J. Rousseau Iban Inequality In

J. Rousseau Iban inequality In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 136 (1980), no: 1, Leiden, 52-63 This PDF-file was downloaded from http://www.kitlv-journals.nl Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 10:22:24AM via free access JEROME ROUSSEAU IBAN INEQUALITY Appel1 (1978: 61) reflects the view of many social scientists when he points out that some of the Borneo societies practising swidden agri- culture "have essentially egalitarian social systems, while others have highly developed systems of social stratification". I argue that the contrast between such societies has been overemphasized. In particular, the Iban have been seen as a paradigm of egalitarianism, but if we analyse their social structure, we can see that inequality is present to a significant extent, and that they are much more similar to the stratified societies of Borneo than is superficially evident.' The following argument5 have been presented to show that the Iban are egalitarian: 1. The Eban are essentially in a state of anarchy: "Jurally, each bilek- family [domestic unit] is a power unto itself, managing its own affairs and acknowledging no other family to be its superior, or master" (Freeman 1970: 129). 2. "There is no institution of leadership" within the cornmunity (Preeman 1970: 129). (An Iban village consists of a single longhouse divided into apartments, one for each domestic unit or bilek. Iban longhouses contain on average 80 or 90 people; cf. Freeman 1970: 62; Jensen 1974: 31.) To be more exact, "under Iban adat a tuai rumah [longhouse leader] JEROME ROUSSEAU took his Ph.D. at the University of Cambridge and is at present Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology at McGiII University. His main fields of interest are social inequality, cognition and ideology, with special reference to insular South-East Asia. His principal publications are The Peoples of Central Borneo, ed. Kuching: Sarawak Museum, 1974, and 'On estates and castes', Dialectica1 Anthropology 3: 85-95, 1978. Dr. Rousseau may be contacted at: Dept. of Anthropology, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke St. W., Montreal, Que., Canada H3A2T7. Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 10:22:24AM via free access Zban Inequality 53 has no authority to command other' members of his community, nor are they, in any marked sense, his personal subordinates" (Freeman 1970: 113). The position of tuai rumah is elective, not hereditary (cf. Freeman 1970: 111). 3. There are no supra-local leaders: "The Ibans had no clear concept of regularly constituted leadership beyond the village-longhouse level" (Pringle 1970: 35). Because of this stmctural weakness, disputes could be solved by agreement only if the parties were relatives, and even in those cases, the decision was often reached by ritual means (diving contests, cock-fighting, ordeals by boiling water) or by club fights, rather than by negotiation (cf. Freeman 1970: 110; Heppell 1976). "Between tribes whose members were not linked by ties of kinship there was no mechanism for dealing with disputes, and in these cases a state of feud (with head-hunting) was endemic" (Freeman 1970: 111). 4. This is linked to an ideology of egalitarianism and an absence of ranking: "Under Iban adat al1 men are equals . Iban society is class- less and egalitarian - and its members, individualists, aggressive and proud in demeanour, lacking any taste for obeisance" (Freeman 1970: 129). Individuals can improve their status, but prestige is entirely the result of one's own activity: 'During his lifetime a man may acquire high prestige and become an honoured leader, but rank is not in- heritable" (Freeman 1970: 129). The egalitarian social structure is explained in part as a consequence of the ideology (cf. Freeman 1970, parsim; Pringle 1970: 28; Sutlive 1978: 59), but other factors are also adduced: the absence of unilineal kin groups "in itself, precludes the possibility of there being any kind of highly developed leadership, or chieftainship" (Freeman 1970: 111 ) . In addition, Sutlive (1978: 59) argues that there could be no full-time politica1 leaders because of the inadequacy of agricultural surplus, and thus that supra-local leaders could not exist. These arguments do not hold if we compare the Iban with other Borneo societies, otherwise similar to the Iban, which demonstrate the presence of a marked structure of inequality, such as the Kayan (cf. Rousseau 1979). The Kayan and the Iban have the same technology: they are shifting cultivators of rice and live in longhouses. Both have a cognatic kinship system and a similar family and household structure; both groups used to be headhunters, sometimes against each other, 1 and at some periods of their history they both engaged in territoria1 expansion, invading areas previously occupied by other groups; they Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 10:22:24AM via free access 54 Jérôme Rousseau also share a nurnber of cultural traits. However, Kayan society is divided into four hereditary strata: the ruling stratum (maren), the "lower aristocrats" (hipuy), the commoners (panyin) and the slaves (dipen). The cornmoners constitute approximately 70 OJo of the population, and the other strata 10 O/o each. Chiefship is transmitted hereditarily and is restricted to the ruling stratum. There is a preference towards stratum endogamy, but inter-strata marriages occur. The "lower aristocrats" and commoners perform corvées regularly for the ruling stratum; the latter also control the labour of the slaves. The Kayan lack unilineal kin groups in the Same way as the Iban do, but this has not prevented the formation of hereditary leadership and strata. Also, the absence of regional political leaders among the Iban cannot be explained by the inadequacy of agricultural surplus: the amount of food production among the Iban and Kayan is very similar (see Freeman 1955 and Rousseau 1977), but the Kayan chief appropriates enough of the surplus to free himself almost completely from productive activities; furthermore, some Kayan village chiefs become regional leaders.' The only remaining explanation is that the Iban are egalitarian because they have an egalitarian ideology. This hardly constitutes an analysis. While ideology can have a significant effect on the social structure, it is necessary to specify the circurnstances and the ways in which it wil1 do so. But are the Iban really egalitarian? This has been taken as fact primarily because of Freeman's ethnographies. These are undeniably of high quality. However, as Pringle (1970: 28) points out, Freeman overemphasizes the democratic aspect of Iban society. To a large extent, this is a consequence of his frame of reference. He concerned himself almost exclusively with the Baleh Iban during the period 1949-51. But the Baleh is a pioneer area, populated by migrants from the Second Division at the period of the quasi-colonial Brooke Raj. If we study the long-settled areas, and go back in time to analyse Iban society before and at the beginning of Brooke rule, Baleh Iban egalitarianism is shown for what it really is, i.e. the result of specific historica1 circum- stances which superficially hid a structure of inequality inherent in Iban society. This in turn made it easier for some authors to over- emphasize some egalitarian traits? The longhouse leader The founders of a comrnunity and their descendants form its core- group. When the longhouse leader dies, his successor is chosen by the Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 10:22:24AM via free access Iban Inequality whole community, including those who joined it after its foundation, but "the core-group. is always able to exert the most influence, and it is always one of its members that is chosen" (Freeman 1970: 111). Freeman shows that jurally, the position of the Baleh Iban tuai rumah is very weak: even if leadership is limited in practice to the core-group, this in itself does not produce a sharp differentiation within the community, because any of its male adult members can theoretically become tuai rumah. Thus, within broad limits, the office is elective, not hereditary; it als0 lacks any form of supernatural sanction (cf. Freeman 1970: 113). Finally, it does not by itself provide any authority or means of coercion. In order to carry out his main duty, which is "to watch over conduct, and to safeguard and administer the customary law" (Freeman 1970: 115), the tuai rumah has to resort to "persuasion and admonition, for he knows that his position is dependent on the continued goodwill and approval" of the other members of the longhouse (~Freeman1970: 113). But are longhouse leaders really in the unenviable situation which Freeman describes? It is clear that Iban custom defines only the minima1 features of the office: "It frequently happens, of course, that a tuai rumah is als0 a man of considerable personal prestige. He may, for example, be a successful headhunter, and have sealed his renown by performing a number of rituals (gawai) which rank so high in Iban estimation. Again, being a tuai rumah does mean that a man becomes widely known, for it is usual for an Iban community to be called after its tuai rumah" (p. 113). The more prestige the leader has, the easier it is for him to impose his will. To increase his influence, the tuai rumah can also become the religious leader. The tuai burong, or augur, has a prestigious position and plays a major role in the organization of the agricultural cycle. In the Second Division, the Same man cumulates the offices of tumai rumah and tuai burong in approximately two-thirds of the longhouses, and "in the past, while . migration was a recurrent event thought to depend for its success on spirit favour and the correct response to spirit guidance, the tuai burong was almost invariably als0 tuai rumah" (Jensen 1974: 61).4 This illuminates Freeman's comment that "the tuai burong is regarded as the jun rumah, or founder of the longhouse" (Freeman 1970: 121).

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