige in Iban society. Finally, the performance of ritual feasts (gaai) in which an individual's valour was celebrated further strengthened his prestige (cf. Freeman 1970: 113; Morgan 1968: 147-149; Sandin 1961; Sutlive 1978: 25-26). We may note the structural consequences of the quest for prestige: it brought about, directly (pioneering) or indirectly (headhunting and the desire for continuously successful crops), the need for territoria1 expansion. In other words, the means of social differentiation were sought outside the boundaries of Iban ~ociety.~The significance of these factors becomes evident if one compares the Iban and the Kayan. Among the latter, a rigid and elaborate system of stratification regulated and legitimated the hereditary position of the chief, and it provided him with the means of maintaining his prestige; in particular, the villagers had to perform corvées regularly for the chief, and thus provided for his subsistence and that of the ruling group in genera1 (cf. Rousseau 1979). The Kayan als0 engaged in migrations, but these were organized on a large scale; they involved the simultaneous move- ment of many communities, after which there would be little mobility. Among the Kayan, migrations were not a consequence of a quest for prestige; they followed from the desire to maintain material prosperity and politica1 stability while reducing warfare to a minimum. Arnong the Iban, migration and expansion constituted a continuous proces resulting from tlie action of individual leaders with a limited number of followers, who might very wel1 be recruited from different com- munities. If individual achievements were necessary among the Iban in order to acquire prestige, doesn't this support the notion of egalitarianism? Could it not be said that while there are positions of authonty and prestige in Iban society, the principle of equality is maintained because

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 10:22:24AM via free access Iban Inequality 59 anybody can occupy them? This interpretation is not possible, given the strong bias towards hereditary transmission of leadership. But one can go further: "Sandin . . . has estimated that no more than twenty per cent of Iban families would have the inherited obligation to seek personal prestige that led men on an intensive hunt for heads and valuable jars. Fifty per cent would be ordinary people who (though they might improve their own position) would, lacking inherited charms, remain followers, rarely able to shape the patterns of war and trade. Thirty per cent would be men of the lower class, paddlers of the warboats" (Morgan 1968: 146-147). Status had to be achieved, but to a large extent, the impetus and the means for its acquisition were inhented. The irnportance of hereditary status is demonstrated by the Second Division Iban's interest in pedigrees (tusut), which often establish descent from supernatural beings and culture heroes (see for instance Sandin 1967). Powerful charms were also inhented, which contributed to legitirnizing the power of the leader (cf. Morgan 1968: 147). Any Iban was theoretically allowed to gain prestige, but only a rninority of the population felt obligated to do SO.~Thus, while what one might cal1 the 'prestige-seeking category' was not formally closed, it tended to reproduce itself. Furthermore, as there was a tendency for the offices of tuai rumah and war leader to be inherited, this made it that much more difficult for others to join that category. The organi- zation of warfare provided some means whereby war leaders could gain matenal advantage: "each warnor owed the first head or captive that he took to his warleader" (Morgan 1968: 143). While the accumulation of head trophies had primarily a symbolic significance, captives con- stituted a workforce for the leader. They maintained a low and dependent status in the society, even when they were adopted by their owner, and the taint of slavery would often prevent maniage with ordinary people (cf. Freeman 1970: 70; Jensen 1974: 36). Distinct from captives were debt-slaves (cf. Gomes 1911: 95) ? The descendants of both kinds of slaves were als0 slaves (cf. Sandin 1967: 125). Finaly, as Morgan (1968: 148-149) shows, the members of the prestige-seeking category obtained, through warfare and pioneering, the means of further enhancing their status: in raids, they would gain not only captives, but als0 prestige property (gongs, jars); they could trade the rice surplus provided by their nch new lands in order to acquire more ~restigeproperty or to finance gawai festivals. In short, Iban society was divided into three status levels (the

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 10:22:24AM via free access 60 Iérôme Rousseau prestige-seeking category, commoners and slaves), which were to a large extent hereditary, although the absence of clear boundaries be- tween them facilitated social mobility. These status levels are comparable to - although not identical with - Kayan strata, and one might hypothesize that the latter developed out of a situation sirnilar to the Iban's where the status levels came to be defined as formally hereditary strata. The presence of the Mualang suggests that such an hypothesis is not fancifui. The Mualang, an 'Ibanic' group of the Kapuas, "have three established ranks: bansa suka (aristocrats) , orang meluar/menua (commoners) and bansa mela- wang (slaves)" (King 1978: 65).1° While slavery exists in both societies, the structure of exploitation generally differs. Among the Kayan, it is institutionalized in the corvke, which forms part of the yearly routine. Among the Iban, exploitation was to a large extent directed at out- siders, in warfare and predatory expansion, and was therefore of a more episodic nature.

The Baleh Iban One problem remains. As Pringle points out, Freeman overemphasized the democratie aspect of Iban society. Nevertheless, his description is tbased on a lengthy and careful fieldwork, and his assertions are supported by evidence. How is Baleh "egalitarianism" to be ex- plained ? Pringle, who accepts the general premise that the Baleh are egalitarian, sees it as a consequence of pioneer conditions: following their usual practice, the Iban moved to the Baleh in smal1 groups, independently of each other, and this temporanly disrupted the old patterns of social differentiation (cf. Pringle 1970: 35-36). This explanation is not accept- able. The process of migration itself reproduced unequal stmctures: leadership of a pioneering group defined an individual as a member of the prestige-seeking category; territoria1 expansion was accompanied by the enslavement of captives. As pioneers, al1 free members of the community were part of the core group, but this did not negate the tripartite ranking of the society. In any case, when Freeman visited the Baleh Iban, they had' been in the area for approximately two generations: they were thus not really pioneers any more. To under- stand the specificity of the Baleh Iban, we have to consider the historica1 circumstances under which they came int0 being. Pioneering activities in the Baleh took place while the Brooke administration was establishing effective control over Sarawak. It was

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progressively playing a greater role in domains that had traditionally been the concern of Iban chiefs. First of all, the administration exercised an increasing degree of control over migrations; it success- fully reduced and eventually eliminated headhunting and warfare. With its district officers and courts, it superimposed a new structure on Iban society. The regional leaders were integrated into that structure by being redefined as penghulus, who received a stipend from the state; the traditional law (adat) was codified and subordinated to the laws of Sarawak; slavery was abolished. These major transformations have effectively undermined the traditional bases of inequality throughout Iban society. Their effect has been more irnrnediately obvious in the Baleh where, almost from the beginning, the Brooke Raj played a predominant role in organizing the society. But, being a consequence of &e subordination of Iban society to a state, the present egalitarian- ism is more illusory than real. Because the structure of inequality is supported from outside Iban culture, it has become possible for the egalitarian features of Iban ideology to become more pro- minent.

Conclusion Iban ideology had an egalitarian slant, but it does not follow that the social structure was actually egalitarian. The ideology reduced the structural stability of inequality and compelled the dominant members of the society to expend energy on maintaining their position, which l they did successfully. While, de jure, Iban leadership is elective and gives almost no authority to the incumbent, de facto it was - and to a large extent, still is - hereditary; a leader could use various means in order to establish his authority, not only in his own village, but also at the supra-local level. The existente of status levels which were largely hereditary also ran counter to the egalitarian principles. Such a contrast between egalitarian ideology and unequal social structure should not surprise US: it is to be found in a more extreme form in our own society. A historical approach to Iban society indicates that they were much more similar to other groups of Borneo shifting cultivators than is superficially evident, and while it is clear that the Iban demonstrate less inequality than many other Borneo groups, their characterization as an egalitarian society is not adequate.

McGill Uniuersity

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NOTES

I wish to thank Madeleine Palmer-Rousseau and Nels Johnson for their - comments. The terms 'egalitarianism', 'inequality' and 'stratification' have a variety of divergent meanings; it may be useful to indicate briefly how they are used here. Stratification is an ideological system which explains and justifies in- equality by classifying al1 the members of a society in a limited number of categones; for instance Indian castes and medieval estates. Such strata are not classes, but they form part of a class stmcture. (For more on this, see Rousseau 1978: 86-88.) For analytica1 purposes, one can distinguish three forms of inequality. Ideological inequality is the differential ranking of social categories (strata, age levels, sexes, etc.). Politica1 inequality exists when one sector of society occupies and maintains a position of power. Exploitative relations of pro- duction constitute economic inequality. Probably no society is entirely free from ideological, politica1 or econornic inequality. 'Egalitarianism' must thus be understood as a pole in a continuum rather than one half of a dichotomy. It should be noted that the role of regional leader does not have to be a full-time activity; therefore, the importante of the agricultural surplus would not in any case determine the presence or absence of regional leader- ship. The ethnographic present refers to 1949-51 for the Baleh Iban and 1960-66 for the Second Division Iban. A nineteenth-century observer also noted this: "The position of a priest being filled by him [the tuai rumah], he offers the sacrifice for his village during an epidemic or any important feast held in his village" (Hoivell 1898: 35). This parallels the Iban rules of inheritance, based on the principle that the domestic unit, not the individual, is the land-owning entity. It follows that al1 its members, whether cognates or affines, inherit equally. "When the Ibans came to be nominally mìed by the Brunei government, the titles of Orang Kaya, Orang Kaya Pemancha, Orang Kaya Penglima and 0. K. Temenggong were bestowed upon the leaders who were loyal to Brunei. . . In Kalirnantan, the titles of Patinggi, Temenggong, Radin and Pateh were given to the ancient Iban leaders" (Sandin 1970: 89-90). I am not arguing that the quest for prestige was the reason for Iban expansion, but it is one of its bases: King (1976) has demonstrated that Iban expansion cannot be explained in purely or even primarily ecological terms, and that "analyses of migration and warfare must give due recognition to the values and beliefs of the society in question" (p. 319). S Similarly, Gomes notes: "It is sometimes stated that, according to ancient custom, no Dyak could marry without having first procured a human head as a token of his valour. This is not tme. It was only in cases of the great men - their Chiefs - that such a thing was necessary" (Gomes 1911 : 74). It ~vouldbe interesting to know whether the members of that privileged sector actually believed the ideological statements which assumed equality. Sandin mentions a third category of slaves: "criminals who could not pay the pati nyawa or compensation due to the person they had injured" (Sandin 1967: 125) ; but this is essentially another form of debt slavery. l0 Of course, this hypothesis presents a logical, not a chronological progression. For instance, we cannot discount the possibility that the ancestors of the Iban had hereditary strata and that some histoncal transformations would

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have attenuated the forma1 importance of heredity. For an explanation of the process which would bnng about the partition of the highest status level into two strata, the ruling group and the lower aristocrats, see Rousseau (1979: 229-231).

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