Dr. Debjani Ghosal, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Surendranath College (Study Materials) Indo-Pak Relations

Since their independence as new nations in 1947, India and Pakistan have followed a path of mutual animosity. Pakistan was created as a national homeland for the Muslim-majority areas of the subcontinent, while India proposed to become a secular nation that included about 85 percent

Hindus, but also more than ten percent Muslims as well as large numbers of Sikhs, Christians and members of other religions. Soon after the partition of the sub-continent into the two nations, about

17 million people fled their homes and journeyed to either Pakistan or India. In one of the largest exchanges of populations in history, violence soon broke out with Muslims on one side and Sikhs and Hindus on the other. The resulting blood shed in the Punjab and West Bengal regions left more than one million people dead in its wake.

In the midst of this refugee movement and open violence, the governments of India and Pakistan hastily tried to divide the assets of British India between the two new countries. From weapons and money, down to paper clips and archaeological treasures, all had to be divided.The British had left behind, besides about half of the subcontinent that it directly governed, some 562 independent or

"princely" states. The provision was that each state could remain independent, join Pakistan or accede to India. A violent competition soon resulted as the two new nations sought to win to their own nations the largest and most strategically located states, such as Hyderabad and Kashmir.

Because Kashmir was more than 70% Muslim, Pakistan insisted that a vote be taken in the state.

However, India argued, since the Maharaja of Kashmir was Hindu, he had right to take the state into

India. Even as independence was being celebrated, India and Pakistan began a covert war in Kashmir and the struggle for that state still goes on today.

In 1947, 1965 and 1971 India and Pakistan fought wars that did not change the status of Kashmir, but did result in the 1971 further partition of West and East Pakistan into the two nations of Pakistan and . Dr. Debjani Ghosal, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Surendranath College (Study Materials) Not only did the architects of Indian foreign policy fear Pakistan, but in 1962, after 's sudden invasion of northeast India, they suddenly realized the ancient protection of the Himalayan

Mountains had vanished. India now would have to build sufficient military power to protect itself from both Pakistan and China, the largest country in the world and a major military power armed with nuclear weapons. Soon after the China war of 1962, Indian scientists began developing its nuclear capability. Under Indira Gandhi's Prime Ministership in 1974, India successfully exploded a nuclear device, announcing to the world its scientific capacity to develop nuclear bombs. Because of the strong world opinion against nuclear testing, India did not undertake additional nuclear testing until May, 1998. However, this fourteen-year moratorium on nuclear testing did not mean

Indian scientists and political leaders were not planning to join the nuclear club.

Although Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reversed his mother's policy of nuclear development, when a new prime minister Narasimha Rao assumed power in 1991, India resumed its plans for nuclear development and in December, 1995, Rao was ready to authorize a nuclear test--only to be discovered by CIA spy satellite and discouraged by President Clinton from going forward with the tests. With the election of the Hindu Nationalist, Bharata Janata Party in 1998, Prime Minister Atal

Vajpayee ordered Indian scientists to proceed with plans for testing as soon as possible. This lead to the series of detonations in May, and the subsequent quick response by Pakistan. India detonates five nuclear devices at Pokhran. Pakistan responds by detonating six nuclear devices of its own in the Chaghai Hills. The tests result in international sanctions being placed on both countries. In the same year, both countries carry out tests of long-range missiles.

In 1999, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee meets with Nawaz Sharif, his Pakistani counterpart, in Lahore. The two sign the Lahore Declaration, the first major agreement between the two countries since the 1972 Simla Accord. Both countries reaffirm their commitment to the Simla

Accord, and agree to undertake a number of 'Confidence Building Measures' (CBMs). Some of the diplomatic gains are eroded, however, after the Kargil conflict breaks out in May 1999. Pakistani Dr. Debjani Ghosal, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Surendranath College (Study Materials) forces and Kashmiri fighters occupy strategic positions on the Indian side of the LoC, prompting an

Indian counter-offensive in which they are pushed back to the other side of the original LoC. Kargil is the first armed conflict between the two neighbours since they officially conducted nuclear weapons tests.In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani chief of army staff, leads a military coup, deposing Nawaz Sharif, the then prime minister, and installing himself as the head of the government.

Since 2000 there were recurrent attacks and counter attacks from both sides. Among them the attack on Srinagar Assembly and Indian Parliament attack made the bilateral relations worse. In

2003 after Musharraf calls for a ceasefire along the LoC during a UN General Assembly meeting in

September, the two countries reach an agreement to cool tensions and cease hostilities across the de facto border.Vajpayee and Musharraf hold direct talks at the 12th SAARC summit in Islamabad in January, 2004 and the two countries' foreign secretaries meet later in the year. This year marks the beginning of the Composite Dialogue Process, in which bilateral meetings are held between officials at various levels of government (including foreign ministers, foreign secretaries, military officers, border security officials, anti-narcotics officials and nuclear experts). In November, on the eve of a visit to Indian-administered Kashmir, the new Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, announces that India will be reducing its deployment of troops there. In 2004, India redeploys 5,000 troops from Jammu and Kashmir, citing an "improvement" in the situation there, but the two countries are unable to reach an agreement on withdrawing forces from the Siachen glacier. In

September of this year President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh agree to put into place an

India-Pakistan institutional anti-terrorism mechanism.

The two countries tried to improve their economic relations in the following years. In 2008

India joins a framework agreement between Turkmenistan, and Pakistan on a $7.6bn gas pipeline project. A series of Kashmir-specific CBMs are also agreed to (including the approval of a triple-entry permit facility). In September, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Indian Dr. Debjani Ghosal, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Surendranath College (Study Materials) Prime Minister Singh formally announced the opening of several trade routes between the two countries. In October, cross-LoC trade commences, though it is limited to 21 items and can take place on only two days a week.

However, the Mumbai attack again had worsened the bilateral relations. The follwing years were significant in determining Indo-Pak relations.

2009 - The Pakistani government admitted that the Mumbai attacks may have been partly planned on Pakistani soil, while vigorously denying allegations that the plotters were sanctioned or aided by

Pakistan's intelligence agencies. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani and Indian Prime

Minister Singh met on the sidelines of a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Sharm elSheikh,

Egypt, issuing a joint statement charting future talks. Singh rules out, however, the resumption of the Composite Dialogue Process at the present time. The Indian government continued to take a stern line with Pakistan, however, with its coalition government saying that it is up to Pakistan to take the first step towards the resumption of substantive talks by cracking down on activist groups on its soil. In August, India gives Pakistan a new dossier of evidence regarding the Mumbai attacks, asking it to prosecute Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the head of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, an Islamic charity with ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba.

2010 - In January, Pakistani and Indian forces exchanged fire across the LoC in Kashmir, the latestin a string of such incidents that have led to rising tension in the area. In February, India and Pakistan's foreign secretaries met in New for talks. This meeting is followed by the two countries' foreign ministers meeting in Islamabad in July.

2012 - In November, India executes Pakistani national Kasab, the lone survivor of a fighter squad

that killed 166 people in a rampage through the financial capital Mumbai in 2008, hanging

him just days before the fourth anniversary of the attack.

2013 - In January, India and Pakistan trade accusations of violating the ceasefire in Kashmir, with Dr. Debjani Ghosal, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Surendranath College (Study Materials) Islamabad accusing Indian troops of a cross-border raid that killed a soldier and India charging that

Pakistani shelling destroyed a home on its side. 2013 - In September, the prime ministers of India and Pakistan met in New York on the sidelines

of the UN General Assembly. Both the leaders agree to end tension between armies of both

sides in the disputed Kashmir.

The Modi Era :

2014 - On May 27, Indian Prime Minister held talks with Pakistan's Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif in New Delhi. Both sides expressed willingness to begin a new era of bilateral relations.

During his first term, Modi sought to improve ties with Pakistan by inviting then-Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif to his 2014 swearing-in ceremony and visited Lahore for an unplanned visit on

Christmas day 2015. But following the January 2016 Pathankot attack, his administration cancelled planned talks with Pakistan by linking dialogue to action from Islamabad against militants believed by New Delhi to be responsible for the attack. The bilateral relationship experienced another strain after India conducted “surgical strikes” inside Pakistan-administered Kashmir in response to an insurgent attack on its military installation in Uri.

Indo-Pak Relations under Modi 2.0

In a historic win, Narendra Modi has won another term in office as prime minister of India while his party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has won an even larger majority than it held before—a first for an Indian political party since 1984. The question of how Modi will approach the India-Pakistan bilateral relationship in his second term has become the talk of the town not only among analysts in India and Pakistan but also international watchers of South Asian politics. This piece lays out possible scenarios for the future of the India-Pakistan bilateral relationship in Modi’s second term and argues that improving ties between the two nuclear-armed neighbors is necessary to resolve historical discord at a time when their hostile relationship is serving as a stumbling block in Dr. Debjani Ghosal, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Surendranath College (Study Materials) harnessing the benefits of an economically-integrated South Asia and when international terror groups are threatening to destabilize the region. In February 2019, tensions escalated when India launched airstrikes in Pakistani territory against alleged terrorist camps which New Delhi claimed were behind the attack on an Indian paramilitary convoy in Pulwama earlier that month. Pakistan retaliated by launching airstrikes in Indian-administered Kashmir, which was followed by an air battle in which an pilot, Abhinandan Varthaman, was captured by Pakistan.

After several days of uncertainty and hostility, tensions finally eased when Pakistan returned

Varthman to India in a goodwill gesture. The post-Pulwama acrimony was reflected in the campaigning for India’s Lok Sabha election earlier this year. Like previous election campaigns, this one too was rife with direct and indirect anti-Pakistan rhetoric, with Modi going as far as to declare that India is not afraid of Pakistan’s nuclear threats anymore and suggesting that India’s nuclear weapons are not just for show.

However, post-election, prospects for engagement look promising. The foreign ministers of both countries met informally during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Council of

Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Kazakhstan in May. Additionally, after the Indian election results were announced recently, Prime Minister Imran Khan telephoned Modi and congratulated him while expressing the desire to improve the bilateral relationship. Modi was receptive, and reiterated his earlier suggestion of working together to fight poverty, develop further cooperation, and enable an environment devoid of violence and terrorism. Additionally, Indian officials have recently been quoted by Indian media outlets as acknowledging that Pakistan is taking meaningful action against anti-India insurgent outfits, which indicates that an opening for dialogue may soon occur.

Fork in the Road

The next 12 to 18 months will be crucial for the India-Pakistan relationship because, as recent history is testament, any new Indian government usually undertakes positive gestures in addressing the

Kashmir dispute, which is the main bone of contention between India and Pakistan, during the first Dr. Debjani Ghosal, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Surendranath College (Study Materials) few months of its tenure. Given the mutual hostility between the two countries, one of three possible scenarios is likely to direct the future nature of their bilateral relationship. First, one possibility is that the status quo will remain intact with no serious engagement between the two countries during Modi’s second term and violence remaining restricted to the Line of Control (LoC).

However, this scenario seems unlikely after the series of moves described earlier, such as the telephone call between Khan and Modi, that suggest a thaw in ties. Second, relations between the two countries could further deteriorate. The likelihood of such a scenario will be greater should the

Modi administration continue to adopt policies viewed as attempts to isolate Pakistan. Past examples of these include India’s non-engagement with Pakistan either at the bilateral or multilateral level since the National Security Adviser-level talks in December

2017, withdrawing the most-favored-nation status India had granted Pakistan, boycotting the

SAARC summit in Pakistan in 2016, and linking sports activities with the political nature of the relationship.The third scenario is that the bilateral relationship could improve to a certain extent.

This could take many potential forms, including Pakistan taking action against anti-India insurgent outfits, the ending of proxy warfare and cross-LoC insurgent activities, both countries accommodating each other’s strategic interests in Afghanistan, and India joining the China-Pakistan

Economic Corridor. The possibility of such a scenario will largely depend on how serious the

Pakistani and Indian governments are in improving bilateral relations. Additionally, the role of third parties like the United States and China will also factor into the materialization of these possibilities.

Pakistan’s crackdown on anti-India outfits could serve as a starting point for the resumption of the composite or comprehensive dialogue, which has been suspended since 2013, and potentially, movement towards peace. Unlike previous crackdowns, the Imran Khan government has taken significant action against banned outfits–local media reports suggest that for the first time in more than three decades, the offices of Kashmiri insurgent organizations operating in

Pakistanadministered Kashmir have reportedly been sealed and prominent leaders of proscribed Dr. Debjani Ghosal, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Surendranath College (Study Materials) outfits have been arrested and their properties, including seminaries and mosques, seized. Such steps have resulted in forcing the leadership of some of these outfits to go underground, and

JaisheMuhammad (JeM) has reportedly asked its cadres to prepare for “migration” and “a new struggle.” These actions suggest that Pakistan is serious about tackling proscribed outfits and this could convince India to give talks a chance.

The challenge for both Modi and Khan will be to ensure that cooperation does not occur at the cost of their strategic interests. For Modi, that means developing a Pakistan policy that satisfies his right-wing Hindutva-centric base while also engaging in talks with Islamabad. Similarly, for Khan, the principal challenge will be to maintain Pakistan’s long-standing position on the Kashmir dispute while also cracking down on anti-India militant outfits operating within Pakistan. There are several ways in which both Modi and Khan can improve the bilateral relationship without appearing weak to their respective publics. First, flare ups on the LoC should be avoided. Pakistan claimed that India committed 1,140 ceasefire violations in 2017 while India claimed that Pakistan was responsible for

881 ceasefire violations the same year. Such incidents have resulted in significant human losses, both military and civilian, on both sides of the border. But, according to research conducted by

Indian political scientist Happymon Jacob, ceasefire violations are not necessarily directed by the top political or military leadership–they are quite often driven by “local military factors,” such as construction of new bunkers, “tests by firing” whenever new officers assume command, etc. Thus, these incidents do not serve a strategic purpose and can sometimes even trigger crises between the two countries. Avoiding them by adopting proposals such as regular communication and meetings between local commanders, coordinated patrolling, and others outlined by various experts would improve the LoC situation, serving as a major confidencebuilding measure to transform the political nature of the relationship. Secondly, improvements by both India and Pakistan to the human security situation in Kashmir would go a long way towards demonstrating to the local populace that both sides genuinely intend to address their apprehensions. This could be accomplished by New Dr. Debjani Ghosal, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Surendranath College (Study Materials) Delhi adopting a less militaristic approach in Indianadministered Kashmir, avoiding human rights violations by Indian security forces, and engaging with all the relevant stakeholders in Kashmir, including the Hurriyat. While Pakistan too could address grievances in Pakistan-administered

Kashmir identified by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights such as clampdown on freedom of speech and wrongful arrest.

Finally, intelligence-sharing between India and Pakistan regarding the movement of members associated with international terrorist groups like the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda in the Indian

Subcontinent (AQIS) and anti-India militant groups operating in Pakistan could simultaneously increase transparency and trust between the two countries. Lastly, informal meetings between

Indian and Pakistani political leadership should become the norm such that they could lead towards a structured dialogue process in the future. In realizing the above-mentioned proposals, Islamabad and Delhi would likely face several major barriers, including pressure from their armed forces, especially regarding an intelligence-sharing framework. The prevalence of negative perceptions of the other in both countries also means that domestic pressure from their respective publics will factor in.

However, India and Pakistan must consider that with international terror groups like IS and

AQIS making inroads into South Asia, it is in both their interests to improve their bilateral relationship. If the Indo–Pak relationship remains broken, the security of the whole region remains at risk. Additionally, the discord between the two countries is preventing them from harnessing their fullest economic potential–their bilateral trade potential is estimated to be $37 billion.

Consequently, the mutual economic benefits will also result in enhancing intra-regional trade in

South Asia, which remains one of the least economically integrated regions of the world. Sources:

1) https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/three-scenarios-for-india-pakistan-

relationsundermodi-2-0/

2) https://asiasociety.org/education/india-pakistan-relations-50-year-history Dr. Debjani Ghosal, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Surendranath College (Study Materials) 3) https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgottenconflict/2011/06/20 11

615113058224115.html

Students are requested to refer this article for making answers for India-Pakistan

Relations. Those who are preparing answer in Bengali, follow these article too for information and refer Pranab Kumar Dalal’s Book on International Relations. For any further query you are free to get them clarified from me).