Landinfo Report Afghanistan Taliban's Organization and Structure

Report Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure Report by Dr. Antonio Giustozzi for Landinfo Report Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure LANDINFO – 23 AUGUST 2017 1 About Landinfo’s reports The Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre, Landinfo, is an independent body within the Norwegian Immigration Authorities. Landinfo provides country of origin information to the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (Utlendingsdirektoratet – UDI), the Immigration Appeals Board (Utlendingsnemnda – UNE) and the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security. Reports produced by Landinfo are based on information from carefully selected sources. The information is researched and evaluated in accordance with common methodology for processing COI and Landinfo’s internal guidelines on source and information analysis. To ensure balanced reports, efforts are made to obtain information from a wide range of sources. Many of our reports draw on findings and interviews conducted on fact-finding missions. All sources used are referenced. Sources hesitant to provide information to be cited in a public report have retained anonymity. The reports do not provide exhaustive overviews of topics or themes, but cover aspects relevant for the processing of asylum and residency cases. Country of origin information presented in Landinfo’s reports does not contain policy recommendations nor does it reflect official Norwegian views. *** This report by Dr. Antonio Giustozzi is commissioned by Landinfo. The content of the report is solely the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of The Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre. © Landinfo 2017 The material in this report is covered by copyright law. Any reproduction or publication of this report or any extract thereof other than as permitted by current Norwegian copyright law requires the explicit written consent of Landinfo. For information on all of the reports published by Landinfo, please contact: Landinfo Country of Origin Information Centre Storgata 33A P.O. Box 8108 Dep NO-0032 Oslo Norway Tel: +47 23 30 94 70 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.landinfo.no Report Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure LANDINFO – 23 AUGUST 2017 2 SAMMENDRAG Organiseringen av Taliban har aldri vært sentralisert, men har blitt stadig mer fragmentert fra 2007 og fremover. Den opprinnelige politiske ledelsen som var samlet i Quetta-shuraen har kjempet for å beholde kontrollen over sine ‘regionale kommandoer’ over Miran Shah, Peshawar og Mashhad. Innenfor Quetta-shuraen har interne maktkamper truet med å undergrave samhørighet siden 2010, og på et tidspunkt ble shuraen delt i fraksjoner som nektet å samarbeide med hverandre. Per 2017 hadde Taliban allikevel vokst til en stor organisasjon, med et variert militærapparat og en omfattende styringsstruktur. Mens fragmenteringen har vedvart, har Talibans forskjellige shuraer begynt å utvikle seg i ulike retninger; noen er mer militaristiske enn andre, for eksempel, og noen er mer sentraliserte enn andre. Selv spørsmålet om forsoning med Kabul har blitt sett på med svært forskjellige øyne av de ulike shuraene. Fragmenteringen av Taliban er i stor grad forårsaket av skjevheter i regionens finansieringskilder, og vil derfor sannsynligvis fortsette i overskuelig fremtid. SUMMARY Never centralised, the organisation of the Taliban became increasingly fragmented from 2007 onwards. The original political leadership gathered in the Quetta Shura struggled to maintain control over its ‘regional commands’ of Miran Shah, Peshawar and Mashhad. Within the Quetta Shura itself from 2010 onwards internal power struggles undermine cohesiveness and at a time the Quetta Shura openly split into factions, which refused to collaborate with each other. By 2017 the Taliban had nonetheless grown into a huge organisation, with a diversified military apparatus and a widespread governance structure. As fragmentation persisted, the different Shuras of the Taliban started evolving through somewhat separated paths: some more militaristic than others, for example, or some more centralised than others. Even the issue of reconciliation with Kabul was viewed very differently by the different shuras. To a large extent Taliban fragmentation is due to incompatible sources of funding in the region, and is therefore likely to persist in the foreseeable future. Report Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure LANDINFO – 23 AUGUST 2017 3 CONTENTS 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 5 2. Main structure – the different shuras and their areas of responsibility ....... 5 2.1 Map 1: Strength of the Taliban shuras by region ................................................... 7 2.2 Figure 1: The Taliban’s shuras and their interaction at leadership level ................ 9 3. Taliban fragmentation ....................................................................................... 9 4. The size of the Taliban ..................................................................................... 12 5. The shadow structure ...................................................................................... 14 6. Command and control ..................................................................................... 16 7. Taliban’s relationship with locals ................................................................... 18 8. Negotiations with Kabul .................................................................................. 20 9. Conclusion: Trends in Taliban organizational evolution ............................. 21 Report Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure LANDINFO – 23 AUGUST 2017 4 1. INTRODUCTION This report aims at providing a concise picture of how the Taliban are organized. It also provides a short assessment of the Taliban’s strength and geographical spread, as well as of their internal politics. In order to facilitate the navigation to the users, the report is structured into sections dedicated to the different aspects of the Taliban’s structure, from their membership and to their politics. The report is largely based on extensive research carried out previously, mostly in 2013-17; no additional research work has been carried out specifically for the purpose of writing it. Public domain sources have been used when available, but they contain very little up-do-date information on Taliban organization and internal politics. The report as such relies heavily on oral sources (primarily face to face interviews and also telephone contacts), mostly Taliban and community elders living in Taliban influenced areas. What is happening in remote areas of the country and inside the Taliban’s safe havens in Pakistan and Iran remains difficult to assess fully. Much of the information utilised might therefore be partial, even if the author has tried to be as balanced as possible and has cast a critical eye on all sources utilised. Over the years the author has carried out (and still carries out) extensive research on the Taliban and other insurgent movements. Some of the output of this research has been published, some is in the process of being published and some might never be published. All of it has been taken into consideration for the preparation of this report. 2. MAIN STRUCTURE – THE DIFFERENT SHURAS AND THEIR AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY In Taliban’s system, shuras are representative organs and commissions, departments and offices are executive ones. Theoretically at the top of the Taliban’s structure is the Amir al Muminin (supposedly Mullah Omar until 2015), who however never played a real leadership role until 2015. With the controversial succession of Akhtar Mohammad Mansur to Mullah Omar in the summer of 2015, the Amir al Muminin was finally a real leader and not a ghostly presence, but at the same time large portions of the Taliban refused to acknowledge Mansur as Amir al Muminin on grounds of his rigging of the party congress that selected him. The same has applied to Haibatullah Akhund when he succeeded to Mansur in May 2016, selected by a small clique of leaders. For all intents and purposes, therefore, the Amir al Muminin from 2015 has become a source of division and controversy, rather than a unifying figure. The Taliban no longer have a figure around whom they all unite.1 In practice the leaderships of the different shuras are the highest authorities within the Taliban, in terms of formal power. Denominations such as ‘Quetta Shura’ or ‘Shura of 1 Barnett Rubin, ‘Turmoil in the Taliban’, The New Yorker, July 31, 2015; Frederic Grare ‘Mission Not Accomplished’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 05, 2015 (http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/08/05/mission-not-accomplished-pub-60950); Nick Robins-Early, ‘What Becomes Of The Taliban After Mullah Omar’s Death? An expert describes challenges for the militants’ new leader’, Huffington Post, 1 August 2015; Theo Farrell and Michael Semple, ‘Ready for Peace? The Afghan Taliban after a Decade of War’, RUSI, Briefing Paper, January 2017. Report Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure LANDINFO – 23 AUGUST 2017 5 the North’ refer to the councils that preside over different Taliban organizations, but are also used to indicate the entire organization subordinated to each shura. So Quetta Shura for example is a shorthand for the Rahbari Shura (Leadership Council), but also for the commissions, offices, and armed groups that operate under the nominal authority of

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