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NAFTA and Mexico's Economic Performance A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Tornell, Aaron; Westermann, Frank; Martínez, Lorenza Working Paper NAFTA and Mexico's Economic Performance CESifo Working Paper, No. 1155 Provided in Cooperation with: Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Suggested Citation: Tornell, Aaron; Westermann, Frank; Martínez, Lorenza (2004) : NAFTA and Mexico's Economic Performance, CESifo Working Paper, No. 1155, Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76631 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu NAFTA AND MEXICO’S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AARON TORNELL FRANK WESTERMANN LORENZA MARTÍNEZ CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1155 CATEGORY 5: FISCAL POLICY, MACROECONOMICS AND GROWTH MARCH 2004 An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded • from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com • from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.de CESifo Working Paper No. 1155 NAFTA AND MEXICO’S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Abstract Mexico, a prominent liberalizer, failed to attain stellar gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the 1990s, and since 2001 its GDP and exports have stagnated. In this paper we argue that the lack of spectacular growth in Mexico cannot be blamed on either the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the other reforms that were implemented, but on the lack of further judicial and structural reform after 1995. In fact, the benefits of liberalization can be seen in the extraordinary growth of exports and foreign domestic investment (FDI). The key to the Mexican puzzle lies in Mexico’s response to crisis: a deterioration in contract enforceability and an increase in nonperforming loans. As a result, the credit crunch in Mexico has been far deeper and far more protracted than in the typical developing country. The credit crunch has hit the nontradables sector especially hard and has generated bottlenecks, which have blocked growth in the tradables sector and have contributed to the recent fall in exports. JEL classification: E20, E44, F30, F43, G15, O40, O50. Keywords: boom-bust cycles, currency mismatch, lending booms, real exchange rate, FDI, credit market imperfections and volatility. Aaron Tornell Frank Westermann Department of Economics CESifo (University of Munich & Ifo Institute) University of California, Los Angeles Poschingerstrasse 5 8283 Bunche Hall 81679 Munich 405 Hilgard Avenue Germany Los Angeles, CA 90024 [email protected] U.S.A [email protected] Lorenza Martínez Banco de Mexico Av. 5 de Mayo No. 1, segundo piso, Colonia Centro, C.P. 06059, Deleg. Cuauhtémoc, México D.F [email protected] This paper is part of “Liberalization, Growth and Financial Crises: Lessons from Mexico and the Developing World” that was prepared for the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity. We want to thank Sasha Becker, Bill Brainard, Pierre O. Gourinchas, Gordon Hanson, Graciela Kaminski, Tim Kehoe, Aart Kraay, Anne Krueger, Norman Loayza, George Perry, Romain Ranciere, Luis Serven, Sergio Schmuckler, Carolyn Sissoko and Alejandro Werner for helpful discussions. For providing data we thank Josúe Campos, Jaime de la Llata, Gerardo Leyva, Arturo López at INEGI, and Alfonso Guerra and Jessica Serrano at Banco de México. Miguel Díaz, Pedro J. Martínez, Paulina Oliva and Roberto Romero provided excellent research assistance. 1. Introduction The Mexican experience is often considered a prime example of what can go wrong with liberalization. Mexico liberalized its trade and finance and entered the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), yet despite these reforms and the advantage of proximity to the United States, Mexico’s growth performance has been unremarkable in comparison with that of its peers. Moreover, during the last two years exports and GDP have stopped growing. Why has Mexico’s aggregate growth performance failed to meet expectations? Why has there been an export slowdown? Where can we see the effects of liberalization and entry into NAFTA? Some have argued that countries like Mexico could have grown faster had they not liberalized trade and finance so fast, and had they received more FDI and less capital in the form of risky bank flows; in this way, Mexico could have avoided the lending boom and the Tequila crisis. We do not agree. That liberalization is bad for growth because it leads to crises is the wrong lesson to draw from the Mexican experience. We have shown in a recent paper that in countries with severe credit market imperfections, liberalization leads to more rapid growth, but also to financial fragility and occasional crises.1 Mexico is thus no exception in experiencing a boom and a bust. Something else must be at work. To find out what that is, we compare Mexico’s experience to an international empirical norm. We argue that Mexico’s less-than-stellar growth is not due to liberalization or to the lending boom and crisis it engendered, and that, in all likelihood, GDP growth would have been slower without liberalization and NAFTA. In fact, in the wake of the crisis, exports experienced extraordinary growth and GDP growth recovered quite quickly. Instead, we argue that a lack of structural reform and Mexico’s credit crunch, which was deeper and more protracted than that of the typical MIC, are important factors behind Mexico’s unremarkable growth performance and the recent slowdown in exports. The data indicate that a key ingredient in any successful explanation of the Mexican experience should account for the sharp ups and downs of the nontradables (N) sector relative to the tradables (T) sector. Furthermore, to account for the effects of trade and financial liberalization, models are needed that focus on the sources of financing at the firm level. As we noted previously, the fastest growing countries of the developing world tend to experience booms and busts. Although Mexico’s growth, relative to its initial GDP, has been decent, when we control for bumpiness Mexico is an underperformer. Even in the period since 1 Tornell, Westerman, and Martinez (2004). liberalization, the Mexican economy has grown 2 percentage points less per year than the average for other countries with comparably risky paths. When we compare Mexico’s boom-bust cycle with that of the typical MIC, we find that Mexico’s boom phase and subsequent crisis are typical; it is Mexico’s response to the crisis that is the outlier. Relative to the typical MIC, Mexico’s credit crunch was both more severe and more protracted. The credit-to-GDP ratio in Mexico fell from 49 percent in 1994 to 17 percent in 2002. This severe credit crunch is in contrast to the fast recovery of GDP growth in the wake of the Tequila crisis of 1994-95. The fast recovery of GDP growth masks a sharp sectoral asymmetry between an impressive increase in exports and a lagging N-sector. The N-to-T output ratio fell about five times as much in Mexico as in the average country in the aftermath of crisis. Micro-level data reveal that the prolonged postcrisis credit crunch mainly affected the N-sector, whereas the T-sector received a large share of foreign direct investment (FDI) and was insulated from the credit crunch because it could access international financial markets and shift away from domestic bank credit. Over the past eight years, tight domestic credit has limited investment and growth in the financially constrained N-sector, with the result that it is the T-sector, in large part, that has enjoyed the beneficial effects of liberalization and NAFTA. Mexico’s persistent credit crunch is puzzling. It cannot be explained by a fall in loanable funds: deposits have grown in parallel with GDP, and a large share of the banking system (88 percent by 2001) has been sold to foreigners. What accounts, then, for the credit crunch? Evidence suggests that the fall in credit has been associated both with a sharp deterioration in contract enforceability and with the policy response to the problem of nonperforming bank loans. Since 2001 Mexican exports and GDP have stopped growing. The empirical evidence indicates that the U.S. recession can account for part of this slowdown, but not all of it. We show that some internal factors--fire sales and the bottleneck effect--can help account for this residual. Access to international financial markets combined with a real depreciation allowed the T-sector to buy N-sector inputs at fire-sale prices and thus to grow rapidly in the wake of the crisis. However, this rosy scenario could not go on forever. Lack of credit and of structural reform depressed N- sector investment, and the resulting decline in N-sector output generated bottlenecks that eventually blocked T-sector growth. In fact, sectoral evidence shows that the subsectors where exports have declined the most are those that use N-sector inputs most intensively. Given the lackluster performance of the N-sector, this suggests that bottlenecks are contributing to the slowdown.
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