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Liquid Assets IV: Hong Kong’s Water Resources Management under “One Country, Two Systems” July 2013 Su Liu About Civic Exchange

Civic Exchange is a Hong Kong-based non-profit public policy think tank that was established in October 2000. It is an independent organisation that has access to policy-makers, officials, businesses, media and NGOs – reaching across sectors and borders. Civic Exchange has solid research experience in areas such as air quality, energy, urban planning, climate change, conservation, water, governance, political development, equal opportunities, poverty and gender. For more information about Civic Exchange, visit www.civic- exchange.org.

About the author

Su Liu is the Head of Great China & Water Policy Researcher of Civic Exchange. Her work in Civic Exchange covers mainly water related policy research and China related project coordination. Su was a former public opinion researcher (Deputy Managing Director of the Gallup Organisation HK), and a communication strategist (Deputy Managing Director of Wirthlin Worldwide Asia).

2 Foreword

Civic Exchange began its policy research work on water resources management in Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta in 2009 and has published five research reports on the topic since then. The last three reports mainly focused on the Dongjiang River and the Pearl River Delta as we believed we needed a better understanding of the region’s current water demand and supply status. Hong Kong relies heavily on Guangdong to meet its internal water demand. These reports informed us about the implications of the region’s economic, social and political development on Hong Kong’s water supply.

This report draws our attention back to Hong Kong. It is an attempt to take a closer look at Hong Kong’s own water resources management today using our previous work as a reference to help frame the issues. Hong Kong will begin its discussion on water supply with Guangdong authorities later this year. We hope that this report can assist Hong Kong in considering how best to chart a better water resources management strategy.

Civic Exchange would like to thank The Noble Group and Mr. Paul Lee for their continuous support. We must also thank the author Su Liu for her dedicated work in this important policy area, the designer, and the Civic Exchange team for their efforts in publishing this report.

Yan-yan Yip Chief Executive Officer July 2013

3 Acknowledgements

A number of scholars and individuals generously shared insights with me in the drafting of this report. I would like to express my gratitude to the following:

Professor Ho Puiyin of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, whose book《點滴話當年 — 香港供水一百五十年》 was the single most important cited resource reference in the drafting of this report.

Dr. Frederick Lee, The University of Hong Kong Dr. Ng Cho-nam, The University of Hong Kong Professor Chen Yongqin, Chinese University of Hong Kong Professor Wong Ming hung, Hong Kong Baptist University Ms. Mayling Chan, Independent Researcher Mr. Clive Noffke, Green Lantau Association

I must also thank those who prefer to remain unnamed. Their expertise and opinions have been inspirational to me.

Many thanks to the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, Water Supplies Department and Drainage Services Department for providing relevant data, and the Drainage Services Department for granting permission to use a relevant photo.

I am grateful to Adrian Lu for translating this report. His translation is of course accurate, but more importantly his work was constructive and efficient. Thanks to a friend who prefers to remain unnamed for his professional editing that came in at a critical time. Without his help, this report will not be published on time in good shape. Thanks to Yan-yan Yip for her administrative support throughout each phase of research for this report; DESIGNORM for its creative cover design and typesetting; Michelle Wong and Rae Leung for overseeing publication; Cissy Lui for her constructive suggestions; Bryan Suen for proof reading all endnotes; Wilson Lau for helping me with software issues; and Civic Exchange intern Jessica Williams for collecting research materials.

4 Deepest gratitude is due to The Noble Group and Mr. Paul Lee, for generously supporting this project. I look forward to further cooperation with them.

Finally, I am grateful to my family for their enduring support!

Su Liu Head of Greater China & Water Policy Research July 2013

5 Preface

In reviewing Hong Kong’s historical and current water policies, this report initiates an exploration of Hong Kong’s water management framework under “One Country, Two Systems” and looks to the demand and resource management of nearby regions to promote discussion and provide suggestions about what Hong Kong must do to ensure sustainable development into the future.

Since Hong Kong was opened for trade in 1842, it has experienced dramatic economic and political changes. But throughout all of the struggles relating to sovereignty and political power, water policy has played a decisive role. Beginning with the earliest supply1 and drainage projects2, it is clear that water policy has long been a top priority for Hong Kong’s administrators.3

In recent years, however — as beneficiaries of the Dongjiang- Shenzhen Water Supply Project4 (hereinafter, the “DongShen Project”) and the Guangdong-Hong Kong Water Supply Agreement5 - Hong Kong people and HKSAR government have discarded any sense of urgency relating to their water supply. People seem to have forgotten that Hong Kong’s long-term stability and prosperity depend directly on having ample supplies. They now take water for granted. When waterworks and water drainage are discussed, people focus on wastewater treatment and flood control. Little effort has gone into comprehensive review or detailed evaluation of water as a vital resource, much less how to make the most efficient use of it.

But water management remains Hong Kong’s top priority policy concern. This was true in the past, is true now, and will remain true in the future.

Su Liu Head of Greater China & Water Policy Research July 2013

6 Contents

1. Water Supply...... 9 1.1 Population and water stress 1.2 Rainfall and water collection 1.3 Water provision and water supply expansion 1.4 Water supply during the british era 1.4.1 Self-reliance (1841-early 1940s) 1.4.2 Bottleneck (Late 1940s-early 1960s) 1.4.3 Innovative solutions (Late 1960s-1984) 1.4.4 The development of dependency (1985-1996) 1.5 Hong Kong’s water supply since reunification (1997-present) 1.5.1 The CCP’s Hong Kong approach, early-on 1.5.2 The DongShen Project and Hong Kong 1.5.3 The Guangdong Yue Gang Water Supply Company – past and present 1.5.4 Hong Kong’s water supply since reunification

2. Water Use: Perilous Abundance and “One Country, Two Systems”...... 34 2.1 Water use during the British colonial era 2.2 Water use since the reunification 2.2.1 Fresh water use 2.2.2 Seawater use 2.3 Future water use and competition for water 2.3.1 Water consumption trends and forcasts in Hong Kong 2.3.2 The Dongjiang Water sharing agreement and its effect on Hong Kong’s future water demand 2.3.3 Development trends in the Pearl River Delta and their effect on Hong Kong’s water resources 2.3.4 China’s “Three Red Lines” regarding water resources and their effect on Hong Kong

7 3. Drainage: The Other End of the Cycle...... 44 3.1 Water drainage in the British colonial era 3.1.1 Sewage discharge and pestilence 3.1.2 Systematic wastewater drainage and disease prevention 3.1.3 The acceleration of Hong Kong’s urbanisation and modification of the Open Ditch Drainage System 3.1.4 Wastewater treatment 3.1.5 The Drainage Services Department is established and charged with pollution control and flood control 3.2 Relocation of manufacturing to the North and Hong Kong’s pollution control 3.3 “One River, Two Systems” – cooperative flood prevention 3.4 Drainage services since reunification

4. Discussion and Policy Recommendations...... 54 4.1 The true cost of water 4.1.1 Water fees decoupled from true value 4.1.2 Unsustainable subsidies 4.2 Seawater: no such thing as a free lunch 4.3 A review of water prices 4.3.1 Grassroot interests 4.3.2 The lifecycle costs of water 4.3.3 Information transparency and public awareness 4.4 Water management framework 4.5 Social justice and Hong Kong’s responsibility 4.6 Raising Hong Kong’s water self-reliance 4.7 Setting goals and creating a future together 4.8 Policy recommendations

Appendices...... 67

Endnotes...... 75

8 1 Water Supply

1.1 Population and water stress

The ever- Hong Kong took about 100 years to grow from a lonely island increasing holding 7,500 people to a city of 1 million at the outset of World War populations of Hong Kong and II (WWII). But in the 7 decades since then, Hong Kong’s population other regions has exploded to over 7.15 million.6 In the 30 years between 1951 and tapping the Dongjiang River 1981, every decade added about 1 million additional inhabitants. are certain to The 1980s brought a slight reprieve, but from 1991 to 2011, the severely challenge the current water population grew by another 1.4million (Figure 1). supply system

Figure 1: Proportion of new additions, historical and forecasted (1841 - 2041)

100% 9 90% 8 80% 7 70% 6 60% 5 50% 4 40% 3 30% 2

20% populationTotal (millions) 10% 1

1841 1851 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 2021 2031 2041 Population 10 years before New addition in last 10 years Total population (Data source: Hong Kong SAR Census and Statistics Department7. The red and green bars refer to the left-hand scale, and the blue line to the right-hand scale, graph by Su Liu)

By 2041, Hong Kong’s population is predicted to reach 8.5 million in 2041, Hong Kong’s meaning that nearly 1.5 million people will be added to the current population is expected to population. Guangdong’s Dongjiang River, on which Hong Kong reach 8.5 million depends most heavily for water supply, is already being tapped beyond its capacity.8 As the population and per capita water usage of Hong Kong and other areas that depend on this source continue to grow, the system is sure to face ever more serious challenges.

9 1.2 Rainfall and water collection

During the For much of Hong Kong’s British era, the Governor’s annual report British colonial almost always began with “Last year, Hong Kong’s rainfall…” 9 Clearly era, rainfall was the lifeline of Hong Kong depended heavily on the skies. There were no substantial Hong Kong’s imports of drinking water until well after WWII. Catchment zones water supply; catchment zones provided Hong Kong’s most basic safeguard of water security. All were secured Hong set aside long before negotiations on the 1997 Reunification began. Kong’s water Hong Kong’s waterworks history reflects the colonial government’s commitment to water self-sufficiency for the territory (Table 1).

Table 1: Historical development of Hong Kong’s reservoirs and catchment zones Reservoir Year(s) Volume Catchment Constructed (million m3) area (km2) Pok Fu Lam Reservoir 1863 0.233 1.73 Tai Tam Reservoirs 1889 - 1917 8.303 15.95 Tai Tam Upper 1889 1.490 Tai Tam Byewash 1904 0.080 Tai Tam Intermediate 1908 0.686 Tai Tam Tuk 1917 6.047 Kowloon Reservoirs 1910 - 1931 2.499 5.77 Kowloon 1910 1.578 Kowloon Reception 1926 0.121 Kowloon Byewash 1931 0.800 Aberdeen Reservoirs 1931 1.259 6.03 Aberdeen Upper 1931 0.773 Aberdeen Lower 1931 0.486 Shing Mun (Jubilee) Reservoir 1937 13.279 25.90 Tai Lam Chung Reservoir 1959 20.490 44.36 Shek Pik Reservoir 1963 24.461 42.28 Lower Shing Mun Reservoir 1965 4.299 19.82 Plover Cove Reservoir 1968 229.729 68.37 High Island Reservoir 1978 281.124 70.04 Total 586.678 300.25 (Data source: Hong Kong Water Supplies Department10, table by Su Liu)

10 By 1981, From 1863, when the Pok Fu Lam Reservoir was completed, until the Hong Kong’s catchment zones High Island Reservoir was completed in 1981, a total of 30 per cent covered 30 per of Hong Kong’s land area was set aside as catchment zones.11 Hong cent of its land area Kong had a population of 5.18 million and was in the midst of rapid industrial development as one of the four ‘Asian Tigers’.12 Land had already become a precious commodity and the amount set aside for rainfall collection had reached its limit. The two reservoirs with greatest volumes, Plover Cove and High Island, had been reclaimed from the ocean, a first in the world of water supply infrastructure; innovative feats of engineering that allowed Hong Kong to bolster its water security without sacrificing more precious land.

The rainfall The amount of rainfall collected increased along with the expansion collection of reservoir volume. In 1983, two years after High Island Reservoir capacity of Hong Kong’s reservoirs was commissioned, the amount of rainfall collected (4.36 million m3) peaked in 1983. accounted for 74.4 per cent of total reservoir volume (5.86 million Even in record rainfall years, m3). But that was the peak. As the flow of imported Dongjiang water the amount increased, rainfall collection decreased (Figure 2). Even in 1997, when retained fell short Hong Kong received its highest total rainfall on record, the collected volume was less than during the 9 other highest-rainfall years from 1981 to 2012 (Table 2). That year, only 2.24 million m3 of rainfall was collected, accounting for just 38.3 per cent of reservoir volume.

Figure 2: Rainfall and amount of water collected (1965 - 2012) 900 4,000

800 3,500 ) 3

700 3,000

600 (mm)Rainfall 2,500 500 2,000 400 1,500 300 1,000 Volumne of (million Water m 200

100 500

0 0 5 6 2 5 6 9 1 5 6 0 7 2 3 5 8 9 0 2 4 5 1 2 67 68 69 70 71 73 74 7 7 78 8 82 83 84 8 8 87 88 91 80 89 94 96 97 9 0 01 03 0 06 07 08 09 10 96 96 97 9 9 9 97 97 99 9 9 99 99 99 99 00 00 0 0 01 01 1 1 19 19 19 19 19 1 1 19 1 1 1 19 1 1 19 19 19 19 19 19 1 19 1 19 19 1 1 19 1 19 19 1 19 20 20 2 20 2 20 20 20 2 2 20 2 2 Rainfall collected (million m3) Water imported from Dongjiang (million m3) Rainfall (mm) (The red and green bars refer to the left-hand scale, and the blue line to the right-hand scale) *Rainfall data provided by Hong Kong SAR Census and Statistics Department 13 **Water collection data since 1981 provided by Hong Kong Water Supplies Department14. Data from 1965 to 1981 was calculated by subtracting each year’s amount of imported Dongjiang water from the total amount consumed by Hong Kong. Calculations and graph by Su Liu.

11 Table 2: The top 10 rainfall years, ranked by amount of rainfall collected (1981-2012) Annual Rainfall Rank Amount of Rainfall Collected Rank Year (mm) (million m3) 3,343.0 1 224.24 10 1997 3,247.5 2 430.94 2 1982 3,214.5 3 298.16 7 2005 3,091.8 4 301.46 6 2001 3,066.2 5 331.96 4 2008 2,893.8 6 436.12 1 1983 2,754.4 7 302.48 5 1995 2,752.3 8 260.76 9 2000 2,725.6 9 276.93 8 1994 2,678.8 10 363.69 3 1992

(Data source: Hong Kong Observatory and Hong Kong Water Supplies Department15)

Since Hong Kong If we separate the data pre- and post-1997 when Hong Kong returned returned to China, average to China, we see that the average annual rainfall post-1997 exceeded annual rainfall pre-1997 levels by 6 per cent, but the average annual rainfall collected has increased 6 per cent while decreased by 12 per cent. On average, in the pre-1997 era, the annual rainfall amount of water taken from the Dongjiang was almost equal to collection has decreased by 12 the amount of rainfall collected each year. However, post-1997, the per cent; Hong amount and proportion of water imported from the Dongjiang each Kong’s rainfall collection year has increased dramatically (Table 3). capacity has not been fully utilised

Table 3: Pre-1997 and post-1997 comparison of rainfall, rainfall collected, and Dongjiang water imported 1965-1996 1997-2012 Change (per Average Average cent) Local Rainfall (mm) 2,297.32 2443.49 106.36 Rainfall Collected (million m3) 258.71 228.28 88.24 Dongjiang Water Imported (million m3) 293.08 727.05 248.07 Ratio of Dongjiang Water to 1.1 : 1 3.2 : 1 Collected Rainfall (Data source: Hong Kong SAR Census and Statistics Department and Hong Kong Water Supplies Department16, calculations and table by Su Liu)

It is important to consider whether Hong Kong’s local water collection capabilities have been adequately utilised since the Reunification in 1997.

12 1.3 Water provision and water supply expansion

Each phase of Throughout Hong Kong’s history, major expansions to water supply Hong Kong’s facilities were always direct reactions to the pressure brought waterworks expansion by population growth. Despite the best efforts of successive was a direct administrations, supply always lagged behind demand. Post WWII, response to the pressure caused expansion not only needed to satisfy human needs, they also had to by population support rapid economic and industrial development. As consumption growth. The DongShen skyrocketed, scarcity became an issue that constantly stimulated Project finally further investments in local waterworks. This continued until the brought Hong Kong into an era 1960s when the Guangdong-Hong Kong Water Supply Agreement of water stability changed the overall arrangement. Continuous upgrades to the capacity of the DongShen Project and ample supply of imported Dongjiang water finally brought Hong Kong into a period of water supply stability, albeit with dependency on external resources (Appendix 1).

1.4 Water supply during the British era

During the Hong Kong’s water supply during the British colonial era (1842-June British colonial 1997) can be summarised in one sentence: “Among all considerations, era, water policy was the first water was a top priority”. These 155 years can be divided into four priority among periods: Self-Reliance (1841-early 1940s); Bottleneck (late 1940s-early all policies 1960s); Innovative Solutions (late 1960s-1984); and The Development of Dependency (1985-1996).

1.4.1 Self-reliance (1841-early 1940s) The British During this period, the colonial Hong Kong government’s most colonial government important tasks were to develop water resources, establish and focused on improve the water provision system, and guarantee water security establishing a secure water and drinking water quality. supply system. Waterworks became Hong The government first funded water supply expansion by digging wells. Kong’s only While the fourth Governor (Sir John Bowring, 1854-1859) actively publicly managed utility encouraged private companies to enter the water supply business, privatisation never took hold. Because survival and prosperity depend directly on adequate water supply, administrations have no choice

13 but to give water policy top priority. “To satisfy the dramatic increase in water consumption demand and support Hong Kong’s economic development, the government’s only choice was to shoulder the critical burden of developing the city’s water supply services.”17 Unlike other publicly used services including electricity, natural gas, transportation and telecommunications, water supply has remained Hong Kong’s only government-operated utility.

The great The great drought of 1929 was the first major challenge to the colonial drought of government’s self-reliance policy. The authorities were forced to 1929 forced the authorities scrounge for water from every possible source, including deployment to establish a of water tanks, shipping water from China, sequestering water from future strategy creeks and streams, asking private organisations to provide water, and even the limited re-opening of wells. Severe water rationing was also implemented.18

Such dire conditions forced the authorities to comprehensively reconsider the adequacy of Hong Kong’s water provision system. This led to the establishment of a two-pronged strategy: 1) continue the large-scale construction of reservoirs, especially in Kowloon and the New Territories; and 2) construct a reticulation network between the New Territories, Kowloon and Hong Kong Island to ensure a stable supply for the Island.

The colonial government implemented the following measures:19 • Deployed specialists to examine the hygiene of Hong Kong’s living environment and its water provision facilities in order to establish a scientific foundation for future development. • Constructed reservoirs and set aside catchment zones on a large scale. There are currently 17 reservoirs and associated catchment zones in use, of which 12 were built during this period. Numerous small-scale reservoirs built at the time were later converted to private use. • Established and gradually completed a network of pipelines between different areas. This included a pioneering submarine water pipe as well as a system of standpipes.

14 • Established a management system under a new Water Supplies Department and a system for financing water supply projects by setting aside a portion of government revenues and installing water metres to allow fees to be collected according to usage. There was also a water-rationing system, and laws to abolish the regulations on non-public standpipes.

During the 1941-45 Japanese occupation, no progress was made on the water supply issue.

1.4.2 Bottleneck (Late 1940s-early 1960s) Water shortages After the allied victory in WWII, China experienced major turmoil, and of 1963-64 showed that when the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, a period of Hong Kong tremendous population growth began in Hong Kong. Between 1951 supply had entered a and 1961, more than a million people flooded south. To make the bottleneck situation more pressing, another major drought plagued the region in the early 1960s. Reservoirs dried out and the government had no choice but to impose Level 7 (Table 4) water rationing for an entire year, during which water was only supplied for four hours every four days.

Table 4: 7 levels of water rationing20 Water Rationing Level Water Supply Status Non-public standpipes opened from 6am to 9pm, supplying Level 1 water for 15 hours a day Non-public standpipes opened from 6-11am and 4-9pm, Level 2 supplying water for 10 hours a day Non-public standpipes opened from 6-9am and 4-7pm, Level 3 supplying water for 6 hours a day Non-public standpipes opened for two hours a day, public Level 4 standpipes opened for 12 hours a day Non-public standpipes closed public standpipes opened Level 5 twice a day Non-public standpipes closed public standpipes opened Level 6 once a day Level 7 Public standpipes closed

The 1929 drought had stimulated great efforts in the drive for water self-reliance. The authorities had averted disaster, and the construction of large-scale reservoirs continued relentlessly. But the 1960s drought made clear that developments had reached a bottleneck. Solving the dilemma would require a revolutionary breakthrough.

15 1.4.3 Innovative solutions (Late 1960s-1984) Learning from Before the drought of the 1960s arrived, construction of the Tai Lam bitter experience, Chung and Shek Pik Reservoirs had begun and Plover Cove Reservoir Hong Kong began a new round was in the planning stage. Hong Kong had also looked across the of expansion, border to Guangdong’s Dongjiang River. However, the drought struck completing a number of before Hong Kong had adequately prepared for it. Learning from bitter innovative, world- experience, the colonial government initiated a new round of water leading water supply projects and supply expansion, and rose to the occasion with several cutting-edge looking across the local projects. border to China

World-leading The period is notable for several innovative projects that will live water supply forever in the annals of water supply engineering. projects: Plover Cove Reservoir; city-wide • Plover Cove Reservoir. This reservoir was the first in the world systematic seawater toilet to be built in what was previously a natural bay of the sea. flushing; the From concept to planning and construction, from the dam to Lok On Pai Desalination Plant its accompanying facilities, tunnels and pipeline system, this project was a pioneering accomplishment in the field of water supply infrastructure. It increased local water storage capacity significantly. • High Island Reservoir. This is another of Hong Kong’s reservoir to be built in a maritime bay. Its surface area is only three-fourths that of Plover Cove Reservoir, but its volume is 22 per cent greater. It is connected to Plover Cove Reservoir by Hong Kong’s water pipeline network, providing greater flexibility for water storage. • Seawater use. Hong Kong was the first city in the world to systematically tap seawater for toilet flushing; and the world’s earliest adopter of large-scale seawater desalination (Lok On Pai Desalination Plant).

Hong Kong’s two schemes for using seawater met very different fates.

Hong Kong is the Using seawater for flushing toilets was first implemented in Kowloon’s only city in the world with city- new construction area in 1957. In 1958, seawater flushing was wide seawater implemented in districts throughout Hong Kong Island and Kowloon, toilet flushing; but the Lok On and in 1965, a law was passed requiring seawater flushing pipes in all Pai Desalination newly constructed or reconstructed buildings. Since then, this scheme Plant was dismantled in has become systemised in Hong Kong, which is still the world’s only 1992

16 city with comprehensive deployment of seawater toilet flushing.21 This topic will be further discussed in section 2 of this report.

In 1963, Hong Kong’s two power companies began trials of seawater desalination technology under government supervision. In 1969, the government made plans to expand desalination capacity, projecting that within 20 years, 40 per cent of Hong Kong’s water would be provided by this method. In 1970, the first experimental desalination plant was completed, and in 1973, formal construction began on the world’s largest desalination plant, the Lok On Pai Desalination Plant, which was completed in October 1975. However, due to high costs, only one boiler unit was in operation in 1976. Owing to the low rainfall in 1977, Lok On Pai operated at full capacity and underwent expansion. However, costs were still three times that of water from other sources, and operation of the plant was temporarily suspended in 1978 because it could not operate profitably. As energy prices increased, plans for reopening the plant were shelved. Lok On Pai was officially retired in 1982 and dismantled in 1992.22

Despite all the local efforts to satisfy its long-term water demand, Hong Kong needed to find a more stable, abundant water source. The Guangdong-Hong Kong Water Supply Agreement of 1960 secured the delivery of water from Shenzhen Reservoir during the drought and the opening of supplies from the Dongjiang in 1965.

Severe droughts Hong Kong’s population has mushroomed since the end of WWII. made obvious the importance From 1951 to 1981, each decade brought in about a million new of Guangdong’s inhabitants. These increases exerted extreme pressure on the city’s water to Hong Kong. The public utilities, most of all the water supply. Although the British DongShen colonial government remained attached to the idea of self-reliance, Project arose from this the reality was undeniable: local rainfall collection alone would never realisation provide the quantities of water needed to guarantee the security of Hong Kong’s population and the demands of industrial development. The droughts of 1929 and especially 1963-64 emphasised the importance of Guangdong’s water resources to Hong Kong. Figure 3 illustrates the fluctuation of local water supplies without greatly increasing imports from across the border. As it continued to expand

17 local water provision capacity, the British colonial government started to consider Guangdong water as a longer-term solution. As a result, the DongShen Project came to fruition.

Figure 3: Sources of Hong Kong water in 1963-64 and 1964-6523 (million m3)

1963-64 1964-65

<1% <1 %

<1 % 15% 19% 3%

43% 10% 23% 72%

14%

1 %

Well water Hong Kong streams and rivers Guangdong water transported by pipeline Hong Kong catchments Pearl River water transported by boat Water imported from elsewhere by boat

Construction of From initial planning to mature operation, the development of the the DongShen DongShen Project spanned three decades corresponding to the Project spanned the terms of terms of five Hong Kong Governors. The first Guangdong-Hong Kong five Hong Kong Water Supply Agreement was signed in 1960, during the term of Governors the 23rd Governor, Sir Robert Black. In 1965, his successor, Sir David Trench, signed an agreement to increase the flow. The 25th Governor, Sir Murray MacLehose, 1971-1982, saw this as more practical and effective than constructing further reservoirs and desalination plants. Strained relations after the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 suspended progress but with the re-establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and China in 1972 the two countries returned to the negotiation table. From 1978 to 1982, MacLehose’s government renegotiated the DongShen Agreement with Guangdong on multiple occasions, eventually signing a long-term agreement setting terms through 1995. (Table 5)

18 Table 5: History of the Dongjiang-Shenzhen project (1960-1996) 24 Agreement Year Annual Quantity of Water Price Signed Provided (m3/RMB) First DongShen Water Supply 1960 22.72 million m3 0.022 Agreement Second DongShen Water 1965 68.20 million m3, increasing 0.100 Supply Agreement to 109 million m3 by 1976 Third DongShen Water Supply 1978 145 million m3 in 1979, 0.150 Agreement increasing to 182 million m3 by 1982 Revision to Third Agreement 1980-82 220 million m3 in 1982 with 0.250 annual increases until 1995 Milestone year 1985 Dongjiang supply volume exceeds local supply Fourth DongShen Water 1987 Starting in 1989, annual 0.492 Supply Agreement increases to 660 million m3 in 1995 Fifth Guangdong-Hong Kong 1989 After 1989, annual increases 0.578 Water Supply Agreement of 30 million m3 up to a total of 1.1 billion m3 annually DongShen Project Phase 3 1990 Invest 1.7 billion RMB to 0.795 Expansion Agreement expand the project, with 1.1 billion provided by the Hong Kong government as prepaid water fees No new agreement signed 1991 0.985 1992 1.137 1993 1.318 1994 2.163 1995 2.332 1996 2.585

1.4.4 The path to dependency (1985-1996) MacLehose’s Governor MacLehose’s decision to increase imports of Dongjiang decision to water was an effective long-term solution to Hong Kong’s water increase imports of Dongjiang concerns. However, as imports increased as a proportion of Hong water effectively Kong’s water supply, Hong Kong’s reliance on the Dongjiang became solved Hong Kong’s long-term ever deeper, while reliance on local reservoirs steadily decreased. water supply This trend became so apparent that in the early 1990s, a Hong Kong concerns, and also sealed legislator asked the government whether it would reconsider its Hong Kong’s

19 dependency on policies regarding catchment zones, and whether there were plans to the DongShen 25 Project reduce the limitations on developments in those areas.

In 1985, a Although Hong Kong’s Public Works Department insisted that it milestone year, would maintain the status of the catchment zones because relying Hong Kong entered an entirely on Mainland China for water would be unwise, in reality, era of water the Dongjiang accounted for over half of Hong Kong’s consumption dependence, a situation that by 1985, a milestone year, and within four years, that proportion may never be quickly increased to over 70 per cent. Since then, Dongjiang water reversed has provided 70-80 per cent of Hong Kong’s supply, cementing Hong Kong’s dependence. It would be nearly impossible to turn back on the road to dependency chosen by Hong Kong.

Although From the perspective of the colonial government, the DongShen the price of Dongjiang Project was always a business decision. After various attempts at self- water increases reliance, the British authorities conceded that despite ever-increasing relentlessly, purchasing from prices, and despite the requirement that Hong Kong provide no- Guangdong is interest loans to China for DongShen Project expansions in the form of still the most 26 convenient advance payments, in the end, it was still the most convenient and and financially economical option. effective solution

Hong Kong’s Hong Kong’s British authorities treated water as a commodity British and viewed the importation of Guangdong water as a commercial authorities treated water transaction. In times when Hong Kong possessed greater economic as a commodity. leverage, this scheme was a good way to safeguard the stability of At the Chinese- British Hong Kong’s water supply. However, during negotiations between negotiations China and the UK over the future of Hong Kong, the issue of water over the future of Hong Kong, provision became an “indefensible” factor for the British, forcing them Hong Kong’s to give in to Chinese demands.27 The British could do nothing about dependence on Guangdong the fact that over 70 per cent of Hong Kong’s water supply would water became come from China for the foreseeable future, and that over 99 per cent an important point of leverage of Hong Kong’s local reservoir capacity was located on the leased land for China of the New Territories.

20 1.5 Hong Kong’s water supply since the reunification (1997-Present)

Since Hong Kong Since the decade before Hong Kong returned to China, its water returned to China, its water supply has depended heavily on the Dongjiang. The DongShen policy has been Project has not only become Hong Kong’s lifeline, it also serves as a “prioritising an abundant and pioneering example of an inter-basin water distribution scheme in stable water modern China.28 supply”. The DongShen Project has The water supply situation in Hong Kong since reunification can become a pioneering be described simply as “prioritising an abundant and stable water example supply”. More specifically, this period can be divided into two sub- of inter- basin water periods: fixed provision of Dongjiang water (1997-2006) and flexible distribution in provision of Dongjiang water (2007-present). It should be noted that modern China the strategic planning of the DongShen Project is inseparable from the Hong Kong/Macau policies implemented by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Therefore, the status of Hong Kong’s water supply since reunification must be discussed in the historical context of the CCP’s strategic considerations regarding Hong Kong and Macau.

1.5.1 The CCP’s Hong Kong approach, early-on The CCP and Hong Kong have shared an inseparable bond since the early years of the CCP29 The CCP’s long-term activity in Hong Kong has had a deep impact on China’s attitudes toward Hong Kong since the PRC was established in 1949. Its policies toward Hong Kong have evolved from initial baby steps to long-term, prudent planning.30

Before the founding of the PRC, the CCP did not intend to immediately take control of Hong Kong. In the early years of the PRC, it was too occupied with economic reconstruction, assisting North Korea in the Korean War and other more pressing issues to pay attention to Hong Kong and Macau. In the latter half of the 1950s, policy started taking shape.32 Hong Kong has been a place of refuge, a centre for intelligence and alliance-forming, and most importantly a source of funding and other resources for the CCP.31

In 1960, the CCP Central Committee promulgated its Eight Word Policy of “long-term planning and full utilisation”「 ( 長期打算,�充分利用」) with respect to Hong Kong and Macau-related activities.33 In 1963,

21 it officially stated that China would not regain control of Hong Kong for some time, that it would peacefully negotiate the issue only when conditions had matured, and that in the interim, China would maintain the status quo.34

The Eight-Word The elucidation of the CCP’s position on Hong Kong and Macau Policy created favorable political opened the way for continued negotiations over the Guangdong-Hong conditions for Kong Water Supply Agreement and its eventual implementation. the DongShen Project. Other Along with satisfying the principle of “blood is thicker than water”, than providing Mainland China’s provision of water to Hong Kong has also served water to Hong Kong, it also the functions of safeguarding foreign trade, opening of markets, and served other maximising flexibility of foreign relations for the CCP. important functions. 1.5.2 The DongShen project and Hong Kong Generally speaking, the DongShen Project is a two-way deal between Hong Kong and Mainland China, with mutually profitable and beneficial results.

a) The Shenzhen Reservoir and the DongShen project Although the A fundamental facility of the DongShen Project is the Shenzhen Shenzhen Reservoir was not Reservoir, which was built in the late 1950s under the direction of built specifically the “CCP Central Committee’s Instructions Regarding Waterworks” to supply Hong Kong with water, during a time when China was undertaking its Great Leap Forward it became one in waterworks projects.35 Construction began on 15 November of the DongShen 36 Project’s key 1959 and took four months. facilities After the facility was completed in 1960, the Baoan County government and the Hong Kong colonial authorities met six times between 15 April and 3 October to discuss the issue of supplying Hong Kong with water. On 15 November, the two parties signed what became known as the First DongShen Agreement, which provided for the supply of 5 billion gallons each year (starting in mid-September and ending at the end of May the following year), and that the price of each gallon would be 0.10 RMB. On 1 February 1961, the Shenzhen Reservoir officially started supplying Hong Kong with water.37 The water stopped flowing in 1962-63 due to the great drought but in 1964, after the Shenzhen Reservoir was connected to the Dongjiang River, pipelines formally began supplying Hong Kong with Dongjiang water on 1 March 1965.38

22 b) The DongShen Project and the CCP’s core interests DongShen is Hoping to solve the long-term problem of supplying Hong Kong not only a final with fresh water, the colonial authorities proposed cooperation solution to Hong Kong’s with Guangdong Province. The Chinese government responded water shortage proactively. After its own study, the Chinese government decided dilemma; it is also a crucial part of to lead the construction of the DongShen Project. China would China’s economy shoulder the responsibilities of design and construction, as well as and trade, foreign relations strategy, finance the entire project. Premier Zhou Enlai instructed China’s and overall State Planning Commission to draw funds out of the foreign aid national strategy budget to pay for the project.39

During a period when China experienced a multitude of extreme challenges,40 the DongShen Project not only ameliorated Hong Kong’s water shortage dilemma, it also brought China much needed food, equipment, foreign exchange and foreign relations. Moreover, the DongShen Project fundamentally safeguarded Hong Kong’s position as East Asia’s center of trade and its value with respect to China’s economy, trade, foreign relations strategy and national strategy.41

c) DongShen and the development of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and the Pearl River Delta The DongShen The DongShen Project has been fundamental to the development Project not only safeguards the of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (the SSEZ) and the Pearl prosperity and River Delta. The SSEZ was established in 1980. When the second stability of Hong Kong, it is also expansion phase of DongShen began in the 1980s, it began the foundation supplying water to Shenzhen and other regions along its length. of development for the Shenzhen When the third expansion phase was completed in 1996, the Special Economic quantity of water supplied to Dongguan, Shenzhen, and other Zone and the Pearl River Delta places along its length had already exceeded the quantity provided to Hong Kong.

At present, only The DongShen Renovation Project, completed in 2003, achieved one-third of the water supplied the separation of clean water and wastewater and improved the by the DongShen quality of the water supply. It “safeguarded the water security Project is delivered to Hong of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Dongguan, a region possessing 20 Kong million people and a total production output value of 1.9 trillion RMB”.42 Out of a total annual water supply of 2.423 billion m3, two- thirds is consumed in Guangdong.

23 Each time the DongShen Project has undergone expansion since it began operation in 1965, the Hong Kong government has provided interest-free loans and helped Guangdong raise funds for construction (Table 6).

Table 6: The DongShen project – an overview Years Total Water Water Notes Quantity Supplied Supplied to of Water to Hong Guangdong Supplied Kong (million m3) (million m3) (million m3)

1960s 0.68 0.68 0 The initial construction was completed in 1965. The total cost of 35.84 million RMB was paid by Chinese Governor.43 1970s 2.88 1.48 1.40 The Phase I expansion was built from 1973 to 1979. The China Governor paid 14.83 million RMB for the project,44 and the Hong Kong government paid 8 million HKD to build Shenzhen’s pipeline number 2.45 1980s 8.63 6.10 2.53 The Phase II expansion was built from 1980- 86, costing about 270 million RMB.46 1990s 17.43 7.38 10.05 The Phase III expansion was built from 1990- 1999. The total cost was 1.7 billion RMB , of which 1.58 billion HKD was provided by the Hong Kong government as an interest-free loan in the form of pre-paid water purchase fees. The remaining amount was raised by the governments of Shenzhen, Dongguan and Guangdong.47 2003- 24.23 8.18 15.95 The DongShen Renovation Project was present built from 2000 to 2003. The total cost was 4.7 billion RMB, of which the Hong Kong government provided 2.364 billion HKD as an interest-free loan in the form of prepaid water fees. About 4.1 billion HKD of the total cost was used to build a sealed pipeline system for delivering Dongjiang water to Hong Kong and Shenzhen. The remaining amount was raised by the governments of Shenzhen, Dongguan and Guangdong.48

24 1.5.3 The Guangdong Yue Gang Water Supply Company – past and present After the 1997 As Table 6 shows, the DongShen Project was a two-way deal between Asian financial the governments of Hong Kong and Mainland China, and it brought crisis, DongShen was a high- mutual benefits. This cooperative spirit reflects clearly in the founding quality asset and development of the Guangdong Yue Gang Water Supply Company used to bolster an at-risk SOE. (GYG Water).

GYG Water was founded on 18 August 2000 as a subsidiary of Guangdong Investment Limited (GDI).49 After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, GDI and its affiliates, all state-owned enterprises, found themselves in dire financial straits and were forced to restructure in order to survive. Under these conditions, the Guangdong provincial government decided to inject the DongShen Project into GDI as a high- quality asset, placing it under GDI’s management and operation.50

After the restructure, the state-owned GDI owned 81 per cent of the Yue Gang Water Supply Holding Company, which in turn controlled 99 per cent of the shares in GYG Water. GYG Water now holds a 30-year exclusive right to provide fresh water to Hong Kong, up to 70 per cent of Hong Kong’s total water consumption. When the agreement was signed between the Hong Kong government and GDI, its estimated value of the agreement made it the key asset that satisfied the creditors of Yue Gang Water Supply Holding Company.51

Each year, A year after the reorganisation, GYG Water had leapt into the position GYG Water contributes at of GDI’s core operation, accounting for 37.5 per cent of GDI’s total least 50 per turnover and 54 per cent of pretax profits. Since then, no matter cent of GDI’s pretax profits. how the external economic environment has changed, no matter Hong Kong’s how GDI’s other operations have shifted, each year GYG Water has water purchases account for over contributed over 50 per cent of GDI’s pretax total profits, becoming 70 per cent of GDI’s single most important profit source. Moreover, Hong Kong’s total turnover from GDI’s water water purchases account for over 70 per cent of GYG Water’s turnover supply operations (Table 7).

25 Table 7: Guangdong investment company’s water supply operations – turnover and profit (thousand HKD) Year Turnover Water Ratio of Pre-tax Pre-tax Proportion Hong Kong Proportion Supply turnover Total Profits Total of profits Water of Water Turnover from Profits from Purchase Supply Supplying from Supplying Expenditure Turnover Water Supplying Water from Hong (per cent) Water Kong Purchases (per cent) 2000 4,947,984 4,255 N.A -1,168,591 -62,504 N/A 2,373,000 N/A 2001 7,271,518 2,727,623 37.51 592,694 317,463 53.56 2,425,000 88.91 2002 6,737,025 2,831,978 42.04 356,614 302,765 84.90 2,445,000 86.34 2003 5,163,943 2,958,281 57.29 1,555,490 1,042,809 67.04 2,498,800 84.47 2004 5,109,127 3,118,627 61.04 1,224,045 830,295 67.83 2,529,700 81.12 2005 5,249,158 3,192,988 60.83 1,728,175 1,039,229 60.13 2,529,700 79.23 2006 6,056,331 3,225,939 53.27 2,047,741 1,060,963 51.81 2,494,800 77.34 2007 6,689,132 3,364,767 50.30 2,404,022 1,296,321 53.92 2,494,800 74.14 2008 7,590,712 3,443,842 45.37 2,606,237 2,511,234 96.35 2,494,800 72.44 2009 5,915,758 3,867,903 65.38 3,166,218 2,222,627 70.20 2,959,000 76.50 2010 6,351,741 4,067,140 64.03 3,807,929 2,380,800 62.52 3,146,000 77.35 2011 7,161,377 4,493,385 62.74 4,329,655 2,585,631 59.72 3,344,000 74.42 2012 7,736,095 4,775,060 61.72 4,730,157 2,686,575 56.80 3,538,700 74.11 (Data from GDI52 and the Hong Kong Water Supplies Department’s 2000-2012 Yearly Reports53, table by Su Liu)

1.5.4 Hong Kong’s Water supply since its reunification Hong Kong’s Since Hong Kong returned to China, the two sides have successfully return to China navigated “water oversupply” negotiations and solved water quality did not alter the Water Supply problems via the DongShen Renovation Project, resulting in greater Agreement’s operational stability and maturity. Overall, the Project’s commercial commercial nature or spirit nature and spirit of cooperation remain unchanged by Hong Kong’s of cooperation. return to the national fold. However, the so-called “flexible water However, the so-called “flexible provision” in the agreement actually provides Hong Kong with limited water provision” flexibility. actually provides limited flexibility a) Fixed water provision era (1997-2006)

Industrial In 1999, Hong Kong’s Audit Committee performed a special shift into audit of “Drinking Water Purchased from Guangdong Province.” Mainland China dramatically Its report revealed that the 1989 Water Supply Agreement’s reduced provision of water from Dongjiang was based on the assumption SAR water consumption, made in 1987 that water consumption would increase 3.43 per such that water cent annually between 1995 and 2000. In reality, due to the imports greatly exceeded Hong manufacturing industry’s shift out of Hong Kong into Mainland Kong’s needs China, Hong Kong’s industrial water consumption decreased dramatically. Between 1989 and 1998, actual water consumption

26 increased an average of 1.28per cent annually, so Hong Kong ended up importing more water from Guangdong than it needed.54

Hong Kong’s The report also stated that the total amount of water in Hong reservoirs Kong’s reservoirs increased because of unused Dongjiang water store unused Dongjiang water, stored there. Reservoirs overflowed when rainfall was high. From reducing rainfall 1994 to 98, a total of 716 million m3 spilled from the reservoirs, collection capacity and causing financial losses of up to 1.718 billion HKD. The Water sometimes Supplies Department also estimated that about 596 million 3m of causing spillage and waste drinking water would be wasted from spillage from 1999 to 2004.55 These figures are consistent with the trends described in Section 1.2 of this report titled “Rainfall and Water Collection”, revealing that the collection capacity of Hong Kong’s local reservoirs is underutilised.

From 1994 to After the Fifth Guangdong-Hong Kong Water Supply Agreement 2006, lack of remedial terms was signed in 1989, the two sides agreed to hold yearly in Water Supply consultations regarding the amount of water supplied and water Agreement and lack of progress pricing. Despite these plans, negotiations over decreasing the in negotiating amount of water supplied made little progress (Table 8). water supply decreases

Table 8: Important events concerning negotiations over amount of water supplied by the Dongshen Project56 Time Event Guangdong’s Agreement in Response Effect 1992 Hong Kong informed Guangdong Agreed to closely 1989 Water that water consumption had monitor relevant Supply decreased slightly since 1991 and conditions Agreement that the amount supplied under the 1989 Agreement would be in surplus. 1993-94 Hong Kong forecasted that long- Agreed to closely 1989 Water term growth in water consumption monitor relevant Supply would remain low, and that the conditions Agreement yearly increases provided in the 1989 Agreement would be too high. However, Hong Kong did not request decreases in supply.

27 1995 Hong Kong officially requested Hong Kong’s request 1989 Water that Guangdong decrease the was rejected by Supply previously agreed-to water supply Guangdong57 Agreement amounts for 1996-2000 1996 Hong Kong requested that the Guangdong declined 1989 Water water supply amount through 2000 to meet Hong Kong’s Supply be frozen at the 1996 level (720 request Agreement million m3) May • Hong Kong again requested • Guangdong again 1989 Water 1997 that the water supply amount declined Supply through 2000 be frozen at the Agreement 1997 level (720 million m3) • Guangdong agreed • Hong Kong was not satisfied to symbolically with the symbolic decreases. decrease the Because Guangdong asked amount of water Hong Kong for a no-interest supplied from 58 loan for renovating DongShen , 1998-200059 Hong Kong thought it might have a chance to negotiate a more favorable agreement. The two sides were unable to reach agreement, and instead agreed to temporarily maintain the status quo. They agreed to continue adjusting the daily water supply without changing the total annual supply. This would provide some flexibility in the daily supply. July 1998 • Hong Kong requested • Guangdong agreed • 1989 Water that progress be made on to decrease the Supply negotiations to decrease water annual increase Agreement supply, but met with only from 30 million • Signed 3 limited success m to 10 million 1998 Loan 3 • Hong Kong agreed to provide m , but would not Agreement 2.365 billion HKD in no- accept any greater including interest loans (released in 8 decreases. terms for biannual installments) for the • Guangdong agreed decreasing construction of the DongShen that it would water supply Renovation Project, to be not insist on a amount. repaid over 20 years. requirement that the water supplied reach 1.1 billion m3 by 2008.

28 Although the 1998 Loan Agreement contained terms that decreased wastage from reservoir spillage, it did not address the underlying mismatch between supply and demand. The Hong Kong Audit Commission found that neither the 1989 Water Supply Agreement nor the 1998 Loan Agreement contained any provisions for adjusting the annual amount of water supplied, concluding that the authorities needed to establish a process to adjust the amount of water supplied by Guangdong, thus reducing the amount of water spilled from the reservoirs and preventing a colossal amount of waste.60

From 1994 to 2006, voices throughout society severely criticised the Hong Kong government for allowing the continued waste of precious water resulting from Guangdong’s oversupply. However, since the signing of the 1998 Loan Agreement and Amendment to the Water Supply Agreement, negotiations between Hong Kong and Guangdong governments progressed slowly because they could not agree on a mechanism for determining water prices.61 In April 2006, Hong Kong and Guangdong finally reached agreement, executing the first “flexible water supply agreement”.62

b) Flexible water provision era (2007-present) Supply can In the 2006 Water Supply Agreement, “flexible” means that be adjusted to reduce the daily supply of water can be adjusted under the “turnkey wastage, but purchase” principle in accordance with seasonal changes in Hong Hong Kong gains no financial Kong’s rainfall collection capacity and to guarantee a 99per benefit from the cent reliability rate for Hong Kong’s water supply.63 This scheme conservation decreases the waste caused by spillage from reservoirs and decreases the costs associated with pumping water.

“Turnkey purchase” means that during the term of the agreement, the yearly amount of water supplied and the price of water are fixed and cannot be changed, but the daily quantity of water supplied to Hong Kong can be adjusted according to local reservoir and rainfall conditions.

29 Hong Kong pays Compared to the era of fixed water supply, Hong Kong has a high price to ensure the significantly increased its flexibility in lowering the amount of reliability of its water wastage. However, it may not benefit from any of its water supply unused annual allotment. The agreement requires it to pay for a fixed amount of water each year, no matter how much is actually supplied. It cannot transfer any unused quota to third parties, save it for future use, or carry forward credits to decrease the amount owed in future years. Therefore, the said “flexibility” is limited in terms of financial options.

Each year since the “Flexible Water Supply Agreement” was signed in 2006, Hong Kong’s annual imported water quantity has been below the allotted limit of 820 million 3m . Other than 2011, when 818 million m3 of water was imported, less than 725 million m3 have been imported each year. Hong Kong has paid for 7 years’ of water supply but received a only 6 years’ worth of its allotment. This scheme has cost Hong Kong an estimated 2.8 billion HKD. Hong Kong has purchased a high-priced insurance policy to safeguard the reliability64 of its water supply (Table 9).

Table 9: Actual quantity of water imported from the Dongjiang and annual allotments for 2006-2012 Year Dongjiang Water Water Purchase Fees (hundred million m3) (hundred million HKD) Actual Quantity Difference Water Financial Quantity of Water Payments Loss of Water Allotted Attributed Imported to Supply- Demand Mismatch* 2006 6.17 8.2 2.03 24.95 6.17 2007 7.15 8.2 1.05 24.95 3.18 2008 6.53 8.2 1.67 24.95 5.08 2009 7.25 8.2 0.95 29.59 3.44 2010 6.81 8.2 1.39 31.46 5.34 2011 8.18 8.2 0.02 33.44 0.06 2012 7.09 8.2 1.11 35.39 4.78 Total 49.19 57.4 8.21 204.72 28.06 *Calculated by finding a unit price from dividing Water Payments by Quantity of Water Allotted, then multiplying unit price by the Difference in Quantities. (Data source: Hong Kong Legislative Council65 and Hong Kong Water Supplies Department, chart by Su Liu)

30 c) Decrease in Dongjiang water quality and the DongShen renovation project Between 1989 According to both the 1989 Water Supply Agreement and the 1998 and 1998, the Loan Agreement, the Dongjiang water supplied to Hong Kong was quality of water supplied to Hong to meet the quality standard for surface water as set by Mainland Kong fell below China in 1983. Although China’s water quality standards were the standards required by the updated in 1988 to make them more comparable to international Water Supply standards, neither of the two above-mentioned agreements were Agreement. The Agreement did not based on Mainland China’s 1988 water standards even though contain penalties they were in effect when those agreements were signed. Neither or compensation provisions for agreement contained penalties or compensation provisions to substandard water ensure that the parties would carry out their obligations. quality

Water quality The Audit Commission’s 1999 analysis of water quality monitoring became even data revealed that from 1989 to 1998, Dongjiang water often did poorer in 1997-98. The Hong Kong not meet either the 1983 or the 1988 water quality standards. For Water Supplies example, one of the common measures of water quality, dissolved Department was forced to allocate oxygen content,66 did not meet 1983 standards in 62 per cent of extra capital funds cases. The situation in 1997-98 was even worse – during these and recurrent expenditures for years, dissolved oxygen content was practically zero. In the case of treating water. ammonia-nitrogen content,67 an important indicator for the safety of drinking water, from 1989 to 1998, 49 per cent of data points exceeded Guangdong’s water quality standards. In March 1998, ammonia-nitrogen content exceeded the standard by a factor of seven.68

In 1996, research completed by experts appointed by the Water Supplies Department showed that Dongjiang water quality would continue to worsen. Because Dongjiang water did not meet quality standards, the Water Supplies Department was forced to make special allocations totaling 35 million HKD for capital expenditures and 104 million HKD for recurring water treatment expenditures during the years 1996-97 and 1998-99.69

31 The governments The governments of Hong Kong and Guangdong met on various of Hong Kong and Mainland occasions to discuss the degradation of Dongjiang water, but China agreed increased communication and remedial measures implemented that a sealed pipeline would by Guangdong proved to be ineffective. When Dongjiang water fundamentally quality became so low that Hong Kong’s water treatment plants solve the water quality could not handle it, Hong Kong was forced to decrease the daily problem. Thus, amount of Dongjiang water imported and then dilute it with large the DongShen Renovation amounts of local reservoir water before sending the mixed water Project was to its treatment plants. launched

The DongShen Guangdong’s government recognised that: “The water pollution Renovation problem is severe throughout the entire province. The aquatic Project greatly improved environment is under heavy load, drinking water supplies are the quality of threatened, and there are extreme water shortages due to poor Dongjiang water, bringing benefits water quality. Regional conflicts over water are increasing, and to the people of implementation of the province’s sustainable development both Guangdong and Hong Kong strategy as well as the rapid development of society, economy and human health have been impacted.” Therefore, the Guangdong government promulgated a special document for increasing efforts to combat water pollution.70 In particular, the situations in Shenzhen and Dongguan, which were simultaneously victims of water pollution and the largest sources of pollution, would need to be rectified.

The governments of Mainland China and Hong Kong believed that building sealed pipelines would get to the root of the problem. This would not only deliver water as needed by the people of Guangdong and Hong Kong, it would also eliminate the risks of water pollution in open ditches without causing significant environmental impacts.71 The DongShen Renovation Project broke ground in 2000. After completion in 2003, the quality of water from Dongjiang greatly improved.

After the completion of the DongShen Renovation Project, the State Council was given direct leadership over a new project under China’s “11th Five-Year Plan”. This special project focused on controlling water pollution and technology for restoring water quality.72 Dongjiang’s water quality was brought into the project as a primary drinking water study: “The Dongjiang River

32 Basin cities of Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Dongguan have been chosen as demonstration zones for studying the seasonal change characteristics of the pollution level of water sources in the lower reaches of the Pearl River. This area will demonstrate general methods and appropriate technologies for safeguarding water security.”73 Thus, the security of Dongjiang’s water quality entered the nation’s investigatory and safeguarding system.

In an already In recent years, Guangdong Province has encouraged a rapid overloaded process of industrial relocation74 which has resulted in the Dongjiang River basin, urbanisation and industrialisation of Huizhou and Heyuan, cities Guangdong’s in the middle and upper reaches of the Dongjiang River. These rapid urbanisation developments create new threats to the quality of Dongjiang and industrial water. The Dongjiang is already overloaded due to uncontrolled relocation cause great concern mining, erosion, destruction of water conservation areas, regarding the poor enforcement of environmental regulations, insufficient long-term ability of the DongShen environmental monitoring, climate change, and hydrological Renovation changes caused by over-exploitation of hydropower.75 For these Project to effectively reasons, the long-term ability of the DongShen Renovation Project safeguard water to ensure Dongjiang’s water quality is far from certain. quality

33 2 Water Use: Perilous Abundance and One Country Two Systems

During the British colonial era, water rationing forced Hong Kong residents to develop habits of “pouncing on water” and “saving water”.

2.1 Water use during the British colonial era

During the 150 During 150 years of British administration, the inconveniences of years of British water rationing left a deep impression on Hong Kong residents. Water administration, water rationing rationing was such a common occurrence that a colourful lexicon of was so common “water slang” appeared in Hong Kong’s Cantonese dialect, including that a colourful lexicon of many phrases related to money. For example, “to be close to water” “water slang” (meaning to make a payment); “to stroll towards water” (to request appeared in Hong Kong’s money or borrow money); “to pillage water” (to make money in Cantonese a questionable manner); “to drink water” (to receive kickbacks or dialect intercept money inappropriately).76 The lack of and criticality of water are evident from these colloquialisms.

Living within As a result of chronic water shortage, “pouncing on water” (having one’s means, a connotation of panic buying) and “saving water” became common living on a budget, making practices of Hong Kong residents. Especially during the extreme full use of water rationing of 1963-64, the scarcity of water grew to a level that can be described by the phrase “when there is no water, every drop is precious; when there is water, there’s not enough to wash.”77 Every imaginable way to conserve water, re-use water, and substitute for water was practised.78

The only way for Hong Kong residents to deal with water shortages was to live within one’s means, live on a budget, and make full use of water. It was not until 1982, when the DongShen Project completed a major expansion, that Hong Kong experienced its last period of water rationing and bid farewell to the era of “pouncing on water”.

34 2.2 Water use since Hong Kong’s reunification

A state of Since Hong Kong’s return to China, Hong Kong’s water supply has perilous been ample, so much so that supply exceeds demand. This state of abundance affairs has caused dramatic changes in Hong Kong residents’ water use habits. In just over 10 years, Hong Kong shifted from “saving water” to “colossal water waste” and now exists in a state of perilous abundance. Household water use has increased dramatically as people began to view water as a “free resource”. Gone are the days when water was cherished as a precious resource.

2.2.1 Fresh water use In just over ten In the years since the Reunification, Hong Kong has not only been years, Hong liberated from the threat of water shortage, it has experienced an Kong shifted from the last oversupply to the level of waste. The shift from rationing to waste period of water took less than twenty years. Now, because water is so abundant, bans rationing to “colossal water have been lifted on many long-prohibited activities. waste” For example, the use of water for cooling, once prohibited, is now encouraged. Hong Kong now has a cross-departmental team that promotes the use of energy efficient, environmentally-friendly water cooling systems.79 In 2009, the Audit Commission performed a special audit on the widespread use of water-based air-conditioning systems and recommended the continued promotion of water cooling systems. 80

Although the widespread use of water cooling systems in Hong Kong increases the consumption of fresh water, after considering factors such as the abundance of Hong Kong’s fresh water supply as well as the other advantages of water cooling, the Audit Commission recommended in 2009 that authorities make “even more proactive efforts” to “continue to provide the aid and incentives” needed to promote the use of water-based air-conditioning systems in new and old portions of Hong Kong.81

35 Hong Kong Hong Kong residents, who long suffered the pain of water rationing, residents have quickly adapted have quickly adapted to an abundance of water. In 1963, average to plentiful daily use of 8 gallons (36.4 litres) per person was seen as too much,82 water, resulting in enormous while in 2011, a study on household water use by the Water Supplies waste Department showed that each person used 55.2 litres of water per day on showering alone.83

On average, The Water Supplies Department’s household water use survey, based Hong Kong on 1,028 households randomly selected in 2011, revealed that average residents take more than 1 per capita consumption is 124.7 litres per day, slightly lower than the shower per average per capita consumption for Hong Kong residents (131 litres) day; water for bathing accounts previously publicised by the Water Supplies Department. The primary for over 40 per consumptive uses were bathing, faucets and laundry. On average, cent of Hong Kong’s water each person uses 55.2 litres of water for bathing each day, each consumption person takes 1.04 baths (or showers) per day, and each person spends an average of 6.7 minutes bathing per day. Faucet water consumption was 61.1 litres per person per day, and per capita water use for laundry was 13.0 litres per da84 (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Daily per capita water consumption (litres)

13 %

55.2 %

61.1 % Bathing Faucet Laundry

(Data source: The Water Supplies Department’s household water use survey)

Inefficient water Per capita daily consumption in households of 1-2 people (143.0 use is revealed by data showing litres) is higher than in households of three or more (112.3 – 113.8 that household litres). Households living in low-to-mid density private housing and consumption is not proportional rural housing have higher per capita daily consumption (138.3 litres) to the number than households living in public housing (120.2 litres). Households of members in a household with live-in housekeepers are more likely to be high-consumption

36 Households than households without: 55.8per cent of households with live-in with live-in housekeepers housekeepers have daily per capita consumption in the middle to are more likely high levels, while only 39.5per cent of households without live-in to be high- 85 consumption housekeepers have middle to high consumption levels. households Faucet and laundry per capita consumption is higher in smaller households than larger ones: households with 1-2 people consume a per capita average of 77.6 litres through faucets, while households with 3 or more people consume a per capita average of 46.9 – 51.9 litres. 1-2 member households consume 16.5 litres of water for laundry per person per day, while 3+ member households consume 11.0 – 11.5 litres.86

Over half of Hong The survey also showed that although 98.8 per cent of households Kong households neglect to expressed support for water conservation, fewer than half of Hong take water Kong households actually took measures to conserve water, such conservation measures as using water conserving fixtures (showerheads, faucets, laundry machines etc.) or actions (taking shorter showers, turning off faucets, waiting for large loads before doing laundry, etc.). There exists a broad chasm between theory and practice.87

These data tell us that Hong Kong’s modern living habits and the widespread practice of having live-in housekeepers are closely related to Hong Kong households’ water consumption. Inefficiencies can be seen from the disproportionately high per capita consumption of smaller households. To make things worse, over half of households neglect to use water conserving products or habits.

2.2.2 Seawater use 40 per cent of In 2011, the Water Supplies Department supplied a total of 270 million Hong Kong’s daily 3 per capita water m of seawater for toilet flushing, nearly enough to fill the High Island consumption Reservoir, Hong Kong’s largest reservoir with a capacity of 281 million is for flushing 3 3 88 toilets. In 2011, m . Additionally, 76 million m of fresh water was used to flush the amount toilets, enough to fill the Pok Fu Lam Reservoir 326 times over.89 of fresh water used for flushing toilets was In a November 2011 question and answer session of Hong Kong’s enough to fill the Pok Fu Legislative Council, the Secretary for Development of Hong Kong Lam Reservoir stated that Hong Kong residents’ per capita daily water consumption 326 times; the amount of is 220 litres, about 30 per cent higher than the world’s per capita daily seawater used consumption of 170 litres. 90 litres are used for flushing toilets (about

37 for flushing was 80 per cent of which is saltwater and 20 per cent of which is drinking enough to fill 90 the High Island water). In light of these data, about 40 per cent of Hong Kong’s per Reservoir capita water consumption is for flushing toilets. He also noted that “there is an increasing trend in per capita daily water use for toilet flushing, which has grown 28 per cent from 70 litres to 90 litres.”91

The seawater Figure 5 shows that since 2005, drinking water consumption has used by Hong decreased gradually each year, but seawater consumption has Kong for flushing toilets increased despite the fact that no new seawater flushing facilities have is by no means entered service. According to 2011 statistics from the Water Supplies a free resource. The growth Department, Hong Kong’s per capita seawater consumption has in per capita increased from 70 litres/day 10 years ago to 90 litres/day, an increase consumption for toilet flushing of nearly 30 per cent.92 exposes the unfortunate reality that residents of Hong Kong are taking a precious resource for granted

Figure 5: Consumption of Drinking Water and Seawater (2000 - 2012)

980 280

970 270

960 260

950 250 940 240 930 230 Drinking water 920 Seawater

220 910

900 210

890 200 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Drinking water (million m3) Seawater (million m3) (Data source: Hong Kong Water Supplies Department93, chart by Su Liu)

38 2.3 Future water use and competition for water

2.3.1 Water consumption and trends forcasts in Hong Kong Water supply In 2009, the Water Supplies Department forecasted that Hong Kong’s allotments currently in water consumption would increase slowly from 2013 to 2017 and force sufficient then more rapidly from 2018, reaching a yearly consumption of 1.225 until 2030, even 3 accounting for billion m in 2030. However, forecasts made in 2010 were lower. population Actual consumption data from 2006-2010 showed a decreasing growth, but uncertain growth trend; actual consumption in these years was much lower whether such than forecasts made in 1999.94 quantities of water will be available for According to the Water Supplies Department’s evaluation in 2012, import in the future Hong Kong’s yearly total water consumption will increase from 935 million m3 in 2012 to 1.1 billion m3 in 2030. This estimate for 2030 is 200 million m3 less than the 2008 estimate. According to these trends, it is likely that the allotments made in the water supply agreement currently in force are enough to supply Hong Kong with sufficient water through 2030. However, it is far from certain whether enough Dongjiang water will be available for import in the future.

2.3.2 The Dongjiang water sharing agreement and its effect on Hong Kong’s future water demand The “red line” In August 2008, the Guangdong Provinial People’s Government limit for the annual amount promulgated a plan for sharing the water resources of the Dongjiang of water that the River Basin. Based on a total water resource of 32.66 billion m3, it Dongjiang can supply for human established a maximum limit for human consumption at 10.664 consumption is billion m3. This limit is set as the “red line” for human consumption 10.664 billion m3. This limit cannot of Dongjiang water, an absolute total quantity that may not be be surpassed exceeded.95

In 2010, the five According to the Guangdong government’s plan, a maximum of major cities in 10.664 billion m3 may be extracted in normal rainfall years, and a the Dongjiang River Basin maximum of 10.183 billion m3 may be used in drought years. However, approached or in 2010, actual water consumption by the five major Mainland cities in exceeded their allotments, the Dongjiang River Basin approached or exceeded their allotments, foreshadowing a especially the cities of Shenzhen, Dongguan, Heyuan and Huizhou future in which demand will which rely heavily on Dongjiang water. Water consumption forecasts exceed supply for 2020 describe severe shortages in the cities of Shenzhen, Huizhou and Dongguan. Heyuan in 2010 already surpassed its allotment,

39 and its consumption has been growing rapidly. It is easy to foresee demand increasingly exceeding supply in Heyuan. Although the provincial capital Guangzhou relies less heavily on Dongjiang water, its eastern districts are currently undergoing rapid development and the city will soon need to supply household drinking water for an additional 4 million people.96 Guangzhou’s water consumption is also certain to increase well into the future (Table 10).

Table 10: Forecasted water consumption by the five Mainland cities of the Dongjiang river basin (100 million m3) 97 City Dongjiang Water 2010 Actual Water 2020 Estimated Allotment (set in 2008) Consumption Water Demand Guangzhou* 13.62 74.35 ? Shenzhen 16.63 18.97 26.2098 Dongguan 20.95 21.08 29.4599 Huizhou 22.68** 21.79 30100 Heyuan 17.63 18.68 ? * For two districts (Zengcheng and Luo Gang) of the Guangzhou city only **Excluding the 265 million m3 allotted to Dayawan and the Renping Peninsula.

Hong Kong’s Chapter 3 of Civic Exchange’s report Liquid Assets IIIA: Dongjiang lower-than- allotted water Overloaded – 2011 Dongjiang Expedition Reportpoints out that the consumption water resources currently available to the five Mainland cities are in 2010 created just enough lower than they were previously, and that all five cities have already surplus to approached or exceeded their allotments of Dongjiang water. The supplement the shortages of consumption of both Shenzhen and Heyuan significantly exceeded Shenzhen and their allotments in 2010, by 234 million m3 and 105 million m3, Heyuan respectively.

Meeting these large shortages with local sources of water is impracticable. Fortunately, shortages can be supplemented by allotted quantities that were not used by other cities. For example, Hong Kong used only 717 million m3 of Dongjiang water in 2010101 although the water supply agreement allotted it 1.1 billion 3m . The 383 million m3 surplus was just enough to supplement the shortages in Shenzhen and Heyuan.

40 The Dongjiang As noted above, Hong Kong’s water supply is guaranteed under the does not have enough water to go current water supply agreement. Despite these assurances, the water around. As demand stress already apparent in the Dongjiang River Basin cities will have a grows, the water sharing scheme will real effect on Hong Kong. As water demand increases in the Dongjiang need to change. River Basin cities, competition for water among the cities will become Competition will increase; and Hong more severe, and the agreed-upon allotments and prices may need to Kong’s flexibility be adjusted. These changes will very likely shrink Hong Kong’s range of with respect to its water supply will flexibility with respect to its water management. shrink

2.3.3 Development rrends in the Pearl River Delta and their effect on Hong Kong’s water resources Integrated The Pearl River Delta Region Reform and Development Plan Outlines planning for 102 Pearl River Delta for 2008-2020 and its follow-up implementation document created will have deep by the National Development and Reform Commission, entitled “Five impact on the 103 optimization of Integration Plans for the Pearl River Delta (2009-2020)”, comprise water resource the development blueprint for the Pearl River Delta. This blueprint is deployment and usage as well an important policy that will significantly affect Hong Kong’s future as Hong Kong’s sustainable development. It will have far-reaching effects on the sustainable development optimisation of water resource deployment and usage.

Pearl River The Pearl River Delta is a pivotal driver of China’s economic growth. Delta resources are already Although it takes up only 0.5 per cent of China’s land area, its stretched beyond population density is seven times the country’s average. In 2010, it their limits. Under the new consumed 1 per cent of China’s water resources, accounted for 7.5 integration plans, per cent of the country’s total energy consumption, contributed 9.4 manufacturing will continue to per cent of China’s total GDP, and produced over one-fourth (27.3 per be the region’s cent) of China’s exports.104 In terms of resources, the Pearl River Delta primary focus, so water demand is already stretched beyond its limits. must continue to increase Under the new integration plans, the Pearl River Delta will become home to a series of new “World-Class” industrial bases, but it will still be focused on manufacturing. Ever-increasing water demand in this region is a near certainty (Figure 6).

41 Figure 6: Industrial integration plans for the Pearl River Delta – each city’s area of focus

International industrial manufacturing center

International industrial manufacturing Cluster area for traditional center industries transformation Guangzhou and upgrading, and major International equipment manufacturing base industrial services center Zhaoqing Huizhou Foshan World-class petrochemical Dongguan industry base

Zhong Shenzhen Jiangmen shan National advanced manufacturing Hong National advanced Kong manufacturing base base

Zhuhai Macau International industrial Innovation center National advanced manufacturing base

Hong Kong’s In recent years, Hong Kong’s comprehensive competitiveness has bargaining decreased.105 With the Pearl River Delta’s continued integrated power on the issue of water development, Hong Kong’s leverage as an independent economic resources will entity will inevitably shrink, and its bargaining power on the issue of continue to shrink water resources will be no exception.

2.3.4 China’s “Three Red Lines” regarding water resources and their effect on Hong Kong In 2011, the In 2011, the CCP Central Committee’s number one document CCP Central Committee’s specifically called for the implementation of the strictest water “Three Red resource management system in China, setting out total water Lines” called for strict national quantity consumption controls, water consumption efficiency water resource controls, and limitations on pollutants in water function zones. These management system “Three Schemes”, also called the “Three Red Lines”, include a series of relevant requirements and measures and specifically calls for the outlining of water management responsibilities and a system for assessing officials’ performance with regard to water resources.106

42 Guangdong The number one document nominated the person-in-charge of each Province formulated level of government (county level and higher) as the person with measures that total responsibility over water resources management and protection now govern water resources in the area under said government’s jurisdiction. In this context, in the Dongjiang Guangdong has formulated goals, responsibilities, concrete measures, River Basin and methods of assessment for implementing the “Three Red Lines”. The control guidelines set by the “Three Red Lines” were specified at the provincial level, with county governments responsible for more detailed analysis. All cities and counties in Guangdong are bound by these rigid requirements,107 and the cities and counties in the Dongjiang River Basin are no exception.

“One Water, Hong Kong, under “One Country, Two Systems”, a party to the Two Systems.” The future of Dongjiang water sharing agreement, has thus far avoided the this scheme is constraints that bind Guangdong. In the 2012-2014 Guangdong-Hong far from certain Kong Water Supply Agreement that was signed in 2011, Hong Kong was not bound by the “Three Red Lines.” It can be said that Hong Kong operates under a scheme of “One Water, Two Systems.”

Even during 2009’s severe drought in southern and southwestern China, when the entire country implemented all available measures to decrease water consumption, Hong Kong’s water supply went unaffected. Although Hong Kong’s government proposed that its Dongjiang water imports should be reduced to aid drought relief, Guangdong’s government continued to supply Hong Kong with its maximum allotment under “One Water, Two Systems”. 108

However, in the contexts of worldwide issue of global warming and the integrated development plans for the Pearl River Delta, it is unclear how far into the future Hong Kong will continue to enjoy the benefits of “One Water, Two Systems”.

43 3 Drainage: The Other End of the Cycle

Hong Kong’s Drainage Services Department is responsible for the city’s drainage, including wastewater discharge and rainwater runoff.

Water supply Provision of water must be handled under the framework of “One should be handled under Country” because clean water is a scarce resource and its distribution the framework of must be subject to the balancing of political and economic factors. “One Country” to ensure balance. Water drainage, however, is handled independently under the “Two But drainage Systems” scheme, with both Hong Kong and its Mainland neighbors can still be handled under abiding by the principle of mutual non-interference. At present, “Two Systems”, drainage still focuses on wastewater discharge and flood prevention. with local responsibility Drainage water has not yet been considered as a valuable resource and mutual non- to be handled in concert with efforts to reduce energy use and interference. Drainage water emissions, fight climate change, and maintain a secure water supply. has not yet been adequately utilised as a resource 3.1 Water drainage in the British colonial era

Drainage services had an early start in Hong Kong. Originally focused on public hygiene, they eventually moved in the direction of environmental protection.

3.1.1 Sewage discharge and pestilence In early Hong Hong Kong’s Committee of Public Health and Cleanliness was Kong, little attention was established in 1843, after which it immediately recommended that paid to sewage the government install a sewer system. In 1845, the first sewer ditches discharge and epidemic appeared in Wong Nai Chung Valley. Victoria City had also begun diseases were installing sewage ditches running along the streets. In 1854, in light rampant of the horrendous living environment and unhygienic conditions of the Chinese community living on Hong Kong Island, the colonial health minister wrote in his annual report to the British government: “Victoria City requires a better sewer system.” Later, the reappointed health minister continued to emphasise that if a comprehensive sewage system was not installed, “the results would be disastrous.”109

44 However, the government continued to neglect the need. In 1882, Royal Engineer Sir Osbert Chadwick released a report that proposed the first detailed blueprint for Hong Kong’s sewer system. The report recorded the geography and environment of Victoria Peak, its population statistics, living conditions, existing wastewater drainage, and recommendations for improvement.110 This report was ignored by the authorities and Chadwick’s recommendations were not implemented.

Chadwick In 1890, the British government asked Chadwick to perform a visited Hong more detailed investigation. On this second trip, he found that Kong a second time, proposing conditions in Victoria City had worsened due to a large influx of new suggestions for inhabitants. Water sources, which had been unclean to begin with, improving water supply, water were further contaminated by the effects of overcrowding. Because drainage, and the government had not installed a comprehensive system, refuse public hygiene. Hong Kong’s and waste was simply piled near people’s homes. In the heat of government paid the summer, conditions were ripe for the proliferation of harmful him little heed, and negligence bacteria that would contaminate drinking water. The horrendous resulted in an hygiene of the entire city provided the perfect environment for an outbreak of pestilence imminent outbreak of pestilence.111

Chadwick recommended a new system of pipes that would use rainwater and mountain runoff to flush wastewater into the ocean. Additionally, districts should be responsible for collecting refuse. These recommendations became Hong Kong’s new blueprint for its sewer system.112 In 1891, Hong Kong’s British colonial government established sub-departments of the Public Works Department in charge of Water Supplies and Drainage Services. However, construction continued to be delayed, until the epidemic of the century broke out.113

3.1.2 Systematic wastewater drainage and disease prevention A hallmark of Hong Kong’s sewer system is the separation of rainwater and sewage.

45 On Chadwick’s The pestilence that broke out in late-nineteenth century Hong third visit, he drew up Kong raged for 30 years, severely impeding its progress as a city. detailed plans During this time, many modern regulations regarding urban hygiene for separated wastewater and construction were set that would go on to influence the living and rainwater conditions of many generations of Hong Kong residents. These drainage systems, setting included the city-wide deployment plumbing and sewer systems, as a foundation well as regulations concerning alleyways behind tenement buildings, for Hong Kong’s modern sewer minimum per capita housing density, lighting, ventilation, and system washrooms.114 Chadwick’s report on his third visit to Hong Kong in 1902 recommended the separation of wastewater and rainwater in Hong Kong’s sewer system and included detailed plans for this system. Chadwick’s third report finally established a foundation for Hong Kong’s modern sewer system.115

Separated The principle of separating rainwater from wastewater was recently drainage of recognised by China as a useful sewer system design. In April 2013, the wastewater and rainwater has State Council promulgated a document requesting that all of China’s been recently cities “renovate their sewer systems to separate rainwater from advocated by China’s wastewater within 5 years.”116 Finally, the cities of Mainland China will government as a enjoy the benefits of a system that Hong Kong started implementing a way to improve urban sewer century ago.117 systems Hong Kong’s sewer system developed rapidly during the first half of the 20th century.118 It not only improved hygiene and largely overcame the risk of water-related epidemics, it also went a long way towards solving Hong Kong’s flood control problems. However, as urbanisation progressed, it became clear that the open ditch drainage system built during this period would need to be altered.

3.1.3 The acceleration of Hong Kong’s urbanisation and modification of the open ditch drainage system Post-World The population of Hong Kong exploded after WWII, putting great War 2, Hong Kong’s open pressure on all of Hong Kong’s public utilities and facilities. A major ditch drainage weakness of the sewer system was that it was largely composed system became an obstacle to of open ditches that had become obstacles to Hong Kong’s rapidly construction and expanding construction and transportation. Thus, a plan to modify transportation the system entered the government’s agenda. In response to the need for major modifications, the agency in charge of drainage services was reorganised in the 1960s. The increased authority of the agency showed that Hong Kong’s drainage systems had become a priority.119

46 To coordinate Open drainage ditches had a serious impact on road transportation with the development because they were installed in the middle of roadways and were needs of ten feet (about 3 metres) wide, sometimes wider. Starting in 1958, Hong Kong, the drainage great efforts were made to cover open nullahs or to convert them services agency into underground pipes. Around the same time, new urban planning was reorganized several techniques were used to design a large-scale sewer system for Hong times and its Kong’s new urban areas that would be in line with international responsibilities 120 were expanded advances in urban development.

3.1.4 Wastewater treatment The period of rapid urbanisation and industrial development created a host of new challenges. Environmental damage and water pollution forced the drainage services agency to shift focus from wastewater drainage to wastewater treatment.

From Hong Kong’s economic lift-off in the 1960s until it took its place as one of the Four Asian Tigers in the 1980s, its manufacturing sector became world-renowned, reaching a peak in the mid-1970s.121 During this period, quantities of household sewage and industrial wastewater grew dramatically and were directly discharged, causing severe damage to Hong Kong’s environment and ecology, in particular the aquatic environment. Pollution plagued Hong Kong’s mountain streams and Harbours. Red tides became a common occurrence, forcing authorities to close the majority of public beaches. In 1973, the Victoria Harbour Race, which had been held annually since 1906, was suspended, exposing the fact that pollution had already exceeded Hong Kong’s environmental capacity. Authorities could no longer delay efforts to deal with this problem.122

In 1971, JD and DM Watson’s Report on Marine Investigation into Sewage Discharge (1968-1971) evaluated the pollution levels of Victoria Harbour and Tolo Harbour, proposed water quality standards, recommended methods and plans for monitoring water quality, and listed a number of projects that would be needed to improve conditions. This report became a prototype for Hong Kong’s water treatment and discharge strategy.

47 In 1974, the Shek Wu Hui Sewage Treatment Plant entered trial operation, and in 1979, Hong Kong built its first secondary wastewater treatment plant at Tai Po.123 In 1980, the Regulations on Water Pollution Control were promulgated.124 These regulations provided a legal basis for implementing a series of water pollution control measures aimed at protecting Hong Kong’s ecology and biodiversity. At the same time, the government promulgated the Regulations on Refuse Disposal which governed the discharge of industrial pollutants into Hong Kong’s sewer system. In 1981, after Hong Kong’s Environmental Protection Department was established, it drafted a ten-year plan for Hong Kong’s wastewater treatment and discharge. At that point, drainage services shifted from mere wastewater drainage into an era of environmental protection.125

3.1.5 The Drainage Services Department is established and charged with pollution control and flood control Hong Kong’s Drainage Services Department was officially established in 1989 and given authority independent from the Water Supplies Department. Efforts to achieve comprehensive water treatment began in the early 1990s.

a) Two plans Between 1989 and 1996, the Drainage Services Department formulated Sewerage Master Plans (SMPs) for all of Hong Kong. These plans divided Hong Kong into 16 wastewater collection districts, each having its own SMP. The aim of the SMPs was to collect all of Hong Kong’s wastewater and centrally treat it before discharging it into the ocean. This process would reduce the pollution in Hong Kong’s waters and maintain their long-term cleanliness.126 During this period, large-scale wastewater collection and transport facilities were constructed throughout Hong Kong.127

Simultaneously, plans were drawn up specifically to solve the problem of pollution in Victoria Harbor. A system of wastewater collection, treatment, and discharge was comprehensively designed for both sides of the Harbour, with the end goal of restoring water quality so that the Cross Harbour Race could be reinstated. This plan, originally called the Strategic Sewage Disposal Scheme (SSDS), was eventually renamed the Harbour Area Treatment Scheme (HATS).128

48 The implementation of these two plans raised Hong Kong’s wastewater treatment capacity and brought the territory closer to perfecting its wastewater collection network. b) Solving the flooding problem Typhoon Mary in 1960, Typhoon Wanda in 1962 and the severe monsoon of 1966 caused enormous economic and human damage in Hong Kong.129 These extreme weather events also made it clear that Hong Kong’s drainage systems were unable to deal with flooding and other risks associated with heavy rainfall. Conditions worsened in the ensuing years, and the newly established Drainage Services Department was tasked with the crucial goal of solving Hong Kong’s flooding problems.

At that time, the low-lying flood plains in the northern and northwestern parts of the New Territories often suffered from flooding. Aiming to solve these flooding problems, the Drainage Services Department ordered the performance of several expert studies (TEL 1, TEL 2 and TEL 3).

Flood prevention plans resulting from those studies included a series of waterway modification plans and the construction of a basic water discharge network. Shenzhen River, Ng Tung River, Shan Pui River, and Kam Tin River were to be modified to ameliorate the flooding problems. There were also flood prevention plans for villages in low-lying areas. These included the building of dykes to prevent floodwaters from entering villages as well as pumps to transfer rainwater into drainage ditches.

Depending on the characteristics of each water collection zone, different factors were considered in designing the plans, including the integration of drainage systems, the landscape, environmental characteristics, transportation, interactions with other infrastructure projects, and locations of underground features. In order to achieve current requirements for flood prevention and deal with future needs, the Drainage Services Department created a Stormwater Drainage Master Plan (DMP) and began implementing it in 1996.130

49 3.2 Relocation of manufacturing to the North and Hong Kong’s pollution control

In the early 1980s, Hong Kong’s environmental pollution problem was most apparent in the dramatic degradation of its aquatic environment. Although the colonial government made efforts to reduce pollution, it would have taken much longer to see the results of its efforts if the manufacturing industry had not moved north into Mainland China.

In the late 1970s, the PRC decided to pursue a policy of reform and opening up to develop its economy. In the process of drawing up a strategy for reform and opening up, the CCP earnestly considered Hong Kong’s position and thus established a SEZ around Shenzhen, the Mainland city neighboring Hong Kong. China hoped to draw upon Hong Kong’s experience in finance, technology, human resources and management to boost the Mainland’s economic and social development. The principle of “One Country, Two Systems”, from its initial formulation through implementation, was nearly synchronised with Mainland China’s reform and opening up process.131 Increased cooperation with Mainland China also allowed Hong Kong to develop a “market in front, factory in back” method of doing business, helping it break through a development bottleneck and eventually transforming Hong Kong into a post-industrial economy.

The relocation of Hong Kong’s manufacturing into Mainland China brought development opportunities to the Pearl River Delta, but it also brought pollution. The Pearl River Delta’s development as the “factory in the back” relied heavily on cheap labor and raw materials. The trade-off of this development model was the prodigious consumption of precious natural resources and the severe degradation of the environment.132 In the process of absorbing Hong Kong’s capital, technology and management, the Pearl River Delta also had to accept the pollution resulting from industrial processes. Without a doubt, the relocation of manufacturing into Mainland China relieved the environmental burden of an overloaded Hong Kong.

50 3.3 One River, Two Systems – co-operative flood prevention

The taming of the The Shenzhen River serves as the boundary between Shenzhen and Shenzhen River, Hong Kong. In the hundred years or so after that boundary was set, accomplished under “One River, the river remained more or less in its original state. Its waterway’s Two Systems”, capacity was only large enough to handle two- to five-year floods. is a concrete example of Later, the land on both sides of the river was developed, causing “One Country, erosion and reducing the capacity of the land to absorb rainwater. As Two Systems” in practice a result, the Shenzhen River’s drainage ability became even weaker and economic losses from flooding increased on both banks.

At the end of 1981, the Hong Kong and Shenzhen governments came to an understanding on the taming of the Shenzhen River, and in 1982 they began negotiations to cooperatively solve the problem. Other than a period in 1988 when negotiations stalled due to a disagreement over border controls, the flood prevention project, whose negotiation, planning and construction process spanned 30 years, generally enjoyed the support and cooperation of both governments.133

The “Regulation The “Regulation of Shenzhen River Project” (the “Shenzhen River of Shenzhen River Project”) was the first project to go through China’s complete Project” was the first project Environmental Impact Assessment and Examination (EIA) procedure. to go through The EIA procedure was synchronised with the project’s design, and its China’s complete Environmental results potentially had “veto authority” over the project’s approval. Impact The project design included special provisions for environmental Assessment and Examination protection as requested by the Environmental Supervisory Team. procedure These provisions included mitigating measures to reduce the potential environmental impact of the project, as well as mechanisms for monitoring compensation and restoration. The Environmental Supervisory Team was given the authority to ensure that measures would be taken to protect the Shenzhen River estuary, the Mai Po Nature Reserve located near Shenzhen Bay, and the Shenzhen Futian Mangrove Nature Reserve.134

51 The long-term co-operation between Shenzhen and Hong Kong on this project created a unified platform for flood prevention. The collaborative model and operation mechanisms developed by the two sides serve as a useful precedent for future large-scale, cross- boundary infrastructure projects.

The completed second section of Phase II of the Shenzhen River Project, located in the Northern District of the New Territories135

(Source: Hong Kong Drainage Department)

“One River, Two Systems”, in the context of flood prevention projects, has been an extremely robust scheme for cooperation. Although the fourth phase of the Shenzhen River Project has raised ecological considerations to the same level as safety considerations, the long- term effects of the project on ecosystem services provided by the Shenzhen River Basin are far from clear. Long-term ecological impacts are difficult to control because land use patterns as well as the current ecological status of the two sides of the river are totally different, and the way that land use will interact with flood prevention infrastructure and the ecology of the river basin is too complex to predict. Especially

52 because both Shenzhen and the New Territories are still undergoing rapid development, the balancing of development with conservation on both sides of the border is a serious conundrum. Achieving sustainable development in the Shenzhen River Basin will be a serious challenge for the “One River, Two Systems” scheme under “One Country, Two Systems.”

3.4 Drainage services since Hong Kong’s reunification

General direction The blueprints for Hong Kong’s wastewater discharge and flood fixed – work on prevention were in large part completed before its return to China, flood prevention and wastewater and have served as a foundation for progress since then. However, discharge climate change and regional environmental change will place new to continue as planned; demands on Hong Kong’s Drainage Services Department. Climate change, resource reuse, and ecological Shenzhen River Project has provided the Drainage Services conservation Department with important experience in the integration of are now on the agenda environmental protection, ecological conservation, flood prevention and wastewater discharge. Elements of ecological conservation were also built into other drainage projects such as the modification of open drainage ditches and rural flood prevention.136

Progress in the In 2005, the Drainage Service Department started exploring the utilisation of potential for repurposing wastewater and transforming sewage rainwater and wastewater as into energy.137 But at present, reclaimed water is still limited to resources has experimental use. Rainwater and wastewater are still treated as been slow waste products that must be treated and then discharged into the environment. Other than plans to complete a plant for centrally repurposing sewage sludge in 2014, progress on efforts to turn wastewater and rainwater into useful resources has been sluggish.138

53 4 Discussion and Policy Recommendations

Challenges and Hong Kong must approach the issue of drinking water in a opportunities thoughtful and cautious manner.139 Backed by Mainland China for Hong Kong within “One physically, economically and politically ─ convergent development Country, Two is the inevitable macro trend, and an opportunity for Hong Kong Systems” and the wider world to renew its glory. But Hong Kong must also remain self-reliant in some ways. With regard to water resources, it must act as a far-sighted, responsible city to reduce water stress in the entire region. It must implement measures such as reclaiming water and maximizing water use efficiency. To combat climate change, Hong Kong can contribute to sustainable development by using water resources more sustainably. Simply put, Hong Kong must act within the greater framework of “One Country, Two Systems” such that it is jointly and separately liable for bearing the burden of protecting the region’s resources and environment.

4.1 The true cost of water

4.1.1 Water fees decoupled from true value Hong Kong’s It is an incontrovertible fact that Hong Kong’s water fees do not water fees do not reflect water’s true scarcity or the costs of obtaining it. Since local reflect water’s true scarcity water-use fees were frozen in February 1995, they have not been or the costs of reviewed for nearly 20 years.140 Compared to the rest of the world, managing it. The relationship Hong Kong’s per capita water consumption (220 litres/day) is 30 between low per cent higher than the world average (170 litres/day), while its prices and high consumption is water fees are among the world’s lowest.141 self-evident Seawater for toilet flushing, which accounts for 22 per cent of Hong Kong’s water use, is supplied and disposed of free of charge. A free provision policy has been in place since Hong Kong started using seawater for toilet flushing. In reality, however, seawater must be extracted, pre-treated, distributed, and treated again

54 before discharge, just like fresh water. The only step for which standards for seawater are lower than those for fresh water is treatment before use. Compared to the relatively expensive Dongjiang water, seawater is a cheap alternative, but it is by no means a free resource. The recent growth in seawater consumption for flushing toilets exposes the unfortunate reality that Hong Kong residents are taking a precious resource for granted. The relationship between low prices and high consumption is self-evident.

Adjustment Hong Kong’s water fees are based on a tiered pricing scheme whose of the tiered principle is “users pay ─ the more you use the more you pay” (see pricing system to encourage Appendix 2 for the tiered water pricing scheme). Sewer fees are conservation and calculated based on the amount of water supplied. In 2008, the penalize waste conditional on Legislative Council approved a plan to gradually increase sewer fees protecting the over ten years (see Appendix 3). 142 interests of Hong Kong’s working class The lowest-tier price and the sizes of the tiers must accurately reflect the value of the resource and the costs of provision in order to serve the purpose of “encouraging conservation and penalizing waste”. At the extreme, if both supply and sewerage services are free, then everyone will be large consumers. In reality, the supply and sewerage of seawater incurs high cost, but because seawater for toilet flushing is provided for free, people mistakenly believe that it is a free resource.

Hong Kong’s water prices were frozen in 1995, while the price of Dongjiang water grew 131 per cent from 2.16 HKD/m3 in 1995 to 4.99 HKD/m3 in 2012. Other costs of supplying and treating water, including energy costs, chemicals and materials for treatment, and labor costs have also increased substantially since 1995. Clearly, the prices set in 1995 no longer reflect actual costs. But any adjustment of the pricing system must carefully consider all relevant factors, including protecting the interests of Hong Kong’s working class.

The Hong Kong Drinking water is a human necessity. Every government is obligated to government provide free, clean water to citizens who cannot afford it in amounts must not continue to necessary for survival. At the same time, the government is also neglect the issue responsible for properly utilizing the funds contributed by taxpayers to of water pricing reform achieve the “user pays” principle as fairly as possible. The government must not continue to dodge the issue of raising water prices just because it is politically sensitive.

55 Furthermore, the government’s disregard for the issue of water price reform has not received residents’ support because of the purported benefits of freezing the fees at 1995 levels, nor has it mitigated residents’ concerns over when prices might go up.143 Because water prices are decoupled from the value of water, the pricing system does not serve the purpose of matching demand with supply. It is not an effective incentive or disincentive because it neither encourages conservation nor punishes waste. The current pricing scheme weakens the “user pays” concept and renders conservation education ineffective.144

4.1.2 Unsustainable subsidies Drinking water Water supply expenditures increased every year from 2000 to 2012, subsidies are as much as 60 per and government subsidies increased each year to match (Figure 7). In cent too high these 13 years, rate subsidies and exemption subsidies have totaled 43.95 billion HKD. The Water Supplies Department has continuously operated at a loss during this period, with accumulated losses of HKD8.7 billion.145 Revenue from the collection of water fees equals only 40 per cent of expenditures. In other words, over the past 12 years, for every 1 HKD of water used by Hong Kong Hong Kong residents, the government has provided a subsidy of 1.6 HKD. The more water one uses, the more subsidies one receives, creating a perverse encouragement of waste.

Figure 7: Water Supply Revenues, Expenditures, and Government Subsidies (2000-2012)

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Expenditure Total subsidiaries Revenue (Data source: Water Supplies Department’s Annual Reports 2000-2012146, chart by Su Liu)

56 Seawater The government provided funding to construct Hong Kong’s seawater subsidies have toilet flushing system and continues to bear the costs of its operation. never been calculated The system does not have water metres for measuring individual consumption. No fees are charged no matter how much seawater is used. Because costs are not calculated, Hong Kong residents have no idea how much their toilet water is worth. The annual amount of seawater consumed can only be found in the appendices of the Water Supplies Departments’ annual reports. No financial information is given, so it is impossible to tell how much taxpayer money is used to subsidise this service.

Wastewater Hong Kong’s wastewater discharge system ostensibly follows the subsidies “polluter pays” principle, but in reality this has little effect, especially eviscerate the “polluter pays” on the residential sector. Sewerage fees are based on water principle consumption quantity, and households are exempted from paying sewerage fees for the first twelve m3 of fresh water consumed in each 4-month payment period. Seawater for toilet flushing is not only supplied for free, its sewerage is also free. Seawater for flushing makes up 40 per cent of Hong Kong’s household water consumption, which is flushed down the toilet along with enormous amounts of public funds. The costs associated with collecting, transporting and treating flushed seawater to prevent the pollution of Hong Kong’s maritime environment are also paid with public money.

4.2 Seawater: no such thing as a free lunch

Major For many decades, its seawater toilet flushing system has been a misconception source of pride for Hong Kong. This system, seen nowhere else in the that seawater is an infinite free world at such scale, has saved Hong Kong prodigious amounts of fresh resource water. From 2000-2012, 20 per cent of the water provided by the Water Supplies Department has been seawater. In the most recent few years, this per centage was even higher, at 23 per cent (Table 11).

57 Table 11: Amount of seawater supplied (2000-2012) Year Seawater Fresh water Total Water Proportion Supplied Supplied Supplied of Seawater 3 (million m3) (million m3) (million m ) Supplied (per cent) 2000 229 924 1,153 20 2001 236 940 1,176 20 2002 235 949 1,184 20 2003 241 974 1,215 20 2004 255 955 1,210 21 2005 263 968 1,231 21 2006 260 963 1,223 21 2007 271 951 1,222 22 2008 275 956 1,231 22 2009 271 952 1,223 22 2010 270 936 1,206 22 2011 270 923 1,193 23 2012 273 935 1,208 23 (Data Source: Hong Kong Water Supplier Department147, table by Su Liu)

Seawater is Seawater is by no means a free resource. From extraction to transport absolutely not to supply to treatment, every step requires large investment and many a free resource. From extraction resources. In particular, the pumping of water requires large amounts to supply to of electricity. According to the Audit Commission’s 2008 audit of treatment, every step requires the Hong Kong government’s electricity use, the Water Supplies large investment Department was the largest consumer, accounting for 22 per cent of and many resources the government’s electricity consumption in 2007-2008. The Drainage Services Department was the fourth largest consumer, accounting for 9 per cent. Combined, these two departments take over 30 per cent of the government’s total electricity consumption to supply and discharge Hong Kong’s water.148

The cost of As described above, the cost of seawater for flushing toilets is not water treatment independently calculated. Therefore, we can only estimate the cost is astronomical – nearly 0.5 billion of treating flushed seawater based on the total amount spent on HKD p.a. to wastewater treatment by the Drainage Services Department. For treat seawater flushed from simplicity, we assume that all the seawater supplied by the Water toilets Supplies Department is used for toilet flushing and must be treated. We estimate that from 2000-2012, 6.3 billion HKD was spent on treating flushed seawater so that it meets quality standards before being discharged (Table 12).

58 Table 12: Estimated cost of treating flushed seawater Year Seawater Wastewater Proportion of Total Cost of Estimated 149 150 Supplied Treated Seawater in Wastewater Cost of 151 (million m3) (million m3) Wastewater Treatment Treating (per cent) (million HKD) Seawater (million HKD) 2000 229 840 27 1,352 369 2001 236 876 27 1,376 371 2002 235 920 26 1,467 375 2003 241 912 26 1,633 432 2004 255 912 28 1,631 456 2005 263 949 28 1,759 487 2006 260 967 27 1,766 475 2007 271 979 28 1,817 503 2008 275 960 29 1,925 551 2009 271 991 27 1,960 536 2010 270 979 28 2,075 572 2011 270 979 28 2,125 586 2012 273 981 28 2,234 622 Total 3,349 12,245 27 23,120 6,334 Annual 258 942 25 1,778 487 Average

Subsidising The figures in Table 12 are rough estimates based on limited data. water Without complete information, exactly how much Hong Kong spends mistreatment and eviscerating on seawater flushing is anyone’s guess. Whether these public funds the “polluter are well-used is also difficult to judge. But one point is clear: seawater pays” principle is by no means a free-lunch resource that can be wantonly wasted. Using public funds in this manner amounts to subsidizing water mistreatment and eviscerating the “polluter pays” principle. With all of its disadvantages, this use of public funds may not be the best way to protect the interests of the working class.

59 4.3 A review of water prices

4.3.1 Grassroot interests The greatest Free water provision in Hong Kong exists for historical reasons. But concern times have changed - incomes are higher, resources are scarcer, and regarding adjustment of costs are high. Hong Kong’s free water policies must be adjusted. water prices Water should be secured in amounts needed for human survival for is its potential effect on Hong those who are truly needy, but there is no need to subsidise a scarce Kong’s working resource for those who can easily afford to pay for it. class residents

The largest obstacle to water price adjustment is the worry that Hong Kong’s grassroot would suffer. However, the water consumption habits of the working class are the least affected by economic levers. Moreover, the interests of the working class can be protected by implementing detailed pricing structures and optimising resource allocation. How to deploy tax dollars where they are most needed to fairly and effectively distribute resources and secure the interests of the working class is a topic that must be considered in a comprehensive and coordinated manner.

4.3.2 The lifecycle costs of water Hong Kong An important reason for the placement of water price reform in a no- lacks a clear accounting man’s-land for government discussions is the lack of a clear accounting system for system for determining the costs associated with the entire lifecycle of determining the costs associated water supply and discharge. with the entire lifecycle of water supply Three government agencies deal directly with water: the Water and discharge. Supplies Department, the Drainage Services Department, and the This deficiency has made Environmental Protection Department, which are subordinate to the price reform Development Bureau and the Environment Bureau. Other agencies a third rail for Hong Kong’s that are indirectly involved with water issues include the Electrical government and Mechanical Services Department, the Housing Department, the Leisure and Cultural Services Department and the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department. These agencies are all subject to annual audit, but there has never been an effort to perform a comprehensive audit of the costs associated with the entire lifecycle of water in Hong Kong (including procuring water, supplying water, treating water, and discharging water). Such an audit is necessary for discovering what can be done to optimise operations, reduce waste, and raise efficiency.

60 4.3.3 Information transparency and public awareness Appropriate Hong Kong residents have the right to know about both obvious decisions are based and hidden costs associated with supplying, utilizing and discharging on adequate water. Taxpayers have the right to know exactly how their money is knowledge used to subsidise water, and what is being subsidised.

But currently, there is insufficient information about the costs of different water sources and substitutes for fresh water, including Dongjiang water, reclaimed water, seawater desalination, rainwater collection, etc. There has been little analysis performed on future water costs and demand based on the Pearl River Delta’s long-term plans and development trends. Without such information, how can Hong Kong residents effectively participate in the discussion regarding water price reform? How can Hong Kong and make decisions rooted in reality?

The interests of The interests of the working class can be better protected using more the working class effective resource allocation. If stakeholders lack comprehensive and can be better protected using complete information, it is difficult for them to make good decisions. more effective For example, Hong Kong’s 2013 budget included a 15 billion HKD resource allocation outlay to the Community Care Fund, aiming to increase poverty reduction efforts. A superficial comparison seems to indicate that the government’s financial support for flushing toilets with seawater is far greater. If taxpayers had a more complete understanding of the situation, they might not have so many concerns about discussing water price reform.

4.4 Water management framework

Fragmented It is impossible to manage the overall situation without adequate administration, information. Fragmentation of the water management framework an obstacle to big-picture among different agencies inevitably results in inefficiencies that strategy and increase administrative costs. However, the biggest difficulty is the planning inability to comprehensively consider the strengths and weaknesses of each agency, organise overall resources, and optimise management from a big-picture perspective when setting policies and plans.

61 For example, the Blueprint for Sustainable Use of Resources (2013- 2022)152 recently released by the Environment Bureau makes no mention of the crucial concept of water recycling. The only water- related topic under the jurisdiction of the Environment Bureau is the disposal of sewage sludge resulting from wastewater treatment. Because a portion of this the sludge is sent to landfills, the government has backed policies to transform it into energy.

Water resources and the supply and discharge of water are managed by the Development Bureau, while water quality is managed by the Environment Bureau. The Environment Bureau, which sets plans for resource recycling, has no administrative authority over the recycling of water. Since 2008, when its subordinate Water Supplies Department released its Total Water Resource Management Scheme Strategy,153 the Development Bureau has not discussed water policy at all, despite the rapidly progressing worldwide trend towards increased water recycling as an important part of water resources management.

4.5 Social justice and Hong Kong’s responsibility

The maintenance The Secretary for Development once said: “As a responsible consumer of environmental justice requires of drinking water in the Pearl River Delta region that is faced with that Hong Kong increasing competition with other cities eager to secure their share control its consumption of of precious water resources, Hong Kong must earnestly investigate Dongjiang water other sources of water to satisfy its water demand, as well as make preparations for climate change and forecasted changes in rainfall”.154 In light of the criticality of Dongjiang’s water to the sustainable development of the Pearl River Delta region, the maintenance of environmental justice obligates Hong Kong to control its use of Dongjiang water.

The Guangdong Province Dongjiang River Basin Water Resources Allocation Plan already set water allocations for Hong Kong and five major cities in Guangdong, based on an extraction limit of 29 per cent of Dongjiang’s average annual flow quantity (as discussed above). According to this plan, the long-term maximum allotment for Hong Kong is 1.1 billion m3 per year. Other than supplying water for human

62 Cities should consumption, Dongjiang River also serves as an important transport be responsible for obtaining conduit, a source of hydroelectricity, and a crucial natural ecosystem. water when they Other cities also have high water demand, and if Hong Kong’s demand exceed their 155 allotment of exceeds its allotment then, it must find alternative sources for itself. Dongjiang water

4.6 Raising Hong Kong’s water self-reliance

The future The current worldwide trend is for every city/region to become more direction of its self-reliant in terms of water. The use of reclaimed water has become Water Supplies Department a common practice. For example, Singapore is already able to provide 50 per cent of its own water supply, and plans to achieve 100 per cent water self-sufficiency by 2061.156 Macau has set a goal to supply 10 per cent of its consumption from reclamation by 2022.157 Shenzhen’s use of reclaimed water has progressed rapidly – 35 per cent of consumption is reclaimed, an annual total of 646 million m3. Beijing’s reclaimed water utilisation rate is 50 per cent, Tianjin’s is 30 per cent, and Qingdao’s is 25 per cent.158

Reclaimed water Increasing water self-reliance is the general trend for cities and regions utilisation is an worldwide in this era of climate change and resource shortages. As a imperative responsible city, Hong Kong is no exception and it must do everything in its power to move in this direction. The utilisation of reclaimed water, a solution that accords with sustainable development and resource reuse, is an imperative for Hong Kong.

63 4.7 Setting goals and creating a future together

Comprehensive With the promulgation of the Water Supplies Department’s Total water resource management Water Resource Management Scheme Strategy in 2008, Hong Kong’s will give rise to urban water resources management entered an era of orderly new challenges management with clear goals. Programmes such as “Conserve First, Increase Later”, “Water Efficiency Labeling Scheme” and “Water Conservation Education” all have had some positive results. Per capita water consumption has already decreased in some degree.

However, climate change and the integrated plans for Pearl River Delta development may pose even greater challenges for Hong Kong. To gain adequate forward-looking perspective, Hong Kong’s comprehensive water resources management must be practised in consideration of China’s national policy and regional development plans. Moreover, any vision of the future must have the support of the public as well as aggressive yet quantifiable goals.

Gaining new The government must study the past to gain new insight and engage insights by studying the the public to inform residents of the ins and outs of their water supply past, rallying as well as the challenges they face. People need to understand the public opinion development paths and visions of the country, the region, and their own city; they should cherish the efforts the nation and the people of the Dongjiang River Basin have made for Hong Kong’s benefit; and they should recognise the accomplishments and innovations of Hong Kong’s water and drainage agencies. All of this would arouse in Hong Kong’s people an ambitious cohesive force that would motivate them to achieve change through action.

Setting goals The success of water conservation plans, water pricing reform, and and collectively creating a future utilisation of reclaimed water depends on whether the government and the people can work together to establish aggressive yet quantifiable goals. Currently, about 20-30 per cent of Hong Kong’s water is supplied from local sources, depending on the season and annual rainfall levels.

Hong Kong agreed to buy Dongjiang water under the “turnkey purchase” principle to ensure a water supply reliability rate of 99 per cent. If Hong Kong can supply more of its water locally, its unused

64 Dongjiang allotment can be released for use by cities that are more in need. This would be a win-win situation for Hong Kong, the nation and their people.

Seawater for flushing toilets accounts for one-fifth of Hong Kong’s water consumption and fresh water for bathing takes up over half of household water consumption. These are scarce and, on a True Cost basis, expensive resources that must be cherished. If we use these resources more wisely, we can significantly raise Hong Kong’s level of water self-reliance.

4.8 Policy recommendations

The HKSAR Government would be well advised to: 1. Promptly call for an independent audit of Hong Kong’s seawater toilet flushing system to conserve public funds and reduce waste; 2. Perform a cross-agency comprehensive audit of the complete lifecycle cost of Hong Kong’s water resources and establish an accounting mechanism for comprehensive water resources management; 3. Re-examine its water pricing structure on the condition that the “user pays” principle is truly reflected and that the grassroots’ interests will be protected; 4. Consult the public and set goals regarding the raising of Hong Kong’s water self-reliance; and 5. Perform public outreach to help residents understand the source of their fresh water, the significance of Dongjiang water, and the challenges raised by the integrated development plans of the Pearl River Delta. This would rally public opinion and facilitate changes in water use habits.

65 6. Set comprehensive policies and mid- to long-term goals for water recycling. These policies and goals must consider important factors such as climate change, energy efficiency, reduction of emissions, poverty reduction and benefits to the elderly. 7. Investigate alternatives for ensuring a 99 per cent reliability rate for Hong Kong’s water supply. 8. Investigate its responsibilities with respect to sharing water resources to carry out its obligations and uphold social justice under “One Water, Two Systems”.

66 Appendix

1. The relationship between population growth and water supply expansion

Years Total Population Reservoir Capacity Reservoir/ Waterworks Location Population Growth /Water Supply Year (per cent) Capacity159 Completed (million m3) 1841-1851 33,000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1851-1861 119,300 262 % N/A N/A N/A N/A 1861-1871 124,200 4 % Pok Fu Lam Reservoir: 0.233 1863 HK Island 1871-1881 160,400 29 % Tai Tam Upper 1881-1891 221,400 38 % 1.490 1889 HK Island Reservoir: Wong Nai Chung 1891-1901 284,000 28 % 0.123 1899 HK Island Reservoir: Tai Tam Intermediate 1901-1911 456,700 61 % 0.686 1908 HK Island Reservoir: Tai Tam Byewash 0.080 1904 HK Island Reservoir: Kowloon Reservoir: 1.578 1910 New Territories New local reservoir 2.344 capacity: 1911-1921 625,200 37 % Tai Tam Tuk Reservoir: 6.047 1917 HK Island 1921-1931 840,500 34 % Shek Lei Pui Reservoir: 0.374 1923 New Territories Kowloon Reception 0.121 1926 New Territories Reservoir: Aberdeen Lower 0.486 1931 HK Island Reservoir: Aberdeen Lower 0.773 1931 HK Island Reservoir: Kowloon Byewash 0.800 1931 New Territories Reservoir: New local reservoir 2.554 capacity: Shing Mun (Jubilee) 1931-1941 1,639,400 95 % 13.279 1937 New Territories Reservoir: 1941-1951 2,015,300 23 % N.A. N/A Tai Lam Chung 1951-1961 3,168,100 57 % 20.490 1959 New Territories Reservoir: 1961-1971 4,045,300 28 % Shek Pik Reservoir: 24.461 1963 New Territories Lower Shing Mun 4.299 1965 New Territories Reservoir: Plover Cove Reservoir: 229.729 1968 New Territories New local reservoir 258.489 capacity: DongShen Project 72.28 1965 Guangdong capacity:

67 Total new water 330.769 1971 provision capacity: 1971-1981 5,183,400 28 % High Island Reservoir: 281.124 1978 New Territories Lok On Pai Desalination 66.36 1975 New Territories Plant 160: Local new capacity: 347.484 DongShen Project 210.91 1979 Guangdong Phase I Expansion: Total new water 558.394 1981 provision capacity: Wong Nai Chung 1981-1991 5,752,000 11 % - 0.123 1986 HK Island Reservoir161: Lok On Pai Desalination - 66.36 1978 New Territories Plant162 : Decrease in local - 66.483 1991 capacity: - 48.313 DongShen Project 701.39 1986 Phase II Expansion: Total new water 634.907 1991 provision capacity: No change in local 1991-2001 6,714,300 17 % capacity DongShen Project 728.63 1999 Guangdong Phase III Expansion: Total new water 728.63 2001 provision capacity: No change in local 2001-2011 7,071,600 5 % capacity DongShen Project: 818.42 2011 Total new water 818.42 provision capacity: No change in local 2011-2021 7,662,000 8 % capacity DongShen Project:163 900 Total forecasted new water provision 900 2021 capacity: No change in local 2021-2031 8,160,900 7 % capacity DongShen Project:164 1,000 Total forecasted new water provision 1,000 2031 capacity: No change in local 2031-2041 8,469,000 4 % capacity DongShen Project: 165 1,100 Total forecasted new water provision 1,100 2041 capacity:

(Data source: Census and Statistics Department and Water Supplies Department, table by Su Liu)166

68 2. Hong Kong’s water pricing scheme167 The following water rates have been in effect since February 1995 except the rate for ocean-going shipping purposes which was effective from July 1996.

Category Water pricing (HKD/m3) Domestic use First Tier (First 12 m3) FREE Second Tier (Next 31 m3) 4.16 Third Tier (Next 19 m3) 6.45 Fourth Tier (For the remainder) 9.05 Non-domestic use Trade 4.58 Construction 7.11 Ocean-going Shipping 10.93 Non-Ocean-going Shipping 4.58 Flushing use Fresh Water for Flushing First Tier (First 30 m3) FREE Second Tier (For the remainder) 4.58 Sea Water for Flushing FREE

69 3. Sewerage fees From 1995 to 2008, sewerage fees were maintained at 1.2 HKD/m3. In 2007, after the new sewerage fees came into effect, the fees began their gradual increase as shown in the table below. Each household is exempt from paying sewerage fees for the first twelve 3m of water consumed for each four month payment period.

Effective Dates Sewerage fees (HKD/m3 supplied) 1.4.1995-31.3.2008 1.20 1.4.2008-31.3.2009 1.31 1.4.2009-31.3.2010 1.43 1.4.2010-31.3.2011 1.57 1.4.2011-31.3.2012 1.71 1.4.2012-31.3.2013 1.87 1.4.2013-31.3.2014 2.05 1.4.2014-31.3.2015 2.24 1.4.2015-31.3.2016 2.44 1.4.2016-31.3.2017 2.67 1.4.2017 and on 2.92

70 The industries listed in Schedule A are charged sewerage fees on only 70 per cent of water supplied because only a portion of their wastewater discharge requires treatment. All industries not listed in Schedule A are charged sewerage fees on 100 per cent of water supplied

Schedule A Note : For a trade, business or manufacture listed above, the amount of SC charged is equal to 70 per cent of the volume of water supplied, other than water supplied specifically for flushing purposes, multiplied by the prevailing sewage charge rate.

Item Number Trade, Business or Manufacture 1. Bleaching and dyeing of garments 2. Bleaching and dyeing of knitted fabric 3. Bleaching and dyeing of woven fabric 4. Bleaching and dyeing of yarn 5. Knit outerwear 6. Soft drinks and carbonated waters industries 7. Breweries and manufacture of malt liquor 8. Distilling, rectifying and blending spirits 9. Restaurants 10. Ice-making industry

71 Trade effluent surcharge (TES) The industries listed in Schedule B are charged TES for industrial wastewater beyond the standard sewerage fees because their wastewater’s pollution level is higher than that of household wastewater. Additional fees are based on the Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) levels (both Total and Settled COD) of these industries’ wastewater. Each industry’s representative COD levels and additional fees are shown in Schedule B. Schedule B

Trade, business or manufacture CODt CODs 1.4.1995– 1.8.2008– 1.8.2009 (g/m3) (g/m3) 31.7.2008 31.7.2009 onwards 1. Yarn sizing 3.78 4.13 4.51 2,000 2,000 2. Washing new garments, excluding 0.82 0.41 0.41 566 507 laundries 3. Bleaching and dyeing of garments 0.64 * * - - 4. Bleaching and dyeing of knitted fabric 1.01 0.41 0.41 665 607 5. Bleaching and dyeing of woven fabric 1.73 1.20 1.20 1,053 981 6. Textile stencilling and printing 1.32 * * - - 7. Knit outerwear 1.01 0.41 0.41 566 507 8. Wearing apparel other than knit 1.80 0.41 0.41 566 507 outerwear 9. Spinning cotton 0.34 0.37 0.41 570 541 10. Laundries 0.60 * * - - 11. Soap and cleaning preparations, 3.78 4.13 4.51 2,000 2,000 perfumes, cosmetics 12. Medicines 3.78 4.13 4.51 2,000 2,000 13. Paints, varnishes and lacquers 1.16 1.27 1.38 1,000 619 14. Basic industrial chemicals 3.78 0.76 0.76 677 656 15. Tanneries and leather finishing 2.56 0.76 0.76 807 781 16. Pulp, paper and paperboard 4.09 4.47 4.88 1,870 947 17. Soft drinks and carbonated waters 1.49 0.47 0.47 826 628 industries 18. Breweries and manufacture of malt 3.29 4.13 4.51 2,000 2,000 liquor 19. Distilling, rectifying and blending 0.11 4.13 4.51 2,000 2,000 spirits 20. Cocoa, chocolate and sugar 3.78 4.13 4.51 2,000 2,000 confectionery 21. Vermicelli, noodles, and similar 3.29 4.13 4.51 2,000 2,000 farinaceous products 22. Bakery products 3.29 3.59 3.92 2,000 1,506 23. Grain mill products 5.98 2.77 2.77 1,521 1,290 24. Vegetable oil, peanut oil, peppermint 3.78 2.48 2.48 1,320 1,310 oil and aniseed oil 25. Canning, preserving and processing of 1.73 1.78 1.78 1,141 873 fish and crustaceans 26. Canning and preserving fruit and 3.63 3.41 3.41 2,000 1,822 vegetables 27. Dairy products 3.78 4.13 4.51 2,000 2,000 28. Slaughtering, preparing and 3.78 1.74 1.74 1,129 769 preserving meat 29. Soy and other sauces 3.78 4.13 4.51 2,000 2,000 30. Restaurants 3.78 3.05 3.05 1,630 1,320 Note: *With effect from 1.8.2008, the operators of “Bleaching and dyeing of garments”, “Textile stencilling and printing” or “Laundries” trades are no longer required to pay the TES.

72 For the trades listed in Schedule C, the amount of TES chargeable is based on 80 per cent of the water supplied to account for the water consumed in the production process which is not discharged into the public sewers. The others are charged at 100 per cent of the water supplied.

Schedule C Item Trade, Business or Manufacture 1. Bleaching and dyeing of knitted fabric 2. Bleaching and dyeing of woven fabric 3. Knit outerwear 4. Soft drinks and carbonated waters industries 5. Breweries and manufacture of malt liquor 6. Distilling, rectifying and blending spirits 7. Restaurants Note : For a trade, business or manufacture listed above, the amount of TES charged is equal to 80 per cent of the volume of water supplied, other than water supplied specifically for flushing purposes, multiplied by the corresponding rates in Schedule B.

73 Endnotes

of each year since 1989. Each year’s amount of rainfall collected 1. Puiyin Ho (2003), 點滴話當年 – 香港供水一百五十年, March 2003, from 1965-1980 was calculated by subtracting that year’s total water 1st edition. (Chinese only) consumption from that year’s import of Dongjiang water. 2. HKSAR Drainage Services Department (2009), Drainage and Flood 15. The ranking of Hong Kong’s top ten years of rainfall is from “Ranking Protection – Drainage Services 1841 - 2008, 2009 edition. of air temperature and rainfall in Hong Kong at Annual” of “Statistics 3. Asia Television Limited (2007), 解密百年香港, Episode 23, Section 2, of Special Weather Events” under the section “Climatological “百政水為先”, http://www.hkatv.com/infoprogram/07/hkdecode/ Information Services” from the webpage of the Hong Kong content40b.html, accessed 22 March 2013. (Chinese only) Observatory (http://www.weather.gov.hk/cis/statistic/erank13.htm, 4. Guangdong Yue Gang Water Supply Co., Ltd. (2012), “Review accessed 29 July 2013). The data source for yearly amount of water of the Development of Dong-shen Water Supply Project”, collected is the same as for Figure 2. September 2012, http://nsbd.mwr.gov.cn/dszywyh/lwxd/201301/ 16. Sources for rainfall volume, amount of rainfall collected in local P020130118578482031968.pdf, accessed 22 March 2013. (Chinese reservoirs, and imports of Dongjiang water are the same as for Figure only) 2. The average figures for 1965-1996 were calculated by taking the 5. HKSAR Government (2011), “Press Releases: Agreement ensures sums of each year’s rainfall volume, amount of rainfall collected in stable supply of Dongjiang water to Hong Kong”, News.gov.hk, local reservoirs, and imports of Dongjiang water and dividing each 5 December 2011, http://sc.isd.gov.hk/gb/www.info.gov.hk/gia/ sum by the number of years (32 years in 1965-1996). The average general/201112/05/P201112050305.htm, accessed 22 March 2013. figures for 1997-2012 were calculated by taking the sums of each 6. HKSAR Census and Statistics Department, “Hong Kong Statistics: year’s rainfall volume, amount of rainfall collected in local reservoirs, Latest Statistics 2012”, the population of Hong Kong as of the end of and imports of Dongjiang water and dividing each sum by the number 2012 were 7,173,900 (released on 19 February 2013), http://www. of years (17 years in 1997-2012). censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/so20.jsp, accessed 22 March 2013. 17. See note 1, p.16. 7. In June 2013 the author contacted the HKSAR Census and Statistics 18. See note 1, pp. 126-130. Department and requested population data collected every decade 19. See note 1, “香港供水大事紀要”, p.242. from 1841 to 2041. The Department responded in the same month. 20. See note 1, p.125. New additions were calculated by starting with the population 21. Ibid. for a particular year (Year A), then taking the population 10 years 22. See note 1, pp. 202-208. later (Year B) and subtracting the Year A population from the Year B 23. See note 1, p.214, charted by Su Liu. population. The resulting difference is used as the “New additions” 24. See note 1, p.221. data for Year B. 25. Hong Kong Legislative Council (1992), Official Record of Proceedings 8. Su Liu, Yong Yang et al., Liquid Assets IIIA: Dongjiang Overloaded of 20 May 1992, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr91-92/english/lc_sitg/ – 2011 Dongjiang Expedition Report, Civic Exchange, May 2012, hansard/h920520.pdf, accessed 29 July 2013. http://www.civic-exchange.org/wp/201205overload_en/, accessed 26. For example, the DongShen Project’s Phase 3 expansion cost a 29 July 2013. total of 1.7 billion RMB, of which 1.1 billion were provided by Hong 9. Puiyin Ho interviewed with the author in June 2013. She is the Kong as advance payments for Dongjiang water, 340 million came author of "點滴話當年 – 香港供水一百五十年". from Shenzhen as prepaid water fees, and 260 million came from 10. In June 2013, the author contacted the HKSAR Water Supplies Guangdong province. The DongShen Renovation Project cost 4.7 Department to request Hong Kong’s reservoir catchment area billion RMB, of which half was provided by Hong Kong as no-interest figures and received a response including the catchment area loans in the form of advance payments for Dongjiang water. figures for each of Hong Kong’s reservoirs in the same month. The 27. John Campbell (2011), The Iron Lady - Margaret Thatcher #2, Penguin dates of completion for Hong Kong’s reservoirs are from the section Books, Abridged edition, 25 October 2011. entitled “香港供水大事紀要” of Puiyin Ho’s book點滴話當年 – 香 28. Liandi Zheng(2003), “中國歷史上的跨流域調水工程”, 南水北調與水 港供水一百五十年 (See also note 19). Reservoir capacities are 利科技, Vol.1 SP, December 2003. from the website of the Water Supplies Department (“Capacity of 29. Both major labor strikes in Hong Kong during the 1920s (the Seaman’s Impounding Reservoirs in Hong Kong”, http://www.wsd.gov.hk/en/ Strike in 1922 and the Canton-Hong Kong strike in 1925-26) were publications_and_statistics/statistics/capacity_of_impounding_ directly or indirectly influenced by the CCP and are now viewed by reservoirs_in_hong_kong/index.html, accessed 29 July 2013). historians as two of the CCP’s important early achievements. (See also 11. HKSAR Information Services Department (2013), Hong Kong: The note 31). Facts – Water, Power and Gas Supply, July 2013, http://www.gov.hk/ 30. In 1927, after Sun Yat-sen’s Great Revolution had failed, the CCP en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/wp&g_supplies.pdf, accessed shifted its tactics from direct resistance to taking advantage of 29 July 2013. Hong Kong’s unique environment. It organized activities that could 12. “亞洲四小龍現狀”, Singapore Insight, 22 May 2006, http://www. not take place in the mainland, turning Hong Kong into a base for sginsight.com/xjp/index.php?id=218, accessed 20 June 2013. marshalling influence, connecting foreign and national resources, (Chinese only) strategic planning and expansion. For a time, the Guangdong CCP 13. In June 2013, the author contacted the HKSAR Census and Statistics Committee was placed in Hong Kong, until 1936 when it was moved Department to request annual rainfall amounts from 1965 to 2011, and re-organized in Guangdong proper (See note 31, pp. 63-64). For a and received a response the same month. period, Zhou Enlai, a first-generation CCP leader who would later have 14. In June 2013, the author contacted the HKSAR Water Supplies great influence over Hong Kong’s future and the DongShen Project, Department to request data on the annual amount of rainfall sought refuge in Hong Kong during an illness and recovered his health collected in reservoirs, the amount of water stored at the beginning there. In the following decades, throughout his extensive dealings of each year, annual imports of Dongjiang water and total water with Hong Kong, Zhou Enlai remained keenly aware of Hong Kong’s consumption from 1965 to present, and received a response the unique position and value. Zhou Enlai’s influence on the CCP’s attitude same month. The Department had records of annual imports of toward Hong Kong in the period after the PRC was founded cannot be Dongjiang water since 1965, annual amount of rainfall collected in over-stated. (See Lin Li, Jia Ceng (2011), “學者憶周恩來香港情結: 促 reservoirs since 1981, and amount of water stored at the beginning 使毛澤東決定暫不收回”, People.com, re-directed from Chinanews.

74 com, 29 June 2011, http://hm.people.com.cn/BIG5/42273/15031201. aspx?id=7198, accessed 27 June 2013, Chinese only). html, accessed 25 June 2013, Chinese only). 41. 歐陽湘, 唐富滿 (2013)，“特載: 從內地對港澳地區的出口供應看中國 31. Christine Loh (2011), 地下陣線-中共在香港的歷史, HKUPress, pp.52- 共產黨的港澳工作方針 (1949－1978)” (Part 1 and Part 2), 新華澳報, 10 61. and 17 January 2013, http://www.waou.com.mo/detail.asp?id=66617 32. In the latter half of the 1950s, Chairman Mao stated that for the (Part 1) and http://www.waou.com.mo/detail.asp?id=66785 (Part 2), foreseeable future, China would “not seek to regain Hong Kong. accessed 22 July 2013. (Chinese only). China is in no hurry because Hong Kong is still of use to us.” In 1957, 42. “東深供水改造工程”, People.com, 30 January 2011, http://scitech. Zhou Enlai elaborated on how Hong Kong was “of use to” them. He people.com.cn/GB/25509/56813/213022/213263/13850493.html, remarked that China could make the best use of Hong Kong as a place accessed 2 July, 2013. (Chinese Only) for absorbing foreign capital and gaining foreign exchange by using 43. See note 37. it as an economic conduit to the rest of the world while mainland 44. Ibid. China went forward with its socialist nation-building project. Zhou 45. See note 1, p.221. Enlai emphasized that “Hong Kong must continue to operate in a 46. See note 37. wholly capitalistic manner in order to survive and develop.” These 47. See note 1, p.221. ideas formed the foundation of Deng Xiaoping’s “One Country, Two 48. HKSAR Government (1998), “新聞公報: 粵港簽署‘東深供水改 Systems” thought. 造工程’貸款協議”, 10 July 1998, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/ 33. The Eight Word Policy clarified China’s position that it would not seek general/199807/10/0710160.htm, accessed 1 July 2013. (Chinese only) reunification of Hong Kong and Macau in the near future. Zhou Enlai 49. Guangdong Yue Gang Water Supply Co., Ltd (2013), “公司簡介”, http:// was to personally oversee work that would “fully utilize Hong Kong’s www.gdhwater.com/defme.asp, accessed 27 June 2013. (Chinese only) unique status and value in the context of continued British control 50. Guangdong Investment Limited, Annual Reports (1997-2000), http:// over Hong Kong in a manner that would best serve China’s socialist www.gdi.com.hk/english/interim_annual_e.php, accessed 29 July 2013. construction and foreign relations”. (See Hou Li (1997), 百年屈辱史的 51. Yau (2012), “金融雲端: 無拖無欠的東江水”, Appledaily, 29 終結 – 香港問題始末, 中央文獻出版社, April 1997) October 2012, http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/financeestate/ 34. Cui Qi (2009), “’評美國共產黨的聲明’的起草經過”, People.com, 10 art/20121029/18051580, accessed 27 June 2013. (Chinese only) June 2009, http://book.people.com.cn/BIG5/69399/107423/157763/9 52. Guangdong Investment Company’s total turnover, water supply 449437.html, accessed 26 June 2013, Chinese only) turnover, pre-tax total profits and pre-tax total profits from supplying 35. Ruifang Wong (2009), “‘大躍進’時期農田水利建設得失問題研 water are from the “Financial Highlights” portion of GDI’s relevant 究述評”, the History of the People’s Republic of China, 28 June annual reports. (GDI’s annual reports are available at: http://www.gdi. 2009, http://www.hprc.org.cn/gsyj/yjjg/zggsyjxh_1/gsnhlw_1/ com.hk/english/interim_annual_s.php, accessed 28 June 2013). Ratio of qiguoshi/200906/t20090628_12573.html, accessed 29 June 2013. turnover from supplying water was calculated by dividing the turnover (Chinese only) from supplying water by the total turnover and multiplying by 100. 36. Fulin Li (2006), “我早期在寶安縣工作的回憶”, Shenzhen Committee Proportion of profits from supplying water was calculated by dividing of Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference, 16 June 2006, pre-tax total profits from supplying water by pre-tax total profits and http://www.szzx.gov.cn/zxxxzwhgz/zwhgzwh/ws_wjzl/wsgjszws/ multiplying by 100. szws8/201004/t20100406_1491409.htm, accessed 29 June 2013. 53. Each year’s Hong Kong water purchase expenditure is from the section 37. Cuiping Sun (2013), “東深工程向香港供水的歷程與意義”, 中共黨史 entitled “Water Authority – Operating Accounts” of the relevant 研究, 2013, Vol. 1. (Chinese only) Water Supplies Department’s annual report. (The Water Supplies 38. Chunliang You (2012), “揭秘周恩來總理親自批准興建的 Department’s annual reports are available at: http://www.wsd.gov.hk/ 香港‘生命之水’”, Sina.com, re-directed from Chinanews. en/publications_and_statistics/publications/list_of_wsd_publications/, com, 11 June 2012, http://dailynews.sina.com/bg/news/int/ accessed 28 June 2013). The proportion of water supply turnover from chinanews/20120611/19073461770.html, accessed 27 June 2013. Hong Kong purchases was calculated by dividing the Hong Kong water (Chinese only) purchase expenditure by the water supply turnover and multiplying by 39. Ibid. 100. 40. The 30 years following the establishment of New China were 54. HKSAR Audit Commission (1999), “Water purchased from Guangdong fraught with difficulties. In particular: the western powers led by Province”, Director of Audit’s Reports, Report No. 33, Chapter 12, 11 the United States imposed a trade embargo on China after China October 1999, http://www.aud.gov.hk/pdf_e/c33ch12.pdf, accessed 29 aided North Korea in the Korean War (see Qunding Ma (2009), “霍 July 2013. 英東談－抗美援朝期間支持新中國建設的幾段往事”, 人民政協報, 55. Ibid. 3 September 2009, http://epaper.rmzxb.com.cn/2009/20090903/ 56. Ibid, tabulated by Su Liu. t20090903_273565.htm, accessed 22 July 2013, Chinese only); by 57. Guangdong’s reason for rejecting Hong Kong’s request: If Hong Kong 1956, nearly all foreign investments and foreign companies had did not abide by the water supply amounts agreed to in the 1989 Water departed China (see Hongxu Wang (1999), “毛澤東時代的中英經貿關 Supply Agreement, Guangdong’s plans would be negatively impacted 係”, 中共中央黨校博士學位論文, 1995, Chinese only); the Great Leap because Guangdong would not be able to receive the expected Forward from 1958-60 (see “‘大躍進’運動”, Xinhuanet, http://big5. revenues set in the Agreement. Moreover, Hong Kong’s request was xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/ denied because the money had already been spent to expand the content_698127.htm, accessed 17 July 2013.); the breakdown of Sino- capacity of the Dongshen Project as requested by Hong Kong so that it Soviet relations in 1960 which resulted in skyrocketing foreign debt; could supply 1.1 billion m3 to Hong Kong by 2008. the Three Bitter Years of 1960-62 (see 中共黨史首次證實“ 1960年人 58. Guangdong asked Hong Kong to provide a large no-interest loan for the 口銳減1千萬”, Netease, re-directed from 新京報, 21 February 2011, construction of a sealed pipeline as part of the Dongshen Renovation http://news.163.com/11/0221/02/6TCO798900014AED.html, 17 July Project. The total cost was estimated to be over 4.1 billion HKD. 2013, Chinese only); the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76 (see “文化 59. Guangdong agreed that it would symbolically decrease the water supply 大革命”, Xinhuanet, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/ amounts in 1998, 1999 and 2000 by 5.5 million m3, 6.5 million m3 and content_697889.htm, accessed 27 June 2013, Chinese only); and 7.5 million m3, respectively. the generous amounts of foreign aid granted by China when it could 60. See note 54. scarcely afford to do so (see Yun Shu (2009), “糾正與國力不符的 61. Panel on Planning, Lands and Works of HKSAR Legislative Council 對外援助 – 中國外援往事”, re-direct from同舟共進, 2009, Vol. 1, (2006), “Dongjiang Water Supply”, CB(1)1305/05-06(01), http://www. Universities Service Centre for China Studies, The Chinese University legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/plw/papers/plwcb1-1305-1e.pdf, of Hong Kong, http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details. accessed 29 July 2013. 62. Ibid.

75 63. This requires that Hong Kong can enjoy 24 hours of daily water supply 89. Hong Kong’s first reservoir – Pok Fu Lam Reservoir’s capacity is even during once-in-a-century drought conditions. 233,000 m3. 64. The Hong Kong government believes that the turnkey purchase 90. HKSAR Government (2011), “Press Releases: LCQ9: Use of water method is the only way to ensure a reliable water supply while resources”, 9 November 2011, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/ allowing some flexibility in provision. Water fees based on actual general/201111/09/P201111090226.htm, accessed 29 July 2013. consumption and complete flexibility in provision are seen as 91. “用水量高於國際平均, 港水務署查港人家居用水習慣”, Chinanews. impracticable. See the Hong Kong Legislative Council’s discussion com, 9 August 2011, http://www.chinanews.com/ga/2011/08- documents from 2006-2013 regarding Dongjiang and the purchase of 09/3243706.shtml, accessed 29 July 2013. (Chinese only) drinking water. 92. “用水量飆, 水署研節約用水”, Singtao Daily, 9 August 2011, http:// 65. The data source for actual amount of water imported is the same www.singtao.com/archive/fullstory.asp?andor=or&year1=2011&mo as for Figure 2. The figures for quantity of water allotted and water nth1=08&day1=09&year2=2011&month2=08&day2=09&category=a payments are from the Hong Kong SAR Water Supplies Department’s ll&id=20110809a06&keyword1=&keyword2=, accessed 29 July 2013. legislative question and answer document (“Examination of Estimates (Chinese only) of Expenditure 2013-14: Controlling Officer’s Reply to Initial Written 93. Figures for drinking water consumption are from the water supplies Question”, 10 April 2013, Reply Serial No.: DEVB(W)132, http://www. section in the Hong Kong SAR Water Supplies Department’s annual wsd.gov.hk/filemanager/en/share/pdf/sfc_e_2013-14.pdf, accessed reports. Figures for seawater consumption are from the same 30 July 2013). The difference was calculated by subtracting the actual annual reports in the section of the appendices. (The Water Supplies quantity of water imported from the quantity of water allotted. Department’s annual reports are available at: http://www.wsd. 66. Low dissolved oxygen encourages the growth of harmful gov.hk/en/publications_and_statistics/publications/list_of_wsd_ microorganisms which can cause water to have foul taste and smell. publications/, accessed 30 June 2013) 67. Ammonia and nitrogen in water indicate that the water contains 94. HKSAR Water Supplies Department, Annual Reports (2006-2011), germs, sewage, and fecal matter. Before filtering water, ammonia and http://www.wsd.gov.hk/en/publications_and_statistics/publications/ nitrogen must first be removed. list_of_wsd_publications/annual_report_archive/index.html, 68. See note 54. accessed 22 July 2013. 69. Ibid. 95. Qinghao Chen, Shuiting Yue (2008), 水量分配方案是取水紅綫“ ”, 南 70. People’s Government of Guangdong Province (1999), “關於加強水污 方日報, 11 December 2008, http://epaper.nfdaily.cn/html/2008- 染防治工作的通知”, (1999)74. (Chinese only) 12/11/content_6708769.htm, accessed 2 March 2012. (Chinese only) 71. HKSAR Government (2011), “新聞公告: 工務局局長發言全文”, 21 96. “廣州東進佈局以及發展規劃”, 網易房產, http://gz.house.163. June 2001, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200106/21/0621212. com/11/0104/16/6PIN76NA00873L40.html, 4 January 2011, accessed htm, accessed 3 July 2013. (Chinese only) 10 May 2012. (Chinese only) 72. Ministry of Environment Protection of the PRC (2008), 水專項“ 97. See note 8. 簡介”, 30 August 2008, http://nwpcp.mep.gov.cn/zxgk/200910/ 98. “深圳嚴重缺水‘十二五’期間有望喝上西江水”, sznews.com, t20091030_180580.htm, accessed 13 July 2013. (Chinese only) 28 March 2011, http://news.sznews.com/content/2011-03/28/ 73. Ministry of Environment Protection of the PRC, “飲用水主題”, content_5472664.htm, accessed 4 May 2012. (Chinese only) 1 September 2008, http://nwpcp.mep.gov.cn/ztsz/200809/ 99. “東莞適當提高水價勢在必行”, Dongguan Times, 6 March 2012, t20080901_128008.htm, accessed 13 July 2013. (Chinese only) http://dgtime.timedg.com/html/2012-03/06/content_935941.htm, 74. Su Liu and Dao Bian (2012), Liquid Assets II – Industrial Relocation accessed 10 May 2012. (Chinese only) in Guangdong Province: Avoid Repeating Mistakes, Civic Exchange, 100. “預計預測2010年惠州缺水2億立方米”, 惠州政府網, http://www. January 2012. Available at http://www.civic-exchange.org/ huizhou.gov.cn/zwgkviewArticle.shtml?method, accessed 4 May wp/120110industrialrelocation_en/, accessed 3 July 2013. 2012. (Chinese only) 75. See note 8. 101. See note 11. 76. Yuyu Chen (2012), “與粤語詞滙中‘水族詞’有關的研究”, 論文網, 102. National Development and Reform Commission of PRC (2008), 4 December 2012, http://www.xzbu.com/9/view-3730797.htm, 珠江三角洲地區改革發展規劃綱要 (2008-2020), December accessed 4 July 2013. (Chinese only) 2012, http://www.gdep.gov.cn/hbgh/ghjh/ghjh/201008/ 77. The award-winning slogan in a water conservation slogan contest P020100804604719020540.pdf, accessed 8 July 2013. (Chinese only) organized by the Office of Education in June, 1963. 103. They are, 珠三角基礎設施建設一體化規劃(2009-2020), http://zwgk. 78. See note 1, pp. 182-201. gd.gov.cn/006939748/201008/t20100810_12099.html, accessed 22 79. HKSAR Audit Commission (1999), “The use of energy-efficient air- July 2013; 珠三角產業佈局一體化規劃(2009-2020), http://zwgk. conditioning systems in Hong Kong”, Director of Audit’s Reports, gd.gov.cn/006939748/201008/t20100810_12102.html, accessed 22 Report No. 33, Chapter 2, 11 October 1999, http://www.aud.gov.hk/ July 2013; 珠三角城鄉規劃一體化規劃(2009-2020), http://zwgk. pdf_e/c33ch02.pdf, accessed 29 July 2013. gd.gov.cn/006939748/201008/t20100810_12101.html, accessed 22 80. HKSAR Audit Commission (2009), “Wider use of water-cooled July 2013; 珠三角基本公共服務一體化規劃(2009-2020), http://www. air-conditioning systems”, Director of Audit’s Reports, Report No. gd.gov.cn/govpub/rdzt/ghgy2/wjzl/201008/t20100816_127494.htm, 53, Chapter 11, 27 October 2009, http://www.aud.gov.hk/pdf_e/ accessed 22 July 2013; and珠三角環境保護一體化規劃(2009-2020), e53ch11.pdf, accessed 29 July 2013. http://www.gd.gov.cn/ghgy/wjzl/201008/t20100816_127496.htm, 81. Ibid. accessed 22 July 2013. (Chinese only) 82. See note 1, p.190. 104. Su Liu, “Liquid Asset Management in the Pearl River Delta - the 83. HKSAR Water Supplies Department (2013), “Domestic Water example of Dongjiang River Basin”, Blickpunkt Asia Pacific, September Consumption Survey: Key Findings – Fact Sheet”, 24 January 2013, 2012, http://www.dapg.de/Content/news/2012-09_Liu-Su_Liquid- http://www.wsd.gov.hk/filemanager/en/content_523/factsheet_e. Asset-Management_Perl-River-Delta.html, accessed 8 July 2013. pdf, accessed 30 July 2013. 105. Kwan (2013), “反省競爭排名降, 攻教育降成本”, Hong Kong Economic 84. Ibid. Times, 19 June 2013, http://www.Hong Kong Economic Times/eti/ 85. Ibid. article/540a9a64-7c50-4cd1-a1e0-7bfa9ba4bd1e-045646, accessed 8 86. Ibid. July 2013. (Chinese only) 87. Ibid. 106. “政策解讀: 水資源管理劃定‘三條紅綫’”, 中國共產黨新聞網, 88. HKSAR Water Supplies Department (2013), Annual Report re-directed from People.com, 11 February 2011, http://cpc.people. 2011/2012, http://www.wsd.gov.hk/filemanager/common/annual_ com.cn/GB/64093/82429/83083/13890130.html, accessed 8 July report/2011_12/index.html, accessed 22 July 2013. 2013. (Chinese only)

76 107. “廣東省‘三條紅綫’真正成為剛性約束”, 法制日報, 7 June 2012, 138. HKSAR Environmental Protection Department (2011), “Sludge http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index/content/2012-06/07/ treatment facility”, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/ content_3626343.htm?node=20908, accessed 8 July 2013. (Chinese environmentinhk/waste/prob_solutions/hkstf_video.html, accessed only) 29 July 2013. 108. Christine Loh (2010), 水費過低“ 不能承受的浪費”, Hong Kong 139. Su Liu (2012), “港飲水思‘危’ 免制水時代再臨”, Hong Kong Economic Economic Times, 25 May 2010, http://www.Hong Kong Economic Times, 5 July 2012, http://www.Hong Kong Economic Times/eti/ Times/eti/article/e34d6811-7b3b-4363-aca4-e2b91cabe8ac-615957, article/9300b9ef-7d43-4d43-9948-30abe98b4bdc-995924, accessed accessed 14 July 2013. (Chinese only) 11 July 2013. (Chinese only) 109. See note 2, Chapter 1. 140. HKSAR Water Supplies Department, Annual Reports (1995-2012), 16 110. “鼠疫過後 公眾衞生與居住空間的基建”, Mingpao Weekly, Vol. 2314, July 2013, http://www.wsd.gov.hk/en/publications_and_statistics/ http://www2.mingpaoweekly.com/contents/?id=26482, 10 July 2013. publications/list_of_wsd_publications/annual_report_archive/index. (Chinese only) html, accessed 29 July 2013. 111. See note 1, p.51. 141. “水費研改結構 用水多收費貴”, 18 May 2010, Hong Kong Economic 112. Ibid. Times, http://www.Hong Kong Economic Times/eti/article/3b733ccb- 113. See note 2, p.20. 10f7-442b-aece-2ac2841f5a65-211232?category=green_news&sourc 114. See note 110. e=print&printable=true, accessed 13 July 2013. (Chinese only) 115. See note 2, pp.27-28. 142. HKSAR Drainage Services Department, Annual Report 2011/12, 116. PRC Government (2013), “關於做好城市排水防澇設施建設工 printed version, p.57; See also the relevant section at: http://www. 作的通知”, (2013)23, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-04/01/ dsd.gov.hk/EN/Files/annual_reports/1112/index2.html, accessed 22 content_2367368.htm, accessed 10 July 2013. (Chinese only) July 2013. 117. See note 2, p.184. 143. “水費勢必加價 水官勿再敗家”, Oriental Daily, 21 October 2011, 118. See note 2, p.38-41. http://orientaldaily.on.cc/cnt/news/20111021/00190_001.html, 119. See note 2, pp.48-49 and 187. accessed 13 July 2013. (Chinese only) 120. Chan (2012), “香港城市規劃欠缺的來龍去脈 – 訪中國科學院院士 144. “東江水加價 公帑年補54億”, Mingpao, 21 October 2011, http:// 葉嘉安”, Bauhinia Magazine Online, April 2012, http://www.baumag. www.mpfinance.com/htm/Finance/20111021/News/ea_gha1h.htm, com.hk/big5/channel3/1204/120432.html, accessed 11 July 2013. accessed 13 July 2013. (Chinese only) (Chinese only) 145. Calculated by Su Liu from data provided in the 2000-2012 Annual 121. The Hong Kong Chinese Importers’ & Exporters’ Association, “香港 Reports of the Water Supplies Department, “水務監督 – 經營帳目”. 產業結構轉型前景 – 發展批發業和製造業”, http://www.hkciea. 146. Water supply revenues, water supply expenditures and government org.hk/submissions_detail.php?id_submissions=11, accessed 11 July subsidies are from the section entitled “Water Authority – Operating 2013. (Chinese only) Accounts” of the Hong Kong SAR Water Supplies Department’s 122. See note 2, Chapter 4. relevant annual reports. (The Water Supplies Department’s annual 123. See note 2, Appendix 1: Milestones. reports are available at: http://www.wsd.gov.hk/tc/publications_ 124. HKSAR Environmental Protection Department (2006), “Introduction and_statistics/publications/list_of_wsd_publications/, accessed 30 to Water Pollution Control Ordinance”, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/ June 2013). Total subsidies are calculated by adding together the english/environmentinhk/water/guide_ref/guide_wpc_wpco_1.html, amounts of rate subsidies, exemption subsidies, and the amount accessed 22 July 2013. spent by the government on providing free water to certain users. 125. See note 2, Chapter 5. 147. Figures for drinking water consumption are from the water supplies 126. HKSAR Drainage Services Department (2009), “Sewage Master Plans”, section in the Hong Kong SAR Water Supplies Department’s annual http://www.dsd.gov.hk/EN/Sewerage/Sewerage_Master_Plans/ reports. Figures for seawater consumption are from the same index.html, accessed 29 July 2013. annual reports in the section of the appendices. (The Water Supplies 127. See note 2, Chapter 6. Department’s annual reports are available at: http://www.wsd. 128. HKSAR Drainage Services Department (2009), “HATS”, http://www. gov.hk/en/publications_and_statistics/publications/list_of_wsd_ dsd.gov.hk/EN/FAQ/HATS/index.html, accessed 29 July 2013. publications/, accessed 30 June 2013). 129. See note 2, p.54-57. 148. HKSAR Audit Commission (2008), “Government electricity 130. HKSAR Drainage Services Department (2009), “Drainage Master consumption”, Director of Audit’s Reports, Report No. 51, Chapter Planning”, http://www.dsd.gov.hk/EN/Flood_Prevention/Long_ 5, 23 October 2008, http://www.aud.gov.hk/pdf_e/e51ch05.pdf, Term_Improvement_Measures/Drainage_Master_Planning/index. accessed 29 July 2013. html, accessed 29 July 2013. 149. HKSAR Water Supplies Department, Annual Reports (2000-2012), 16 131. Siren Gao (2009), “香港在國家改革開放中的地位和貢獻”, July 2013, http://www.wsd.gov.hk/en/publications_and_statistics/ 求事, 2009 Vol. 1, 22 June 2009, http://www.qstheory.cn/ publications/list_of_wsd_publications/annual_report_archive/index. zxdk/2009/200901/200906/t20090609_1617.htm, accessed 22 July html, accessed 29 July 2013. 2013. (Chinese only) 150. See note 136. 132. Jie Fan, Dong Chen (2009), “珠江三角洲產業結構轉型與空間結 151. Ibid. 構調整的戰略思考”, 戰略與決策研究, 2009 Vol. 24, No. 2, http:// 152. HKSAR Environmental Bureau (2013), “Hong Kong Blueprint for sourcedb.igsnrr.cas.cn/zw/lw/201003/P020100302577745024148. Sustainable Use of Resources”, 20 May 2013, http://www.enb.gov.hk/ pdf, accessed 11 July 2013. (Chinese only) en/files/WastePlan-E.pdf, accessed 29 July 2013. 133. HKSAR Drainage Services Department (2013), 融匯, 聚變, 三十年 – 深 153. HKSAR Waste Supplies Department, “香港的全面水資源管理”, 港聯合治理深圳河紀事 (Internal publication), 2013. http://www.wsd.gov.hk/filemanager/common/digital_resources/ 134. Ibid. presentation/twm.pdf, accessed 10 July 2013. (Chinese only) 135. HKSAR Drainage Services Department (2010), “Northern New 154. Panel on Development of HKSAR Legislative Council (2011), Minutes Territories Flood Prevention Projects”, 28 September 2010, http:// of meeting, CB(1)600/11-12, 25 October 2011, http://www.legco.gov. www.dsd.gov.hk/EN/HTML/266.html, accessed 17 July 2013. hk/yr11-12/english/panels/dev/minutes/dev20111025.pdf, accessed 136. HKSAR Drainage Services Department, DSD Annual Reports (2000- 29 July 2013. 2012), http://www.dsd.gov.hk/EN/Publicity_and_Publications/ 155. Ibid. Publicity/DSD_Annual_Reports__/index.html, accessed 29 July 2013. 156. 顏嘉南 (2013), “新加坡喝水不求人”, Chinatimes.com, re-directed 137. HKSAR Drainage Services Department (2009), “Reclaimed water”, from Commercial Times, 3 September 2012, http://news.chinatimes. http://www.dsd.gov.hk/EN/Sewerage/Environmental_Consideration/ com/world/11050401/122012090200343.html, accessed 16 July Reclaimed_Water/index.html, accessed 29 July 2013. 2013. (Chinese only) 77 157. 澳門特別行政區推動構建節水型社會工作小組 (2013), “澳門再生 水發展規劃(2013-2022)諮詢文本”, p.8, http://www.marine.gov.mo/ waterconservation/pdfs/recycledWaterPlan.pdf, accessed 22 July 2013. (Chinese only) 158. “深圳再生水年利用量已達6.46億立方米”, sznews.com, 11 May 2013, http://www.sznews.com/news/content/2013-05/11/ content_8037251_2.htm, accessed 16 July 2013. (Chinese only) 159. Reservoir capacity refers to the maximum amount of water that the reservoir can store. 160. Calculated from the Lok On Pai Desalination Plant’s 1977 full operational capacity of 10.7 billion gallons. 161. Taken out of operation in 1986 and transformed into Hong Kong’s first boating park. 162. Lok On Pai Desalination Plant was shut down in 1978 and completely dismantled in 1992. 163. According to the DongShen Water Supply Agreement currently in force, which provides for a maximum supply of 1.1 billion m3 in 2030 and 820 million m3 per year from 2012-14. 164. Ibid. 165. Ibid. 166. Sources of population are the same as Fig. 1 (See note 7). The reservoirs’ capacities were collected from the website of Water Supplies Department (http://www.wsd.gov.hk/en/publications_ and_statistics/statistics/capacity_of_impounding_reservoirs_in_ hong_kong/index.html, accessed 30 July 2013). Completed years of reservoirs/water projects were sourced from the section “香港 供水大事紀要” of Punyin Ho’s book (See note 19). Water supply volume of the water project (i.e., Lo On Pai Desalination Plant) were collected from the section of “WSD Milestone” of Water Supplies Department’s website (http://www.wsd.gov.hk/en/education/ history/wsd_milestone/index.html, accessed 30 July 2013). With the total of 6 machine sets with daily productivity of 30,000 m3 for each set, the projected year seawater desalination can provide up to 66.36 million m3. 167. See note 140.

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