Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique French Journal of British Studies

XXIV-4 | 2019 Mutations politiques et économiques du Royaume- Uni, entre perspective britannique et angle écossais Numéro en hommage à Jacques Leruez Political and Economic Change in the UK: British and Scottish Perspectives

Edwige Camp-Pietrain (dir.)

Édition électronique URL : http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/4752 DOI : 10.4000/rfcb.4752 ISSN : 2429-4373

Éditeur CRECIB - Centre de recherche et d'études en civilisation britannique

Référence électronique Edwige Camp-Pietrain (dir.), Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXIV-4 | 2019, « Mutations politiques et économiques du Royaume-Uni, entre perspective britannique et angle écossais » [En ligne], mis en ligne le 18 novembre 2019, consulté le 05 mai 2020. URL : http:// journals.openedition.org/rfcb/4752 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.4752

Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 5 mai 2020.

Revue française de civilisation britannique est mis à disposition selon les termes de la licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modifcation 4.0 International. 1

SOMMAIRE

Avant-propos Edwige Camp-Pietrain

Pour saluer Jacques Leruez Gérard Hocmard

Hommage à Jacques Leruez Jean-Didier Hache

Bibliographie de Jacques Leruez Edwige Camp-Pietrain

Margaret Thatcher, un tournant

Margaret Thatcher et les marchés financiers : le paradoxe de la déréglementation Marie-Claude Esposito

From the “Thatcherisation of Europe” to Brexit Nicholas Sowels

Margaret Thatcher in Spitting Image Yves Golder

La Dévolution du pouvoir, source d'innovations

The Scottish First Ministers from 1999 to 2014: Role, Power and Leadership Gilles Leydier

Twenty Years of Devolution in Scotland: the End of a British Party System? Fiona Simpkins

Devolution, the Independence Referendum and Votes at 16 in Scotland: Holyrood, a Pioneer in Democracy Leading the Way for Westminster? Sarah Pickard

L'Écosse et l'Union

Mise à jour de la fiche signalétique de l’Écosse Jean Berton

Can the Anglo-Scottish Union Survive Brexit? Michael Keating

L'Économie d'une Écosse indépendante, de la rente pétrolière au Brexit Edwige Camp-Pietrain

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Réformes et conservatismes

Non, non, non ! Le Combat tory d’Enoch Powell contre les réformes de la Chambre des Lords en 1958 et 1969 Stéphane Porion

From Exclusion to Inclusion: the Glasgow Magdalene Institution, an Instrument of Social Control in the Nineteenth Century Christian Auer

Comptes-rendus

Compte rendu de l’ouvrage L’Éveil du dragon gallois de Stéphanie Bory Moya Jones

Review of British Broadcasting and the Public-Private Dichotomy by Simon Dawes Lucie de Carvalho

Compte-rendu de Portraits of Violence : War and the Aesthetics of Disfigurement de Suzannah Biernoff Sophie Sibson

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Avant-propos Foreword

Edwige Camp-Pietrain

1 Né en 1931, Jacques Leruez fit des études supérieures d'anglais, de droit et de science politique. Il enseigna l'anglais en collège et en lycée avant d'entrer au CNRS en 1968. Sur le plan de la recherche, il s'intéressa aux questions économiques (avec, à l'origine, une thèse sur la planification), puis au système politique du Royaume-Uni. Il publia de nombreux travaux sur les années Thatcher et sur les politiques étrangères du Royaume-Uni. Il sut par ailleurs faire connaître au public français la question de l'Écosse. Ce sujet, quelque peu marginal dans les années quatre-vingt, devint un thème à part entière de la civilisation britannique. En effet, la dévolution du pouvoir, longtemps discutée dans ses moindres détails, connut une traduction concrète à partir de 1999. De plus, loin d'endiguer la progression du SNP, parti indépendantiste, elle lui fournit un cadre pour convoquer un référendum d'autodétermination.

2 Jacques Leruez devint une référence dans ses domaines de prédilection. Outre ses articles et ouvrages (dont il faut souligner les mises à jour), il contribuait régulièrement à commentaires de l'actualité pour la Documentation française ou l'encyclopédie Universalis. C'est d'ailleurs en tant qu'étudiante que je découvris son ouvrage intitulé L'Écosse, une nation sans État peu après sa première parution. Cette lecture, rapidement complétée, suscita une passion pour les questions institutionnelles et politiques écossaises. C'est ainsi que j'eus l'occasion de travailler avec Jacques Leruez, dans un cadre universitaire ou bien au sein de l'association franco-écossaise qu'il présidait. Toujours dynamique, enthousiaste, passionné par les questions politiques et économiques, il resta actif bien au-delà de sa retraite, prise en 1997, jusqu'à son décès en 2018.

3 Membre du CRECIB depuis sa création, Jacques Leruez avait publié de nombreux articles dans la Revue française de civilisation britannique et avait appartenu à son comité de direction. Ce numéro spécial propose une thématique relativement large, afin de rendre hommage à la diversité de ses centres d'intérêts, autour de quelques grandes mutations du Royaume-Uni en général, et en Écosse en particulier. Nombre d'auteurs

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ne manquent pas de se référer au Brexit, rupture historique dont les répercussions sont attendues dans la plupart des champs de l'action publique.

4 Trois auteurs abordent des mutations dues aux gouvernements de Margaret Thatcher. Après avoir présenté le contexte des années soixante-dix, Marie-Claude Esposito évoque la déréglementation financière qui s'est accompagnée d'un durcissement de la réglementation bancaire. Nicholas Sowell analyse l'influence du Premier ministre britannique sur une étape clé de la construction européenne, le marché unique, mais aussi la prise de distance qui s'en est suivie, jusqu'au référendum de 2016 sur la maintien dans l'UE. Yves Golder s'intéresse à la caricature de la Dame de fer dans Spitting Image, en soulignant que les critiques ainsi véhiculées ont pu renforcer sa stature politique.

5 Trois articles sont consacrés aux mutations engendrées par la dévolution du pouvoir. Gilles Leydier centre son analyse sur les First ministers écossais (travaillistes puis SNP), leurs pouvoirs, leurs décisions, leur relations avec les gouvernements britanniques successifs. Fiona Simpkins s'intéresse plus largement à l'impact de la dévolution sur le système britannique de partis avec la montée en puissance du SNP et les divergences internes aux partis britanniques. Sarah Pickard analyse la décision, prise par le Parlement écossais, d'abaisser la majorité électorale lors du référendum d'autodétermination de 2014, ses effets en Écosse sur le court et le moyen terme et sa portée dans le débat britannique.

6 Trois articles abordent les relations entre Écosse et Angleterre, à travers leurs mutations, au moment où le Brexit semble fragiliser l'Union. Jean Berton a une approche historique et linguistique permettant d'apprécier les pressions anglaises et les résistances écossaises. Michael Keating traite des conséquences politiques et institutionnelles du Brexit, en particulier les risques de re-centralisation, de désintégration, voire de reconfiguration de l'Union. Edwige Camp-Pietrain analyse l'évolution du programme économique du SNP depuis le référendum de 2014, afin de pallier les faiblesses apparues pendant la campagne, mais dans un cadre désormais dominé par les incertitudes inhérentes au Brexit.

7 Ce numéro se termine par deux articles traitant de lois singulières, posant la question des conservatismes tentant d'empêcher les réformes ou de contrôler leurs effets. Stéphane Porion détaille l'opposition virulente d'Enoch Powell à l'égard de la réforme de la Chambre des Lords dans la deuxième moitié du XXe siècle, un positionnement qui puise ses racines dans la pensée tory, de Burke à Disraeli. Christian Auer consacre un article à la Magdalen Institution de Glasgow, qu'il décrit comme un moyen de contrôle social des prostituées dans l'Écosse du XIXe siècle, pleinement intégrée au Royaume- Uni.

8 Ce numéro a été mis en forme avec le logiciel Lodel par Arnaud Page, Anne Cousson, Shirley Doulière et John Mullen.

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AUTEUR

EDWIGE CAMP-PIETRAIN Université Polytechnique des Hauts-de-France (Valenciennes)

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Pour saluer Jacques Leruez In Homage to Jacques Leruez

Gérard Hocmard

1 C’est avec émotion que j’ai reçu cette invitation à rédiger un hommage à Jacques Leruez, dont j’ai partagé l’amitié pendant quarante ans.

2 Je l’ai connu par l’intermédiaire de Marie-Danièle, ma collègue à Paris III dans les années 1970. Jacques avait déjà à ce moment-là opéré le virage professionnel qui l’avait amené à quitter sa carrière de professeur certifié d’anglais pour reprendre des études, à la Faculté de Droit de Caen d’abord, puis à Paris à la Fondation nationale des Sciences politiques et à la Faculté de Droit. Il en était sorti avec un DEA, passant ainsi, comme l’a si joliment dit le Professeur Laidlaw dans l’hommage qu’il lui a rendu au nom de la Franco-Scottish Society, « d’angliciste à politologue, ou plutôt à politologue angliciste ». Détaché depuis quelques années au CNRS, il venait, lorsque j’ai fait sa connaissance, d’être inscrit sur la liste d’aptitude à la maîtrise et allait bientôt être nommé maître de recherches.

3 La sympathie mutuelle entretenue par des rencontres en Val de Loire orléanais chez une amie commune et par des centres d’intérêt partagés, en l’espèce les institutions et la vie politique britanniques, ont fait qu’à partir de ce moment-là nous avons eu des contacts fréquents en dépit de parcours très divergents. C’est ainsi que nous avons tous deux fait partie du petit noyau de happy few qui, autour de Monica Charlot, a fondé le CRECIB. Jacques a poursuivi une brillante carrière universitaire qui l’a amené à faire partie du Conseil de Laboratoire du CERI, puis représentant des chercheurs du CERI au Conseil scientifique de l’IEP de Paris avant de siéger au Comité national du CNRS, indépendamment de cours dispensés dans plusieurs universités parisiennes et de nombreuses directions de thèses. J’avais pour ma part choisi de continuer à enseigner en classes préparatoires. Nous nous retrouvions au sein du Conseil de Direction de l’Association France Grande-Bretagne, dont nous faisions partie tous deux, et aux séances de l’Association franco-écossaise, qu’il ne présidait pas encore mais dont il était déjà un des animateurs.

4 Jacques avait à son actif une liste de publications impressionnante, qu’il s’agisse de livres ou d’articles. Son Royaume-Uni au XXe siècle, ses analyses du thatchérisme comme

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Thatcher, la Dame de fer ou Le Phénomène Thatcher, celles encore qu’il avait consacrées à l’Écosse : L’Écosse, une nation sans État ou, après la dévolution, L’Écosse, vieille nation, jeune État, avaient fait de lui un des analystes étrangers les plus écoutés en matière de vie politique britannique. Il avait à ce titre été demandé comme visiting professor par nombre d’universités du monde anglophone, invité comme intervenant dans de nombreux colloques internationaux, très sollicité par les radios hexagonales pour commenter les événements d’outre-Manche. La Reine en personne l’avait décoré, à titre honoraire, du titre de Commandeur de l’Ordre de l’Empire britannique.

5 Indépendamment des marches et randonnées qu’il effectuait avec zèle au sein d’un groupe portant le nom pittoresque de « Les Étapes savantes » ou de son jardin de La Cadière d’Azur qu’il cultivait avec amour, la passion de Jacques était l’Écosse. Il l’avait découverte en tant qu’assistant de français dans les années cinquante et y avait rencontré sa future épouse, Marie-Danièle. Devenu président de l’Association franco- écossaise en 1997, il avait voué une grande partie de son énergie au développement, par l’intermédiaire de celle-ci, des relations d’amitié entre les deux pays de la « Vieille Alliance », organisant des programmes de conférences variés et attrayants, instituant le rite d’échanges annuels avec la Franco-Scottish Society et créant, avec l’aide de la Fondation catholique écossaise, un prix afin de récompenser chaque année le meilleur mémoire de recherche sur l’Écosse, dans le but de développer dans le monde universitaire l’intérêt pour celle-ci.

6 Plus que sa propre maladie, la mort de Marie-Danièle l’avait profondément affecté. Il n’était plus le même ensuite, dans les quelques mois qui ont précédé son propre décès, attentif cependant jusqu’au bout aux événements et soucieux du bon fonctionnement de l’Association franco-écossaise. Outre le chagrin qu’elle cause à ses proches et ses nombreux amis, français, écossais ou anglais, la disparition de Jacques Leruez crée un grand vide intellectuel à un moment où la situation confuse créée outre-Manche par le résultat du référendum sur le Brexit exigerait des commentateurs la profonde connaissance du monde britannique et la perspicacité qui étaient les siennes. Anglicistes, anglophiles, anglotropes, nous sommes tous en deuil et nous associons à celui de toute la famille aimante qui l’entourait.

AUTEUR

GÉRARD HOCMARD Professeur de Première supérieure honoraire

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Hommage à Jacques Leruez Farewell to Jacques Leruez

Jean-Didier Hache

1 Le géographe André Siegfried, citant Michelet, se plaisait à dire à ses élèves : « L’Angleterre est une île, maintenant vous en savez autant que moi … ». Mais ceci était avant Jacques Leruez. Non seulement ce dernier nous a-t-il permis, à travers une riche collection de publications majeures sur les institutions et la vie politique britanniques, d’en comprendre les mystères – et ce au-delà d’un simple effet de l’insularité -, mais surtout nous a-t-il rappelé que le Royaume-Uni ne se limitait pas à la seule Angleterre…chose que de trop nombreux Français ignoraient, et ignorent hélas parfois encore ! À l’heure où le Royaume-Uni poursuit une navigation aussi tumultueuse qu’incertaine dans les méandres du Brexit (navigation dont, à l’heure ou ces lignes sont écrites, on ne saurait prédire l’issue), c’est à cet aspect son œuvre qu’il nous faut tout particulièrement songer. Car la question du « Brexit » est, à plusieurs titres, hantée par la nature des rapports au sein des diverses entités qui composent les îles britanniques, domaine auquel Leruez avait consacré une majeure partie de ses travaux. Fantôme le plus évident, celui du rétablissement d’une frontière physique entre l’Irlande du Nord et la République d’Irlande, laquelle violerait les termes du « Good Friday agreement » et pourrait raviver les troubles d’Ulster. Situation paradoxale d’ailleurs, qui a vu la survie du gouvernement de Mme May – et le blocage subséquent de l’accord sur le Brexit - tenir à l’appui d’une petite formation unioniste particulièrement intransigeante à tout compromis ; ce alors que l’électorat de l’Irlande du Nord a, dans sa majorité, voté en faveur du « remain » ! Nul doute que l’amusement de Collins, Griffth ou De Valera serait grand s’ils pouvaient voir la partition de l’Irlande, contre laquelle ils s’étaient battus les armes à la main dans les années 1920, mettre l’ancienne puissance coloniale dans une situation aussi inextricable près d’un siècle plus tard… Autre fantôme irlandais, plus lointain encore, que celui des récents efforts de la Chambre des Communes pour s’emparer du gouvernail des négociations du Brexit, en remettant en cause la préséance de l’Exécutif dans la fixation de l’ordre du jour

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parlementaire. Rappelons en effet que cette préséance remonte aux mesures mises en œuvre dans les années 1880 pour contrecarrer les techniques « d’obstruction parlementaire » déployées par Parnell afin de soulever la question irlandaise. Parnell, lui aussi, rirait probablement beaucoup de voir le Speaker de la Chambre, John Bercow, contraint de remettre en question cette « tradition parlementaire » qui fut créée à son encontre il y a près de 140 ans. Fantôme écossais, enfin, avec une Écosse qui ayant voté aux deux tiers pour rester dans l’Union Européenne, se voit entraînée contre son gré dans le « Brexit ». Paradoxe là encore, puisque c’est la perspective d’une sortie automatique de l’Écosse de l’UE en cas de majorité de « oui » lors du référendum sur l’indépendance de 2014, qui avait été l’une des menaces majeures brandie par les partisans du « non ». Or, c’est précisément la victoire du statu quo lors dudit referendum qui va obliger les Écossais à sortir de l’UE avec l’ensemble du Royaume-Uni. Et c’est aussi, en partie du moins, la crainte de devoir céder demain à la demande d’un second référendum sur l’indépendance écossaise qui expliquait la réticence de Mme May, comme celle du Leader de l’opposition M. Jeremy Corbyn, à proposer un second référendum sur la question du «Brexit » . Jacques Leruez l’avait bien compris : on ne saurait apprécier pleinement la politique britannique sans prendre en compte l’histoire complexe des rapports entre l’Angleterre et ses nations voisines. Lors de la montée du nationalisme écossais, et des divers référendums qui s’en suivirent, Jacques Leruez et moi avions passé de longues (parfois trop longues !) heures au téléphone pour discuter de la situation écossaise. Nul doute que les aventures du Brexit eussent à nouveau mis les réseaux téléphoniques en péril. Hélas, le téléphone ne sonnera plus…

AUTEUR

JEAN-DIDIER HACHE Retraité, partage sa vie entre la France et l'Écosse

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Bibliographie de Jacques Leruez Bibliography of Work by Jacques Leruez

Edwige Camp-Pietrain

NOTE DE L'AUTEUR

Cette bibliographie a été préparée avec le concours d'Elisabeth Chaigneau Leruez. Elle ne peut toutefois prétendre à l'exhaustivité, en particulier en ce qui concerne les publications diverses. En outre, Jacques Leruez était régulièrement invité à participer à des émissions de radio, par exemple sur France Culture (Les enjeux internationaux, 27 juin 2007, 4 février 2009, 30 janvier 2013) ou RFI (15 septembre 2014, 28 mai 2015, 28 décembre 2015, 21 avril 2016).

Ouvrages

1 Planification et politique en Grande-Bretagne 1945-1971, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1972, 314 p., ouvrage rédigé à partir de la thèse L'Idée de planification économique en Grande- Bretagne. Développements politiques et institutionnels, Paris, Université Panthéon-Assas, 1971, 650 p.

2 Economic Planning and Politics 1945-1974, Londres, Martin Robertson, 1975, 324 p., traduction de Planification et politique en Grande-Bretagne 1945-1971.

3 Le Royaume-Uni, trente ans de difficultés, Paris, Hatier, 1979, 80 p. ; réédition 1982.

4 (avec Sergeant Jean-Claude et Toboul William) Les partis politiques britanniques : du bipartisme au multipartisme ?, Paris, PUF, 1982, 256 p.

5 L'Écosse, une nation sans État, Lille, Presses universitaires de Lille, 1983.

6 Le Phénomène Thatcher, Bruxelles, éditions Complexe, 1991, 336 p.

7 Gouvernement et politique en Grande-Bretagne, Presses FNSP et Dalloz, 1989, 423 p.

8 Le Système politique britannique depuis 1945, Paris, Armand Colin, 1994 ; deuxième édition 2001, 331 p.

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9 (avec Morère Pierre) L'Écosse contemporaine. Politique, société, économie, culture, Paris, Ophrys-Ploton, 1995.

10 L'Écosse, Vieille nation, Jeune État, Crozon, éditions Armeline, 2000, 344 p. ; édition mise à jour de L'Écosse, une nation sans État.

11 Thatcher, la dame de fer, Bruxelles, Versaille, 2012, 242 p. ; édition mise à jour de Le Phénomène Thatcher.

Directions de périodiques et d'ouvrages

12 Le Thatchérisme. Doctrine et Action, Paris, La Documentation française, Notes et études documentaires, octobre 1984, 143 p.

13 (avec de la Serre Françoise et Wallace Helen) Les Politiques étrangères de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne depuis 1945. L'inévitable ajustement, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1990, 295 p.

14 (avec de la Serre Françoise et Wallace Helen) French and British Foreign Policies in Transition. The Challenges of Adjustment, New York, Oxford, Munich, Berg Publishers, 1990.

15 La Grande-Bretagne à la fin du XXe siècle. L'héritage du thatchérisme , Paris, La Documentation française, Notes et études documentaires, n°4997, 1994, 161 p.

16 (avec Civardi Christian) « L'Écosse contemporaine : politique, société, culture », Revue française de civilisation britannique, vol. IX, n°2, 1997.

17 Londres et le monde. Stratèges et stratégies britanniques, Paris, Autrement, 2005, 147 p.

Chapitres d'ouvrages

18 (avec Surel Jeannine) La Grande-Bretagne tome 3. Les temps difficiles 1914-1977, François Bedarrida (dir.), collection d'histoire contemporaine, Paris, Hatier université, 1978.

19 « Macroeconomic Planning in Mixed Economies : the French and British Experience », in Hayward J. et Narkeiwicz C. (dir.), Planning in Europe, Londres, Croom Helm, 1978, p. 26-52.

20 « Planning in an Overloaded Economy », in Rose Richard (dir.), Challenge to Governance : Studies in Overloaded Polities, Londres, Sage, 1980, p. 53-71.

21 « Les Méandres de Londres », in Béja Jean-Philippe (dir.), Hong-Kong 1997, fin de siècle, fin d'un monde ?, Bruxelles, éditions Complexe, 1993, p. 47-60.

22 « Le Chef de l'État dans le débat républicain en Australie : du Gouverneur-Général au Président de la République », in Pons Xavier et Smit Corinne (dir.), Le Débat républicain en Australie, Paris, Ellipses, 1997, p. 60-75.

23 « Le Dirigisme de guerre et ses conséquences : naissance d'un État semi- corporatiste ? », in Frison Danièle (dir.), La Société anglaise en guerre septembre 1939-août 1945, Paris, Ellipses, 1998, p. 54-63.

24 « Britain, France and Economic Planning in the 1960s – the Commissariat au Plan, Role Model or Counter Model ? », in Chassaigne Philippe (dir.), Anglo-French relations 1898-1998 : from Fashoda to Jospin, Londres, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

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25 « D'un Référendum à l'autre. L'expérience écossaise », in Leydier Gilles (dir.), La Dévolution des pouvoirs à l'Écosse et au pays de Galles 1966-1999, Paris, Ellipses, 2006, p. 15-30.

Articles dans des revues scientifiques

26 « Le Conflit israélo-arabe et l'action des puissances : la Politique de la Grande- Bretagne », Revue française de science politique, vol. 19, n°2, avril 1969, p. 429-443.

27 « Guerres civiles et conflits transnationaux : Irlande du Nord : intégration ou sécession ? », Revue française de science politique, vol. 21, n°4, août 1971, p. 836-858.

28 « Y-a-t-il une issue en Irlande du Nord ? », Revue de Défense Nationale, novembre 1972, p. 1668-1686.

29 « Actualité du problème ethnique en Grande-Bretagne », Revue française de science politique, vol. 23, n°5, octobre 1973, p. 1080-1090.

30 « Le Malaise politique en Grande-Bretagne », Études, n°9, août-septembre 1974, p. 291-296.

31 « Syndicalisme et politique : les syndicats britanniques face au gouvernement conservateur 1970-1974 », Revue française de science politique, vol. 25, n°5, octobre 1975, p. 919-945.

32 « La Crise nord-irlandaise », Revue française de science politique, vol. 26, n°3, juin 1976, p. 535-567.

33 « Où en est la Grande-Bretagne ? De la crise économique aux incertitudes politiques », Défense nationale, 33e année, février 1977, p. 41-55.

34 « Partis politiques et élections dans l'Écosse d'aujourd'hui», Revue française de science politique, vol. 28, n°3, juin 1978, p. 508-536.

35 « La dévolution écossaise », Études, juillet 1978, p. 43-58.

36 (avec Charlot Monica et Brennan Paul) « Élections en Grande-Bretagne », Projet, juillet- août 1979, p. 863-880.

37 « Régionalisme et politique au Royaume-Uni. Les Scrutins du 1er mars et du 3 mai 1979 en Écosse et l'échec de la dévolution », Revue française de science politique, vol. 29, n°6, décembre 1979, p. 1064-1089.

38 « Le Cabinet-fantôme : l'opposition institutionnalisée en Grande-Bretagne », Pouvoirs, n°12, février 1980, p. 165-178.

39 « Dévolution et politique au Royaume-Uni : l'État central et les nationalismes écossais et gallois », Revue française de civilisation britannique, vol. II, n°3, janvier 1984, p. 63-82.

40 « La Grande-Bretagne après les élections de juin 1983 », Études, n°1, janvier 1984, p. 5-18.

41 « L'Enjeu de la Défense : l'“élection nucléaire” n'aura pas lieu », Revue française de civilisation britannique, 1984, p. 57-76.

42 « La Politique économique dans la vie politique : la planification économique centrale 1962-1970 », Revue française de civilisation britannique, vol. III, n°1, décembre 1984, p. 25-42.

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43 « À propos des élections de 1983 : renouvellement des études électorales en Grande- Bretagne », Revue française de science politique, vol. 36, n°4, août 1986, p. 546-558.

44 (avec Burgi Noëlle) « La Grève des mineurs britanniques (mars 1984-mars 1985) », Revue française de science politique, vol. 36, n°5, octobre 1986, p. 646-671 .

45 « Le “thatchérisme” à l'épreuve du pouvoir : “incrémentalisme” et “radicalisme”, Pouvoirs, n°37, avril 1986, p. 31-44.

46 « Le Référendum du 5 juin 1975 », Revue française de civilisation britannique, vol. IV, n°2, février 1987, p. 59-81.

47 « Le Scrutin du 11 juin 1987 en Grande-Bretagne. Lumières et ombres d'une réélection “triomphale” », Commentaire, n°39, automne 1987, p. 471-481.

48 « La Division politique nord-sud et la crise économique », Revue française de civilisation britannique, vol. IV, n°3, novembre 1987, p. 7-25.

49 « Public/privé en Grande-Bretagne : à la recherche d'une frontière mouvante », Politiques et management public, vol. 6, n°1, mars 1988, p. 61-79.

50 « La “Relation spéciale” américano-britannique sous Ronald Reagan et Margaret Thatcher », Revue française de science politique, vol. 39, n°4, août 1989, p. 563-583.

51 « Fin de partie en Grande-Bretagne. Bilan de l'ère thatchérienne », Études, 374, n°2, février 1991, p. 159-170.

52 « Le Parti national écossais et l'Europe », Annales de l'université de Savoie, tome 14, 1991, p. 3-14.

53 « Bilan des privatisations sous les gouvernements Thatcher », Revue française de civilisation britannique, vol. VI, n°4, février 1992, p. 29-41.

54 « L'Écosse, l'État britannique et les élections générales du 9 avril 1992 : contribution à une réflexion sur les nations sans État d'Europe occidentale », Pouvoirs, n°63, novembre 1992, p. 129-144.

55 « L'Élection du 9 avril 1992 en Écosse », Revue française de civilisation britannique, vol. VII, n°1, décembre 1992, p. 119-134.

56 « L'Hégémonie Tory. Les élections du 9 avril 1992 au Royaume-Uni : aboutissement heureux d'une “alternance douce” », Commentaire, n°59, automne 1992, p. 629-638.

57 « Lettres de Grande-Bretagne : le Royaume-Uni depuis les élections d'avril 1992 – le chemin de croix de John Major », Pouvoirs, n°70, 1994, p. 163-172.

58 « Fin du règne conservateur au Royaume-Uni : les élections générales du 1er mai 1997 », Pouvoirs, n°83, novembre 1997, p. 165-175.

59 « Le nouveau Parlement écossais et les élections du 6 mai 1999 », Pouvoirs, n°90, 1999, p. 153-164.

60 « L'Actualité de Beveridge. À propos de la réédition de la grande biographie de William Beveridge », Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, n°1, 1999.

61 « L'Écosse vers l'autonomie politique », Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, n°65, janvier- mars 2000, p. 109-123.

62 « La “Relation Spéciale” sous Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) », Revue française de civilisation britannique, vol. XII, n°1, décembre 2002, p. 101-112.

63 « Lettres d'Édimbourg. Heurs et malheurs de la dévolution : les élections parlementaires du 1er mai 2003 en Écosse », Pouvoirs, n°107, 2003, p. 145-159.

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64 « La Démocratie britannique à l'épreuve de la guerre d'Irak », Pouvoirs, n°110, 2004, p. 171-190.

65 « De Tony Blair à Gordon Brown. La passation des pouvoirs au 10 Downing Street », Pouvoirs, n°125, 2008, p. 123-134.

66 « D'un hung Parliament à un gouvernement de coalition. L'élection britannique du 6 mai 2010 et ses suites », Pouvoirs, n°4, 2010.

67 « Lettres de Londres. Margaret Thatcher, un gouvernement fort dans un système souple et adaptable », Pouvoirs, n°4, 2013.

68 « Lettres d'Édimbourg. Le Référendum du 18 septembre 2014 en Écosse : l'échec d'un long processus », Pouvoirs, n°152, 2015, p. 145-160.

69 « Lettres de Londres. Les Élections britanniques du 7 mai 2015 : la victoire de David Cameron n'est-elle qu'un mirage ? », Pouvoirs, n°155, 2015, p. 173-188.

70 « La Pratique référendaire en Écosse avant 2014 », Revue française de civilisation britannique, vol. XX, n°2, 2015, http://rfcb.revues.org/1976, consulté le 23 juillet 2015.

Divers

Encyclopédie Universalis

71 « Royaume-Uni : vie et institutions politiques », p. 708-720.

72 « Grande-Bretagne : l'année des deux élections », Universalia, 1975, p. 293-296.

73 (avec Burgi Noëlle) « Grande-Bretagne : le conflit des charbonnages », Universalia, 1986, p. 260-263.

74 « Où va le thatchérisme ? », Universalia, 1987, p. 281-284.

75 « Grande-Bretagne. Où en sont les privatisations ? », Universalia, 1990, p. 262-265.

76 « Grande-Bretagne : le départ de Mme Thatcher », Universalia, 1991, p. 282-284.

77 « Grande-Bretagne. La Division Nord-Sud : historique et réalités contemporaines », Universalia, 1992, p. 274-277.

78 « Grande-Bretagne. Une élection pour rien ? », Universalia, 1993, p. 244-246.

79 « Grande-Bretagne. Vers un nouveau Labour », Universalia, 1995.

80 « Grande-Bretagne. De John Major à Tony Blair. Les élections générales du 1er mai 1997», Universalia, 1998.

81 « Grande-Bretagne. Tony Blair. Mauvaise passe ou réel déclin ?», Universalia, 2006, p. 229-232.

82 http://www.universalis-edu.com/encyclopedie/tony-blair

83 http://www.universalis-edu.com/encyclopedie/james-callaghan

84 http://www.universalis-edu.com/encyclopedie/edward-heath

85 http://www.universalis-edu.com/encyclopedie/john-major

86 http://www.universalis-edu.com/encyclopedie/royaume-uni-la-societe-britannique- contemporaine/

87 http://www.universalis-edu.com/encyclopedie/royaume-uni-le-systeme-politique

88 http://www.universalis-edu.com/encyclopedie/diane-spencer

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La Documentation française

89 (avec de la Serre Françoise) « Le Référendum européen en Grande-Bretagne : 5 juin 1975 », Problèmes politiques et sociaux, n°265, Paris, La Documentation française, août 1975, 44 p.

90 « Le Royaume-Uni. L'année Thatcher », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, n°4565, Paris, La Documentation française, avril 1980, p. 13-33.

91 « Le Royaume-Uni en 1980 », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, n° 4621, Paris, La Documentation française, mai 1981, p. 13-29.

92 « Le Royaume-Uni en 1981 », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, n° 4661, Paris, La Documentation française, mars 1982, p. 15-41.

93 « 1982 au Royaume-Uni : l'année des Falkland », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, n° 4723, Paris, La Documentation française, juin 1983, p. 13-48.

94 « Le Royaume-Uni en 1983 », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, n° 4760, Paris, La Documentation française, 1984, p. 13-42.

95 « Le Thatchérisme. Doctrine et Action », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, n°4765, Paris, la documentation française, 1984, 144 p.

96 « Le Royaume-Uni en 1984 », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, n° 4783, Paris, La Documentation française, 1985, p. 13-40.

97 « Le Royaume-Uni au début de 1986, le gouvernement Thatcher devant la montée des périls », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, n°4813, Paris, la documentation française, septembre 1986, p. 13-36.

98 « Le Royaume-Uni en 1987 : troisième mandat pour Mme Thatcher », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, Paris, La Documentation française, septembre 1988, p. 15-42.

99 « Le Royaume-Uni en 1988 : la deuxième vague radicale », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, Paris, La Documentation française, septembre 1989, p. 15-34.

100 « Le Royaume-Uni en 1989 : Mme Thatcher face à une crise de confiance », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, Paris, La Documentation française, septembre 1990, p. 15-36.

101 « Le Royaume-Uni en 1990 », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, Paris, La Documentation française, septembre 1991, p. 17-39.

102 « Le Royaume-Uni en 1991. Une succession délicate », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, Paris, La Documentation française, septembre 1992, p. 15-39.

103 « Le Royaume-Uni en 1992. Une année “exécrable” ? », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, Paris, La Documentation française, 1993, p. 19-40.

104 « Le Royaume-Uni en 1998 : un “état de grâce” persistant », Les Pays d'Europe occidentale. Notes et études documentaires, Paris, La Documentation française, 1999.

105 « Les Institutions Politiques de la Grande-Bretagne. Documents réunis et commentés », Documents d'études. Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques, 1.03, Paris, La Documentation française, 1989, 1994, 40 p.; « Les Institutions Politiques du Royaume- Uni », 1999, 51 p.

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106 « Le Système politique britannique : que reste-t-il du modèle de Westminster ? », Questions internationales, n°66, Paris, La Documentation française, juillet-août 2006.

107 « L'Écosse à l'heure du choix », Questions internationales, n°66, Paris, La Documentation française, mars-avril 2014.

Autres

108 « Programmes et difficultés du gouvernement travailliste. M. Wilson se heurte aux faiblesses structurelles de l'économie », Le Monde Diplomatique, avril 1974.

109 (avec de la Serre Françoise) « Le Référendum européen en Grande-Bretagne : victoire des modérés et clivage au sein des partis », Le Monde Diplomatique, juillet 1975.

110 (avec Charlot Monica) « Deux tests pour la régionalisation au Royaume-Uni : en Écosse, une réponse à la normande. Au pays de Galles, un non “franc et massif”, Le Monde diplomatique, avril 1979.

111 « Royaume-Uni : jusqu'où aller trop loin ? », Le Figaro, 25-26 septembre 1982, p. 13-14.

112 « Un Exemple de nationalisme : le parti national écossais SNP », Revue Historique Bretonne, n° 10, janvier 1985, p. 10-16.

113 Margaret Thatcher et l'Écosse, Paris, Association franco-écossaise, hors-série, avril 1993.

114 (avec Dickson George) L'Écosse contemporaine, Actes du colloque franco-écossais tenu au Sénat le 18 septembre 1996 à l'occasion du centenaire de l'association franco-écossaise, Paris, 1998, 59 p.

115 Auld Alliances, New Alliances : Scotland, Europe and France Toward the Next Century, Édimbourg, Franco-Scottish Society of Scotland.

116 (sous la direction de), Où va l'Écosse après 13 ans de dévolution ?, Actes du colloque de l'association franco-écossaise, Paris, association franco-écossaise, 2012, 50 p.

117 « Royaume-Uni : enjeux », in Généreux Jacques (dir.), Enjeux du Monde, Paris, Hachette, 1988, p. 241-249.

118 « Grande-Bretagne. Difficultés à l'intérieur, immobilisme à l'extérieur », L'Année internationale, 1990-1991, Paris, Hachette, 1990, p. 36-38.

119 Le Royaume-Uni après les élections de mai 1997 ; Changement de gouvernement ou changement de régime, Paris, Études du CERI, n°38, janvier 1998, 45 p.

Recensions

120 « Parkin Frank, Radicalism, the Socialist Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament ; Blackburn Robin, Cockburn Alexander (dir.). The Incompatibles. Trade Union Militancy and the Consensus », Revue française de science politique, vol. 19, n°3, 1969, p. 708-711.

121 « Fort Paul, The Politics of Harold Wilson », Revue française de science politique, vol. 19, n°6, 1969, p. 1260-1262.

122 « Hirschman Albert Otto, Exit, Voice and Loyalty Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States », Revue française de science politique, vol. 22, n°4, 1972, p. 914-916.

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123 « Barnett Correlli, The Collapse of British Power », Revue française de science politique, vol. 23, n°4, 1973, p. 873-876.

124 « Raymond Vernon, Les entreprises multinationales. La souveraineté nationale en péril ; Hugh Stephen, The Coming Clash. The Impact of the National Corporation on the Nation State », Revue française de science politique, vol. 24, n°1, 1974, p. 127-129.

125 « Fitzgerald Garret, Towards New Ireland ; O'Brien Conor, States of Ireland », Revue française de science politique, vol. 24, n°1, 1974, p. 129-132.

126 « Heclo Hugh, Wildarsky Aaron, The Private Government of Public Money : Community and Policy Inside British Politics », Revue française de science politique, vol. 25, n°2, 1975, p. 342-345.

127 « Bedarida François, La société anglaise 1851-1975 », Revue française de science politique, vol. 26, n°6, 1976, p. 1158-1160.

128 « Stewart Michael, The Jekyll and Hyde Years. Politics and Economic Policy since 1964 », Revue française de science politique, vol. 28, n°1, 1978, p. 148-149.

129 « Chester Norman, The Nationalisation of British Industry 1945-1951 », Revue française de science politique, vol. 28, n°5, 1978, p. 925-927.

130 « Butler David, Kitzinger Uwe, The 1975 Referendum ; Goodhart Philip, Full-Hearted Consent. The Story of the Referendum Campaign and the Campaign for the Referendum ; King Anthony, Britain Says Yes. The 1975 Referendum on the Common Market », Revue française de science politique, vol. 28, n°6, 1978, p. 1121-1122.

131 « Butler D., Ranney Austin (dir.), Referendums. A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory », Revue française de science politique, vol. 29, n°3, p. 511-513.

132 « Middlemas Keith, Politics in Industrial Society : the Experience of the British System since 1911 ; Alt James, The Politics of Economic Decline. Economic Management and Behaviour in Britain since 1964 », Revue française de science politique, vol. 30, n°6, 1980, p. 1313-1315.

133 « Charlot Monica, Élections de crise en Grande-Bretagne », Revue française de science politique, vol. 30, n°1, 1980, p. 148-149.

134 « Williams Raymond, Politicians and Letters, Interviews with New Left Review; Wright AW, GDH Cole and Social Democracy », Revue française de science politique, vol. 31, n°1, 1981, p. 268-270.

135 « Williams Philip, Hugh Gaitskell. A Political Biography », Revue française de science politique, vol. 31, n°3, 1981, p. 593-595.

136 « Ravier Jean-Pierre, Les Syndicats britanniques sous les gouvernements travaillistes », Revue française de science politique, vol. 32, n°2, 1982, p. 283-284.

137 « Les Séquelles du débat sur la dévolution en Grande-Bretagne. Notes de recherches bibliographiques », Revue française de science politique, vol. 32, n° 4-5, 1982, p. 860-864.

138 « Kermode D., Devolution at Work, Case Study of the Isle of Man », Revue française de science politique, vol. 32, n°4-5, 1982, p. 865-866.

139 « Harris Kenneth, Attlee », Revue française de science politique, vol. 33, n°5, 1983, p. 888-890.

140 « Borthwisk RL., Spenge JE. (dir.), British Politics in Perspective ; Budge I., MacKay D. et al., The New British Political System. Government and Society in the 1980s ; Leys C. , Politics in Britain. An Introduction », Revue française de science politique, vol. 35, n°1, 1985, p. 119-122.

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141 « Tiryakian Edward, Rogowski Ronald (dir.), « New Nationalisms of the Developed West. Towards Explanations ; Meny Y, Wright V. (dir.), Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe ; Keating M., Jones B (dir.), Regions in the European Community », Revue française de science politique, vol. 36, n°5, 1986, p. 698-701.

142 « Hayward Jack, The State and the Market Economy. Industrial Patriotism and Economic Intervention in France », Revue française de science politique, vol. 37, n°1, 1987, p. 99-101.

143 « Jowell Jeffrey, Dawn Oliver (dir.), The Changing Constitution ; Marshall Geoffrey, Constitutional Conventions. The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability ; Journès Claude, L'État britannique ; Jones Barry, Keating Michael, Labour and the British State », Revue française de science politique vol. 37, n°6, 1987, p. 916-919.

144 « Goehlert Robert, Martin Fenton, The Parliament of Great Britain : a Bibliography ; Judge David, The Politics of Parliamentary Reform ; Norton Philip (dir.), Parliament in the 1980s ; Jones Barry J., Wilford RA. », The Committee on Welsh Affairs », Revue française de science politique, vol. 38, n°1, 1988, p. 138.

145 « Lewis J., Townsend A., The North-South Divide. Regional Change in Britain in the 1980s ; Smith D., North and South, Britain's Growing Divide ; Osmond J., The Divided Kingdom ; Johnston RJ., Pattie CJ., Allsopp JG., A Nation Dividing ? The Electoral Map of Great Britain 1979-1987 », Revue française de science politique, vol. 40, n°2, 1990, p. 276-279.

146 « Bergougnioux A., Manin B., Le Régime social-démocrate », Revue française de science politique, vol. 40, n°4, 1990, p. 623-627.

147 « Le Thatchérisme revisité », Revue française de science politique, vol. 41, n°5, 1991, p. 693-699.

148 « Tivey L., Interpretations of British Politics. The Image and the System », Revue française de science politique, vol. 41, n°6, 1991, p. 846-847.

149 « Goldring Maurice, Belfast from Loyalty to Rebellion », Vingtième Siècle, vol. 33, 1992, p. 1478.

150 « Du Déclin britannique en général et du thatchérisme en particulier. Capet Antoine, Le poids des années de guerre. Les classes dirigeantes britanniques et la réforme sociale 1931-1951 ; Farnetti Richard, Le Déclin de l'économie britannique de Victoria à Thatcher ; Poirier François, Génération Thatcher. La Culture politique de l'Angleterre », Revue française de science politique, vol. 43, n°1, 1993, p. 139-143.

151 Margaret Thatcher, Ten Downing Street, Quinzaine Littéraire, n°637, décembre 1993.

152 « Foley Michael, The Rise of the British Presidency ; Lenman Bruce, The Eclipse of Parliament. Appearance and Reality of British Politics since 1914 ; Judge David, The Parliamentary State », Revue française de science politique, vol. 44, n° 6, 1994.

153 « Crowe Sybil, Corp Edward, Our Ablest Public Servant Sir Eyre Crowe 1864-1925 », Vingtième Siècle, vol. 43, 1994, p. 150-151.

154 « Journès Claude, L'État britannique », Vingtième Siècle, vol. 48, 1995, p. 193-194.

155 « À propos de la trilogie de Keith Middlemas État et société en Grande-Bretagne depuis 1940 », Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, n°49, 1996, p. 110-121.

156 « Hamer David, Can Responsible Government Survive in Australia ? », Vingtième Siècle, vol. 55, 1997, p. 189-190.

157 « Ouvrages récents autour de la question écossaise », Revue française de civilisation britannique, vol. 9, n°2, mai 1997, p. 115-120.

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158 « Crowley John, Sans épines, la rose. Tony Blair, un modèle pour l'Europe ? », Revue française de science politique, vol.49, n°4, 1999, p. 721-723.

159 « Bédarida François, Churchill », Revue française de science politique, vol. 50, n°6, 2000, p. 996-998.

AUTEUR

EDWIGE CAMP-PIETRAIN Université Polytechnique des Hauts-de-France (Valenciennes)

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Margaret Thatcher, un tournant Margaret Thatcher: a Turning Point

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Margaret Thatcher et les marchés financiers : le paradoxe de la déréglementation Margaret Thatcher and Financial Markets: the Paradox of Deregulation

Marie-Claude Esposito

1 Quand Margaret Thatcher arriva au pouvoir en mai 1979, le Royaume-Uni était à la dérive. La dégradation de l’économie, progressive au cours des années 1960, s’était accélérée au cours de la décennie suivante : la croissance y était inférieure à celle de ses voisins européens, notamment la France et l’Allemagne, son taux annuel ne dépassant pas 1,5 % entre 1973 et 1979, si bien que sa part dans la production industrielle mondiale avait régressé de 20,5 % à 9 % entre 1955 et 1976 ; le chômage était en augmentation constante, et son taux atteignait 5,5 % de la population active, pendant que le taux d’inflation atteignait les 10,5 % en moyenne annuelle. Le Royaume-Uni était devenu l’homme malade de l’Europe. En plus de connaître un important déclassement par rapport aux autres pays membres de l’OCDE, il avait dû en 1976, pour restaurer la confiance dans la livre sterling, solliciter un prêt de 3,6 milliards de dollars auprès du Fonds Monétaire International. Enfin, l’action du gouvernement travailliste de James Callaghan s’était trouvée totalement paralysée au cours de l’hiver du mécontentement (winter of discontent 1978-1979) par la multiplication des conflits sociaux.

2 Pour le nouveau Premier ministre et son équipe, une thérapie de choc était nécessaire pour redresser l’économie britannique. La politique économique des trois mandats de Margaret Thatcher entre 1979 et 1990 s’est donc voulue en rupture totale avec les politiques macro-économiques keynésiennes mises en œuvre depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, tant par les gouvernements conservateurs que travaillistes, politiques qui n’avaient pas permis une croissance durable de l’économie mais avaient abouti à créer à la fois inflation et chômage1. Elle comporta deux grands volets. Le premier avait pour objectif la lutte contre l’inflation, l’utilisation des instruments monétaires et budgétaires, grâce à la mise en place d’une Stratégie financière à moyen terme (SFMT) devant créer un cadre macro-économique stable et non inflationniste ; le

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second visait à réduire le rôle de l’État dans l’économie et à améliorer les performances de l’offre globale, dont dépendait la croissance, ce qui impliquait d’une part de déréglementer, c’est-à-dire de supprimer tous les obstacles qui, sur les différents marchés (capital, travail, produits), empêchaient les mécanismes de marché de jouer leur rôle, et d’autre part de privatiser des pans entiers du secteur public.

3 Cet article se limitera à l’étude de la déréglementation des marchés financiers, dont la contribution en termes de production, d’emploi et d’exportations de services augmentait depuis le début des années 1970. Grâce à sa situation géographique entre Tokyo et New York, la place financière de Londres jouissait d’un avantage comparatif indéniable au moment où se mettait en place un système financier intégré et global, le développement des nouvelles technologies de l’information rendant possible le fonctionnement des marchés financiers en continu 24 heures sur 24. Toutefois, devant les scandales qui éclatèrent dans la City, le gouvernement mit en place, au cours de la même période, un système de surveillance statutaire des acteurs et des marchés financiers, si bien que l’économiste Philip Booth a pu intituler un de ses articles « Thatcher : le mythe de la déréglementation »2. Après avoir repéré les forces et les faiblesses de la City à la fin des années 1970 (partie 1), cet article présentera les principales mesures de déréglementation prises dans la sphère financière durant les deux premières mandatures de Margaret Thatcher pour provoquer l’adaptation structurelle de ce secteur, ainsi que leurs conséquences (partie 2), avant d’analyser pourquoi et comment le gouvernement en vint à élargir le champ de la réglementation financière et à durcir la réglementation bancaire (partie 3).

La City des années 1970

4 Si la City ne jouissait plus du statut de première place financière du monde à l’issue de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, New York l’ayant détrônée bien que le dollar n’eût pas encore acquis le statut de première devise internationale, force est de constater que sa partie internationale parvint peu à peu, au cours des années 1960 et 1970, à reconquérir le terrain perdu, à partir du moment où les grandes banques commerciales se mirent à utiliser le dollar et non plus le sterling pour financer leurs activités internationales3. En effet, depuis l’innovation de la Midland Bank en 1954 – une opération d’arbitrage sur taux d’intérêt pour attirer les dépôts en dollars dans la City4 (les eurodollars) qui étaient ensuite convertis en livres sterling sur le marché à terme5 −, certaines banques s’étaient mises à utiliser le dollar, lorsqu’il leur fut interdit, au moment de l’affaire de Suez de 1956, de financer des crédits en sterling pour des opérations en dehors de la zone sterling. L’ingéniosité de la Midland Bank venait de conduire les banques de la City à abandonner la livre sterling au profit du dollar, comme monnaie de transaction dans leurs activités à l’international.

5 Bien que l’utilisation des dollars par les banques de la City contournât la réglementation des changes imposée par le gouvernement, la Banque d’Angleterre (Bank of England, BoE), responsable de la surveillance des banques, laissa faire. Cette innovation, en effet, limitait les effets négatifs, temporairement du moins, provoqués par les flux entrants de dollars sur la balance britannique des paiements, dont l’équilibre, depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, n’était pas considéré, par les gouvernements successifs, comme une contrainte imposée à la politique économique mais comme un objectif en soi. Ce faisant, la BoE facilita la diffusion de l’innovation auprès des institutions

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financières qui intervenaient dans la partie internationale de la City. Très rapidement, les banques étrangères installées à Londres (surtout américaines et japonaises), dont le nombre doubla quasiment au cours des années 19606, les banques d’outre-mer (overseas banks), et les banques d’affaires britanniques (merchant banks) dominèrent ce marché off-shore des eurodollars, dont le développement n’était entravé par aucune réglementation. Alimenté par les dépôts des banques et des grandes multinationales américaines, par ceux de la Banque des Règlements internationaux (BRI), et ceux des banques centrales des pays de la Communauté Économique Européenne (CEE)7, ce marché allait redonner à la City le rôle international de tout premier plan qu’elle avait perdu à l’issue du second conflit mondial, et ce en dépit du déclin du sterling comme monnaie internationale. Puis, les deux chocs pétroliers (1973, 1978) contribuèrent à la croissance exponentielle de ce marché, les pays producteurs de pétrole souhaitant détenir leurs avoirs sous forme de dépôts bancaires, qui étaient ensuite recyclés par les banques étrangères de la City grâce à une autre innovation des années 1960 : celle des crédits syndiqués. Également appelés eurocrédits, ces prêts à moyen terme et à taux variable, financés à partir des eurodollars, étaient accordés par des consortiums bancaires, car le montant des opérations était si élevé qu’aucune banque ne pouvait, seule, en supporter le risque. Sur 17 syndicats créés entre 1964 et 1971, la City en accueillait treize, Paris trois et Bruxelles un ; trois merchant banks britanniques (Warburg, Rothschild et Hambro) étaient chefs de file des vingt premiers consortia, les banques étrangères dominant également le marché dans ce domaine8. En 1979, on dénombrait 30 syndicats à Londres9.

6 À côté de la partie internationale de la City, il existait une autre City qui était, elle, centrée sur le financement de l’économie nationale. La liste des institutions financières gravitant dans cette City s’était allongée au cours des années 1950 et 1960, et leurs activités étaient devenues plus nombreuses. Pour répondre aux nouveaux besoins des agents économiques, des sociétés de prêts immobiliers (building societies), des maisons de financement des ventes à tempérament, des sociétés de gestion de portefeuilles, des sociétés de leasing et de factoring côtoyaient désormais les banques commerciales (clearing banks), qui s’étaient mises à diversifier leurs activités, et les maisons d’escompte (discount houses) qui souscrivaient chaque semaine la totalité des nouvelles émissions de bons du Trésor.

7 L’apparition de ces nouveaux acteurs avait entraîné une reconfiguration du marché de l’escompte qui, au sortir de la guerre et jusqu’au milieu des années 1960, assurait le refinancement de l’ensemble des banques grâce au rôle des maisons d’escompte. Intermédiaires entre la Banque d’Angleterre et les autres banques, ces dernières acceptaient des prêts au jour le jour et à court terme, et prenaient des effets en pension, ce qui permettait la régulation de la liquidité pour l’ensemble du système bancaire. De nouveaux marchés en sterling, dits marchés parallèles ou marchés secondaires, avaient vu le jour à côté du marché de l’escompte : marché des prêts aux collectivités locales pour financer la reconstruction du pays après la guerre, marché des ventes à tempérament pour accompagner l’essor de la consommation de masse, marché interbancaire, et marché des certificats de dépôts. Puis, ils étaient devenus des compartiments du marché de l’escompte, grâce à l’activité des banques commerciales qui intervenaient sur tous ces marchés.

8 La City des années soixante-dix était donc bicéphale, la City internationale et la City « domestique » étant séparées par le mur invisible du contrôle des changes. La

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première, centrée sur les euromarchés, prospérait en échappant à toute réglementation. Elle regroupait les banques étrangères américaines, japonaises et européennes, qui avaient organisé le retrait de la livre sterling et travaillaient en dollar uniquement avec les agents non-résidents. Il s’ensuit que les problèmes posés par la livre sterling en tant que monnaie de réserve ne les concernaient plus. Du reste la Banque d’Angleterre et le Treasury n’y trouvaient rien à redire, car ils souhaitaient que la City redevienne un grand centre financier international 10, le Treasury appréciant de surcroît les rentrées fiscales et les créations d’emploi venant des banques étrangères11.

9 La City « domestique », en revanche, était celle des banques commerciales britanniques, des sociétés de prêts immobiliers, des compagnies d’assurance et de la Bourse de Londres (le London Stock Exchange, LSE). Toutes ces institutions, qui travaillaient en livre sterling avec les agents résidents, étaient protégées par des barrières institutionnelles, comme l’accord de cartel tripartite entre les banques commerciales, les maisons d’escompte et la BoE12, et bénéficiaient de pratiques restrictives qui limitaient la concurrence et l’entrée de nouveaux acteurs sur les différents marchés. L’autorégulation était de mise, même si, pour prévenir la dépréciation du sterling, les banques devaient respecter certains ratios imposés par la Banque d’Angleterre, et si le niveau des taux d’intérêt était décidé par le Treasury dans le cadre de la politique monétaire.

10 La City internationale et la City « domestique » allaient-elles pouvoir poursuivre leur cohabitation avec les bouleversements qu’allait connaître le système monétaire international à partir du milieu des années 1970 et l’accélération de l’intégration du marché financier mondial ?

La déréglementation financière

11 Entre 1979 et 1989, le gouvernement britannique prit pas moins de dix mesures de déréglementation des marchés financiers. Il s’attaqua d’abord au contrôle des changes, dont le démantèlement, par étape, durant les six premiers mois de la législature, allait rendre toute mesure d’encadrement du crédit inefficace, et battre en brèche le caractère restrictif de sa politique monétaire. L’analyse se limite aux mesures dont les effets se développèrent en cascade.

La suppression du contrôle des changes

12 Introduit pour une période temporaire au début de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le contrôle des changes, qui avait été prolongé par le Control Exchange Act de 1947, était toujours en vigueur quand Margaret Thatcher arriva au pouvoir en mai 1979. Bien qu’en partie responsable de la perte de compétitivité de la City au cours des deux décennies qui suivirent la guerre, il bénéficiait d’un certain consensus auprès des élites politiques et financières. Seule la BoE, chargée de sa mise en œuvre, et quelques fonctionnaires du Treasury souhaitaient vraiment sa disparition13. D’après Geoffrey Howe, premier chancelier de l’Échiquier de Margaret Thatcher qui, en novembre 1978, avait soulevé la question de son bien-fondé lors du premier débat parlementaire sur le système monétaire européen (SME), il fallut attendre une publication de février 1979 du très libéral Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) pour que la question de sa suppression soit abordée publiquement14.

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13 Question politiquement sensible, la suppression du contrôle des changes ne fut pas mentionnée dans les deux documents annonçant la stratégie économique du parti conservateur The Right Approach to the Economy15 de 1977 et le Manifeste électoral du Parti conservateur pour les élections législatives de 197916. Nigel Lawson, qui occupait à l’époque le poste de Financial Secretary17, l’évoqua toutefois durant la campagne électorale dans les colonnes du Financial Weekly qui parut le 20 avril 197918.

14 Cette mesure, qui allait avoir des conséquences très importantes pour la City et pour la mise en œuvre de la politique monétaire, avait été recommandée à Margaret Thatcher, dès le 4 mai 1979, par un ami proche (l’économiste Douglas Hague) qui, pour tenter d’enrayer l’augmentation du taux de change préjudiciable pour les entreprises britanniques, préconisait, à la différence de la BoE et du Treasury, de laisser jouer les forces du marché pour contrecarrer l’augmentation de l’excédent de la balance des capitaux19. Ce même jour, le chancelier de l’Échiquier avait reçu un courrier du Gouverneur de la BoE20, accompagné d’une note technique sur la politique de change à mener pour tenter de ralentir l’appréciation du taux de change due essentiellement à l’augmentation du prix du pétrole de la mer du Nord. Si celle-ci contribuait à lutter contre l’inflation, elle était préjudiciable aux entreprises britanniques, en conséquence de quoi, la BoE recommandait d’assouplir le contrôle des changes.

15 C’est bien la volonté de rendre l’économie plus compétitive, ce qui impliquait de libéraliser les marchés, et non pas l’idée selon laquelle la déréglementation serait bénéfique pour la place financière de Londres, qui prévalut pour décider de supprimer le contrôle des changes. C’est du moins ce que l’on peut déduire d’un courrier envoyé par le chancelier de l’Échiquier Howe à Margaret Thatcher le 11 octobre 1979, courrier qui détaillait les mesures que le Treasury comptait prendre pour « (…) poursuivre notre objectif de libéraliser l’économie »21. La BoE l’avait informé des conséquences probables de la suppression du contrôle des changes22, à savoir que les investisseurs britanniques se tournent davantage vers l’étranger, et que les entreprises britanniques aient des difficultés à trouver du capital.

16 Si Lawson penchait pour une suppression rapide du contrôle des changes, Howe était, lui, en faveur d’une suppression par étape. Quant à Margaret Thatcher, elle était hésitante et il fallut la convaincre du caractère indispensable de cette mesure23, l’afflux de capitaux, provoqué par l’appréciation du sterling en raison de son statut de pétro- devise, pesant sur la compétitivité des entreprises britanniques. En libéralisant les mouvements de capitaux, le gouvernement pouvait espérer, à court terme, que des sorties de capitaux viendraient compenser, au moins en partie, les entrées de capitaux, ce qui pousserait le taux de change à la baisse et, à plus long terme, que les sorties de capitaux, source de revenus, contribueraient à l’équilibre de la balance des paiements. Mais, comme le souligne Lawson, il était impossible de prévoir quelle serait l’ampleur des fuites de capitaux provoquée par la suppression du contrôle des changes24, et personne à la BoE ou au Treasury n’envisagea les conséquences que cette mesure allait avoir sur la politique monétaire britannique25.

17 Un premier train de mesures26 fut annoncé par le chancelier Howe dès le 12 juin 1979 au cours de la déclaration budgétaire27. Il devint désormais possible d’obtenir des devises, au cours officiel, pour effectuer des investissements à l’étranger, le montant maximal autorisé étant de 5 millions de livres par projet. De plus, l’obligation de rapatrier deux tiers des bénéfices obtenus à l’étranger fut supprimée, et les allocations personnelles accordées pour les voyages et l’achat de biens à l’étranger furent

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augmentées. Enfin, l’obligation de couvrir à 115% les investissements de portefeuille par des emprunts en devises étrangères fut supprimée, de même que le contrôle sur les importations d’or et de pièces de monnaie.

18 Le mois suivant, le 19 juillet, Howe décida, sur les recommandations de Lawson28, de libéraliser davantage les investissements de portefeuille effectués à l’intérieur de la CEE. Les résidents du Royaume-Uni obtinrent le droit d’investir dans des titres libellés dans une monnaie de la CEE ou émis par une organisation internationale, telle que la Banque mondiale.

19 Vers le 19 septembre, Lawson et des hauts fonctionnaires du Treasury recommandèrent à Howe d’en finir avec les restrictions qui subsistaient en matière de change, pendant que le conseiller économique en chef du Treasury, Fred Atkinson, le mettait en garde contre les risques encourus. Howe rappelle qu’il fut nécessaire de revenir plusieurs fois à la charge auprès du Premier ministre pour obtenir son accord, et que ce n’est qu’à l’issue d’une ultime réunion avec Howe, le gouverneur de la BoE, Nigel Lawson, Peter Carrington et John Nott que Margaret Thatcher finit par se laisser convaincre29.

20 La suppression des dernières restrictions en matière de change, à l’exception de celles concernant la Rhodésie, fut annoncée à la Chambre des Communes le 23 octobre, le Cabinet n’étant prévenu que quelques heures auparavant, ce qui mécontenta fortement le ministre de l’Environnement Michael Heseltine. Elle entraîna dans son sillage la fermeture d’un département entier de la BoE, qui comptait 750 personnes, et le redéploiement de 25 personnes au sein du Treasury30.

21 Très rapidement, les investisseurs institutionnels se mirent à accumuler des actifs à l’étranger ; mais la quasi-totalité des opérations échappait aux institutions britanniques (merchant banks et sociétés de bourse) et ne profitait qu’aux banques étrangères, c’est-à-dire à la City internationale et non à la City domestique. Si cet effet avait été largement sous-estimé par les autorités monétaires (Treasury et BoE) 31, le gouvernement allait ensuite reprendre l’argument de la Bourse de Londres et plus généralement de la City, selon lequel la suppression du contrôle des changes créerait les conditions pour que Londres consolide sa position comme centre financier international de première importance32.

La libéralisation des marchés financiers et le Big Bang

22 Ce processus avait en fait commencé dès septembre 1971 avec la mise en place de la réforme « Concurrence et contrôle du crédit » (Competition and Credit Control). Celle-ci avait autorisé les banques commerciales à intervenir sur le marché des euro-monnaies, créé les conditions d’une meilleure concurrence entre les banques et les institutions financières non bancaires, et modifié le contrôle du crédit en redonnant aux mécanismes de marché plus d’importance, c’est-à-dire en substituant aux mesures de contrôle direct une politique de taux et d’open market33. Mais deux ans après cette réforme d’inspiration très libérale, la crise bancaire de 1973-1974, qui avait débuté comme une crise de spéculation immobilière pour évoluer rapidement en une crise de spéculation sur les changes, avait contraint la BoE à surveiller les banques d’une manière un peu plus formelle. Cela l’avait conduite à créer un département chargé de la supervision bancaire, et à soumettre à nouveau l’augmentation des dépôts des banques commerciales à un contrôle quantitatif, en introduisant le système des dépôts spéciaux supplémentaires (Special Supplementary Deposits), plus connu sous le nom de corset.

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Proche du système français des réserves obligatoires, il obligeait les banques commerciales à geler auprès de la BoE un montant croissant de leurs dépôts, lorsque leur rythme d’augmentation dépassait un certain taux.

Rendre le système financier plus concurrentiel

23 Ce système discriminatoire, qui allait à l’encontre de la libéralisation des marchés, se révéla totalement inefficace après la suppression du contrôle des changes, les banques parvenant à déjouer la réglementation en faisant des dépôts dans leurs filiales à l’étranger non soumises au corset. C’est pourquoi, en juin 1980, le gouvernement décida de supprimer le corset. Puis, quatorze mois plus tard (août 1981), il prit des mesures pour renforcer la concurrence au sein du système financier, qui se traduisirent par la suppression du coefficient d’actifs liquides imposé aux seules banques, et par l’obligation pour toutes les institutions collectant des dépôts de geler auprès de la BoE un pourcentage de leurs actifs, dont le taux devait être révisé chaque trimestre. Enfin, en juillet 1982, le crédit à la consommation fut entièrement libéralisé.

24 Ces mesures entraînèrent un décloisonnement des activités des différentes catégories d’institutions, qui se livrèrent une concurrence acharnée pour gagner des parts de marché. Elles accordèrent des facilités de prêts aux ménages qui choisirent de s’endetter auprès des banques plutôt qu’auprès des sociétés de prêts immobiliers pour acheter des actifs réels. D’où une forte augmentation de l’endettement des ménages auprès du système bancaire et une forte diminution du taux d’épargne nette des ménages. Par ailleurs, les banques se mirent à offrir des produits d’épargne rémunérés par un intérêt en rapport avec celui du marché, ce qui entraîna une ré-allocation de l’épargne liquide au profit des banques et au détriment des building societies, car il était plus intéressant pour les épargnants de détenir des actifs financiers offerts par les banques. Ces mouvements de ré-allocation de portefeuille entrèrent en contradiction avec les objectifs de la politique monétaire : en faisant revenir dans le circuit bancaire des actifs qui l’avaient quitté, ils provoquaient un gonflement de la masse monétaire, au moment où le gouvernement s’efforçait de réduire son rythme de croissance.

La loi sur les sociétés de prêts immobiliers (Building Societies Act, 1986)

25 En octobre 1983, le cartel qui protégeait ces institutions s’effondra en raison de la concurrence des banques commerciales qui venaient d’investir le marché des prêts immobiliers, et de l’arrivée d’institutions spécialisées dans les prêts hypothécaires surtout américaines.

26 Pour rendre le système financier plus concurrentiel, le gouvernement fit voter le Building Societies Act, 1986, pour que ces établissements spécialisés dans le financement du logement puissent offrir à leurs clients d’autres produits financiers comme, par exemple, l’ouverture et la gestion de comptes de dépôts, l’achat et la vente de titres financiers et le courtage d’assurance. La loi donnait également aux sociétés de prêts immobiliers le droit d’abandonner leur statut mutualiste et de devenir des sociétés par actions, ce qui leur permettait d’être cotées à la Bourse de Londres et d’émettre des actions. Grâce à ces mesures de libéralisation, qui contribuaient à supprimer les frontières traditionnelles entre les différents intermédiaires financiers, le

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gouvernement espérait une diminution des coûts de l’intermédiation financière sous les effets de la concurrence. Une nouvelle autorité de régulation fut créée, la Building Societies Commission (voir infra).

La réforme du marché boursier : le Big Bang de 1986

27 En dépit de son nom, la réforme du LSE n’est pas arrivée d’un seul coup. On peut faire remonter le processus conduisant au Big Bang à la suppression du contrôle des changes, dont un des premiers effets fut d’exposer la Bourse de Londres à la concurrence internationale, alors que, jouissant d’un monopole pour les transactions sur les actions britanniques et les fonds d’État, elle était sans doute le marché financier de la City le plus protégé. « Exemple achevé du particularisme britannique »34, c’était un club très fermé dont les règles de fonctionnement remontaient à sa création en 1812. Celles-ci n’autorisaient pas les banques britanniques et les courtiers étrangers à mener une activité sur le marché boursier.

28 Lorsque les Conservateurs arrivèrent au pouvoir, le LSE faisait l’objet d’une plainte. Déposée en 1978, devant le Tribunal des pratiques restrictives, par le Bureau de la concurrence loyale (Office of Fair Trading), elle avait pour objet de savoir si deux particularités du LSE − les commissions fixes et l’interdiction faites aux non-résidents et aux banques d’intervenir sur le marché boursier − constituaient des pratiques restrictives. Le gouvernement conservateur décida, dans un premier temps, de laisser la procédure suivre son cours ; mais il revint sur cette décision, lorsqu’il apparut que le LSE allait être condamné, ce qui risquait de rendre le marché boursier très instable. Finalement, et à la suite de longues tractations35 entre le nouveau ministre du Commerce et de l’Industrie, Cecil Parkinson, et le président du LSE, Gordon Richardson, un compromis (le Goodison-Parkinson Agreement), fut trouvé : le gouvernement retirait sa plainte dès lors que le LSE acceptait de se réformer.

29 La réforme mise en place le 27 octobre 1986 supprima la capacité unique36, les commissions fixes et les barrières entre le marché des fonds d’État et les marchés d’actions et autres titres financiers ; elle ouvrit le LSE aux banques britanniques et étrangères, et le gouvernement décida de réduire le droit de timbre, pour que le marché boursier londonien puisse lutter à armes égales avec Wall Street et Tokyo. Enfin, la Bourse de Londres se dota d’un système37 permettant la cotation en continu 24 heures sur 24 de 3500 titres nationaux et internationaux, et la participation de tous les agents à la cotation ; celui-ci fut complété en février 1987 par un système de transactions électroniques : le TOPIC38. La salle du rez-de-chaussée, le floor, où s’étaient effectuées les transactions depuis l’origine, fut fermée et remplacée par une immense salle des marchés au premier étage abritant des centaines d’ordinateurs.

30 Immédiatement après le Big Bang, les banques commerciales qui avaient été écartées de la Bourse de Londres, et qui étaient maintenant concurrencées par les sociétés d’investissement immobilier, se lancèrent dans une stratégie de banque d’investissement (investment banking) ; mais, devant les pertes accumulées au début des années 1990, elles durent réduire la voilure et revenir à l’activité de banque de détail (retail banking). Pour les banques d’affaires, qui rachetèrent les maisons de courtage pour augmenter leur potentiel à l’international, le choc fut encore plus rude et, après le choc boursier de 1987, elles furent balayées par les banques d’investissement

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américaines et les grandes banques universelles européennes. Ainsi, sous les effets de la concurrence, la place financière de Londres amorçait une nouvelle mutation39.

L’évolution de la réglementation financière

31 Si la déréglementation financière cherche à améliorer l’efficience du système en introduisant davantage de concurrence, ce qui, en diminuant les coûts et en améliorant la qualité des produits, doit normalement bénéficier aux consommateurs, elle peut également conduire à des effets négatifs prenant la forme de prises de risques excessifs qui menacent la stabilité du système et sont préjudiciables aux déposants. C’est pourquoi il est nécessaire de mettre en place une réglementation prudentielle adéquate des acteurs financiers.

32 Devant l’évolution des marchés financiers de la City, le gouvernement conservateur comprit très vite que la réglementation en vigueur était inadaptée, et qu’il était nécessaire d’améliorer la surveillance des activités financières pour renforcer la protection des investisseurs. Trois lois furent votées dans la foulée du Big Bang qui modifièrent radicalement la surveillance des acteurs et des marchés financiers.

La loi sur les services financiers de 1986 (Financial Services Act, 1986)

33 Le projet de loi fut l’objet de plusieurs débats avant le vote de la loi. La nouvelle législation confia les compétences de surveillance au ministère du Commerce et de l’Industrie (DTI) qui les transféra au Securities and Investment Board (SIB), organisme de droit privé financé par des fonds privés, et dont le président était nommé conjointement par le DTI et la BoE. Elle organisa l’auto-réglementation du système financier dans un cadre légalement défini, en mettant en place la surveillance des fonctions et non plus celle des institutions financières. Le SIB fut doté de compétences très importantes, puisqu’il était responsable de l’agrément et de la surveillance des organismes d’autorégulation (Self-Regulating Organizations, SRO), des bourses (Recognized Investment Exchanges, RIE) et des organisations professionnelles (Recognized Professional Bodies, RPB), tels que les cabinets d’experts comptables, tous ces acteurs devant préparer un code de bonne conduite. Seuls la Banque d’Angleterre, les compagnies d’assurance et les organismes mutualistes échappaient au contrôle du SIB. La loi exigeait des opérateurs, après obtention de l’agrément, de signer avec chaque client un accord écrit fixant les conditions d’achat ou de vente, et de donner au client et à l’autorité de régulation une information régulière sur l’évolution de la transaction.

34 Ce système, très complexe, fut rapidement l’objet de critiques, les uns l’accusant de n’être qu’une bureaucratie inutile, et les autres de ne pas échapper à la « capture du régulateur » (regulatory capture40), situation qui avait toute chance d’aboutir à une totale inefficacité du système de surveillance. Soulignons toutefois que Lawson, dans ses mémoires, rend les professionnels du secteur en partie responsables du caractère bureaucratique de la législation, car ils ne firent pas bon usage de la longue période de consultation précédant le vote de la législation41.

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La loi sur les sociétés de prêts immobiliers (Building Societies Act, 1986)

35 Votée en 1986, ses principales dispositions n’entrèrent en vigueur que le 1er janvier 1987. Cette loi, qui avait autorisé les sociétés de prêts immobiliers à mener les mêmes activités que les banques, confia la surveillance de ces institutions, devenues les concurrentes des banques commerciales, à un nouvel organisme, la Building Societies Commission, qui se substitua au Registrar of Friendly Societies. Si les sociétés de prêts immobiliers pouvaient désormais obtenir des fonds sur les marchés de gros (wholesale markets), la loi leur imposait toutefois que 80 % de leurs avoirs proviennent de fonds de détail. Leurs actifs étaient maintenant divisés en trois catégories : les prêts hypothécaires, les créances garanties, et les créances non garanties ; mais les montants des deux dernières catégories devaient rester très faibles tant que ces institutions conservaient leur statut mutualiste.

La loi bancaire de 1987 (Banking Act, 1987)

36 En 1984, soit dix ans après la crise bancaire de 1974, la City fut secouée par une crise qui allait révéler des défaillances dans la surveillance des établissements de crédit. Celle-ci durait depuis une semaine quand, le 1er octobre, le chancelier de l’Échiquier Nigel Lawson, qui se trouvait à Washington pour les réunions annuelles du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale, en fut informé. La banque Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB) était sur le point de faire faillite et risquait d’entraîner dans son sillage la maison de courtage Johnson Matthey, spécialisée dans les transactions sur l’or, et une filiale de la Midland Bank : Samuel Montagu. Le chancelier n’eut que quelques minutes pour décider s’il devait accorder la garantie du Treasury au plan de sauvetage organisé par le BoE, ce qu’il refusa de faire tout en donnant néanmoins le feu vert à la banque centrale pour l’organisation du sauvetage par les grandes banques commerciales et plusieurs banques d’affaires42.

37 Le 17 décembre 1984, il informa le Parlement de la mise en place d’une commission chargée d’évaluer le système de surveillance des banques et de faire des recommandations. Placée sous la présidence du Gouverneur de la BoE, Robin Leigh Pemberton, elle comptait parmi ses membres une équipe du Treasury dirigée par le Secrétaire Permanent, Peter Middleton, et un représentant des banques commerciales en la personne de Deryk Vander-Weyer, qui avait été vice-président de la Barclays. Le rapport de cette commission, publié le 20 juin 1985, montra que le Département de la Banque d’Angleterre chargé de la surveillance des banques avait failli dans sa mission, et recommanda une réforme complète du système de surveillance, la loi bancaire de 1979 n’étant plus adaptée à la City telle qu’elle était devenue.

38 La loi bancaire de 1987 supprima la distinction introduite par celle de 1979 entre les banques reconnues (recognized banks), seules habilitées à utiliser le mot banque dans leur raison sociale, et les institutions autorisées à recevoir des dépôts (licensed-deposit takers), qui jouissaient de critères moins stricts quant au niveau d’actifs financiers nécessaires pour garantir leurs dépôts. Pour assurer une couverture suffisante du risque, la nouvelle loi introduisit des règles qui étaient applicables à tous les établissements de crédit. Elle imposa aux auditeurs de transmettre aux autorités de surveillance les informations paraissant nécessaires. Enfin, et malgré l’opposition de la

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Banque d’Angleterre, qui ne s’y résolut qu’après que Lawson lui eût fait comprendre que Margaret Thatcher était prête à lui retirer la surveillance des banques pour la confier à une agence indépendante43, elle créa un Comité de la surveillance bancaire (Board of Banking Supervision) présidé par le Gouverneur de la BoE, qui comptait deux tiers de membres non banquiers, et qui avait une mission de conseil auprès de la Banque centrale. Celle-ci pouvait rejeter ses conseils, mais était tenue d’en informer le chancelier de l’Échiquier. Lawson avait préféré ne pas retirer la surveillance des banques à la Banque d’Angleterre, même si cette décision aurait eu le mérite de supprimer tout conflit d’intérêt entre la politique monétaire et la surveillance bancaire. Il considérait en effet que l’autorité de la BoE dans la City découlait du fait qu’elle était chargée de la surveillance du système bancaire. Il lui paraissait important qu’elle le restât, et la nouvelle loi lui accorda même davantage de pouvoir concernant les règles prudentielles à faire respecter lors des opérations de prise de contrôle d’un établissement bancaire. La BoE pouvait désormais, au nom de la prudence, s’opposer à toute prise de contrôle d’une banque inscrite au Royaume-Uni, car la prise de participation d’une banque au capital d’une autre banque n’augmente pas la capitalisation globale du système, et par voie de conséquence n’augmente pas la protection contre le risque, même si elle renforce la position de la banque.

39 La loi de 1987 mettait en place une surveillance des activités bancaires beaucoup plus structurée, même si la BoE avait toujours l’intention d’utiliser les procédures informelles et le dialogue, et de ne recourir aux pouvoirs que lui conférait le législateur que dans les cas graves et une fois que toutes les voies informelles auraient été épuisées. C’est ce qu’on peut déduire du discours du sous-gouverneur de la BoE, Sir George Blunden, prononcé devant la Lombard Association le 8 avril 198744.

Conclusion

40 La déréglementation financière, qui rendit le système financier britannique beaucoup plus concurrentiel, mit fin à la spécialisation des acteurs britanniques, au cloisonnement des marchés, et à l’existence des « deux Cities ». Elle renforça le rôle international de la City au profit des mastodontes américains, japonais et européens, mais au détriment des acteurs britanniques. Avec la loi sur les services financiers de 1986 et la loi bancaire de 1987, la réglementation bancaire et financière au Royaume- Uni prit une forme inconnue jusque-là. La réglementation, qui toucha désormais tous les acteurs et tous les secteurs et devint extrêmement détaillée et normative, mit fin à ce qui subsistait du système d’autorégulation. Si la Banque d’Angleterre paraît avoir été très peu associée à la conception de la loi sur les services financiers, l’accord Parkinson- Goodison montre qu’elle joua un rôle non négligeable dans la déréglementation de la Bourse de Londres, et qu’elle parvint à convaincre le gouvernement, grâce à la prise de position du chancelier de l’Échiquier, qu’elle devait rester le régulateur des banques, alors que ce rôle était très menacé par le pouvoir politique.

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BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Archives

Bank of England

Sir Kenneth Couzens to Geoffrey Howe, Gordon Richardson, Nigel Lawson, Douglas Dawkins and David Walker, 17 September 1979, Bank of England Archives, Exchange Control Department, File EC5/652.

Sir Geoffrey Howe, Letter to Margaret Thatcher, 11 octobre 1979, Bank of England Archives, Exchange Control Department, File EC5/652.

Gordon Richardson, Letter to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 11 mai 1979, Bank of England Archives, File G3/355.

The National Archives (TNA)

HM Treasury, Economic Progress Report sent to Margaret Thatcher, Oct.1981, Records of the Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1979-1997. ECONOMIC POLICY. Exchange rate; exchange control policy ; inflow controls ; part 1. 4 mai 1979 – 23 octobre 1981, TNA, PREM 19/437.

Prime Minister’s Office, Correspondence and Papers, 1979-1997, Douglas Hague letter to MT ("Exchange Control"), 4 mai 1979, TNA, PREM19/437.

Références

BELLRINGER Christopher, MICHIE Ranald, « Big Bang in the City of London: an intentional revolution or an accident », Financial History Review, vol. 21, n°2, août 2014, p. 111-137.

BLUNDEN George (Sir), « Supervision and Central Banking », Speech by the Deputy Governor to the Lombard Association, 8 avril 1987, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, vol. 27, n°3, 3 août 1987, p. 380-386.

BOOTH Philip, « Thatcher: the Myth of Deregulation », IEA Discussion Paper No. 60, mai 2015,

CAPIE Forrest, The Bank of England: 1950s to 1979, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 920 p.

CASSIS Youssef, Les capitales du capital, 1780-2005, Genève, Editions Slatkine, 2006, 453 p.

CONSERVATIVE PARTY, The Right Approach to the Economy, Londres, 1977,

CONSERVATIVE PARTY, 1979 Conservative Manifesto,

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ESPOSITO Marie-Claude, La politique industrielle des gouvernements conservateurs d’Edward Heath et de Margaret Thatcher, Thèse de Doctorat d’État de l’Université de Paris Sorbonne, dirigée par le professeur André Guillaume, janvier 1990, tome 1.

ESPOSITO Marie-Claude « La déréglementation financière au Royaume-Uni : un peu d’histoire » in AZUELOS Martine (dir.), La déréglementation des économies anglo-saxonnes, Paris, PSN, 1995, p. 89-97.

ESPOSITO Marie-Claude, « L’irrésistible ascension de la place financière de Londres depuis le milieu des années 1950 », in KORINMAN Michel (dir.), L’avenir économique du monde, Économie et géopolitique. 1, Bègles, Collection Outre-Terre, 2016, p. 106-130.

HOUSE OF COMMONS, Hansard, 12 juin 1979, vol. 968, col. 235-263.

HOWE Geoffrey, Conflict of Loyalty, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1994, 736 p.

LAWSON Nigel, The View from Number 11, Londres, Bantam Press, 1992, 1152 p.

LERUEZ Jacques, Le Phénomène Thatcher, Bruxelles, éditions Complexe, 1991.

LERUEZ Jacques, Thatcher, la dame de fer, Bruxelles, éditions André Versaille, 2012.

MICHIE Ranald et WILLIAMSON Philip (dir.), The British Government and the City of London in the 20th Century, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 381 p.

MICHIE Ranald, « A Financial Phoenix : The City of London in the Twentieth Century », in CASSIS Youssef et BUISSIÈRE Éric (dir.), London and Paris as International Financial Centres in the Twentieth Century, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 15-41.

SCHENK Catherine R., « The Origins of the Eurodollar Market in London, 1953-1963 », Explorations in Economic History, vol. 35, n°2, 1998, p. 221-238.

SCHENK Catherine, « Crisis and Opportunity: The Policy Environment of International Banking in the City of London, 1958-1980 », in CASSIS Youssef et BUISSIÈRE Éric (dir.), London and Paris as International Financial Centres in the Twentieth Century, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 207-228.

ROBERTS Richard, « The Bank and the City », in ROBERTS Richard and KYNASTON David (dir.), The Bank of England: Money, Power and Influence, 1694–1994, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, 315 p.

THATCHER Margaret, The Downing Street Years, Londres, HarperCollins, 1993, 914 p.

NOTES

1. Pour plus de détails, on pourra se reporter très utilement à deux ouvrages de Jacques Leruez : Le Phénomène Thatcher, Bruxelles, éditions Complexe, 1991 ; Thatcher, la dame de fer, Bruxelles, éditions André Versaille, 2012. 2. BOOTH Philip, « Thatcher : the Myth of Deregulation », IEA Discussion Paper No. 60, mai 2015, https://iea.org.uk/publications/research/thatcher-the-myth-of-deregulation. 3. Voir également ESPOSITO Marie-Claude, « La déréglementation financière au Royaume-Uni : un peu d’histoire » in AZUELOS Martine (dir.), La déréglementation des économies anglo-saxonnes, Paris, PSN, 1995, p. 90-91, et ESPOSITO Marie-Claude, « L’irrésistible ascension de la place financière de Londres depuis le milieu des années 1950 », in KORINMAN Michel (dir.), L’avenir économique du monde, Économie et géopolitique 1, Bègles, Collection Outre-Terre, 2016, p. 108-111.

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4. Ceux-ci étaient placés à Londres par les banques américaines souhaitant bénéficier de taux plus rémunérateurs, la FED ayant imposé la réglementation Q qui plafonnait la rémunération des dépôts en dollars sur le territoire américain. 5. SCHENK Catherine R., « The Origins of the Eurodollar Market in London, 1953-1963 », Explorations in Economic History, vol. 35, n°2, 1998, p. 224-226. 6. Il passa de 82 en 1961 à 159 en 1970. Voir MICHIE Ranald, « A Financial Phoenix : The City of London in the Twentieth Century », in CASSIS Youssef et BUISSIÈRE Éric (dir.), London and Paris as International Financial Centres in the Twentieth Century, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 31. 7. Le fonctionnement du système international de Bretton Woods les contraignait à racheter les dollars du déficit américain qu’elles venaient placer sur ce marché. 8. CASSIS Youssef, Les capitales du capital, 1780-2005, Genève, Editions Slatkine, 2006, p. 312. 9. SCHENK Catherine, « Crisis and Opportunity: The Policy Environment of International Banking in the City of London, 1958-1980 », in CASSIS Youssef et BUISSIÈRE Éric (dir.), London and Paris as International Financial Centres in the Twentieth Century, op. cit., p. 212. 10. SCHENK Catherine, « Crisis and Opportunity: The Policy Environment of International Banking in the City of London, 1958-1980 », op. cit., p. 237. 11. MICHIE Ranald et WILLIAMSON Philip (dir.), The British Government and the City of London in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 44. 12. Il comprenait un accord entre les banques sur un taux minimum pour les prêts au jour le jour aux maisons d’escompte, un prix d’offre unique proposé par les maisons d’escompte à l’adjudication hebdomadaire des bons du Trésor, et l’engagement de la BoE que les maisons d’escompte puissent se refinancer selon la pratique du prêt en dernier ressort. Voir ESPOSITO Marie-Claude, La politique industrielle des gouvernements conservateurs d’Edward Heath et de Margaret Thatcher, Thèse de Doctorat d’État de l’Université de Paris Sorbonne, dirigée par le professeur André Guillaume, janvier 1990, tome 1, p. 82. 13. LAWSON Nigel, The View from Number 11, Londres, Bantam Press, 1992, p. 39. 14. HOWE Geoffrey, Conflict of Loyalty, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 141. 15. CONSERVATIVE PARTY, The Right Approach to the Economy, Londres, 1977. 16. CONSERVATIVE PARTY, 1979 Conservative Manifesto, www.conservative-party.net/manifestos/ 1979/1979-conservative-manifesto.shtml. 17. Il sera chancelier de l’Échiquier de 1983 à 1989. 18. Nigel LAWSON, The View from Number 11, op. cit., p. 38. 19. Douglas Hague’s letter to MT (“Exchange Control”), 4 mai 1979, TNA, PREM 19/437. 20. Gordon Richardson’s letter to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 11 mai 1979, Bank of England Archives, File G3/355. 21. Sir HOWE Geoffrey, Letter to Margaret Thatcher, 11 octobre 1979, Bank of England Archives, File EC5/652. 22. Voir la note du 17 septembre 1979 envoyée par Sir Kenneth Couzens à Geoffrey Howe, Gordon Richardson, Nigel Lawson, Douglas Dawkins et David Walker. Bank of England Archives, Exchange Control Department, File EC5/652. 23. D’après Howe, Margaret Thatcher a très facilement accepté la première étape du processus, mais difficilement les mesures prises à l’automne. Voir HOWE Geoffrey, Conflict of Loyalty, op. cit., p. 142. Quant à Margaret Thatcher, elle ne mentionne à aucun moment la question du contrôle des changes dans ses mémoires. Voir THATCHER Margaret, The Downing Street Years, Londres, HarperCollins, 1993. 24. Les estimations du Treasury concernant le montant des fuites de capitaux furent très en deçà de la réalité. Ex post, les flux sortants atteignirent 4 milliards de livres à partir de 1981, soit deux fois plus que les prévisions du Treasury. Voir HM Treasury, Economic Progress Report sent to Margaret Thatcher, Oct. 1981, Records of the Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and

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Papers, 1979-1997. ECONOMIC POLICY. Exchange rate; exchange control policy ; inflow controls ; part 1. 4 mai 1979 – 23 octobre 1981. TNA, PREM 19/437. 25. LAWSON Nigel, The View from Number 11, op. cit., p. 39. 26. Pour le détail des mesures, voir également ESPOSITO Marie-Claude, La politique industrielle des gouvernements conservateurs d’Edward Heath et de Margaret Thatcher, op. cit., p. 316. 27. HOUSE OF COMMONS, Hansard, 12 juin 1979, vol. 968, col. 235-263. 28. LAWSON Nigel, The View from Number 11, op. cit., p. 40. 29. HOWE Geoffrey, Conflict of Loyalty, op. cit., p. 142. 30. Ces suppressions d’emplois furent gérées grâce à des pré-retraites, au redéploiement de postes au sein de la BoE, et à l’acceptation d’emplois dans la City. Voir LAWSON Nigel, The View from Number 11, op. cit., p. 40, et CAPIE Forrest, The Bank of England : 1950s to 1979, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 770. 31. HMT, Economic Progress Report sent to Margaret Thatcher, Oct 1981, Records of the Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1979-1997, op. cit. 32. BELLRINGER Christopher et MICHIE Ranald, « Big Bang in the City of London: an intentional revolution or an accident », Financial History Review, vol. 21, n°2, août 2014, p. 122. 33. Pour plus de détails, voir ESPOSITO, M-C., La politique industrielle des gouvernements conservateurs d’Edward Heath et de Margaret Thatcher, op. cit., p. 79-85. 34. ESPOSITO Marie-Claude, « La déréglementation financière au Royaume-Uni », op. cit., p. 93. 35. Une analyse détaillée, à partir des archives disponibles, est donnée dans BELLRINGER Christopher et MICHIE Ranald, « Big Bang in the City of London: an intentional revolution or an accident ? », op. cit, p. 124-126. 36. Elle empêchait tout conflit d’intérêt entre les jobbers (les contrepartistes) et les brokers (agents de change) qui transmettaient les ordres de la clientèle aux jobbers. 37. Il s’agit du SEAQ (Stock Exchange Automated Quotation). 38. Teletext Output of Price Information by Computer. 39. Voir ESPOSITO Marie-Claude, « L’irrésistible ascension de la place financière de Londres depuis le milieu des années 1950 », op. cit., p. 114-115. 40. Cette théorie, qui découle des travaux de George Stigler, décrit une situation où une institution publique de régulation, qui se doit d’agir en faveur de la collectivité, finit par servir les intérêts privés. 41. LAWSON Nigel, op. cit., p. 401. 42. LAWSON Nigel, op. cit., p. 403-405. 43. Ibidem, p. 408. 44. Sir BLUNDEN George, « Supervision and Central Banking », Speech by the Deputy Governor to the Lombard Association, 8 avril 1987, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, vol. 27, n°3, 3 août 1987, p. 380-386.

RÉSUMÉS

La politique économique de Margaret Thatcher de 1979 à 1990 s’est voulue en rupture avec les politiques macro-économiques keynésiennes mises en œuvre depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Elle eut pour premier objectif la lutte contre l’inflation, et pour second objectif la réduction du rôle de l’État dans l’économie pour améliorer les performances de l’offre globale,

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dont dépendait la croissance, ce qui impliquait d’une part de déréglementer les marchés, et d’autre part de privatiser des pans entiers du secteur public. Cet article se limite à l’étude de la déréglementation des marchés financiers dont la contribution en termes de production, d’emploi et d’exportations de services affichait une progression régulière depuis le début des années 1970. Les forces et les faiblesses de la City à la fin des années 1970 sont présentées dans une première partie. Les principales mesures de déréglementation des marchés financiers font l’objet de la deuxième partie. La troisième partie explique pourquoi le gouvernement a élargi le champ de la réglementation financière et durci la réglementation bancaire.

Margaret Thatcher’s economic policy from 1979 to 1990 was meant to break away from the economic practices of successive post-war Keynesian governments. Fighting inflation was its first objective and reducing the government’s presence in the economy to improve its supply-side, and growth in particular, its second objective. As a result, markets were deregulated and state- owned industries were privatized. This article deals with the deregulation of financial markets whose contribution in terms of wealth, job creation and exports had been rising since the beginning of the 1970s. The strengths and weaknesses of the City of London are analysed in a first part and the deregulation of financial markets in a second part. The third section explains why the government introduced regulation into areas which had never been subject to statutory regulation, and why it broadened the scope of financial regulation and strengthened banking supervision.

INDEX

Mots-clés : Banque d’Angleterre, Big Bang, City, contrôle des changes, Securities Investment Board (SIB), Treasury Keywords : Bank of England, Big Bang, City, exchange controls, Securities Investment Board, Treasury

AUTEUR

MARIE-CLAUDE ESPOSITO Professeur émérite, Sorbonne Nouvelle, EA 2291, ICEE-Intégration et coopération dans l'espace européen

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From the “Thatcherisation of Europe” to Brexit De la « Thatchérisation de l'Europe » au Brexit

Nicholas Sowels

Introduction

1 Wondering what Margaret Thatcher would think about Brexit could be an amusing parlour game: the mystically inclined might even try to summon up her spirit with a Ouija board. But even if the Iron Lady were to communicate across the ether, the message would surely be garbled, given the complexity of Britain’s Brexit predicament. This can be traced back directly to her days in power. In re-reading Jacques Leruez’s clear and concise presentation of Thatcher’s relations to Europe in Le phénomène Thatcher, it is striking to see how many of the ingredients of Britain’s historical convulsion today emerged during her time in office.1

2 Thatcher’s own political choices and her demise sprang from her and Britain’s persistent ambiguities over Europe, which her governments compounded greatly. Work by Pauline Schnapper, for example, recalls how the UK has always been an ambivalent partner (partenaire ambivalent) in the EU for multiple institutional, constitutional and cultural reasons. These include: Protestantism; Britain’s idea of Parliamentary sovereignty; its imperial history and rivalry with other European countries; the problems Britain feels Europe has caused it, especially the wars in the 20th century; the UK’s special relationship with the United States; and Britain’s visceral attachment to free trade.2 Far from supporting European integration enshrined in the idea of “ever closer union”, Britain has almost consistently rejected the EEC/EU3 as a political project. Instead, its participation in “Europe” has been motivated by economic considerations, often coloured with memories of previous policy failures. Notably, Britain did not join the Eurozone in the late 1990s and early 2000s, partly because of the haunting memory of its ERM/EMS4 membership from 1990 to 1992, which had opened the floodgates to Eurosceptism. But New Labour’s decisions not to join the Eurozone

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also reflected genuine concerns about the incoherencies of the single currency which are still weighing on it today.5 Britain’s overall disposition to the EU has therefore exhibited a high degree of “path dependency”.6 Successive generations of politicians have fought almost every proposal of institutional integration, often using economic arguments to support their positions. Despite growing economic integration, the UK therefore did not converge with its neighbours and partners in supporting the deepening of the European project. And today, Britain is on the path to Brexit.

3 This article demonstrates how Mrs Thatcher’s years as Prime Minister intensified Britain’s ambivalence to Europe. In 1986, she supported the creation of the Single Market as a trade liberalisation project, widely referred to as the “Thatcherisation of Europe”.7 Yet two years on, her famous Bruges Speech set out Thatcher’s opposition to the growing federalism of the European Economic Community (EEC). Subsequently, in early October 1990, Thatcher finally accepted the pound’s membership of the ERM, only to lambast her European colleagues’ project for monetary union a few weeks later. Her famous “No, No, No” speech in Parliament on 30 October, just days after an acrimonious EEC summit, stridently criticised plans for monetary union, and Jacques Delors’ proposals for strengthening the EU institutions.8 It was to trigger her downfall.

4 This article begins by reviewing briefly the early ambiguities of Thatcher’s positions on Europe. It then examines the role Thatcher and her ally Lord Cockfield played in the creation of the Single Market, and how she quickly responded to the mounting integrationist ambitions of the Delors Commission. The article goes on to examine the fiasco of Britain’s ERM membership and its legacies. It then analyses how Britain shifted away from Europe’s social model under Margaret Thatcher, drawing on the “varieties of capitalism” literature, and ends by examining the inherent contradiction between the Conservatives’ drive to reduce the size of government while pursuing globalisation.

Britain’s complicated path to the Single Market project

5 The design and launching of the Single Market in the mid-1980s were arguably the high-point of Britain’s membership of the EEC/EU. With Denmark and Ireland, the UK only entered the common market in 1973, under the Conservative government of Edward Heath. Yet only two years later, the then Labour government organised a referendum on membership of the EEC, and 67% of the voters favoured remaining.9 As today, both Britain’s major parties were split on the issue, and Harold Wilson held Britain’s first referendum ever as a means to overcome divisions in the party: Jeremy Corbyn voted leave at the time.10

6 Despite the strong vote to remain in the EEC, Britain soon again signalled profound doubts about the European project by staying out of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM). This was the centre-piece of the EEC’s European Monetary System (EMS), a major Community policy launched in March 1979 to limit exchange rate fluctuations between member currencies. The UK’s reluctance to join can be partly put down to continued reticence over Europe by Labour and its new leader and Prime Minister James Callaghan.11 But as Nathalie Champroux has pointed out, advice from the Treasury was unenthusiastic, especially given that an attempt to limit exchange rate fluctuations among European countries in 1972 had been costly and had failed.12

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7 The incoming Conservative government, elected in May 1979 under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, was no more interested in EMS membership either. This followed a similar desire to limit the UK’s European engagement, and the fact that the Conservatives came to power with the clear ambition to pursue monetarism as a new macroeconomic policy, while favouring market forces instead of government intervention. Pegging the pound to other EEC currencies would have tied the government’s hands on monetary and run counter to its free-market ideology.13

8 In fact, Margaret Thatcher’s first years in office were characterised by a confrontational relationship with her European partners, as she tried to reduce Britain’s large, net budget contributions to the EEC. This imbalance was largely due to the UK paying significant tariffs on food imports from its historical (Commonwealth) suppliers, while Britain’s relatively small and efficient agricultural sector received little financial support from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).14 For Britain’s partners, Thatcher’s demands to “get [her] money back” were seen as non communautaire: penny- pinching ignoring the wider aims of the European project. This budget battle raged on until the Fontainebleau summit of 1984, when Britain was granted its budget rebate.

From the “Thatcherisation of Europe” to the Bruges Speech

9 With the budget issue settled, a more constructive chapter opened up in Britain’s relations with the EEC, with Britain being fully engaged in the development of the Single Market. Its aim was to open up fully Europe’s national economies, notably by bringing down non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade in goods and especially services. These included national public procurement policies by public sectors; idiosyncratic health and safety regulations; regulations limiting access to professions by nationals, etc. By adopting the principle of “mutual recognition”, the Single Market project made such NTBs obsolete as products deemed acceptable in one country must be recognised by all other Member States (in areas where harmonised European standards do not exist). It is this principle which today, for instance, gives financial institutions (including foreign entities) established in the UK their “passporting rights” to sell services throughout the European Union, as they are regulated by the UK authorities. On leaving the EU, such foreign and British-owned institutions will lose these rights.

10 The creation of the Single Market was based on the implementation of nearly 300 European Directives to remove impediments to cross-border business. This is a process which is still going on in some public services: for example, France is set to open up rail services to private, and potentially foreign, operators as of 2021. More generally, the Single Market project established the four freedoms of the movement of goods, services, capital and people. These freedoms lie at the heart of Britain’s Brexit predicament as the referendum in 2016 was much about controlling immigration, while having continued access to the Single Market is supported by many businesses.

11 At the time, the whole project was based on a White Paper published by the European Commission in 1985 and entitled Completing the Internal Market.15 It was drafted under the supervision of Lord Arthur Cockfield, a close Thatcher ally whom she nominated to the European Commission headed by Jacques Delors in 1984, in part to hold Delors in check.16 But things turned out rather differently. Cockfield strongly believed in opening

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up markets. He was highly effective in implementing EU legislation to bring down trade barriers, and this deregulatory/liberalisation thrust of the Single Market explains why it became known as “Thatcherisation of Europe”. For his part, Delors was happy to let Cockfield pursue his work, seeing the Single Market as a means for achieving “Economic and Monetary Union essentially leading to European Union”.17

12 Lord Cockfield’s zeal in pursuing market integration – including VAT harmonisation across the Community – ultimately however ran into resistance from Thatcher, the Treasury and the Foreign Office. Moreover, his assertion in June 1988 that Britain would eventually have to drop its opposition to a single European currency led Thatcher not to reappoint him to the Commission, as he had “go[ne] native”.18 By this stage, however, she – and arguably the UK as a whole – had been locked in on several points. First, Cockfield’s project had become a legally-binding European Treaty, rather than a mere agreement among Member States which Thatcher favoured.19 It therefore constituted a clear institutional step to closer integration. Secondly, the preamble of the Single European Act specifically brought the goal of strengthening economic and monetary union into the Treaties of the Communities. The SEA also established qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers as the basis for adopting EU Directives. This fundamental shift away from unanimity voting greatly improved EU decision-making, but it also weakened the direct power of national governments to oppose policies. Furthermore, the SEA strengthened the consultative powers of the European Parliament, and it nuanced Member States’ powers to block measures that went against important national interests (the so-called Luxembourg compromise).20

13 Overall, the SEA therefore bound the UK into the EEC and into European law far more tightly than had been the case before. Some Conservatives like the highly influential Sir Edward du Cann explicitly drew attention to the broader implications of the Act, as it went through Parliament, noting that the Act was “probably… the largest constitutional measure that the House has had to discuss since our discussions on the European Communities Act 1972”.21

14 Moreover, Jacques Delors soon made clear that the Single Market was only a stepping stone to economic and monetary union, leading to a rift between Thatcher and the Commission President in 1988. Two events in particular sparked Thatcher’s defence of national sovereignty in her Bruges Speech. The first was a speech given by Delors to the European Parliament in July 1988, setting out the importance of strengthening the Community’s social progress, and developing European government. Indeed, Delors even went so far as to assert that “[t]en years hence, 80% of our economic legislation, and perhaps even our fiscal and social legislation as well, will be of Community origin”.22 Then, in September 1988, Delors made a landmark speech at the annual conference of the Trades Union Congress, in which he underlined the importance of consolidating social and economic rights in the EEC and supporting collective bargaining at the European level.23 Delors was given a standing ovation, and the British union movement subsequently became far more pro-European.24

15 To Thatcher, these integrationist ambitions and her view that the Commission’s competencies were progressively expanding into new areas raised a fundamentally threatening question: “Were British democracy, parliamentary sovereignty, the common law, our traditional sense of fairness, our ability to run our own affairs in our own way to be subordinated to the demands of a remote European bureaucracy, resting on very different traditions?”25 A few days after Delors’ TUC appearance, she gave her iconic Bruges

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Speech, outlining Britain’s place in 2,000 years of European history and culture. She came out very much in favour of a Europe des nations, of a Europe that was not only the European Community. Moreover, in a specific rebuttal to Jacques Delors she stated emphatically that: “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels”.26 In view of Brexit, it must also be recalled that Thatcher stated: “Britain does not dream of some cosy, isolated existence on the fringes of the European Community. Our destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community”. While the Bruges Speech became in many ways the founding text of Euroscepticism, it also re-states – emphatically – Britain’s longer-term inclination of favouring closer economic links with its partners, while rejecting the institutional and political integration of the EEC/ EU.

16 The ambiguities of Mrs Thatcher’s position – and more generally the dilemma of the UK since the signing of the SEA – could not be starker. On the one hand, she and her allies welcomed the market liberalisation of the Single Market. On the other hand, they were deaf to the integrationist aspirations Jacques Delors and other European politicians and in many ways to the ambition of European project from the outset. From a political economy point of view there is also a major contradiction here. Thatcher, today’s Eurosceptics and arguably neoliberals more generally fail to acknowledge sufficiently that markets need laws and government to function. The creation of the Single Market has necessarily led to the deepening of European law to allow it to operate, and this has consolidated the primacy of EU law over national law. Moving forward to Brexit, there already is inevitably today, for example, a tug-of-war between the UK and the EU over which court(s) will have the final say over future economic relations between both parties.

Britain’s ERM debacle and the surge of Euroscepticism

17 Margaret Thatcher was also a key player in the next major episode of the emergence of British Euroscepticism. After a decade of putting off ERM membership until the “time [was] right”, she oversaw entry of the pound into the ERM during the last days of her premiership. This strategic policy decision was based on two sets of economic and political considerations. But, it turned out to be a spectacular comedy of errors in Britain’s relationship with the European Union.

18 The economic case for joining the ERM was based on the on-going imperative of fighting inflation. Since the 1970s, Britain had had a poor record on controlling inflation, and the switch to monetarism when the Conservatives came to power in 1979 did not lead to immediate improvements as it was accompanied by other policies that stoked inflation: notably the increase in VAT from 8% to 15% in June 1979, to pay for income tax cuts.27 Although inflation did subsequently come down, as high interest rates squeezed the economy and along with a surging pound caused manufacturing output to collapse and unemployment to rise to more than 3 million by 1986, price increases were never fully under control during the 1980s, and in fact began rising again at the end of the decade. This was in no small part due to the so-called “Lawson boom”, driven by house price rises (aggravated by financial market deregulation), significant tax cuts in 1988, and a lax monetary policy Nigel Lawson ended up pursuing inadvertently.28 As the monetarism of the early Thatcher years had not worked as

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predicted, the government looked for other ways to fight inflation. Eventually, Lawson turned to Europe for inspiration, following widely-held economic opinion that the anchoring of their currencies to the Deutschmark via the ERM had allowed other countries to combat inflation successfully (notably France and Italy). Accordingly, Lawson began an unofficial policy of “shadowing the mark” in early 1987. International events however undermined this strategy, as a massive stock exchange crash in October 1987 led the US and other central banks to cut interest rates, while the Deutschmark also experienced weakness in international markets. To give credibility to his policy of shadowing the mark, Lawson felt obliged to follow the mark’s depreciation, by keeping UK interest rates low.29 This unfortunately encouraged renewed inflation, and led to an increasingly fractious relationship between Thatcher and Lawson, culminating in his resignation in October 1989.30 There followed a hiatus for a year in which house prices, the economy and inflation continued to surge, fuelling further debate within the Tory leadership, business and the press about ERM membership.

19 The economic case for joining the ERM was then backed up by the dramatic changes in global politics. In November 1989 the Berlin Wall came down fairly unexpectedly, following political changes in the Soviet Union since the middle of the 1980s and massive demonstrations in East Germany during the summer that year. In quick succession, the countries of Eastern Europe went though mainly peaceful revolutions, casting out previous, Soviet-backed regimes, while Germany itself was reunited on 3 October 1990. Germany’s (West) European partners had little choice but to go along with this, though many like Thatcher and François Mitterrand had reservations about a larger, united Germany re-emerging. In exchange for their acceptance of reunification, the German government led by Helmut Kohl signed up emphatically to economic and monetary union and hence relinquishing the Deutschmark, the economic and political cornerstone of Germany’s post-War reconstruction.

20 Given these astounding shifts in Europe’s geopolitical tectonics, pressure on Thatcher to accept ERM membership – as a strategy for combating inflation and for keeping the UK at the centre of European politics – became overwhelming.31 And so, on Friday 5 October 1990, the government announced, somewhat unexpectedly, that the pound would join the ERM. Britain’s European partners were given practically no advanced warning, and there was something sleight of hand about this political manoeuvre. It was a major decision and it turned out to be fateful for Britain’s future relationship with the EU. Within weeks, Thatcher gave her famous “No. No. No.” speech which led to her unprecedented sacking by Conservative MPs.32 More fundamentally, to attract foreign capital to finance reunification and to control inflation, Germany’s central bank held interest rates high during the following years. As a result, other countries like Britain, France and Italy in particular were forced to keep their own interest rates high in order to support their currencies within the ERM, despite the significant recession the major world economies experienced in the early 1990s.33

21 In Britain, the housing market crashed, output slumped and unemployment again rose above 3 million. This second deep recession under the Tories did finally wring inflation out of the economy, abetted by a decade of anti-union legislation and major industrial disputes which much weakened the ability of Britain’s workers to fight for pay. Although the Conservatives under John Major were re-elected for a fourth time in April 1992, they found themselves under increasing political and financial market pressure

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to improve the economy. Some attempts were made to lower interest rates slightly. However, during the summer and especially from August 1992 onwards, financial markets began betting against the pound (and Italian lira) and their governments’ ability to maintain ERM parities. Events came to a head on “Black Wednesday”, 16 September, when Chancellor Norman Lamont announced the government was suspending the pound’s membership of the ERM: dramatic efforts that day to buy sterling, while hiking interest rates first to 12% and then 15% had failed to stem market selling of the pound. The Italian government made the same move two days later.

22 This was a dark moment for John Major and his colleagues. They had staked their reputations on Britain’s credible membership of the ERM and their policy had ended ignominiously. The government’s reputation never recovered, even though it managed to elaborate a new – successful – macroeconomic policy framework quite quickly. This was based on using short term interest rates to target inflation directly, and giving the Bank of England a greater, more transparent say in policy. Ultimately, these arrangements paved the way for Gordon Brown as Chancellor to introduce operational independence for the Bank of England to set interest rates, when New Labour came to power in May 1997. Yet the ERM debacle also led to Gordon Brown’s own weariness of joining the Eurozone, and when he came to office he quickly set out “five tests” to determine whether joining the Eurozone was in Britain’s economic interests. The broad nature of these tests largely precluded a simple binary choice, and it is not surprising that Brown, his special advisor Ed Balls and analysts at the Treasury concluded in the autumn of 1997 that the time was not right for Britain to adopt the euro at its launch in 1999. A far more detailed economic analysis was conducted in 2003 and again it was concluded that the time was not right. The economic caution of the Chancellor, his advisors and the Treasury held sway over the more optimistic and pro-European sentiments of Prime Minister Tony Blair.34

23 As for the Conservatives, the crashing out of the ERM, followed by Britain’s economic success in the 1990s and 2000s played a substantial role in strengthening Euroscepticism. In the words of Europhile Tory grandee Kenneth Clarke, “the ERM crisis had put a match to the dry tinder of resentment that backbench and grassroots Conservatives continued to feel about the fall of Margaret Thatcher two years earlier..... Black Wednesday had opened the Eurosceptic floodgates.”35 After they lost office in 1997, the Conservatives were led by harder, right-wing Eurosceptics: William Hague, Ian Duncan-Smith and Michael Howard, whose anti-European positions were prominent in their political positioning. As Agnès Alexandre-Collier recalls, by the time the more centrist David Cameron became leader in 2005, the party had become far more Eurosceptical.36 In terms of path dependency, the ERM episode marked an irreversible break point which set the Conservative party and UK-EU relations on a more confrontational path, and ultimately to the Brexit referendum.

Britain’s “variety of capitalism” setting it apart from Europe

24 If the sacking of Thatcher and the success of the UK economy after crashing out of the ERM – “Black” Wednesday turned “White” – were key to the rise of Euroscepticism, it is also useful to examine the structural changes of its economy which pulled Britain away from its European partners. These too can be traced back to the Thatcher years. Put

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simply, they boil down to Britain moving away from what is now often called the “European social model”, or as Delors said in his TUC speech the “uniquely European model”, including “mechanisms of social solidarity, of protection of the weakest, and of collective bargaining”.37

25 Neoliberal policies of deregulation, tax reduction and the general weakening of labour compared to capital have affected most of the world since the 1970s and 1980s, yet Britain has gone further down the path of neoliberalism than its main European partners. This has created a structural, economic divergence which underpins Brexit, coming on top of the other political, institutional and cultural considerations. This economic divergence can also be traced back to Margaret Thatcher’s leadership of the Conservative party, and today it is important to the economic visions of Conservative “Brexiteers” based on rolling back EU regulation and pursuing independent free trade agreements internationally: in the words of Nigel Lawson, for example, a leader of the 2016 Leave campaign, Brexit provides the opportunity “to make the UK the most dynamic and freest country in the whole of Europe: in a word, to finish the job that Margaret Thatcher started”.38

26 To examine Britain’s specific trajectory, I draw on key texts of the “varieties of capitalism” literature, which identified different types of capitalism in old industrialised countries, in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall. The ensuing typologies are now dated, not covering the development of China. Yet they remain relevant to examining how countries in “the West” evolved in response to the stagflation of the 1970s, and how the Conservatives set the UK on a different path to its European partners. Indeed, in today’s world, it is difficult to recall that Britain had been a pioneer of European social democracy after 1945, or that the Conservatives and then Labour tried to emulate French indicative planning in the UK during the 1960s. It is hard to remember that top income tax rates in the UK (and the United States!) were considerably higher than in France and Germany through to the end of the 1970s, and that levels of income inequality were very similar in all these countries.

27 Yet as the 1970s wore on, Mrs Thatcher and the “New Right” of Conservative thinkers turned increasingly to the monetarist and neoliberal ideas emerging from the University of Chicago, and the network of free-market think-tanks on both sides of the Atlantic. Over time, this led to Britain converging on the more free-market form of capitalism which was reasserting itself in the United States. Aspects of market deregulation had been adopted by the Democratic Presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) in areas of transport. Carter also appointed Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1979 to apply monetarism to fight inflation. But it was the Republican Presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) which really entrenched neoliberalism, notably through the implementation of its supply-side agenda. This included substantial tax cuts, further market deregulation and a confrontational stance towards America’s (public sector) unions. Progressively, the weakening of labour in the US was compounded by reforms of local public services (leading to new public management or NPM), and the relocation of industry out of the US industrial heartlands, first to so-called “right-to-work” states with weak labour regulations, and then overseas as firms sought to increase shareholder value. These developments led to what the French economist, fonctionnaire and businessman Michel Albert called the “neo-American” model, described in his book Capitalisme contre capitalisme.39 Published in 1991, it contrasts this new US model with what he called “Rhineland capitalism”

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(capitalisme rhénan). The latter entails far more financing by house-banks rather than stock markets, meaning there is less pressure to achieve short term returns. Firms are also more involved in training employees, and collective agreements establish working conditions in sectors. Companies also have more stable relationships with suppliers and clients. Finally, welfare protection in Rhineland capitalism is more developed. This model was traditionally most represented by Germany, but also by other continental European countries like Austria and the Netherlands. By contrast, the Thatcherite agenda in Britain unfolded in parallel to events in the United States, in terms of weakening labour, deregulating markets (notably financial markets), and implementing public sector reforms, based on privatisation, contracting out and the steady application of NPM.

28 This bi-polar view of capitalism was much extended in a landmark study coordinated by Peter Hall and David Soskice, entitled Varieties of Capitalism: the Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (2001).40 Based on the microeconomic observation of how companies operate in different sectors and across countries, the study concluded that there are (were) essentially two types of capitalism, made up of liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). Britain, along with the other English-speaking/“Anglo-Saxon” countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United States) was classified as LMEs in this study. At the risk of over-simplifying, this means that relations between actors in these economies (companies, employees, finance, suppliers and customers) tend to be arm’s length, market-based, contractual and less permanent. Firms resort more to financial markets than banks to obtain funding. They are less involved in training employees. Technological innovation tends to be radical rather than progressive, as employees quit their companies to create start-ups. Production networks with suppliers tend to be less stable. This all contrasts with the more stable economic relationships to be found in CMEs.

29 Finally, it is worth mentioning the pioneering typology of welfare states formulated by the Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen. Published in 1990, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, identifies three prevailing welfare state types in North America and Western Europe.41 The first, Esping-Andersen calls “liberal welfare states”, in which much “social” insurance is organised privately (notably pensions, but also health care). Public transfer payments to individuals (such as unemployment support) tend to be minimal and means-tested. By contrast, “conservative welfare states” involve more collective provision, with benefits often being income-related, so that middle class households tend to defend such systems politically. However, these systems tend(ed) to be socially conservative because historically they were based on the “male breadwinner” family model. Significantly, such systems do not strive for top-down income redistribution. Instead they are based on horizontal solidarity within professions, as social security contributions and payments are traditionally organised by profession. From Esping-Andersen’s perspective, only the third group of “social democratic” welfare states in Scandinavia are truly progressive. They (used to) provide universal benefits to citizens that do not depend directly on their status as employees in the labour market, and also redistribute(d) income vertically.

30 Taking these various analyses together, it becomes clear that the UK has distanced itself from its European partners in several ways. The market deregulations and privatisations of the 1980s and 1990s, including that of financial markets, have

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strengthened the contractual nature of the British economy, and have consolidated the use of capital markets by companies. Similarly, the Conservatives under Thatcher implemented successive reforms to welfare policy to keep control on spending and to increase the gap between paid work and welfare transfers. Britain therefore passed from having a more social democratic welfare state to being more in line with the liberal one, providing minimal welfare benefits. Tellingly, the Major government negotiated an opt-out from the EU’s Social Protocol, of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. This was obtained to maintain the UK’s more deregulated labour market: a particular bone of contention at the time was the EU’s Working Time Directive limiting the working week to 48 hours, which the government was very keen to avoid. Major also opposed implementing a minimum wage, another policy set out in the Social Protocol.

31 It was only when New Labour came to power in 1997 that the UK finally signed up to the Social Protocol. However, in one area Britain under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown continued a key policy shift by Thatcher, which still sets Britain apart quite strongly from many other European countries. This concerns the role of unions as interlocutors in companies, industries and nationally. When Thatcher came to office, she ended what the British used to refer to (quaintly and pejoratively) as “beer and sandwiches in Downing Street”, when union leaders were consulted on government policy. New Labour’s policy was to keep out the unions, to keep social dialogue to a minimum, and to perpetuate Thatcher’s dismantling of collective bargaining.

Potential flaws in the “Global Britain” project

32 Moving forward, the legacy of the early Thatcher years also played a role in the Coalition government’s “austerity” policies from 2010 onwards, thus worsening Britain’s social climate in the run-up to the EU referendum. In the wake of exploding government deficits and debts following the financial crisis (2007-2008), the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition entered office and immediately adopted the objective of eliminating Britain’s public deficit (then at 10% of GDP) by the end of Parliament (2015). Deep cuts were implemented in a wide variety of areas (except health, pensions and overseas development aid). This downward pressure on spending played its part in the economic flat-lining of the British economy during the early 2010s. It was a controversial policy, attacked not just by the government’s opponents, but was also by the IMF at the time. In rebutting such criticisms, George Osborne as Chancellor of the Exchequer argued that tight control of government finances was vital to retain credibility with financial markets. He also specifically referred to the experience of the first Thatcher government, which in 1981 cut the public sector deficit in the middle of a deep recession. At the time, Thatcher was scathingly criticised by the economics profession, but with hindsight the 1981 budget coincided with the beginnings of an upturn in the economy. Osborne saw himself as applying the same strategy, and seems to have been vindicated subsequently.42 The British economy did pick up from the second half of 2013 onwards, and recorded better growth than elsewhere in Europe, through until the end of 2016. But Osborne’s policy was not only driven by the expediency of reducing deficits, but also by his view that the size of the State should be shrunk significantly.43 The Brexit referendum suggests that his neoliberal enthusiasm for small government was backfired. The squeeze on welfare support including big cuts to benefits and public services occurred just as immigration

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into the UK was surging. In the two years running up to the referendum, annual net migration exceeded 300,000, half of which coming from the EU.44

33 Intuitively it is easy to see that this policy-mix was risky. But there are underlying economic reasons why the overall Conservative party strategy of pursuing economic openness and less public spending was always going to be difficult. In his subtle analysis of The Globalisation Paradox, the Harvard-based international political economist Dani Rodrik emphasises the strongly unbalanced costs and benefits which trade liberalisation brings. He argues that while international trade theory has historically favoured free trade decisively, it plays down the negative consequences which liberalisation may have for certain social and economic groups, even if it benefits society as a whole. He notes, for example, that a $1 improvement in national welfare resulting from tariff cuts is likely to be accompanied by a $50 shift of resources between groups within the economy. In other words, collectively everyone is better off, but a minority will be far worse off. Moreover, such within-country transfers are greater when existing tariffs are lower! 45

34 Dani Rodrik also returns to an economic study by a political scientist at Yale University named David Cameron [sic] into examining why public spending rises over time. In looking at various institutional and political factors, such as the political business cycle, the influence of pressure groups on politicians. Cameron found that the single most important cause for higher public spending was the exposure of an economy to international trade. He argues this occurs because governments, in response to institutional pressure from voters and unions, pursue numerous policies to protect their populations from the adverse consquences of trade openness. Though Cameron’s work was published in the late 1970s, Rodrik’s own research reaches the same conclusions.

Graph: Dani Rodrik’s Impossibility Trilemma

35 More generally, Rodrik has attracted much attention in recent years for arguing that globalisation brings with it a “trilemma”, or an “impossibility theorem” (see Graph). He argues that i) democracy, ii) national sovereignty and iii) global economic integration cannot be achieved simultaneously: countries are able to pursue any two of these three objectives, but not all three. If for example, a country wants to preserve national sovereignty and democracy, then there are limits to it pursuing international integration. According to Rodrik, this kind of balance existed during the post-war, Bretton Woods era, when trade liberalisation was still limited and financial flows across

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borders quite strongly regulated. Alternatively, a country may seek to pursue national sovereignty and global integration. This was the situation which existed during the 19th century, a period Rodrik calls the “golden straightjacket”, when currencies were backed by gold, and democracy was generally limited. Finally, it is possible for nations to pursue both global economic integration and democracy, but at the expense of national sovereignty. Such a choice involves moving towards a form of “global federalism”, which Rodrik cautions is difficult to achieve, even for relatively like- minded nations as exist in the European Union. He concludes that any reform of the international economic system must face up to the constraints of this trilemma.46

36 Applying these analyses by Rodrik to the Thatcherite agenda sheds light on the contradictions of supporting the creation of the Single Market while simultaneously seeking to maintain national sovereignty and democracy. Conversely, Brexit vote clearly stands out as a rejection of European integration, and is much defended by Brexiteers as an expression of democracy. Whether root-and-branch change of Britain’s economic and political system based on a 52 percent majority of a 72 percent turnout is actually democratic may be debated. But the Conservative Brexiteer project of finishing the Thatcher revolution by further strengthening market forces as part of a Global Britain strategy carries its own risks of aggravating income and wealth inequalities and undermining the kind of democracy usually associated with a more inclusive society.

Conclusion

37 Many of the profound difficulties the UK currently has over Brexit may be traced back to the Thatcher era. Britain has always been ambivalent about the European project, showing a strong degree of path dependency in favouring economic ties yet almost consistently rejecting institutional and political integration. Margaret Thatcher’s support for the creation of the European Single Market as a form of trade liberalisation greatly compounded this ambivalence. By definition, the opening up and economic integration of Europe’s national economies set out in the Single Market programme necessarily called for more EU legislation and law (interpreted by the European Court of Justice). The Single Market Act also explicitly called for more monetary cooperation. Greater integration was clearly the goal of Jacques Delors and others, building on the original call by the Treaty of Rome for “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. Furthermore, Thatcher played a key role in Britain joining the ERM, while her defenestration by Conservative MPs and the subsequent ejection of the pound from the ERM in 1992 lit the flame of Euroscepticism.

38 Margaret Thatcher’s policy legacy also pushed Britain further down the road of neoliberalism than its European partners. It arguably created the economic basis for Brexit, and so-called hard Brexiteers are seeking to pursue the neoliberal agenda further, with tax cuts, market deregulation and tariff reduction. Such an overall strategy will likely expose certain industries and farming in the UK to severe losses. This will surely aggravate Britain’s social inequalities further, with potentially significant political consequences.

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Young, Hugo, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London, Macmillan, 1999).

NOTES

1. Jacques Leruez, Le phénomène Thatcher, coll. Question au XXe siècle (Bruxelles, éditions Complexe, 1991), pp. 247-290. 2. Pauline Schnapper, Le Royaume-Uni doit-il sortir de l’Union européenne (Paris, La documentation française, 2014), pp. 25-42. 3. The European Economic Community (EEC) became the European Union (EU) in 1993, following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 4. See the next section for definitions. 5. The Eurozone is a colloquial term referring to economic and monetary union (EMU), which was created as a monetary union but without a common fiscal policy and federal budget. This is widely perceived as a structural weakness, raising fundamental concerns about the Eurozone’s future. More generally, after 20 years, EMU still lacks many of the attributes of an “optimum currency area” (OCA), such as labour mobility, wage flexibility, risk-sharing and automatic fiscal transfer, commonality of destiny (i.e. solidarity), etc. For an overview of OCAs see , [15 July 2019]. 6. The idea of path dependency has emerged in economics and other social sciences over the last twenty years to help explain why countries, economies, businesses and agents do not converge on standardised, economically-efficient practices. Put very simply, it is based on the idea that “history matters”, and that for various technical, cultural and random factors, behaviour may be “locked-in” to particular patterns which are not optimal and which are non-reversible. Instead of stochastic (i.e. random) processes converging around one (efficient) mode, they can lead to convergences around several modes. For a general, early exposition, see Paul David, ‘Path dependence, its critics and the quest for “historical economic”’, June 2000, at: , [14 July 2019]; and for a current overview see , [15 July 2019]. 7. According to Dr Martin Holmes, an early user of this term was Lord (David) Young (a Thatcher appointee to various public offices responsible for labour and industry during the 1980s): David Holmes, ‘From Single Market to Single Currency: Evaluating Europe's Economic Experiment’, The Bruges Group, 1 July 1995, < https://www.brugesgroup.com/media-centre/papers/8-papers/804- a-single-european-currency-why-the-united-kingdom-must-say-no>, [16 July 2019]. 8. Jacques Delors was President of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995. 9. Edward Heath became Prime Minister after the Conservatives won the general elections of 1970. Heath then lost the elections to Labour in February 1974, and Harold Wilson returned to Downing Street. Wilson retired in April 1976. He was succeeded by James Callaghan who remained Prime Minister until May 1979, losing the elections to Margaret Thatcher and the Conservatives. The referendum on remaining in the EEC was held in June 1975.

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10. Kylie MacLellan, ‘Labour’s Corbyn, who voted “No” in 1975, raises Brexit fears’, Reuters, September 11, 2015, at , [17 July 2019]. 11. For a good secondary source on Labour’s ERM/EMS decision see Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London, Papermac, Macmillan, 1998), pp. 299-305. 12. Carine Berbéri and Nathalie Champroux, ‘La question de l’adoption de l’euro’, in Agnès Alexandre-Collier, Bernard d’Hellencourt et Pauline Schnapper (eds.), Le Royaume-Uni et l’Union européenne depuis 1997 (Dijon, Sociétés EUD, 2007), pp. 117-130. 13. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London, HarperPerennial, 1995 [1993]), pp. 691-693. 14. Ibid., pp. 62-63 and 541-545. 15. Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market, COM(85) 310 final, Brussels, 14 June 1989, , [30 August 2018]. 16. Lord Arthur Cockfield had variously been a British civil servant, a former managing director Boots (Britain’s ubiquitous high street chemists) and a politician. He had held several ministerial appointments since the Conservatives came to power in 1979, including being a Secretary of State for Trade. He was the kind of doer with private-sector experience who appealed to Thatcher, and whom she sent to Brussels in 1984. The Daily Telegraph, ‘Lord Cockfield: obituary’, 11 January, 2007, at:, retrieved 30 August 2018. 17. European Institute, Oral History Archive, Interview with Arthur Cockfield by A. Crozier, London, Historical Archives of the European Union, 24 August 1998, at , retrieved 30 August 2018. 18. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London, HarperPerennial, 1995 [1993]), p. 547. 19. Helen von Bismarck, ‘Margaret Thatcher: the critical architect of European integration’, UK in a Changing Europe, 4 May 2016, , [30 August 2018]. 20. Commission of the European Communities, Single European Act, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/86. 21. Sir Edward du Cann, European Communities (Amendment) Bill, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, 23 April 1986 vol 96 cc316-97, at < https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/ commons/1986/apr/23/european-communities-amendment-bill>, [31 August 2018]. 22. Jacques Delors, Speech, Debates of the European Parliament, No 2- 367/140, 6 July 1988, , [31 August 2018]. 23. Jacques Delors, ‘1992: The Social Dimension’, Speech at the TUC annual conference Bournemouth, 8 September 1988, at , [31 August 2018]. 24. Anne-Marie Motard, ‘Le TUC et l’Europe, le virage des années Thatcher : de l’internationalisme de principe au pragmatisme pro-européen’, in Anne-Marie Motard (ed.), 'Les syndicats britanniques : déclin ou renouveau?', Revue française de civilisation britannique, XV: 2, 2009, pp. 113-131, , [31 August 2018]. 25. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London, HarperPerennial, 1995 [1993]), pp. 742-743. 26. The Bruges Speech was given at the College of Europe in Bruges on 20 September 1998, where Thatcher had had a longstanding invitation to speak. The full text is available at , [17 July 2019]. 27. Conservative Party papers released in the 1990s show that the decision to raise VAT to pay for income tax cuts was taken in June 1978 by Geoffrey Howe (then Shadow Chancellor) and

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leading Conservative policy-makers, including Keith Joseph, Nigel Lawson, Peter Rees, Lord Cockfield and Patrick Jenkin; reported by Nicholas Timmins, ‘How the Tories kept secret the 15% VAT hike’, The Independent, 3 January 1995, , retrieved 5 September 2018. 28. Nigel Lawson was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer after the Conservatives’ re-election in 1983. 29. Nigel Lawson, The View from No. 11: Memoires of a Tory Radical (London, Bantam Press, 1992), p. 785. 30. Nigel Lawson, letter of resignation 27 October 1989, available at , retrieved 5 September 2018. 31. In her memoires, Thatcher notes that: ‘There are limits to the ability of even the most determined democratic leader to stand out against what the Cabinet, the Parliamentary Party, the industrial lobby and the press demand…”, Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London, HarperPerennial, 1995 [1993]), p. 722. 32. The Poll Tax fiasco was the other major issue leading to her colleagues turning on her. 33. The recession of the early 1990s was caused by a number of reasons. It was partly the result of a cyclical period of cooling following the rise in activity and inflation brought on by very low interest rates in the wake of the October 1987 stock market crash. It also followed the Savings & Loans financial crisis and credit crunch in the United States and the huge stock and housing market collapses in Japan at the time. Lastly, global growth took a hit after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the ensuing war in early 1991. 34. Carine Berbéri and Nathalie Champroux, ‘La question de l’adoption de l’euro’, in Agnès Alexandre-Collier, Bernard d’Hellencourt et Pauline Schnapper (eds.), Le Royaume-Uni et l’Union européenne depuis 1997 (Dijon, Sociétés EUD, 2007), pp. 117-130. See also, William Keegan, The Prudence of Mr Gordon Brown (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 2004), pp. 301-328. 35. Kenneth Clarke became Chancellor of the Exchequer following the Black Wednesday debacle. The quote is from his memoires, reproduced by Alan Travis, ‘Thatcher warned Major about exchange rate risks before ERM crisis’, The Guardian, 29 December 2017, , retrieved 3 September 2018. 36. Agnès Alexandre-Collier reviews well the years out of office and the way Euroscepticism became a major force in the Conservative Party: Agnès Alexandre-Collier, ‘Les Conservateurs face à la question européenne depuis 1997’, in Agnès Alexandre-Collier, Bernard d’Hellencourt and Pauline Schnapper (eds.), Le Royaume-Uni et l’Union européenne depuis 1997, Dijon, Sociétés EUD, 2007, pp. 9-18. 37. Delors, op.cit. 38. Nigel Lawson, ‘Brexit gives us a chance to finish the Thatcher revolution’, The Financial Times, September 2, 2016, , retrieved 7 September 2018. In this article, Lawson goes on to criticise efforts by the UK to negotiate some form of access to the Single Market. 39. Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre capitalisme (Paris, Seuil, 1991). 40. Peter Hall and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: the Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001). 41. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990). 42. The influence of Thatcher on the Coalition government’s fiscal policy is discussed in Nathalie Champroux and Nicholas Sowels, ‘The Monetary and Fiscal Policies of Early Thatcherism and the Legacy of the Medium Term Financial Strategy’, in Raphaëlle Espiet-Kilty (eds.), 'L'héritage du thatchérisme/The Thatcher Legacy', Observatoire de la société britannique, 17, 2015, pp. 135-161.

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43. Patrick Wintour and Larry Elliot, ‘Osborne moves to cut spending to 1930s levels in dramatic autumn statement’, The Guardian, 4 December 2014, , [19 July 2019]. 44. ONS, Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: November 2018, 29 November 2018. 45. Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (W. W. Norton & Company, 2012 [2011]), p. 57. 46. Ibid., pp 184-207. For an online summary see, Dani Rodrik, ‘The inescapable trilemma of the world economy’, Dani Rodrik’s weblog, June 27, 2007, at , [14 September 2018].

ABSTRACTS

This article begins by recalling the early ambiguities of Margaret Thatcher’s positions on Europe, and then the role Britain played in the creation of the Single Market as of 1986. This has often been referred to as the “Thatcherisation of Europe”, and the launching of the Single Market was the high-point of Britain’s involvement in the EEC/EU. The article goes on to look at the rising tensions between Britain and its partners that followed soon, notably as Jacques Delors’ integrationist aspirations became clearer. Mrs Thatcher’s position at that point, stated clearly in her Bruges Speech of September 1988, summarises starkly Britain’s consistent reluctance to engage in the process of institutional and political convergence that has always been part of the European project. Such tensions gave way to deepening Euroscepticism in the Conservative party, in the wake of Britain’s thwart membership of the ERM/EMS (1990-1992). The article then examines how Britain shifted away from Europe’s post-war social model under Margaret Thatcher, drawing on the “varieties of capitalism” literature, and argues that this created the economic foundations for Brexit. The article ends by examining the inherent contradiction between the Conservatives’ drive to reduce the size of government since the global financial crisis and Great Recession, while at the same time pursuing globalisation: it draws here on the work of Dani Rodrik and his political “trilemma” of the world economy.

Cet article commence par rappeler les ambiguïtés de Margaret Thatcher concernant l’Europe, puis le rôle que le Royaume-Uni a joué dans la création du marché unique à partir de 1986 : un projet souvent appelé « la Thatcherisation de l’Europe ». C’était le point culminant de la participation britannique à la construction européenne. L'article examine ensuite les tensions croissantes qui ont suivi peu après entre le Royaume-Uni et ses partenaires, notamment lorsque les aspirations intégrationnistes de Jacques Delors sont devenues plus claires. La position de Mme Thatcher, énoncée clairement dans son discours de Bruges au mois de septembre 1988, résume clairement la réticence persistante du Royaume-Uni à s’engager dans le processus de convergence institutionnelle et politique qui a toujours fait partie du projet européen. Ces tensions ont laissé la place à un euroscepticisme grandissant au sein du Parti conservateur, à la suite de l’adhésion malheureuse de la livre au Système monétaire européen (1990-1992). En s’appuyant sur la littérature sur les «variétés du capitalisme», l’article se penche ensuite sur la façon dont le Royaume-Uni s’est écarté du modèle social européen d'après-guerre sous les gouvernements de Margaret Thatcher et il affirme que cette évolution a jeté certaines bases économiques du Brexit. L’article se termine par une analyse de la contradiction inhérente entre la volonté des Conservateurs de réduire la taille du secteur public depuis la crise financière

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mondiale et la Grande Récession, tout en poursuivant une politique favorable à la mondialisation. Cette analyse s'inspire des travaux de Dani Rodrik et de son « trilemme politique » en ce qui concerne l'économie mondiale.

INDEX

Keywords: Margaret Thatcher, United Kingdom, EEC, European Union, Brexit, single market, Exchange Rate Mechanism, globalisation. Mots-clés: Margaret Thatcher, Royaume-Uni, CEE, Union européenne, Brexit, marché unique, Système monétaire européen, mondialisation.

AUTHOR

NICHOLAS SOWELS Nicholas Sowels is a senior lecturer in English for economics at the University Paris 1 Panthéon- Sorbonne, and is a member of the CREW research center (EA 4399). His main current areas of research include public services, Brexit and financial services, and the on-going crisis of capitalism since the global financial crisis and Great Recession.

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Margaret Thatcher in Spitting Image Margaret Thatcher dans Spitting Image

Yves Golder

Introduction

1 The political dimension of British caricatures developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when caricaturists like William Hogarth and James Gillray portrayed politicians and the society of their time with a satirical outlook. When, in the eighteenth century, the word “caricature” made its appearance in Great Britain, it referred to engravings having a comical or satirical purpose.1 That said, before it even reached Great Britain, this form of graphic satire had emerged both in Italy with baroque caricature and in Germany with symbolic engravings dating from the time of the Protestant Reformation.2 Moreover, we can note that caricature is endowed with a formidable capacity of adaptation. It was already present in theatre during the Greek Antiquity when actors wore masks called persona to represent specific people, attitudes or emotions.

2 In Spitting Image, the use of puppets allowed for a caricature which could be broadcast on television. In the 1980s, television was developing at full pace as most Western European households could get an access to this medium. Moreover, the appearance of satellite television made for a better broadcasting quality. When the ITV network was launched in 1954, its main objective was to compete with the BBC and to count on its advertising revenue in order to finance its programmes. It was therefore based on a much more liberal approach than the BBC right from its creation.

3 Spitting Image was created by Martin Lambie-Nairn, Peter Fluck and Roger Law. It was first broadcast in 1984 but its production had to stop in 1996 because of a continuous decline in viewership all along the 1990s. That said, by the end of the 1980s, its viewership peaked at around fifteen million people.3 The first nine out of the eighteen seasons that the series counts were made while Margaret Thatcher was in power as Prime Minister, that is to say from 1984 to 1990. It seems that as Margaret Thatcher’s political image4 was full of paradoxes and contradictions, it was possible to elaborate a

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complex caricature out of it. Besides being a specialist of the British political system, Jacques Leruez published several books on Margaret Thatcher. In one of these works, he wrote that she was “the most important Prime Minister since Churchill and Attlee”5 and that she was not only a person like everyone else but became a “character”6 as if she were the hero of a fictional story. Biographer Janet Fallon also noted that she was a “ remarkable leader”7 because she revolutionised British politics. During her premiership, she was often considered as an icon or myth, and she probably became even more of a mythical figure after her resignation in 1990.

4 The name of the show, Spitting Image, implies that the puppets faithfully mirror the different celebrities represented. Of course, the main feature of any caricature is that it is a distortion of reality.8 Therefore, the aim may have been to show the hidden faces of those celebrities and what they generally do not disclose in front of TV cameras. Politicians are indeed often presented as experts in the art of dissimulation because, with the help of their media advisers and spin doctors,9 they want to give a positive image of themselves. Beyond constituting an entertainment, did Spitting Image succeed in unveiling the most negative aspects of Margaret Thatcher and in building an efficient criticism by, for example, making fun of her ? As Brian McNair remarks, any media organisation plays two complementary roles : conveying the politicians’ message and providing a journalistic bias.10 In this respect, Spitting Image necessarily built its parodies on real elements and, in spite of the self-censorship of the BBC and ITV on issues such as the Falklands War or the IRA attacks,11 it managed to portray the British political stage with a new, irreverent approach.

5 In this article, the different ways in which Margaret Thatcher was caricatured and ridiculed in the TV show will be contrasted with what she wanted to display in front of her fellow citizens. The main purpose will be to emphasize the most relevant and interesting extracts which were selected on two main criteria : they had to correspond to different periods of Margaret Thatcher’s time in power and to represent various aspects of her political image. Among the nine seasons featuring Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister, particular attention was paid to the very first episodes through which she became an essential character of the show. The four parts of this study which emerged from this selection of representations and broadcasts cover such matters as her unpopularity, authoritarianism, her negative image as a sadistic woman and the ambiguities concerning her sex. I would like to encourage the readers to watch the video extracts indicated in the footnotes which are freely available on YouTube.

From political outsider12 to unpopular leader

6 Margaret Thatcher was born in Grantham, a small town in Lincolnshire. Her parents, Alfred and Beatrice Roberts, were the owners of a grocery shop where the young Margaret Roberts was helping when she was not at school, at her piano lessons or at the local Methodist church to attend the Sunday’s services.13 From the very beginning of her lifetime, she thus grew up in an environment which was quite different from that of other children of her age. When she became a public figure, she often referred to the values given to her by her parents and, among others, mentioned thrift, hard work, personal responsibility and determination. Her battle to get elected as Leader of the Conservative Party in 1975 was fought with a clear message : she was different from most male Conservative politicians who had grown up in aristocratic families and could

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therefore not share the same values as theirs. In her autobiography, she made the following statement : I was conscious of being the first research scientist to become Prime Minister – almost as conscious, in fact, as I was of being the first woman Prime Minister.14

7 In Spitting Image, her values are turned into derision. For example, the “Grantham anthem”15 sung by Margaret Thatcher’s media persona16 puts forward the double- meaning of the word “value” as the lyrics of the song consist in an enumeration of products and their respective cost. This representation reflects Margaret Thatcher’s childhood as a “grocer’s daughter”17 who belonged to the middle class. Her puppet is shown playing the piano on a till while the sound of an organ can be heard, thus highlighting her religious devotion. The conflation of religion and money creates a disturbing atmosphere showing that the Prime Minister’s values are only materialistic and that they lack real substance. At the end of the performance, Margaret Thatcher’s puppet declares that she has “made the universe”. This assertion denounces the Prime Minister’s determination to make her fellow citizens share the same values as hers. We may therefore claim that Spitting Image provides a representation of Margaret Thatcher as an authoritarian God, comparable to that of the Old Testament. After all, when she became Prime Minister in 1979, her first words were a prayer from Saint Francis of Assisi. In Spitting Image, according to this religious representation, she thought she was endowed to destroy everything that was not part of her “universe”, just like she wants to get rid of Scotland, which she considers as a “testing ground” in another episode.18

8 Another particularity which made Margaret Thatcher an unusual politician was her womanhood. In Spitting Image, the mixture of her politician and housewife images is something which is quite often satirised. For example, her puppet is shown wearing an apron covered with blood, and cutting meat in her Cabinet meeting room while talking about the elections.19 This representation thus reflects her own use of her femininity to appeal to female voters and relies on the stereotypes of femininity and masculinity which often depend on the conflicting notions of softness and toughness. This tough woman image appears in the closing credits of another episode where we can hear Margaret Thatcher insulting her colleagues at the House of Commons.20 Her use of obscene language highlights the discrepancy between her and other members of the Conservative Party who, at that time, were often part of the aristocracy and showed an image of decency and politeness.

9 Her specificity as a political outsider could either be an asset or a disadvantage for Margaret Thatcher. Spitting Image used it as a disadvantage to show her unpopularity. In the series, she is often presented as an austere politician that British people hated even though, in real life, she had many supporters who allowed her to remain in power for eleven years. When the puppet representing Gordon Reece, her media adviser, tries to modify her image and self-presentation, nothing really suits her and he must admit that all the modifications undergone by the Prime Minister haven’t really helped her boost her popularity.21 Moreover, in another extract, when Margaret Thatcher’s media persona asks her hairdresser to make her look “universally popular”, he just takes his razor’s blade and cuts her head.22

10 Besides, her differences with other politicians and her lack of experience in certain areas caused many questionings and criticisms concerning her legitimacy. In Spitting Image, her puppet sings My Way while, in the background, pictures of the most negative events which took place during her mandates are shown.23 For example, we can see the

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Falklands War24 with the sinking of the Belgrano, police repression during massive anti- Thatcher demonstrations or the bombings in Libya.25 Margaret Thatcher thus seems to be proud of her very personal accomplishments whereas we are incited to consider only the worst of what took place during her premiership. In that extract, she is presented as an extremely self-confident world leader who thought that she could never be overthrown. As we shall see it now, this caricature was recurrent in Spitting Image.

From supreme leader to would-be dictator

11 In several episodes, Margaret Thatcher’s media persona appears disguised as Queen Elizabeth II. For that purpose, she often wears a crown and royal garments.26 The Prime Minister’s desire to embody the monarch reveals her unstoppable and boundless ambition. Of course, it was profitable for the media to create some form of rivalry between the two women. Moreover, one of Margaret Thatcher’s main characteristics was her fervent patriotism, especially exhibited after the British victory in the Falklands in 1982. Caricaturists like Nicholas Garland27 said that her victory at war made her an iconic personality who then became omnipresent in the media.28 It is also possible that the real Margaret Thatcher wanted to become an allegory of the nation, like Britannia or the Queen.

12 In the very first episode of the TV show, the opening scene shows Margaret Thatcher’s entry with the royal ornaments after she is announced to her ministers as their “most graceful sovereign, the Queen”.29 This first instalment of the whole series set the tone for the ones to follow and announced an omnipresent as well as omnipotent Margaret Thatcher. The lack of charisma of Michael Foot,30 contributed to her attractivity as a main character in the show but we may argue that it was also because her character had such a comic potential that it became essential to the series. Indeed, some personal attributes like her behaviour, voice and intonations could easily be parodied.

13 Margaret Thatcher’s puppet encounters other world leaders to whom the British Prime Minister tries to show the extent of her power. For example, François Mitterrand and Ronald Reagan are impressed by her strong international stature. She does not really cooperate with them ; she rather tries to control them. In her “special relationship” with Ronald Reagan, she is sometimes presented as a devoted friend who would support him at all costs and, at other times, she yells at him to impose her own power. The so-called “special relationship” between the British and American leaders is caricatured to the extreme as they are once shown exchanging a long and passionate kiss,31 as if they were lovers. In real life, Thatcher and Reagan were close allies and friends as both advocated in favour of neoliberalism, monetarism as well as individualism and rejected communism. As far as François Mitterrand is concerned, he was reported to have said about her British counterpart that she had “the eyes of Caligula/Stalin and the mouth of Marilyn Monroe”.32 This portrayal shows that she was an impressive figure able to ally stereotypes of masculinity with feminine clichés because she failed to conform to gender expectations.

14 In the first season, Margaret Thatcher meets a supposedly dead dictator : Adolf Hitler.33 The fact that Adolf Hitler lives next door to the 10 Downing Street residence enabled the makers of the TV show to draw a link between the Nazi Führer and the woman who came to be called “the Iron Lady” as if she were no more than a dictator or some sort of

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tyrant. In the show, when the two characters meet, they talk about contemporary British politics but the conversation is paved with misunderstandings as Hitler only makes references to the context of the Second World War. Therefore, when Margaret Thatcher means “SAS”, “the Winter of Discontent” or “the [trade] unions”, Hitler says “SS”, highlights the importance of “not attacking in Winter” and mentions the “Soviet Union”. On top of this series of misunderstandings which constitute an efficient basis for humour, Margaret Thatcher is tricked and ridiculed as, in spite of all the clues given by Hitler himself, she does not recognise the Nazi Führer and believes that his name is Jeremy von Wilcox, not a fugitive ex-dictator but a random German neighbour. Moreover, when Hitler tries to flirt with her, she does not notice his attempts. Hence she is presented as a person lacking common sense or, at least, deprived of any understanding of social conventions. This way of portraying her contrasts with her image of a politician managing the nation finances in a very pragmatic way. Besides, this precarious sociability points to her insensitivity which has been largely commented on by her political entourage as well as by the media. In a series of testimonies compiled by Iain Dale, she is for instance referred to as a “cold, unfeeling automaton”.34 The producers of Spitting Image did not forget to build their caricature of Margaret Thatcher on that feature.

From school mistress35 to sadistic dominatrix

15 Almost every time Margaret Thatcher’s media persona is having a meeting with her Cabinet colleagues, she is presented as an authoritarian school mistress humiliating them and punishing them. As far as her male colleagues are concerned, they behave like children who are particularly undisciplined and incompetent. Moreover, they are quite coward as they seem to fear their leader and never tell her what they think about her harsh methods. For example, in a short extract, the table around which the meeting takes place is full of papers and files and some of the members of the Cabinet are rocking on their chairs while others are crumpling papers.36 The mess in the Cabinet room seems to symbolise disorder in the Conservative Party at large. Margaret Thatcher thus takes all the decisions because her team is unable to work efficiently.

16 In another extract featuring a Cabinet meeting in the first season of the show, the Prime Minister interrogates her different ministers about political matters but all of them are spending their time playing with whatever they can find on the table and are fooling about.37 Margaret Thatcher’s own game consists in humiliating them as if she were an excessively authoritarian teacher facing a bunch of childish pupils in a classroom. Therefore, we might claim that the different ministers are like puppets within the puppet show and Margaret Thatcher is like a deus ex machina directing them. Moreover, the ministers’ cowardice relies on their inability to answer to the Prime Minister as they all seem to be highly scared of her. They all speak in a very soft way whereas she keeps on screaming and says that “the opposite of unanimous is fired”. This apprehension towards Margaret Thatcher is very apparent in another extract where all the ministers hide their faces under the table whenever their leader starts yelling.38 Norman Tebbit,39 presented as her protégé, is used as a security guard who is allowed to hit his colleagues when they dare make awkward suggestions.

17 Steve Nallon, the actor who lipsynced Margaret Thatcher’s puppet made her voice go from very strident tones - once, her husband’s glasses smashed to pieces because of her

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shrill scream40 - to much deeper ones. The impression which emerges from these constant changes in voice pitch is one of an orator who could appear soft or tough according to the situations. Her colleagues, and the spectators, therefore never know when she is about to throw a tantrum.

18 Even US President Ronald Reagan is the victim of Margaret Thatcher’s verbal assaults but he seems to like them in a quite masochistic way.41 The “special relationship” is thus presented as a relation between a dominant and a dominated partner, both of them agreeing to play their respective role. Interestingly, this representation corresponds to a reversal of the reality as the United States has always managed to put forward its superior status since the end of the Second World War.

19 The violence exuding from Margaret Thatcher’s puppet is not only verbal as it sometimes turns into physical aggression. For instance, in season 3, there is a scene in which she hits one of her Cabinet ministers whom, in real life, Margaret Thatcher was often heard complaining about.42 This colleague, namely Geoffrey Howe, 43 decided to resign in 1990 because of his disapproval with his leader’s positions on Europe. Even though he was often caricatured as the harmless sheep of the Thatcher government,44 it is interesting to note that Howe’s resignation eventually precipitated the Prime Minister’s downfall. John Major, another of her colleagues who then succeeded her in her functions, is also presented as being her scapegoat. Besides, in the TV show, he is portrayed as someone who does everything he can for the sake of his leader.45 This depiction was elaborated on the basis of Major’s public persona which was one of moderation and restraint. Margaret Thatcher’s particularity as a woman surrounded by men on whom she imposed her sadistic attitude generated a representation full of sexual innuendos which easily attracted the spectators’ attention, even if that attention was triggered by a sexist conception of social roles. Her cruelty towards men finds its apogee when she is shown waking up her husband Denis by pouring hot tea on his genitals.46 This attempt at emasculating her husband contrasts with Margaret Thatcher’s declarations about preparing his breakfast in real life.47

20 The only extract in which Margaret Thatcher is dominated by someone else is when she is shown through the traits of Ronald Reagan’s poodle and obeys his orders.48 This reversal of the roles is an exception which can be explained by the political context of the time : the US was asking Britain permission to use its airbases in order to attack Libya in 1986. Quite exceptionally, at that very moment, Britain was generally perceived as the subordinate partner in the “special relationship” whereas the US was seen as the dominant one.

21 The representation of Margaret Thatcher as a dominatrix is full of stereotypes and implies a focus on her hybrid sexual attitudes. Of course, she was a woman, but Spitting Image suggested that she behaved more like a man and sometimes even caricatured her as an inhuman creature.

Woman, man or “alien” ?

22 In the second season of the series, Margaret Thatcher’s media persona started wearing a masculine outfit consisting in a suit and tie. As in real life, she still wore make up, jewellery and her famous handbag but her clothes were typically masculine. Her voice also evolved throughout the different seasons to become more authoritarian and deep, especially at the start of the third season. These changes in her voice more or less

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corresponded to those which took place in reality. In the show, in order to emphasize Margaret Thatcher’s masculinity, her colleagues often call her “sir” instead of “madam” 49 and she is shown at the urinals standing next to male colleagues like Michael Heseltine.50

23 In the fourth season, another prop was added to Margaret Thatcher’s puppet : she constantly appeared with a cigar in her hand.51 The fact that she wore a suit and tie and smoked cigars constituted a reference to one of her predecessors whom she admired, Winston Churchill. The real Margaret Thatcher mentioned Churchill in many of her speeches. For example, at a party conference, she declared : You will understand, I know, the humility I feel at following in the footsteps of great men like […] Winston Churchill, a man called by destiny who raised the name of Britain to supreme heights in the history of the free world.52

24 Beyond denying Margaret Thatcher her femininity through the exaggeration of her male characteristics, Spitting Image sometimes deprived her of her humanity. In some sequences, she appeared as a frightening creature which was all but human. For example, there is a passage in which she is presented as the “perfect winning machine” able to win any election and where she is caricatured in the traits of a scary alien.53 In this extract, a scientist analyses her DNA through a microscope and notices that “her DNA’s structures are indestructible” and that “her defences are impenetrable”. When Margaret Thatcher’s media persona makes its entrance in the laboratory, it has the physical appearance of the alien from the Alien movies whose first instalment was released in 1979. Caricaturing the Prime Minister as a monster while highlighting her cruelty was commonplace at the time. In some tabloids, she also appeared as the big bad wolf or as Count Dracula.54

25 In another very short passage, we can see Margaret Thatcher using print stripper as a perfume.55 Such a product should be toxic when applied to one’s skin but it does not have any negative impact on Margaret Thatcher. This video extract thus constitutes a demonstration of her inhuman nature and contributed to her caricature as an outstanding personality.

Conclusion

26 As it is clearly stated in the TV show, the British Prime Minister had to endure “a great deal of criticism and even personal abuse, some of it admittedly from Spitting Image”.56 According to Kiene Brillenburg, the programme itself faced much criticism when it was launched because it was considered disrespectful towards politicians and the royal family.57 It was the return of “satire as an offensive practice”.58 In an interview given in 2008, Peter Fluck confessed his aversion towards Margaret Thatcher and claimed that denouncing her evil sides had been one of the show’s greatest achievements : I still get a lot of people saying, “Thank you for helping me through the Thatcher years”. People were losing their jobs, mines were being closed and Christ knows what was going on. People wanted a programme that was not afraid to tackle those issues.59

27 Some media organs, like the BBC, had adopted a quite anti-Thatcher stance as they were against the wholesale and radical changes she promoted through her encouragement of deregulation and competition. This new climate made the creation of innovative private media possible. Such was the case of Channel 4, launched in 1982.

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The popular press – essentially composed of tabloids like The Sun, The Daily Mail, The Express and News of the World60 – was dominated by an imposing figure and ally of Margaret Thatcher : Rupert Murdoch. Her good relationships with the media mogul made it easier for him to extend his empire. Indeed, as Jacques Leruez explains, tabloids were generally supportive of the Prime Minister as both Mr. Murdoch and Mrs. Thatcher helped each other acquire more power and influence in their respective domain.61

28 The puppets constituted a fictional intermediary enabling the producers of the show to express ideas which would probably have been more controversial had they been voiced by real actors. In this respect, there is a clear contrast with other programmes of the time such as Yes, Prime Minister or The New Statesman. That said, did Spitting Image succeed in expressing a clear political bias and in producing an efficient criticism of Margaret Thatcher’s supremacy ?

29 Although its viewership was exceptionally high in the 1980s, it is difficult to assess the TV show’s real impact in terms of depreciation of the Prime Minister’s image. Spitting Image probably fuelled criticism against the Conservatives and their leader which was one of its main objectives. Nevertheless, there is no clear correlation between enjoying the show for its political content and voting against the Conservative Party, personified by Margaret Thatcher, which happened to have much success in the polls throughout the 1980s. Spitting Image however reflected converging discourses from the trade unions, when it positioned itself in favour of Arthur Scargill62 in the context of the 1984-1985 miners’ strike, but also from the Labour Party and left-wing intellectuals and artists who tended to criticise Margaret Thatcher for her lack of support for culture. The producers of the show continued to more or less indirectly support the Labour Party until 1996 when the programme stopped being broadcast. In that year, they even produced one of its campaign videos in which John Major was presented as an outgoing Prime Minister who had lost all of his credibility during his mandates.63

30 That said, Margaret Thatcher’s portrayal as a strong personality who was, even if excessively, determined to follow her own track puts forward an image of political will and power. As power is generally seen as a political asset, it seems that the caricature elaborated by Spitting Image came to reinforce Margaret Thatcher’s legitimacy and reputation. Moreover, Mrs. Thatcher was famous for being able to turn her flaws into positive qualities. For instance, when the Red Star, a Soviet newspaper, gave her the nickname “Iron Lady” in 1976 in order to blame her stubbornness, she immediately used it to her own advantage while redefining it in her own way : I stand before you tonight in my Red Star chiffon evening gown, my face softly made up and my fair hair gently waved, the Iron Lady of the Western world. A Cold War warrior… Yes, I am an iron lady […] ; yes, if that’s how they wish to interpret my defence of values and freedoms fundamental to our way of life.64

31 It seems that most of Margaret Thatcher’s imperfections could easily be turned into positive attributes as all the satirical attacks against her participated in shaping her image as a fighter who would not allow herself to be destabilised by such criticism. Generally speaking, her main weapon was the attraction and fascination she prompted. Although she resigned in 1990 because of a loss of support from Conservative Members of Parliament, Spitting Image continued being broadcast and the new Prime Minister, John Major, was caricatured as a dull and uninteresting figure.65

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32 In 2008, a new political puppet show called Headcases was produced by Henry Naylor and broadcast on ITV from 6 April to 15 June. Though it finally did not meet much success, it emerged from a necessity to disclose the backstage of British politics. As Henry Naylor declared on the day of the first broadcast : I think the need for a show like this is greater than ever. There is now a real spin culture in place and someone has to look behind that. Political figures now invite us into their homes and control almost every aspect of their public image. The viewer needs a way of getting back at that sort of behaviour. Our show will do that.66

33 At a time when politicians make more and more often use of marketing strategies to display an attractive image to their potential electorate, a battle must be fought and political satire is needed as it can constitute a potent weapon for criticism. When this kind of satire does not succeed in enticing people to oppose political personalities, it can at least attract an audience that is not always interested in politics thanks to its comic dimension. If, like John Reith – founder of the BBC – we consider that the core mission of any media in a representative democracy is to first “inform”, then “educate” and finally “entertain”, we must admit that Spitting Image does constitute a harmonious combination of instruction and amusement.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baridon, Laurent and Guedron, Martial, L’Art et l’histoire de la caricature (Paris, Éditions Citadelles & Mazenod, 2015 [2006]).

Blake, Stephen and John, Andrew, Iron Lady : The Thatcher Years (London, Michael O’Mara Books Limited, 2012 [2003]).

Brillenburg, Kiene, ‘Spitting Image and Pre-Televisual Political Satire : Graphics and Puppets to Screens’, Image and Narrative, vol. 12 : 3 (2011).

Brown, Mark, ‘Spitting Image Creator Says Times Are Right for US Revival’, The Guardian, 14 November 2018, [9 May 2019].

Campbell, John, Margaret Thatcher. Volume One : The Grocer’s Daughter (London, Jonathan Cape, 2000).

Cockerell, Michael, ‘The Making of the Iron Lady’, BBC 4, 8 June 2008.

Dale, Iain (ed.), Memories of Margaret Thatcher : A Portrait, by Those Who Knew Her Best (London, Biteback Publishing Limited, 2013).

Fallon, Janet L., A Communication Perspective on Margaret Thatcher : Stateswoman of the Twentieth Century (New York, Lexington Books, 2017).

Hastings, Chris, ‘Spitting Image Secrets Revealed by Creator’, The Telegraph, 6 April 2008, [7 May 2019].

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Kavanagh, Dennis and Seldon, Anthony, The Powers Behind the Prime Minister : The Hidden Influence of Number Ten (London, HarperCollins, 1999).

Leruez, Jacques, Le Système politique britannique : de Winston Churchill à Tony Blair (Paris, Armand Colin, 2001).

Leruez, Jacques, Thatcher : la dame de fer (Brussels, André Versaille Éditeur, 2012).

McNair, Brian, An Introduction to Political Communication (London, Routledge, 2011 [1995]).

Margaret Thatcher Foundation : [14 May 2019].

Millat, Gilbert, ‘Satire graphique et enracinement national : le dessin de presse britannique’, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XIII : 4 (1 January 2006, [10 May 2019].

Moore, Charles, Margaret Thatcher, The Authorized Biography : Volume One (London, Penguin Books, 2014 [2013]).

Scammell, Margaret, ‘Politics and Image : the Conceptual Value of Branding’ in Smith, Gareth and Needham, Catherine (eds.), Journal of Political Marketing, vol. 14 : 1-2 (2015), pp. 7-18.

Shephard, Gillian, The Real Iron Lady : Working with Margaret Thatcher (London, Biteback Publishing Limited, 2013).

Thatcher, Margaret, The Downing Street Years (London, Harper Collins, 1993).

Thieriot, Jean-Louis, Margaret Thatcher (Paris, Éditions de Fallois, 2007).

NOTES

1. Laurent Baridon and Martial Guedron, L’Art et l’histoire de la caricature (Paris, Éditions Citadelles & Mazenod, 2015 [2006]), p. 81. 2. Gilbert Millat, ‘Satire graphique et enracinement national : le dessin de presse britannique’, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XIII: 4, 1 January 2006, http://journals.openedition.org/ rfcb/1647, consulted 10 May 2019. 3. Mark Brown, ‘Spitting Image Creator Says Times Are Right for US Revival’, The Guardian, 14 November 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2018/nov/14/spitting-image- creator-says-times-are-right-for-us-revival, consulted 9 May 2019. 4. As Margaret Scammell explains, a politician’s image corresponds to his/her reputation: Margaret Scammell, ‘Politics and Image: the Conceptual Value of Branding’ in Gareth Smith and Catherine Needham (eds.), Journal of Political Marketing, vol.14 : 1-2, 2015, p. 5. 5. “Mme Thatcher ayant été le Premier ministre le plus important depuis Churchill et Attlee”, Jacques Leruez, Thatcher: la dame de fer (Brussels, André Versaille Éditeur, 2012), p. 10. 6. “personnage”, Ibid., p. 11. 7. Janet L. Fallon, A Communication Perspective on Margaret Thatcher: Stateswoman of the Twentieth Century (New York, Lexington Books, 2017), p. 15. 8. Laurent Baridon and Martial Guedron, L’Art et l’histoire de la caricature (Paris, Éditions Citadelles & Mazenod, 2015 [2006]), p. 6. 9. Margaret Thatcher could count on the help of communication and media advisers like Tim Bell from the Saatchi and Saatchi agency, Gordon Reece or Bernard Ingham, in Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, The Powers Behind the Prime Minister: The Hidden Influence of Number Ten (London, HarperCollins, 1999), p. 171.

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10. Brian McNair, An Introduction to Political Communication (London, Routledge, 2011 [1995]), pp. 10-11. 11. Kiene Brillenburg, ‘Spitting Image and Pre-Televisual Political Satire: Graphics and Puppets to Screens’, Image and Narrative, vol.12: 3, 2011, p. 114. 12. The use of the word “outsider” to describe Margaret Thatcher comes from Gillian Shephard, The Real Iron Lady: Working with Margaret Thatcher (London, Biteback Publishing Limited, 2013), p. 169. This expression has been studied by Karen Ross who considers it as one of the three frames used by the media to represent women politicians: Karen Ross, Gendered Media: Women, Men, and Identity Politics (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010). 13. Gillian Shephard, The Real Iron Lady: Working with Margaret Thatcher (London, Biteback Publishing Limited, 2013), pp. 169-170. 14. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London, Harper Collins, 1993), p. 24. 15. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iOFvgiCyChA, consulted 3 August 2018. 16. The expression “media persona” is used as a synonym for “puppet”. It enables the reader to make the difference between Margaret Thatcher as a real person and her parodic representation in Spitting Image. 17. The characterization of Margaret Thatcher as nothing more than a “grocer’s daughter” was quite recurrent in the 1980s. For instance, the French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was said to have used this expression in a quite derogatory way. 18. YouTubehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 2’50’’ consulted 3 August 2018. 19. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L2ZgwgHTBA8, 15’45’’, consulted 3 August 2018. 20. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 12’20’’, consulted 3 August 2018. 21. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NlnvWCLbKYw, 17’35’’, consulted 3 August 2018. 22. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XH2XV-wC8vQ, 24’25’’, consulted 3 August 2018. 23. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 27’20’’, consulted 3 August 2018. 24. The Falklands War lasted from 2 April to 14 June 1982. It was triggered by Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands which were British territory. Margaret Thatcher responded by sending the British navy and finally defeated the Argentinian junta. 25. Margaret Thatcher authorized the United States to use Royal Air Force airbases in order to attack Libya. This decision caused much criticism against the British Prime Minister. 26. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 5’50’’, consulted 3 August 2018. 27. Nicholas Garland is a British caricaturist who worked for The Daily Telegraph from 1966 to 2011. Between 1986 and 1990, he interrupted his career at The Daily Telegraph to work for The Independent, created in 1986. In the 1970s, he had also worked for The New Statesman and The Spectator. 28. Nicholas Garland in Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher, The Authorized Biography: Volume One (London, Penguin Books, 2014 [2013]), p. 640. 29. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lrE8XfoY3ow, 0’00’’, consulted 3 August 2018. 30. Michael Foot was Leader of the Labour Party from 1980 to 1983. 31. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 30’00’’, consulted 3 August 2018. 32. There is uncertainty and debate about the exact words pronounced by François Mitterrand in a private meeting. According to most commentators, he compared Margaret Thatcher to Caligula while to his special adviser Jacques Attali, who was next to the French President when he pronounced those words, the comparison was not with the Roman Emperor but with Stalin.

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33. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 17’20’’, consulted 3 August 2018. 34. Iain Dale (ed.), Memories of Margaret Thatcher: A Portrait, by Those Who Knew Her Best (London, Biteback Publishing Limited, 2013), p. 173. 35. The use of the expression “school mistress” to portray Margaret Thatcher comes from Jacques Leruez, Thatcher: la dame de fer (Brussels, André Versaille Éditeur, 2012), p. 11: “maîtresse d’école”. 36. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 2’30’’, consulted 3 August 2018. 37. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jINZBOxdja8, consulted 3 August 2018. 38. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 4’15’’, consulted 3 August 2018. 39. Norman Tebbit was Margaret Thatcher’s Secretary of State for Employment from 1981 to 1983 and her Secretary of State for Trade and Industry from 1983 to 1985. In 1985, he became Chairman of the Conservative Party. 40. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 13’40’’, consulted 3 August 2018. 41. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 24’05’’, consulted 4 August 2018. 42. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RObqJFw-vpw, 3’55’’, consulted 4 August 2018. 43. Geoffrey Howe started working with Margaret Thatcher as Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1975 to 1979. In 1979, he became the government’s Chancellor of the Exchequer and occupied other ministerial functions until he resigned in November 1990. 44. ‘Geoffrey Howe: The Sheep That Roared’, The Economist, 15 October 2015, https:// www.economist.com/britain/2015/10/15/the-sheep-that-roared, consulted 11 May 2019. 45. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 6’40’’, consulted 4 August 2018. 46. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 8’55’’, consulted 4 August 2018. 47. “I am a very ordinary person who leads a very normal life. I enjoy it – seeing that the family have a good breakfast.” Daily Mirror, 3 February 1975, in John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher. Volume One: The Grocer’s Daughter (London, Jonathan Cape, 2000), p. 296. “The welfare of her family is the prime concern of nearly every woman”, ‘Article on Women MPs (Youngest Woman Candidate Calls to Women)’, Evening Post, 27th January 1950, https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/ 100855, consulted 11 May 2019. 48. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 9’30’’, consulted 4 August 2018. 49. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kkb8FCZMn0w, 0’00’’, consulted 4 August 2018. 50. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 7’10’’, consulted 4 August 2018. 51. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 13’55’’, consulted 4 August 2018. 52. Margaret Thatcher’s speech at the 1975 Conservative Party Conference, in Stephen Blake and Andrew John, Iron Lady: The Thatcher Years (London, Michael O’Mara Books Limited, 2012 [2003]), p. 141. 53. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 9’55’’, consulted 7 August 2018. 54. Jean-Louis Thieriot, Margaret Thatcher (Paris, Éditions de Fallois, 2007), p. 158. 55. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 21’45’’, consulted 7 August 2018. 56. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rMnv6sZVow, 10’40’’, consulted 7 August 2018. 57. Kiene Brillenburg, ‘Spitting Image and Pre-Televisual Political Satire: Graphics and Puppets to Screens’, Image and Narrative, vol.12 : 3, 2011, p. 115. 58. Ibid., p. 116.

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59. Peter Fluck interviewed by journalist Chris Hastings, ‘Spitting Image Secrets Revealed By Creator’, The Telegraph, 6 April 2008, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1584109/ Spitting-Image-secrets-revealed-by-creator.html, consulted 7 May 2019. 60. Jacques Leruez, Le Système politique britannique: de Winston Churchill à Tony Blair (Paris, Armand Colin, 2001), pp. 239-240. 61. Jacques Leruez, Thatcher: la dame de fer (Brussels, André Versaille Éditeur, 2012), pp. 132-133. 62. Arthur Scargill was the President of the National Union of Mineworkers from 1982 to 2002. He was famous for leading the union during the 1984-1985 miners’ strike and for being one of Margaret Thatcher’s main adversaries during her time in power. 63. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QBek3r1o1KI, consulted 15 May 2019. 64. Speech delivered by Margaret Thatcher in Finchley, 31 January 1976, in Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher, The Authorized Biography: Volume One (London, Penguin Books, 2014 [2013]), p. 333. 65. ‘Dominic West and the Greyness of John Major’, The Telegraph, 30 September 2012, https:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/9574711/Dominic-West-and-the-greyness-of- John-Major.html, consulted 7 August 2018. 66. Henry Naylor interviewed by journalist Chris Hastings, The Telegraph, 6 April 2008, https:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1584109/Spitting-Image-secrets-revealed-by-creator.html, consulted 18 August 2018.

ABSTRACTS

The main ambition of this article is to pay tribute to Jacques Leruez whose work came to constitute a reference for British civilisation researchers focusing on the twentieth century. It provides a study of the representation of Margaret Thatcher’s political image in the British television show called Spitting Image. This TV show was broadcast on ITV from 1984 to 1996. As that period included six years of her premiership, it is not surprising that Margaret Thatcher was one of the main characters in the show. Its aim was to offer a political caricature necessarily consisting in a distortion of reality. In the late twentieth century and, more precisely, in the 1980s, television developed as a means of communication throughout Western Europe thanks to the creation of new channels and the general deregulation of this market. As a consequence, it was increasingly used as a means of political propaganda or advertising whether by politicians themselves or by the media. One main ambition behind Spitting Image was to ridicule British politicians like Margaret Thatcher. Did the TV show succeed in building an efficient criticism thanks to its satirical dimension ? This contribution will first highlight the different ways in which Margaret Thatcher was caricatured by Spitting Image. More precisely, it will focus on four different forms of representations which seemed to prevail in the show. As for the conclusion, it will be devoted to the ways in which her caricature was generally perceived by her fellow citizens.

Cet article a pour ambition première de rendre hommage à Jacques Leruez dont le travail vint à constituer une référence pour les chercheurs en civilisation britannique spécialistes du vingtième siècle. Il fournit une étude de la représentation de l’image politique de Margaret Thatcher dans l’émission télévisée britannique Spitting Image. Cette émission fut diffusée sur ITV de 1984 à 1996. Étant donné que la période incluait six années pendant lesquelles elle était

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Premier ministre, il n’y a rien d’étonnant à ce que Margaret Thatcher fût l’un des principaux protagonistes de l’émission. Son objectif était d’offrir une caricature politique qui consistait de fait en une distorsion du réel. Au cours de la seconde moitié du vingtième siècle et, plus précisément, dans les années 1980, on assista à une propagation de la télévision en tant que moyen de communication à travers l’Europe de l’Ouest grâce à la création de nouvelles chaînes et à la dérégulation du secteur télévisuel. De ce fait, elle fut de plus en plus fréquemment utilisée par les personnalités politiques comme par les médias pour diffuser des propagandes électorales ou des publicités. Une des ambitions premières de Spitting Image était de railler les politiciens britanniques comme Margaret Thatcher. L’émission télévisée parvint-elle à constituer une critique efficace grâce à sa dimension satirique ? Cette contribution apportera tout d’abord un éclairage sur les différentes façons dont Margaret Thatcher fut caricaturée par Spitting Image. Elle mettra en évidence quatre formes de représentations qui semblaient primordiales. La conclusion, quant à elle, sera consacrée à la manière dont la caricature de Margaret Thatcher était perçue par ses concitoyens.

INDEX

Mots-clés: Thatcher, politique, médias, représentation, caricature, satire Keywords: Thatcher, politics, media, representation, caricature, satire, Spitting Image

AUTHOR

YVES GOLDER Equipe Savoirs dans l’Espace Anglophone : Représentations, Culture, Histoire,at the University of Strasbourg. Yves Golder wrote and defended a PhD thesis on the construction of Margaret Thatcher’s political image from 1950 to 1990. His main interests are contemporary British civilisation, media communication and political sciences. Yves Golder is an English teacher at the faculty of law and political sciences of the University of Strasbourg as well as a member of the research team SEARCH EA2325.

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La Dévolution du pouvoir, source d'innovations Devolution as a Source of Innovation

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The Scottish First Ministers from 1999 to 2014: Role, Power and Leadership Les Premiers ministres écossais de 1999 à 2014: rôle, pouvoir et leadership

Gilles Leydier

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This article is an updated version of a chapter published in Agnès Alexandre-Collier and François Vergniolle de Chantal (eds.), Leadership and Uncertainty Management in Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). For many decades, Jacques Leruez has been an inspiring and friendly figure in French academic circles specialized in British institutions, who paved the way for many researchers in Scottish politics. In his seminal book L'Écosse, une nation sans État he forged the widely acclaimed concept of stateless nations, and then relentlessly updated the problematics of territorial governance, from the devolution years to the recent debate on Scottish independence. He will be missed greatly for his expertise and his human qualities.

Introduction

1 The implementation of the Devolution settlement in 19991 created a legislative body, the Scottish Parliament, as well as a separate political executive, composed of a First Minister and a Cabinet, which comprises about two dozen senior and junior ministers. Although a great deal of research2 has been devoted to the functioning and achievements of the new Scottish Parliament, very few political comments have focused upon the executive power and the devolved ministers. More strikingly, the coverage and analysis of the position and achievements of the Scottish First Ministers since 1999 have been extremely limited.

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2 This article aims at understanding the political leadership of the Scottish First Ministers in the original context of Scotland's newly-created devolved institutions. It will focus on the conditions which have framed political leadership, the way successive First Ministers have built their legitimacy and influence, faced challenges and constraints, interacted with their followers, dealt with public opinion and the media. Under which circumstances have Scottish politicians acceded to leadership? To what extent have Scottish leaders been visible and efficient? What have they brought to the new Scottish institutional framework? Why have they failed or been successful? Stability providers, game-changers, communicators or “grassroots-connectors”: how have the Scottish First Ministers fitted into this leadership typology? In order to answer these questions this article will provide an overview of the role and actions of the successive leaders between the start of the devolved institutions in 1999 and the 2014 Referendum on Independence, which put an end of the first phase of the devolution process. The article will study the First Ministers’ political initiatives and assess their performances, explore the way successive incumbents have embraced their function in order to establish a political domination upon the Scottish stage. The analysis starts with a description of the place of the Scottish Executive and First Ministers within the framework of the newly devolved institutions, with an exploration of the political environment and the institutional limits and constraints upon them. It then focuses on the successive Scottish leaders’ backgrounds, legitimacy and profiles. It finally moves to an evaluation of their record and legacy as political leaders, trying to outline a typology of their leadership style.

The Scottish leaders and the devolved institutions

3 The post of First Minister (FM) was created by the Scotland Act 1998. Under this settlement the FM is the leader of the Cabinet and primarily responsible for the formulation, development and presentation of Scottish Government policy. Appointed by the Queen amongst Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs), he is directly accountable to it for his actions and those of the wider government. He has the power to choose his Ministers, who must be members of and nominated by the Scottish Parliament. In practice the First Minister has an almost free rein in order to appoint and dismiss the members of his team, and complete liberty to intervene in the policy fields according to his priorities. The First Minister is also assisted by a Deputy First Minister, a post which was originally created for the leader of the junior party in the prospect of a coalition government. The Scottish Cabinet operates in the Westminster style and on the principle of collective responsibility with weekly meetings and the assistance provided by the work of a small number of Cabinet committees.

4 Between 1999 and 2014 Scotland had four First Ministers as well as one acting First Minister. Labour leader Donald Dewar, the main architect of the Scotland Act, was the first FM from May 1999 until his sudden death in October 2000. Then Labour Henry McLeish occupied the post until he decided to resign in November 2001 over accusations of office expense irregularities. He was succeeded by another Labour leader, Jack McConnell, who held the position of First Minister until his party came in second at the May 2007 Scottish elections. Following the electoral success of his party, the SNP leader Alex Salmond became First Minister and remained leader until his resignation in November 2014, being the longest-serving Scottish First Minister. On

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three occasions, due to Donald Dewar’s sickness and then following Donald Dewar’s death and Henry McLeish’s resignation, the Liberal-democrat Deputy First Minister Jim Wallace assumed the role of “Acting” First Minister for a short period of time. The office of First Minister was thus characterized by great instability during the first three years of devolution.3 Since 2002, however, McConnell – five years and a half as FM – and Salmond – seven years and a half in office – have managed to secure their position and establish their leadership on a long-term basis.

Constraints upon the leadership

5 From 1999 to 2007, with no single party holding an absolute majority in Parliament, devolution was characterized by coalition governments between Labour – the leading party at Holyrood – and the Liberal-Democrats. Under a coalition4 the Scottish Executive must negotiate a policy platform at the beginning of each parliamentary session. In 1999 the establishment of this programme was subject to rather difficult bargaining between the two coalition partners, notably over the questions of university fees, free personal care for the elderly and land reforms. In 2003 the negotiations between the two political parties were easier and shorter, but the Lib-Dems were in a stronger position to impose their policy priorities on Labour First Minister Jack McConnell, notably on the issue of the introduction of proportional representation in local government. Coalition management also implies that the First Minister has to work closely with the deputy FM in order to deliver the Executive Partnership’s programme, both leaders being responsible for the policies engaged. Furthermore, the coalition allows the leader of the junior party to select its own ministers and give a veto over their dismissal. The power of appointment and dismissal of the FM is therefore reduced. On the whole, the political autonomy of the first three FMs has been constrained by the realities of coalition government.5

6 Between 2007 and 2011 the scenario changed with the advent of an SNP-led minority Government.6 Although the Scottish Executive was freed from coalition bargaining and recovered some flexibility in policy-making, it had to find a majority of MSPs for each piece of legislation. The new First Minister Alex Salmond had to make concessions in order to have his program approved by Parliament while avoiding to face a vote of confidence. From this perspective the vote of the first Budget of the new administration was crucial. While the budget was initially defeated in the Scottish Parliament by a coalition of Labour, Lib-Dem and Green MSPs, the Scottish Executive did not resign and Salmond demonstrated his leadership skills by calling a media briefing, directly challenging the opposition by threatening to call new elections. Eventually a week later a new Budget deal was passed in Parliament with the support of both Labour and the Liberal-Democrats and the authority of the new FM upon the Scottish political stage was firmly established for the following months7. During his first term as FM, Salmond was also able to propose consensual policies – such as the removal of tuition fees, the defence of the National Health Service or the protection of universal benefits or free care for the elderly that could be accepted by a majority of MSPs whatever their political obedience.

7 After 2011 the absolute majority gained by the SNP at the Scottish elections enabled FM Alex Salmond to have a free rein in order to promote his priorities and consolidate his leadership.8

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Relations with London

8 In addition to the Scottish situation, the UK political context has also been of some importance for the political autonomy of the First Minister and the assertion of his authority. Between 1999 and 2007 the successive Labour-dominated coalitions and Labour-led executives in Scotland coincided with New Labour governments and Tony Blair’s Premiership in London. There were close links between Labour ministers in London and Edinburgh, the presence of several important Scottish ministers in the UK Government such as Gordon Brown, Robin Cook or Alastair Darling facilitating these connections.9 In practice, Scottish ministers often had to refer to their London counterparts or contemplate what the Labour Party leadership in the centre would think of their initiatives.

9 Because of his previous experience as a long-serving Westminster MP and member of the Labour Cabinet between 1997 and 1999, Donald Dewar was naturally at ease to deal with the London leadership when he became First Minister. However, he got involved in a turf war with the first post-devolution Scotland Secretary within the British Government John Reid. Henry McLeish could also rely on his experience as an MP and on his London, networks established as a Minister of State for the Scottish Office from 1997 to 1999.10

10 As for Jack McConnell, he was a political outsider to Westminster lacking the networks of contacts in London and the FM least dependent on London for his position.11 Nevertheless he chose to align himself as much as possible with London and stick to the New Labour Government, as was the case when he decided to put the issue of the “ned culture” – anti-social behaviour – at the forefront of the Scottish political agenda. Even when Scottish policies diverged from those implemented in England, as in public- system provision for instance, McConnell kept a low profile and refused to play up the issue before the British Government, contrary to the situation at the same moment in Wales, where First Minister Rhodri Morgan openly capitalized on traditional “Old Labour” values, claiming to put “clear red water” between him and Blair.12

11 In 2007 the situation changed with different parties at the two executive levels. The establishment of an SNP government in Edinburgh was a major test for the devolution settlement. Although many observers had anticipated regular internal conflicts and a possible breakdown of the system in the context of divided party control, informal links and a working collaboration were gradually established between ministers in Edinburgh and in London. At First Minister level Alex Salmond worked hand in hand with the British government on issues of UK importance such as the Glasgow Airport terrorist attack in 2007 or the 10th anniversary of the foot-and-mouth crisis in 2011. However, on regular occasions there were real arguments between the Scottish Executive and Westminster, on topics such as energy policy, the removal of Trident submarines or Treasury funding. During the financial crisis Alex Salmond expressed a clear divergence with the solution implemented by Gordon Brown in order to save the Scottish banks HBoS and RBS. But the high-profile row between Salmond and London concerned the future of the convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset al-Megrahi – who was later released by the Scottish Government on compassionate grounds on account of his terminal illness in the face of huge criticism from the US and others. After 2010 with the Conservative David Cameron in charge in London, Salmond often “played the

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Scottish card” in order to resist Westminster cuts, and the renewed legitimacy provided by his electoral triumph at the 2011 elections enabled him to directly challenge the British Prime Minister in the negotiations around the terms of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum.13

Taking policy initiatives

12 In order to assert their authority upon the Scottish political stage, the successive First Ministers have used their office in order to put their stamp on Scottish politics by promoting specific and/or symbolic policy initiatives.

13 At the beginning of his mandate Henry McLeish decided to put the emphasis on the issue of free health care for the elderly, a social measure that should be funded by the Scottish Executive. Although the idea was rather popular among Scottish opinion, it was very controversial within Scottish and British politics. Notably the previous FM Donald Dewar, the majority of the members of McLeish’s Cabinet including his Health Minister and the majority of Labour MSPs as well as the Labour Government in London, were all favourable to the idea that the state should finance health care costs for elderly people through means testing. But McLeish decided to do otherwise on this prominent welfare issue. By doing so he distanced himself from his predecessor and asserted his leadership within the Executive as a whole.14 He also demonstrated the autonomy of Scottish policy towards the UK Government in front of Scottish opinion and could claim it as the major achievement of his term.

14 During his time in office FM Jack McConnell also chose to pursue distinctive flagship policies. He first made a personal political mark by promoting “environment justice” as a cross-cutting issue influencing the work of the whole Executive. Besides he promoted a series of symbolic initiatives intended to strike opinion and/or change its behaviour. There was first “One Scotland-Many Cultures”, a campaign designed to tackle the on- going problems of racism and sectarianism within Scottish society; then the “Fresh Talent initiative” aimed at arresting Scotland’s demographic decline and attracting young and skilled immigrants to come to live and work in Scotland; last but not least there was the campaign to ban smoking in Scottish public places, an initiative that gave Scotland the leadership within the United Kingdom and can be considered as McConnell’s most far-reaching achievement.15

15 As for Alex Salmond his accession to the post of First Minister in 2007 was soon followed by a spectacular gesture aimed at changing the name of the “Scottish Executive” into that of “Scottish Government”. That move had been previously tried by Henry MacLeish in 2001 but quickly stopped by Labour at Westminster. There was again some resistance to the initiative from opponents in London as well as in some Scottish media. But Salmond stayed firm and the symbolic change was soon implemented. At the same time the FM decided to drastically cut down the size of the Cabinet from twelve to six members, a way to demonstrate his willingness to put his mandate on the bases of coherent and efficient governance rather than political bargaining.

16 A few weeks after his accession to the post of FM Alex Salmond unveiled the Independence White Paper and launched a “National Conversation” with the Scottish people on Scotland’s constitutional future.16 For the new First Minister that was an opportunity not only to maintain his party's push for independence – the SNP’s “raison d’être”– but also to set Scotland’s political agenda and take Scottish – as well as British

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leadership on the key issue of the future of devolution for the years to come. Between 2007 and 2014 Salmond managed to keep the lead on the constitutional debate while adapting to the electoral realities of Scottish politics and the preferences of Scottish opinion17: first by supporting from the start the idea of a multi-option referendum including the choice of “enhanced devolution”; then two years later by promoting “fiscal autonomy” in Scotland while offering the possibility of “devolution max”, the most popular constitutional option within Scottish opinion; later by giving up the idea of delivering a referendum in 2010 while separating the issue of Scotland’s constitutional future from the 2011 Holyrood election campaign; and eventually by using his new enhanced position following the 2011 elections to impose the referendum of 2014 on the issue of Scottish independence.

Scottish leaders in the international environment

17 In order to assert their leadership successive First Ministers have tried to give their office some international visibility, by promoting Scotland abroad and developing a role in European and external affairs.18

18 First Ministers McLeish and McConnell were particularly active in personally promoting “Tartan Day” in New York and the United States. After 2007 Salmond downplayed this controversial celebration criticized for giving a stereotyped image of Scotland based on outdated “tartanry”, however he continued to promote Scotland abroad – this time more as a modern and serious nation – through the concept of the “Scottish Week”.

19 McLeish and McConnell have also been keen to develop a Diaspora strategy as the Scottish Executive launched the wider networks “Global Scots” and “Global Friends of Scotland”, in order to identify expatriates who could help through investment and/or development. Inspired by the success of the Irish experience this strategy encouraging the Scottish diaspora to invest in or return to Scotland was continued after 2007 by the SNP with 2009 being declared the year of “Homecoming”.

20 Concerning European matters Labour First Ministers sought to make the Scottish Executive sign cooperation agreements with European regions such as Catalonia, Tuscany, Bavaria, North-Rhein Westphalia or Flanders, and to develop economic partnerships with Nordic countries on common concerns or with new EU incomers such as Estonia or the Czech Republic on European structural fund matters. In 2001 McLeish signed the Declaration of Flanders with the “constitutional regions” of Europe, calling for a recognition of their position within the European Union. Throughout his mandate McConnell was personally involved in the Conference of Presidents of Regional Legislative Assemblies of Europe and was President of RegLeg (European regions with legislative powers) for one year, hosting Regleg's 5th annual meeting in Edinburgh in November 2004.

21 From a more global perspective in line with his commitment to put the emphasis on environmental policy McConnell attended the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, subsequently developing an economic link between Scotland and the South African region of Eastern Cape. Throughout his mandate McConnell also demonstrated a constant interest for Malawi, forging development programs with this developing country historically linked with Scotland.

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Eventually McConnell played a prominent role in securing the hosting of the 2014 Commonwealth Games for Glasgow.19

22 On the whole Scottish First Ministers and their executives have progressively implemented a “paradiplomacy”, based on the forging of international links and partnerships mainly in economic, commercial and cultural fields. After 2007 with the SNP in office the emphasis continued to be on a strategy of economic promotion, trade development and inward investment. However it can be argued that there has been a shift towards the emergence of a more political “protodiplomacy”, with Scotland no longer promoted as a European region or a sub-state government but as a nation-state in the making.20 Thus for instance the existing links with German Länder were minimized while those with Catalonia or Flanders – two highly autonomous regional components engaged like Scotland in the process of nation-building – were highlighted. Managing to appear as a head of state Salmond put Scotland on a par with small independent states in northern Europe, praising the example of the “arc of prosperity” – until Ireland and Iceland happened to be seriously affected by the financial crisis of 2008 – or promoting the Norwegian model. There was also more open competition between the First Minister and the London Government in the struggle for attracting foreign investments, for example with China, a country for which Salmond has demonstrated a special interest, paying three personal visits there between 2007 and 2014.

Political legitimacy and styles of leadership

23 Each of the four successive Scottish First Ministers occupied the position with his own political legitimacy, personality and leadership style.

24 The first incumbent, Donald Dewar, was very popular and uncontested at the beginning of his mandate, his position as first First Minister in a devolved Parliament looking almost like a matter of historical inevitability.21 Highly respected within his own party and Scottish politics as one of the key men who kept the devolution cause alive in Labour circles over the previous decades and the one who eventually brought back a Scottish Parliament three centuries after its dissolution, his commitment to the devolution cause has gained him the label of “Father of the Parliament” or even “Father of the Scottish nation”.22 In his first speech for the opening of the new institutions he caught the mood brilliantly.23 But that initial iconic status was soon challenged by the numerous problems of his new administration, embroiled in the access-to-ministers scandal, the spiralling cost of the Holyrood building, the row over the repeal of Section 28 on homosexuality or the exam results fiasco. Dewar had to face harsh criticisms from sections of the Scottish press who had decided devolution was a mess and achieving nothing. Although his integrity, decency and fairness were never contested in the public opinion and despite the fact that he remained close to his followers and could rely on his party’s backing, Dewar failed to be convincing with regard to the fact that, had he been the right man to deliver devolution, he was the right one to run Scotland. Reasonable, moderate, supremely cautious, not confrontational, working in a collegiate style, he was something of a reluctant leader, suspected of lacking the “messianic zeal” and authority over his team. In fact, being mainly preoccupied by the setting up of the new institutions, Dewar had little time to sponsor a personal policy area or to establish the power of the Executive facing the

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stronger legitimacy of the Scottish Parliament. Acting as a link and a buffer between Edinburgh and London he also devoted much time finding a breathing space and a workable relationship with the Secretary of State for Scotland, a position he had occupied before 1999 and from which he seemed to find it difficult to distance himself as First Minister.

25 When he became First Minister in October 2000, Dewar’s successor Henry McLeish could rely on his background as a Westminster MP and as Minister for Devolution in the Scottish Office before 1999, as well as his experience as a holder of a prominent ministerial post within the Scottish Executive after May 1999. Considered as Gordon Brown’s “protégé”, he was seen as a safe pair of hands and backed by the Labour leadership in London to take over the reins following Dewar’s death. But like Dewar before him, McLeish had to share the position of Scottish Labour leader with the Secretary of State for Scotland – this time Helen Liddell – as well as to manage the new Executive in the context of a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. The rather confused situation over the status of the First Minister with the Scottish Labour Party – with one leader for Scottish elections, and another leader for British ones – affected McLeish’s power and authority, especially as, unlike Dewar, he had not faced a Scottish election as Scottish leader.24 As a natural conciliator he adapted to the electoral reality by taking up the policies which seemed to have majority support in the Scottish Parliament, like free personal care for the elderly and putting a distinctive Scottish stamp on policies. But he failed to establish the authority of the Executive before Parliament as well his own over the Labour party in Scotland.25 His inability to control rebellion within his own ranks proved lethal to the First Minister when he got caught in the row over his Westminster constituency expenses. His inability to resolve the “Officegate” in the eyes of the public and the media, describing his actions as “a muddle, not a fiddle” led to his quick fall after only one year in office.26

26 Contrary to McLeish, McConnell was in a stronger political position within the Scottish Labour Party when he became First Minister, having used his years working in Labour’s Scottish headquarters to build a network of supporters in order to prepare for a leadership contest at some future date. He had also demonstrated his ambitions by challenging McLeish for the post of FM in 2000, gaining the support of most Labour backbenchers during the leadership contest. McConnell did provide stability for the Scottish Labour Party when he became leader, his grip on his own supporters being also eased by the decreasing importance of the Secretary of State for Scotland within the British Government after 2003. McLeish was really eager to assert his authority upon the Scottish Executive, beginning with a purge of prominent members of the Dewar and McLeish cabinets and their replacement by his own supporters when establishing his first team. Having no Westminster connections but significant experience in the previous executives as a former Finance Minister and then Education, Europe and External Affairs Minister, McConnell constantly sought to readjust the balance of power within the devolved institutions in favour of the Executive, as demonstrated by the unilateral decision to ban smoking in enclosed public places imposed by the FM in October 2004.27 He also extended the reach of the Executive within Parliament by creating the posts of Ministerial Parliamentary Aides (MPAs) and by being personally involved in the selection of members and chairs of parliamentary committees, all of whose initiatives contributing to a useful extension of his patronage power.28 Furthermore, McConnell also wanted to bind the Scottish bureaucracy closer to his Executive and accountable only to him, although it has remained part of the UK public

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service. On the whole McConnell managed to develop a core Executive in Scotland and expand his own support mechanisms within it.29

27 If McConnell demonstrated political shrewdness and authority in extending the role and resources of the office of First Minister, he had more difficulties in imposing himself as a “national leader” toward Scottish opinion. His modest credo about “doing less, better”, as well as his absence of proposals on the constitutional debate about Scotland’s future, failed to capture the people’s imagination and fuelled the criticisms about his “lack of vision” and his “New Labour conformism”. His absence of personal charisma, which had already been striking during the 2003 elections when his “recognition factor” was rather low and comparable with the one of marginal left-wing activist Tommy Sheridan, had later to suffer from the comparison with SNP’s leader Alex Salmond after 2004. During the 2007 legislative campaign although the Labour Party and the SNP were neck and neck in the polls, 43% of Scottish respondents claimed that Salmond would make the best FM, whereas only 23% supported McConnell.

Alex Salmond’s charismatic leadership

28 According to the classical Weberian definition, charismatic authority can be described as a power legitimized by a leader’s exceptional personal qualities, which creates a strong personal relationship between the leader and the political environment and inspires loyalty and obedience from followers. To what extent did Alex Salmond’s domination over the Scottish political stage during a decade or so fit into that leadership category?

29 Before becoming First Minister Alex Salmond had managed to build up a strong leadership within his own party as well as a high profile in London where he relentlessly promoted the nationalist case at Westminster and in numerous broadcast political programmes.30 By the time of the 2007 Holyrood elections he had clearly become a major electoral asset for the SNP, with polls showing him to be far more popular than the incumbent First Minister, Jack McConnell. This prompted the SNP to emphasise the contrast between the party leaders, a strategy that culminated in the party using “Alex Salmond for First Minister” instead of “SNP” as the main party identifier on the regional ballot paper.31

30 Following the result of 2007 elections Salmond’s first coup was the decision to go for a minority government, calculating it by seizing the machinery of power while maintaining party integrity, he could consolidate the SNP’s advantage.32 The decision illustrates the profile of Salmond as a risk-taker, a feature that he had the opportunity to demonstrate on later occasions, notably on the course towards the independence referendum, his major gamble.

31 When in power Salmond and his minority Government promoted an agenda based on competence, consensus and change. They produced evidence of their capacity to govern within the constraints of the devolution settlement, to make some difference on significant issues, such as transport, health, education, energy or the economy, and to implement a social contract in keeping with the values of the Scottish opinion.33 At the same time they put forward a vision of the future for Scotland and managed to keep the constitutional debate alive, by focusing on the opportunities that further steps in the devolution process would provide for Scottish interests.34 Thus the renamed Scottish Government positioned itself as an efficient alternative to the previous coalition within

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the present constitutional settlement as well as the best embodiment of the dynamics of devolution.

32 As head of the Executive Salmond could rely on an astonishing loyalty from his followers, without any dissent inside the SNP where his supremacy had been unchallenged since 2004. Within the devolved institutions and under the constraint of a minority Government he displayed at the same time authority, tactical sense, pragmatism and an ability to exploit opportunities, demonstrating his leadership skills on numerous occasions: by using the threat of a vote of confidence throughout the first three years of his mandate in order to get his policies approved by a majority of MSPs ; by showing the capacity to adapt to the situation when he decided to change the referendum agenda in 2010; or by proving his resilience and ability to take difficult decisions in the case of the release of the Lockerbie bomber. Salmond also behaved as a British leader, through the British-Irish Council, developing relationships with Cardiff, Belfast and Dublin, claiming a seat in the party leaders’ TV debates and proposing a “Lib-Lab-Nat” coalition at Westminster during the 2010 general election campaign.

33 Long before his accession to the position of First Minister, Alex Salmond had been acclaimed by the Scottish media altogether not only as an efficient and talented politician, but also as a charismatic and magnetic leader, capable of capturing the people’s imagination and inspiring fervour.35 Salmond’s charismatic domination over the Scottish stage, fuelled by his communication skills, media performances and presidential style campaigns, found in the position of First Minister an ideal environment to flourish. As Scottish Government leader, he developed a stirring, hope- inspiring narrative, finding sometimes messianic accents to evoke Scotland’s potential – like for instance in the field of renewables – and future. In a Gaullist posture he often managed to put himself above party politics. Eventually his active proto-diplomacy promoting Scotland as a nation-state in the making also contributed to making him largely identified with Scotland and reach the head of state’s status, a dimension that even David Cameron, when trying to disparage him as “El Presidente Salmondo”36, was implicitly forced to admit.

34 Salmond’s personal aura and statesmanship played a large part in the electoral triumph of the SNP during the 2011 Holyrood elections, which turned into a personality contest and a presidential race.37 From 2007 to 2011, whatever the fortunes of his party Salmond had benefited from permanent net positive ratings in the polls and on polling day, 52% of the Scottish electorate thought Salmond would make the best FM, against 33% supporting one of the four alternative possibilities and only 17% supporting his main rival Ian Gray.38 Salmond’s charismatic domination over the Scottish political scene had reached an unprecedented height.39

Conclusion

35 Since 1999, the successive First Ministers have struggled to put their stamp upon Scottish politics within the framework of the devolved institutions. The initial constitutional settlement was largely favourable to the Scottish Parliament, considered as the democratic embodiment of Scottish society and the main source of legitimacy for Scottish policies. Successive FMs had thus to reverse the balance of power between the executive and legislative powers, as well as to impose their grip within a Cabinet system of government. The establishment of their leadership had to go through a

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number of identified institutional hurdles and within a complex and multi-level environment involving their internal legitimacy within their own party, the control of their political majority at Holyrood, the communication with Scottish opinion and media as well as a potentially problematic relationship with the British Government. On the whole one of the most visible trends of Scottish politics since 1999 has been the rise of the executive power and the affirmation of its leader, on the British model and following recent trends in contemporary democracies.40

36 By reference to the initial typology suggested in the introduction of the article, successive Scottish FMs can be mostly seen as game-changers, creating then strengthening the newly established Scottish Executive in search of legitimacy. The first two FMs were in post for a short period of time, the first one at a time of transition during the early months of devolution. Three out the four FMs occupied their position in a context of coalition governments and of similar majorities in London. The fourth FM had to deal with a situation of a minority government before eventually obtaining an absolute majority, in both cases with a diverging majority at Westminster. If Dewar was the architect of the new institutions and had little time to develop the office of FM, following leaders tried to establish their power and increase their resources, largely building on the arrangements they inherited. As heads of government as well as party leaders, they notably sought to distance themselves from collective responsibility within their Cabinet, develop their core executive, extend their initially limited patronage power, increase their grip on policy making, promote specific flagship policies and establish their visibility on the European and international stage. McConnell was particularly active and innovative in establishing the Scottish FM power within the devolved institutions in the specific context of a coalition government.

37 Salmond brought a new dimension to the office of Scottish First Minister. If like Dewar before him, he could rely on a strong partisan and popular legitimacy before taking the position, he managed to display management credibility and to develop a dynamic relation with his followers and the opinion when becoming FM. His aptitude to communicate a strong and positive narrative, his uncontested authority within his own camp and his capacity to exploit the Scottish card when dealing with London, all brought the conditions for an effective leadership in Scotland, despite the restrictive context of a minority government. Eventually Salmond’s personal charismatic domination over the Scottish political stage made the First Ministerial position turn presidential, a situation which has been reinforced after 2011 in the unprecedented context of a one-party majority government.

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NOTES

1. The 1998 Scotland Act established a Scottish Parliament of 129 members (MSPs) – 73 elected by the first-past-the-post for individual constituencies and 56 elected proportionally from party lists in regional constituencies, all elected for a fixed four-year-term with high hurdles against dissolution at any time. The Scottish Parliament was given extensive powers of primary legislation in “devolved areas” such as education and training, housing and planning, health, social work, law and order, economic development and transport, local government, the administration of European structural funds as well as limited fiscal powers confined to the possibility of varying the British rate of income tax by up to 3p in the pound. Meanwhile the Westminster Parliament was keeping the reserved powers in the main fields of defence, foreign affairs, social security, fiscal and monetary policy, employment relations, immigration, energy, nuclear safety and the constitution. Besides a Scottish Executive was established, led by a First Minister chosen among the MPs and submitted by the President Officer to the Queen for formal

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appointment. The first Scottish Parliament elections took place in May 1999. Nigel Forman, Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom (London, Routledge, 2002). 2. David Arter, The Scottish Parliament. A Scandinavian-style Assembly (London, Frank Cass, 2004), Eberhard Bort, Christopher Harvie, ‘After the Albatross: a new start for the Scottish Parliament?’, Scottish Affairs, 50, 2005, pp. 26-38, Charles Jeffery, James Mitchell (eds.), The Scottish Parliament 1999-2009: The First Decade (Edinburgh, Luath Press/Hansard Society, 2009), David McCrone, ‘A Parliament for a People: Holyrood in an Understated Nation’, Scottish Affairs, 50, 2005, pp. 1-26, Robert McLean, ‘Gallant Crusader or Cautious Persuader? Donald Dewar’s role in securing Scotland’s Parliament’, Scottish Affairs, 34, 2001, pp. 1-10, James Mitchell, Devolution in the United Kingdom (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2009), Lindsay Paterson, ‘Scottish Democracy and Scottish Utopias: the first year of the Scottish Parliament’, Scottish Affairs, 33, 2000, pp. 45-61, Brian Taylor, The Scottish Parliament (Edinburgh, Polygon, 1999), Alan Trench (ed.), Has Devolution Made a Difference? The State of the Nations (Exeter, Imprint Academic, 2004), Alan Trench (ed.), The Dynamics of Devolution. The State of the Nations (Exeter, Imprint Academic, 2005). 3. James Mitchell, ‘Third Year, Third First Minister’, in Robert Hazell (ed.), The State of the Nations (Exeter, Imprint Academic, 2003). 4. A coalition governement was made almost inevitable by the importance of proportional representation within the electoral system. The first Scottish Parliament elections in 1999 resulted in the election of 56 Labour, 35 SNP, 18 Conservative, 17 Liberal-Democrats, 1 Socialist, 1 Independent and 1 Green MSPs. Although being the leading party with 39% of votes, the Scottish Labour Party had to conclude an alliance with the Lib-Dems in order to secure a majority in the first Holyrood Parliament. The following elections in 2003 resulted in an even more diversified representation (the so-called “rainbow Parliament”), with the Labour Party losing 7 seats, and an electoral coalition between Labour (50 MSPs) and the Lib-Dems (17 MSPs) being necessary again in order to reach the majority of 65 MSPs at Holyrood. 5. Richard Parry, ‘The Scottish Executive and the challenges of complex policy making’, The Political Quarterly, 74: 4, 2003, pp. 450-458. 6. Peter Jones, ‘The Smooth Wooing: the SNP’s Victory in the 2007 Scottish Parliament Elections’, Scottish Affairs, 60, 2007, pp. 6-23. Robert Johns, James Mitchell, David Denver and Charles Pattie, Voting for a Scottish Government: the Scottish Parliament elections of 2007 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010). 7. Gerry Hassan (ed.), The Modern SNP from Protest to Power (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 8. John Curtice, ‘The 2011 Scottish Election: records tumble, barriers breached’, Scottish Affairs, 76, 2011, pp. 51-73. 9. Gerry Hassan (ed.), The Scottish Labour Party (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2004). 10. Henry McLeish, Scotland First. Truth and Consequences (Edinburgh, Mainstream, 2004). 11. Davidson, Laura, Lucky Jack: Scotland’s First Minister (Edinburgh, Black & White Publishing, 2005). 12. Michael Keating, The Government of Scotland (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2010). 13. David Torrance, ‘A tale of two elections’, Scottish Affairs, 76, 2011, pp. 10-32. 14. Peter Lynch, ‘Governing Devolution: understanding the office of FM in Scotland and Wales’, Parliamentary Affairs, 59: 3, 2006, p. 427. 15. Hamish Macdonnel, Unchartered Territory. The Story of Scottish Devolution, 1999-2009 (London, Politico’s, 2009). 16. Scottish Government, Choosing Scotland’s Future. A National Conversation. Independence and Responsibility in the Modern World (Edinburgh, Scottish Government, 2007). 17. Michael Harvey, Peter Lynch, ‘Inside the National Conversation: the SNP Government and the Politics of Independence 2007-2010’, Scottish Affairs, 80, 2012, pp. 91-116.

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18. Scottish Executive, European Strategy (Edinburgh, Scottish Executive, 2004). Scottish Executive, International Strategy (Edinburgh, Scottish Executive, 2004). 19. Hamish Macdonnel, Unchartered Territory. The Story of Scottish Devolution, 1999-2009 (London, Politico’s, 2009), p. 236. 20. Michael Keating, The Government of Scotland (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 161-164. 21. Robert MacLean, ‘Gallant crusader or cautious persuader? Donald Dewar’s role in securing Scotland’s Parliament’, Scottish Affairs, 34, 2001, pp. 1-10. 22. Wendy Alexander (ed.), Donald Dewar: Scotland’s First Minister (Edinburgh, Mainstream, 2005). 23. Lindsay Paterson, ‘Scottish democracy and Scottish utopias: the first year of the Scottish Parliament’, Scottish Affairs, 33 2000, pp. 45-61. 24. Peter Lynch, ‘Governing Devolution: understanding the office of FM in Scotland and Wales’, Parliamentary Affairs, 59: 3, 2006, pp. 420-436. 25. Gerry Hassan, Chris Warhurst (eds.), Anatomy of the New Scotland, Power, Influence and Change (Edinburgh, Mainstream, 2002). 26. Hamish Macdonnel, Unchartered Territory. The Story of Scottish Devolution, 1999-2009 (London, Politico’s, 2009), pp. 63-72. 27. Eberhard Bort, Christopher Harvie, ‘After the Albatross: a new start for the Scottish Parliament?’, Scottish Affairs, 50, 2005, pp. 26-38. 28. Keating, Michael, Carney, Paul, ‘A New Elite? Politicians and civil servants in Scotland after devolution’, Parliamentary Affairs, 59: 1, 2006, pp. 1-17. 29. Peter Lynch, ‘Governing Devolution: understanding the office of FM in Scotland and Wales’, Parliamentary Affairs, 59: 3, 2006, p. 435. 30. Peter Lynch, The History of the Scottish National Party (Cardiff, Welsh Academic Press, 2002). 31. Leith Murray, E. Crawford, The Role of Charismatic Leadership in a Nationalist Movement – A Case Study, University of the West of Scotland, unpublished paper, 2010. 32. Christopher Harvie, ‘A Year with Salmond’, Scottish Affairs, 65, 2008, pp. 38-46. 33. Gilles Leydier, ‘Devolution: the next stakes’, in Susan Finding, Moya Jones and Philippe Cauvet (eds), Unfinished Business, Governance and the Four Nations: Devolution in the UK (Bordeaux, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2011). 34. Michael Harvey, Peter Lynch, ‘Inside the National Conversation: the SNP Government and the Politics of Independence 2007-2010’, Scottish Affairs, 80, 2012, pp. 91-116. 35. David Torrance, Salmond against the Odds (Edinburgh, Birlinn, 2010). 36. David Torrance, ‘A Tale of two Elections’, Scottish Affairs 76, 2011, p. 28. 37. Andrew Whitaker, ‘Holyrood elections will be a battle of leaders’, The Scotsman, 14 October 2010. 38. John Curtice, ‘The 2011 Scottish Election: records tumble, barriers breached’, Scottish Affairs, 76, 2011, pp. 51-73. 39. David Denver, ‘Another Historic Moment: the Scottish Parliament elections 2011’, Scottish Affairs, 76, 2011, pp. 33-50. 40. Andrew Blick, George Jones, Premiership (London, Imprint Academic, 2010); Michael Foley, The British Presidency (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2001).

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ABSTRACTS

This article analyses the achievements of the Scottish First Ministers in the original context of Scotland's newly-created devolved institutions between 1999 and 2014. It notably focuses on the role and power of these political leaders, the conditions which have framed their leadership, the way successive First Ministers have built their legitimacy and influence, faced challenges and constraints, interacted with their supporters and dealt with public opinion and the media.

Cet article analyse l’action des First Ministers écossais dans le cadre des nouvelles institutions décentralisées entre 1999 et 2014. Il étudie notamment le rôle joué et le pouvoir exercé par ces leaders politiques, les conditions qui ont permis à leur leadership d’émerger et de se développer, la manière avec laquelle ces dirigeants successifs ont construit leur légitimité et leur influence, fait face aux défis et contraintes liées à la fonction, interagi avec leurs partisans et communiqué avec l’opinion publique et les média.

INDEX

Mots-clés: Premiers Ministres écossais, dévolution, pouvoir, leadership Keywords: Scottish First Ministers, devolution, power, leadership

AUTHOR

GILLES LEYDIER Université de Toulon, BABEL EA 2649. Gilles Leydier est Professeur de civilisation britannique à l'Université de Toulon. Ses recherches portent sur l'histoire politique et les institutions britanniques et écossaises.

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Twenty Years of Devolution in Scotland: the End of a British Party System? Vingt ans de dévolution en Écosse : fin d’un système politique britannique ?

Fiona Simpkins

Introduction

1 It is ironic that in the midst of a fierce debate over the United Kingdom’s future after it leaves the European Union, Roger Awan-Scully would remark upon the similarities between the UK and European Parliaments “whose members are all democratically chosen, but from a disconnected series of separate national contests”. This, he concludes, “is deeply problematic for the long-term unity and integrity of the UK”.1 In fact, the European referendum results of June 2016 revealed a striking contrast in the way the different constituent nations of the UK voted: while Scotland overwhelmingly supported continued European membership with a 62% vote in favour of “Remain”, together with Northern Ireland where the border counties and Belfast also voted “Remain” as a majority, both England and Wales decisively voted to leave the European Union. Yet, the geographical divides that characterised the outcome of the European referendum should have come as no surprise given the increasingly divergent electoral results of the last two decades in each of the four UK nations. The questions raised by the outcome of the European referendum over the integrity of the UK, with the risks posed by the return of a hard border in Northern Ireland and the possibility of a second independence referendum in Scotland, are symptomatic of the changes that have affected the British political landscape since the late 1990s. While the roots of divergent political patterns across the UK may lay in the 1960s and 1970s with the emergence of the nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales and the long decline of the Conservatives north of the border, as Roger Awan-Scully suggests, we shall contend that the

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introduction of devolution to Scotland and Wales in 1999 had the most direct and immediate impact on British party politics.

2 Admittedly, devolution itself was introduced to rebalance political power in the UK. In James Mitchell’s view, “the whole point of the Parliament was that it was meant to insulate Scotland from a Tory government”2 after the idea of a democratic deficit became widespread during the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s for which there was no majority in Scotland. Yet, with the dominant position of the Labour party in Scotland in the late 1990s and the structural mechanisms integrated within the Scottish Parliament project by the Scottish Constitutional Convention to guarantee smooth inter-governmental relations and prevent the likelihood of a nationalist majority, there was little to suggest how rapidly and sharply Scotland’s electoral landscape would diverge from that of its southern neighbour.3

3 To the fracture between both ends of the political spectrum, new divides have now been added that cut across it along both nationalist and unionist, as well as pro- European and Eurosceptic fault lines. This has led to the emergence of a distinctive Scottish political debate which produces very different electoral results to those south of the border. The June 2017 general election results are a case in point as Prime Minister Theresa May’s majority in Parliament was only saved thanks to the surprising addition of thirteen Scottish Conservative MPs. While the Corbynite youth movement failed to take hold of Scotland where youths were widely radicalised and mobilised by the independence movement, the success of the Scottish Conservatives was largely due to their leader’s decision to differ from the Westminster leadership of the party and run a distinctively Scottish campaign that successfully combined unionism and conservatism.4 It appears that the Scottish electorate no longer responds to Westminster politics in a similar way to that of the rest of the country and that devolution has created a de facto separate political system which spells the end of UK party politics. This paper therefore seeks to examine British party politics in light of the last twenty years of devolution in Scotland and assess the impact of devolution on both the Labour and the Conservative parties, suggesting that both parties’ responses to devolution have been key to the increasing rift between Scotland and the rest of the UK.

The rise of Scottish nationalism

4 The SNP’s electoral breakthrough of 2007 set a momentum for deeper political change in Scotland. Although it only obtained one more seat in the Scottish Parliament election of May 2007 than its Labour rival (47 seats to Labour’s 46 seats), the SNP’s formation of a minority government paved the way for its success at the May 2011 Scottish Parliament elections when it managed to obtain an overall majority of seats despite an electoral system explicitly designed to prevent this from happening. The formidable rise to power of the SNP in Edinburgh did not, however, appear to correspond to any surge in either an exclusively Scottish identity or to separatism. The successive Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys published between May 1999 when the Scottish Parliament first came into existence and the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 (after which the question was no longer included in the surveys) show neither a hardened sense of identity in Scotland nor stronger separatist feelings among Scots. The results of the surveys showed that there was no marked movement in

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favour of independence before the Scottish independence referendum of September 2014, as shown in the graph below: 28% of Scots were in favour of independence in 1999 when the Scottish Parliament first opened, 23% in 2007, 32% in 2011, 24% in 2012 and 32% in 2014 on the eve of the Scottish independence referendum.

Support for independence 1997-2014

Source : Results compiled from Scottish Election Studies (1992-1997), Scottish Referendum Survey and Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys (1999-2014).

5 Neither did devolution affect Scottish national identity. The Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys admittedly witnessed a steep rise of the percentage of people who considered themselves “Scottish and not British” and rejected a dual identity between 1992 and the introduction of devolution in Scotland in 1999 (from 19% in 1992, when the question was first asked, to 33% in 1997 and 32% in 1999). Indeed, this can be explained by the rejection of the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s as well as initial enthusiasm for devolution in Scotland. However, this trend has tended to stabilise since then (28 % in 2016) while the number of people who considered themselves as equally Scottish and British has risen slightly, particularly on the eve of the 2014 independence referendum (32% in 2014 and 29% in 2016). In fact, all trends have been remarkably stable since the 1997 referendum, which suggests that neither devolved politics in Scotland, SNP electoral victories or the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 have durably affected Scottish national identity in the last twenty years.

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Scottish identity on the Moreno scale, 1992-2016

Source: Results compiled from Scottish Election Studies (1992-1997), Scottish Referendum Survey 1997, Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys (1999-2016), ICM (2009).

6 In fact, according to an April 2018 BBC poll by YouGov, the percentage of people in Scotland who strongly identify themselves (61%) or fairly strongly identify themselves (23%) as being Scottish is equivalent to the percentage of people who strongly identify themselves (58%) or fairly strongly identify themselves (25%) as being English south of the border. Besides, similarly to Scotland where national identity trends have remained stable, polls have indicated that there was no hardening of an English identity either.5 Yet, the idea that national identities in the UK have become stronger in recent years and are weakening the British Union has become commonplace. A series of Policy Exchange polls by Deltapoll of May 2018 found that 60% of people polled believed that people today identify more with their home nation than with the UK than five or ten years ago, 15% believed that people identify more with the UK as a whole and 19% believed there was no difference. A majority of people also believed that stronger national identities in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were weakening the UK with 17% believing they weakened the UK a lot, 39% a little and a minority (26%) not at all. Overall, most people held pessimistic views of the future of the British Union with 52% believing it would not hold together within the next hundred years and only 19% believing it would. If these widely held beliefs are not supported by any sharp surge in national identities in the UK, they most likely reflect the rise of the SNP in Scotland and the growing political divergences between UK nations.

7 Indeed, while the SNP had trouble making any real electoral breakthrough in general elections due to the first-past-the-post system and the fluctuating support for the party before the introduction of devolution, the Scottish Parliament and its semi- proportional electoral system provided the Nationalists with a new political platform and an ideal constitutional set-up to advance the case of independence.6 Prior to devolution in 1999, the SNP had sought to win a majority of seats at Westminster and

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use that as a mandate for independence but any substantial electoral success failed to materialise as the party was set back by the first-past-the-post system and had trouble bridging internal divisions between gradualists, in favour of a step by step approach to independence, and fundamentalists, advocating independence and nothing less. These divisions were largely overcome after devolution was introduced: while a Scottish Parliament fitted well with the gradualists’ strategy, fundamentalists found that the Scotland Act 1998 created a new institutional structure in which the party would be better able to win votes and seats thanks to its semi-proportional electoral system. Some within the party considered that Holyrood would serve as an easier political and institutional platform to hold an independence referendum as it made the prospect of an electoral majority more likely.

8 The SNP’s strategy for independence therefore came to rest upon government office in the Scottish Parliament as it presented several key advantages. The first was that the SNP was able to use the powers and responsibilities held by the Scottish Parliament in key matters such as health, education, agriculture, fishing and fisheries, or the environment, to name but a few, to articulate distinctive policies which fit well with the overall centre-left consensus in Scottish politics, such as abolishing prescription charges, scrapping bridge tolls or replacing the council tax with a local income tax. These policies would also be given more traction as the Nationalists could present their party as the only party with no British counterpart that could speak for Scotland and defend its distinctive interests. In doing so, the SNP would also exploit the flaws of the new constitutional set-up itself to demand more powers for the Scottish Parliament, short of independence. This strategy therefore enabled the party to decouple voting SNP from independence as it made independence much less immediate. The discrepancy between the percentage of votes obtained by the SNP at Scottish Parliament elections and the level of support for independence suggests that this decoupling strategy was successfully achieved. While the SNP obtained 32.9% of the constituency vote in 2007, support for independence was as low as 23% according to Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys of that same year. Likewise, the Nationalists obtained 45.4% of the constituency vote in 2011, although support for independence then stood at 32%. While the Nationalists managed to form a minority government in 2007, their attitude to an independence referendum during their first term in government suggests their awareness of the limited support for independence in Scotland despite their positive electoral scores. Indeed, the party prudently proposed holding an independence referendum in the latter stages of a Scottish parliamentary term and preferred holding a vast public consultation on independence first, significantly named National Conversation.

9 After having been on the fringes of political power at Westminster for years, the SNP became Scotland’s second political party as soon as the 2003 Scottish Parliament election. Its formation of a minority government in 2007 enabled it to assert its competence over key economic and social issues in Scotland whilst attempting to develop at the same time a support base for its flagship separatist policy. Its avowed strategy was to show that it was able to deliver on key policy pledges and boost voter confidence in relation to a further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament, before perhaps full independence for Scotland. Yet, it was only after the SNP unexpectedly won a majority of seats in 2011 on a manifesto explicitly pledging to organise an independence referendum, that the party was able to build up on its promises and launch the Scottish independence referendum of 18th September 2014.

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Although the issue of independence had long been the party’s raison d’être and been presented as its primary objective at a number of elections over time, it was only after the SNP obtained 69 seats, thus achieving to form the first majority government in Edinburgh, that Scotland’s other political parties recognised the SNP’s mandate to do so.

10 In his seminal study of the SNP, Peter Lynch notes that the Nationalists’ unexpected electoral success in 2011 and the opportunity provided to organise an independence referendum meant that the party had little room for error in devising its strategy ahead of the referendum.7 Whilst the idea of a two-step referendum on enhanced devolution and independence had been floated during their first term in government, polls indicated that there was no widespread support for independence but that enhanced devolution appeared as a majority’s preferred option. The Scottish Social Attitudes Survey of 2011 indicated that independence was only supported by 32%, compared to 58% support for enhanced devolution. The two-option referendum thus appearing counterproductive, and even threatening to the SNP’s desired outcome, the intergovernmental negotiations with the UK government and the Edinburgh Agreement signed on 15th October 2012 therefore led to the setting up of a single question referendum on Scotland’s independence. Yet, the main difficulty remained that of securing a Yes vote to deliver independence: the Nationalists would have to run an “uphill struggle” type of campaign to convince a majority of heretofore sceptical voters to change their minds about Scottish independence.8

11 The referendum campaign ran from May 2012 to September 2014, with the Yes campaign having opted for a long campaign in order to allow itself sufficient time to build momentum and support for independence across Scotland whilst the No campaign was short (May to September 2014) and focused negatively on specific issues such as the economy and business interests, the currency used by an independent Scotland or EU membership among others.9 The analysis of the Yes campaign and the conversion of large numbers of people to support independence from a relatively low existing base have been discussed at length.10 Indeed, Yes Scotland’s strategies and organisation serve as an interesting example of a single-issue campaign successfully growing into a mass social movement which continued to expand after it lost the referendum of September 2014, having achieved 45% of the vote. Although its outcome was the status quo, the long independence referendum campaign appears to have transformed Scottish politics on a much deeper level than might have been expected. SNP membership soared as it became the third largest political party in the UK and its electoral results soon followed suit as the May 2015 general election results returned a “nationalist tsunami”11 of 56 SNP MPs to Westminster out of a total of 59, sending shockwaves in UK political circles.

12 The May 2016 Scottish Parliament election results – albeit less spectacular – confirmed the profound changes that had appeared in the Scottish political debate as the SNP secured a third term in government, falling only two seats short of a second consecutive overall majority in the Scottish Parliament. The division between the pro- independence parties led by the SNP within the Yes campaign and the three main unionist parties sharing a single political platform within the Better Together campaign has appeared to survive the referendum and created a new binary system centred along a fracture between unionists and nationalists. The three partners of the Better Together campaign represented both the left and right wings of the political

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spectrum, yet their association to represent a common position within a single organization during the independence referendum campaign suggests that these traditional left/right divisions were largely made redundant when the main issue at stake was the constitutional future of Scotland.

Unionist parties and devolution: the case of Labour

13 Although Scottish Labour and the Scottish Conservatives shared a unionist platform, there were significant differences in their attitudes towards devolution and Scotland’s constitutional position. The Labour party had fully participated in the Scottish Constitutional Convention and introduced devolution under Prime Minister Tony Blair, but the Conservative party had been traditionally opposed to devolution which, it claimed with considerable foreboding, would serve as a “slippery slope to independence”. The introduction of devolution to Scotland in 1999 was therefore apprehended in a very different way by each party and a comparison of both parties’ structural and organizational evolution since 1999 may give some clues as to the impact of devolution on each party’s electoral fortunes in the last twenty years. Indeed, both parties had to adapt to the new political structures introduced by devolution and embodied by the new Scottish Parliament, but also to a distinctly Scottish political debate, removed from the pan-British political system in which both parties had been hegemonic since the post-war period. While comparative studies on multi-level party politics suggest that there is often a declining capacity of the major parties to maintain political hegemony due not only to a proliferation of new party alternatives, as is the case in Scotland, but also to a pluralization of political rifts with the classical functional divides of class and religion losing saliency in structuring party competition, they also point to regional advocacy as a central strand of sub-state party competition.12 In other words, campaigning on specific Scottish issues and in defence of distinct Scottish interests became key to winning elections. However, this was all the more difficult for UK-wide parties such as Labour and the Conservatives as the context of governing diverged between Westminster and Holyrood. Both parties soon struggled to elaborate uniform party strategies and policy platforms which would be satisfactory to voters north and south of the border and provide solutions and benefits to all parts of Britain despite each nation’s distinctive economic and social characteristics, interests and concerns. Besides, the constitutional issue proved to be a particular stumbling block for Labour. While the two main British parties needed to find programmatic answers to the SNP’s demands for independence, the Labour party found it perhaps more arduous to propose a satisfactory compromise between the SNP’s independence stance and the Conservatives’ status quo and to adopt a clear position within the starkly polarized unionist-separatist political divide. We shall see that the European referendum of June 2016 and the Brexit process would further exacerbate those difficulties as the Remain/ Leave divide followed neither strict partisan lines, nor the constitutional divide.

14 Until 2007, Labour was in power in both London and Edinburgh and while coalition politics in the latter provided some degree of divergence, partisan harmony and policy coherence were facilitated by the party’s electoral hegemony as well as a common political ground shared by the leaderships of both the UK and Scottish parties. Laffin et al. note that conflicts between the UK party and the Scottish party were few and far between while Labour was in power in both Westminster and Holyrood, thus indicating

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either a high degree of party consensus or strict leadership efforts to avoid overt disagreements by marginalising opponents, stifling contradictory demands, shaping rules or managing the decision-making process.13 Indeed, there appeared to be a strong impetus to respect the message and creed of British Labour and a top-down approach to policy was itself ensured by the then highly centralised structure of the party.

15 Admittedly, Labour did take into account to at least some degree the need to decentralise some policy-making responsibilities after having introduced devolution. A new Scottish Policy Forum was created in 1998. It was modelled after the National Policy Forum, responsible for UK policy development, and would propose and elaborate policy ideas in devolved matters. Its recommendations would be subjected to the decision of the Scottish Conference and, if approved, could be added to the Scottish manifesto. Besides, the Scottish Conference, which had only held an advisory function before devolution, became a sovereign body capable of determining by a two-thirds majority which devolved policy item could form part of the Scottish Labour party’s programme and perhaps be included in its manifesto. However, the final drafting of the manifesto remained the responsibility of a committee equally drawn from the Scottish Executive Committee and the Scottish Parliamentary Labour Group and these changes therefore continued to imply a continuous top-down process involving the party leadership rather than a bottom-up approach to policy. Reserved matters were furthermore decided by the national policy procedures within the National Executive Committee and Scottish Labour was allowed very little input with its modest contribution of 12 members out of a total of 180 in the National Policy Forum. Although the responsibility of candidate selection was entrusted to the Scottish Executive Committee (SEC) for Holyrood selections, the National Executive Committee – to which the SEC remains accountable – kept jurisdiction over all other selections. Finally, the relative autonomy of the Scottish party was also minimized by the material support of the UK party upon which the Scottish party has become increasingly dependent14, thereby tempering divergence in policy choices.

16 The Scottish Labour party was nonetheless able to somewhat overcome this structural straitjacket and pursue a divergent political path to that proposed by the pro-business market-oriented New Labour party in London while it was in government. Yet this was due to Scotland’s distinct institutional landscape and to the new centre-left consensus that emerged in the Scottish Parliament. In contrast to its British counterpart in Westminster, Scottish Labour had to compete with other centre-left parties rather than the Conservative party. Rather than being fought across the left-right continuum, the Scottish electoral battle took place in a left to centre arena with the constitutional question cutting across it, thus requiring a more flexible approach to policy. One of the main divergences came over the question of tuition fees as a result of the coalition agreement between Scottish Labour and the Scottish Liberal-Democrats. The latter having argued in favour of scrapping tuition fees altogether in Scotland, a compromise was reached between the two partners of the new Scottish Executive and a Graduate Endowment Grant scheme was introduced in Scotland with the Education (Graduate Endowment and Student Support) (Scotland) Act 2001, whereby students would not have to pay for their tuition fees up front but would reimburse a fixed amount of £2,289 after having graduated. Some areas of policy such as education or health therefore inevitably diverged north and south of the border, yet there were surprisingly few clashes over policy and party discipline appeared to have prevailed. The row over free personal care to the elderly was the most notable exception as its introduction in

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Scotland made it difficult for British Labour to argue that the policy was unaffordable without appearing incoherent.15 Yet, the Scottish party itself was bitterly divided over the issue and the row did not, therefore, represent a straightforward conflict between the UK and Scottish parties. In fact, it was not before November 2007 that a true rift did emerge between both parties. Unsurprisingly, the bone of contention was that of an independence referendum which former Scottish leader Wendy Alexander called for during a live BBC interview (the famous “Bring it on” episode). Her bold move was not supported by her colleagues in London or by the Prime Minister. She was thereafter obliged to back down and was shunned by the Labour leadership when she became caught up in a campaign funding scandal which ultimately led to her resignation. The episode suggested that policy divergences were admitted so long as they concerned devolved matters and did not question or undermine the Labour party’s brand politics and message. Yet, it also pointed to the inherent weakness of the Scottish Labour party as it had to choose between the cohesive electoral message of the party as a whole and its own electoral priorities in a different political landscape.

17 Indeed, Labour’s position on the political spectrum in Scotland’s devolved political environment has proved to be particularly problematic. While its UK counterpart faces little competition to the left, Scottish Labour has to contend with several left and centre-left parties, including the SNP, RISE (which was formed out of the union of several radical movements active in the independence referendum campaign) and the Scottish Greens. There are, for instance, few differences to be found between Labour and the SNP on a wide set of issues, as both parties broadly agree on opposing cuts to public services and protecting the welfare system, opposing the renewal of Trident and supporting a living wage. This makes it particularly difficult for Labour to distinguish its political programme and brand message from the other centre-left to left parties in Scotland, notably with that of the SNP, whose leader, Nicola Sturgeon, remains the most popular political figure in Scotland.

18 In contrast, Scottish Labour has had eight different leaders since the introduction of devolution with few high-profile figures among them. With party heavyweights and ambitious young politicians preferring to build their careers in Westminster, the Scottish Labour party’s electoral scores have consequently suffered from its lacklustre leaderships and campaigns. Besides, the radical momentum created by Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership election in September 2015 failed to take hold of Scotland where the core issue of Scotland’s constitutional future and the radical character of the pro- independence movement during the referendum debate in Scotland have acted as a substitute to the kind of radicalism that has attracted young activists back to Labour elsewhere in Britain, notably through the student fees protests south of the border. In a nation where there are no student fees, the political awakening of young voters came not with the fees movement but with the independence campaign.16 Scottish Labour has consequently failed to renew its membership and voter bases as the young radical vote in Scotland has now defected to pro-independence parties, not least to the SNP whose members below the age of 30 account for 21% of its total membership.

19 Finally, Scottish Labour’s position over the constitutional future of Scotland has plagued the party since the independence referendum of 2014. Scottish Labour’s doomed decision to participate in the Better Together No campaign alongside the two coalition government partners of the time has durably damaged the party’s image, firstly because it stood on the same political platform as the Conservatives and

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secondly because of the negativity of the Better Together campaign. The Better Together campaign was led by a senior Labour figure, Alistair Darling, and became an easy target for the SNP, which could present the umbrella campaign as a Conservative- led initiative which gathered three British rather than Scottish parties and generally defended austerity policies and welfare cuts. The 2014 referendum campaign has therefore lastingly damaged the Labour party’s image in Scotland as well as its electoral scores.

20 The Scottish Labour party was almost wiped out in the 2015 general election and only retained a single seat in Scotland, like both its unionist rivals, while the SNP won 56 out of the 59 Scottish Westminster seats. It then lost 13 seats in the May 2016 Scottish Parliament elections and was unable to take advantage of the outcome of the June 2016 European referendum in which a majority of Scots voted Remain. Indeed, Scottish Labour only managed to win a handful of seats (7) in the 2017 general election despite the extraordinary circumstances created by the Brexit context. The Labour party’s ambiguous position over the Brexit issue, its divisions over the issue and its hesitations to back a “People’s Vote” meant that it failed to seize the opportunity provided to use the campaign as a pro-European platform in Scotland. Meeting little resistance from Labour and taking advantage of the divisions created by the European issue within Nationalist ranks, the Scottish Conservatives were able to minimize the issue during the campaign, preferring instead to concentrate on the constitutional issue and fighting a staunchly unionist campaign. Against all odds, the Conservatives made a shock electoral comeback in Scotland as they won 13 Scottish seats and saved Theresa May’s Conservative government.

The Scottish Conservatives: unionism, Europe and the constitutional issue

21 Indeed, the Scottish Conservative Party came out of the independence referendum campaign unscathed and ascertained in its belief that it stood for Scottish unionism, which it thereafter fully embraced as its flagship policy in ensuing electoral campaigns. However, rather than opposing devolution as a “slippery slope to independence” as it had before the 1997 referendum, the Conservatives now fully engaged in devolved politics and supported Scottish unionism in a devolved environment. Indeed, the Conservative party had felt compelled to engage in a soul-searching debate over its internal territorial structures after it failed to win a single seat in Scotland in the 1997 general election. Although the Scottish Unionist Party had remained an affiliated yet constitutionally separate party until 1965, direct authority was thereafter exercised by the British leadership and the Conservative Party had maintained a very centralized approach to party organization. The shock results of 1997 nevertheless led the Scottish Conservative Party to become an affiliated partner of the Conservative Party. It continued to participate fully in UK-wide processes, but its organization and internal procedures, over which it gained statutory control, were now independently managed. The Party Constitution therefore holds that Scottish members are obliged to follow UK party rules with respect to UK matters but will follow Scottish party rules with respect to Scottish matters, thereby enabling the Scottish party to acquire more autonomy in its management of devolved policy-making and organization. Besides, it was never as

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dependent as Labour on membership fees, despite a similar centralist funding model, because the bulk of its funding is provided by individual donors and corporations.

22 The 1998 party reform established both a party executive committee (Governing Board) responsible for the management of the party and a Conservative Policy Forum, charged with organizing policy debates and programmatic development. The Forum only has an advisory character and the elaboration of policy programmes and electoral manifestos remains largely in the hands of the parliamentary leader and his/her inner circle. Yet, in contrast with Scottish Labour, the Scottish Conservatives have enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy with respect to devolved policies as the Scottish election manifesto emerges from within the Scottish Conservative parliamentary group and is debated within the Scottish constituencies and the regional party executive. The Scottish Conservatives can therefore develop their own proposals for Scottish matters without formal interference by the national party leadership. This autonomy has thus enabled the Scottish party to develop a more moderate, centrist policy profile on devolved issues in order to better adapt to the new devolved Scottish political landscape.17 Yet, the Scottish Conservatives’ fundamental conception of unionism remained intact until the 2014 independence referendum.

23 The 2011 leadership election was the first contested leadership election since the introduction of devolution and therefore provided the opportunity for a public discussion of the future of the party. Two factions emerged during the campaign, with one faction arguing that devolution should not be enhanced any further and that the Scottish Conservatives should remain integrated to the UK Conservative Party, and another claiming that the Scottish Conservative Party had become more autonomous and should be open to leading the debate on further powers to the Scottish Parliament. The former view was represented by Ruth Davidson, Jackson Carlaw and Margaret Mitchell, while the latter was strongly defended by Murdo Fraser in his leadership bid as he argued that the party should disband and reform itself as a Scottish party modelled along the lines of the former Unionist Party, that is a separate party with MPs nevertheless taking the Conservative whip at Westminster. With Ruth Davidson narrowly elected as leader, it appeared that continuity had prevailed and that the Conservatives would remain opposed to any further extension of the Scottish Parliament’s powers. Yet, the new Scottish Conservative leader was soon forced to change her mind by Prime Minister David Cameron’s own admission in a February 2012 speech that “This does not have to be the end of the road. When the referendum on independence is over, I am open to looking at how the devolved settlement can be improved further”18. The Conservative-led Coalition government’s strategy was to accept the organisation of a referendum, which was now unavoidable, on terms it found acceptable and to avoid appearing anti-Scottish in a bid to save the union. Ruth Davidson therefore had no choice but to come round to the view initially expressed by Fraser and set up a Conservative commission to examine the current devolution settlement and make proposals for a possible extension of the Scottish Parliament’s powers. The Commission on the Future Governance of Scotland published its report in May 2014 and made rather timid proposals for further devolution to Scotland, suggesting that the Scottish Parliament should become responsible for setting rates and bands of income tax throughout Scotland but that pensions should stay within the remit of the UK Government, and admitting there was a case for devolving housing benefit and attendance allowance as well as conferring the Scottish Parliament the

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power of supplementing benefits legislated for at UK level. These proposals, however, represented a revolution for the Scottish Conservative party as it finally came to terms with devolution and attempted to reconcile a Conservative brand of unionism with a centre-right case for further autonomy, particularly regarding fiscal powers.

24 The Scottish Conservatives were thereafter able to build upon a coherent unionist strategy which integrated both conservative political thought and further autonomy for Scotland, and the strong Scottish credentials of their new leader, whose working- class background and comprehensive education made it possible for her to present herself as an untypical Tory and put what she described as “clear blue water” between the policies of the Scottish Conservatives and those of the UK party. Ruth Davidson has indeed frequently shown her independence from Westminster politics: she was a staunch Remain supporter during the referendum campaign and has repeatedly said since then that she was favourable to “an open Brexit, rather than a closed Brexit” with the “largest amount of access” to the Single Market. She challenged a number of immigration policies espoused by May during her time as Home Secretary and urged the Prime Minister to reconsider the Conservative target to cut net migration to below 100,000 a year as well as drop “easy slogans” on immigration. She signalled her opposition to May’s deal with the DUP by tweeting a link to the same-sex marriage lecture she gave at Amnesty’s Pride lecture in Belfast in 2016, sought and received assurances from the Prime Minister that she should try to advance gay rights in Northern Ireland despite the DUP’s record on such issues. Finally, she has admitted to being a centrist in terms of social policy with a more right-wing stance on justice and fiscal policies.

25 The diverging strategy of the Scottish Conservative party from its UK counterpart became most apparent during the 2017 general election campaign. Ruth Davidson chose to concentrate on the constitutional issue despite the “strong and stable” campaign message that her party had set out to develop nationally in order to make of the 2017 general election one that focused on the Prime Minister’s persona and would strengthen her hand to deliver Brexit. Although she was under pressure from the party leadership to respect the Conservative campaign message, Ruth Davidson’s decision to stray away from it proved correct because the political debate north of the border has become strikingly different. Firstly, the SNP’s campaign was overshadowed by the European question despite its attempt not to focus only on its “independence in Europe” mantra or on the issue of a second referendum. This considerably divided the SNP’s electorate as nearly a third of Yes voters at the 2014 referendum and an estimated 36% of SNP voters voted Leave at the EU referendum. In fact, a YouGov poll of January 2017 showed that only 65% of Yes voters who backed Leave said they would back independence again. In contrast, the Scottish Conservatives argued that their party were negotiating a Brexit deal for the UK, and Ruth Davidson repeatedly stated her preference for a soft Brexit and stark opposition to a second independence referendum. This strategy appears to have functioned insofar as the Conservative resurgence in Scotland at the 2017 general election occurred predominantly amongst those who voted No in 2014, wining as much as 44% of the vote among this group (up 17 points since 2015), well ahead of Labour’s 36% whose more uncertain message on the constitutional issue has failed to make it profitable in terms of vote. More significantly perhaps is that the Scottish Conservatives obtained 8% of the vote among Yes voters, that is 5% more than in 2015. This progression among Yes voters is accounted for by the number of Leave voters among them. Indeed, just over one in five (21%) of those who voted Yes and Leave voted for the Scottish Conservatives in June 2017. Ruth Davidson’s

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campaign thus clipped the wings of the Nationalists as she argued that an anticipated second independence referendum would be unfair to voters who had not been given sufficient time to make an informed decision.

26 Secondly, general elections in Scotland are paradoxical insofar as much of the policy agenda matters little because it is devolved to the Scottish Parliament. The controversies over Theresa May’s manifesto thus had little resonance in Scotland where the Scottish Tory leader was able to argue that it did not concern Scotland. Besides, May’s most controversial policy on social care – the so-called “dementia tax” – was in fact more generous than the existing system in Scotland: while Scotland does provide free social care to the elderly in their own homes, only £26,000 of pensioners’ assets are protected when they go into residential care rather than the £100,000 figure given by the Prime Minister. It was in none of the main Scottish parties’ interests to explain how much more generous the UK Prime Minister’s proposal was, and the issue was therefore absent from the Scottish campaign. Moreover, the Scottish Conservatives had declared themselves opposed to any changes to fox-hunting rules in Scotland before Theresa May controversially pledged in May 2017 that she would allow a free vote in Parliament over the relaxing of rules or repeal of the Hunting Act 2004. Davidson’s Scottish Conservatives were able to exploit a grey area over which welfare policies were devolved to Scotland to rule out any cuts to winter fuel allowances in their manifesto, arguing that there was no need for cuts in fuel allowances in Scotland to fund the so-called “dementia tax” since the country would not be affected by it. With all potentially explosive issues contained north of the border, the Scottish Conservatives were thus able to concentrate on the constitutional issue and deliver positive results in Scotland, obtaining a total of 13 seats (+12) and increasing their share of the vote by 13.7%.

Conclusion

27 The results of both the European referendum of June 2016 and the general election of June 2017 proved just how different a political landscape Scotland had become after two decades of devolved government. Scotland’s traditionally more left-wing political culture and the centre-left political consensus which has emerged in Holyrood in the last twenty years has meant that anti-European voices have had extremely feeble resonance north of the border: only 16.5% of Scots voted for pro-Brexit parties at the 2015 general election (14.9% voted for the Conservative Party and 1.6% for UKIP) and a majority of Scottish Conservative MPs and MSPs campaigned for Remain, a position strongly defended by their leader, Ruth Davidson. Ironically, the electoral comeback achieved by the Scottish Conservatives in Scotland in the 2017 general election, despite the losses suffered by their party in the rest of the UK, was made possible by their strong unionist stance and the divisions created by the Brexit debate within the Nationalist movement. Scottish Labour on the other hand, failed to emulate its British counterpart insofar as there was no significant swing to Labour in key seats in Scotland. The electoral campaign in Scotland was once again overshadowed by the constitutional question – over which Labour has had trouble defining a clear position – made all the more complex by the current Brexit negotiations and the looming prospect of seeing Scotland taken out of the EU despite a clear 62% majority in favour of Remain. The constitutional divide has come to dominate Scottish politics since the

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introduction of devolution in 1999 and devolution itself has transformed Scotland’s political landscape to the extent that many of the party dynamics or campaign issues prevalent in Westminster have little if no significance north of the border. The country now appears as having a self-contained political system of its own, functioning alongside rather than in coordination with the British political system. Yet, ironically, the Scottish Conservatives’ 13 seats in the 2017 general election were crucial to Theresa May’s ability to remain in office and Labour’s electoral slump in Scotland has dented its chances of winning a general election. Today, no less than 29 Scottish constituencies are competitive between Labour and the SNP and the prospect for a change in Downing Street may therefore partly depend on a set of policy issues and debates far removed from those prevailing in Westminster.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Awan-Scully, Roger, The End of British Party Politics? (London, Biteback Publishing, 2018).

Barnes, Eddie, ‘Race for the Swing Vote’, Scotland on Sunday, 20th February 2011.

Brooks, Libby, ‘Jeremy Corbyn “Can Help Labour Rebuild Scotland”’, Guardian, 24th August 2016.

Cameron, David, ‘Scotland Speech’, 16th February 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/ speeches/transcript-pm-scotland-speech

Camp-Pietrain, Edwige, L’Écosse et la tentation de l’indépendance. Le référendum d’autodétermination de 2014 (Villeneuve-d’Ascq, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2014).

Curtice, John, ‘Does Scotland Want a Different Kind of Brexit?’, NatCen Social Research and ScotCen Social Research, March 2017.

Curtice, John, ‘On the Myth of a Growing Sense of English Identity’, What Scotland Thinks, blog, 29th November 2018, http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2018/11/on-the-myth-of-a-growing- sense-of-english-identity/, last access 15th January 2019.

Detterbeck, Klaus, Multi-Level Party Politics in Western Europe (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

Duclos, Nathalie, L’Écosse en quête d’indépendance. Le référendum de 2014 (Paris, Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2014).

Hassan, Gerry and Shaw, Eric, The Strange Death of Labour Scotland (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2012).

Hepburn, Eve, Using Europe: Territorial Party Strategies in a Multi-level System (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2010).

Hopkin, Jonathan and Bradbury, Jonathan, ‘British Statewide Parties and Multilevel Politics’, The Journal of Federalism, 36, 2006, pp. 135–52.

Laffin, Martin, Shaw, Eric and Taylor, Gerald, ‘The New Sub-National Politics of the British Labour Party’, Party Politics, n°13, 2007, pp. 88–108.

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Leruez, Jacques, Le Système politique britanique de Winston Churchill à Tony Blair (Paris, Armand Colin, 2001, second edition).

Liddle, Andrew, Ruth Davidson and the Resurgence of the Scottish Tories (London, Biteback Publishing Ltd, 2018).

Lynch, Peter, The History of the Scottish National Party (Cardiff, Welsh Academic Press, 2013, 2nd edition).

Lynch, Peter, ‘Bottom-up versus Top-down Campaigning at the Scottish Independence Referendum 2014’, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XX:2, 2015.

MacWhirter, Iain, Tsunami. Scotland’s Democratic Revolution (Glasgow, Freight Books, 2015).

Shipman, Tim, Fallout. A Year of Political Mayhem (London, William Collins, 2018).

Simpkins, Fiona, ‘The Conflicting Loyalties of the Scottish Labour Party’, in Avril, Emmanuelle and Beliard, Yann (eds.), Labour United and Divided from the 1830s to the Present (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2018).

Simpkins, Fiona, ‘The 2016 Scottish Parliament Elections: Unionist Parties and the Constitutional Divide’, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXII:4, 2017.

Simpkins, Fiona, ‘Challenging Theresa May’s Vision of Brexit Britain: Ruth Davidson and the 2017 UK General Election’, Observatoire de la Société Britannique, 21:1, pp. 141-160.

NOTES

1. Roger Awan-Scully, The End of British Party Politics? (London, Biteback Publishing, 2018), p. 13. 2. James Mitchell in Eddie Barnes, ‘Race for the Swing Vote’, Scotland on Sunday, 20th February 2011. 3. Jacques Leruez, Le Système politique britanique de Winston Churchill à Tony Blair (Paris, Armand Colin, 2001, second edition). 4. For a detailed analysis of this campaign, see Fiona Simpkins, ‘Challenging Theresa May’s Vision of Brexit Britain : Ruth Davidson and the 2017 UK General Election’, Observatoire de la société britannique, 21:1, pp. 141-160. 5. John Curtice, ‘On the Myth of a Growing Sense of English Identity’, What Scotland Thinks, blog, 29th November 2018, http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2018/11/on-the-myth-of-a-growing- sense-of-english-identity/, last accessed 21st June 2019. 6. The electoral system adopted by the Scottish Constitutional Convention for Scottish Parliament elections uses both the first-past-the-post method for constituency seats and the proportional Additional Member System for regional seats. Seventy three constituency members are elected using the first-past-the-post system in the same electoral constituencies used for general elections, and an additional 56 members are elected with the AMS on a regional basis (seven members per region for the eight regions of Scotland usually used for European elections). This was meant to provide Scotland with a more representative political arena with few overall majorities. 7. Peter Lynch, The History of the Scottish National Party (Cardiff, Welsh Academic Press, 2013, 2 nd edition), p. 280. 8. Peter Lynch, ‘Bottom-up versus Top-down Campaigning at the Scottish Independence Referendum 2014’, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XX:2, 2015. 9. Fiona Simpkins, ‘Better Together and the No Campaign: from Project Fear to Grace?’, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XX:2, 2015.

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10. See Edwige Camp-Pietrain, L’Écosse et la tentation de l’indépendance. Le référendum d’autodétermination de 2014 (Villeneuve d'Ascq, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2014) ; Nathalie Duclos. L’Écosse en quête d’indépendance. Le référendum de 2014 (Paris, Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2014) ; Peter Lynch, op. cit. 11. Iain McWhirter, Tsunami. Scotland’s Democratic Revolution (Glasgow, Freight Books, 2015). 12. Eve Hepburn, Using Europe: Territorial Party Strategies in a Multi-level System (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2010) ; Klaus Detterbeck, Multi-Level Party Politics in Western Europe (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 13. Martin Laffin, Eric Shaw and Gerald Taylor, ‘The New Sub-National Politics of the British Labour Party’, Party Politics, 13, 2007, pp. 88–108. 14. Fiona Simpkins, ‘The Conflicting Loyalties of the Scottish Labour Party’, in Emmanuelle Avril and Yann Béliard (eds.), Labour United and Divided from the 1830s to the Present (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2018), pp. 238-253. 15. Soon after his election, Tony Blair announced the nomination of a royal committee in charge of investigating the extent to which care could be financed by the elderly themselves. The final report of the Sutherland Committee was published in March 1999 and recommended universal free care to the elderly, a solution which was rejected outright by both the British Prime Minister and the Scottish First Minister Donald Dewar. Yet Dewar’s sudden death in October 2000 was to represent a sudden shift in relations between Scottish Labour and the UK Labour Party. Indeed, the new First Minister, Henry McLeish, soon surprised his colleagues by making free care to the elderly one of his top priorities as head of the Scottish Executive, having been impressed with the arguments brought forward by the Sutherland report which stressed the absurdity of a system covering medical care for somebody with a heart disease but not for a person with Alzheimer’s disease. Henry McLeish had broken the rules of New Labour policy-making: he had neither consulted the other members of the Scottish Executive, Scottish Minister for Health and Community Care Susan Deacon, or the British Labour Cabinet and was to face much pressure to back down. Downing Street eventually retaliated by cancelling the ₤23 million Attendance Allowance that was to be attributed to Scotland to fund care for the elderly, that is 20% of the budget that the Scottish Executive had counted on to fund its project. 16. Libby Brooks, ‘Jeremy Corbyn “Can Help Labour Rebuild Scotland”’, Guardian, 24th August 2016. 17. Jonathan Hopkin and Jonathan Bradbury, ‘British statewide parties and multilevel politics’, The Journal of Federalism, 36, 2006, pp. 135–52. 18. David Cameron, ‘Scotland Speech’, 16th February 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/ speeches/transcript-pm-scotland-speech, last accessed on 21st June 2019.

ABSTRACTS

The geographical divides that characterised the outcome of the June 2016 European referendum, with a Remain majority in Scotland and Northern Ireland and a Leave majority in England and in Wales, are symptomatic of the increasingly divergent electoral results of the last two decades in each of the four UK nations. While the roots of divergent political patterns across the UK may lay in the 1960s and 1970s with the emergence of the nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales and the long decline of the Conservatives north of the border, we shall contend that the introduction

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of devolution to Scotland and Wales in 1999 had the most considerable impact on British party politics.

Les divisions géographiques qui caractérisèrent les résultats du référendum européen de juin 2016, avec une majorité favorable au maintien du Royaume-Uni au sein de l’Union Européenne en Écosse et en Irlande du Nord et une majorité opposée en Angleterre et au pays de Galles, sont symptomatiques des résultats électoraux de plus en plus divergents des quatre nations britanniques au cours de ces deux dernières décennies. Si ces tendances politiques divergentes puisent leurs racines dans l’émergence des partis nationalistes écossais et gallois des années 1960 et 1970 et le long déclin des conservateurs en Écosse, nous analyserons en quoi l’introduction de la dévolution en Écosse et au pays de Galles en 1999 eut un impact considérable sur le système britannique de partis politiques.

INDEX

Mots-clés: dévolution, politique écossaise, SNP, référendum sur l’indépendance de l’Écosse, Parlement écossais, Brexit Keywords: devolution, Scottish politics SNP, Scottish independence referendum, Scottish Parliament, Brexit

AUTHOR

FIONA SIMPKINS Université Lumière-Lyon 2, Triangle UMR 5206. Fiona Simpkins is a Senior Lecturer in British contemporary history and politics at the Université Lumière of Lyon (Lyon 2). Her main areas of research are devolution, Scottish politics and the constitutional debate in Scotland.

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Devolution, the Independence Referendum and Votes at 16 in Scotland: Holyrood, a Pioneer in Democracy Leading the Way for Westminster? La Dévolution, le référendum sur l'indépendance et le droit de vote à 16 ans : l’Écosse, un pionnier de la démocratie montrant la voie à Westminster ?

Sarah Pickard

Introduction

1 In the September 2014 referendum on the independence of Scotland, for the first time, 16 and 17-year-old Scottish residents were able to vote in a nationwide public poll. In a pioneering political move, the Scottish Parliament was among the very first in the world to lower the minimum voting age below 18. However, in the 2015 and 2017 general elections and the 2016 referendum on the membership of the European Union (EU), the minimum voting age remained 18 across the four nations of the United Kingdom. The youngest 16-year-olds that voted in the 2014 referendum were, therefore, unable to vote the following year in the 2015 general election or the 2016 referendum. Young people’s voting rights are thus asymmetric within the UK because they are enfranchised at different ages depending on where they live and the type of vote. The Electoral Reform Society (ERS), a proponent of lowering the voting age, deems that consequently many 16 and 17-year-old citizens are being denied a voice.1

2 Lowering the minimum voting age raises fundamental questions about citizenship, democracy, the status of young people in society and attitudes towards them among politicians, the mainstream media and the population more widely. Political positions

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on enfranchising 16 and 17-year-olds also involve the issue of political opportunism from both proponents and opponents with vested interests.

3 The history of political and activist support for lowering the minimum voting age to 16 within Westminster is well documented.2 Parliamentary debates started at the end of the twentieth century, when a Liberal Democrat MP proposed an amendment to the Representation of the People Bill 1999 and two years later the Lib Dems were the first to include lowering the voting age in a general election manifesto. The issue gained traction in the UK after the 2001 general election, when the turnout rate of 18 to 24- year-olds fell to around 40 per cent (although participation dropped among all age brackets).3 For the New Labour Government of Tony Blair, introducing votes at 16 could have been a way to engage young people in electoral politics, address the democratic deficit and avert the potential delegitimisation of elected institutions. However, in various reports published in 2003 and 2004, the Electoral Commission (the independent body that oversees elections in the UK) advised against lowering the voting age4 and thus the policy did not appear in a Labour Party manifesto until 2010, whereas it has never been a Conservative policy. UK-wide discussions on lowering the voting age continued and widened in the run-up to the 2016 EU membership referendum and gathered pace after the 2017 General Election associated with the “youthquake”, i.e. higher levels of political interest, engagement and activism among young people.5

4 However, less has been written about the processes involved in the emergence and gradual increase in support for enfranchising 16 and 17-year-olds in Scotland that predates parliamentary interest in Westminster. This article aims to fill some of the gaps, in order to highlight the fundamental discrepancies between Holyrood and Westminster about attitudes towards the minimum voting age and young citizens. It comes at a critical time in British politics with regard to Brexit and calls for Indyref2, as well as increasing electoral and non-electoral political participation among young people in the UK.

5 This article addresses how and why Holyrood lowered the minimum voting age, whereas Westminster has not (yet). It first documents the incremental processes leading to the enfranchisement of 16 and 17-year-olds in Scotland for the 2014 independence referendum. Next, the results of the referendum are studied and the outcomes in terms of the voting age in wider Scottish elections. The article then deals with the potential impact on Westminster debates on votes at 16 for the 2016 EU referendum. Last, there is a discussion on the differing stances in Holyrood and Westminster regarding young citizens and their right to vote.

Devolution: a driving force for votes at 16

6 Those allowed to vote in public elections and referendums reflects prevailing political and social views towards different segments of the population. In the UK, years of campaigning for equal rights brought about a shift in public and political opinion, leading to universal suffrage in 1928, when the minimum voting age for both men and women was set at 21 (see Table 1).

7 By the 1960s, the UK was going through tremendous social, cultural and demographic changes, as the children born during the post-Second World War “baby boom” and into the new Welfare State had become a demographic critical mass of young people who were healthier and wealthier than previous generations. These young people were also

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less deferential to the Establishment6 and more informed about political developments around the world, which contributed to the rise of the student movement and civil rights activism in the UK and other countries at the end of the decade. The burgeoning demographic of 18, 19 and 20-year-olds were obliged to pay taxes, but were unable to vote, at a time when the official school leaving age was 15. This discrepancy between rights and responsibilities was in part resolved by the Labour Government led by Harold Wilson that lowered the minimum voting age for public elections from 21 to 18 with the Representation of the People Act, 1969. Apart from addressing issues of democracy, representation and rights, the Prime Minister may also have hoped his party would obtain the majority of votes from the newly enfranchised electors that he keenly tried to attract, for example, by awarding The Beatles MBEs in 1965. Significantly, by lowering the minimum voting age to 18, the UK was a pioneer and it led the way for other countries to follow suit. Later, the SNP in Scotland would lead the way in the early twenty-first century with votes at 16 for public elections and referendums, which became possible due to devolution of certain powers from Westminster.

8 Indeed, almost three decades after the lowering of the minimum voting age to 18 in the whole of the UK, the SNP pledged in its 1997 general election manifesto Yes We Can Win the Best for Scotland that: “the franchise will be extended to include all those aged 16 and over”. 7 The Labour Party won a landslide victory and four months after entering 10 Downing Street, Tony Blair called a referendum in Scotland on devolution of certain powers from Westminster. Almost three-quarters (74%) of those who voted were in favour of a Scottish Parliament.8 The subsequent Scotland Act, 1998 created a new Scottish Parliament Edinburgh with a Scottish Executive having primary legislative powers.9

9 The first election for the new Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh saw the Scottish Labour Party enter office in 1999 as part of a coalition Government with the Liberal Democrats. The Labour Party would remain in power with the Liberal Democrats following the 2003 election. During the election campaign, the pledge to lower the voting age featured in the SNP’s election manifesto: “we re-affirm our long-standing commitment to reduce the voting age to sixteen. Sixteen and seventeen-year-olds are expected to take on the responsibilities of adulthood and must therefore have the right to vote”.10

10 In its 2007 Scottish Parliament election manifesto, the SNP gave a new argument in support of votes at 16 that involved democracy: “we support reducing the voting age to 16 to allow young people to exercise their democratic right”.11 Power changed hands in Scotland with the 2007 election, thus the SNP formed a minority Government with party leader Alex Salmond as First Minister. This provided Nationalists with a platform to promote a future Scotland-wide referendum on the independence of the nation from the rest of the UK and continue its support for votes at 16.

11 In November 2009, the White Paper Your Scotland, Your Voice: A National Conversation (with a foreword from Alex Salmond) evoked the possibility of lowering the voting age in Scotland.12 The same year, the Health Boards (Membership and Elections) (Scotland) Act, 2009 became the very first piece of Scottish legislation to enfranchise 16 and 17-year- olds, thus enabling them to vote in the pilot Health Board elections on 10 June 2010.13

12 Next, the Scottish Government launched a national consultation on a possible independence referendum, which addressed the issue of votes at 16. The resulting document Scotland's Future: Draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill Consultation Paper published in

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March 2010 outlined various reasons in favour of lowering the voting age centred on democracy, participation and other legal thresholds: The Scottish Government’s view is that the voting age should be reduced to 16 for all elections. Denying 16 and 17 year-olds the vote risks them becoming disengaged from the political process at the very point society expects them to take on rights and responsibilities such as getting married or serving in the armed forces. Reducing the voting age to 16 would encourage participation by young people in Scotland’s democratic processes and will give them a voice on matters that affect them.14 The consultation paper also underlined that lowering the voting age enjoyed wide support among most political parties and youth organisations.

13 The May 2011 Scottish Parliament election was won outright by the SNP still led by Alex Salmond who thus remained First Minister, but now at the head of the first ever majority government in Edinburgh (Camp, 2014). The prospect of an independence referendum and votes at 16 became more likely. The following year, the Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on an Independence Referendum for Scotland or the Edinburgh Agreement was signed by the Prime Minister of the UK, David Cameron (Conservative) and the Secretary of State for Scotland in the UK Government, Michael Moore (Scottish Liberal Democrats), the First Minister of Scotland, Alex Salmond (SNP), and the Deputy First Minister of Scotland Nicola Sturgeon (SNP), on 15 October 2012.15 The official agreement established that the terms of a future referendum on the independence of Scotland from the UK (to be held before the end of 2014) would be set by the Scottish Parliament. Notably, the devolved body would decide the date of the referendum, the “wording of the question”, the “rules on campaign financing”, other rules for the conduct of the referendum and “the franchise”, i.e. who would be allowed to vote. On this particular point, the “Memorandum of Agreement” in the Edinburgh Agreement stated very clearly that it would be for the Scottish Executive to decide on the minimum voting age: The Scottish Government’s consultation on the referendum […] set out a proposal for extending the franchise to allow 16 and 17-year-olds to vote in the referendum. It will be for the Scottish Government to decide whether to propose extending the franchise for this referendum and how that should be done. It will be for the Scottish Parliament to approve the referendum franchise, as it would be for any referendum on devolved matters.16

14 According to Edwige Camp, “Under the Edinburgh agreement, the Nationalists were allowed to lower the voting age to 16. They put forward that the future of young people was at stake. It was also mischievously said that the latter were supposedly more enthusiastic about independence”. 17

15 Next, in March 2013, it was announced that the referendum would be held 18 months later and the Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Bill, 2013 was introduced to the Scottish Parliament by Nicola Sturgeon. During parliamentary debates among Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs), the SNP Deputy First Minister of Scotland at the time declared her support for lowering the voting age in the referendum. She emphasised the usual themes of democracy and engagement, but she also underlined that young people would live the longest with the outcomes of the poll: No-one has a bigger stake in the future of our country than today’s young people and it is only right that they are able to have a say in the most important vote to be held in Scotland for three centuries. In next year’s referendum, Scotland’s 16 and 17-year-olds will be given the opportunity to shape their country’s path by choosing what type of country they want Scotland to be. We want to make sure that our young people have the opportunity to engage in Scotland’s democratic process.

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We want to give them the right to voice their views, freely and confidently, on the matters that affect them.18

16 There was cross-party support among Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) for lowering the voting age: the SNP, the Scottish Labour Party, the Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Green Party were all in favour. Annabel Goldie, leader from 2005 to 2011 of the Scottish Conservative Party (with only 17 out of 129 MSPs in 2013), commented abstrusely: “the Scottish Conservatives are not hostile to debate on the different age limits for different activities but are not supportive of singling out the independence referendum for a trial extension of franchise to 16 and 17-year-olds”.19 The Electoral Reform Society Scotland (ERS), the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) and the National Union of Students (NUS) were all also in favour of votes at 16.

17 The Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act, 2013 received Royal Assent on 7 August 2013. The statute reduced the voting age to 16 for the independence referendum. It provided for the collection of data on 15 to 17-year-olds whose details would not otherwise be compiled and for the information to be held in a new separate Register of Young Voters to be maintained by the Electoral Commission. The law also set out who would have access to the data held on these “attainers” (young people reaching the minimum voting age), in order to provide child protection, but also transparency in accordance with MSPs’ requests. A “Young Voter Registration Form” was issued to each household in Scotland, in order to collect and confirm the details of the young people in question during the annual household canvass of voters that took place from 1 October 2013 to 10 March 2014.

18 In this way, within two decades, devolution of power, involving the opening of the Scottish Parliament and then the election of an SNP majority government led to provisions being made to enfranchise 16 and 17-year-old Scottish residents for the first time in a Scotland-wide public vote, in the independence referendum held in September 2014. The next section documents efforts to encourage 16 and 17-year-olds to vote, their participation rate, their preference and impressions of being enfranchised for the 2014 independence referendum.

High turnout and support for independence from young voters

19 Mid-2014, the estimated Scottish population was 5,347,600 with 59,820 16-year-olds and 62,081 17-year-olds (121,901 16 and 17-year-olds), making up 2.27 per cent of the total population in Scotland.20 Thus, lowering the voting age for the Scottish independence referendum meant that 8.2 per cent of the 1.53 million 16 and 17-year-olds in the UK were enfranchised.21

20 Young people eligible to vote for the first time in the September 2014 referendum, particularly 16 and 17-year-olds, were encouraged to go on the electoral register. Notably, a Scotland-wide national advertising campaign over mainstream and social media was aimed at 15, 16 and 17-year-olds to increase their awareness about registration. Run by the Electoral Commission, its message was clear: “You can vote at age 16 in the Scottish Referendum but only if you have registered to vote first.” Prior to the referendum, 109,593 16 and 17-year-olds registered to vote, amounting to around 80%

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of those eligible to be on the electoral register,22 compared to 76% of 18 to 24-year-olds and almost 98% of over 65s.23

21 Various actors involved in the Scottish independence referendum campaign purposely attempted to engage young people and especially school pupils. The Electoral Commission provided many free-to-download resources, including factsheets, posters and web banners. Schools, youth organisations and public bodies were encouraged to get young people interested and involved, which led to many debates and events across the nation in different settings. Young people were targeted by the Better Together campaign against independence and especially the Yes Scotland campaign in favour of independence.24 Marginalised young people living in difficult and deprived conditions who were likely to be politically disengaged were a priority for the Yes campaign through door-to-door canvassing in poor neighbourhoods and areas with a high proportion of social housing.25

22 After the longest electoral campaign in British history,26 on 18 September 2014, Scottish residents aged 16 and over were asked: “Should Scotland be an independent country?” The overall turnout rate was significantly higher in the 2014 independence referendum at 84.6%, than in the 1997 devolution referendum when it was 60.4% and the 1979 devolution referendum when it was 63.7%.27 It was also higher than the previous Scottish Parliament elections and UK general elections.

23 Participation rates in the independence referendum according to age are particularly striking (see Table 2). According to the available data, around three-quarters of 16 and 17-year-olds who had gone on the electoral register reported having voted in the referendum,28 compared to 54% of 18 to 24-year-olds, 72% of 25 to 34-year-olds, and 83% of the Scottish population as a whole.29 Thus, the participation rate of the 16 and 17-year-old first-time voters was notably higher than those a little older than them, but lower than the overall average of the Scottish electorate.

24 According to the concept of the political life cycle, electoral participation rates are usually curvilinear. The lowest turnout rates are among the very youngest (usually 18 to 24-year-olds) and very oldest members of the electorate. But in the Scottish independence referendum, 16 and 17-year-olds turned out more to vote than 18 to 24- year-olds. This difference may be partly attributable to the “novelty value” of 16 and 17-year-olds being enfranchised for the first time, the substantial publicity generated about the change in the minimum voting age and the fact they were deliberately targeted in the campaign.

25 Sceptics and cynics regarding the lowering of the minimum voting age and the high turnout rate of 16 and 17-year-olds posited both the debate and decision involved in a Yes/No referendum are less complex than in an election. But the discourse in the mainstream media about young people’s participation in the referendum was overwhelmingly positive, depicting them as capable of engagement and enthusiasm. The newly enfranchised 16 and 17-year-olds were mostly portrayed as being capable of intelligent and independent thinking, i.e. responsible, competent and mature citizens with agency. Academic research concords, for example, according to Andrew Mycock, Scottish 16 and 17-year-olds “showed themselves to be highly engaged with the campaigns, making a positive contribution to the public debate about Scotland’s constitutional future”. 30

26 Among 16 and 17-year-olds who reported having voted in the independence referendum, three-quarters claimed they would support a measure that allowed everyone to vote from the age of 16 in the future. Moreover, 97% reported they would

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vote again in future elections and referendums,31 suggesting that lowering the voting age would have an ongoing positive effect on electoral participation, in line with the notion that voting is habitual, i.e. the younger someone votes for the first time, the more likely he/she is to vote again and the more someone votes the more probable it is he/she will vote again.32

27 Voting in the referendum was a secret ballot; it is therefore impossible to know in which box young people put their cross. According to the Scottish Referendum Study, younger voters were much more in favour of independence than older voters, with 62 per cent of 16 to 19-year-olds voting “Yes” to independence, well above the overall national average of 44.7 per cent (see Table 3). Indeed, support for independence seemed to decrease with age and support for remaining in the UK increase with age. But the age group in the Scottish population most in favour of independence were 25 to 35-year-olds.33 They would have been between the ages of ten and 20 in 1999 and thus politically socialised at a highly political time in Scotland with all the debates surrounding devolution and the opening of the Scottish Parliament, which would have had a lasting impact on them as a generational unit.34

28 In this way, 16 and 17-year-olds were enfranchised for the first time in the UK by the SNP majority Scottish Government in a pioneering act of democracy. In the 2014 independence referendum, the very youngest members of the Scottish electorate had a higher turnout rate than 18 to 24-year-olds. Young people voted mostly in favour of independence in line with SNP policy and they had a positive view about being enfranchised. The next section examines the impact of votes at 16 in the Scottish referendum and the outcome in terms of future polls in Scotland and the 2016 UK-wide referendum on membership of the European Union.

From the Scottish independence referendum to the EU membership referendum

29 Following the outcome of the September 2014 Scottish independence referendum, Alex Salmond resigned as First Minister and Nicola Sturgeon took over the role. The same year, UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, established a commission “to take forward the devolution commitments on further powers for the Scottish Parliament”.35 The resulting report, the Smith Commission Agreement was published on 27 November 2014 and it included proposals that the Scottish Parliament be given powers to decide on the election of its members (MSPs) and on the extension of the franchise to 16 and 17-year- olds, thus allowing them to vote in the 2016 Scottish Parliament elections.

30 The SNP Government quickly introduced the Scottish Elections (Reduction of Voting Age) Bill 2015. During the debate in the Scottish Parliament (18 June 2015) on extending the right to vote to 16 and 17-year-olds in all Scotland-wide elections, John Swinney, the Deputy First Minister and SNP MSP commented: “The level of engagement that we have had from young people is impressive.” He went on to declare: They did not just register to vote in record numbers; they participated in the campaigns and were active on both sides of the debate. Some joined political parties as a consequence and have remained active in other areas. They made the case for lowering the voting age by their actions, which were louder than words, and they deserve the result that they will receive tonight when the Parliament votes to give them the vote that they demanded.36

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31 Due to cross-party support, nine months after the Scottish independence referendum, following a one-hour debate, on 18 June 2015, Members of the Scottish Parliament voted (86 votes for, 8 votes against) in favour of enfranchising 16 and 17-year-olds for all Scottish local elections and parliamentary elections, another pioneering political decision.

32 Certain former opponents of lowering the voting age in Scotland revised their opinion after the referendum, most notably, the Scottish Conservative Party leader since 2011, Ruth Davidson MSP.37 This would put her at odds with the leader of the Conservative Party and UK Prime Minister since 2016, Theresa May who mentioned on several occasions her opposition to giving 16 and 17-year-olds the right to vote.

33 During the Scottish Parliament debate in Holyrood, Lewis Macdonald (Labour MSP) contended: “we should champion the case for votes at 16 in the referendum on remaining in the European Union, and for making the franchise for that as inclusive as possible”.38 Indeed, the very same day the Scottish Parliament voted to extend the franchise to 16 and 17-year- olds for all public elections held in Scotland (18 June 2015), the UK Parliament voted down a proposed amendment to the European Union Referendum Bill, 2015-2016 that would have given the right to vote to 16 and 17-year-olds in the upcoming 2016 UK referendum on EU membership.

34 Baroness Morgan of Ely, a Labour peer, had moved an amendment to the bill during its Report Stage with a view to lowering minimum the voting age for the EU referendum, in line with the Scottish independence referendum.39 During parliamentary debates on the amendment, many reasons were expressed in the House of Commons and the House of Lords both in favour of and against giving the right to vote to 16 and 17-year-olds. Some of them were arguments used in previous debates on the subject. For example, it was proffered that lowering the voting age would encourage young people to get into the habit of voting, and politicians would pay more attention to issues important to young people if 16 and 17-year-olds could vote, or it would reduce the democratic deficit. Conversely, it was stated that young people aged 16 and 17 are not mature enough or are too immature to be allowed to vote. Other points raised in Parliament were more specific to the context of the upcoming 2016 referendum.

35 The main arguments expressed in favour of lowering the voting age specific to the EU membership referendum were: (1) There was a need for legislative consistency with the decision in Scotland to let 16 and 17-year-olds vote in the independence referendum of 2014. (2) Enfranchising 16 and 17-year-olds in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum had been a success in terms of interest and turnout. (3) 16 and 17-year-olds can take responsibility of voting seriously (as shown in Scotland) as they are sufficiently competent and mature. (4) Contemporary young people are better informed than previous cohorts of young people due to social media and the introduction of Citizenship Education onto the school curriculum and thus more able to make informed decisions. (5) As a “once-in-a-generation decision” (remaining in or leaving the European Union) 16 and 17-year-olds should have a say. (6) Younger people would mostly live longer with the result of the referendum than older people. (7) The logistical issues (registering thousands of 15 to 17-year-olds) could be overcome.

36 The main arguments expressed against were: (1) Allowing 16 and 17-year-olds to vote in the referendum would create a precedent, leading to unwelcome calls for the lowering of the voting age for parliamentary general elections through a snowball

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effect. (2) It would be wrong to change the “tried and tested” general election voting age for just a single poll. (3) There would be many logistical difficulties registering potentially over a million young people in a brief period. The difficulty would be exacerbated by the fact that 16 and 17-year-olds do not necessarily have official identity papers (for example, a driving licence or a passport). (4) The financial implications of enfranchising 16 and 17-year-olds were too high. (5) The introduction of a lower voting age would delay the referendum taking place due to the logistics of an unprecedented registration of 16 and 17-year-olds. Opponents of votes at 16 in the EU referendum commented that the Electoral Commission had worries about how long it would take to register 16 and 17-year-olds.40 (6) Vulnerable children and young people could be manipulated and exploited, especially online. (7) It would make 16-year-olds more vulnerable to sexual predators and “shrink childhood.” (8) Opponents also commented in Parliament that voting in the referendum would be too much of a responsibility for young people on such a serious subject. Indeed, it was argued that young brains do not mature until around the age of 25, and so 16-year-olds are not “ready” to vote. (9) It was predicted that only half of 16 and 17-year-olds would vote in the European Union referendum if allowed. (10) Young people would mostly vote in favour of remaining in the European Union, and thus allowing them to vote would be a form of political engineering and it would skew the result. (11) It was suggested, why not let 10-year-olds vote (the age of criminal responsibility in England), as they would be affected by result too. (12) In law, someone must legally be age 18 to watch pornography, gamble, buy cigarettes, alcohol, knives and fireworks and to do jury service. Therefore, young people should not be allowed to vote until the same age threshold.

37 In this way, compared to debates in Holyrood on lowering the voting age for the independence referendum, the subsequent debates in Westminster on votes at 16 for the EU referendum were different in tone and were much less consensual; they discussed young citizens in a dissimilar way and delivered a different outcome.

Discussion: The specificities of votes at 16 in Scotland

38 In the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, a majority of 16 and 17-year-olds appear to have voted for independence, in accordance with pre-referendum polls and surveys. This pays credence to the hypothesis that the lowering of the minimum voting age initiated by the SNP Government could have been politically motivated, i.e. enfranchising 16 and 17-year-olds would increase votes for independence. Mycock and Tonge argue that Alex Salmond’s decision to give 16 and 17-year-olds the vote would probably “enhance the chances of victory in the referendum” because opinion polls in Scotland showed that young people aged 18 to 34 were the most supportive of independence and thus 16 and 17-year-olds would be more likely to vote to leave the UK in line with SNP policy.41 Moreover, endorsing a policy to enfranchise 16 and 17- year-olds may also have made the SNP more popular among young people who thought they were given a voice and taken seriously. It could also be seen as if the Nationalists were nurturing a new generation of SNP and independence supporters.

39 The suggestion that the SNP only started to favour votes at 16 for the 2014 independence referendum out of political opportunism can be countenanced by the

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fact that lowering the minimum voting age had been a Nationalist policy going back to before the September 1997 Scottish devolution referendum (see above). Subsequent manifesto pledges evoked rights, responsibilities, democracy and the youth of young people as reasons for lowering the voting age.

40 However, the lowering of the voting age in Scotland has not be accompanied by significant improvement of citizenship education in schools. The debate about lowering the voting age in Scotland and the UK more widely consistently involves discussions about the provision of citizenship education or political literacy within school curricula in primary and secondary schools.42 The Scottish Government has a “less prescriptive approach to monitoring the implementation of educational policy” compared to England.43 The provision of citizenship education is not obligatory in Scotland and it is usually embedded across the curriculum in Scottish schools leading to criticisms that it is “ variable in its quality and quantity”.44 According to critics, the SNP Scottish Government has failed to provide young people with adequate citizenship education that would help inform and empower them to accompany the lowering of the voting age. This points to the SNP being primarily interested in harvesting the votes of 16 and 17-year-olds, rather than educating young Scots about citizenship and democracy in school.

41 Furthermore, the SNP Scottish Government has not reduced the ages young people access other citizenship rights, i.e. only the voting age has been lowered. On the contrary, certain age limits in Scotland have been raised, for example, to 18 regarding smoking, and most legislative changes in Scotland have been in an “upwards trajectory”. 45 This inconsistency on young people’s legal status suggests lowering the voting age for Scottish residents was said to be in part due to “political motives”.46

42 In discussions about lowering the voting age, this crucial point about legal thresholds regarding the rights and responsibilities of young people often goes unheeded. Scotland has different legislative age thresholds to the rest of the UK on important issues that are often cited as to why the voting age should be lowered to 16. In Scotland, 16-year-olds can leave school, whereas in England after the age of 16, it is obligatory to stay in full-time education, or start an apprenticeship or traineeship, or spend 20 hours or more a week working or volunteering, while in part-time education or training.47 In Scotland, it is legally possible to marry at sixteen without parental consent as legislated in the Marriage (Scotland) Act, 1977. This is contrary to the law in England and Wales, where the consent of one parent is required to marry at 16 or 17.48 Thus, when Ruth Davidson argued, in 2015, in favour of votes at 16 on the basis of acquired rights and responsibilities, her stance was consistent with Scottish legislation, but it does not fully apply to the rest of the UK: “We deem 16-year-olds adult enough to join the army, to have sex, get married, leave home and work full-time. The evidence of the referendum suggests that, clearly, they are old enough to vote too”.49 The age discrepancies on rights and responsibilities between Scotland and England is an inconvenient truth for supporters of the right to vote at 16 for UK general elections.

43 According to Briggs,50 lowering the voting age to 16 for the Scottish independence referendum “is said to have infuriated many Tory MPs in particular” sitting in the House of Commons who mostly opposed the change. Their opposition was based on two points. First, as already mentioned, it was thought by looking at opinion polling that most first-time young voters would vote for independence. Surveys in Scotland pointed to young citizens being keener about independence than older citizens. Second, there were fears that it might set a precedent leading to the voting age being lowered for UK

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general elections. This would be a disadvantage for the Conservatives because young people tend to vote more for the Labour Party,51 as was the case in the 2015 general election held just before the parliamentary vote on lowering the voting age for the EU referendum. It is striking that proponents and supporters of votes at 16 tend to be electorally popular among young voters. Indeed, “parties supporting voting age reform appear to be most likely to benefit from such a move”,52 this includes the Labour Party and the Green Party, pointing to political opportunism.

44 Whilst political opportunism – most young people did indeed vote for independence in accordance with opinion polls and Nationalists expectations – the SNP in its language and reasons for lowering the voting express a certain way of considering young people that inculcates them with different capitals and agency and commitment to young people.

Conclusion

45 In this article, it was shown that the SNP included lowering the voting age as early as its 1997 general election manifesto. Devolution of power involved the opening of the Scottish Parliament and then election of an SNP majority government in 2011. The Nationalists were thus able to set about implementing their pledge of nearly two decades for the September 2014 independence referendum. There followed intense debates in Scotland on votes at 16. Those in favour, especially the SNP, emphasised the importance of removing existing age-based discrepancies in rights and responsibilities, getting young people involved in the democratic process and giving them a voice. The voting age was lowered in the Scottish Parliament in time for the 2014 independence referendum. There was a dynamic and youth-focused referendum campaign that contributed to particularly high registration and participation rates of 16 and 17-year- olds. This illustrates that when political debate and the democratic process are inclusive of young people who are recognised as citizens, capable of mature decision- making and active citizenship most do engage in electoral politics. For detractors of lowering the voting age, there is a condescending and disingenuous reason: the increased turnout of young people was due to the “simple” single-issue nature of the referendum. The SNP enfranchised 16 and 17-year-olds arguing it was good for young people and good for democracy. But it was also good for the pro-independence movement and the SNP seemingly cultivating a new generation of supporters. Positions of votes at 16 evolved after the 2014 independence referendum and there is now cross- party support in the Scottish Parliament for 16-year-olds to vote in all Scottish public elections. The SNP went on to enfranchise 16 and 17-year-olds for all Scotland-wide elections, which was an unprecedented measure in the UK and indeed a rarity in most of the world.

46 Consequently, there is no longer a UK-wide official “age of majority” or rite of passage symbolised in voting/enfranchisement, all the more since Wales has also legislated to introduce votes at 16 (there is not enough space to discuss this in detail here). Rights and responsibilities are accrued incrementally and often inconsistently across the four nations. Most notably, in Scotland 16-year-olds can leave school and they can get married without parental consent. Now they can take part in all public votes in Scotland, but not the UK as a whole. Varying minimum voting ages across the UK

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underlines a wider issue regarding the ambiguous and ambivalent status of young people in society and the difficulty of defining “young people”.

47 However, the UK Parliament voted against lowering the voting age for 2016 EU membership referendum. In Westminster, only the Conservative Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) remain officially opposed to giving 16-year-olds the right to votes.53 The discrepancy in voting ages in Scotland and the UK underlines inconsistencies in how young people are considered in Holyrood and Westminster. But this difference is likely to disappear as support for votes at 16 is increasing South of the border.

48 Last, it has been argued that Alex Salmond brought about votes at 16 because he wanted to “place the issue on the political agenda” and it was “calculated” because it would entail Scotland having a resolutely different policy from the rest of the UK, making Scotland look like a “modern democracy” contrary to the “archaic” Westminster Parliament.54 In this way, the new Scottish Parliament would appear more liberal and forward-thinking by setting a precedent, in other words, pioneering. Whatever the motives behind lowering the voting age in Scotland, attitudes towards young people and political participation has evolved. At a time a critical time in British politics, when young citizens are especially active in electoral and non-electoral forms of political participation, it would seem that the only thing between Westminster following the pioneering Holyrood in order to lower the minimum voting age is the Conservative Party and that with a change of government will come votes at 16 and a greater voice for young people.

Table 1: From Universal Suffrage at 21 to votes at 16

Year Legislation Enfranchisement Government

Representation of the Implemented universal suffrage with Conservative 1928 People (Equal Franchise) equal voting rights for all men and (Westminster) Act women aged 21 and over

Representation of the Reduced voting age to 18 for men and Labour 1969 People Act women with effect from 1970 (Westminster)

Unified minimum voting age at 18 for all Representation of the Conservative 1983 levels of public elections in single piece People Act (Westminster) of legislation

Established devolved Scottish Government of Wales Parliament, National Assembly for Wales Labour 1998 Act, Scotland Act, and Northern Ireland Assembly with (Westminster) Northern Ireland Act powers to decide on voting and candidacy ages in regional elections

Voting Age (Reduction) Unsuccessful Private Members’ Bill to Labour 2008 Bill reduce voting age to 16 and over (Westminster)

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Scottish Independence SNP Enfranchised 16 and 17-year-olds to vote 2013 Referendum (Franchise) in Scottish referendum on independence (Scottish Act Parliament)

Scottish Elections SNP Enfranchised 16 and 17-year-olds to vote 2015 (Reduction of Voting in Scottish Parliamentary elections (Scottish Age) Act Parliament)

Unsuccessful House of Lords amendment European Union 2015 (17 to reduce voting age to 16 in UK Conservative Referendum Bill, Nov) referendum on leaving or remaining in (Westminster) Amendment 3 EU

Representation of the Unsuccessful House of Lords amendment People (Young People’s to reduce voting age to 16 in UK Conservative 2017-2019 Enfranchisement and referendum on leaving or remaining in (Westminster) Education) Bill EU

Representation of the People (Young People’s Unsuccessful bill to reduce the minimum Conservative 2017-2019 Enfranchisement and voting age to 16 (Westminster) Education) Bill

Welsh Labour Welsh Parliament and A bill to reduce the minimum voting age 2018 Elections (Wales) Bill to 16 (Welsh Assembly)

Sources: Compiled from information available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk (National Archives, 2018).

Table 2: Turnout by age in Scottish independence referendum, 18 September 2014

Ages (years) Turnout (years)

16-17 75

18-24 54

25-34 72

35-44 88

45-54 82

55-64 87

65+ 96

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All 83

Reported turnout among specific groups (1,852 respondents). Source: Adapted from Electoral Commission, Scottish Independence Referendum. Research Post-polling Day Opinion Research Report, Prepared by ICM Research on behalf of the Electoral Commission, November 2014, p. 11.

Table 3: Voting by age in Scottish independence referendum, 18 September 2014

Ages (years) Yes to independence (%) No to independence (%)

16-19 62.5 37.5

20-24 51.4 48.6

25-29 55.2 44.8

30-39 53.9 46.1

40-49 50.6 49.4

50-59 47.1 52.9

60-69 43.7 56.3

70+ 34.3 65.7

All* 44.7 55.3

Survey of 5,000 voters soon after Scottish independence referendum. Source: Adapted from Alisa Henderson and James Mitchell, The Scottish Question, Six Months On, Scottish Referendum Study, 27 March 2015, p. 7 and General Registrar Office for Scotland.

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Leruez, Jacques, 'La Pratique Référendaire en Écosse avant 2014', Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XX-2 (2015), doi: 10.4000/rfcb.376

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Leruez, Jacques, 'Le Référendum du 18 septembre 2014 en Écosse: l'échec d'un long processus', Pouvoirs, 152, 1 (2015), pp. 145-160, doi: 10.3917/pouv.152.0145.

Leydier, Gilles and Jones, Moya (eds.), La Dévolution des pouvoirs à l'Écosse et au pays de Galles (Paris, CNED Armand Colin, 2006).

Leydier, Gilles, 'Mobilisation (record) et polarisation (spectaculaire) de l’électorat écossais autour de l’enjeu de l’indépendance', Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XX-2 (2015), doi: 10.4000/ rfcb.391

Leydier, Gilles (ed.), La Dévolution des Pouvoirs à l'Écosse & au pays de Galles 1966-1999 (Paris, Ellipses, 2007).

Macdonald, Lewis, Debate in Scottish Parliament on Scottish Elections (Reduction of Voting Age) Bill, 18 June 2015. https://www.theyworkforyou.com/sp/?id=2015-06-18.20.0

Macnab, Scott, 'Sturgeon outlines “votes at 16” referendum plans', The Scotsman, 13 March 2013. https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/sturgeon-outlines-votes-at-16-referendum- plans-1-2831525

Mannheim, Karl, 'The Problem of Generations', translated by Paul Kecskemeti, in Paul Kecskemeti (ed.), Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), pp. 276-320.

Marwick, Arthur, The Sixties. Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958-c. 1974 (London, Bloomsbury, 1998).

Munn, Pamela and Arnott, Margaret, 'Citizenship in Scottish Schools: The Evolution of Education for Citizenship from the late twentieth century to the present', History of Education, 38, 3 (2009), pp. 437-454. https://doi.org/10.1080/00467600902855488

Mycock, Andrew, 'The UK isn’t ready to lower the voting age to 16', The Guardian, 10 October 2014.

Mycock, Andrew, and Tonge, Jonathan, 'Alex Salmond’s Bannock’s Bairns', Open Democracy, 20 February 2012. https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/andrew-mycock-jon-tonge/alex- salmond%E2%80%99s-bannock-bairns

Mycock, Andrew, and Tonge, Jonathan, 'Votes at 16: we need a proper conversation about when adulthood begins', Democratic Audit, 22 November 2017. http://www.democraticaudit.com/ 2017/11/22/votes-at-16-we-need-a-proper-conversation-about-when-adulthood-begins

Mycock, Andrew, and Tonge, Jonathan, 'An evaluation of historical and contemporary arguments about lowering the voting age', funded by the Leverhulme Trust, 2018-2020. https:// www.liverpool.ac.uk/politics/research/research-projects/voting-age

National Archives, http://www.legislation.gov.uk, 2018.

National Records of Scotland (NRS), Mid-2014 Population Estimates Scotland. Population estimates by sex, age and administrative area, 30 April 2015, https://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/files/statistics/ population-estimates/midyear-2014/14mid-year-pe-cahb-publication-correction.pdf

Office for National Statistics (ONS), 'Statistical bulletin. Population estimates for UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland: mid-2014', ONS, 2015.

Pickard, Sarah, Politics, Protest and Young People: Political Participation and Dissent in 21st Century Britain (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

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Plutzer, Eric, 'Becoming a Habitual Voter: Inertia, Resources, and Growth in Youth Adulthood', The American Political Science Review, 96, 1 (2002), pp. 41-56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117809

Scottish Government, Your Scotland, Your Voice. A National Conversation, White Paper, Scottish Government, 30 November 2009. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/11/26155932/0

Scottish Government, Scotland's Future: Draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill Consultation Paper, Scottish Government, February 2010. https://www2.gov.scot/resource/doc/303348/0095138.pdf

Scottish Government, Scotland’s Electoral Future Delivering Improvements in Participation and Administration, DPPAS26645 (04/14), Scottish Parliament, 2014.

Scottish Government, The Smith Commission, 2014, https://www2.gov.scot/Topics/constitution/ smith-commission

Scottish National Party (SNP), The SNP General Election Manifesto 1997. Yes We Can Win the Best for Scotland, 1997. http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ge97/man/snp97.pdf

Scottish National Party (SNP), Heart of the Manifesto, SNP 2001 General Election Manifesto, 2001. http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/e01/man/snpman01.pdf

Scottish National Party (SNP), Release Our Potential, SNP 2003 Scottish Parliament election manifesto, 2003.

Scottish National Party (SNP), If Scotland Matters to You Make it Matter in May, SNP 2005 General Election Manifesto, 2005.

Scottish National Party (SNP), SNP. Its Time, 2007 Scottish Parliament election manifesto, 2007. http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ass07/man/scot/snp.pdf

Scottish National Party (SNP), Elect a Local Champion, SNP 2010 General Election Manifesto, 2010. http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ge10/man/parties/SNP.pdf

Sloam, James and Matt Henn, Youthquake: The Rise of Young Cosmopolitans in Britain (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

Sturgeon, Nicola, Debate on the Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Bill, 2013, Scottish Parliament, 12 March 2013.

Swinney, John, Debate in Scottish Parliament on Scottish Elections (Reduction of Voting Age) Bill, 18 June 2015. https://www.theyworkforyou.com/sp/?id=2015-06-18.20.0

Young Citizenship Commission (YCC), Making The Connection. Building Youth Citizenship in the UK, YCC, 2009.

NOTES

1. Electoral Reform Society (ERS), 'Votes at 16. Scottish 16 and 17 year olds can vote while their peers across the border are still disenfranchised', 28 June 2017. 2. For example, see (1) work by Andy Mycock and John Tonge, including the project “An evaluation of historical and contemporary arguments about lowering the voting age”, funded by the Leverhulme Trust, 2018-2020. See also (2) Jan Eichhorn, 'Votes At 16: New Insights from Scotland on Enfranchisement', Parliamentary Affairs 71, 2, 2018, pp. 365-391 and (3) Sarah Pickard, Politics, Protest and Young People (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), chapter 9. 3. Ipsos MORI, How Britain Voted in 2001, 20 July 2001. 4. Electoral Commission, How Old is Old Enough? The Minimum Age of Voting and Candidacy in UK Elections, July 2003. Electoral Commission, The Age of Electoral Majority, Report prepared by ICM for

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the Electoral Commission, November 2003. Electoral Commission, Age of Electoral Majority: Report and Recommendations, April 2004. 5. Ipsos MORI, How Britain Voted in the 2017 Election, 20 June 2017. James Sloam and Matt Henn, Youthquake. The Rise of Young Cosmopolitans in Britain (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). 6. Arthur Marwick, The Sixties. Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c. 1958-c.1974 (London, Bloomsbury, 1998), p. 58. 7. SNP, The SNP General Election Manifesto 1997. Yes We Can Win the Best for Scotland, 1997, p. 10. SNP, Heart of the Manifesto, SNP 2001 General Election Manifesto, 2001, p. 7: “the SNP has a long-standing commitment to the reduction of the voting age and would like young people from the age of 16 to have voting entitlement”. 8. There had already been a referendum on devolution of power from Westminster to Scotland in 1979 (see Gilles Leydier and Moya Jones (eds.), La dévolution des pouvoirs à l'Écosse et au pays de Galles (Paris, CNED Armand Colin, 2006); Nathalie Duclos, La Dévolution des pouvoirs à l'Écosse et au Pays de Galles 1966-1999 (Nantes, Éditions du Temps, 2007); Gilles Leydier (ed.), La Dévolution des Pouvoirs à l'Écosse & au pays de Galles 1966-1999 (Paris, Ellipses, 2007); Jacques Leruez, 'Le Référendum du 18 septembre 2014 en Écosse: l'échec d'un long processus', Pouvoirs, 152, 1 (2015), pp. 145-160). Scottish residents were asked two questions in the 1997 referendum: (1) Do you agree that there should be a Scottish Parliament as proposed by the Government? (2) Do you agree that a Scottish Parliament should have tax-raising powers as proposed by the Government? 9. The Scottish Executive was renamed the Scottish Government in 2007. 10. SNP, Release Our Potential, SNP 2003 Scottish Parliament election manifesto, 2003, p. 27. 11. SNP, SNP. Its Time, 2007 Scottish Parliament election manifesto, 2007, p. 50. However, thereafter, there was no mention of giving 16 and 17-year-olds the right to vote in the SNP’s 2005 and 2010 UK general election manifestoes, or the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections manifesto (just three years before the independence referendum). SNP, If Scotland Matters to You Make it Matter in May, SNP 2005 General Election Manifesto, 2005. SNP, Elect a Local Champion, SNP 2010 General Election Manifesto, 2010. 12. Scottish Government, Your Scotland, Your Voice. A National Conversation, White Paper, Scottish Government, 30 November 2009, p. 153. 13. The Crofting Commission (Elections) (Scotland) Regulations, 2011 also enfranchised 16 and 17- year-olds for elections to the Crofting Commission (Scottish Government, Scotland’s Electoral Future Delivering Improvements in Participation and Administration, DPPAS26645 (04/14), Scottish Parliament, 2014, p. 13). 14. Scottish Government, Scotland's Future: Draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill Consultation Paper, February 2010, p. 28. 15. Nathalie Duclos, L'Écosse en quête d'indépendance ? Le référendum de 2014 (Paris, Presses Universitaires Paris-Sorbonne, 2014), chapitre 3. 16. HM Government and the Scottish Government, Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on an Independence Referendum for Scotland, Edinburgh, 15 October 2012, p. 4. 17. Edwige Camp, 'The Scottish National Party (SNP): A Party of Government in the early 21st Century', Lisa, 12, 8, 2014. 18. Nicola Sturgeon, Debate on the Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Bill, 2013, Scottish Parliament, 12 March 2013. 19. Scott Macnab, 'Sturgeon outlines “votes at 16” referendum plans', The Scotsman, 13 March 2013. 20. National Records of Scotland (NRS), Mid-2014 Population Estimates Scotland. Population estimates by sex, age and administrative area, 30 April 2015.

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21. Jacqueline Briggs, Young People and Political Participation: Teen Players (London, Palgrave Macmillan), 2016, p. 142. ONS, 'Statistical bulletin. Population estimates for UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland: mid-2014', ONS, 2015. 22. Electoral Commission, Scottish Independence Referendum. Report on the referendum held on 18 September 2014, Report by the Electoral Commission. Electoral Commission, Scottish Independence Referendum. Report on the Referendum held on 18 September 2014, Report by the Electoral Commission, Electoral Commission, December 2014, pp. 7 and 60. 23. Electoral Commission. Scottish Independence Referendum. Research Post-polling Day Opinion Research Report. Prepared by ICM Research on behalf of the Electoral Commission, November 2014, p. 9. 24. The SNP youth wing Young Scots for Scotland and SNP Students actively campaigned to encourage 16 and 17-year-olds to go on the electoral register and to vote for independence. 25. Gilles Leydier, 'Mobilisation (record) et polarisation (spectaculaire) de l’électorat écossais autour de l’enjeu de l’indépendance', Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XX-2, 2015. 26. Jacques Leruez, 'Le Référendum du 18 septembre 2014 en Écosse: l'échec d'un long processus', Pouvoirs, 152,1, 2015, pp. 145-160. 27. Jacques Leruez, 'La Pratique Référendaire en Écosse avant 2014', Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XX-2, 2015. 28. Electoral Commission, Scottish Independence Referendum. Report on the referendum held on 18 September 2014, Report by the Electoral Commission, Electoral Commission, December 2014, p. 1. 29. Electoral Commission. Scottish Independence Referendum. Research Post-polling Day Opinion Research Report. Prepared by ICM Research on behalf of the Electoral Commission, November 2014. 30. Andrew Mycock, 'The UK isn’t ready to lower the voting age to 16', The Guardian, 10 October 2014. 31. Electoral Commission, Scottish Independence Referendum. Report on the referendum held on 18 September 2014, Report by the Electoral Commission. Electoral Commission, December 2014, p. 1. 32. Eric Plutzer, 'Becoming a Habitual Voter: Inertia, Resources, and Growth in Youth Adulthood', The American Political Science Review, 96, 1, 2002, pp. 41-56. 33. Gilles Leydier, 'Mobilisation (record) et polarisation (spectaculaire) de l’électorat écossais autour de l’enjeu de l’indépendance', Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XX-2, 2015. 34. Karl Mannheim, 'The Problem of Generations', translated by Paul Kecskemeti, in Paul Kecskemeti (ed.), Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), pp. 276-320. 35. Scottish Government, The Smith Commission. 36. John Swinney, Debate in Scottish Parliament on Scottish Elections (Reduction of Voting Age) Bill, 18 June 2015. 37. Ruth Davidson, 'Why Ruth Davidson supports votes at 16', Electoral Reform Society, 24 June 2015. 38. Lewis Macdonald, Debate in Scottish Parliament on Scottish Elections (Reduction of Voting Age) Bill, 18 June 2015. 39. European Union Referendum Bill, 2015-2016, amendment 3: Clause 2, page 2, line 10, at end insert “and persons who would be so entitled except for the fact that they will be aged 16 or 17 on the date on which the referendum is to be held.” 40. The Electoral Commission suggested there were options “available to help get as many voters as possible on the register in the available timeframe”, such as “a registration initiative, led by Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) and supported by the Electoral Commission”, “public awareness activities”, “ political literacy initiatives” and “targeted work in schools and other education institutions.” 41. Andrew Mycock and Jonathan Tonge, 'Alex Salmond’s Bannock’s Bairns', Open Democracy, 20 February 2012.

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42. Learning and Teaching Scotland (LTS), Education for Citizenship in Scotland: A Paper for Discussion and Development, LTS, 2006. Curriculum Review Group (CRG), Purposes and Principles for the Curriculum 3-18, Scottish Executive, 2004. 43. Pamela Munn and Margaret Arnott, 'Citizenship in Scottish Schools', History of Education, 38, 3, 2009, p. 452. 44. Andrew Mycock and Jonathan Tonge, “Alex Salmond’s Bannock’s Bairns', Open Democracy, 20 February 2012. 45. Young Citizenship Commission (YCC), Making The Connection. Building Youth Citizenship in the UK, YCC, 2009. 46. Jacqueline Briggs, Young People and Political Participation. Teen Players (London, Palgrave Macmillan), 2016, p. 144. 47. HM Government, School Leaving Age, 2019. 48. The Age of Criminal Responsibility (Scotland) Act 2019 raised the age of criminal responsibility in Scotland from eight to 12 years-old. In England and Wales, it remains ten year-old. 49. Ruth Davidson, 'Why Ruth Davidson supports votes at 16', Electoral Reform Society, 24 June 2015. 50. Jacqueline Briggs, Young People and Political Participation. Teen Players (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 143. 51. Sarah Pickard, Politics, Protest and Young People (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), chapter 8. 52. Andrew Mycock and Jonathan Tonge, 'Votes at 16: we need a proper conversation about when adulthood begins', Democratic Audit, 22 November 2017. 53. Neil Johnston and Noel Dempsey, Voting Age, Briefing Paper, Number 1747, House of Commons Library, 12 October 2018. 54. Andrew Mycock and Jonathan Tonge, 'Alex Salmond’s Bannock’s Bairns', Open Democracy, 20 February 2012.

ABSTRACTS

The Scottish Parliament enfranchised 16 and 17-year-olds prior to the 2014 referendum on independence of Scotland from the UK. Scotland was among the very first nations in the world to lower the minimum voting age below 18. The Scottish National Party (SNP) majority Government emphasised the importance of recognising other rights and responsibilities acquired at 16, getting young people involved in the democratic process, and giving them a voice. It also knew that independence was popular among young people. All the main parties are now in favour of votes at 16 in the Scottish Parliament, whereas in the UK Parliament, the Conservative Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) remain officially opposed. This article addresses how and why Holyrood lowered the minimum voting age, contrary to Westminster. It first documents the processes that led to the enfranchisement of 16 and 17-year-olds in Scotland for the 2014 independence referendum. Next, the results of the referendum are studied and the outcomes in terms of the voting age in wider Scottish elections. The article then deals with the potential impact on Westminster debates on votes at 16 for the 2016 EU referendum. Last, there is a discussion on the differing stances in Holyrood and Westminster regarding young citizens and their right to vote.

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Le Parlement écossais a accordé le droit de vote aux jeunes de 16 et 17 ans, en 2014, à l’occasion du référendum de 2014 sur l'indépendance de l'Écosse. Ce faisant, l'Écosse a été l'une des toutes premières nations au monde à abaisser l'âge minimum du droit de vote au-dessous de 18 ans. Le gouvernement du Parti national écossais (SNP) a souligné l'importance d'impliquer les jeunes dans le processus démocratique, ainsi que les différents droits et responsabilités acquis à 16 ans. Dans le même temps, les Nationalistes savaient que le mouvement indépendantiste était également populaire parmi les jeunes. Tous les principaux partis du Parlement écossais sont désormais favorables au droit de vote à 16 ans, alors qu'au Parlement britannique, le Parti conservateur et le Parti unioniste démocratique (DUP) sont officiellement opposés. Cet article examine pourquoi Holyrood a abaissé la majorité électorale à la différence de Westminster. Il documente d'abord le processus menant au droit de vote des jeunes de 16 et 17 ans en Écosse en vue du référendum sur l'indépendance de 2014, ainsi que les résultats et les retombées du vote. Il analyse ensuite les raisons pour lesquelles le gouvernement majoritaire du SNP a choisi d'abaisser la majorité électorale. Ensuite, l’article traite de l’impact potentiel sur les débats à Westminster. L'article se termine en expliquant pourquoi Holyrood et Westminster diffèrent dans leur évaluation des jeunes citoyens et de leur droit de vote.

INDEX

Mots-clés: majorité électorale, Écosse, référendum indépendance Écosse, vote à 16 ans, jeunes Keywords: minimum voting age, Scotland, Scottish independence referendum, Votes at 16, young people

AUTHOR

SARAH PICKARD Sarah Pickard est enseignant-chercheur en civilisation britannique contemporaine à l'université Sorbonne Nouvelle et membre de CREW (EA 4399). Ses travaux portent principalement sur la participation politique des jeunes. Elle vient de publier Politics, Protest and Young People: Political Participation and Dissent in Britain in the 21st century (Palgrave, 2019, 501 pages).

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L'Écosse et l'Union Scotland and the Union

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Mise à jour de la fiche signalétique de l’Écosse Updating Scotland's ID documents

Jean Berton

Introduction

1 Cette étude ambitionne de rendre hommage aux travaux que Jacques Leruez a menés sur l’Écosse dès après que celle-ci a traversé l’épreuve du premier référendum d’autodétermination en 1979 alors que la transformation de l’empire en Commonwealth touchait à sa fin. Dans L’Écosse, une nation sans État, il s’agissait d’en comprendre les tenants et les aboutissants. En 2000, il publiait une mise à jour dans L’Écosse, vieille nation, jeune État. Quelque vingt ans après cette parution, nous voulons apporter une modeste contribution à la compréhension de ce pays ami de la France.

2 Le temps d’une génération, les Écossais se sont interrogés sur l’identité de leur nation et sur la valeur de l’union avec l’Angleterre : le résultat a été la réouverture du Parlement d’Écosse le 1 juillet 1999. En 2019, la crise majeure que traverse le Royaume- Uni depuis le 23 juin 2016 a ravivé une grave question : cette crise aboutira-t-elle au divorce de l’Écosse et de l’Angleterre ? La séparation des deux nations qu’envisage le SNP, pour incertaine que soit l’issue de la crise du Brexit, ne peut être qu’un long processus où sera remis en cause un nombre incalculable d’évidences, telles que les langues nationales.

3 La campagne pour le référendum de 1979 a mis en avant les questions existentielles inévitables : qui sommes-nous, d’où venons-nous, où voulons-nous aller ? Et Jacques Leruez dans L’Écosse, une nation sans État (p. 10), posait la question de manière plus globale : « Comment peut-on être écossais ? » Depuis une quarantaine d’années beaucoup de questions ont trouvé leurs réponses et, le 18 septembre 2014, à la suite de riches débats, les Écossais ont participé massivement au référendum sur l’indépendance. Mais si le questionnement n’est pas de nature à donner des réponses définitives, la fiche signalétique de cette vieille nation doit être mise à jour, dans une

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double approche diachronique et interdisciplinaire, surtout à l’intention des pays proches, dont la France qui est encore trop prompte à confondre Écosse, Grande- Bretagne et Royaume-Uni.

4 Cette mise à jour ponctuelle de la fiche signalétique de l’Écosse se concentre sur trois points : premièrement, pour répondre à la question « qui est l’Écosse », nous abordons la question de la reconnaissance par l’identité patronymique et l’identité visuelle ; deuxièmement, puisqu’il est question de mettre fin à l’union, nous interrogeons l’état- civil ; et, troisièmement, nous devons aborder la question délicate des langues indigènes qui sont un enjeu majeur de différences internes au Royaume-Uni.

L’identification de l’Écosse

5 L’Écosse a deux noms officiels, Scotland (en écossais et anglais) et Alba (en gaélique), et aussi des surnoms latins : Scotia et Caledonia. La nation a des représentations visuelles : la licorne, le chardon, le sautoir, Caledonia, Dame Scotia et, pour quelque temps encore, Elizabeth Regina. Il s’agira de préciser Caledonia et Dame Scotia qui semblent être actuellement délaissées1.

L’identité patronymique

6 La nation écossaise a un double patronyme, soit en anglais et écossais « Scotland », l’étymologie latine « Scotti » et anglaise « land » signifiant littéralement ‘terre des Écossais’, soit en gaélique moderne « Alba », l’étymologie latine « albus/a » signifiant littéralement ‘blanche’ parce que vues à distance, les montagnes des Hautes-Terres étaient couvertes de neige une majeure partie de l’année… En même temps la plupart des villes portent un double nom, à l’instar d’Édimbourg : Edinburgh, en anglais et Dùn Eideann, en gaélique.

7 L’Écosse jouit aussi d’une double dénomination ancestrale latine : Scotia et Caledonia. Le nom de Scotia dérive du nom des immigrés qui à partir du deuxième siècle sont venus d’Irlande et se sont implantés dans les Hébrides et le long de la côte ouest. Identifiée par les Romains sous l’appellation de « Scotti » cette peuplade a fini par dominer et faire disparaître les Pictes. Leur territoire a été appelé « Scotia » dans les écrits en latin.

8 Le nom de Caledonia a été donné par les Romains, au premier siècle, parce que le massif montagneux (cal) des Hautes-Terres était vue comme une place forte imprenable (dunum) pour les légions. Scotia et Caledonia, en tant que dénominations d’un même territoire, ont été personnifiées au XVIe siècle pour Scotia, et au XIX e siècle pour Calédonia2. Ces deux représentations emblématiques de l’Écosse ont pris corps dans des contextes politiques très différents.

9 Alors que Henry VIII formulait le projet de créer le royaume de ‘Bretayne’, l’image de Britannia commençait à prendre forme depuis que Polydore Vergil composa avant 1515, et fit imprimer en 1534, Anglica Historia3. L’élite d’Écosse connaissait le personnage de Boudicca ; il restait à lui inventer une homologue, fût-ce dans le registre ironique. Robert Wedderburn, dans sa Complaynt of Scotlande (1549), créa un personnage féminin, laissant son lecteur libre de faire des rapprochements avec Marie de Guise : « my name is callit the affligit lady dame Scotia »4. De fait, ce personnage né dans un songe représente la

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nation et non pas la reine douairière qui n’avait pas encore reçu officiellement le pouvoir de régence. In my dullit dreyme ande sopit visione i thocht That ther aperit to me ane lady of excellent extractione Ande of anciant genolygie makkand ane Melancolius cheir for the grite violens that sche hed Sustenit & indurit5

10 La tête et chevelure qualifient l’apparition : « Hyr / Haistylye in the maist extreme exterminatione hyr / Hayr of the cullour of fyne gold vas feltrit & trachlit / Out of ordour hingand ouer hyr schuldirs »6. Sa couronne d’or est chancelante et sur le point de tomber sur la terre froide parce que les héritiers putatifs du trône se jalousent et se neutralisent à l’avantage de l’ennemi. Son bouclier (F54V) arbore un lion rampant, symbole de la royauté, qui est blessé de toutes parts parce que les forces armées sont désorganisées. Son manteau est un miroir du pays, il expose la perte de la richesse, de l’instruction et de l’activité économique.

11 Cette mater dolorosa porte un manteau sur lequel l’auteur distingue clairement trois parties : dans la partie supérieure on voit des pierres précieuses gravées et des signes de noblesse ; dans la partie médiane sont imprimés des lettres et des nombres, des bonnes actions et des miracles ; dans la partie inférieure sont brodées des représentations de bétail et de produits agricoles et industriels. Dans sa description, le narrateur répète qu’il parvient à peine à lire. Le lecteur comprend que cette vision apocalyptique de la nation traduit un manque de présence politique de l’Écosse, et la conséquence est catastrophique puisqu’il n’y a pas le moindre espoir de salut : il s’agit d’un transfert de l’ambiance générale de la nation vers le personnage qui la représente.

12 La description sommaire de l’accoutrement de ‘Dame Scotia’ est inspirée des portraits peu flatteurs qu’avait fait François Deserps avant de les emporter avec lui en France. La sauvage d’Escosse. Si tu mets l’œil dessus ceste figure A celle fin que certain tu en soys, C’est la sauvage au pays Escossoys, De peaux vestue encontre la froidure.7

13 Ainsi, l’élément commun entre Dame Scotia et « La sauvage d’Escosse » est le manteau. Celui de Dame Scotia est plus élaboré pour servir l’intention satirique de Wedderburn : le rapprochement entre le vêtement symbolique de Dame Scotia et celui de « La sauvage d’Écosse » montre que le pouvoir royal symbolisé par le manteau se dégrade à un point tel que la royauté écossaise sera bientôt réduite à néant. Si le conflit dit de la cour brutale n’a pas été remporté par le pouvoir anglais, les conséquences en seront l’anéantissement du pouvoir écossais.

L’identité visuelle

14 Portés par la vague de la Renaissance, les Tudors ont ressuscité le concept de Britannia en lui donnant l’esprit de résistance de Boudicca, représentée sur un char tout près du Parlement de Westminster. Sa réalité esthétique s’est concrétisée au moment de l’union des parlements d’Angleterre et d’Écosse en 1707. On l’a ensuite parée de vertus morales, politiques et mythologiques en la représentant comme la Neptune de l’Empire. Britannia est représentée en guerrière romanisée : elle porte une toge, un casque de général, un bouclier, une lance ou un trident8. Parodiant l’allégorie de la Grande-

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Bretagne, William Hole a créé le portrait de Caledonia (1898) pour manifester la supériorité de la science à la lutte armée, bien que Caledonia se tienne prête à prendre les armes. En effet, Caledonia est vêtue comme un général romain. Elle a posé son glaive et son bouclier. Elle est assise dans l’encadrement d’une fenêtre. De la main gauche elle tient un grand livre, de la main droite elle repousse le rideau pour montrer un ciel étoilé. Force est de constater qu’aucun des portraits de Marie de Guise que l’on trouve à la Scottish National Portrait Gallery (SNPG) d’Édimbourg ne correspond ni à la Dame Scotia de Wedderburn, ni à la Caledonia de Hole. Cependant, Marie de Guise, Dame Scotia et Calédonia ont en commun les valeurs morales de courage et détermination et une grande lucidité sur l’état de la nation.

15 Avant de chercher à représenter une idée de la nation par la création d’un modèle, on a représenté l’État sous les traits du monarque. Le tableau de Jacques V et de Marie de Guise après leur mariage est censé être le portrait officiel du monarque et de sa seconde épouse. Cependant, il y a deux versions de ce double portrait : dans la première, appelée le tableau de Blair Castle, le roi et la reine sont assis derrière une table. À gauche, le roi est tourné vers son épouse ; et réciproquement la reine est tournée vers la gauche. La main droite du roi est posée sur un livre imprimé symbolisant l’instruction et le savoir et la main gauche du roi recouvre la main droite de Marie pour indiquer leurs statuts respectifs. Jacques V regarde son blason, le lion rampant, et celui des Guise. Dans la seconde version, réalisée entre 1554 et 1560 alors que Marie était Régente, le roi et la reine regardent vers la gauche, l’un et l’autre tiennent entre pouce et index une pierre précieuse portée en collier, attribut de pouvoir.

16 La SNPG d’Édimbourg conserve une vingtaine de portraits, réalisés après son décès, censés représenter Marie de Guise : ils sont accompagnés de commentaires, tels que « artist unknown » ou « a possibly different sitter ». Le portrait réalisé par Corneille de Lyon, qui a fait la réputation de Marie de Guise à travers les siècles, a été peint un siècle après la mort de la reine. Cependant, il faut garder en mémoire que, du temps de Marie de Guise, l’iconoclasme était encouragé par les presbytériens. Duncan Macmillan rappelle que Jacques V, en 1541, fit voter une loi contre cette pratique9 : « George Wishart preached in Ayrshire in 1545 against images and caused great damage. »10

17 Si Jacques V a hérité de son père le goût des arts et le sens de leur importance, Duncan Macmillan reconnaît que la reine venue de France partageait cette vue : elle avait fait venir de France Pierre Quesnel qui fit un portrait11 accompagné de ce commentaire : « Mary of Guise (Lorraine), Queen of James V. 1515-60. Composed ‘aetatis suae 35 / anno Domini 45’. Wearing two brooches, one with the ‘M’ and the other ‘L’ ». La cour et les visiteurs étaient sous le charme de la reine régente qui, devenue veuve, ne céda pas aux avances anglaises, ni pour elle ni pour sa fille, dans le but d’une union des couronnes anglaise et écossaise, et peut-être lorraine... Melanie Clegg, dans Scourge of Henry VIII, the Life of Marie de Guise, met en avant cette obsession chez le roi anglais d’épouser sinon Marie de Guise du moins de marier son fils à la reine écossaise.

18 Les années passant, Marie de Guise a cédé la prééminence à sa fille, Mary Stuart, alias Mary Ie Stuart, alias Mary, Queen of Scots12, qu’il faut distinguer de Marie, reine de France parce que épouse de François II. Quant à Marie la Régente, on constate que tous les portraits de la reine, de son mariage à son décès, y compris le profil imprimé sur les pièces de monnaie13, la montrent séduisante, mais aucun ne peut être daté du fait de l’absence d’arrière-plan.

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19 L’héraldique développée lors du Moyen-Âge a mis en scène des animaux inspirés des fables héritées des auteurs latins et grecs. Et, en 1707, le mariage du triple lion passant14 anglais avec le lion et la licorne rampants écossais constitue une fable propre à générer des métaphores. Les personnages emblématiques d’une part et les animaux mythiques d’autre part illustrent dans leurs démêlées au fil du temps la complexité, parfois la férocité, des rapports entre les dirigeants. L’épopée du lion britannique se terminant théoriquement avec la fin de l’empire, il reste la geste du lion et de la licorne : deux animaux inconciliables puisque le premier relève de la réalité et le second du fantastique.

L’Écosse entre mariage contesté, allégeance refusée et cohabitation insoutenable

20 Le quiproquo est un art à cultiver : tandis que l’Angleterre adoptait le rôle du soupirant éconduit mais certain de son droit et de la sincérité de son projet d’union, l’Écosse ne cessait d’affirmer son droit à la liberté d’autodétermination depuis que Constantin II avait fait, le premier, acte d’allégeance (c. 927) au roi anglais Athelstan. Pour l’Écossais, ce n’était qu’une formalité sans réel fondement ; pour l’Anglais, c’était un engagement. Les successeurs d’Athelstan n’eurent de cesse de s’appuyer sur ce précédent pour parvenir à leur fin, à savoir fondre toutes les parties des Îles britanniques dans Britannia. Mais à compter de 1295, les rêves d’expansionnisme sur le continent ont été contrariés par Philippe le Bel et sa Vieille Alliance. La suite a montré que l’entente franco-écossaise, malgré les déceptions, n’a eu de cesse d’entraver les initiatives d’union exclusive anglo-écossaise.

Le contrat de mariage

21 Il était inévitable que la mort de Jacques V quelques jours après la naissance de Mary, sa fille légitime, causât des remous dans le monde politique de l’Écosse. Two factions began to form amongst the Scottish nobles […] By and large, there was a faction that was pro-English and, in the case of some of the nobles, there was a desire to bring in a measure of Protestant Reformation, which James had firmly rejected. The second group preferred the traditional Auld Alliance with France, and were generally committed to maintaining the Catholic faith. However, affiliations were not black and white, and there were Protestants who looked towards France, and Catholics who believed an accord with England was appropriate.15

22 Alors que les traités de Greenwich conclus peu de temps après la mort de Jacques V, en décembre 1542, étaient dénoncés par les Écossais, Henry VIII estimait qu’il était en droit de lancer une campagne punitive — comme Édouard I en 1296 — pour contraindre l’Écosse à respecter les traités qui l’engageaient à marier Mary Stuart à son fils et héritier. Si la mort d’Henry VIII, le 28 janvier 1547, mit fin à la première phase de la crise, en revanche le régent, Somerset, se révéla fidèle aux intérêts d’Édouard VI : Believing it to be his ‘godly purpose’ to ‘enjoin the Queen and Council to deliver the young Queen to be suitably nourished and brought up with her husband, as a Queen of England,’ Somerset launched his military campaign against the Scots in August 1547. The ideological justification for his invasion and subsequent occupation of Scotland was deeply rooted in terms of Anglo-British imperialism. In his Epistle Exhortatorie to the Scots (1548), for example, Somerset reasoned that ‘as you and

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wee be annexed and ioyned in one Islande, so no people so like in manner, forme, language, and all condicion […] should bee, like two brethren of one Islande of great Britayn’, and ‘if it wer possible one kyngdome not to be divided in rulers’.16

23 La crise dite de la cour brutale17 menée par Henri VIII Tudor à l’égard de Marie Stuart et de ses protecteurs commence dès la naissance de la princesse héritière du trône d’Écosse et la mort prématurée de Jacques V en décembre 1542. Elle prend officiellement fin le 24 mars 1550 : « [this was when] the French and the English signed the Treaty of Boulogne, agreeing a peace in which Scotland would be included. For the first time since the death of James V, the threat of an English invasion was removed »18. Selon Ritchie, « England had a long tradition of claiming suzerainty over Scotland, [and the] birth of Mary Stewart merely provided the means through which this imperial vision could be realised dynastically. »19

24 En 1543, le projet d’union des deux royaumes eut le soutien de l’Assemblée écossaise où le parti favorable au rapprochement scotto-anglais qui avait la majorité promit la main de la princesse. Mais, l’influence française fut assez forte pour contrecarrer ce projet. Le cardinal Beaton et le parti des catholiques entraînèrent le pays dans un nouveau conflit avec le royaume voisin protestant, selon Williams20.

25 L'âge de la princesse rendait inévitable la nomination d’un régent21, et la candidature qui s’imposait était celle de James Hamilton, Comte d’Arran, deuxième dans l’ordre des successeurs au trône après Mary22. Mais cela fut contesté par le cardinal Beaton, archevêque de Saint-Andrews, qui se prévalait de sa nomination par le défunt monarque au Conseil de régence. Quoi qu’il en fût, la compétition entre Beaton et Hamilton, qui avait été nommé gouverneur par le Parlement le 13 mars 1543, prit fin avec le décès du cardinal en mai 1546. Beaton s’était opposé à la réforme en Écosse, et Hamilton était à la tête de la faction protestante pro-anglaise. Mais en mai 1554, le palais de Holyrood fut pillé et en partie détruit par l’armée anglaise, ainsi que le souligne Annette Bächstädt23. Et Hamilton retourna son pourpoint en faveur de l’Écosse tandis que Marie de Guise s’activait pour la promotion des intérêts de la France. Elle veillait aussi aux intérêts dynastiques de sa fille : cela incluait la liberté de l’Écosse et la réactivation de la Vieille Alliance franco-écossaise. Ritchie précise, page 19 : « The treaties contracting the marriage of Mary Stewart to Edward Tudor were revoked and largely on account of England’s extremely harsh Scottish policy, that is to say the military invasions known as the ‘rough wooings’ ». Les divisions internes étaient telles que les Écossais ne s’accordaient sur rien, pas même sur l’opposition à la présence militaire anglaise sur leur territoire. C’est ainsi que les troupes anglaises purent infliger des punitions aux Écossais pour leur manque de soutien au projet de création d’un grand royaume de ‘Brytain’.

26 Les luttes intestines entre pro-Anglais et anti-Anglais dans la crise de la demande en mariage faite par l’Angleterre exaspéraient le peuple écossais qui n’avait pas oublié la menace qui est au cœur de la Déclaration d’Arbroath de 1320 : Yet if [our monarch] should give up what he has begun, and agree to make us or our kingdom subject to the King of England or the English, we should exert ourselves at once to drive him out as our enemy and a subverter of his own rights and ours, and make some other man who was well able to defend us our King; for, as long as but a hundred of us remain alive, never will we on any conditions be brought under English rule.

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27 Malgré sa ferme et constante opposition à une union entre sa fille, reine des Écossais, et Édouard VI d’Angleterre, les choix politiques de Marie de Guise restaient contestables puisqu’elle s’appuyait sur le soutien du roi de France.

La conquête par les armes

28 Le projet d’Henry VIII, dont ses prédécesseurs avaient rêvé, faisait suite à sa rupture d’avec l’Église de Rome qui ajoutait une valeur selon Ritchie : « a Protestant dimension to the existing geographical, linguistic and cultural arguments in favour of Anglo-Scottish union which culminated in the treaties of Greenwich »24. Mais les Écossais, qui n’ignoraient rien de l’annexion récente du pays de Galles, n’eurent pas davantage confiance dans les promesses de Somerset que dans celles d’Henry VIII, à savoir qu’il respecterait l’indépendance de l’Écosse et qu’il souhaitait simplement libérer le pays du joug imposé par le Pape et qu’il n’avait que de bonnes intentions en sous-entendant le respect du contrat de mariage signé en 1543. Et Donaldson de préciser : « and the English manifestos drew attention to the material advantages which would accrue from the godly purpose »25.

29 Si aucun accord de mariage n’était possible, restait la solution de la conquête. Les attaques anglaises culminèrent avec le désastre de Pinkie Cleugh le 10 septembre 1547. Somerset fit construire des places fortes dans des lieux stratégiques : les envahisseurs créaient une enclave sur le modèle du « pale » en Irlande. Cette enclave devait permettre aux armées d’occupation de mener des expéditions dévastatrices dans le Lothian et les Marches écossaises, telle que celle qui eut lieu en février 1548 : « The English did not spend long in Scotland, but as well as causing the usual destruction they managed to capture Haddington, a wealthy and strategically placed burgh in East Lothian »26.

30 Marie de Guise allait se révéler femme de tête : convaincue de la faiblesse de l’armée écossaise et de celle de ses chefs, elle prit les choses en main et se tourna d’abord vers le roi Henri II de France. Alors qu’il préparait la force d’intervention, James Hamilton prit langue avec les Anglais, évoquant la possibilité d’un changement radical de sa politique en leur faveur. Mais Henri II, qui le connaissait bien, avait exigé qu’il lui confie son fils aîné en otage27. De plus, Marie avait persuadé le roi de France de lui donner en mariage une riche héritière : Henri II lui offrit même un duché… Par ailleurs, la noblesse d’Écosse reçut d’importants cadeaux par la même occasion. La corruption devenait endémique, ce qui attisait le courroux de John Knox.

31 La flotte française arriva au port de Leith le 16 juin 1548, et après avoir accueilli la délégation menée par d’Essé, la reine fit le nécessaire pour que sa fille partît en France, le 7 août 1548, sur un bâtiment français. Puis elle exhorta tous les Écossais en âge de prendre les armes de se rendre dans les campements écossais. Elle montra alors ses talents de commandement : she mounted her horse and rode along the High Street of Edinburgh, stopping at every house to root out any deserters lurking inside. As soon as she found them, she asked them in Scots. ‘Is it thus that you set a good example? Before God, if I had not seen you with my own eyes and if anyone had told me that you were like to forget your honour in this way, I would not have believed them I should have thought such a thing incredible, having praised you so much all my life for what I believed and still do believe to be true, that no nation on earth would equal your courage!’ […] According to Beaugué, the soldiers were thoroughly ashamed and set off at once to rejoin the Scottish army.28

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32 Comme l’aurait fait Boudicca29, Marie de Guise monta sur son cheval pour se rendre à Haddington afin de soutenir les soldats écossais qui assiégeaient la ville occupée par les Anglais : On the evening of Monday 9 July she decided to venture as far as St Mary’s church which lay on the edge of Haddington, beside the River Tyne. […] Guns from both sides were still firing but […] she rode up to the back of the church. At that moment there was a thunderous explosion as the cannon inside the town fired in her direction.30

33 Les chroniqueurs rapportent qu’elle fut blessée avec quinze autres soldats, et qu’elle perdit connaissance. À cause de l’aide du corps expéditionnaire français en quelques semaines l’armée anglaise abandonna toutes les villes occupées en Écosse. Et en juin 1549, une autre troupe, à la demande de Marie de Guise, reprit l’île de Inchkeith dans l’estuaire de la Forth.

34 La reine en titre, Mary Stuart, fut promise au dauphin par le traité de Haddington du 7 juillet 1548, mais le conflit dit de la cour brutale ne prit fin que le 24 mars 1550 lorsque Français et Anglais signèrent le traité de Boulogne dans lequel la paix avec l’Écosse était consignée31. Du temps d’Henry VIII Marie protégeait sa fille ; quand Somerset prit la régence elle fut particulièrement active dans la défense de l’Écosse. Avant même qu’elle ne fût officiellement régente d’Écosse en 1554, Marie de Guise avait séduit les chroniqueurs qui montrèrent la reine veuve et mère sous les traits d’une vraie héroïne digne du titre de Dame Scotia. Selon Eric Durot32, Marie de Guise affirmait alors sa légitimité politique malgré le départ pour la France de sa fille déjà polyglotte.

35 En étudiant les événements qui ont touché l’Écosse au seizième siècle, il apparaît que la cohabitation entre l’Écosse, l’Angleterre et la France était cause de confrontation violente, durable conséquence de la guerre de Cent Ans. Marie de Guise puis Mary Stuart ont préservé l’indépendance de l’Écosse tant bien que mal. Suite à l’abdication de Mary Stuart et à sa soumission à Elizabeth Tudor en mai 1568, Jacques VI, fils de Mary et filleul d’Elizabeth, parvint à obtenir le trône d’Angleterre et contraignit l’Angleterre, l’Écosse et l’Irlande à une forme de cohabitation. Malgré l’union de 1707 et l’aventure conjointe de l’empire, la création du Royaume-Uni n’a pas apporté de solution pérenne puisque la Couronne se trouvait à la tête de trois nations — l’Angleterre (qui avait annexé le pays de Galles), l’Écosse et l’Irlande — peu enclines à la fusion.

36 En ce début du vingt-et-unième siècle, à la suite de la dévolution, même partielle et inégale, des pouvoirs, l’union britannique se transforme en cohabitation au sein de l’ensemble plus large de l’Union européenne, véritable mise en abyme. La crise du Brexit, qui n’est pas terminée à ce jour, met en évidence que le mariage entre l’Angleterre, l’Écosse et l’Irlande était un mariage à trois indésirable, dans la mesure où l’Écosse a voté à 62% pour rester dans l’Union européenne. On garde à l’esprit, comme une mise en abyme, que les Anglais, sinon les Britanniques, dans leur pratique quotidienne, n’ont jamais cessé de donner au mot ‘Européens’ le sens de ‘Continentaux européens’, s’excluant du concept d’union européenne.

L’Écosse, une nation plurilingue

37 Lorsque la religion chrétienne, avec le latin, s’est implantée en Écosse, à compter du sixième siècle, la carte linguistique était une mosaïque complexe. Des siècles plus tard, la langue des Anglo-Saxons n’a pas réussi à phagocyter les langues indigènes. Une

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certaine confusion vient de la cohabitation de langues nationales et de dialectes communautaires. Et devant la fermeté des Écossais quant à la reconnaissance et du gaélique et de l’écossais (Scots33), nous devons prendre pour acquis le fait que l’Écosse est une nation qui se revendique plurilingue, marque distinctive au sein de la Grande- Bretagne.

Un état des lieux

38 Jacques Leruez, dans L’Écosse, une nation sans État (p. 43), place un intertitre provocateur, « Un non-problème : la langue », et ajoute : « Le traité d’Union ne mentionne pas la question de la langue. C’est qu’en 1707 la langue n’est déjà plus un problème ». L’argumentation était recevable et discutable en 1979, mais une quarantaine d’années plus tard, le plurilinguisme n’est plus contestable. Leruez rappelle, à juste titre, p. 45 : « […] comme ailleurs en Europe, un renouveau d’intérêt pour les langues minoritaires s’est manifesté en Écosse depuis les années cinquante. » En effet, la Convention culturelle européenne de 1954 a été ratifiée par le Royaume-Uni en mai 1955. L’article 2 de cette Convention énonce : Chaque Partie contractante, dans la mesure du possible : […] 2- s’efforcera de développer l’étude de sa langue ou de ses langues, de son histoire et de sa civilisation sur le territoire des autres Parties contractantes et d’offrir aux nationaux de ces dernières la possibilité de poursuivre semblables études sur son territoire. 34

39 Cela signifie clairement que chaque langue a droit de cité dans son territoire et droit à la reconnaissance internationale. Il restera à définir ce qui est considéré comme langue et ce qui est considéré comme dialecte.

40 Il faut attendre 1992 pour que l’Europe publie à Strasbourg la Charte européenne des langues régionales ou minoritaires, ratifiée par le Royaume-Uni en 2001. Article 1 – Définitions : Au sens de la présente Charte : par l’expression « langues régionales ou minoritaires », on entend les langues : 1- pratiquées traditionnellement sur un territoire d’un État par des ressortissants de cet État qui constituent un groupe numériquement inférieur au reste de la population de l’État ; et différentes de la (des) langues(s) officielle(s) de cet État ; elle n’inclut ni les dialectes de la (des) langues(s) officielle(s) de l’État ni les langues des migrants ; 35

41 Vu la Charte européenne des langues régionales ou minoritaires, la question de l’utilité ou de la pertinence de l’écossais et du gaélique est caduque.

42 Britannia est un mot latin qualifiant les peuplades brittoniques d’avant l’invasion des Angles, des Jutes et des Saxons des cinquième et sixième siècle. Les Tudors ont repris le toponyme pour en faire un concept englobant l’emblématique Boudicca. Jacques VI d’Écosse et Ier d’Angleterre et d’Irlande a importé Scotia et Calédonia en 1603 et élargi le concept de Britannia à celui de Great Britain, zone anglophone. Mais contre toute attente, l’Écosse, partie prenante du Royaume-Uni, est restée une nation plurilingue : dans l’ordre chronologique, gaélophone, scottophone, anglophone.

43 À compter de la fin du haut Moyen-Âge, la nation écossaise s’est construite sur deux systèmes linguistiques inconciliables, celtique et germanique. Contrairement à la tendance générale, ni l’un ni l’autre n’a cédé la place et disparu ; et l’Écosse clame que

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le plurilinguisme est un atout. Après avoir obtenu la majorité à Holyrood en 2007, le SNP a mis en avant la richesse linguistique de la nation36. Déjà, depuis avril 2005, le gaélique avait acquis la reconnaissance officielle en accédant au statut de langue nationale à parité avec l’anglais ; mais depuis la réouverture du Parlement, en 1999, les textes officiels sont publiés et en anglais et en gaélique37. Cependant, l’écossais, bien que parlé par une majorité d’Écossais, souffre à la fois de sa proximité d’origine avec l’anglais et de n’être pas encore parvenu à unifier la douzaine de dialectes présents sur le territoire38. Les scotticistes savent que l’insulte préférée des Écossais à l’endroit des Anglais est « Sassenach », qui ne signifie rien d’autre que Saxon…

Le gaélique

44 Donnée pour moribonde dès avant les années Thatcher, la langue gaélique s’est rénovée et unifiée grâce aux travaux de linguistes et à la volonté des politiques de préserver les langues mineures et régionales. Dans les années 1980, dictionnaires et manuels d’apprentissage ont été publiés pour établir les nouvelles normes grammaticales et orthographiques. Nombre de pédagogues et d’écrivains ont produit des textes adaptés à l’enseignement au niveau de l’école primaire, puis à celui du secondaire afin de créer un corpus à l’intention des élèves qui pourraient ainsi se former et passer des examens de valeur nationale. La production de nouvelles et de romans a été encouragée, ainsi que celle de pièces dramatiques. La poésie étant riche de sa variété depuis le quinzième siècle, il n’était pas indispensable de dynamiser l’inspiration des poètes. La reconnaissance de la langue, qui peut se mesurer au nombre d’enfants dans les écoles bilingues, a eu un effet salutaire sur la population gaélophone bilingue39. En effet, la confiance en soi et en sa langue maternelle a permis d’infléchir la tendance à quitter le territoire national40. Les cours d’été que dispense l’Université des Hautes Terres et des îles à l’intention des étudiants écossais et étrangers et les nombreux événements culturels redonnent à cette culture sa place dans le pays : le débat sur le nombre de locuteurs et le rôle que joue cette langue à part entière dans la nation n’est pas près de s’arrêter — il convient, cependant, d’estimer à leur juste valeur les faits, notamment donnés par les recensements, et l’effet, difficilement quantifiable. Quoi qu’on en pense, le gaélique écossais est une réalité aussi visible que le kilt et aussi audible que la cornemuse.

45 Les scotticistes français sont confrontés à des discours divergents animés de sentiments contradictoires : la négation pure et simple de la langue gaélique, son inutilité, la quasi impossibilité de l’apprendre, sa dépendance du folklore, mais aussi sa richesse littéraire, la différence de vision du monde… L’étudiant en études écossaises est avant tout placé devant une langue différente mais pas plus complexe que l’anglais. Une fois retenue l’évidence d’une nation trilingue, le latin mis à part, se pose la question légitime : où parle-t-on gaélique ?

46 Le mot « Gàidhealtachd », simplifié en « Gaeltachd » (en écossais), traduit en anglais par « Gaeldom », correspond au mot « Gaélie », néologisme41 que j’ai introduit en 2003. Gaélie est la contraction de gaélophonie. Jusqu’au dix-neuvième siècle, le terme de géographie « Highlands » signifiant rien d’autre que Hautes Terres était donné pour équivalent de « Gàidhealtachd », mot gaélique formé de « Gàidheal » et du suffixe « - achd » servant à créer un concept. Les Hautes-Terres42 se sont dépeuplées au dix- neuvième siècle, et la pratique du gaélique a grandement diminué à l’avantage du

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dialecte anglais Highland English. La plus grande densité de gaélophones se trouve sur la côte d’Argyll et dans les Hébrides43. Cependant, les universités de Aberdeen, Glasgow et Édimbourg ont un département de gaélique, la ville de Glasgow a reçu une forte migration de gaélophones et la ville d’Édimbourg abrite le Parlement d’Écosse où le gaélique a droit de cité au même titre que l’anglais. Il s’avère donc que l’on est susceptible de rencontrer un(e) gaélophone partout sur le territoire de l’Écosse, d’autant plus que la concurrence entre gaélophones et scottophones a cessé depuis plus d’une génération. De cette rapide observation, on déduit que les limites de la Gaélie sont théoriquement celles de l’Écosse. Et la notion de gaélophonie se justifie par le fait que cette langue s’étudie dans certains territoires de l’ancien empire britannique, tels que le Canada et la Nouvelle Zélande.

L’écossais

47 La langue écossaise (Scots) a survécu à un double handicap : le premier est une origine commune avec l’anglais, puisque le nord-anglien s’est ancré et développé dans le nord- est44 aux sixième et septième siècles, puis à l’écart des royaumes saxons et angliens à cause du royaume danois (Danelaw, circa 871-954) ; le second est une fragmentation dialectale cristallisée par les effets de la révolution davidienne à partir du douzième siècle. De la gémellité supposée de l’anglais et de l’écossais est née une compétition incessante où l’anglais cherche à prendre le dessus. De la fragmentation en une douzaine45 de dialectes répertoriés des Marches à l’archipel des Shetland, ces variations dialectales sont des marqueurs de singularité issue de mouvements migratoires historiques. D’un point de vue politique, cette fragmentation est un obstacle à la reconnaissance officielle du statut de langue nationale. Il reste que ce qui est une faiblesse pour les uns est une richesse pour les autres : le dorique, par exemple, témoigne d’une vitalité remarquable de la zone d’Aberdeen : ce dialecte n’hésite pas à s’approprier, par la traduction, des œuvres de langues étrangères, telles que des pièces de Molière (Le malade imaginaire sous la plume de J. Derrick McClure devient The Hypochondriak) et le Macbeth de William Shakespeare (qui, traduit par Lorimer & Purves, devient The Bludie Tragedie o' Macbeeth).

48 Lorsque, au cours de la guerre de Cent Ans, la langue française a été bannie d’Angleterre à l’avantage de l’anglais (English) qui allait au seizième siècle subir les transformations que l’on connaît, l’Écosse a affirmé sa propre langue en changeant l’appellation courante de « Inglis » à « Scottis » — et les Makars, tels que R. Henryson et W. Dunbar, lui ont donné ce socle formel que l’on trouve dans The Complaynt of Scotlande. La langue écossaise a continué de s’enrichir, bien au-delà de la Renaissance, de vocables français et latins, mais aussi gaéliques en les adaptant à sa phonologie. Au seizième siècle, l’écossais a subi les assauts de l’anglais pour des raisons politiques, et la période de la cour brutale à l’égard de Marie Stuart révèle que les Anglais cherchaient à discréditer la langue des Écossais en la rabaissant au niveau de « mauvais anglais ». Mais on observe aujourd’hui une moindre persistance chez les anglophones à chercher à réduire à néant et la langue écossaise et la langue gaélique avec des arguments politiques culpabilisants.

49 On doit à Robert Burns (1759-1796) la revitalisation de la langue écossaise et le retour à la confiance en soi chez les scottophones et à Walter Scott d’avoir su mettre en avant la richesse linguistique de l’Écosse, notamment dans Waverley46 et les romans dits écossais

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(Waverley novels). Scott est resté sourd aux demandes de ses lecteurs anglophones anglais et américains de supprimer tout ou partie des pages écrites en écossais : il voulait exprimer sa vision du monde complexe en jouant des langues indigènes de son pays. Julian D’Arcy, dans Subversive Scott47, a montré qu’il était nécessaire de réévaluer l’œuvre de Walter Scott dans une perspective écossaise plutôt qu'anglo-britannique : ses romans écossais ne cachent rien, mais il est nécessaire de les aborder avec une sensibilité plurilingue pour percevoir les nuances d’ironie romantique48 dans son usage des langues et dialectes indigènes.

L’anglais, l’écossais, le gaélique et le français

50 La langue anglaise s’est imposée — avec un succès relatif à la suite de la signature de la loi d’Union de 1707 — par la force dans les établissements scolaires ; jusqu’au milieu du vingtième siècle, les écoliers gaélophones et scottophones en ont conservé des souvenirs cuisants : l’usage de la ceinture comme fouet restant imprimé dans les mémoires plus longtemps que dans les corps. Aujourd’hui, en Écosse, un anglophone se distingue à la fois par son accent et par sa langue qui diffèrent de l’anglais dit d’Écosse, ou SSE (Scottish Standard English) qui veut se qualifier de langue de référence. Inévitablement, cette langue anglaise s’est fragmentée en différents parlers, dont le plus connu est l’anglais de Haute Écosse…

51 Il demeure que, actuellement, la présence de l’anglais, de l’écossais et du gaélique crée une forme de cohabitation linguistique : c’est ce que l’on trouve exposé dans la revue annuelle New Writing Scotland qui a fait paraître son trente-cinquième numéro annuel en 2018. À la discrétion du responsable d’édition du numéro, on y trouve des formes courtes de prose, de poésie et de texte dramatique dans les trois langues indigènes : écossais, gaélique, anglais.

52 Le texte en moyen-écossais de The Complaynt of Scotlande de 1549 de Robert Wedderburn, recèle divers aspects de la crise que traversait l’Écosse. Le narrateur montre qu’il a une claire compréhension des événements politiques qui se déroulaient entre 1547 et 1549. Et l’on peut avancer que ce texte fondateur annonce les crises linguistiques futures. Le choix de Wedderburn d’écrire en écossais, la langue officielle de la Cour, est une décision militante : « oure Scottis language » souligne le fait que le terme « Inglis » a été abandonné au profit des voisins d’Angleterre. C’était une réponse aux envahisseurs du royaume voisin qui prétendaient que l’Angleterre et l’Écosse partageaient une même langue : I hef red in ane Beuk of ane preceptor that said til his discipulis […] thou sal speik comont langage […] it is necessair at sum Tyme til myxt oure langage vitht part of termis dreuyn Fra lateen be rason that oure scottis tong is nocht sa Copeus as is the lateen tong […] 49

53 Alors que le latin était considéré comme la troisième langue d’Écosse, l’auteur mélange librement l’écossais et le latin ; mais il n’autorise pas le personnage de Dame Scotia à s’exprimer en français, langue romane. L’emploi des langues sert le narrateur dans sa description de la souffrance des Écossais : « the langorius / desolat & affligit pepil » (F1R). Ici, les trois termes qualifiant le peuple d’Écosse sont d’origine romane. Et la cause de cette dépression générale est la violence et la cruauté des Anglais qui sont traités de

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loups : « volfis of ingland » (F3R), autant pour exprimer un sentiment de mépris que pour donner au texte une saveur littéraire, puisque le loup était déjà le personnage cruel des fables et récits à valeur satirique.

54 L’intention de la complainte de Wedderburn est bien d’éveiller les consciences des lecteurs instruits par le biais des références abondantes aux civilisations anciennes : mais à quel tyran contemporain Wedderburn veut comparer Caligula ? […] quha listis to reid the tragedeis of lucius seneque or ihone bocchas in his buik of the ruyne of nobillis thai sal fynd al cruel vsurpatours of vthir cuntreis mak ane mischeuous ende there for i hope in god that vitht in schort days the protectour of ingland and his cruel counsel sal be put in the croniklis in as abhominabil stile as vas […] Nero Callugala50

55 Les langues vivantes et anciennes sont la manifestation audible des enjeux politiques. Et la réforme religieuse oppose les langues vernaculaires aux langues classiques et amplifie le spectre de l’impérialisme linguistique apparenté à l’expansion romaine. Aujourd’hui, le traducteur de textes plurilingues se trouve devant une difficulté majeure car, ainsi qu’on le voit dans les romans écossais de Walter Scott et dans les textes de ses nombreux émules actuels, chacune de ces langues doit être traitée de manière distincte qui ne soit en aucun cas dépréciative.51

Conclusion

56 Aux touristes convaincus que l’Écosse est un pays celtique parce que longtemps considérée comme faisant partie de la « frange celtique », il convient de déployer une carte et de montrer la complexité onomastique — intégrant le nordique — du pays et sa richesse historique : Which was the true Scottish nation? Was it the Gaeltachd, by then in the early nineteenth century confined to the Highlands and the Hebrides? Or was it the Scots- or English-speaking Lowlanders, who from the Middle Ages on had built up a rich culture of their own, a culture which in Walter Scott’s heyday was influential in England and the English-speaking world, and also in Europe at large?52

57 Cette citation de John Pinkerton (1758 – 1826) interroge le concept de « Scottish nation » : « Scot » et « Scottish » ayant la même étymologie que quelque dix-huit siècles d’histoire ont rendue complexe en référant à la fois aux gaélophones, aux scottophones et aux anglophones, l’expression « Scottish nation » pourrait exprimer l’hybridité, tout en préservant une originalité. Il en résulte que la notion de communauté n’est pas étrangère aux Écossais qui la considèrent indispensable.

58 De George Buchanan (1506-1582) William Ferguson rappelle la subtilité de l’humanisme : But although pro-French, his Epithalamium — celebrating the nuptials of the Dauphin Francis and the young Mary, Queen of Scots — also brags about the antiquity of the Scots and their fierce love of independence, hinting perhaps that, while the author preferred France to England, he yet had no wish for his country to fall under the French domination.53

59 La lucidité de George Buchanan sur les relations internationales de l’Écosse, que partageait Marie de Guise, est un héritage reçu par les responsables politiques d’aujourd’hui, comme le montre le comportement du gouvernement de Nicola Sturgeon

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sur l’émancipation de la nation. La paix dans l’archipel britannique leur importe grandement, ils observent, non sans inquiétude, l’agitation chez leurs voisins irlandais à propos de l’enclave anglo-britannique en Ulster. Oublieuse de Caledonia, Hibernia et Britannia, l’Écosse entend commercer avec l’Irlande comme avec les nations européennes, France incluse, comme avec l’Angleterre, mais ne pas être enfermée dans une relation dite privilégiée avec cette dernière. Est-ce à dire que les Écossais doivent s’attendre à une transformation de leur passeport britannique ?

60 Jean Berton est professeur émérite en études écossaises de l’Université de Toulouse Jean-Jaurès. Son domaine de recherche interdisciplinaire couvre l’Écosse : auteur du Dictionnaire insolite de l’Écosse (2019), il aime dénicher des sujets méconnus et parcourir l’histoire de la nation en optant pour des angles de recherche propres à stimuler la curiosité de son lecteur. Il concentre actuellement ses études sur les langues nationales et la traduction de textes plurilingues. .

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Anonymous, Marie de Guise: Regent of Scotland (Coll. Tudor Times Insight, Tudor Times Ltd, 2015). [14 octobre 2018].

Bächstädt, Annette, Maes, Bruno, Sukic, Christine, Marie de Lorraine-Guise, un itinéraire européen, Annales de l’est n° 1-2017, Nancy, Université de Lorraine, 2018.

Brotchie, T.C.F., The Battlefields of Scotland, their Legend and Story, Édimbourg, T.C.& E.C. Jack, 1913.

Clegg, Melanie, Scourge of Henry VIII, The Life of Marie de Guise, Barnsley, Pen and sword history, 2016.

D’Arcy, Julian, M., Subversive Scott, Reykjavik, Iceland University Press, 2005.

Deserps, François, Recueil de la diversité des habits, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, 1567.

Devine, Tom, et Logue, Paddy, Being Scottish, Édimbourg, Polygon, 2002.

Donaldson, Gordon, James V—James VII, Édimbourg, Oliver & Boyd, (1965) 1978.

Ferguson, William, The Identity of the Scottish Nation, Édimbourg, Edinburgh University Press, 1998.

Fuga, Antonella, Artists’ Techniques and Materials, Los Angeles, Getty Publications, 2006.

Keir, Dan, Machair, 2014, [5 septembre 2019].

Leruez, Jacques, L’Écosse, une nation sans État, Lille, PUL, 1983.

Leruez, Jacques, L’Écosse, vieille nation jeune État, Crozon, Armeline, 2000.

Macmillan, Duncan, Scottish Art 1460-1990, Édimbourg, Mainstream, 1990.

Marshall, Rosalind K., Mary of Guise: Queen of Scots, Londres, Collins, 1977.

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Merriman, Marcus, The Rough Wooings Mary Queen of Scots 1542-1551, East Linton, Tuckwell, 2000.

Mikalachki, Jodi, The Legacy of Boadicea: Gender and Nation in Early Modern England, Abingdon, Routledge, 2014.

Moffat, Alistair, The Great Tapestry, Édimbourg, Birlinn, 2013.

Ritchie, Pamela E., Mary of Guise in Scotland, 1548-1560: A Political Study, Édimbourg, Tuckwell Press, 2002.

Schoentjes, Pierre, Poétique de l'ironie, Paris, coll. "Points/Essais-Inédits", 2001.

Trow, M. J., Boudicca: the Warrior Queen, Londres, Thistle Publishing, 2015.

Wedderburn, Robert, The Complaynt of Scotlande, 1549. Oxford Text Archive, [15 septembre, 2017].

Williams, H. Noel, The Brood of False Lorraine, the History of the Ducs de Guise 1496-1588, 2 volumes, Londres, Hutchinson & Co, non daté.

NOTES

1. Cette étude ne traite pas des caricatures, telles que celle du troll, du 4 juin 1794, publiée sur la couverture de la revue de ESSE, Messenger, vol. VII, n°2, printemps 1998. 2. Depuis deux ou trois générations, Britannia est l’objet de raillerie sous la plume d’humoristes et de satiristes mais l’on ne cherche plus à recréer un portrait de Calédonia dont la physionomie soit reconnaissable. 3. Voir The Great Tapestry of Scotland, de MOFFAT Alistair (Édimbourg, Birlinn, 2013) : la page 74 représente le premier imprimeur d’Écosse, Chepman & Myllar. 4. La traduction des extraits cités dans cet article ne sert qu’à guider la compréhension du texte. Les codes, ici F56V, indiquent les numéros de page. « On m’appelle Dame Scotia, la femme affligée ». 5. « Dans mon triste rêve et cette vision floue, j’ai cru / que m’apparaissait une dame d’excellente famille et d’ancienne lignée qui arborait / un air mélancolique suite à la grande violence qu’elle avait subie et endurée » (F54V). 6. « Sa coiffure dans un état lamentable / sa chevelure couleur d’or pur était crêpée / et tombait en désordre sur ses épaules » (F54V). 7. Images de DESERPS François. Texte et images de : Marie de Guise and Scottish fashion in the 16th century. Voir le site de BÄCHSTÄDT Annette : [26 février 2019]. 8. Ce concept androgyne a été secondé par le personnage mâle devenu légendaire de John Bull. Et John Arbuthnot, dans son ouvrage satirique The History of John Bull (1712), s’est bien gardé de faire de Peg, personnage féminin, son épouse : Peg est la sœur acariâtre de John. L’image de l’Angleterre et celle de l’Écosse s’en trouvaient à égalité d’origine, en théorie. Ainsi Britannia est- elle le point de départ de la mythologie britannique, non pas anglo-saxonne parce qu’elle n’est pas germanique. 9. MACMILLAN Duncan, Scottish Art 1460-1990, Édimbourg, Mainstream, 1990, p. 37. 10. Ibid., p. 38. 11. Coté à SNPG : S.Ph.I 38-20. 12. L’expression « Queen of Scots », reine des Écossais, est la traduction littérale de l’expression latine utilisée pour la dynastie des Alpin (fondée vers 843) : Rex Scottorum. Dans la culture des Gaëls, le roi (« Rì nan Albannach ») régnait sur des hommes et des femmes ; le peuple tout entier

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appartenait au territoire qu’ils occupaient et à qui ils allaient remettre leurs dépouilles, plutôt qu’ils possédaient la terre. C’est sous l’influence anglo-normande que les monarques devinrent « Kings of Scotland », « Rì na h-Alba », en gaélique moderne. La graphie en gaélique est variable au fil des générations : l’équivalent de « the Great Glen » est « Gleann Mòr », ou « Glen Albyn », la vallée de l’Écosse. À plusieurs reprises, Shakespeare place le personnage de Albany qui représente l’Écosse. Dans King Lear, les époux des trois filles représentent la France, l’Écosse et l’Angleterre. 13. Photo cotée à SNPG : S.Ph.I. 38-25. 14. Le léopard passant des Plantagenêts est devenu le lion passant au cours de la guerre de Cent Ans. 15. ANON. Marie de Guise: Regent of Scotland [14 octobre 2018], p. 15. 16. RITCHIE Pamela, Mary of Guise in Scotland, 1548-1560, Édimbourg, Tuckwell Press, 2002, p. 21. 17. Voir, dans The Rough Wooings, Mary Queen of Scots, 1542-1551, de MERRIMAN Marcus, l’étude détaillée de la crise. À la page 6, il résume l’événement : « The war took place in two stages : first under Henry VIII (from 9 November 1543 to 6 June 1546), then one directed by Edward’s Protector, the Duke of Somerset (from 2 September 1547 until 24 March 1550). That actually makes two rough wooings. If one then includes the vigorous and successful war by the French King Henry II by which he achieved Mary’s hand for his four-year-old son (June 1548 to April 1550), there are three wooings. » 18. MARSHALL Rosalind, Mary of Guise: Queen of Scots, Londres, Collins, 1977, p. 69. 19. RITCHIE Pamela, Mary of Guise in Scotland, 1548-1560, op. cit., p. 19. 20. WILLIAMS Noel, The Brood of False Lorraine, the History of the Ducs de Guise 1496-1588, Londres, Hutchinson & Co, non daté, p. 99. 21. Voir l’article de BLAKEWAY Amy, « Marie de Guise: Dowager and Regent of Scotland » in BÄCHSTÄDT Annette (dir.), Marie de Lorraine-Guise, un itinéraire européen, Nancy, Université de Lorraine, 2018, p. 125. 22. Voir RITCHIE Pamela, Mary of Guise in Scotland, 1548-1560, op. cit., p. 17. 23. « Falkland Palace, Edinburgh and Holyroodhouse : Three Scottish Residences of Marie of Lorraine (1538-1559) » in BÄCHSTÄDT (dir.), op. cit., p. 117-129. 24. RITCHIE Pamela, Mary of Guise in Scotland, 1548-1560, op. cit., p. 19. 25. DONALDSON Gordon, James V—James VII, Édimbourg, Oliver & Boyd, 1978, p. 77. 26. MARSHALL Rosalind, Mary of Guise: Queen of Scots, op. cit., p. 65. 27. Ibid., p. 66. 28. Ibid., p. 67. 29. Voir de MIKALACHKI J., The Legacy of Boadicea, Abingdon, Routledge, 2014. 30. MARSHALL Rosalind, Mary of Guise: Queen of Scots, op. cit., p. 68. 31. Ibid., p. 68. 32. « Marie de Guise, un sacrifice pour les siens », in BÄCHSTÄDT Annette, Marie de Lorraine-Guise, un itinéraire européen, op. cit., p. 69. 33. Afin d’éviter de m’exprimer en franglais inutilement, je préfère ne pas utiliser le terme « Scots » qu’il faudrait écrire « scotse » pour l’adapter à la grammaire et à la phonologie françaises. Le terme « écossais » signifiant « langue écossaise » n’offre pas d’ambiguïté. 34. 35. 36. Voir de NIHTINEN Atina, « Gaelic and Scots in Devolved Scotland » (2008) sur le site : [1er juin 2019]. 37. Voir de BERTON Jean, « Scottish Gaelic : An Age-Old Language in Modern Europe », in LEYDIER Gilles (dir.) Scotland and Europe, Scotland in Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2006, p. 142-155.

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38. Voir les travaux de ROBINSON Christine, lexicographe réputée, qui fut responsable de la mise à jour du Dictionary of the Scots Language. Elle est aussi l’auteure de Modern Scots Grammar (Édimbourg, Luath, 2012). 39. Il n’y a plus de locuteur gaélophone monoglotte depuis au moins deux générations. En revanche, s’il est difficile de quantifier au plus juste les gaélophones selon leurs compétences comme on le voit dans les recensements décennaux, on s’aperçoit qu’ils se sont libérés de toute la culpabilisation dont ils ont fait l’objet depuis des siècles. De surcroît, s’est imposée l’idée que le plurilinguisme est un atout. La gaélophonie concerne essentiellement : l’Écosse, le Canada et la Nouvelle-Zélande. 40. Voir, de McCRONE David, Understanding Scotland : The Sociology of a Stateless Nation, Londres, Routledge, 2001. 41. Voir « Gaélie ou Highlands, mythes et réalité ? », in Bernard SELLIN (dir.), Écosse des Highlands, mythes et réalités, Brest, CRCB, Université de Bretagne occidentale, 2003. 42. Je distingue l’expression globalisante de Haute Écosse (sans trait d’union) de la partition géographique Haute-Écosse (Highlands), Basse-Écosse (Lowlands), Marches (Southern Uplands). 43. Le machair condense la vision du monde des gaélophones. Voir mon article « Le machair, symbole de la résistance victorieuse à la colonisation de l’Écosse septentrionale », in BESSON F. (dir.) Écrits et cris de la terre dans le monde anglophone, Toulouse, PUM Caliban 61, octobre 2019, et le poème de Dan KEIR « Machair » : Where salt air, sand and soil meet; / A breeze of seasons sung a day. / Life grows to pass beneath your feet; / Still under grass we sleep to stay. 44. Les royaumes anglais de Bernicia (englobant le Lothian) et de Deira ont fusionné et se sont développés pour créer Northumbria (VIIIe siècle). 45. Il va de soi que le nombre proposé par les linguistes est contesté. 46. Voir, de BERTON Jean, « Translating Scottish Literary Texts: A Linguistic Clover-Leaf » in CORBETT John (dir.), International Journal of Scottish Literature, Glasgow, IJLS, hiver 2010. Et « Le réalisme linguistique dans Waverley. » in SUHAMY H. (dir.), Scott Walter (Sir), Waverley, Paris, Ellipses, 1998. 47. D’ARCY, Julian, Subversive Scott, The Waverley Novels and Scottish Nationalism, Reykjavik, University of Iceland Press, 2005. 48. Voir, dans Poétique de l'ironie de P. Schoentjes, le procédé systématique de l'ironie romantique comme recours aux jeux énonciatifs qui brisent l’illusion romanesque par des commentaires décalés du narrateur ou des personnages. Ces commentaires souvent résident dans l’emploi d’un dialecte ou d’une langue différence de celle du narrateur. Selon F. Schlegel, l'ironie romantique, synonyme de liberté créatrice, permet à l'artiste de corriger le caractère subjectif de son œuvre par des moments objectifs. (). 49. « J’ai lu dans un livre / d’un précepteur qui disait à ses élèves / […] tu parleras la langue du peuple […] il est nécessaire parfois / de mélanger dans notre langue des mots issus du latin / pour la bonne raison que notre langue écossaise n’est pas / aussi riche que ne l’est le latin […] » (F14V). 50. « [si tu] lis les tragédies de Lucius Sénèque ou Jean Boccace dans son ouvrage sur la ruine / de la noblesse tu trouveras tous les cruels usurpateurs des autres pays / qui ont connu une fin cruelle. Donc j’espère / — que le Seigneur m’entende — que très prochainement le roi d’Angleterre / et son cruel gouvernement seront présentés dans les chroniques / d’une manière aussi abominable que le sont […] Néron et Caligula (F64V). 51. Voir « Étude sur The Spanish Galleon, de John Brandane (1921), drame archétypal écossais plurilingue », in BERTON J., CORRONS F., SURBÉZY A. (dir.) Traduction, plurilinguisme et langues en contact, Toulouse, PUM - « La main de Thôt » CETIM, juillet 2014. 52. FERGUSON William, The Identity of the Scottish Nation, Édimbourg, Edinburgh University Press, 1998, p. 309. 53. Ibid., p. 81.

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RÉSUMÉS

Le titre « Mise à jour de la fiche signalétique de l’Écosse » annonce une étude limitée à l’identité patronymique et visuelle de la nation, à l’origine et l’état de l’union avec l’Angleterre et au plurilinguisme assumé de l’Écosse. Les noms latins de Britannia, Scotia et Caledonia, hérités des Romains, forcent à explorer l’histoire sur quelque vingt siècles ; la renaissance de Britannia a fait renaître Scotia au seizième siècle et la nouvelle tentative d’union a cristallisé leur antagonisme attisé par la France. Les langues indigènes de l’Écosse, enjeu de différence, loin d’avoir été diluées dans le Royaume-Uni se régénèrent depuis deux générations.

The theme of updating Scotland’s documents developed in this article is centred on three points: the names and portraits of the nation, how valid the state of the union with England can be today (when compared to how powerful the idea of marriage was in the 16th century), and how Scots and Gaelic have managed to survive the invasion of English. Since Britannia, Scotia and Caledonia are part of the Roman heritage, one must be prepared to be familiar with Scotland’s history so as to evaluate the age-old antagonism between England and Scotland and the survival of the nation’s indigenous languages.

INDEX

Keywords : Britannia, Caledonia, Scotia, union, multilingualism. Mots-clés : Britannia, Caledonia, Scotia, union, plurilinguisme

AUTEUR

JEAN BERTON Université Toulouse Jean-Jaurès, laboratoire CAS

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Can the Anglo-Scottish Union Survive Brexit? L'Union anglo-écossaise peut-elle survivre au Brexit ?

Michael Keating

The Scottish Settlement

1 Among the foreign observers of Scotland’s peculiar political and constitutional status, none was more acute than Jacques Leruez. His book L'Écosse. Une Nation sans État introduced French readers to the idea that nation and state are distinct concepts and, in the United Kingdom, different political realities. In a series of publications over the years, he explored the nature of the relationship of Scotland to the wider British state and the complex meanings of union as multinational compromise. As a student of territorial politics and statecraft, he was able to trace the multiple ways – economic, social and political – in which Scotland was integrated, without being assimilated, into the wider state. British unionism was very different from French Jacobinism and could accept differentiation in culture, education, law and social policies. The one thing it could never concede was the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament. For a century, this meant that British governments would not bow to demands for home rule or devolution, fearing that this could lead to federalism and erosion of parliamentary sovereignty or even to secession.

2 At the end of the twentieth century, this obstacle was removed as the Labour Government set up devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The sovereignty question was dealt with in a summary clause asserting that none of this affected the union or the right of the Westminster Parliament to legislate in all parts of the country. There followed a convention (the Sewel Convention) stating that it would not “normally” do so. Of course, many people in Scotland did not accept this interpretation, insisting that Scotland had its own tradition of sovereignty, that the Acts of Union did not mean that the English tradition of sovereignty had passed to the new Parliament of Great Britain, and that the devolution referendum of 1997 was an act

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of self-determination. In true British fashion, however, people were left to believe different things and relations between the two parliaments were generally cooperative, even when the Scottish National Party (SNP) was in power in Holyrood and Labour and then the Conservatives ruled at Westminster.

3 A critical factor in this was membership of the European Union and of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (under the Council of Europe), which have transformed the meaning of sovereignty and statehood in Europe. As sovereignty is divided and shared in Europe, it provides a discursive space for ideas of post- sovereignty, which many nationalist and regionalist movements in Europe have adopted.1 Post-sovereignty does not mean that sovereignty has disappeared but that it has been transformed and is no longer monolithic and located only in the nation-state. The Northern Ireland settlement explicitly invites citizens to choose whichever combination of identities (Irish, British, Northern Irish, European) they prefer and gives these institutional expression. Most Scots, rather than being torn between British and Scottish identities, combine these in varying proportions. The SNP’s embrace of Europe from the mid-1980s was a recognition that independence is not isolation but rather a change in the complex web of interdependencies in which the nation is located. Radical visions of a Europe of the (small) Nations or Europe of the Regions may have come to little, but nationalities movements in Europe do see it as a framework for greater autonomy and protagonism. During the independence referendum campaign of 2014, both sides were committed to Europe, differing only on the best way to stay in it. Unionists argued that an independent Scotland would be excluded from the EU, while nationalists warned that, without independence, Scotland risked being dragged out of the EU by a Eurosceptic England. With the consensus on Europe, the argument then came down to managing the various unions. SNP leader Alex Salmond even argued that Scotland was currently in six unions – political, monarchical, monetary, defence, European, and social – and proposed withdrawing only from the first.

4 Europe provided an economic framework for independence, by guaranteeing free trade and free movement. The Single Market allowed a more generous measure of devolution in economic matters than would have otherwise been possible, as it also secured the internal market of the United Kingdom. Industrial policy, aid to industry, agriculture, fisheries and the environment were all devolved to Scotland, within the scope of EU law, which itself was directly applicable in Scotland. The only role for the UK in these fields was to secure a common negotiating position in the Council of the European Union.

5 The EU and the ECHR ensured a common regime of rights not only across the EU but within the UK. This is of vital importance in Northern Ireland and Scotland, as it separates the question of human rights from citizenship and identity. That is crucial in territories where substantial parts of the population do not identify as British but where equality of rights is important. ECHR rulings, whether by domestic courts or the European Court of Human Rights, are directly applicable in devolved fields in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In reserved fields and in England, on the other hand, they do not bind Parliament and the courts can only bring breaches of the convention to its attention.

6 Europe also serves to lower the importance of borders, so helping to bring together the two parts of Ireland without changing their constitutional status. It also eases cross- border issues between England and Scotland and, in the case of Scottish independence,

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would have prevented the emergence of a hard border, assuming that both states remained in the EU.

7 A central concern of supporters of Brexit is to reassert the sovereignty of the UK Parliament, to “bring back control”. According to them, there is a fundamental contradiction between the European project, with its supranational pretentions, and the British constitution, rooted in the unassailable supremacy of the unitary Parliament. In Scotland, however, a different conception of the state prevails, according to which the United Kingdom is a plurinational union of nations, with no single people (demos) and no shared aim or end-point (telos). It is open to multiple interpretations, which co-exist in practice if not in theory and are constantly negotiated. Sovereignty is not settled but constantly questioned. For some the union is about economics, while others stress history, common sentiment or shared welfare. Understood in this sense, there is a fundamental compatibility or ‘goodness of fit’ between the UK constitutional order and that of Europe, which is based precisely on these ideas and has survived by not defining them too rigidly.

8 Neither the UK or the EU is a federation but they do share key federal principles. British devolution has evolved over twenty years as the institutions have matured. Northern Ireland has its own dynamics and the settlement has experienced serial crises. Scotland has gained more powers, most recently over taxation and aspects of welfare. The National Assembly for Wales has followed Scotland in gaining legislative powers and more competences. In the final days of the Scottish referendum campaign of 2014, former Prime Minister Gordon Brown rallied the unionist parties to promise more powers, calling for the UK to be as much like a federal system as was possible within the British constitution. There followed the Smith Commission and the Scotland Act (2016), which stipulated that the Scottish Parliament was a permanent feature of the constitution, which could be abolished only by referendum of the Scottish people, and put the Sewel Convention into law. Of course, if the Westminster Parliament is still sovereign, it is not bound by this Act but the move did appear to be a federalizing one and it was understood that Westminster was committing itself to legislative restraint.

Scotland and Europe

9 During the 1970s, Scotland was comparatively Eurosceptic. In the 1975 referendum on continued membership of the European Communities, it voted to remain by a smaller majority than did England. Both the Labour and Scottish National parties were largely opposed to the EC. In the mid-1980s, both Labour and the SNP changed positions and committed themselves to membership of the European Union. For the SNP, Europe provided a framework for independence, rebutted charges of “separatism” and offered guarantees of market access. Some nationalists accepted the full implications of Europe, that an independent Scotland would not be fully sovereign.2 Others were more wary, favouring an intergovernmental Europe of the Nations. From this point, Scots started to look on Europe less sceptically than did the English, a reverse of the position in the 1970s. This was not, however, because nationalist voters bought the argument about independence in Europe. There was no correlation whatever between views on independence and on Europe.3 Hard-line nationalists in Scotland, which includes those who want complete and immediate independence and those British nationalists who would do away with the Scottish Parliament (a much smaller number) were rather

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Eurosceptic. In the middle of both the nationalist-unionist and Europhile-Eurosceptic spectra, on the other hand, there was a strong correlation between supporting more devolution and moderate pro-Europeanism. These are the consistently post- sovereigntist voters, found in all the parties. SNP voters were not particularly pro- European and less so than Labour voters. Survey evidence suggests that, in England, support for Brexit is strongly related to feeling English rather than British. In Scotland, national identity has no such effect.

10 A notable feature of Scottish politics is the low salience of immigration and European free movement, compared with England. Surveys have shown that Scottish voters are not particularly pro-immigration but all parties in the Scottish Parliament have framed immigration as a demographic and economic issue, a vital means to sustain Scotland’s population rather than a threat. This has served to contain one of the main drivers of Brexit sentiment.

11 These factors ensured that, in the 2016 Brexit referendum, while England and Wales voted narrowly to leave the EU, Scotland voted by a large margin to remain, with remain majorities across all parts of the country and across all parties.

Table 1. Percentage Vote in EU referendum

Leave Remain

UK 52 48

England 53 47

Scotland 38 62

Wales 53 47

Northern Ireland 44 56

12 It was immediately apparent that, with Northern Ireland also voting to remain (but divided between the two communities), Brexit posed a serious challenge to the territorial constitution of the United Kingdom. What was less clear was how this could work out. We can discuss this according to three scenarios, which have yet to play out fully. One is recentralization as the UK reconstitutes itself as a unitary state after Brexit. Another is disintegration, as the Scotland and Northern Ireland remain in the EU. A third is reconfiguration as the various nations renegotiate their places in both unions.

Recentralization

13 There have been a number of signs that Brexit could entail a recentralization of the state and a reversal of the federalizing trend that has prevailed since 1999. The first was the insistence by the UK Government, without consulting the devolved nations, that the whole state would withdraw. As ministers constantly repeated, this was a decision by “the British people”, implying a unitary demos that had spoken as one. They

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had earlier rejected suggestions that Brexit might require concurrent majorities across the UK nations.

14 A second instance was the case in the Supreme Court brought by Gina Miller concerning whether the UK Government needed the consent of Parliament to activate Article 50 of the EU treaty, to begin the withdrawal process. The position of the UK Government was that triggering Article 50 did not require parliamentary approval at all but, as “foreign policy”, could be done under prerogative powers. The Scottish Government joined the action, claiming that it would also trigger the need for legislative consent under the Sewel Convention, as Brexit entailed changing their devolution settlements (by removing the application of EU law). The UK Supreme Court (2017) ruled that the UK Government did indeed need parliamentary approval but not that of the devolved legislatures.4 Rather than ruling on the narrow ground that EU relations were a reserved matter and thus not subject to the Sewel Convention, the Court added that Sewel was a mere “political” convention having no binding force in any circumstances. At a stroke it thus emptied the efforts in 2016 and 2017 to entrench it, and undermined a pillar of the devolution settlement. In fact, the Supreme Court declined to enter into a constitutional argument, treating parliamentary sovereignty as a simple fact rather than a complex concept that might have to be reconsidered in the light of devolution.

15 A third instance concerns the negotiations for withdrawal. The UK Government took the position that this was a matter for it alone that the devolved bodies would only be consulted along with other stakeholders. This differed from the position in normal EU negotiations where matters touching on devolved competences are discussed in an intergovernmental forum, the Joint Ministerial Committee. Eventually, the UK Government agreed to establish a Joint Ministerial Committee (European Negotiations) but this did not have a substantive role in the negotiations themselves. It did not debate the main issues in advance of European negotiations and Scottish ministers complained that they were not informed in time of upcoming issues or given the requisite papers on time. On the other hand, this may suit the political purposes of the Scottish Government which was opposed to Brexit and not necessarily interested in helping it to happen.

16 The fourth issue concerns those competences that are devolved to Scotland but subject to European law. Agriculture, fisheries, environment, regional economic development and, in Scotland and Northern Ireland, large parts of Justice and Home Affairs competence are not reserved to Westminster. This means that, unless the devolution statutes themselves were amended, these competences would after Brexit revert directly to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Only in respect of England would they come back to Westminster.

17 Repatriation is not, however, clear cut. Regulation and support for agriculture and fisheries are devolved, but not trade. Whatever trade deals the UK signs with the UK or others will include rules on agricultural support, as would falling back on World Trade Organization rules. There is also the fact the EU framework is responsible for maintaining a single market, including fair competition and regulatory harmonization, within the UK itself. Environmental policies have external effects that need to be managed in common.

18 The UK Government’s initial interpretation was that, currently, the devolved governments “are responsible for implementing the common policy frameworks set by

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the EU” rather than making policy. Taking back the powers would thus not reduce their ability to take decisions. Moreover, “when the UK leaves the EU, the powers which the EU currently exercises in relation to the common frameworks will return to the UK”.5

19 This interpretation was strongly disputed by all the devolved administrations who argued that after Brexit the current frameworks will cease to exist as they are the product of EU law and there is no provision for them in UK law. They did come to accept that common UK frameworks might be needed but not that this would justify Westminster taking back the competences.

20 The initial EU Withdrawal Bill proposed that all the relevant powers would come under the heading of “retained EU law” and come back to Westminster. In due course, some of them could be “released” back to the devolved legislatures. In a rare show of unity, all parties in the Scottish Parliament refused to give legislative consent (as did the Welsh Government) and the UK Government was forced to retreat. Amendments were introduced providing that only selected competences would be taken back to Westminster and they would be released after a maximum of seven years. The reservation of powers would be done by statutory instrument (decree) and would be subject to consent provisions by the devolved legislatures. The concession was undermined, however, by the new clause specifying exactly how the consent provisions were to work. If the devolved legislatures agreed to the orders, they would go ahead; if they refused consent, the orders would go ahead; and if they did not state an opinion, they would go ahead. While in a strict legal sense, this would not change anything, as Westminster has always claimed the right to proceed without consent under the Sewel Convention, the provision, like the Supreme Court judgment, served to emphasize that such conventions really count for nothing. It thus represents a setback for the federalizing trend that has been under way since the devolution settlement of 1999, which itself was reaffirmed by the unionist parties in the Scotland Act of 2016.

Disintegration

21 Immediately after the vote, the Scottish First Minister declared that another Scottish independence referendum was likely in order to keep Scotland in the EU. In March 2017 the Scottish Parliament, with a pro-independence majority consisting of the SNP and Greens, passed a resolution supporting another referendum. They claimed a mandate for this on the grounds that the SNP manifesto for the 2016 Scottish elections had said that there would not be a new independence referendum unless there was a material change of circumstances such as Scotland being taken out of the EU against its will. This is exactly what had happened. The unionist response was that the 2014 referendum result was still binding.

22 Independence in Europe, however, does not provide a simple answer. Since the mid-1980s the SNP have argued for independence-in-Europe as a way of softening the impact of secession, avoiding hard borders and providing an external support system for a small independent nation; other European nationalist movements make the same argument. Yet an integral part of the argument was that, with the Kingdom also inside the EU, there would be no hard border between them and no obstacle to trade. With Scotland in the EU and the UK outside, there would be a hard economic border. This is a vital matter, as Scotland does about four times as much trade with the rest of the UK as with the EU 27.

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23 There was some debate at the time of the 2014 referendum about whether an independent Scotland would be allowed into the EU. José Manuel Barroso, then President of the European Commission, pronounced that it would be “difficult if not impossible”. There was, however, no legal basis for this and most academic observers agreed that as, under the Edinburgh Agreement, an independent Scotland would be recognized by the United Kingdom, there was no reason for any other state to refuse recognition.6 Given that it was a liberal democracy and market economy already meeting the acquis communautaire, there were no grounds for excluding it. The Spanish Foreign Minister even conceded that Spain would follow the UK line7 and in 2017 his successor made the point explicit.8 The difficulties, rather, hinge on the process of accession and whether Scotland would inherit the UK terms of membership. It is unlikely that the EU would simultaneously negotiate Brexit and Scottish accession but, if the latter had not been agreed by the time the UK leaves the EU, Scotland could be left in limbo.

24 Another possibility is that Scotland could opt for membership of the European Economic Area (EEA). In that case, it would be within the Single Market but not within the customs union and so able also to negotiate a free trade agreement with the United Kingdom. It would also be outside the Common Fisheries Policy, a contentious point in Scotland. On the other hand, negotiating EEA membership might be no less complex than getting into the EU and it would mean that Scotland, like Norway, would have to accept Single Market policies without having a role in making them.

25 Brexit did not, as widely expected, produce an increase in support for independence, which remained at the same level (around 45 per cent) as it had since the Scottish independence referendum. As noted above, not all SNP voters support the EU and around a third of them had voted for Brexit. Taking votes for independence and for Brexit together, the result is as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Support for EU and independence in Scotland

Yes independence No independence

Remain 27 34

Leave 17 21

TOTAL 44 55

Chris Prosser and Ed Fieldhouse, A tale of two referendums – the 2017 election in Scotland, British Election Study, http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-findings/a-tale-of-two-referendums-the-2017- election-in-scotland/#.WeoCaDb9O7M

26 It is clear from this that there is no combination of positions on the independence and European questions that commands majority support in Scotland. The difficulty was illustrated, and compounded, when the UK Government called a general election in 2017. The SNP, which had won 56 of the 59 Scottish seats in 2015, remained the largest party but was reduced to 35 seats. The Conservatives experienced a significant revival, gaining twelve seats at the expense of the SNP, largely because of the latter’s pro- European stance. With thirteen seats at Westminster (following their second place in

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the Scottish elections of 2016), the Scottish Conservatives became a significant force in Scottish politics for the first time in thirty years.

27 Finally, the Scottish Government would require the consent of the UK Government in order to repeat the 2014 referendum. The UK Government response was not to rule out an independence referendum in Scotland but to declare that this is not the time. It thus once again side-stepped the issue of principle of whether Scotland has a right to self- determination, while retaining control of the issue. The Scottish Government could perhaps organize its own referendum on a question that could be within the law but this would carry little conviction. The unionists could simply boycott the campaign and the vote, thus depriving it of legitimacy. In the event, the fall in support for the SNP at the 2017 UK General Election removed the prospect of an imminent independence referendum.

Reconfiguration

28 This leaves the option of differentiation for the devolved territories. There have been efforts to find a new middle ground, both between nationalism and unionism and between remaining in and leaving the EU, by allowing parts of the UK to remain in the EU at least for some purposes. Yet differentiation is more difficult in relation to EU membership than it is within the United Kingdom itself since the EU is based on law and on political compromises that are difficult to unwind.

29 The Scottish Government proposed that, if the UK is going to leave the EU, including the Single Market, then Scotland would remain in the Single Market even as England and Wales left.9 This would give it a status analogous to that of the European Economic Area (EEA); indeed Scotland might formally become part of the EEA. As with the EEA, agriculture and fisheries would be excluded. If the UK were to leave the EU customs union (as it declared it would), Scotland would also leave, remaining in a customs union with the UK. This would allow it to avoid tariffs and rules of origin on trade in goods between Scotland and the rest of the UK and thus obviate the need for a physical border. There would be full access to the Single Market in services and provision for the free movement of workers between Scotland and the EU-27. All parties in the Scottish Parliament favour free movement and there is a broad consensus in favour of immigration, in contrast to England. Scotland would participate in European social provisions, academic exchange and research and in aspects of EU Justice and Home Affairs policies.

30 These proposals are legally and technically feasible, although they do pose challenges. Being in a customs union with the UK and a Single Market with the EU could be complex. Retaining a customs union with the UK could remove the need for physical checks on goods traded between Scotland and England. There would, however, need to be rules governing the treatment of goods entering the UK from EU countries, depending on whether they were destined for Scotland or for England and Wales (we leave Northern Ireland aside here as it too might have a differentiated settlement). The Scottish Government concedes that there would have to be certification as to the final point of sale of such goods. There would also have to be rules of origin if intermediate goods were passing through England and Wales en route for Scotland.

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31 There would be a virtual border in services to the degree that EU and UK rules diverged after Brexit. This could be avoided by double compliance rules to ensure that Scottish services were compliant with both UK and EU regulations.

32 Free movement of workers between Scotland and the EU would require controls to ensure that EU workers did not come into Scotland in order to cross the border to work in England. This is not an insuperable problem since a similar mechanism operates in the Schengen area for third-country nationals with the right to work in one member state but not in another. It would be monitored at the place of work rather than at the border. There would also have to be provisions to define a Scottish worker, for the purposes of rights to work in member states of the EEA.

33 In order for Scotland to remain compliant with Single Market regulations, the Scottish Parliament and Government would require new competences across a wide range of Single Market matters that are currently reserved to Westminster.

34 In the event, the UK Government refused to entertain any territorial differentiation on Brexit and these proposals did not feature in the UK negotiation with the EU, as they would have had to in order to be feasible. The Scottish Government nevertheless, continued to seek means for keeping Scotland aligned with Europe in so far as possible. In response to the UK Withdrawal Act, it introduced its own bill (commonly known at the Continuity Bill). The main intention of this was to enshrine current EU competences (within devolved fields) in Scottish law, so preventing them being taken back by Westminster. It also, however, contained provision for aligning Scottish law with EU law and updating it, through a fast procedure that would not require primary legislation each time. The UK Government referred the bill to the Supreme Court, claiming that it was ultra vires. This gave its law officers another opportunity to rehearse their doctrine of Westminster supremacy and even to go back to their original argument that all EU powers, including in devolved fields, would revert to Westminster if nothing else were done. Such claims represent a further undermining of the spirit of devolution as a form of federalism.

Scotland, the EU and Europe

35 Europe has provided a vital external support system for devolution in the United Kingdom, allowing its transformation into a form of asymmetrical and quasi-federal state embedded in a complex system of shared sovereignty and interdependence. This has accorded with the aspiration of the largest number of Scots. While Westminster never formally surrendered sovereignty either to the EU or to Scotland, practice and convention meant that in effect power was shared and constitutional clashes were avoided. There has been little litigation about Scotland’s powers and almost all the cases have involved European law rather than the domestic settlement. This is difficult to sustain in the context of Brexit. A paradoxical effect of the Brexit referendum, which was ostensibly about reasserting the sovereignty of the British Parliament, was in fact to undermine that sovereignty and both Conservative and Labour parties insisted that the supreme rule was the will of the people, before which Parliament must bow. Yet once the popular will is introduced, the question arises of who are the people and whether there is just one demos in the United Kingdom. The Scottish vote to remain was substantially larger than the overall UK majority to leave, and arguably provides a quite separate mandate.

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36 For some years, the Conservative Party has proposed to repeal or modify the Human Rights Act, which incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law. Instead, there would be a British Bill of Rights. Proponents of this idea seemed initially unaware that the ECHR was also incorporated into the law of the devolved territories, so that their devolution statutes would also have to be amended. Yet that provision has served an important stabilizing role by separating nationality from rights and providing a nationally neutral framework for ruling on them. When this has been pointed out, opponents of the ECHR have fallen into confusion, some of them suggesting that the British Bill of Rights might be confined to England and others just wanting to go ahead anyway. The proposal has been put on hold during the debate on membership of the EU but is likely to resurface in the future and will put a further strain on the union. Once again, it is unionists who are putting the union at risk.

37 The travails of the UK Government following the triggering of Article 50 in March 2017 demonstrated that the idea of sovereignty is much more complex than supporters of Brexit supposed. By the summer of 2018, the UK Government had retreated on their sweeping proposals to take back powers from the devolved legislatures, while not conceding on their right to do so. At the European Elections in May 2019, the SNP ran on a strongly pro-European platform, joining the Liberal Democrats and Greens in calling for a second EU referendum to reverse Brexit. These pro-EU parties gained over 60 per cent of the vote while the Brexit Party (which led in England and Wales) was far behind at less than 15 per cent. There is also some evidence that the SNP has lost many of its former Leave voters and so has a more coherent pro-Europe base. None of this, however, was enough to create a clear majority for independence.

Conclusion

38 At the time of writing, the Brexit saga has a long way to run but one thing is clear – sovereignty in the old sense is more of a slogan than a practical reality in a complex and interdependent world. Neither the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 nor the Brexit referendum of 2016 could have brought back the old nation-state. Whatever happens, Scotland, as Leruez showed all those years ago, remains a nation, a distinct society and, increasingly a self-governing community. It remains without a state because statehood itself no longer means what it once did but its future is unknown.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Keating, Michael, Plurinational Democracy. Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001).

Keating, Michael, The Independence of Scotland. Self-Government and the Shifting Politics of Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009).

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Keating, Michael, ‘The European Question’, in Michael Keating (ed.), Debating Scotland. Issues of Independence and Union in the 2014 Referendum (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017).

MacCormick, Neil, Questioning Sovereignty. Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999).

Prosser, Chris and Fieldhouse, Ed, A tale of two referendums – the 2017 election in Scotland, British Election Study, http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-findings/a-tale-of-two- referendums-the-2017-election-in-scotland/#.WeoCaDb9O7M

Scottish Government, Scotland’s Place in Europe (Edinburgh, Scottish Government, 2016).

UK Government, Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, 2017.

UK Supreme Court, Judgment on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant) (London, UK Supreme Court, 2017).

NOTES

1. Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty. Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999); Michael Keating, Plurinational Democracy. Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001). 2. Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty. Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999). 3. Michael Keating, The Independence of Scotland. Self-Government and the Shifting Politics of Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009). 4. UK Supreme Court, Judgment on the application of Miller and another (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant) (London, UK Supreme Court, 2017). 5. UK Government, Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, 2017. 6. Michael Keating, ‘The European Question’, in Michael Keating (ed.), Debating Scotland. Issues of Independence and Union in the 2014 Referendum (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017). 7. Ibid. 8. Quoted in ABC, 02.04.2017. 9. Scottish Government, Scotland’s Place in Europe (Edinburgh, Scottish Government, 2016).

ABSTRACTS

Since 1999 Scotland has a devolved Parliament and Government. The European Union provided an important framework. EU membership reinforces ideas of shared and divided sovereignty. Through the European Single Market it secures the internal market of the United Kingdom itself. The EU, together with the European Convention on Human Rights, directly applicable in Scotland, separates rights from nationality. Brexit thus destabilizes the domestic devolution settlement.

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Depuis 1999, l'Écosse dispose d'un Parlement et d'un gouvernement autonome. L’Union européenne fournit un cadre externe pour cette dévolution du pouvoir. L’appartenance à l’Union renforce le concept de souveraineté partagée, longtemps présent dans la pensée politique écossaise. Le marché unique européen assure le marché intérieur du Royaume-Uni. Le droit communautaire, avec la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme (applicable directement en Écosse) définit des droits humains sans référence à la nationalité. La sortie du Royaume-Uni de l’Union européenne déstabilise donc le système.

INDEX

Mots-clés: Écosse, dévolution, Europe, Brexit. Keywords: Scotland, devolution, Europe, Brexit

AUTHOR

MICHAEL KEATING Michael Keating is Professor of Politics at the University of Aberdeen and Director of the Centre on Constitutional Change based at the University of Edinburgh. He is currently directing a major project on the effects of Brexit on the devolution settlements in the United Kingdom.

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L'Économie d'une Écosse indépendante, de la rente pétrolière au Brexit An Independent Scotland's Economy, from the Oil Windfall to Brexit

Edwige Camp-Pietrain

Introduction

1 Depuis 1946, date de publication de la déclaration de politique du SNP (créé en 1934), ses dirigeants présentent des programmes axés sur l'économie, affirmant que les ressources naturelles de l'Écosse doivent être gérées par un État indépendant. À la fin des années soixante, ce raisonnement fut étayé par la découverte d'hydrocarbures en mer du Nord. Le SNP ne cessa de produire des données chiffrées, afin de mettre en évidence les capacités de l'Écosse, par opposition au Royaume-Uni devenu « l'homme malade » de l'Europe1.

2 Ces programmes contribuèrent à assurer son succès électoral à la Chambre des Communes (où il obtint 11 des 71 sièges écossais en octobre 1974)2. Au Parlement écossais, instauré en 1999, il emporta une majorité relative (2007) puis absolue (2011). Son leader, l'économiste Alex Salmond, devint First Minister. Il s'entoura d'un conseil, composé d'experts de renommée internationale, formulant des avis sur les orientations économiques. Puis des groupes de travail affinèrent son projet indépendantiste, en vue du référendum du 18 septembre 20143. Si les unionistes (Travaillistes, Conservateurs et Libéraux-démocrates, opposés à l'indépendance) durent reconnaître que l'économie écossaise ne pouvait plus être considérée comme « dépendante »4 de son grand voisin, ils mirent en avant certaines faiblesses, suffisantes pour convaincre des indécis de rejeter l'indépendance. Néanmoins, ils acceptèrent de conférer au Parlement écossais des compétences supplémentaires, notamment en matière fiscale (Scotland Act de 2016).

3 Ces questions institutionnelles, considérées comme réglées, ont resurgi avec le référendum du 23 juin 2016 sur le maintien du Royaume-Uni dans l'UE. Les Écossais

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s'étant distingués des Anglais et des Gallois en votant contre le Brexit, cela pouvait légitimer l'organisation d'un second référendum d'autodétermination. Afin de compléter son programme économique, Nicola Sturgeon, First Minister depuis novembre 2014, a mis en place une Sustainable Growth Commission (SGC), présidée par Andrew Wilson, un économiste ayant travaillé aux côtés de Salmond5. Le rapport de celle-ci, publié en mai 2018, a été approuvé par le SNP en avril 2019.

4 Cependant, dans un contexte d'incertitudes inhérentes au Brexit, il convient de se demander dans quelle mesure la SGC a pu répondre à deux critiques récurrentes en 2014, la viabilité d'une Écosse indépendante et son autonomie réelle. Au-delà, il s'agit de rendre hommage à Jacques Leruez, qui s'est intéressé tout au long de sa carrière aux questions politiques et économiques, sur le plan britannique comme sur le plan écossais6.

La viabilité d'une Écosse indépendante

5 Le SNP fonde son programme indépendantiste sur les richesses matérielles et humaines de l'Écosse, suffisantes pour équilibrer le budget.

Des atouts matériels et humains à consolider

6 Les dirigeants du SNP justifient l'accession à l'indépendance par l'existence de ressources génératrices de croissance économique ; dans les années 2000, ils ont ajouté le concept de croissance inclusive, susceptible de bénéficier au plus grand nombre de personnes.

7 D'une part, s'agissant des ressources nationales, le SNP a axé sa campagne de 2014 sur le schéma des années soixante-dix, selon lequel la plupart des hydrocarbures forés en mer du Nord se trouveraient dans des eaux sous la souveraineté de l'Écosse indépendante, laquelle bénéficierait alors des impôts collectés en sus de l'impôt sur les sociétés auprès des opérateurs privés, détenteurs de licences. Les recettes fiscales (plus de 11 milliards de livres en 2011-2012, tableau 1) représenteraient près de 20 % du budget de l'État indépendant. Une partie d'entre elles (jusqu'à un milliard par an) abonderait un fonds souverain, sur le modèle des conseils des îles Orcades et Shetland. Certes, ces recettes étaient sur le déclin, car les puits rentables étant épuisés, il fallait inciter, par des dégrèvements fiscaux, à la recherche de nouveaux gisements, plus coûteux. Mais le SNP tablait encore sur 6,9 milliards de livres pour 2016-2017, première année de l'État indépendant, soit le double des prévisions du gouvernement britannique.

8 Or, à la fin de 2014, le cours du baril a chuté de moitié, ce qui a entraîné une hausse des incitations fiscales. Les recettes se sont effondrées, pour s'établir à 36 millions en 2016-2017, un étiage sans précédent depuis 1980. Elles n'excéderaient pas 3 milliards si le baril retrouvait son niveau de 2014 (100 dollars)7. La SGC les considère donc comme des revenus exceptionnels, épargnés dans un fonds d'investissement destiné à soutenir la lutte contre les inégalités sociales et la transition climatique.

9 Reste à développer les ressources renouvelables. En la matière, le SNP continue à se prévaloir d'un potentiel sans égal en Europe, grâce à ses façades maritimes. Les Verts écossais, également indépendantistes, s'en réjouissent, estimant qu'elles peuvent créer

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plus d'emplois que les hydrocarbures (200 000 contre 156 000), à condition de mobiliser tous les acteurs et les autorités publiques (politique fiscale, prises de participations)8.

10 Cependant, des doutes persistent quant à la viabilité financière de ces investissements sans le soutien des infrastructures britanniques9 et quant à l'authenticité des intentions au regard du bilan écologique du Parlement écossais. Certes, en 2009, des objectifs de réduction des gaz à effet de serre plus contraignants que ceux du reste du Royaume-Uni ont été fixés (42 % d'ici 2020 et 80 % d'ici 2050, par rapport à 1990). Mais avec les compétences conférées par le Scotland Act de 2016, le gouvernement écossais a adopté un simple moratoire sur les gaz de schiste10. C'est sous la pression de l'opposition qu'il doit rétrocéder aux communautés côtières les revenus des activités pratiquées jusqu'à 12 milles nautiques du plateau continental (propriétés du Crown Estates), ce qui devrait stimuler les énergies renouvelables. Mais fin avril 2019, la reconnaissance de l'urgence climatique par Sturgeon a semblé marquer une rupture11.

11 D'autre part, la SGC promeut une croissance économique inclusive, pour des raisons de justice sociale mais aussi d'efficacité, comme l'a montré Joseph Stiglitz, l'un des conseillers de Salmond12. Les élus indépendantistes soulignent les atouts de leur nation : taux de chômage des jeunes en forte régression (de 25 % à 8,4% fin 2018), taux de chômage plus faible qu'en Angleterre (3,6 % contre 4 %), inégalités sociales un peu moins marquées (coefficient de Gini). Mais les Conservateurs rappellent que sa croissance est inférieure d'un tiers à la croissance britannique depuis 200713, sans perspective d'amélioration (tableau 2).

12 L'une des priorités de la SGC est de stimuler la productivité, problème récurrent de l'économie écossaise14. Comme le SNP en 2014, la SGC met l'accent sur l'enseignement, en s'appuyant sur l'excellence des universités locales (source de recherches et d'innovations, en relation avec les entreprises) et sur le potentiel de chaque individu15. Elle veut stimuler le travail des femmes. Par ailleurs, elle préconise la flexisécurité du marché du travail, associant flexibilité et accompagnement actif dans la recherche d'emploi.

13 Ces propositions pourraient nécessiter des réorientations des politiques des gouvernements SNP. En effet, ceux-ci ont pris des mesures pour faciliter le travail des femmes, tout en réduisant les budgets de l'enseignement professionnel. Dans le champ restreint de leurs compétences en matière sociale, ils ont atténué les effets de la flexibilité britannique, pour le salaire minimum et la saisie des tribunaux des prud'hommes16. Mais ils ont également renforcé l'accompagnement des chômeurs au lieu de les sanctionner.

14 Par ailleurs, d'aucuns regrettent le conservatisme de ces recommandations, s'agissant autant de la structure et du fonctionnement des entreprises privées (confédération syndicale STUC17), que de la nature des emplois existants face au développement de l'intelligence artificielle (George Kerevan, ex-député SNP)18.

La recherche de l'équilibre budgétaire

15 En 2014, les dirigeants du SNP anticipaient un déficit budgétaire, guère supérieur aux déficits britanniques (tableaux 3 et 4). Ils misaient sur de nouvelles recettes (pétrole) et sur des économies (nucléaire, administration). Ils restaient imprécis sur le plan fiscal, sinon pour abaisser l'impôt sur les sociétés au-dessous du taux britannique afin d'attirer les entreprises. Quant aux dépenses, ils avaient une estimation optimiste des

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coûts inhérents à la constitution d'un État (450 milliards). Ils promettaient de maintenir les acquis sociaux et même de revenir aux fondements de l'État-Providence de l'après-guerre, car la fragilisation de ces derniers par les gouvernements britanniques depuis 1979 affectait l'Écosse, même dans les domaines dévolus. Cet argumentaire a été entendu, le système de santé étant l'une des principales préoccupations des électeurs indépendantistes19.

16 Cependant, au cours des années suivantes, l'écart entre les données écossaises et britanniques s'est creusé. En 2016-2017, le « déficit » de l'Écosse s'est établi à 8,9 %, environ deux fois plus que prévu en 2014, tandis que le budget britannique tendait vers l'équilibre. Cela est en partie lié à une volonté, partagée par les élus écossais, de limiter les effets des politiques britanniques d'austérité par des hausses relatives de dépenses publiques (tableau 5) assurant la gratuité de services publics et la revalorisation de certaines allocations20. Mais les recettes sont sources de divisions. Les Conservateurs sont arc-boutés sur la baisse de la pression fiscale, tandis que les autres partis ne parviennent pas à s'accorder sur le degré de progressivité, seuls les Verts finissant par voter le budget du gouvernement SNP (minoritaire depuis 2016)21.

17 L'indépendance offrirait plus de latitude, à condition de dépasser le clivage entre indépendantistes et unionistes. La SGC prévoit un retour à un déficit inférieur à 3 % du PIB sur une dizaine d'années, fondé sur une hausse réelle des dépenses publiques inférieure de 1 % au taux de croissance22. Elle souligne les finalités à atteindre (lutte contre la pauvreté) sans s'attarder sur les moyens (sinon pour entériner le refus, par Sturgeon, d'accorder une baisse générale de l'impôt sur les sociétés). Évitant tout arbitrage23, elle préfère mettre en cause les effets des politiques britanniques.

18 Les indépendantistes radicaux y ont vu un projet d'austérité, axé sur des équilibres d'inspiration néolibérale, et sur les intérêts des entreprises, que Wilson s'attache à défendre dans son cabinet privé24. Ils réclament des politiques susceptibles de transformer la société (Verts), porteuses d'ambitions sociales (Common Weal)25.

19 Les dirigeants SNP ont alors nuancé leur position, évoquant une révision des dépenses (Sturgeon), voire une politique de relance (Derek MacKay, ministre des Finances)26, avant de s'engager à créer une commission sur la justice sociale et l'équité (Sturgeon) lors de l'adoption du rapport de la SGC par le SNP27. Outre la viabilité du nouvel État se pose la question de sa capacité à mettre en œuvre des politiques indépendantes.

L'autonomie réelle d'une Écosse indépendante

20 L'accession à l'indépendance doit permettre la prise de décisions distinctes par des élus écossais. En 2014, à la surprise générale, c'est autour de la monnaie que les passions se sont cristallisées. En 2018, la SGC a mis l'accent sur la capacité d'action des petits États, sans parvenir à faire taire la polémique relative à la devise. Elle avait confiance dans la capacité d'insertion de l'Écosse dans l'économie-monde, malgré le Brexit.

La monnaie, un symbole de l'indépendance

21 Le SNP n'avait pas mené de réflexions approfondies sur la monnaie. Les Écossais ayant renoncé à leur monnaie en signant le traité d'Union de 1707, la création d'une devise semblait devoir accompagner l'accession à l'indépendance. Dans les années quatre-

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vingt-dix, le SNP opta pour l'adhésion à l'euro, assortie de conditions restrictives (examen de la conjoncture, consultation de la population), avant d'y renoncer lors de la crise de la zone euro.

22 Pendant la campagne référendaire, sur les conseils de son groupe d'experts, le gouvernement écossais s'engagea à conserver la livre sterling dans le cadre d'une union monétaire avec le reste du Royaume-Uni. Mais il se heurta au refus de George Osborne, Chancelier de l'Échiquier, des autres unionistes (Libéraux-démocrates et Travaillistes) et même de hauts fonctionnaires28. Cette fermeté contribua à décrédibiliser le projet indépendantiste. La monnaie apparut comme le principal facteur motivant un rejet de ce dernier29.

23 La SGC a tenu compte de ces arguments, tant pour la monnaie (elle préconise l'utilisation de la livre sterling, sans union monétaire) que pour d'autres aspects de la politique financière.

24 Tout d'abord, s'agissant des opérateurs financiers, elle prône la création d'une Banque centrale écossaise sur le modèle de la Banque d'Angleterre, afin d'assurer la réglementation du système bancaire et d'agir comme prêteur en dernier ressort. En 2014, les unionistes soulignaient qu'une telle institution n'aurait pu assurer le sauvetage de la RBS et de la Bank of Scotland (devenue HBoS) en 2009. Ils martelaient que les fleurons du secteur bancaire écossais, réalisant l'essentiel de leurs activités à l'extérieur de l'Écosse, envisageaient une délocalisation de leur siège en cas d'indépendance. Cette projection, alors contestée par le SNP, a été entérinée par la SGC. De ce fait, la Banque centrale écossaise limiterait son aide aux activités bancaires de détail des filiales installées en Écosse30. Mais la SGC ne remet en cause ni le démantèlement du secteur financier écossais, ni la nature de la réglementation financière31.

25 Ensuite, s'agissant des taux d'intérêt, la fixation du taux directeur continuerait à relever de la banque d'Angleterre. En 2014, les indépendantistes affirmaient que celle- ci tiendrait compte de la conjoncture écossaise. Cet espoir n'est plus de mise en l'absence d'union monétaire. De même, en 2014, les indépendantistes ne pensaient pas que les marchés financiers puissent réclamer des taux élevés au gouvernement écossais, en tant que nouvel acteur. Mais la SGC s'est rangée aux arguments des unionistes, évoquant toutefois un surcoût, inférieur à un point, qui devrait s'estomper32, et ne devrait pas se répercuter sur les emprunts contractés par les ménages et les entreprises car ils ne présenteraient pas de risque. Mais selon les unionistes, l'impact du surcoût sur l'économie réelle pourrait atteindre 2 % du PIB sur le court-terme33.

26 Enfin, en ce qui concerne les possibilités d'évolution, la SGC n'écartait pas la création d'une monnaie, seul gage d'une véritable indépendance selon de nombreux partisans de celle-ci. Le recours à la livre sterling serait limité à une phase de transition, destinée à assurer la stabilité de l'État indépendant34. Mais la SGC proposait six critères d'évaluation, de nature économique (déficits publics et endettement, crédibilité de la Banque centrale écossaise, réserves de change, confiance des ménages et des entreprises, structure commerciale de l'économie écossaise, corrélation des cycles économiques de l'Écosse avec ceux de ses principaux partenaires35). Ce procédé ressemblait à celui employé par Gordon Brown en tant que Chancelier de l'Échiquier s'agissant de l'euro, pour se ménager une décision politique permettant d'enterrer le projet d'adhésion en 2003.

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27 Cependant, cette option était controversée au sein du mouvement indépendantiste. Dès 2017, Common Weal a publié une analyse détaillée concluant que l'utilisation de la monnaie d'un autre État sans union monétaire n'était réaliste que pour des micro-États tels Andorre ou le Liechsteintein, alors que l'Écosse, qui représentait 10 % de l'économie britannique, avait des intérêts propres36. Seule une devise écossaise garantirait la souveraineté, en restant arrimée à la livre sterling dans un premier temps, avant de pouvoir éventuellement s'en démarquer.

28 La polémique ayant pris de l'ampleur lors des assemblées consultatives organisées par le SNP, en mars 2019, Keith Brown, numéro deux du parti, et Derek MacKay ont précisé que la livre ne serait conservée que dans une période transitoire, une devise étant créée dès que possible, grâce au redressement de l'économie. Mais nombre d'indépendantistes, qui exigeaient une transition plus rapide et l'abandon des six critères37, ont obtenu satisfaction sur le premier point. En effet, à l'issue d'une campagne menée par Kerevan et Ronnie Cowan, député à la Chambre des Communes, le Congrès du SNP, réuni en avril 2019, s'est engagé à préparer l'adoption d'une devise si les Écossais se prononçaient en faveur de l'indépendance38.

29 Cette clarification, indispensable pour de nombreux indépendantistes, ne sert pas nécessairement leur cause, l'opinion publique restant attachée à la livre sterling sur le long terme. La proportion atteignait deux-tiers en 2016 selon BMG (24 % pouvant envisager une devise écossaise), 47 % au début de 2019 (23 % approuvant la transition prônée par la SGC, 6 % réclamant une évolution plus rapide)39. En tout cas, l'euro était plébiscité par moins d'un sondé sur huit, même si cette option ne saurait être écartée selon les unionistes, car la promesse d'intégration de la monnaie unique est exigée des candidats à l'adhésion à l'UE.

La petite taille, un atout

30 En 2014, les références du SNP aux petits États étaient ponctuelles. À son arrivée au pouvoir, en 2007, Salmond avait érigé en modèle l'arc de prospérité allant de la République d'Irlande aux États scandinaves. Lorsque la crise financière de 2008 mit en évidence leur fragilité, le First minister continua à louer la réactivité des petits États (le gouvernement irlandais face à ses banques), et leur capacité à rechercher des compromis par la discussion (notamment au sein de l'UE, face aux grands États). Les dirigeants du SNP mettaient aussi en avant les politiques redistributives des pays scandinaves, mais ils préféraient s'attarder sur le volet dépenses que sur des prélèvements sociaux plus élevés qu'en Écosse. Les unionistes anticipaient, à l'inverse, un affaiblissement de la voix écossaise et de sa capacité à défendre ses intérêts au sein de l'UE.

31 À l'issue du référendum, le gouvernement écossais est resté centré sur des modèles européens. Il entend poursuivre le rapprochement avec les pays nordiques, auquel il associe désormais les pays baltes40.

32 La SGC a élargi ses références, englobant les petits États (entre 5 et 10 millions d'habitants) hors de l'UE, en Europe (Suisse) ou ailleurs (Singapour, Nouvelle-Zélande, et même Hong-Kong). Elle met en avant leurs atouts par rapport aux grands États : croissances démographique et économique, PIB par habitant, taux de chômage, efficacité de l'action gouvernementale, part des exportations et des investissements directs de l'étranger (IDE) rapportée au PIB, investissement soutenu dans le capital

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humain41. Si les bilans en matière de productivité, d'inégalités de revenus entre classes et sexes, de recherche et développement, de dépenses publiques sont plus diversifiés, la SGC souligne que ces États mènent des politiques distinctes. Leurs emprunts ne sont pas plus coûteux, comme en témoignent les taux d'intérêts sur les obligations à dix ans.

33 Selon la SGC, au sein du Royaume-Uni, les dirigeants écossais sont empêchés de prendre des initiatives susceptibles de stimuler le potentiel économique42. Ainsi, le gouvernement britannique a gaspillé les recettes pétrolières (328 milliards) en dépenses courantes, alors que son homologue norvégien a constitué un fonds atteignant 750 milliards d'euros. De plus, une réduction de l'écart salarial hommes- femmes pourrait entraîner une hausse du PIB comprise entre 800 millions (modèle suédois) et 6 milliards (modèle néo-zélandais).

34 L'Écosse doit se doter d'une stratégie nationale s'inspirant des meilleurs exemples étrangers ; elle doit viser une croissance égale ou supérieure à celle des petits États (2,5 % puis 3,5%), plus ambitieuse que les prévisions disponibles (tableau 2). Cette croissance doit profiter à l'ensemble de la population. Elle peut s'accompagner d'une flexibilité du marché du travail (modèle danois), tout en sécurisant la protection sociale fragilisée par les réformes britanniques. Les entreprises doivent être soutenues, pour leurs investissements, leurs exportations, leurs activités quotidiennes (plan d'action irlandais) afin d'améliorer la productivité (commission ad hoc néo-zélandaise). Mais le dumping fiscal irlandais est écarté43.

35 Or, ces choix restent sélectifs. Kerevan, indépendantiste, dénonce l'attention portée à trois États, Finlande, Danemark et Nouvelle-Zélande, pour l'innovation et les ressources naturelles, tout en occultant les aspects en contradiction avec les valeurs du SNP (respectivement austérité, montée de l'extrême-droite, néolibéralisme).

36 Les unionistes s'étonnent de l'absence du Portugal ou de la Grèce, tout en soulignant que les performances des « modèles » ne se démarquent pas tellement de celles du Royaume-Uni44. Ils rappellent, comme en 2014, la capacité des grands États à absorber les chocs. Les Travaillistes contrastent l'austérité proposée par la SGC, qu'ils surnomment commission « des coupes budgétaires » (fort éloignée de la lutte contre les inégalités, érigée en priorité par Sturgeon) et les politiques scandinaves qui se rapprochent de certaines de leurs propositions pour le Royaume-Uni45. Enfin, la SGC sous-estime les contraintes pesant sur des décisions prises par un nombre plus réduit de personnes, dans un petit État, sous la pression d'un grand voisin46.

L'insertion dans l'économie-monde en dépit du Brexit

37 Le SNP conçoit l'indépendance comme un moyen pour l'Écosse de s'insérer dans l'économie mondiale. Les propositions de la SGC, optimistes, ont été éclipsées par les polémiques engendrées par le Brexit.

38 S'agissant du commerce, la SGC reprend la stratégie du SNP en 2014, cherchant à encourager les acteurs à travailler de concert (team Scotland) et à créer un réseau de correspondants, afin de tirer parti de la marque Écosse et ses avantages concurrentiels47. Elle affiche des objectifs volontaristes (création d'une commission de la productivité) et des moyens moins agressifs (l'impôt devant favoriser les pratiques vertueuses).

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39 En ce qui concerne l'immigration, en 2014, le SNP entendait favoriser l'accueil et l'insertion de toutes les catégories d'immigrés, soulignant sa conception ouverte de la citoyenneté (droit du sol). Mais il n'écartait pas un système de points pour l'immigration économique. De même, la SGC préconise la simplification des formalités et des incitations fiscales pour attirer des immigrés du monde entier, dénonçant, comme les élus écossais48, des politiques britanniques restrictives, peu adaptées aux besoins locaux.

40 Mais le débat public s'est focalisé sur l'UE. Nicola Sturgeon s'est prononcée dès 2016 en faveur de l'Espace économique européen (EEE), permettant de rester dans le marché unique, renonçant si nécessaire à l'union douanière, sur le modèle norvégien. Ce compromis serait moins pénalisant pour l'économie écossaise que l'Association européenne de libre-échange (AELE, accords avec l'UE au cas par cas) ou qu'une sortie sans accord, conduisant à un commerce aux conditions de l'OMC (tableau 6)49. En effet, 56 % des exportations écossaises sont liées à l'UE (43 % directement, 13 % par les accords de libre-échange avec des pays tiers). Certaines de ces exportations émanent de sociétés étrangères tirant avantage du marché unique. Ces IDE représentent 2350 entreprises (dont 44 % originaires de l'UE) et 318 000 emplois.

41 De plus, en 2017, l'Écosse comptait 219 000 citoyens de l'UE (soit deux-tiers des ressortissants étrangers), parmi lesquels près de 140 000 en provenance des États devenus membres en 2004 ; cette population est jeune et active (60 % ont moins de 35 ans, 77 % ont un emploi, contre 42 % et 73 % de l'ensemble des résidents). Selon les modélisations du gouvernement écossais50, chaque ressortissant de l'UE rapporte en moyenne 10 400 livres en recettes publiques et 34 400 livres au PIB. Seuls ces flux en provenance de l'UE peuvent permettre à l'Écosse (moins attractive auprès du reste du monde) de rattraper son retard sur l'ensemble du Royaume-Uni en matière de croissance du PIB (ce facteur étant aussi important que l'évolution du chômage, tableau 7) et de mettre un terme au déclin de sa population (dont le solde naturel est négatif).

42 Le gouvernement écossais s'est donc indigné des options retenues par le gouvernement britannique de Theresa May (sortie du marché unique et de l'union douanière), mais aussi de l'acceptation, dans l'attente d'un accord de libre-échange consécutif au Brexit, du maintien de l'Irlande du Nord dans le marché unique. L'Écosse est exclue de ce traitement différencié51. De plus, le gouvernement britannique a invité son homologue écossais à mener des politiques stimulant commerce et immigration dans son champ de compétences, sans élargir ce dernier52.

43 Cette intransigeance conforte la nécessité d'accéder à l'indépendance au sein de l'UE, car celle-ci défend ses membres de petite taille, notamment l'Irlande sur la question de la frontière. Le gouvernement britannique, qui a ignoré les intérêts écossais, ne peut se prévaloir d'offrir un cadre protecteur, comme en 2014.

44 De ce fait, le gouvernement écossais entend promouvoir l'image de sa nation, ouverte sur le monde, par opposition à une Angleterre qui se replie. Il martèle que les ressortissants de l'UE sont bienvenus. Il mène, en collaboration avec les agences Scottish Enterprise, Scottish Development International, VisitScotland, les universités, une campagne de promotion de l'Écosse auprès des touristes, des étudiants et des investisseurs53.

45 Il a publié une stratégie commerciale visant à faire passer la part des exportations dans le PIB écossais de 20 % à 25 % sur dix ans54. D'une part, il agit auprès des principaux partenaires de l'Écosse, en désignant un ministre du Commerce, en ouvrant des

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bureaux (Dublin, Francfort, Paris, Ottawa) et en mobilisant diaspora et envoyés spéciaux (telle Wendy Alexander, ancienne ministre travailliste). D'autre part, il souhaite aider les entreprises. Une banque nationale d'investissement va compléter les subventions aux entreprises, sans condition de nationalité55. Les PME, déjà dispensées de taxe locale, vont bénéficier d'un fonds de soutien à l'exportation, grâce au parrainage de sociétés plus expérimentées (avec CBI Scotland).

46 Les unionistes craignent la marginalisation d'un petit État indépendant, mais les termes du débat ont évolué depuis 2014. S'agissant du commerce, le coût d'une rupture avec le principal partenaire (britannique) de l'Écosse serait huit fois supérieur à celui d'une sortie de l'UE sans accord56, alors que celle-ci est considérée comme la pire des hypothèses (tableau 6), tant pour les grandes villes que pour les périphéries rurales57. Quant à la libre circulation, les unionistes s'interrogeaient en 2014 sur la possibilité de maintenir une Écosse indépendante dans la common travel area avec le reste du Royaume-Uni et l'Irlande. Cette position est difficile à justifier en 2019, pour une frontière courte (70 km, huit points de passage) et pacifiée depuis des siècles58 alors que des dérogations sont envisagées pour l'Irlande du Nord à l'issue du Brexit.

47 Enfin, l'opinion publique est plus réservée que le gouvernement écossais. En 2017, selon Panelbase, seuls 45 % des sondés estimaient que les ressortissants de l'UE devraient conserver le droit de vivre et travailler au Royaume-Uni, 38 % y étant opposés. D'après l'enquête sociologique annuelle Scottish social attitudes, si les Écossais souhaitent maintenir le libre-échange (90%), 63 % accepteraient pour cela la libre circulation des personnes. Mais deux-tiers prônent les mêmes règles de commerce et d'immigration pour le Royaume-Uni.

Conclusion

48 Le SNP, qui a fondé son nationalisme sur les questions économiques, et sur lequel un économiste, Salmond, a imprimé sa marque, semblait armé pour répondre aux interrogations dans ce domaine. Pourtant, en 2012 comme en 2016, ses dirigeants ont eu recours à des experts pour conforter leur crédibilité. De plus, la SGC a vu ses propositions marginalisées par un Brexit susceptible d'affecter la viabilité et l'autonomie de l'Écosse.

49 D'une part, depuis 2016, le gouvernement SNP, qui peine à s'affranchir des comparaisons avec l'Angleterre, est focalisé sur les bienfaits de l'UE sur le plan économique, multipliant les projections détaillées (malgré leur caractère hypothétique). La SGC, qui a une vision plus large, veut améliorer l'insertion de l'Écosse dans l'économie-monde, pour faire face à tous les scénarios. Mais la réalisation de son projet dépend en partie d'un Brexit qui échappe au gouvernement écossais.

50 D'autre part, en 2018, lors de la publication du rapport, la pêche, qui n'est pas mentionnée dans ce dernier, a dominé les débats parlementaires, pour des raisons politiques (SNP et Conservateurs se trouvant en concurrence auprès des communautés côtières). Or, les pêcheurs, qui veulent quitter la politique commune de la pêche, craignent que le gouvernement britannique n'autorise les bateaux de l'UE à pêcher dans leur zone économique exclusive en échange d'un accès au marché unique (satisfaisant l'industrie agro-alimentaire)59.

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51 En outre, le Brexit accentue le dilemme entre deux unions. Les incertitudes économiques constituaient déjà le premier facteur de rejet de l'indépendance en 201460, alors que le marché unique devait permettre le maintien de liens étroits. Pis, le Brexit engendre de nouvelles fractures, entre des ouvriers plus eurosceptiques mais toujours plus enclins à voter pour l'indépendance que les classes moyennes pourtant attachées à l'UE61. D'ailleurs, prenant acte de la régression du SNP aux élections à la Chambre des Communes de juin 2017, Sturgeon n'a cessé de repousser la requête d'un second référendum d'autodétermination, tout en évitant d'évoquer les recommandations de la SGC, d'autant que les contradictions du processus de Brexit contrariaient les promesses de continuité en cas d'indépendance.

52 Les reports successifs du Brexit, à l'issue du 29 mars 2019, ont changé la donne. Le 23 avril, Sturgeon a demandé un second référendum d'autodétermination d'ici la fin de la législature écossaise (2021), tout en soulignant la nécessité de forger un consensus autour de l'indépendance, avec l'appui de Wilson, et d'Angus Robertson, son ancien numéro deux qui, après sa défaite en 2017, a créé un institut d'études (Progress Scotland). Elle entend mettre l'accent sur l'économie, en diffusant le projet de la SGC et en le consolidant (notamment sur le plan social), tout en affirmant l'importance de l'UE62. Elle a annoncé la mise en place d'assemblées citoyennes pour discuter de l'avenir de l'Écosse. Elle a vu dans le succès du SNP aux élections au Parlement européen du 23 mai 2019 une nouvelle dynamique. Mais Sturgeon devra composer avec des voix divergentes au sein du mouvement indépendantiste qui, loin de se satisfaire de leur victoire partielle sur la question de la monnaie, exigent un changement réel d'orientation et une accélération du calendrier63, au lieu de se perdre dans des conjectures autour d'un second référendum sur le Brexit.

53 Edwige Camp-Pietrain est Professeur de civilisation britannique à l'Université Polytechnique des Hauts-de-France (Valenciennes). Membre du laboratoire CALHISTE EA4343, ses recherches portent sur la vie politique, les institutions politiques et les politiques publiques dans l'Écosse contemporaine. Annexes

Tableau 1 : Évolution des recettes fiscales britanniques liées au pétrole en mer du Nord

Année fiscale Recettes en milliards de livres sterling

1980-1981 3,861

1981-1982 6,395

1982-1983 7,867

1983-1984 8,788

1984-1985 12,326

1985-1986 11,217

1986-1987 4,701

1987-1988 4,736

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1988-1989 3,301

1989-1990 2,502

1990-1991 2,342

1991-1992 1,017

1992-1993 1,338

1993-1994 1,266

1994-1995 1,673

1995-1996 2,341

1996-1997 3,351

1997-1998 3,33

1998-1999 2,511

1999-2000 2,564

2000-2001 4,455

2001-2002 5,426

2002-2003 5,097

2003-2004 4,284

2004-2005 5,183

2005-2006 9,384

2006-2007 8,924

2007-2008 7,474

2008-2009 12,456

2009-2010 5,991

2010-2011 8,406

2011-2012 11,336

2012-2013 6,632

2013-2014 4,499

2014-2015 1,691

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2015-2016 -0,085

2016-2017 0,036

2017-2018 1,192

Tableau 2 : Prévisions de l'évolution des fondamentaux des économies britannique et écossaise selon les organismes indépendants Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR, mars 2018) et Scottish Fiscal Commission (SFC, mai 2018)

2017 (données) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

PIB OBR 1,7 1,5 1,3 1,3 1,4 1,5

SFC 0,8 0,7 0,8 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9

PIB par habitant OBR 1,1 0,9 0,7 0,7 0,8 0,9

SFC 0,2 0,3 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,7

Emploi (millions) OBR 32,1 32,2 32,4 32,5 32,6 32,7

SFC 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,7

Salaires réels OBR 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,8 1

SFC -1 -0,5 0 0,2 0,6 0,9 1,2

Gains nominaux OBR 2,6 2,7 2,4 2,5 2,8 3

SFC 1,1 1,6 1,9 2,2 2,6 2,9 3,2

Tableau 3 : Prévisions des déficits publics en proportion du PIB à la fin de 2013 pour 2016-2017

Royaume-Uni Royaume-Uni Écosse (gouvernement Écosse (fourchette basse

(OBR) sans Écosse écossais) revenus pétrole)

Déficits 2,6 % 2,3 % 3,2 % 5,3 % publics

Tableau 4 : Évolution des déficits publics en proportion du PIB

Écosse sans pétrole Écosse avec pétrole Royaume-Uni

2005-2006 10,1 1,7 2,9

2006-2007 9,8 2,3 2,3

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2007-2008 9,4 2,6 2,4

2008-2009 13,7 2,9 6,7

2009-2010 17,8 10,6 11,1

2010-2011 16,1 8,5 9,3

2011-2012 14,7 5,8 7,6

2012-2013 14 8,3 7,3

2013-2014 11,9 8,3 5,5

2014-2015 10,7 8,9 4,9

2015-2016 10,5 9,7 3,8

2016-2017 9,7 8,9 2,3

2017-2018 9,5 7,9 1,9

Tableau 5 : Évolution des dépenses publiques totales par habitant (en livres sterling)

Année fiscale Royaume-Uni Écosse Écart Écosse/Royaume-Uni (en %)

2008-2009 10 263 11 408 11,1

2009-2010 10 796 11 852 10,98

2010-2011 11 046 12 158 11,01

2011-2012 10 951 12 227 11,16

2012-2013 10 998 12 265 11,15

2013-2014 11 425 12 708 11,2

2014-2015 11 594 12 821 10

2015-2016 11 599 12 914 11,3

2016-2017 11 742 13 190 12,3

2017-2018 11 954 13 530 13,2

Tableau 6 : Modélisation de l'impact du Brexit sur les fondamentaux de l'économie écossaise en dix ans

EEE AELE OMC

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Exportations de biens -12 à -18 % -12 à -18 % -26 %

Exportations de services -11 à -18 % -18 à -22 % -25 %

Croissance du PIB (%) -2 à 3 % -3 à 4 % -5 %

PIB par rapport à 2015-2016 (livres) -3 à 5 milliards - 4 à 6 milliards -8 milliards

Croissance des salaires réels (%) -3 à 4 % -5 à 6 % -7 %

Salaires réels, travail à temps plein (livres) -800 à 1200 -1200 à 1600 -2000

Taux d'emplois -1 à 2 % -1 à 2 % -3 %

Nombre d'emplois -30 000 -30 000 -80 000

Tableau 7 : Prévisions de l'évolution des fondamentaux de l'économie écossaise : effet de différents facteurs

Variations selon Prévision Variations selon Variations le nombre Variations selon moyenne les flux selon le taux de d'heures la productivité 2018-2023 migratoires chômage travaillées

PIB 0,9 0,7 à 0,9 0,8 à 1 0,7 à 1,1 0,4 à 1,5

Emploi 0,1 -0,1 à 0,2 0 à 0,2 0,1 0,1

Gains 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,3 à 2,7 2,1 à 3,1 moyens

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NOTES

1. LERUEZ Jacques, Le Royaume-Uni, trente ans de difficultés, Paris, Hatier, Profil dossier, 1979, p. 4. 2. L'économiste Gavin McCrone avait publié une analyse pessimiste (MCCRONE Gavin, The Economics of Nationalism, Oxford, Blackwell, 1969, p. 106), avant de changer d'avis en 1974 dans une note confidentielle au gouvernement britannique. 3. FISCAL COMMISSION WORKING GROUP, The Economic Foundations of an Independent Scotland, Édimbourg, SG, août 2014. Le gouvernement britannique affina également ses analyses (programme Scotland Analysis). 4. LERUEZ Jacques, L'Écosse, une nation sans État, Lille, Presses universitaires de Lille, 1983, chapitre 5.

Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXIV-4 | 2019 173

5. SUSTAINABLE GROWTH COMMISSION (SGC), Scotland. The New Case for Optimism, Édimbourg, SNP, 2018, 354 p. Wilson fut recruté par la Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) en 1997, avant de fonder en 2014 un cabinet de conseil aux entreprises, Charlotte Partners. Militant au sein du SNP, il a travaillé pour Salmond dans les années quatre-vingt-dix, avant de siéger au Parlement écossais à ses débuts. Outre Jim Mather, ex-ministre des Entreprises de Salmond, sa commission comptait des universitaires (Catherine Schenk, Iain Docherty, Andrew Hughes Hallett), des chefs d'entreprises (Petra Wetzel, Marie Macklin, Mark Shaw, Dan McDonald, fondateur de N56, groupe de réflexion indépendantiste) et des élus au Parlement écossais (Kate Forbes et les ministres Derek MacKay, Shirley-Anne Sommerville), à la Chambre des Communes (Roger Mullin, battu en 2017) et dans une collectivité territoriale (Marie Burns). 6. Jacques Leruez avait d'ailleurs sollicité l'auteur de ces lignes, à deux reprises en 2012, pour évoquer les questions économiques écossaises dans le cadre de l'association franco-écossaise qu'il présidait. 7. MCLAREN John, « Reflections on the SNP's SGC Report », Scottish Trends, août 2018, 4. 8. PALUELLO Mika Minio, Jobs in the New Economy, Édimbourg, Scottish Greens, août 2015. 9. HAGUE Kevin, Response to the SGC, These islands, juillet 2018, 2. SP, OR, 13 juin 2018, col. 83, Adam Tomkins. 10. Derek MacKay, ministre des Finances et du Travail Équitable a renoncé à abaisser la taxe sur les passagers aériens, tout en incitant les collectivités territoriales à décourager l'usage de la voiture en ville. SP, OR, 8 mai 2019. Avec les compétences dévolues par le Scotland Act de 2012, le gouvernement écossais avait conservé une taxe sur les déchets non recyclés proche de celle du reste du royaume, et des capacités de recyclage insuffisantes. 11. SP, OR, 21 janvier 2018, Roseanna Cunningham, ministre de l'Environnement, du Changement climatique et de la Réforme foncière. 12. SGC, Scotland. The New Case for Optimism, op. cit., A5. 13. SP, OR, 16 janvier 2019, Dean Lockhart (Conservateur). 14. BELL David, « The Contemporary Landscape », in GIBB Kenneth, MACLENNAN Duncan, MCNULTY Des, COMERFORD Michael (dir.), The Scottish Economy, Londres, Routledge, 2017, p. 29. 15. SGC, Scotland. The New Case for Optimism, op. cit, A6.129-156. 16. SP, OR, 6 novembre 2018, Neil Findlay (travailliste) relève que près de 500 000 personnes en sont exclues. 17. Elle n'a pas été consultée par la SGC. STUC, On Growth Commission Report, 25 mai 2018. 18. Un million d'emplois écossais seraient menacés sur 15 ans. KEREVAN George, « Growth Report Gets an A+ for Effort, B- for Currency », The National, 26 mai 2018, 2. Il préconise des expérimentations pour rompre avec les excès du capitalisme, TREBECK Katherine, KEREVAN George, BOYD Stephen, Tackling Timorous Economics, Édimbourg, Luath Press, 2017, p. 125. 19. MACWHIRTER Iain, Disunited Kingdom, Édimbourg, Cargo, 2014, p. 173. 20. En novembre 2018, le rapporteur spécial de l'ONU sur l'extrême pauvreté a reconnu leurs efforts, tout en pointant leurs limites dans le cadre existant. ALSTON Philip, Statement, Londres, novembre 2018. 21. SP, OR, 21 février 2019, col. 41-54. Les Conservateurs sont obnubilés par les comparaisons avec l'Angleterre, pour l'impôt sur le revenu en 2018-2019 comme pour les droits de mutation à titre onéreux dévolus en 2012, SP, OR, 23 décembre 2016, col. 87, John Swinney, ministre des Finances. 22. SGC, Scotland. The New Case for Optimism, op. cit., B12. 23. MCLAREN John, op. cit., 5. Cet économiste, consulté par la SGC, estime que l'occasion doit être saisie. 24. SHAFI Jonathan, « Independence Movement Must Fight Corporate Interests », The Herald, 25 avril 2019, p. 15. Shafi a co-fondé la Radical Independence Campaign en 2012 et le parti RISE après le référendum.

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25. COMMON WEAL, White Paper Project. A Business Plan for a New Nation, Édimbourg, 2018, p. 20. 26. HERALD, « Nicola Sturgeon Downplays Key Recommandation of the Growth Commission », 23 août 2018, p. 4. GRANT Alistair, « Row over Nats Plans for New Currency in an Independent Scotland », The Herald, 5 mars 2019, p. 6. 27. STURGEON Nicola, Address to Conference, 28 avril 2019. 28. L'avis de Nicholas MacPherson, secrétaire permanent du Trésor, avait été rendu public, HC, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SELECT COMMITTEE, Lessons for Civil Service Impartiality from the Scottish Independence Referendum, 2015, 69. 29. MACWHIRTER Iain, Disunited Kingdom, op. cit., p. 173. 30. SGC, Scotland. The New Case for Optimism, op. cit., C3.25. 31. KEREVAN George, « Growth Report Gets an A+ for Effort, B- for Currency », art. cit., HAGUE Kevin, Response to the SGC, op. cit., 8. 32. SGC, Scotland. The New Case for Optimism, op. cit., C3.17. Afin de rassurer les marchés, la SGC propose une contribution écossaise annuelle au service de la dette britannique, fondée sur la proportion d'habitants, alors qu'en 2014, le gouvernement écossais envisageait une méthode de calcul plus favorable aux intérêts écossais, tout en conditionnant ces versements à l'obtention d'avantages dans les négociations sur l'indépendance. 33. SCOTTISH BUSINESS UK, Win-Win. The Business Case for Scotland's Place in the UK, Édimbourg, septembre 2018, p. 22. Le groupe est dirigé par Struan Stevenson, ancien député conservateur au Parlement européen. 34. Il fallait éviter d'obérer les capacités d'action du nouvel État. Tommy Sheppard, député SNP à la Chambre des Communes, s'en est félicité, SHEPPARD Tommy, « Thoughts on the SGC », Scottish Left Review, juillet 2018. 35. SGC, Scotland. The New Case for Optimism, op. cit., C2.6. 36. DALZELL Craig, Scottish Currency Options post-Brexit, Common Weal, juillet 2016. 37. Robin McAlpine (Common Weal), Colin Fox (SSP), ou encore Bella Caledonia. BELLA CALEDONIA, Replying to Andrew Wilson : a Scottish Currency is not Symbolic, it's Power, 14 février 2019. 38. BROOKS Lilly, « SNP Votes for Scotland to Quickly Adopt New Currency if it Leaves the UK », The Guardian, 27 avril 2019. 39. PROGRESS SCOTLAND, First Progress Scotland Poll Shows Brexit Impact, 30 mars 2019. John Curtice, politiste, s'est interrogé sur l'utilité de la réflexion menée par la SGC. CURTICE John, Does the Scottish Growth Commission Matter ?, 24 mai 2018. 40. SG, Nordic-Baltic Policy Statement, Édimbourg, mars 2014. SG, All Points North : the Scottish Government's Nordic-Baltic Policy Statement, Édimbourg, septembre 2017. 41. SGC, Scotland. The New Case for Optimism, op. cit., A. 42. Ibid., B7, A5.25. 43. Ibid., A6.212. 44. HAGUE Kevin, Response to the SGC, op. cit., 1, 2. 45. SP, OR, 13 juin 2018, col. 82, Neil Findlay. 46. KEATING Michael, Is Small Always Beautiful ?, 31 mai 2018. Ce politiste a approfondi ces questions dans KEATING Michael, HARVEY Malcolm, Small Nations in a Big World, Édimbourg, Luath Press, 2014. 47. SGC, Scotland. The New Case for Optimism, op. cit., A3. 48. HC, SAC, Immigration and Scotland, Londres, Stationery Office, juillet 2018, 41, 79, 84, 98. 49. SG, Scotland's Place in Europe. People, Investment, Jobs, Édimbourg, janvier 2018, 24, 35, 43. 50. SG, Scotland's Population Needs and Migration Policy, Édimbourg, février 2018, 35, 131, 133. 51. SG, Scotland's Place in Europe : An Assessment of the UK Government's Proposed Future Relationship with the EU, Édimbourg, novembre 2018, 45.

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52. HC, SAC, Scotland, Trade and Brexit, mars 2019, 33, George Hollingberry, ministre chargé de la politique commerciale. MAC, EEA Migration in the UK : Final Report, Londres, septembre 2018, 7.71. 53. EY, Sectoral Impact Analysis and British Readiness Assessment, Édimbourg, SG, janvier 2019. 54. SG, A Trading Nation, A Place for Growing Scotland's Exports, Édimbourg, avril 2019, p. 16. 55. C'est Richard Leonard, leader des Travaillistes écossais, qui regrette l'attribution, depuis 2007, du tiers des regional selective assistance à des entreprises non-écossaises. SP, OR, 16 janvier 2019. LEONARD Richard, « Who Owns and Controls Scotland's Economy », in BRYAN Pauline, KANE Tommy (dir.), Class, Nation and Socialism, Glasgow, Glasgow Caledonia University, 2013, p. 17. 56. SCOTTISH BUSINESS UK, Win-Win. The Business Case for Scotland's Place in the UK, op. cit., p. 25. 57. SG, No-Deal Brexit. Economic Implications for Scotland, Édimbourg, février 2019, p. 32-33. DHINGRA Swati, MACHIN Stephen, OVERMAN Henry, The Local Economic Effects of Brexit, Londres, London School of Economics, 2017. 58. Alyn Smith, député SNP au Parlement européen, cité par GRANT Alistair, « SNP Needs to Have Post-Brexit Answers Ahead of Indy Ref2 », The Herald, 29 mars 2019, p. 7. 59. CARPENTER Griffin, « Troubled Waters, Scottish Fisheries and the EU », in HASSAN Gerry, GUNSON Russell (dir.), Scotland, the UK and Brexit. A Guide to the Future, Édimbourg, Luath Press, 2017, p. 75-76. 60. LINEIRA Robert, HENDERSON Ailsa, DELANEY Liam, « Voters' Response to the Campaign : Evidence from the Survey », in KEATING Michael (dir.), Debating Scotland. Issues of Independence and Union in the 2014 Referendum, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 181. 61. DALZELL Craig, The Demographics of Independence, Common Weal, juin 2018. Seule la position des étrangers a connu une nette évolution en faveur de l'indépendance. 62. Selon Survation, en mars 2019, l'UE est devenue un enjeu aussi important que l'économie parmi les facteurs susceptibles d'orienter le vote sur l'indépendance (43 % contre 22 % en 2014), PROGRESS SCOTLAND, op. cit. 63. Colin Fox ou Stuart Campbell (Wings over Scotland). GORDON Tom, « Sturgeon Planning IndyRef2 Vote Before 2021 Ballot », The Herald, 25 avril 2019, p. 1. DALZELL Craig, « Scotland Deserves More than Trap of 'Soft Independence' », The Herald, 1er mai 2019, p. 20. La stratégie du SNP est critiquée au sein même du parti (Joanna Cherry, députée à la Chambre des Communes).

RÉSUMÉS

Le SNP prône l'accession de l'Écosse à l'indépendance pour des raisons principalement économiques. Les responsables politiques écossais doivent pouvoir gérer les ressources naturelles et humaines pour stimuler la croissance et atteindre des finalités sociales. Cependant, lors du référendum d'autodétermination de 2014, nombre d'électeurs ont été dissuadés par des incertitudes persistantes, notamment au sujet de la devise. Un second référendum étant envisageable en réaction au Brexit, le SNP a créé la Sustainable Growth Commission pour formuler des propositions crédibles, démontrant la viabilité de l'Écosse et sa capacité à mener des politiques autonomes. Cet article examine le processus et les réactions suscitées jusqu'à l'adoption de la plupart de ses recommandations par le Congrès du parti en 2019.

The SNP wants Scotland to become independent chiefly on economic grounds. Scottish politicians ought to be able to run Scotland's natural and human resources to boost growth and

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meet social aims. Yet in 2014 when the referendum on Scotland's independence was held, there were lingering uncertainties – especially over the currency – which deterred many voters. As another referendum might be on the agenda in response to Brexit the SNP set up the Sustainable Growth Commission to devise credible responses proving Scotland's viability and its ability to conduct autonomous policies. This article examines the process and the reactions it triggered up to the 2019 SNP conference which endorsed most of its recommendations.

INDEX

Mots-clés : Écosse, indépendance, pétrole, monnaie, Brexit, Sustainable Growth Commission Keywords : Scotland, independence, oil, Brexit, Sustainable Growth Commission

AUTEUR

EDWIGE CAMP-PIETRAIN Université Polytechnique des Hauts-de-France (Valenciennes), CALHISTE EA4343

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Réformes et conservatismes Reforms and conservatism

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Non, non, non ! Le Combat tory d’Enoch Powell contre les réformes de la Chambre des Lords en 1958 et 1969 No, no, no! Enoch Powell's Tory Opposition to the 1958 and 1968-69 Reforms of the House of Lords

Stéphane Porion

No institution is immortal, any more than any other human thing is immortal, and there is no sovereign remedy against its deterioration. Institutions are not only created and strengthened, they also weaken and disappear. We cannot deny that. Enoch Powell, 1992 (Attallah Naim, Asking Questions, Londres, Quartet Books, 1996, p. 355).

Introduction

1 Avant la réforme instaurée par le gouvernement Blair en 1998, la composition et les pouvoirs de la Chambre des Lords, dominée par les Conservateurs, étaient régis par trois textes fondamentaux : le Parliament Act de 1949 qui avait amendé celui de 1911, le Life Peerage Act de 1958 et enfin le Peerage Act de 1963. Selon Jacques Leruez : C’est moins la coloration politique des Lords qui a changé que sa compétence. (…) Ce mélange, finalement assez harmonieux, entre l’élément héréditaire et l’élément nommé, a transformé la nature de la Chambre des Lords. Elle est souvent mieux équipée que les Communes pour discuter de sujets spécialisés ou techniques. (…) Les pairs n’ont pas acquis la légitimité démocratique mais celle de la compétence. D’une Chambre aristocratique privée de tout pouvoir législatif réel, la Chambre des

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Lords est devenue une institution de conseil soucieuse de l’intérêt public, ou du moins, de ce qu’elle définit comme l’intérêt public1.

2 Ce même auteur estime que les Lords ont préféré faire valoir leur droit d’amendement plutôt que leur veto suspensif et ajoute « qu’en définitive, l’influence de la Chambre des Lords dépend des circonstances et d’abord de la composition et de l’humeur des Communes »2. Jacques Leruez a aussi analysé la réforme avortée de cette Chambre haute, portée par le Premier ministre travailliste Harold Wilson à la fin des années 19603, laquelle visait à « abolir la pairie héréditaire, sauvegarder le rôle législatif de la seconde chambre et modifier sa composition de telle sorte que celle-ci ne soit jamais contraire, politiquement, à la majorité des Communes »4. Elle fut décriée au sein des Communes par un nombre non négligeable de backbenchers, à la fois travaillistes et conservateurs (dont Enoch Powell en fut la figure de proue), qui tinrent en échec le projet gouvernemental le 17 avril 1969. Par ailleurs, Jacques Leruez s’est aussi intéressé à « la réforme inachevée » mise en place par Tony Blair5.

3 Le politiste Philip Norton rappelle, quant à lui, que la Chambre des Lords « n’a pas de légitimité démocratique » et par conséquent « est considérée comme une Chambre politiquement inférieure à la Chambre des Communes élue »6. Malgré ses particularités et ce statut jugé inférieur, Enoch Powell s’est toujours avéré être un ardent défenseur de cette seconde Chambre, et plus généralement, des Institutions britanniques. Alors que le gouvernement conservateur réforma la Chambre des Lords en 1958, en permettant la création de pairies à vie, Powell vilipenda cette mesure menée par son propre parti au nom du principe de prescription qui avait toujours, à ses yeux, régi les institutions britanniques. À en croire l’historien A. J. Davies, « not only did this reform successfully deflect criticism by introducing a meritocratic element, but the creation of life peers also allowed the elevation of non-Conservatives who could give the House of Lords a less lopsided political look »7. De surcroît, Powell alla même jusqu’à former en 1968-1969 « an unholy alliance »8 avec des Travaillistes, dont Michael Foot, afin de s’ériger contre la réforme d’Harold Wilson. Néanmoins, dans la dernière anthologie de ses discours, publiée en 1991 et considérée comme préparant l’héritage de sa pensée, force est de constater que l’accent est mis exclusivement sur la Chambre des Communes9, occultant ainsi son vif et durable intérêt pour la Chambre des Lords.

4 Cet aspect de la carrière politique de Powell reste méconnu, tant elle reste encore dominée par les questions postcoloniales d’immigration10. En effet, Powell évoque dans la mémoire populaire le souvenir d’un homme politique opportuniste, raciste et populiste11, suite à son discours très controversé du 20 avril 1968, dont le but était de dénoncer ouvertement les problèmes résultant d’une immigration non maîtrisée, qui menaçait, selon lui, l’homogénéité de la nation britannique. Paul Corthorn, historien britannique, rappelle que l’historiographie reste « hautement divisée et politisée »12, car les études sur le Powellisme se sont concentrées de manière disproportionnée sur le sujet de l’immigration, de manière clivée, entre défenseurs et détracteurs de Powell.

5 Parmi celles abordant les idées politiques et constitutionnelles de Powell, même les plus récentes13, les historiens ou politistes n’ont pas analysé son attachement viscéral à la Chambre des Lords. À part un chapitre de Michael Forsyth14, visant à mettre en lumière la dévotion de Powell à la constitution non-écrite britannique ainsi que sa déférence pour les institutions politiques de son pays, il demeure que seules quelques biographies mentionnent de manière non exhaustive son opposition aux réformes de la Chambre des Lords. Cet article, à la mémoire de Jacques Leruez, intéressé, entre autres,

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par les questions constitutionnelles et les idéologies des partis politiques britanniques, a pour ambition d’analyser, sans tentative de réhabilitation, le combat de Powell pour protéger la Chambre haute.

6 Dès la fin des années 1940, lorsqu’ émergea la doctrine Salisbury visant à empêcher toute tentative d’obstruction des Lords, Powell décida d’écrire, avec l’aide de l’historien Keith Wallis, une histoire complète de la seconde Chambre, qu’il publia finalement en 196815. L’écrivain Anthony Powell considère l’ouvrage de Powell à la fois comme « a prodigious work of scholarship » et « compulsory reading for everyone (…) who ventures to hold forth on what is to be done about the contemporary House of Lords »16.

7 Le positionnement politique et constitutionnel de Powell s’ancre manifestement dans le Conservatisme de Disraeli, synthétisé dans son célèbre discours prononcé le 24 juin 1872 au Crystal Palace, visant à définir les objectifs du Parti conservateur : les Tories devaient, entre autres, œuvrer à la pérennisation des institutions du pays, tout en améliorant le sort des plus démunis17. Powell s’était en effet toujours considéré comme un Tory, même après son départ du Parti conservateur en 1974, et affirmait encore en 1976 : « I was born a Tory, I have lived a Tory, I will die a Tory » 18, créant ainsi une différence, sans doute artificielle, entre les termes Tory et Conservateur. Durant sa carrière politique, il avait en effet toujours défendu les institutions britanniques dans la droite lignée de Disraeli et d’Edmund Burke. Ainsi, l’analyse de Julian Critchley semble la plus pertinente, lorsqu’il décrivit Powell comme « an economic Whig but a political Tory »19.

8 Pour comprendre pourquoi Powell a toujours défendu la nature héréditaire de la Chambre des Lords, il faut donc analyser un principe structurant de son positionnement tory hérité de Burke – celui de « prescription », défini comme suit : « a title or an institution having become legally established or accepted by long usage or the passage of time »20. Cette approche n’a pas vraiment retenu l’attention des études précédentes, alors que ce principe était d’une importance capitale pour Powell qui déclarait encore en 1991 : « Our unique and most precious possession, our Parliament. Our whole constitution rests, uniquely in the world, upon what Burke called 'prescription' »21. Les débats parlementaires autour des réformes de la Chambre des Lords en 1958 et 1968-1969, émaillés d’interventions de Powell, apportent un certain éclairage sur sa défense de la Chambre haute. Toutefois, l’utilisation de ses archives privées détenues au Centre d’Archives de Churchill College à Cambridge, peu exploitées pour analyser cette question, permet de mettre davantage en perspective l’appropriation powellienne de ce principe burkien. Ainsi, cet article analysera, en premier lieu, la dimension tory du Powellisme héritée de Disraeli pour justifier l’attachement de Powell au Parlement britannique. Puis, on montrera comment Powell s’est approprié le principe burkien de prescription pour donner plus de force et de cohérence à son positionnement tory impliquant de défendre la Chambre des Lords en 1958. Enfin, on dégagera les stratégies mises en œuvre par Powell qui s’insurgea contre le projet de réforme déposé par le Premier ministre travailliste Harold Wilson en 1968-1969 visant à réformer une nouvelle fois la Chambre haute.

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Powell : un défenseur tory des institutions politiques dans la lignée de Disraeli

Powell formé en politique dans une perspective d’héritage disraélien

9 Lorsque Powell fit son entrée en politique et rejoignit le Conservative Research Department (CRD), il devint un chercheur de l’ombre (« backroom boy ») de Rab Butler, responsable de cet organe du Parti conservateur. Son travail consistait à préparer des notes de synthèses pour les députés et des rapports visant à nourrir les idées du parti. Powell, alors novice en politique, découvrit les écrits de Disraeli à cette période et confia qu’il dévora ses romans au cours des repas qu’il prenait au Junior Carlton Club22. Il expliqua que, pendant cette période cruciale d’opposition, qui devait permettre aux Conservateurs de rénover la machine du parti et de refondre leurs idées politiques, ces derniers exprimèrent un réel besoin de rechercher des sources d’inspiration et de parcourir de nouveau les textes fondamentaux qui avaient défini les principes conservateurs jusqu’à 194523. Selon lui, « once more, as in its defeats of the past, the Conservative Party turned to the source of its own history and of English history, to Disraeli, to Burke, to Bolingbroke and even beyond that »24. Alors que Robert Blake, historien du parti, souligne aussi que Disraeli fut, par conséquent, élevé simultanément au statut de prophète, de grand prêtre et de philosophe25 au sein du Parti conservateur, d’autres historiens considèrent que les Conservateurs se tournèrent vers lui comme vers « une flamme sacrée » dans des moments de doute26. En effet, Rab Butler, entre autres, confirme dans ses mémoires qu’intellectuellement les Conservateurs travaillant au sein du CRD devaient s’appuyer sur des figures tutélaires du passé, telles que Bolingbroke, Burke et Disraeli, afin de refondre les idées conservatrices27. À part la théorie organique de la société28 et le Conservatisme social hérité de Disraeli que les Conservateurs comptaient toujours promouvoir, ils envisageaient de continuer à défendre les Institutions, comme le souligne John K. Walton : « To maintain our Institutions and to protect the established constitution in church and state, with due reverence for the monarchy and respect for aristocratic government in general and the House of Lords in particular, are thus part of the perceived Disraelian legacy»29.

10 Lorsque Powell se présenta pour la première fois aux élections législatives de février 1950, il fit référence à Disraeli pendant sa campagne dans cette perspective, et réitéra les objectifs du discours du Crystal Palace de 1872, dont celui de préserver les institutions politiques30. Quand il devint ainsi député pour la première fois en 1950, et très rapidement le neuvième et dernier membre fondateur du One Nation Group (ONG) la même année, il était toujours question pour ses membres de réitérer l’héritage disraélien. L’ONG utilisa de manière efficace le pouvoir incantatoire de l’expression « One Nation ». Philip Norton et Arthur Aughey estiment que ce fut une formule gagnante, « [as] it did strike a chord in the minds of Conservatives. If it was a myth that Disraeli had something of practical significance to say to post-war Britain it was an effective myth »31. Disraeli leur fournit ainsi des objectifs, des idées, une tradition tory, de puissantes images et du matériau de propagande. L’évocation de son nom restait une force créatrice efficace pour les Conservateurs, selon John K. Walton : « He spoke – and speaks – to an attachment to tradition and order. (…) Not only does he offer an array of fine phrases to kindle and sustain enthusiasm and a sense of collective mission »32. Il est toutefois intéressant de noter que Powell ne devint pas un ardent défenseur du Conservatisme social prôné

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par Disraeli, puisque, déjà influencé par les idées libérales de F. V Hayek et de Diana Spearman33, il s’interrogea, dès la fin des années 1940 et encore plus au début des années 1950, sur le bien-fondé de son paternalisme et de l’ingérence étatique dans l’économie pour « élever la condition du peuple ». Ainsi, seul l’objectif disraélien visant à défendre les Institutions politiques forgea l’aspect tory de ce qui allait devenir officiellement le Powellisme en 196534.

La dimension tory du Powellisme

11 Ce fut après son éviction du Cabinet fantôme en avril 1968, suite à la controverse autour de son discours de Birmingham, encore communément appelé « le discours des Fleuves de Sang »35, que Powell expliqua à plusieurs reprises ce qu’il entendait par être « Tory » − ce qui n’était pas synonyme à ses yeux de « Conservateur ». Il déclarait en effet en juillet 1968 : « I am a Tory – I prefer that to Conservative – I am a Tory for keeps »36. Tout était une question d’ « instinct » pour Powell et de vision du monde reposant sur une théorie organique de la société, excluant toute théorie abstraite : It’s a view but not a system, and a point of view which can be consistent within the limits of the material to which it is applied. (...) I can’t consider any of these matters out of the context of a society. I do not know of human beings existing outside society, nor can I give any meaning to the propositions about such things in abstraction from a society37.

12 Le philosophe Roger Scruton perçoit cet instinct tory comme « a distinct way of being human » – « it is a rich source of reflection on political order »38. Même une fois devenu député d’Irlande du Nord pour le Parti Unioniste d’Ulster, il affirmait de nouveau à la fin des années 1970 : Of course I am very proud of being a Tory. Yes, in my head and in my heart I regard myself as a Tory. As I have said, I was born that way. I believe it is congenital. I am unable to change it. That is how I see the world39.

13 Dans sa biographie, Robert Shepherd souligne que le choix délibéré de Powell en faveur de l’appellation « tory » implique plus qu’une étiquette de parti40. Comme ce dernier l’explique encore lui-même : « Some people use “Tory” as a four-letter word, and therefore handy for 'Conservative'. Others use it in a specific sense, but the specific senses tend to vary. I am a Church-and-Queen Tory »41. Powell rappelle ici l’origine historique du terme Tory utilisé pour la première fois après la restauration de la monarchie en 1660, pour décrire les sentiments traditionalistes et loyalistes qui parcouraient les factions royalistes du gouvernement. Puis ce terme devint usage courant après la Révolution Glorieuse de 1688-1689 pour décrire les hommes politiques ou penseurs attachés aux coutumes et aux Institutions, qui considéraient comme légitime tout ce qui était hérité du passé plutôt que créé par choix : « Torysim was not so much a philosophy as a political practice, which pitted tradition and loyalty to the crown against the advocacy of liberal reforms »42.

14 Dans cette logique, Powell réaffirmait que l’objectif ultime d’un Tory était bien la défense des institutions politiques : To me a Tory is a person who believes that authority is vested in institutions—that's a carefully honed definition. (…) A Tory therefore reposes the ultimate authority in institutions—he is an example of collective man43.

15 Il estimait qu’un Tory est quelqu’un qui pense que les institutions politiques sont plus sages que ceux qui les dirigent.44 Il mettait en lumière l’idée selon laquelle « l’homme collectif » – c’est-à-dire l’homme compris dans sa relation à la société – prévaut sur

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l’homme individuel et qu’il vaut mieux faire confiance à l’Histoire – notamment aux Institutions qui sont ancrées dans un passé historique – qu’à la raison des individus45. Ainsi, Powell eut plusieurs fois l’occasion de préciser ce qu’il entendait par être un Tory et s’évertua à ne jamais utiliser les termes de « Conservateur » ou de « Conservatisme ».

16 Toutefois, malgré cet effort de définition, on peut estimer que Powell créa en réalité une distinction artificielle entre « Conservateur » et « Tory » dans une perspective politicienne afin de dissocier Parti conservateur et pensée conservatrice, et justifier ainsi son départ du Parti en 1974. Alors que cette différence ne semble pas opérante pour des spécialistes du Parti conservateur qui considèrent les deux termes comme interchangeables46, les Conservateurs expliquent que le mot Tory, employé délibérément par leurs adversaires travaillistes à défaut du mot Conservateur, implique une connotation négative visant à les faire apparaître comme réactionnaires et démodés47. À cet effet, Patrick Cosgrave, auteur de The Lives of Enoch Powell en 1989, s’interrogea sur la pertinence de cette distinction terminologique et demanda à Powell de la justifier. Ce dernier fit de nouveau référence à Disraeli et à la protection des institutions politiques pour justifier son positionnement tory : A Tory is a person who stands for a phrase in Disraeli’s novels 'the throne, the altar and the cottage' or to put it more philosophically, I believe that the important things about human society are those which are inherited and instinctual, that authority is immanent in society, that institutions are the crucial facts48.

17 En définitive, la vision tory de Powell consistait à reconnaître la sagesse des institutions (la Couronne, l’Église et le Parlement), l’importance de la hiérarchie et la primauté de l’organisation organique de la société fondée sur l’idée de l’ « homme collectif ». Elle reposait sur « un instinct », la tradition et l’héritage historique. Ce fut précisément lorsque la composition et les pouvoirs de la Chambre des Lords furent menacés, aux yeux de Powell, par des réformes en 1958 et 1968-1969, que sa vision tory nourrie des idées de Disraeli se précisa et s’enracina dans le principe burkien de « prescription ».

Powell : un défenseur du principe de «prescription »

Le principe burkien de prescription

18 Edmund Burke peut être considéré comme le père fondateur des principes du Conservatisme britannique, comme le souligne Frank O’Gorman dans son ouvrage sur le développement des idées conservatrices : It was Burke who laid down in a reasonably systematic form the fundamental philosophical, political, social and religious ideas upon which later Conservatives developed more specific details of policy and practice. The Conservative canon has, of course, been extended since Burke’s day to incorporate, for example, the love of empire. At the same time, not all of Burke’s dogmas have been retained by later Conservatives (e.g his distaste for greater religious toleration), but most of them have49.

19 Aux yeux de Burke, la constitution du pays et ses institutions politiques étaient solides au point qu’elles n’appelaient que peu de réforme significative, car il croyait en l’importance de conserver une constitution prescriptive en défendant la tradition et l’héritage historique : « All the reformations we have hitherto made have proceeded upon the principle of reference to antiquity »50. En d’autres termes, Burke estimait que les Institutions avaient une légitimité prescriptive à leur façon, car elles existaient depuis

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si longtemps et avaient acquis une légitimité qui ne reposait pas sur des critères extérieurs, tels que l’efficacité, la modernité ou l’humanité51.

20 Parmi les discours de Burke, il faut se tourner vers celui du 7 mai 1782 pour trouver une justification détaillée des fondements prescriptifs de la Constitution : Our constitution is a prescriptive constitution; it is a constitution, whose sole authority is, that it has existed out of mind. (…) Prescription is the most solid of all titles, not only to property, but, which is to secure that property, to government. (…) It is accompanied with another ground of authority in the constitution of the human mind, presumption. It is a presumption in favour of any settled scheme of government against any untried project, that a nation has long existed and flourished under it. (…) It is an idea of continuity, which extends in time as well as in numbers and in space52.

21 Ainsi, ce principe de prescription et ses caractéristiques associées de transmission héréditaire et d’ajustement constant garantissaient pour Burke la continuité, la stabilité, la légitimité des institutions, le pouvoir et les coutumes. Alain Morvan estime que « loin de tout fixisme, [Burke] lit l’histoire des sociétés comme une évolution créatrice, où le temps est un enrichissement, où les institutions sont le fruit d’une maturation lente mais néanmoins dynamique, d’une véritable concrétion »53. Russell Kirk considère, pour sa part, le principe de prescription comme le troisième principe des dix principes structurants du Conservatisme : Conservatives very often emphasize the importance of prescription—that is, of things established by immemorial usage, so that the mind of man runneth not to the contrary. There exist rights of which the chief sanction is their antiquity— including rights to property, often. (…) It is perilous to weigh every passing issue on the basis of private judgment and private rationality. The individual is foolish, but the species is wise, Burke declared. In politics we do well to abide by precedent and precept and even prejudice, for the great mysterious incorporation of the human race has acquired a prescriptive wisdom far greater than any man’s petty private rationality54.

22 En d’autres termes, le principe de prescription repose sur des anciennes coutumes ou un usage immémorial qu’en faisaient déjà leurs ancêtres il y a bien longtemps. Les Conservateurs pensent en général que le concept de prescription est presque toujours une meilleure autorité en politique que les idées modernes que des individus pourraient avoir. Dans le cas des institutions britanniques, elles ont survécu au fil du temps, conservant deux Chambres au Parlement, malgré le Commonwealth de Cromwell (1649-1660), et réinventant la monarchie après la Révolution Glorieuse. Ainsi, en admettant un changement graduel et organique, c’est la tradition qui doit primer, voire le statu quo.

23 Par ailleurs, Ian Gilmour entreprit de définir ce qu’était le Conservatisme britannique à la fin des années 1970 alors que Thatcher était en train de modeler un nouveau paradigme intellectuel inspiré des idées de the New Right. Il rejetait l’idée selon laquelle il existait une idéologie conservatrice systématique, mais reconnaissait toutefois qu’il y avait des thèmes récurrents définissant un « instinct conservateur » (« a Conservative attitude »), dont ceux de la tradition et de la prescription55. W. H. Greenleaf, quant à lui, soulignait l’importance du principe de prescription dans son analyse du Conservatisme britannique post-1945, lequel était composé d’un pôle néolibéral et d’un pôle tory56. Le Powellisme représentait à lui seul ce « twin heritage »57, et il convient donc de se demander comment Powell s’était approprié ce principe tory de prescription.

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Appropriation powellienne du principe de prescription

24 Le principe de prescription représente l’une des clefs de voûte de la dimension tory du Powellisme en ce qu’il justifie de garder, dans une logique de continuité, l’héritage du passé, et donc les institutions politiques britanniques qui ont traversé l’histoire. Ce principe illustre aussi l’instinct tory défini par Powell, qu’il identifie comme caractéristique intrinsèque des Anglais. À ce titre, il déclarait lors de son discours à la Royal Society of Saint George le 22 avril 1961 : The deepest instinct of the Englishman – how the word 'instinct' keeps forcing itself in again and again! – is for continuity; he never acts more freely nor innovates more boldly than when he is most conscious of conserving or even of reacting58.

25 Powell reconnaît dans ses écrits que sa position tory fut influencée par Burke et modelée par ce principe de prescription. Dans cette perspective, il fut toujours un ardent défenseur de la Chambre des Lords, dont il fallait protéger, à ses yeux, le caractère héréditaire, « la nature prescriptive »59 et les pouvoirs. Selon lui, dans un pays gouverné par une constitution non-écrite, jusqu’à The European Communities Act de 1972 scellant l’entrée du Royaume-Uni dans la CEE, les pouvoirs et l’autorité de la Chambre des Lords reposaient sur ce sacro-saint principe : « In the course of time [the House of Lords] has come to be constituted as it is and to exercise the powers and authority that it does. Prescription is the word for this which Edmund Burke bequeathed to us »60.

26 Powell estime qu’il faut prendre en compte la nature et la portée d’un changement afin de déterminer si ce dernier détruit ou réduit le principe de prescription dans la composition d’une institution. La loi de 1958 n’a pas, à ses yeux, eu cet effet en ce sens qu’elle n’a pas abrogé les pouvoirs prescriptifs de la Chambre haute du Parlement. Il affirme ainsi : The same would not necessarily apply, if, by the effluxion of time and the continued exercise by the Crown of the powers conferred on it in 1958, the House of Lords were to be seen as having ceased to be the same prescriptive institution and consequently as possessing the same prescriptive powers61.

27 Son analyse explique pourquoi il est peu intervenu dans le débat parlementaire sur le Life Peerage Bill en 1958, mais a mené activement la fronde contre le projet de loi du gouvernement Wilson en 1969, qui, de son point de vue, allait profondément mettre à mal ce principe de prescription : « The labyrinth is one in which Michael Foot and I entrapped and eventually butchered in 1969 the only attempt at reform which ever got far enough to risk inhabiting the shape of a parliamentary Bill »62. S’appuyant sur la décision de Westminster d’entériner la loi d’entrée du Royaume-Uni dans la CEE en 1972, Powell considère que le Parlement peut, par la mise en place de lois, détruire ou modifier certains ou tous les effets du principe de prescription, y compris les pouvoirs qui sont exercés par ce principe même, comme c’est le cas pour la Chambre des Lords63. Ainsi, comme le suggère la citation mis en exergue de cet article, aucune institution n’est immortelle pour Powell et peut être détruite ou très affaiblie par ses propres membres. Tout le problème réside dans le fait que la constitution britannique est non-écrite et donc que le principe de prescription n’y est pas gravé dans le marbre : « In a nation with an unwritten constitution, which has consented to Parliament changing that constitution fundamentally, prescription, even though it is the basis of the existing institutions, can afford no protection to them »64.

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L’opposition de Powell au Life Peerage Act de 1958

28 Un mois après avoir quitté le gouvernement le 6 janvier 1958, en tant que secrétaire d’État au ministère de l’Économie, pour des différends idéologiques et stratégiques65, Powell allait s’opposer frontalement à ses anciens collègues du Cabinet et s’insurger contre la réforme de la Chambre des Lords, pourtant mise en avant dans le programme électoral du Parti conservateur en 195566. Selon Robert Sherpherd, « the Government’s reform of the House of Lords (…) provoked Powell into giving free rein to (…) his Tory sentiments »67. Powell estimait que le principe de prescription, faisant intégralement partie de la constitution évolutive du pays, régissait la nature de la Chambre des Lords. Il rappela les vertus de ce principe hérité de Burke à la Chambre des Communes le 12 février 1958, alors que le gouvernement conservateur de Macmillan avait l’intention de créer des pairies à vie et de modifier la composition de la Chambre haute : There is no possibility of arguing that the present composition of the House of Lords can be justified either by logic or by reference to any preconceived constitutional theory. (…) It is the result of a long, even tortuous, process of historical evolution. Its authority rests upon the acceptance of the result, handed down to our time, of the historical process. It is the authority of acceptance, of what Burke called 'prescription'68.

29 Powell percevait ainsi la possibilité de créer des pairies à vie comme « une manipulation cynique » de la part de Macmillan, alors qu’il estimait que la Chambre des Lords ne nécessitait absolument pas d’être réformée69. Selon Philip Norton, « cette mesure visait à renforcer la Chambre des Lords en élargissant sa composition, la rendant ainsi plus acceptable par ceux qui n’aimaient pas le principe de la pairie héréditaire. Elle avait aussi l’avantage d’offrir une plus grande flexibilité dans la création des pairies où l’octroi de pairies à vie n’avait pas sur la composition de la chambre les effets à long terme des pairies héréditaires » 70.

30 Par ailleurs, Powell refusait également que des femmes puissent siéger au sein de cette Chambre, puisque rien ne le justifiait : « Neither logic nor statute nor theory is the basis of that other hereditary institution by which it comes about that a young woman holds sway over countless millions »71. Le problème pour Powell était que cette réforme sans fondement allait altérer la composition de la Chambre des Lords, alors que, selon lui, ce changement radical n’était sous-tendu par aucune sagesse ou aucun besoin. Il s’opposait ainsi à la création de Life Peers travaillistes.

31 Conscient qu’il pouvait être accusé de défendre une position réactionnaire, Powell nuança son propos en justifiant dans quel contexte un changement pouvait s’avérer indispensable : « One should never alter or interfere with an institution of this kind. (…) There were many cases where a change has, in fact, resulted in preserving, and even enhancing, the institution in question »72. De son point de vue, il fallait uniquement mettre en place une réforme d’une telle nature quand cela était absolument nécessaire dans le but de se prémunir d’un mal clairement identifié et imminent73. Powell s’inscrivait de nouveau dans la lignée de Burke : « In apprehending the reality of inevitable social change, Burke recognized the duty of statesmen as minimising the impact and slowing the rate of such change. Only thus could the constitution and institution of the country be preserved »74.

32 Un mois avant la deuxième lecture du projet de loi en février 1958, Powell avait correspondu avec le Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain (le Vicomte Kilmuir, David Maxwell Fyfe) pour s’assurer que par le passé, il n’y avait jamais eu un précédent autour de la question des pairies à vie, afin de rejeter leur création75. Bien que Powell

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en fût convaincu, le Lord Chancellor lui répondit qu’il y eut quelques cas aux XIVe et XVe siècles, faisant référence au rapport du Wensleydale Case : « though the Crown might at one time had the power to create life peers with a right to sit and vote, that power had not been exercised for so long that it had fallen into desuetude »76. Puisque l’expérience fut de courte durée, il n’y avait pas besoin, aux yeux de Powell, de la réitérer. Powell finit par concéder que la portée de la réforme défendue par le gouvernement Macmillan était limitée et n’allait pas remettre en question le principe héréditaire de la Chambre haute. Il décida de ne pas prendre part au vote que le gouvernement remporta avec une majorité de cinquante-quatre voix.

Le combat de Powell contre le projet de réforme de la Chambre des Lords en 1969

33 Dans le discours de la Reine du 30 octobre 1967, le Parti travailliste fit part de son intention de réduire les pouvoirs de la Chambre des Lords et de supprimer son caractère héréditaire dans une volonté de modernisation du système parlementaire. Richard Crossman, responsable du projet, comptait ainsi rénover la Chambre haute et étendre le pouvoir de contrôle du Parlement sur le gouvernement. L’affaire des sanctions prises contre la Rhodésie vint accélérer la volonté réformatrice du gouvernement : les Lords rejetèrent le 18 juin 1968 la décision ratifiée par la Chambre des Communes le jour d’avant. Le Premier ministre Harold Wilson ne pouvait accepter qu’une Chambre non démocratique puisse annuler une décision prise par une assemblée élue au suffrage universel direct.

34 Le projet gouvernemental fut publié sous la forme d’un livre blanc77. La réforme envisageait deux types de membres : 230 pairs avec voix délibérative (Voting Peers) nommés par le gouvernement au pouvoir et tous les pairs actuels qui pourraient participer aux débats et déposer des amendements mais sans droit de vote. Comme le remarque Monica Charlot : Ces pairs consultatifs devaient d’ailleurs peu à peu disparaître, les héritiers du titre n’ayant plus le droit de siéger à la Chambre des Lords. Quant aux pairs à part entière, ce seraient exclusivement des pairs nommés, étant entendu que quelques pairs héréditaires pourraient l’être, mais à vie et à titre personnel. (…) Ainsi la Chambre des Lords devait-elle être ramenée de plus de 1 000 pairs à 230 Lords à part entière78.

35 En d’autres termes, le Premier ministre travailliste voulait créer « a two-tier second chamber »79 : « Le dosage aurait été fait de façon à ce que le gouvernement en place dispose de la majorité relative des voix, mais non de la majorité absolue »80. Le veto suspensif des Lords serait réduit à six mois. Toutes ces dispositions auraient renforcé les pouvoirs de l’exécutif sur le Parlement.

36 Afin de s’opposer au projet du gouvernement travailliste, Powell suivit deux stratégies complémentaires. Il publia une histoire complète de la Chambre des Lords en 1968 peu avant les débats parlementaires, avec l’aide de Keith Wallis, spécialiste des baronnies au XVe siècle. Powell s’était aperçu qu’à part l’étude de L. O. Pike, intitulée Constitutional History of the House of Lords, publiée en 1894 et écrite de la perspective d’un avocat et non d’un historien, il n’existait pas « a continuous history [of the House of Lords] from the beginning to the present »81. Pendant ses vingt années à rédiger l’histoire de la Chambre des Lords, Powell se construisit une réputation d’expert de cette question. En effet, en

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août 1955, il enregistra trois émissions sur la Chambre des Lords pour Third Programme de la radio BBC qui portaient sur le début de ses recherches sur l’histoire de la Chambre haute du Parlement82. De même, à l’automne 1958, après les débats parlementaires sur le Life Peerage Act, il fit deux longues interventions à la radio sur la Chambre des Lords au cours de Third Programme de la BBC83. Au cours des débats parlementaires, même le député travailliste Frank Bowles admira publiquement les grandes connaissances historiques et constitutionnelles de Powell sur le Parlement : « [Powell] is a very learned man and also a great historian »84. Powell visait à se forger une autorité indiscutable sur cette question.

37 Lorsque Wilson indiqua son intention de modifier la composition et les pouvoirs de la Chambre des Lords, Powell et Sir Anthony Richard Wagner, Garter Principal King of Arms, grand défenseur des pairs héréditaires et auteur d’un article majeur justifiant leur présence au sein de la Chambre haute, publié dans le Times le 30 janvier 1969, commencèrent une correspondance en 1968 afin que Powell puisse préparer la meilleure riposte lors des débats parlementaires de 1969. Par exemple, Sir Richard Anthony Wagner estimait que le principe héréditaire de la Chambre des Lords était une tradition bénéfique pour cette chambre : Like all inheritance of vocation, it makes possible specific training for the work from birth and, indeed, from before birth since family tradition contributes greatly to it, this is to say, a hereditary legislator of long standing absorbs a developed tradition. This is the point you made about oaks. (…) Who planted the trees which today contribute so much to the beauty of landscape? Eighteenth century noblemen who did so because they felt an assurance that their descendants would enjoy the fruits of what they were doing85.

38 Ce dernier fit beaucoup de recherches sur le sujet et rédigea une longue note de synthèse de neuf pages86 qu’il transmit à Powell afin qu’il poursuive le combat contre la réforme de la Chambre des Lords87.

39 L’une des cibles de la réforme, en dehors de la majorité conservatrice, était bien les Lords héréditaires qui ne siégeaient pas. Powell avait déjà réfléchi à ce sujet dès 1947 lorsque le gouvernement travailliste envisageait une réforme de la Chambre haute. Powell estimait que les Lords héréditaires siégeaient et débattaient sur des sujets dont ils avaient la compétence et pour lesquels ils avaient un intérêt. Si on les supprimait, cela reviendrait à ses yeux « to replace a house of 'experts' with a house of general politicians »88. Par ailleurs, Powell considérait les jeunes pairs héréditaires comme « a valuable element of youth in the Upper House », car ils pourraient y jouer directement un rôle important. Il pensait qu’ils auraient déjà les capacités, la formation nécessaire acquise par le biais de la tradition familiale et l’ambition, « without losing years in fighting their way to recognition in politics »89. À cette époque, Powell n’avait manifestement pas appréhendé la question de la Chambre des Lords dans une perspective burkienne.

40 Pendant la phase des débats parlementaires, Powell reçut de nombreuses lettres de soutien, montrant que ses idées avaient de l’influence sur un nombre non négligeable de députés ou membres du Parti conservateur90. Selon Jacques Leruez : Cette réforme raisonnable, quoique assez compliquée et un peu humiliante pour les pairs en place (…) fut acceptée par les dirigeants de l’opposition, mais elle suscita des protestations chez bon nombre de backbenchers des Communes, dans la mesure où elle renforçait le pouvoir de patronage des frontbenchers des deux grands partis91.

41 De plus, Powell entreprit une seconde stratégie qui consista à créer une alliance contre- nature avec des députés travaillistes peu satisfaits du projet de réforme déposé par

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Harold Wilson, car ils espéraient l’abolition de la Chambre haute. Cette alliance de circonstance est restée célèbre car Powell et Michael Foot se retrouvèrent temporairement dans le même camp, alors que le second avait durement condamné quelques mois plus tôt les propos du premier suite à son discours de Birmingham du 20 avril 1968.

42 Cette alliance contre-nature a déjà été bien analysée par Andrew Roth, Robert Shepherd et Simon Heffer dans leur biographie sur Powell. Ce dernier s’efforça de déconstruire tous les volets du projet de réforme pour montrer à quel point, selon lui, cette réforme était sans fondement. Il indiqua clairement le 12 février 1969 qu’il n’était pas favorable à ce que la Chambre des Lords soit décrite comme héréditaire, afin de contrer un amendement déposé par Robert Sheldon, déterminé à défendre l’abolition des Lords héréditaires : If the House of Lords were founded on the principle of heredity, a peerage would not descend to the eldest son. It would descend to all sons, since there can be no ground for selecting in respect of ability or other characteristics one rather than another of the offspring of a sire. Secondly, the descent of peerages would be through the female as well as through the male, since there is equally no reason for supposing that whatever virtues may be transmissible hereditarily are not just as transmissible through the female as through the male92.

43 Powell défendit de nouveau l’idée selon laquelle la Chambre des Lords était régie par le principe burkien de prescription :

44 The House of Lords is a prescriptive House. It consists partly of members who are nominees in that they are peers of first creation; but it consists also and preponderantly of members of hereditary succession who they are by prescription, because prescriptive right to succeed in a certain way to a seat and to a wit of summons to the upper Chamber has come down in the course of our history. The fact that the elder son succeeds arises from the convention of primogeniture93.

45 Selon lui, préserver la nature prescriptive de la Chambre haute revenait à en protéger l’identité intrinsèque, car cette dernière devait rester différente de la Chambre des Communes. Powell s’exprima de nouveau à la Chambre des Communes les 20 et 26 février afin de défendre des amendements au projet de loi. Il était devenu à la fois l’allié des députés travaillistes abolitionnistes et de Michael Foot, et celui des députés conservateurs traditionalistes. La stratégie des opposants au projet gouvernemental consista ainsi à recourir à un déluge d’amendements pour freiner les débats en vue de bloquer la réforme.

46 En fin de compte, Wilson se heurta à une double opposition : « [celle] de sa gauche (qui trouvait qu’on en faisait pas assez) et [celle] de la droite conservatrice (qui trouvait qu’on en faisait trop). Malgré l’accord de principe des deux frontbenches, il s’[inclina] sans trop résister, cédant ainsi au conservatisme institutionnel fondamental des deux grands partis »94. Quant à Powell, il savoura sa victoire, après avoir bien mené la fronde. Simon Heffer juge toutefois la victoire de Powell de manière un peu excessive : « The destruction of the Bill was perhaps the greatest triumph of Powell’s political career, and it served largely to rehabilitate him in the Commons »95. Powell avait, en fait, réussi à se faire reconnaître par ses pairs comme l’expert de l’histoire de la Chambre des Lords. Powell avait également été parfaitement conscient que son alliance avec Michael Foot restait contre-nature et conjoncturelle, mais il tint tout de même à le remercier pour leur « successful association », tout en lui précisant que cette dernière ne

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signifiait pas « a larger area of agreement between ourselves »96. Ainsi, Powell lui offrit un exemplaire de son ouvrage sur la Chambre des Lords97.

Conclusion

47 Cette étude sur la Chambre des Lords en hommage à Jacques Leruez a permis de montrer que Powell s’insurgea contre les réformes de la Chambre des Lords en 1958 et 1968-1969 au nom du principe burkien de prescription. Powell s’était en effet approprié ce principe, après avoir été formé en politique au sein du CRD, dans un cadre influencé par l’héritage disraélien. Il avait développé un « instinct » tory qui impliquait de défendre les Institutions politiques. Robert Shepherd estime, à juste titre, après les interventions de Powell à la Chambre des Communes contre le projet de réforme de la Chambre haute défendu par Harold Wilson en 1969, qu’il était bien un Tory : « This was not the language of a right-wing Conservative. Neither was it the talk of a populist. It was the authentic voice of a Country Tory »98. De son point de vue, « the Government against the opponents of the bill was a classic confrontation between front bench and back bench, or Court and Country »99. Powell avait en effet montré son attachement à la tradition et non pas à l’aristocratie. Il refusait catégoriquement la nouvelle composition de la Chambre haute, telle qu’elle avait été élaborée par Wilson : I wish to say that no member of the House of Lords has the right to sell out valuable elements of our constitution for the sake of the advantage which they may hope personally to enjoy in their life time. The British Constitution is not the personal property of any particular generation of members of either House of Parliament. (…) As long as it is 'OK' for them, they are prepared to swallow the consequences for the future and the inherent absurdities and obscenities of the scheme. 'Après moi le deluge' – it is a good aristocratic rule. Over and over again, it has been the common people, the people represented in this House who have shown the truest appreciation and valuation of the prescriptive parts of our Constitution100.

48 Par ailleurs, Powell et Michael Foot revinrent sur leur alliance contre-nature dans une émission en 1973 et déclarèrent tous deux que si la réforme constitutionnelle de Wilson avait été adoptée, elle aurait représenté « une attaque contre la Chambre des Communes », dans le but de « la détruire »101. Selon Powell : Both of us saw the reform of the House of Lords as down to put more power in the hands of the executive and to increase its independence of the House of Commons – I mean its possibility of being indifferent to debate questioning giving account to the House of Commons102.

49 Powell ne mettait plus en avant le sacro-saint principe de prescription qui régissait à ses yeux la Chambre des Lords, mais défendait l’équilibre des pouvoirs tel qu’il avait été mis en place par la constitution évolutive du pays. Toutefois, il défendit de nouveau ce principe burkien, lorsqu’en 1994 il estima que toute réforme constitutionnelle importante de la Chambre Haute aurait indéniablement des conséquences sur l’équilibre des pouvoirs et des contre-pouvoirs et sur la nature de la constitution non- écrite du pays tant le principe de prescription serait remis en cause103. Il reçut cette même année un rapport de la Freedom Association qui, comptant sur son soutien, lui expliquait que la préparation d’une constitution européenne « pose[d] a threat to the hereditary peerage and the monarchy »104. La voix de Powell comme expert de la Chambre des Lords semblait toujours être reconnue.

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BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Sources primaires

Archives

House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 12 février 1958.

House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 19 novembre 1968.

House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 21 novembre 1968.

House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 20 décembre 1968.

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House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 25-26 février 1969.

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House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 17 avril 1969.

POWELL Enoch & WALLIS Keith, The House of Lords in the Middle Ages: A History of the English House of Lords to 1540, Londres, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.

The Longden Papers, LSE Archives, Londres, LONGDEN 4/3.

The Powell Papers, Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge.

POLL 3/1/2/12, POLL 5/5, POLL 4/1/1 File 6, POLL 1/4/39, POLL 3/1/2/5, POLL 7/12.

White paper on the Reform of the House of Lords, Cmnd 3799. HMSO, 1968.

Sources Secondaires

Ouvrages

ATTALLAH Naim, Asking Questions, Londres, Quartet Books, 1996.

BERTHEZÈNE Clarisse, Les Conservateurs britanniques dans la bataille des idées, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2011.

BLAKE Robert, The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher, Londres, Fontana, 1985.

CHARLOT Monica, « L’Impossible réforme de la Chambre des Lords », Revue Française de Science Politique, n° 4, 1969, p. 793-806.

BUTLER Rab, The Art of the Possible, Londres, Purnell Book, 1971.

COL Norbert, « Burke et le retournement du contrat social », Revue de la Société d'études anglo- américaines des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, 1993, p. 83-101.

COLLINGS Rex (dir.), Reflections of a Statesman, Londres, Bellew, 1991.

CORTHORN Paul, Enoch Powell: Politics and Ideas in Modern Britain, Oxford, OUP, 2019.

DAVIES A. J., We, The Nation: The Conservative Party and the Pursuit of Power, Londres, Little, Brown and Company, 1995.

ESTEVES Olivier Esteves & PORION Stéphane (dir.), The Lives and Afterlives of Enoch Powell: The Undying Political Animal, Londres & New York, Routledge, 2019.

Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXIV-4 | 2019 192

FORSYTH Michael, « Constitutional Reform » in HOWARD OF RISING LORD (dir.), Enoch at 100: A Revaluation of the Life, Politics and Philosophy of Enoch Powell, Londres, Biteback, 2012, p. 63-84.

GASH N. et al., The Conservatives: A History from their Origins to 1965, Londres, George Allen and Unwin, 1977.

GILMOUR Ian, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism, Londres, Hutchinson, 1977.

GLICKMAN Harvey, « The Toryness of English Conservatism », Journal of British Studies, Vol. 1, n°1, The University of Chicago Press, novembre 1961, p. 111-143.

GREENLEAF W. H., The British Political Tradition – The Ideological Heritage (Vol. II), Londres, Methuen, 1983.

HEFFER Simon, Like the Roman: The Life of Enoch Powell, Londres, Phoenix, 1999.

HOGG Quintin, The Case for Conservatism, Londres, Penguin Books, 1947.

LERUEZ Jacques, SERGEANT Jean-Claude & TOBOUL William, Les Partis politiques britanniques : du bipartisme au multiculturalisme ?, Paris, PUF, 1982.

LERUEZ Jacques, Gouvernement et politique en Grande-Bretagne, Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques & Dalloz, 1989.

LERUEZ Jacques (dir.), La Grande-Bretagne à la fin du XXe siècle (L’Héritage du thatchérisme), Paris, La Documentation Française, 1994.

LERUEZ Jacques, Le Système politique britannique depuis 1945, Paris, Armand Colin, 1994.

LERUEZ Jacques, Le Système politique britannique : De Winston Churchill à Tony Blair, Paris, Armand Colin, 2001.

MORVAN Alain, « Le Visionnaire et le publiciste : Burke, Paine et la Révolution française », Revue de la Société d'études anglo-américaines des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, 1988, p. 23-29.

MORVAN Alain, GOURNAY Jean-François Gournay et LESSAY Franck, Histoire des idées dans les îles britanniques, Paris, PUF, 1996.

NORTON Philip Norton & AUGHEY Arthur, Conservatives and Conservatism, Londres, Temple Smith, 1981.

NORTON Philip, « La Réforme des Lords », Pouvoirs, 93, 2000, p. 39-52.

O’GORMAN Frank, British Conservatism: Conservative Thought from Burke to Thatcher, Londres & New York, Longman, 1986.

PORION Stéphane, « Enoch Powell et le powellisme : entre tradition disraélienne et anticipation néo-libérale, 1946-1968 », Thèse de Doctorat non publiée, 2011, Université de la Sorbonne- Nouvelle.

PORION Stéphane & KAZIN Michael, « George Wallace et Enoch Powell : Comparaison des politiques de deux conservateurs populistes aux États-Unis et au Royaume-Uni », in BERTHEZÈNE Clarisse & VINEL Jean-Christian (dir.), Conservatismes en mouvement (une approche transnationale au XXe siècle), Paris, Presses de l’EHESS, 2016, p. 233-260.

PORION Stéphane, « 'A Local Difficulty'? Enoch Powell’s Secret Motivations to Resign from the Treasury in 1958 and its Aftermath », in PORTIER-LECOCQ Fabienne (dir.), Secrets and Lies in the United Kingdom: Analysis of Political Corruption, Washington, Westphalia Press, 2017, p. 47-74.

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PORION Stéphane, « Diana Spearman's Role within the Post-War Conservative Party and in the 'Battle of Ideas' (1945-1965) », Women's History Review, 2018, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09612025.2018.1482655

ROTH Andrew, Enoch Powell: Tory Tribune, Londres, Macdonald & Co, 1970.

SAMPSON Anthony, Who Runs this Place? The Anatomy of Britain in the 21st Century, Londres, John Murray, 2004.

SCHOFIELD Camilla, Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013.

SCRUTON Roger, Conservatism, Londres, Profile Books, 2017.

SCHWARZ Bill, The White Man’s World: Memories of Empire, Volume I, Oxford, OUP, 2011.

SHEPHERD Robert, Enoch Powell: A Biography, Londres, Pimlico, 1997.

WALTON John K., Disraeli, Londres & New York, Routledge, 1990.

Presse

CRITCHLEY Julian, « The Case for a Whig Revival in the Tory Party », The Times, 15 février 1969.

WAGNER Anthony Sir, « Hereditary Peers Defended », The Times, 30 janvier 1969.

Sites internet

PADMANABHAN Leala, « 'Conservative' or 'Tory': What's in a Name? », BBC News, 8 avril 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-30899534 [dernière consultation du site, 3 décembre 2018]. http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Enoch_Powell [dernière consultation, le 12 avril 2007]. https://kirkcenter.org/conservatism/ten-conservative-principles/ [site consulté le 29 juin 2019]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oEmLEWg2ut8 [site consulté le 5 septembre 2018]. http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1955/1955-conservative-manifesto.shtml [dernière consultation le 15 avril 2019].

NOTES

1. LERUEZ Jacques, Gouvernement et politique en Grande-Bretagne, Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques & Dalloz, 1989, p. 62-63. 2. Ibid., p. 64. 3. Ibid., p. 65. 4. CHARLOT Monica, « L’Impossible réforme de la Chambre des Lords », Revue Française de Science Politique, n° 4, 1969, p. 798. 5. LERUEZ Jacques, Le Système politique britannique : De Winston Churchill à Tony Blair, Paris, Armand Colin, 2001, p. 66-70. 6. NORTON Philip Norton, « Le Parlement », in LERUEZ Jacques (dir.), La Grande-Bretagne à la fin du XXe siècle, L’Héritage du thatchérisme, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1994, p. 63. 7. DAVIES A. J., We, The Nation: The Conservative Party and the Pursuit of Power, Londres, Little, Brown and Company, 1995, p. 129. 8. Ce fut le député Conservateur Iain Macleod qui utilisa cette expression. ROTH Andrew, Enoch Powell: A Tory Tribute, Londres, Macdonald & Co, 1970, p. 363.

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9. COLLINGS Rex (dir.), Reflections of a Statesman, Londres, Bellew, 1991. 10. SCHWARZ Bill, The White Man’s World: Memories of Empire, Volume I, Oxford, OUP, 2011, SCHOFIELD Camilla, Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 11. PORION Stéphane & KAZIN Michael, « George Wallace et Enoch Powell : Comparaison des politiques de deux conservateurs populistes aux États-Unis et au Royaume-Uni », in BERTHEZENE Clarisse & VINEL Jean-Christian (dir.), Conservatismes en mouvement (une approche transnationale au XXe siècle), Paris, Presses de l’EHESS, 2016, p. 233-260. 12. CORTHORN Paul, Enoch Powell: Politics and Ideas in Modern Britain, Oxford, OUP, 2019, p. 3. 13. Voir par exemple Ibid., ESTEVES Olivier & PORION Stéphane (dir.), The Lives and Afterlives of Enoch Powell: The Undying Political Animal, Londres et New York, Routledge, 2019. 14. FORSYTH Michael, « Constitutional Reform » in HOWARD OF RISING LORD (dir.), Enoch at 100: A Revaluation of the Life, Politics and Philosophy of Enoch Powell, Londres, Biteback, 2012, p. 63-84. 15. POWELL Enoch & WALLIS Keith, The House of Lords in the Middle Ages: A History of the English House of Lords to 1540, Londres, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968. 16. POWELL Anthony, Daily Telegraph, 18 July 1968, in HEFFER Simon, Like the Roman: The Life of Enoch Powell, Londres, Phoenix, 1999, p. 475. 17. LERUEZ Jacques, SERGEANT Jean-Claude & TOBOUL William, Les Partis politiques britanniques : du bipartisme au multiculturalisme ?, Paris, PUF, 1982, p. 36. 18. Entretien d’Enoch Powell avec Patrick Cosgrave et Hoggett, 1976, POLL 5/5, Powell Papers. 19. CRITCHLEY Julian, « The Case for a Whig Revival in the Tory Party », The Times, 15 février 1969, p. 8. 20. New Oxford Dictionary of English cité dans FORSYTH Michael, « Constitutional Reform », op. cit., p. 64. Quant aux spécialistes français de Burke, ils utilisent tous en français l’expression de « principe ou concept de 'prescription' ». Dans cet article, on gardera la même expression. Voir MORVAN Alain, « Le Visionnaire et le publiciste : Burke, Paine et la Révolution française », Revue de la Société d'études anglo-américaines des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, 1988, p. 23-29, COL Norbert, « Burke et le retournement du contrat social », Revue de la Société d'études anglo-américaines des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, 1993, p. 83-101, MORVAN Alain, GOURNAY Jean-François et LESSAY Franck, Histoire des idées dans les îles britanniques, Paris, PUF, 1996. 21. FORSYTH Michael, « Constitutional Reform », op. cit., p. 64. 22. Entretien d’Enoch Powell avec Robert Behrens, 29 octobre 1987, p. 9, LONGDEN 4/3, Longden Papers, LSE archives. 23. Ibid. 24. ROTH Andrew, Enoch Powell: Tory Tribune, op. cit., p. 50. 25. BLAKE Robert, The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher, Londres, Fontana, 1985, p. 3. 26. Voir notamment SOUTHGATE D., « From Disraeli to Law », in GASH N. et al., The Conservatives: A History from their Origins to 1965, Londres, George Allen and Unwin, 1977, p. 125. 27. BUTLER Rab, The Art of the Possible, Londres, Purnell Book, 1971, p. 134. 28. Voir par exemple, HOGG Quintin, The Case for Conservatism, Londres, Penguin Books, 1947, p. 24-25. La société est envisagée comme un organisme vivant et non mécanique. À ce caractère organique est associée l’idée qu’il faut préserver une continuité avec le passé et n’entreprendre que des changements de manière graduelle sans trop de déstabilisations. BERTHEZENE Clarisse, Les Conservateurs britanniques dans la bataille des idées, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2011, p. 123-124. 29. WALTON John K., Disraeli, Londres & New York, Routledge, 1990, p. 5. 30. SHEPHERD Robert, Enoch Powell: A Biography, Londres, Pimlico, 1997, p. 80. 31. NORTON Philip & AUGHEY Arthur, Conservatives and Conservatism, Londres, Temple Smith, 1981, p. 78. 32. WALTON John K., Disraeli, op. cit., p. 66-67.

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33. PORION Stéphane, « Diana Spearman's Role within the Post-War Conservative Party and in the 'Battle of Ideas' (1945–1965) », Women's History Review, 2018,https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ full/10.1080/09612025.2018.1482655 34. Voir PORION Stéphane, « Enoch Powell et le powellisme : entre tradition disraélienne et anticipation néo-libérale, 1946-1968 », Thèse de Doctorat non publiée, 2011, Université de la Sorbonne-Nouvelle. 35. Un certain nombre d’historiens et de politistes remettent désormais en cause le nom que la presse donna à ce discours de Birmingham du 20 avril 1968. Voir ESTEVES Olivier & PORION Stéphane (dir.), The Lives and Afterlives of Enoch Powell: The Undying Political Animal, op. cit.. 36. « This Week: The World of Enoch Powell », Rediffusion TV, 4 juillet 1968, in COLLINGS Rex (dir.), Reflections of a Statesman, op. cit., p. 448. 37. Entretien d’Enoch Powell avec Patrick Cosgrave et Hoggett. 38. SCRUTON Roger, Conservatism, Londres, Profile Books, 2017, p. 1. 39. Entretien d’Enoch Powell avec Brian Walden, 29 janvier 1978, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/ Enoch_Powell, [dernière consultation, le 12 avril 2007]. 40. SHEPHERD Robert, Enoch Powell: A Biography, op. cit., p. 3. 41. « Politicians and Other Artists », Entretien d’Enoch Powell avec John Goodbody et Robert Silver, Trinity Review, été 1977, in COLLINGS Rex (dir.), Reflections of a Statesman, op. cit., p. 23-24. 42. SCRUTON Roger, Conservatism, op. cit., p. 19-20. 43. ATTALLAH Naim, Asking Questions, op. cit., p. 354-355. 44. Daily Telegraph, 31 mars 1986, in SAMPSON Anthony, Who Runs this Place? The Anatomy of Britain in the 21st Century, Londres, John Murray, 2004, p. 46. 45. Voir GLICKMAN Harvey, « The Toryness of English Conservatism », Journal of British Studies, Vol. 1, n°1, The University of Chicago Press, novembre 1961, p. 121. 46. O’GORMAN Frank, British Conservatism: Conservative Thought from Burke to Thatcher, Londres & New York, Longman, 1986, p. 11, DAVIES A. J., We, The Nation: The Conservative Party and the Pursuit of Power, op. cit., p. 8. 47. PADMANABHAN Leala, « 'Conservative' or 'Tory': What's in a Name? », BBC News, 8 avril 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-30899534 [dernière consultation du site, 3 décembre 2018]. 48. Entretien d’Enoch Powell avec Patrick Cosgrave et Hoggett. 49. O’GORMAN Frank, British Conservatism: Conservative Thought from Burke to Thatcher, op. cit., p. 12. 50. Ibid., p. 14. 51. Ibid., p. 15. 52. Ibid., p. 100-101. 53. MORVAN Alain, « Le Visionnaire et le publiciste : Burke, Paine et la Révolution française », op. cit., p. 26. 54. https://kirkcenter.org/conservatism/ten-conservative-principles/ [site consulté le 29 juin 2019]. 55. GILMOUR Ian, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism, Londres, Hutchinson, 1977, p. 109-111. 56. GREENLEAF W. H., The British Political Tradition – The Ideological Heritage (Vol. II), Londres, Methuen, 1983, p. 191. 57. Ibid., p. 189-195. 58. POWELL Enoch, Discours à l’occasion du Saint George’s Day Banquet, 22 avril 1961, p. 5, POLL 4/1/1 File 6, Powell Papers. 59. POWELL Enoch, Notes manuscrites, 9 novembre 1969, p. 1, POLL 3/1/2/12, Powell Papers. 60. POWELL Enoch, « Will the Lords Survive? », in The Manorial Society of Great Britain, The House of Lords: A Thousand Years of British Tradition, Londres, Smith’s Peerage Limited, 1994, p. 123, POLL 1/4/39, Powell Papers.

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61. Ibid. 62. Ibid., p. 128. 63. Ibid., p. 124. 64. Ibid. 65. PORION Stéphane, « 'A Local Difficulty'? Enoch Powell’s Secret Motivations to Resign from the Treasury in 1958 and its Aftermath », in PORTIER-LECOCQ Fabienne (dir.), Secrets and Lies in the United Kingdom: Analysis of Political Corruption, Washington, Westphalia Press, 2017, p. 47-74. 66. « It has long been the Conservative wish to reach a settlement regarding the reform of the House of Lords, so that it may continue to play its proper role as a Second Chamber under the Constitution. (…) We believe that any changes made now should be concerned solely with the composition of the House ». http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1955/1955-conservative- manifesto.shtml [dernière consultation le 15 avril 2019]. 67. SHEPHERD Robert, Enoch Powell: A Biography, op. cit., p. 186. 68. House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 12 février 1958, col. 436. 69. ROTH Andrew, Enoch Powell: Tory Tribune, op. cit., p. 193, SHEPHERD Robert, Enoch Powell: A Biography, op. cit., p. 186-187. 70. NORTON Philip, « La Réforme des Lords », Pouvoirs, 93, 2000, p. 42. 71. House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 12 février 1958, col. 437. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid., col. 437-441. 74. O’GORMAN Frank, British Conservatism, op. cit., p. 71-72. 75. Lettre de Powell au Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, 8 janvier 1958, POLL 3/1/2/5, Powell Papers. 76. Lettre du Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain à Powell, 11 février 1958, POLL 3/1/2/5, Powell Papers. 77. Cmnd 3799. HMSO. 78. CHARLOT Monica, « L’Impossible réforme de la Chambre des Lords », op. cit., p. 799. 79. SHEPHERD Robert, Enoch Powell: A Biography, op. cit., p. 380. 80. LERUEZ Jacques, Gouvernement et politique en Grande-Bretagne, op. cit., p. 65. 81. POWELL Enoch & WALLIS Keith, The House of Lords in the Middle Ages, op. cit., p. ix. 82. SHEPHERD Robert, Enoch Powell: A Biography, op. cit., p. 135. 83. Ibid., p. 188. 84. HEFFER Simon, Like the Roman: The Life of Enoch Powell, op. cit., p. 245. 85. Lettre de Sir Richard Anthony Wagner à Powell, 5 novembre 1968, POLL 3/1/2/12, Powell Papers. 86. WAGNER Richard Anthony Sir, « House of Lords Reform Proposals: A Note on Possible Consequent Changes in Styles, Titles, Ceremonies and Kindred Matters », 18 décembre 1968, POLL 3/1/2/12, Powell Papers. 87. Lettre de Sir Richard Anthony Wagner à Powell, 20 mars 1969, POLL 3/1/2/12, Powell Papers. 88. POWELL Enoch, « Alteration of the composition of the House of Lords », 10 novembre 1947, p. 1, POLL 3/1/2/5, Powell Papers. 89. Ibid. 90. Voir par exemple, lettre de Sydney Irving à Powell, 25 mars 1969, lettre du Viscount Dilhorne, 30 décembre 1968, POLL 3/1/2/5, Powell Papers. 91. LERUEZ Jacques, Gouvernement et politique en Grande-Bretagne, op. cit., p. 65. 92. House of Commons Debates, Hansard, cols. 1351-1352. 93. Ibid., cols. 1353-1354. 94. LERUEZ Jacques, Le Système politique britannique depuis 1945, op. cit., p. 44. 95. HEFFER Simon, Like the Roman: The Life of Enoch Powell, op. cit., p. 521.

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96. Lettre de Powell à Michael Foot, 17 avril 1969. 97. Ibid. 98. SHEPHERD Robert, Enoch Powell: A Biography, op. cit., p. 383. 99. Ibid., p. 382. 100. ROTH Andrew, Enoch Powell: Tory Tribune, op. cit., p. 368. 101. Émission sur Radio 4, intitulée « Politics in the 1970s » et présentée par Robin Day, 10 juin 1973, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oEmLEWg2ut8 [site consulté le 5 septembre 2018]. 102. Ibid. 103. Voir POWELL Enoch, « Will the Lords Survive? », op. cit.. 104. Lettre de The Freedom Association à Powell, 11 juillet 1994, POLL 7/12.

RÉSUMÉS

Cet article vise à analyser pourquoi Enoch Powell s’insurgea contre les réformes de la Chambre des Lords en 1958 et 1968-1969. Ce dernier fut formé en politique en 1946 au sein du Conservative Research Department, influencé par l’héritage disraélien, et développa ainsi un instinct tory justifiant une défense des institutions politiques. Ce fut à la lecture de Burke que Powell reprit à son compte le principe de prescription pour nourrir la dimension tory de sa pensée. Par ailleurs, Powell entreprit d’écrire l’histoire de la Chambre des Lords qu’il publia en 1968. Il s’insurgea contre la réforme d’Harold Wilson en 1968 et 1969, créant « une alliance contre-nature » avec des députés travaillistes et Michael Foot empêchant le Premier Ministre de faire aboutir son projet.

This paper analyses why Enoch Powell opposed the 1958 and 1968-69 reforms of the House of Lords. He started his political career working at the Conservative Research Department that was influenced by the Disraelian legacy, and thus developed a Tory attitude consisting in defending British political institutions. After reading Burke, Powell promoted the principle of prescription to fuel the Tory dimension of Powellism. In addition, he decided to write a history of the House of Lords that he published in 1968. Powell butchered Wilson’s bill in 1968-1969, after forging “an unholy alliance” with some Labour MPs and Michael Foot, which resulted in the Prime Minister’s failure to implement his reform.

INDEX

Mots-clés : Chambre des Lords, lords héréditaires, principe de prescription, Benjamin Disraeli, Edmund Burke, Enoch Powell Keywords : House of Lords, hereditary peers, principle of prescription, Benjamin Disraeli, Edmund Burke, Enoch Powell

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AUTEUR

STÉPHANE PORION Université de Tours. Stéphane Porion, agrégé d'anglais, maître de conférences en civilisation britannique à l'Université de Tours, a rédigé son doctorat sur les idées politiques et constitutionnelles d'Enoch Powell de 1946 à 1968. Il a beaucoup publié sur cet homme politique et récemment codirigé un ouvrage avec Olivier Estèves, publié chez Routledge en mai 2019 et intitulé The Lives and Afterlives of Enoch Powell: The Undying Political Animal. Ses travaux portent également sur le Parti conservateur britannique depuis 1945, ainsi que sur les droites radicales depuis 1967.

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From Exclusion to Inclusion: the Glasgow Magdalene Institution, an Instrument of Social Control in the Nineteenth Century De l’exclusion vers l’inclusion: la Glasgow Magdalene Institution, instrument de contrôle social au dix-neuvième siècle.

Christian Auer

Introduction

1 Questioning the notion of social control, an inherently dynamic process more than a static concept, primarily means studying the mechanisms, methods and strategies through which a society manages to establish, secure and preserve social stability and cohesiveness. The title of this paper explicitly refers to the Glasgow Magdalene Institution as an instrument of social control, which seems to imply that the institution that was created in the early 1860s was only one constituent of a more comprehensive strategy aimed at controlling a category of the population, prostitutes, that did not comply with the rules or the norms established by society and who were seen as representing a potential threat to the political, sanitary and moral stability of the social structure1. The following passage, extracted from the Glasgow Magdalene Institution’s annual report of 1870, seems to show that the directors of the Institution were perfectly conscious of their essential role as protectors of social stability: The directors of the GMI […] desire to acknowledge, with gratitude to God, the amount of good accomplished through the instrumentality of the Homes, which in the past year have been kept full; a state of matters, which they believe, has been owing to the wholesome enforcement of the Police Act against street solicitation and improper houses. This much needed repressive action on the part of our civic authorities has had the effect of partially protecting the virtuous, and making the practice of vice more difficult; whilst at the same time the experience of the past

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year’s work has proved that it has led to a desire on the part of many to be delivered from a life of evil.2

Prostitution in mid-Victorian Britain

2 Before analysing the strategies that were implemented by the Institution it is necessary to briefly examine how prostitution was perceived in mid-Victorian Britain. When one mentions prostitution in the context of nineteenth century Britain one is faced with a double paradox: on the one hand a society that showed violent hostility towards the prostitute, seen, to quote Judith Walkowitz, both as “an object of fascination and disgust”3 and as the “highly visible symbol of the social dislocation attendant upon the industrial era”4; yet, most Victorians were reluctant to legislate in the matter.5 As the following comment, written by an observer who tried to assess the number of prostitutes plying their trade during the Glasgow Fair, tends to suggest, the term prostitute could apply to any woman whose behaviour or lifestyle did not comply with the norms:

3 Saw 94 prostitutes, also a large number of millworkers, scarcely distinguishable from prostitutes in their conduct. Saw 5 young prostitutes squatting on the grass in a very immoral manner; also one couple lying on the grass. (We speak confidently of the purpose, because a policeman on the Green assured us … that no woman went to the Green after a certain hour, save for that purpose).6

4 William Tait, a surgeon at the Lock Hospital of Edinburgh, who in 1842 published the results of an inquiry into prostitution, considered that “the term prostitute is always employed to designate a person who habitually follows the course of conduct implied in successive acts of prostitution”.7 Prostitution was generally considered as being the result of voluntary choice and few Victorians were clear-sighted enough to attribute prostitution to unfavourable social circumstances. The following comment, written by the journalist William Greg, did not correspond to what most people thought at the time: “The first and perhaps the largest class of prostitutes are those who may fairly be said to have had no choice on the matter […] the prostitutes who spring from this class are clearly the victims of circumstances, and therefore must […] be allowed to be objects of the most unalloyed compassion”.8

5 Numerous were those who considered that venereal diseases were a natural punishment ordained by divine justice. The following graphic description, extracted from one of the Lectures on Female Prostitution by Ralph Wardlaw, who was a minister in Glasgow, is particularly telling: The disease […] is absolutely terrific. Its effects are, - extensive, severe, and loathsome ulcerations; the destruction of the eye-sight, and of the palate and tonsils; the rotting of the flesh from the bones; the exfoliation of the bones themselves, till the whole frame becomes a mass of living corruption, from which the eye, though filled with the tear of pity, turns away in sickening disgust. […] I wish to fill you with loathing of the loathsome effect, that you may loath with a deeper loathing the more loathsome cause.9

6 The Contagious Diseases Act, voted on June 20 1864, represented the first real attempt to control prostitution in Great Britain. The Act, which was aimed at protecting the army and the navy from venereal diseases, allowed the police to ask women suspected of being prostitutes to have compulsory checks for venereal disease.10 If the women were found to be suffering from sexually transmitted diseases they were placed in a

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Lock hospital until cured. Although Glasgow was a garrison town the law was never applied there because the town had developed its own system of regulation and control of prostitution.

The Glasgow system

7 The Glasgow system, as it was called, relied on the close cooperation of three different institutions, the police, the Lock Hospital and the Magdalene Institution. The Glasgow Police Acts of 1843, 1862 and 1866 allowed the police to close brothels and to arrest and imprison women caught soliciting: “Every prostitute, or nightwalker loitering in any road or street court, or common stair, or importuning passengers for the purpose of prostitution shall be liable to a fine of 40 shillings or 14 days imprisonment”.11 Diseased prostitutes were treated in the Lock hospital; as the surgeon of the hospital, Alexander Patterson, indicated to the parliamentary commission in 1882, the prostitutes could leave the hospital if they wanted to interrupt their treatment. The cornerstone of the Glasgow System was the Glasgow Magdalene Institution. The Institution had been created for “the Repression of vice, and the Reformation for penitent Females”.12 The Institution’s purposes were “ to provide temporary homes for Females who have strayed from the paths of virtue […] and who are willing to return to them, and similar refuge or other protection to females who may be in imminent danger of being led astray”.13 The women admitted to the institution were not professional prostitutes but young women or girls - half of them were under twenty years of age - who had occasionally resorted to prostitution to support themselves. The authorities of the Institution considered that prostitution was a real plague that threatened the moral balance of society. In the report of 1862 prostitution was described as the “Social Evil”, “the monster evil”, “the social sore”, “the terrible scourge”, “ the great social plague”, “the giant sin” or “the Evil”.14 The report of 1865 concluded that “ Rooted in the vitals of society – suffered to grow through apathy on the one hand, and indifference or connivance on the other – the 'SOCIAL EVIL' disgraces the land, and calls for every effort to subdue it, reclaim its victims, and protect those who are in danger”.15

8 Strict discipline was an integral part of the system put in place in the institution:

9 Punishment is viewed by our Society chiefly as a means to an end – that of discouraging vicious practices which leave their ruined victims very unlikely subjects of reformation, and which, moreover, if unchecked, are sure to find new victims to fill up the vacant space left by any old ones who have been rescued and reformed […] punishment is simply our most direct and efficacious method of prevention.16

10 Inmates could in theory leave the institution if they wanted to: “It should be explained that the Matrons have no power, nor do they ever attempt to detain girls against their will. Every inmate is received on her voluntary application”.17

The Glasgow Magdalene Institution’s annual reports

11 After this brief presentation of the Glasgow Magdalene Institution, I would now like to turn my attention to the Institution’s annual reports since these documents provide essential information about the ideological foundations of the Institution’s discourse and about the way the directors of the Institution perceived their role and mission in society. Special attention will be paid to the former inmates’ letters that were inserted

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at the end of the reports. How did the women that had left the Institution perceive the process of rehabilitation they had been subjected to? What practical and ideological influence did the Institution exert on these women? The former inmates’ letters provide some answers to these questions.

12 The women committed themselves to keeping in touch with the institution for at least six months after they had left; if they encountered a problem, they were supposed to contact the institution for help or advice. Thus the process of moral rehabilitation went on after the two years the women generally spent in the institution.18 The reports indicate that the former inmates wrote regularly, but it seems that it was the matrons who took the initiative of writing as numerous inmates’ letters start with an apology for not having written earlier. The following is a typical example: “I received your kind and welcome letter some time ago. You will be thinking me very careless in not answering your kind letter, but you will have to excuse me as I have been very busy”.19 The letters systematically started with the inmates mentioning their present situation, “I like my place very well”,20 “I am very comfortably situated”,21 “I am coming on very well and like my place well”.22 Here is one typical example taken from one of the letters published in the report of 1878: “beautiful weather”, “pleasant music”, “pleasant evening”, “very nice piano”, “pleasant fireside”, “magnificent river”,23 are but a selection of the numerous positive comments of the letter. The inmates would never fail to mention the time they had spent at the institution and the knowledge they had acquired there and not surprisingly the comments were always favourable and sometimes even dithyrambic. “ It is now I can bless that day that God sent me to the Home. It shall be in my heart and mind till I go to my grave the many blessed lessons I was taught by you and the dear gentlemen of the house”.24 The lessons that had been learned seemed to have been completely assimilated: “While I am performing my duties around the house, I very often remember your instructions which are fresh in my memory”.25 The women never forgot to specify that they constantly thought of the supervisors and their former friends; some of them even experienced intense nostalgia: “Oh, how do I often wish I was back at Lochburn once more, with all my kind friends”.26 Some women even implied that their stay at the institution had been a kind of rebirth; they assimilated the institution to a new home or a new family and sometimes mentioned that they wished to go back to pay a visit to the supervisors. “Dear Mother, for I cannot call you anything else, as you have acted a mother’s part over me”27 or “I will never forget you, for you were a mother to me and you have handed me over to another mother”.28 The link that had been established between these women and their supervisors or teachers transcended the simple relationship between pupil and master. The institution and its staff had replaced an absent family, the directors taking up the role of the paternal figure and the female staff taking up the role of the maternal figure.

13 One fundamental point requires close examination, and that is the profound religious dimension of all the letters. Before analysing some of the prominent aspects as regards that particular point it might be useful to note, as Tom Devine has pointed out, that “ religious values continued to remain central to the ethos of Victorian Scotland”.29 Olive Checkland, in a book about philanthropy in Victorian Scotland, has the following comment:

14 The Scotland of Victoria’s reign saw a remarkable phenomenon, namely the attempt by the Church of Scotland and the other churches in Scotland to stay the tide of secularism and to recall the nation to God and to his worship. In this the

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philanthropists (both clerical and lay) were the driving force. By an extraordinary range of initiatives they sought to resist this incipient secularism of the industrial age and to create, perhaps in a somewhat renovated form, a life in which the Christian religion was the principal part.30

15 Needless to say, the Glasgow Magdalene Institution played its part in the process. Thus, it should not come as a surprise to see these women mention in very explicit terms the fundamental part religion and God played in their current lives. “I am always thinking of you and all the ladies, and girls. Oh, that they would all give their hearts to the Saviour, who is standing with melted heart and open hands to receive them”.31 Life was nothing but a long passage sown with suffering and sin: “it was God my Father, and your Father, that brought me to you, and then He brought me to Jesus our blessed Saviour, and there I will ask God to keep me till death takes me away from this world of sin and misery”.32 One had to endure the ordeals of earthly life with stoicism: “as we go through this world we sometimes find many difficulties, and we have just got to make the best of it”.33 But there was definitely hope in the beyond: “Sooner or later we must part, but hope to meet in that lovely home above, to be with Christ; which is far better”.34 Religion had a purifying function; it helped to surmount ones’ darker impulses: “I don’t feel any evil passion getting the same as I used to have, because when I feel any temper, I just say – Lord, give me a sweet temper, and that helps me greatly”.35 The letter of an inmate who had emigrated to the province of New Brunswick in Canada seems to testify to the success of the proselytizing process: There is a reformation going on out here under the name of the Dutchers Temperance Reformers, and they are doing splendid work in rescuing souls from a drunkard’s death and grave. […] We hope that this institution will continue as it has begun, going forth conquering and to conquer.36

16 Some of the letters constituted a real encouragement to emigration and would probably have delighted all those who thought that emigration was the panacea for solving the problem of overpopulation in Scotland. The following is an extract of a letter sent from Adelaide in Australia: Any young woman can get from 25 to 30 shillings a week. I have not regretted of coming to this colony. I would advise any young woman to come out here; they would do much better than at home. I wish you could advise A – P – to come out here; I think it would be the best thing ever that ever she could do; she would be away from all temptation here.37

17 I would argue that the interest of these letters lies more in what they suggest than in what they explicitly say or to put it differently in their subtext more than in their text. The first point to be noted is that the letters were all written without the slightest spelling or grammar mistake, which is rather surprising since the directors of the institution themselves deplored the fact that about two thirds of the women that entered the institution could not write. Should this be construed as some further evidence of the pedagogical success of the teachers of the institution or should it rather be analysed as the sign of some kind of editorial intrusion? The style, the structure and the internal organisation of these letters are so similar that one is entitled to think that they must have been carefully read, analysed, selected, censored, amended and edited before publication. These letters could thus be seen as the implementation of a practical exercise more than the expression of some genuine personal feelings. The letters were a form of discourse inserted into another larger and inherently different form of discourse; in fact, what we have here is a double level of discourse. The letters were indeed diverted from their primary function, the private sphere, and integrated

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into an official discourse aimed at the public sphere. First, the letters were obviously meant to demonstrate that the objective of the institution had been reached. The authors of the letters expressed themselves with great humility, showed that they understood that they had seriously sinned and committed themselves to leading a virtuous life. It might be interesting to point out that these letters were mentioned by one of the members of the select committee on the Contagious Diseases Act who indicated that the documents “[breathed] a great amount of piety and religious feeling”.38 The letters also had another function: they helped to send a positive image of the Institution and thus encouraged the public to make donations. The institution was not self-supporting and it needed money from the public since the work of the inmates represented only two thirds of its total budget. The strategy of inserting former inmates’ letters in the annual reports of the Institution apparently bore its fruit; the authors of the report of 1863 indeed remarked that The generosity of the public has placed ample funds in your Directors’ hands for their ordinary expenditure during the past year; and it has gratified them much to notice the continuance of that accession of new subscriptions of a smaller amount, which they take as an indication of an increasing interest in the work in which they are engaged. The continuance of former subscriptions from friends of the cause they thankfully regard as a proof of confidence in their administration.39

Social control according to Michel Foucault

18 To get a better understanding of the strategies of social control that were implemented by structures such as the Glasgow Magdalene Institution it seems necessary to refer to Michel Foucault’s work and more particularly to his studies of the prison system and of the relationships between the notions of power, knowledge, and discourse.40 Let us start with the following quotation: “Hôpitaux, asiles, collèges, usines, ateliers avec leur discipline, et finalement, prisons, tout cela fait partie d’une espèce de grande forme sociale du pouvoir qui a été mise en place au début du XIXème siècle”.41 Although the term “espèce” seems to be open to different possible interpretations, it appears that Michel Foucault clearly suggests that social control and power are interconnected concepts. Only those who detain the power can develop strategies aimed at subduing potentially destabilizing elements in society. Foucault stresses the fact that communication between police and medicine is absolutely essential. He adds that hospitals are invested with different missions, to cure, to redress, to correct and to control, which is exactly how the Glasgow Magdalene Institution saw its function.

19 Analysing Michel Foucault’s theory Jean-Philippe Cazier has the following comment: “ Enfermer le délinquant, c’est d’abord l’inclure dans un réseau coercitif de surveillance et de contrôle qui l’individualise et le fixe pour l’assujettir42.” The notion of confinement is essential to an understanding of the process prostitutes were subjected to. In structures such as the Glasgow Magdalene Institution individuals were inserted in a strict organisation of time and space, leaving them a minimum amount of freedom and independence. Confinement became a means of acting not only on the bodies but also on the minds since one of the central purposes of the process was to produce subjects that would comply with a certain number of well established and clearly determined rules and norms. Foucault also uses the concept of “quadrillage”, which, in a recent book devoted to some of the fundamental aspects of Foucault’s work, has been described in the following terms:

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Le mot quadrillage contient en lui deux notions : celle d’encerclement, ou d’enfermement, et celle de gestion, de guidance de l’objet. Par le quadrillage l’objet du pouvoir est contrôlé et agencé. Le quadrillage appartient donc à un programme, il n’est ni spontané, ni improvisé. Ce programme du quadrillage se développe par un savoir, ou par une sélection du savoir, que détient le pouvoir. […] Le pouvoir sélectionne le savoir, et ce qui est enseigné est d’abord une partie productive de ce savoir […] Il y a donc par le savoir, un procédé d’enfermement de la pensée, un conditionnement de l’individu comme producteur, ou travailleur, et comme reproducteur d’un sens en cours.43

20 It seems to me that the polysemy of the French term cannot be easily rendered into English, the least unsatisfactory translation of “quadrillage” would probably be control, but the French term connotes regularity, method, coherence, efficiency, order, organisation, power and obviously control. All these terms could be used to describe the nature of the process put in place by structures such as the Glasgow Magdalene Institution. As Pierre Bourdieu has demonstrated, power can express itself without the use of physical force and can be transmuted in a symbolic form, and as such invested with a kind of legitimacy.44 What has to be noted here is that the type of power displayed by the Glasgow Magdalene Institution was not only symbolic, since the authorities could and did resort to punishment or violence. Yet, the letters published in the reports seem to suggest that the inmates, at least some of them, participated in their own subjection. The ultimate success of the process of rehabilitation could only be attained through the inmates’ active complicity and their belief in the institution’s legitimacy.

Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus

21 Here I would like to refer to the concept of habitus as developed by Pierre Bourdieu. For Bourdieu, the concept of habitus, which is produced socially and corresponds to the interiorisation or the incorporation of exteriority, designates a series of dispositions that lead the agent to behave and react in a certain way.45 The concept is meant to refer primarily to those dispositions acquired during childhood that inevitably reflect the social conditions in which they have been acquired. What I am suggesting here is that this notion of habitus can be used to explore and assess the nature and the extent of the task undertaken by the directors of the Glasgow Magdalene Institution; indeed the Institution’s main purpose consisted in trying to transform what I would call the original habitus of the inmates, an enormously complex task, since Bourdieu argues that the original dispositions are so deeply rooted in the body and in the mind that they endure all along the individual’s existence. The letters published in the annual reports would tend to substantiate the idea that the process of transformation succeeded or to put it differently that the Institution managed to erase the past of these women and to replace it with a new set of beliefs and behaviours. Two essential questions need to be asked here: did the system work for all of these women and were they all ready to accept the place that had been chosen for them?

Moral purification and social rehabilitation

22 Several elements would seem to suggest that some of these women opposed or refused the processes of moral purification and social rehabilitation they were subjected to.

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The annual report of 1863 for example indicated that “if striking results were to be held as the measure of the value and efficiency of such an agency as the Magdalene Institution, those charged with its management might be discouraged when presenting their Annual Report”.46 Furthermore, a close reading of the statistics provided by the Institution itself suggests that the system was far from being totally efficient. The report of 1878 indicated that: It is shewn that of 294 young women who left during the year, 96, or nearly one- third, have been satisfactorily disposed of: that is to say, after having received the usual industrial and educational training, in most cases extending to two years, they have been restored to their friends, or have been placed in respectable situations. True, there are besides these a good many cases more or less disappointing. Some were passed on to other institutions more likely to benefit them, while others proved quite “unsuitable”, or “left on their own accord”, after having been only a short time, sometimes only a few days with us.47

23 At no time does the report explain the precise nature of what the institution calls “ unsuitable” behaviour or provide any information about why some of the inmates decided to leave the institution. What these figures undoubtedly demonstrate is that any form of social control necessarily contains the possibility of resistance, unrest, opposition or even rebellion. One of the principal aims of the Glasgow System was to fight the “Great Social Evil” and to transform prostitutes into law-abiding and socially useful citizens. As the General Board of Directors of the Institution admitted in 1873, this aim had been only partly achieved and only in certain areas of the town of Glasgow:

24 In regard to repressive action it was stated that the central part of the city was almost entirely cleared of improper houses and that street solicitation was greatly lessened, but there was reason to fear that the outside districts and suburbs were in danger of being visited by the above evils unless precautions were used.48

Conclusion

25 Although the select committee on the contagious Diseases Act concluded that the Glasgow System had managed to fight prostitution efficiently, “the case of Glasgow was especially relied upon as showing that without the exceptional legislation of the acts, prostitution might be greatly diminished and order and decency established in a large town, simply by means of stringent police interference”,49

26 there can be no denying that some women refused to be “socially controlled” and to comply with the rules established by Victorian society; furthermore the “operation against the monster evil and the ravages of this terrible scourge”, to quote the words used in the report of the Institution in 1862,50 was a highly discriminatory process since a large number of prostitutes went on plying their trade at the periphery of the town in less respectable districts. Some of the women who went through the filter of the Magdalene Institution were passive and obedient subjects but evidence also suggests that others did refuse to adhere to the dominant patriarchal ideology of the time. The Institution’s main purpose was to oblige the inmates to adopt the behaviour, beliefs, values and norms of the respectable part of society (or to put it in the Institution’s own words, “to restore young women to lives of respectability”51), but the process, and I would like to end on that final remark, was also a source of potential instability and subversion.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bourdieu, Pierre, Questions de Sociologie [1984] (Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit, 2002).

Bourdieu, Pierre, Langage et Pouvoir Symbolique [1991] (Paris, Seuil, 2001).

Bourdieu, Pierre, La Domination Masculine [1998] (Paris, Seuil, 2002).

Devine, Thomas Martin, The Scottish Nation 1700-2000, [1999] (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2000).

Fisher, Trevor, Prostitution and the Victorians (Stroud, Sutton, 1997).

Foucault, Michel, Surveiller et punir (Paris, Gallimard, 1975).

Gordon, Eleanor, Breitenbach, Esther (eds.), The World is Ill Divided (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1990).

Glasgow Magdalene Institution, Annual Report [Glasgow, Mitchell Library], 1862, 1863, 1875, 1878, 1884, 1889

Greg, William, The Great Sin of Great Cities (London, 1853).

Leclercq, Stéfan (ed.), Abécédaire de Michel Foucault (Mons, Sils Maria, 2004).

Parliamentary Papers, Report from the Select Committee on the Contagious Diseases Acts, [Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland] Vol. VIII, xiv, 1881.

Parliamentary Papers, Report from the Select Committee on the Contagious Diseases Acts, [Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland] vol. IX, civ, 1882.

Tait, William, Magdalenism, An Inquiry into the Extent, Causes and Consequences of Prostitution in Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1840).

Trudgill, Eric, Madonnas and Magdalens: The Origins and Development of Victorian Sexual Attitudes (London, Heinemann, 1976).

Walkowitz, Judith, Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class and the State (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980).

Wardlaw, Ralph, Lectures on Female Prostitution: its Nature, Effects, Guilt, Causes, and Remedy (Glasgow, 1842).

NOTES

1. In 2015 I was contacted by Jacques Leruez who asked me if I would be interested in giving a lecture on the Highland Clearances for the Association franco-écossaise. I gave that lecture in November 2016 at the Collège des Écossais in Paris. Jacques Leruez was very interested in the topic and more specifically in the various movements of resistance against the Highland Clearances that were most of the time led by women of the Highlands. We had a long conversation about the fact that it was the women of the Highlands and not the men who stood against the people who were in charge of evicting them. That's why I thought that an article dealing with another aspect of my research about gender issues, the social control implemented by the Glasgow authorities over prostitutes at the end of the nineteenth century, would have interested Jacques Leruez.

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2. Parliamentary Papers, Report from the Select Committee on the Contagious Diseases Acts, [Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland] vol. IX, civ, 1882 (hereafter Report, 1882), pp. 372-373. 3. Judith Walkowitz, Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class and the State (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 32. 4. Ibid., p. 32. 5. See Eric Trudgill, Madonnas and Magdalens : The Origins and Development of Victorian Sexual Attitudes (London, Heinemann, 1976), p. 111 ; Trevor Fisher, Prostitution and the Victorians (Stroud, Sutton, 1997), p. 29; Judith Walkowitz, op. cit., p. 32. 6. Quoted in Linda Mahood, ‘The Wages of Sin: Women, Work and Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century’, pp. 29-48, in Eleanor Gordon and Esther Breitenbach (eds.), The World is Ill Divided (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1990), p. 32. 7. William Tait, Magdalenism, An Inquiry into the Extent, Causes and Consequences of Prostitution in Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1840), p. 1. 8. William Greg, The Great Sin of Great Cities (London, 1853), p. 11. 9. Ralph Wardlaw, Lectures on Female Prostitution: its Nature, Effects, Guilt, Causes, and Remedy (Glasgow, 1842), p. 43. 10. Two other laws were passed in 1866 and 1869. 11. Parliamentary Papers, Report from the Select Committee on the Contagious Diseases Acts, [Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland] Vol. VIII, xiv, 1881 (hereafter, Report, 1881), pp. 370-1. 12. Glasgow Magdalene Institution, Annual Report [Glasgow, Mitchell Library], (hereafter GMI, Report), 1862, p. 4. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. GMI, Report, 1865, p. 11. 16. GMI, Report, 1863, p. 9. 17. GMI, Report, 1878, p. 9. 18. Some of the women spent less than two years in the institution. The report of 1865 indicates that a young woman left the institution after eight months only and that another was allowed to go back to her family after a year and a half. (GMI, Report, 1865, appendix A) 19. GMI, Report 1884, p. 15. 20. GMI, Report 1878, p. 14. 21. Ibid. 22. GMI, Report 1884, p. 13. 23. GMI, Report 1878, p. 14. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid., p. 16. 26. GMI, Report 1889, p. 15. 27. GMI, Report, 1884, p. 15. 28. GMI, Report 1889, p. 12. 29. Thomas Martin Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2000, [1999] (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2000), p. 364. 30. Ibid., p. 30. 31. GMI, Report 1878, p. 14. 32. GMI, Report 1884, p. 15. 33. GMI, Report 1889, p. 13. 34. Ibid., p. 13. 35. GMI, Report, 1878, p. 15. 36. Ibid., p. 16. 37. GMI, Report, 1863, p. 14. 38. Report, 1881, question 7616.

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39. GMI, Report, 1863, p. 8. 40. See Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir (Paris, Gallimard, 1975). 41. Quoted in Stéfan Leclercq (ed.), Abécédaire de Michel Foucault (Mons, Sils Maria, 2004), p. 70. “Hospitals, asylums, factories, workshops with their discipline and finally prisons, all those places are part of a kind of big social structure of power that was put in place at the beginning of the nineteenth century.” 42. Jean Philippe Cazier in Stéfan Leclercq (ed.), Abécédaire, p. 42. “Locking up offenders amounts to including them in a coercive network of surveillance and control that individualizes them and fixes them to bring them into subjection”. 43. Stéfan Leclercq in Stéfan Leclercq (ed.), Abécédaire, pp. 152-153. “The term control contains two notions: first encircling or confinement and second management or guidance of objects. Thanks to control the object of power is controlled and ordered. The pattern belongs to a program; it is neither spontaneous nor improvised. This program of control develops through knowledge or through a selection of knowledge that is detained by power. […] Power selects knowledge and what is taught is first a productive part of that knowledge […] Thus through knowledge there is a process of confinement of thought, a conditioning of the individual as producer or worker and as reproducer of ongoing meaning.” 44. See Pierre Bourdieu, Langage et Pouvoir Symbolique [1991] (Paris, Seuil, 2001). 45. See for example Pierre Bourdieu, Questions de Sociologie [1984 (Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit, 2002), pp. 133-137 ; Pierre Bourdieu, Langage, op. cit., pp. 22-27 ; Pierre Bourdieu, La Domination Masculine [1998] (Paris, Seuil, 2002), pp. 41-53. 46. GMI, Report 1863, p. 5. 47. GMI, Report, 1878, pp. 8-9. 48. GMI, Minutes of the General Board of Directors, 25 November 1873. 49. Report, 1882, p. lvii. 50. GMI, Report, 1862, pp. 5-6. 51. GMI, Report, 1878.

ABSTRACTS

The Contagious Diseases Acts that were passed in the 1860s to protect the army and the navy from venereal diseases represented the first real attempt of the British government to control and regulate prostitution in Great Britain. Although Glasgow was a garrison town, the laws were never applied there, as the town developed its own system to fight prostitution, the “Glasgow system”. From the early 1870s onwards three different institutions combined their efforts to try to eradicate the “great social evil”: the police, the Lock Hospital, whose mission was to cure venereally diseased prostitutes, and the Magdalene Institution, where prostitutes underwent a process of moral purification. This paper examines the role of the Glasgow Magdalene Institution as an instrument of social control and analyses the content and the function of the former inmates’ letters that were published in the annual reports of the Magdalene Institution. These letters always gave a most positive image of the Institution and tended to demonstrate the efficiency of the system in terms of moral rehabilitation. But the organisation, the structure, the vocabulary as well as the content of the letters are so similar that they seem to testify more to the moral and didactic purpose of the directors of the institution than to the spontaneous and natural expression of their authors.

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These letters, which were diverted from their primary function — the private sphere –, fitted in the Glasgow Magdalene Institution’s entire strategy that was primarily aimed at resocializing the women who had sinned and at imposing a moral model that actually stifled more than encouraged personal development.

Les lois sur les maladies contagieuses qui furent votées dans les années 1860 afin de protéger les soldats et les marins des maladies vénériennes constituent la première tentative de gouvernement britannique de contrôler et de réguler la prostitution en Grande-Bretagne. Bien que Glasgow fût une ville de garnison, les lois n’y furent jamais appliquées, la ville ayant mis au point son propre système pour lutter contre la prostitution, le « système de Glasgow ». À partir des années 1870, trois institutions joignirent leurs efforts pour éradiquer le « grand mal social ». : la police, l’hôpital Lock, qui avait pour mission de soigner les femmes atteintes de maladies vénériennes et la Magdalene Institution, chargée de la purification morale des prostituées. Le présent article a comme ambition d’étudier le rôle de la Glasgow Magdalene Institution en tant qu’instrument de contrôle social et se propose d’analyser le contenu et la fonction des lettres de prostituées qui furent publiées dans les rapports annuels de l’Institution. Ces lettres avaient comme objectif de démontrer l’efficacité du système comme outil de réhabilitation morale. Cependant, l’organisation, la structure, le lexique utilisé de même que le contenu des lettres présentent de fortes similitudes, ce qui laisse à penser que ces lettres témoignent avant tout des intentions morales et didactiques des responsables de l’Institution davantage que d’une expression spontanée et naturelle de leurs auteurs. Ces lettres, détournées de leur fonction initiale, la sphère privée, s’intégraient dans la stratégie de l’Institution qui visait en premier lieu à resocialiser les femmes qui avaient péché et à imposer un modèle moral qui étouffait tout développement personnel.

INDEX

Mots-clés: Glasgow, Magdalene Institution, prostitution, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault Keywords: Glasgow, Magdalene Institution, prostitution, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault

AUTHOR

CHRISTIAN AUER Professeur Émérite, Université de Strasbourg, EA 2325 SEARCH, Savoirs dans l’Espace Anglophone, Représentations, Culture, Histoire. Christian AUER, Agrégé de l’Université, Professeur Émérite à l’Université de Strasbourg, est spécialiste de civilisation britannique. Il travaille principalement sur les aspects économiques, politiques, sociaux et culturels de l’Ecosse au XIXe siècle. Il est l’auteur de nombreux articles et de plusieurs ouvrages dont Scotland and the Scots 1707-2007 A Reader (Strasbourg, Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2013) et Luttes et résistances des femmes écossaises, 1838-1915 (Paris, L’Harmattan, Collection des idées et des femmes, 2013).

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Comptes-rendus Book Reviews

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Compte rendu de l’ouvrage L’Éveil du dragon gallois de Stéphanie Bory

Moya Jones

RÉFÉRENCE

Stéphanie Bory, L’Éveil du dragon gallois : D'une assemblée à un parlement pour le pays de Galles (1997-2017), Paris, L'Harmattan, 2019, 360 pages.

Plus de vingt ans après la dévolution des pouvoirs au Royaume-Uni, les changements constitutionnels et la création de l’Assemblée galloise, cet ouvrage propose un examen synthétique et critique de cette nouvelle instance de gouvernance territoriale au Royaume-Uni. La dévolution est un processus assez différent des modèles adoptés dans d’autres pays européens, et l'originalité de cet ouvrage se trouve dans la lumière mise sur un des piliers principaux de la nouvelle politique au pays de Galles, à savoir la défense de l'environnement et le développement durable. L'auteur examine comment les élus de l'Assemblée utilisent la thématique environnementale pour positionner le pays de Galles au plan régional, national et mondial afin de contribuer à la construction d'une identité galloise résolument moderne. Rédigé dans un style agréable et clair, l’organisation de l’ouvrage suit une logique claire. Il comprend trois parties, divisées en chapitres. La première relie les premières idées de dévolution à la prise de conscience nationaliste et environnementale provoquée par certains événements clés, et termine avec la création de l'Assemblée et les premières élections en 1998. La deuxième partie traite des débuts de l'Assemblée et la définition des projets nationaux. A travers les politiques environnementales, les gouvernements successifs ont porté les ambitions galloises au niveau international. La troisième partie expose les failles et les limites de ces projets et examine les différents choix offerts au pays de Galles en politique énergétique, ainsi que les relations entre les partis politiques à ce sujet. La conclusion, optimiste mais réaliste, résume bien le chemin parcouru par le pays de Galles avant, et surtout après, la mise en place de l'Assemblée.

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La bibliographie est très complète. Il y a également une liste des sigles employés en politique britannique et galloise etc. qui s'avère très utile, ainsi que quatre annexes (composition de différents gouvernements gallois,...) qui sont un bon complément à l'ouvrage. L'originalité et l'intérêt de cet ouvrage se reposent sur sa contribution au champ pluridisciplinaire des "environmental studies" car il relie la question de l'environnement aux sujets de science politique, aux problématiques d'histoire, de sociologie et d'identité nationale La deuxième qualité de l’ouvrage se trouve dans sa contribution originale aux études galloises. C'est un outil d'information et de recherche très précieux car il existe peu d'ouvrages de cette qualité, surtout en français, accessible à tous ceux susceptibles de s'intéresser au pays de Galles. De plus, il représente incontestablement une contribution importante aux débats actuels sur l’impact de la dévolution. C’est donc un ouvrage susceptible d’intéresser les universitaires et les étudiants, surtout ceux dans les filières politiques, historiques et anglicistes. Il attirera l'intérêt des acteurs et observateurs dans les milieux politiques ainsi que tous ceux qui s’intéressent aux questions de l'environnement et de la gouvernance territoriale Tous y trouveront les solutions originales proposés au Royaume-Uni et surtout au pays de Galles. L’Assemblée galloise s’est construite une véritable identité au fil des ans, marquant sa distance avec le pouvoir central du Parlement à Westminster et affirmant sa différence par le biais de sa politique environnementale. L’ouvrage de Stéphanie Bory propose une progression logique et cohérente couvrant tous les aspects importants du sujet. Il constitue ainsi un apport important à la réflexion sur des débats d’actualité, celui de la dévolution et celui de l'environnement.

AUTEURS

MOYA JONES Professeure émérite de civilisation britannique, Université Bordeaux Montaigne

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Review of British Broadcasting and the Public-Private Dichotomy by Simon Dawes

Lucie de Carvalho

REFERENCES

Simon Dawes, British Broadcasting and the Public-Private Dichotomy: Neoliberalism, Citizenship and the Public Sphere, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

1 The private-public dichotomy has been an object of intense scholarly scrutiny over the past fifty years, especially since the structural changes triggered by the expansion of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s. While a fair amount of research has been conducted on this question in fields such as political science and social sciences, studies in political philosophy have been scarcer. British Broadcasting and the Public-Private Dichotomy partakes in this enduring conceptual debate and questions its methodological relevance by applying it to the British broadcasting sector. This book is intended for anyone interested in regulation and the tensions around the permeable and elusive boundary between what is sometimes narrowly described as the ‘public v. the private sector’ binary. Understanding the stakes of broadcasting regulation means questioning not only the social, political and economic functions of the state and of broadcasting actors, but also their relationship to the public. Using the role of the state and of its relations with the private sector as the broader analytical window is indeed fundamental in so far as, as the author puts it, ‘the mass media communications sector lies in both the role it plays in organising the symbolic world […] and in its link between the economic structures and cultural formations of modern capitalist societies.’ (p. 70).

2 Simon Dawes takes a rather original approach, by elaborating on the genealogical perspective framed by Michel Foucault in order to engage with theoretical and methodological debates in media studies. The aim is to grasp the discursive dynamics of

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power and control at work behind broadcasting regulation. In other words, Dawes’s work partakes in the ongoing reappraisal of the importance of Michel Foucault’s criticism of neoliberal power and knowledge structures which is currently taking place in the English-speaking academic world (the Anglo-Foucauldians).

3 Drawing on this perspective, the author discusses and assesses the relevance of the theoretical and methodological concepts that have traditionally been used in academic research to analyse broadcasting regulation: ‘public service’, ‘citizenship’, and ‘public sphere’. Like a set of Russian dolls, these fundamental conceptual viewpoints are then articulated with those of political participation, consumerism, choice, and competition, which help delineate ‘public control’. Since the study of broadcasting cuts across a number of academic lines, Dawes navigates around and draws on several and complementary intellectual traditions ranging from political philosophy (Kant, Hegel, Foucault, for example) to sociology (Habermas, Marshall, Williams, among others) or critical discourse analysis (Mouffe, for instance).

4 The book offers one of the most up-to-date and comprehensive literature reviews of major scholars’ works on broadcasting, starting with the key notion of ‘public’ as both a noun (‘the public’) and a modifier (‘public interest’, ‘public sector’). The author aims to ‘problematise’ the ‘public’ as an analytical object, in order to investigate the complexity that lurks behind such seemingly transparent concepts. More specifically, the analysis takes on the almost hackneyed concept of ‘public sphere’ coined by Habermas in order to reveal its weaknesses and the way in which it became a tool for scholars to buttress their take on broadcasting regulation. Similarly, Dawes does not only define these concepts or show that they are far from being ‘vague notions’ (p. 90), he tackles their inherent ambiguities meticulously, and the ways they have been construed, championed, challenged, contested, discarded, or reappraised by scholars. The notion of ‘critique’ in the intellectual sense really is the cornerstone of Dawes’s research.

5 Yet, his fundamental interest is not only to take stock of the theoretical debates which have been raging since the 1980s, but also to articulate a political statement, by advocating for a reappraisal of the UK policies on media regulation using this Foucauldian perspective.

6 Moreover, this book makes a most impressive contribution to the ever-evolving literature on neoliberalism. In an attempt to somehow ‘depoliticise’ or ‘de-reify’ this concept, Dawes indeed demonstrates that neoliberalism should neither be dismissed swiftly nor used as a monolithic framework, and that it cannot be boiled down to simplistic oppositions, be they between the state and markets or between citizens and consumers. On the contrary, it needs to be approached and deconstructed as an essentially protean discursive process, ‘neoliberalisation’. What this book attempts to capture are the fundamental tensions between the collective and the individual. Analysing broadcasting regulation opens inroads into the intricacies of free speech and the freedom of the press, on which all pluralist and deliberative democracies should rest.

7 As regards structure, the book is divided into four somewhat unbalanced parts. The Foucauldian non-chronological approach is defined and the need for a general rethinking of the broadcasting theoretical traditions is justified in the first part (chapters 1 and 2).

8 In Part Two, Dawes not only offers a critical overview of Habermas’s seminal public sphere theory and of its limitations, he also traces its historical roots back in time

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(chapter 3). Chapter 4 and chapter 5 explore how citizenship, consumption, and neoliberalism have been used – or misused – in recent broadcasting literature. By addressing the divide between politics and economics, these chapters help grasp the elusive and ever-shifting figure of the consumers and citizens. They interrogate the limits of T.S. Marshall’s citizenship theory in the sense that it has undermined the scope of citizens’ political participation (Chapter 4), and demonstrate how the concepts of citizenship and consumption have been construed in broadcasting discourses and thus need to be transcended. Finally, Dawes successfully anchors this critical discussion of the consumer-citizen binary in a detailed overview of recent literature on neoliberalism, praising the analytical interest of the Anglo-Foucauldian governmentality approach, which enables scholars to historicise this key object of study. Neoliberalism thus becomes an instrument of power and active component of public policy (Chapter 5).

9 Once this preliminary definitional work is done, Dawes then tackles how the above concepts have shaped scholarly debates on broadcasting regulation in the UK (Part Three) and focusses on the problematisation of the rationale underpinning them. Chapter 6 addresses the ‘public control v. private enterprise’ dichotomy, thus furthering the book’s exploration of what the phrases ‘public interest’ and ‘public value’ have actually entailed. Chapter 7 takes a rather different take on regulation by focussing on the way policymakers’ discourses have constructed the rise of ‘consumer sovereignty’, which has in turn been alternatively politicised and depoliticised. Finally, Dawes shifts his standpoint by questioning the interest of the concept of monopoly as a defining parameter to characterise public services, especially given that competition has gained political and intellectual credence since the neoliberal turn of the 1980s.

10 In Part Four, the author really hits the heart of his research project: the public – private dichotomy, as the book takes a more decisively prescriptive turn to provide new impetus for future research on public media models. The intellectual value of neoliberalism and citizenship as key concepts is first advocated (chapter 8). A similar direction is defended in the following chapter, which encourages future scholars to transcend the traditional opposition between social and political citizenship, in order to embrace less exclusive analytical categories. By looking at political participation and the process of individualisation, Chapter 10 also calls for moving beyond the ‘active- passive’, ‘citizen-consumer’ binary. It promotes the use of an alternative conceptual tool, ‘the voice’. The voice is defined as a process to pin down the way neoliberalism has reshaped the very concept of citizenship and the spaces conducive to claiming new rights or defending sometimes contradictory interests. The last binary to be reassessed is the bidimensional state v. market nexus (Chapter 11). Yet, Dawes advocates for retaining the private-public binary, provided that the general reappraisal of the concepts of citizens and the public sphere and the reconfiguration of ‘neoliberalisation’ as a process he outlined in the previous chapters be taken on board.

11 Through this far-reaching and thorough exploration of theoretical debates, Dawes successfully helps his readers navigate an intricate conceptual and methodological ecosystem. Here, the author has built a solid case in favour of Foucault’s genealogical perspective without shying away from addressing and answering its detractors.

12 Yet, the extreme wealth of the theoretical apparatus demonstrated also gives rise to the three major limits of the book. Firstly, and conversely to what the title could suggest, this book is not a political or sociological analysis of public-private tensions in

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a specific case study. Therefore, this book is not necessarily suited for readers looking for a historical narrative of the evolution of the UK broadcasting sector, which actually takes a back seat throughout the whole book. Moreover, in his ambitious attempt to provide a most comprehensive and detailed account of the relevant scholarly debates, the author somehow fails to make his own voice clearly heard, except in the last three chapters. Finally, the conceptual complexity of this historiographical work means that readers will most likely need to be well versed in Foucault’s work and in media study theories to fully grasp Dawes’s demonstration.

13 This being said, Simon Dawes’s book is a fundamentally original, rich, and impressive genealogical work, which provides precious insight in a fifty-year intellectual history of broadcasting regulation in the UK. Between its lines emerges a rare, intellectually- daring, and historicised definition of the British broadcasting culture.

AUTHORS

LUCIE DE CARVALHO Maître de conférence en civilisation britannique, Université de Lille, CECILLE

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Compte-rendu de Portraits of Violence : War and the Aesthetics of Disfigurement de Suzannah Biernoff

Sophie Sibson

RÉFÉRENCE

Biernoff, Suzannah. Portraits of Violence : War and the Aesthetics of Disfigurement, Ann Arbor, Michigan : University of Michigan Press, 2017.

1 Suzannah Biernoff est actuellement maître de conférences en culture visuelle et contemporaine à Birkbeck, Université de Londres. Son domaine de recherche concerne l’histoire du corps et du visage, parallèlement aux cultures visuelles, à travers les périodes médiévales et modernes.

2 « Tout le monde voit quelque chose de différent » (p3). 1 Voici ce qu’explore le livre de Suzannah Biernoff : Portraits of Violence : War and the Aesthetics of Disfigurement. Biernoff se concentre sur la culture visuelle et l’expérience des blessés de guerre.

3 L’auteur se penche sur la représentation des blessés de la face à travers une étude de la culture visuelle et non de l’art en tant que tel (p5). Biernoff inclut donc des objets visuels non artistiques (photographies médicales, coupures de journaux, moules de masques) mais les réactions de la population face aux blessés, défigurés, ou corps handicapés sont également étudiées (p5).

4 L’ouvrage se compose de cinq chapitres. Le premier est basé sur des photographies de soldats blessés de notre époque, afin d’examiner les conventions et les limites de portraits comme médiateurs des conséquences atroces de la guerre. Le deuxième chapitre analyse la stigmatisation du défigurement durant la Grande Guerre. À travers les chapitres III et IV, Biernoff analyse les photos et dessins de défigurés de la Première Guerre. Elle note ainsi le lien étroit entre illustrations médicales et portraits. Bien que ces œuvres ne fussent jamais conçues pour être exposées au public de l’époque, elles

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mettent en perspective le lien entre la science et l’art, la beauté et l’horreur. Le chapitre V est un retour au présent avec une étude sur la résurrection digitale d’un patient de Gillies2 dans le jeu vidéo Bioshock3. À travers ce chapitre Biernoff étudie la signification des représentations historiques dans l’art contemporain et digital.

5 Pour Biernoff, le défigurement devient un problème moral ou esthétique dans les yeux de l’autre. Afin de défendre ce point de vue, elle embarque le lecteur à travers différentes périodes allant de la Grande Guerre jusqu’à aujourd’hui, dans une exploration approfondie de photographies, de dessins et de peintures de soldats défigurés.

6 Dans notre société actuelle, la photographie est un des éléments clés dans la communication du conflit. En effet, à travers un portrait, nous pouvons mesurer la violence d’un conflit, en ressentir la souffrance (p37). Cependant est-ce que notre définition de la beauté s’en trouve modifiée ? À travers une étude de travaux d’artistes actuels tels que le photographe anglais Stuart Griffiths4 et la photographe Nina Berman, 5 établie à New York, Suzannah Biernoff conclut que quand le visage d’une personne est altéré ou caché, quand l’image renvoyée par le visage est celle d’un traumatisme plus que celle d’une émotion, alors le portrait de cette personne perd de son identité aux yeux du public (p54).

7 Lorsque nous revenons à l’époque de la Grande Guerre, nous voyons que le défiguré est quasiment totalement absent de la sphère artistique visuelle en Grande-Bretagne (p56). Biernoff argumente que la raison de cela provient du fait que le soldat défiguré représentait un problème aux yeux du public car, contrairement aux amputés, le défiguré avait perdu toute humanité. L’auteur note alors l’importance de l’art dans le processus d’humanisation du défiguré, notamment à travers la création de masques. Cependant, il est difficile de connaître le réel impact de cet élan d’humanité sur les soldats eux-mêmes, ni même de savoir s’ils portaient effectivement leur masque ou encore s’ils furent réellement soulagés de leur apparence après quantité de chirurgies plastiques. Quant aux dessins biens connus produits par Henry Tonks6, Suzannah Biernoff souligne qu’ils furent créés dans un but médical et artistique. Par conséquent, il est extrêmement difficile de les interpréter clairement (p137). On peut dire que Biernoff a parfaitement mis en avant l’étroite relation entre l’histoire médicale et l’histoire de l’art. En effet, des dessins de Tonks émanent une certaine intimité mais aussi un recul médical qui rend le dessin dénué d’émotion7.

8 Par ailleurs, Biernoff évoque un sujet qui, bien que déjà évoqué dans d’autres œuvres, mériterait une étude approfondie : la différence de perception du défiguré en France et en Angleterre. Pendant la Grande Guerre, environ 40 % du contingent français furent blessés et entre 11 et 14 % de ces derniers furent touchés au visage. Près de 15 000 grands blessés de la face furent hospitalisés8. En France, des représentants des soldats défigurés furent présents lors de la signature du Traité de Versailles, ce qui, selon Biernoff, montre que les défigurés étaient gérés de manière collective (p113).

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De gauche à droite : Eugène Hébert, Henri Agogué, Pierre Richard, Albert Jugon, André Cavalier. Les 5 « gueules cassées » présentes lors de la signature du Traité de Versailles. Gelly, Georges. "Appel en faveur du foyer des Gueules cassées." (Paris : Société régionale d'imprimerie et de la publicité, 1926), p. 5.

9 Alors que nous pouvons considérer cette présence comme un acte positif, mettant à l’honneur ces hommes qui ont défendu leur pays, Andrew Bamji9 adopte une vision plus négative. Il considère cela comme une exposition à l’intention des vaincus afin de leur montrer les conséquences de "leur guerre". Pour lui, si effectivement il n’y avait pas d’associations telles que les "Blessés de la Face" en Angleterre, cela venait du fait que les vétérans n’en ressentaient pas le besoin. Il affirme que le bon traitement des soldats défigurés à Sidcup, le suivi personnalisé des chirurgiens de chaque homme, les liens forts tissés entre les patients, les différents soins apportés aux soldats sur le site, sont tous des facteurs qui ont éliminé la nécessité de former une association pour venir en aide à ces hommes10. Même si fondamentalement les défigurés de guerre français comme anglais furent confrontés aux mêmes difficultés de réinsertion, force est de constater que ces derniers étaient beaucoup plus montrés dans l’espace public en France qu’en Grande-Bretagne.

10 Selon Biernoff, deux facteurs rentrent en jeu dans la perception horrifique de la défiguration par le peuple britannique. La première est que les images de sacrifice s’étaient toujours concentrées sur le visage comme symbole de pureté et de courage. Le deuxième facteur serait, selon Biernoff, la peur permanente de la syphilis qui était encore une malade incurable, associée à des lésions et difformités faciales. Une comparaison détaillée de la culture visuelle de ces deux pays face à ses défigurés pourrait être un élément clé dans la compréhension de l’attitude de chacun à la vue d’un visage défiguré.

11 Suzannah Biernoff n’insiste pas sur le sujet de la masculinité des années 1900, qui est dans un certain sens toujours présent dans notre société actuelle. Le lecteur aurait envie de lire davantage sur sa propre analyse de l’influence des idéaux masculins de l’époque sur la perception de la défiguration. Elle cite cependant à plusieurs reprises

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Dismembering The Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War 11de Joanna Bourke, mais note que les blessures de la face restent un sujet souvent mis à l’écart des discussions autour de la masculinité et des souffrances. Cette œuvre amène le lecteur à réfléchir à la définition de la beauté et à son impact sur autrui.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Bamji, Andrew. Faces From the Front. (Solihull : Helion and Company, 2017).

Biernoff, Suzannah. Portraits of Violence : War and the Aesthetics of Disfigurement. (Ann Arbor, Michigan : University of Michigan Press, 2017).

Bourke, Joanna. Dismembering the Male : Men’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War. (Londres : Reaktion Books, 1996).

Messager, Danielle. Les "gueules cassées", pionniers sans visage de la médecine moderne. 26 octobre 2017. [20 avril 2019]

Tonks, Henry. "The Tonks Pastels." Gillies archives.

[13 août 2019]

NOTES

1. "Everyone sees something different." 2. Sir Harold Gillies (1882-1960) né en Nouvelle-Zélande mais ayant vécu à Londres est considéré comme le père fondateur de la chirurgie plastique moderne. Il exerça successivement à l’hôpital d’Aldershot puis au Queen Mary’s Hospital de Sidcup qui ferma ses portes aux défigurés en 1925. 3. Jeu vidéo de tir à la première personne sorti en 2007. 4. Stuart Griffiths, né en 1972 à Manchester est un ancien soldat britannique maintenant photographe. Son premier livre The Myth of the Airborne Warrior fut publié en 2011 puis son deuxième Pigs Disco en 2013. 5. Nina Berman, née en 1960 à New York est une photographe documentaire américaine. Elle a publié trois livres Purple Hearts – Back from Iraq (2004), Homeland (2008) dont une autobiographie An Autobiography of Miss Wish (2017). 6. Henry Tonks (1862-1937) était un chirurgien britannique qui plus tard devint peintre et caricaturiste. Il est notamment connu pour ses dessins de soldats défigurés. 7. Tonks, Henry. "The Tonks Pastels." Gillies archives. [13 Août 2019] 8. Messager, Danielle. Les "gueules cassées", pionniers sans visage de la médecine moderne. 26 Octobre 2017. [20 Avril 2019] 9. Andrew Bamji a travaillé en tant que médecin conseil en rhumatologie et réhabilitation à l’hôpital de Queen Mary à Sidcup de 1983 à 2011. Depuis 1989, Andrew Bamji s’intéresse aux dossiers médicaux des sections britanniques et néo-zélandaises qui travaillaient à Sidcup durant

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la Grande Guerre. Ces 2 500 dossiers font partie des seules archives cliniques de ce conflit, elles incluent des notes chirurgicales, des diagrammes, des radios et des aquarelles. 10. Bamji, Andrew. Faces From the Front. (Solihull: Helion and Company , 2017), p. 114. 11. Bourke, Joanna. Dismembering the Male : Men’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War. (Londres: Reaktion Books, 1996).

AUTEURS

SOPHIE SIBSON Doctorante, travaillant sous la direction de John Mullen, Université de Rouen-Normandie

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