Kevin Dougherty. The Peninsula Campaign of 1862: A Military Analysis. Michael Moore. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2005. ix + 183 pp. $45.00, cloth, ISBN 978-1-57806-752-7.
Reviewed by Bruce Tap
Published on H-CivWar (August, 2007)
Although not as popular as such major Civil Manassas Junction in Virginia, McClellan would War battles as Gettysburg, Antietam, or Freder‐ initiate a turning movement, transporting Union icksburg, the Peninsula Campaign has attracted forces from Annapolis, Maryland, via the Chesa‐ the attention of a number Civil War and military peake Bay, to Urbanna, Virginia on the Rappahan‐ historians in the last several years. In addition to nock River. From there, it was a quick march to the work of Stephen Sears, both Thomas Rowland Richmond. If Confederate forces under Joseph and Ethan Rafuse have written major works on Johnston withdrew from Manassas and were able George McClellan that have dealt extensively with to occupy Richmond prior to McClellan's army, the Peninsula Campaign.[1] Although slimmer Union forces would cross to the south bank of the and far less scholarly in terms of archival sources, James River and operate against Richmond from Kevin Dougherty and J. Michael Moore provide a the south. McClellan believed his plan was faster succinct summary of the Peninsula Campaign that than the overland route and less costly because it ofers both a comprehensive treatment of the would most likely avoid dangerous frontal as‐ campaign's major battles as well as a penetrating saults--the Confederate army would probably be analysis of the signifcance of both Union and forced to attack McClellan in an efort to drive Confederate operations during this campaign. Federal forces from Richmond. What distinguishes this study from previous ones The essentials of the plan changed when is the attempt "to analyze the campaign in the Johnston withdrew his army from the Manassas context of current and enduring military doc‐ area to the Rappahannock River in early March trine" (p. viii). 1862. According to Dougherty and Moore, this As conceived by George McClellan initially, meant that Johnston would have positioned his the Peninsula Campaign (originally the Urbanna army between Union forces at Urbanna and Rich‐ plan) was an amphibious turning movement. In‐ mond. As a result, McClellan changed his plan, stead of attacking Confederate forces located at landing at Fortress Monroe, near the James River H-Net Reviews on the York-James Peninsula. After taking York‐ dangerous Confederate ironclad, Merrimack, was town, Union forces would advance to West Point. bottled up at nearby Norfolk. What was needed, Using the Richmond and York River railroad, Mc‐ the authors point out, was an informal, but never‐ Clellan would advance on Richmond and, in all theless, close collaboration based on the model of probability, initiate siege operations on the Con‐ Ulysses Grant and Andrew Foote in the western federate capital. Although Abraham Lincoln was theater; however, the personalities of both men skeptical of McClellan's plan, he was eventually prevented such collaboration. persuaded to support it. However, as the authors "Few can fault McClellan as an administrator, note, Lincoln's support was contingent on a num‐ builder of an army, or planner," the authors write. ber of conditions and the most important condi‐ "Instead, his fault lay in execution" (p. 140). In‐ tion was the requirement that Washington, D.C. be deed, two primary traits were responsible for Mc‐ furnished with enough troops to make it invulner‐ Clellan's inability to execute: his infexibility and able to a Confederate attack. his contempt for civilian authority. In a number of After providing a straightforward narrative diferent contexts, the authors point out McClel‐ of the campaign, from the fall of the Yorktown lan's infexibility. McClellan laid siege to Yorktown through the Seven Days battles and the Union re‐ because that is what he planned to do all along. treat to Harrison's Landing on the James River in He simply would not deviate from his plan, what‐ early August 1862, the authors turn to analysis ever the circumstances. A notable shortcoming re‐ and assessment. Since McClellan failed to take lated to infexibility was McClellan's failure to Richmond or destroy the Army of Northern Vir‐ plan branches, options that are built into a plan ginia, and he had his own Army of the Potomac that are dependent upon victory, defeat, or stale‐ withdrawn from the banks of the James River, the mate. As the author's note, McClellan did not in‐ campaign was an obvious failure. Why did the corporate much in the way of surprise in his oper‐ campaign fail? And how does the performance of ations. He was predictable to his core. McClellan each major commander stack up against contem‐ preferred low-risk siege operations and lacked the porary standards of command? Dougherty and fexibility to boldly maneuver or take risks based Moore ofer several sensible reasons for McClel‐ on what he thought the enemy might do. While lan's lackluster performance. For McClellan's cam‐ some of this infexibility was the result of Union paign to be successful, he needed productive col‐ weaknesses (for instance, sub-par intelligence laboration with the U.S. Navy, and particularly gathering), much of it, according to the authors, from North Atlantic Blockade Squadron comman‐ was simply the result of McClellan's training and der, Louis Goldsborough. As an amphibious oper‐ temperament. When judged against many endur‐ ation, a good working relationship with the navy ing military concepts--the element of surprise, an‐ was essential. During the Civil War, however, the ticipation, or planning branches--McClellan's gen‐ theory of unifed command or joint operations eralship was defective. was non-existent. Other than the commander-in- A by-product of his experience in Mexico, Mc‐ chief, there was no joint chiefs of staf to coordi‐ Clellan was suspicious of civilian leaders. During nate the various branches of the armed services. the Civil War, his tortured relationship with Abra‐ Hence, neither Goldsborough nor McClellan could ham Lincoln, the authors argue, contributed to his order the assistance of the other. McClellan, note failure on the Peninsula. Knowing, for instance, Dougherty and Moore, thought Goldsborough had that the President was skeptical about the Penin‐ promised him naval frepower to help reduce the sula Campaign largely because of fears about the fortifcations at Yorktown; however, Goldsbor‐ safety of Washington, D.C, McClellan did little to ough saw his only duty as making sure that the
2 H-Net Reviews relieve the president's concerns. In fact, McClellan oped a plan to trap and destroy the Union army. failed to inform Lincoln of how he had arranged Throughout the Peninsula Campaign, it was Lee troops in the Washington environs and the who dictated the time and tempo of the campaign. Shenandoah Valley to respond to a Confederate Lee, according to the authors, implemented the threat. When the Confederacy sent Thomas J. important principle of simultaneity when he ad‐ "Stonewall" Jackson into the Shenandoah to vised Jeferson Davis to send Jackson to the threaten Washington, D.C., Lincoln took the bait Shenandoah and caused Lincoln to divert McDow‐ and withheld McDowell's corps from McClellan. ell's corps from reinforcing McClellan. The only "In spite of his knowledge of Lincoln's misgivings major shortcoming that plagued Lee during the about the Peninsula Plan and fears for Washing‐ Peninsula Campaign was formulating complicated ton," Dougherty and Moore write, "McClellan re‐ attacks that could not be simultaneously imple‐ fused to take the president into this confdence mented by generals who were not experienced and give him a sense of security" (p. 64). with ofensive warfare. During the battles of Me‐ Indeed, while Lincoln's ideas of grand strate‐ chanicsville and Gaines Mill, uncharacteristic gy evolved in the spring and summer of 1862 and sluggishness by Jackson led to attacks that were would incorporate military as well as such politi‐ piecemeal and uncoordinated. In pursuing the re‐ cal and economic measures as emancipation and treating Federal army to Harrison's Landing, the confscation, McClellan clung to his narrow defni‐ attacks at Savage Station were similarly uncoordi‐ tion of the war and failed to acknowledge the po‐ nated and inefective. litical environment in which the president had to Dougherty and Moore have written a brief, operate. Not only did McClellan fail to keep his concise account of one of the major campaigns of commander-in-chief apprised of his plan early on the Civil War. Although sparse in terms of prima‐ in the war, his harsh descriptions of Lincoln and ry sources, the authors provide their readers with other cabinet ofcers demonstrate a complete a comprehensive account of the campaign and lack of subordination to civilian authority. Ac‐ solid analysis that judges the campaign according cording to Dougherty and Moore, McClellan did to the maxims of contemporary military doctrine. not exercise the military doctrine of objective that Although an efective analysis of the Peninsula is, taking clearly defned action that was subordi‐ Campaign, the monograph is less efective as the nate to the objectives as determined by his com‐ result of some minor defciencies. For instance, mander-in-chief. "This represents one of McClel‐ the book gets of to slow start with a tedious col‐ lan's greatest shortcomings as Lincoln's subordi‐ lection of short biographies of the major and mi‐ nate," Dougherty and Moore note, "the failure to nor fgures of the Peninsula Campaign. Together understand the president's developing grand these short biographies read like the Dictionary of strategy" (p. 146). American Biography and provide, in the opinion When judged against McClellan as a comman‐ of this reviewer, an awkward way to approach der, Robert E. Lee, in the estimation of Dougherty the subject at hand. Additionally, the work pro‐ and Moore, comes of much more favorably, par‐ vides detailed accounts of geography, terrain, and ticularly when judged by the standards of contem‐ battles. More frequent and more detailed maps porary military doctrine. If McClellan was infexi‐ would certainly assist the reader in understand‐ ble, Lee anticipated the enemy's movement and ing the strategy, tactics, and battles of the Peninsu‐ tried to stay one step ahead. With superior intelli‐ la Campaign. gence gathering, Lee determined that McClellan Dougherty and Moore rightfully criticize Mc‐ was retreating to the James and quickly devel‐ Clellan for his failure to subordinate himself to
3 H-Net Reviews the Lincoln administration, arguing that McClel‐ Note lan failed to appreciate the military, political, and [1]. Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Rich‐ economic aspects of the war. At the same time, mond: The Peninsula Campaign (New York: Tic‐ the authors neglect to adequately spell out the knor & Fields, 1992); Thomas J. Rowland, George reasons for McClellan's point of view. It was not a B. McClellan and the Civil War History: In the peculiarity of the Young Napoleon, but rather an Shadow of Grant and Sherman (Kent, OH: Kent instance of Jominian thinking that characterized State University Press, 1998); and Ethan S. Rafuse, an entire generation of West Point educated of‐ McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the cers. In the recent Mexican War, Winfeld Scott Struggle for the Union (Bloomington and Indi‐ had waged a war based on professionalism, mini‐ anapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005). mizing contact with civilians, and devoid of radi‐ cal social or economic objectives. McClellan's con‐ tention that the war should be limited in scope and not involve civilians or social institutions was not something out of the mainstream, but repre‐ sentative of an educated ofcer corps in the Unit‐ ed States. This was simply the way a large per‐ centage of West Point ofcers thought about war‐ fare. Finally, Dougherty and Moore end their ac‐ count of the Peninsula Campaign without provid‐ ing their readers with the strategic signifcance of the removal of the army from the James River in early August 1862. Radical Republicans had at‐ tacked McClellan throughout the campaign, charging him with cowardice and lack of enthusi‐ asm for the Union cause. Because of its associa‐ tion with McClellan, the amphibious approach to Richmond was taboo for the rest of the war. Even in January 1864 when Grant suggested sending a Union force of 60,000 via the ocean (to land in Suf‐ folk, Virginia and begin a raid on Raleigh, North Carolina), Henry Halleck rejected his advice, argu‐ ing that the only legitimate avenue to Lee's army and Richmond was the Washington/Richmond line. Thus McClellan's failure on the Peninsula dramatically limited the strategic options avail‐ able for subsequent Union commanders. Despite these limitations, however, Dougherty and Moore have provided a solid, albeit brief, ac‐ count and analysis of the Peninsula campaign. Most serious students of the American Civil War will beneft from it.
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Citation: Bruce Tap. Review of Dougherty, Kevin. The Peninsula Campaign of 1862: A Military Analysis. H-CivWar, H-Net Reviews. August, 2007.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=13471
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