Kevin Dougherty. The Peninsula Campaign of 1862: A Military Analysis. Michael Moore. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2005. ix + 183 pp. $45.00, cloth, ISBN 978-1-57806-752-7. Reviewed by Bruce Tap Published on H-CivWar (August, 2007) Although not as popular as such major Civil Manassas Junction in Virginia, McClellan would War battles as Gettysburg, Antietam, or Freder‐ initiate a turning movement, transporting Union icksburg, the Peninsula Campaign has attracted forces from Annapolis, Maryland, via the Chesa‐ the attention of a number Civil War and military peake Bay, to Urbanna, Virginia on the Rappahan‐ historians in the last several years. In addition to nock River. From there, it was a quick march to the work of Stephen Sears, both Thomas Rowland Richmond. If Confederate forces under Joseph and Ethan Rafuse have written major works on Johnston withdrew from Manassas and were able George McClellan that have dealt extensively with to occupy Richmond prior to McClellan's army, the Peninsula Campaign.[1] Although slimmer Union forces would cross to the south bank of the and far less scholarly in terms of archival sources, James River and operate against Richmond from Kevin Dougherty and J. Michael Moore provide a the south. McClellan believed his plan was faster succinct summary of the Peninsula Campaign that than the overland route and less costly because it offers both a comprehensive treatment of the would most likely avoid dangerous frontal as‐ campaign's major battles as well as a penetrating saults--the Confederate army would probably be analysis of the significance of both Union and forced to attack McClellan in an effort to drive Confederate operations during this campaign. Federal forces from Richmond. What distinguishes this study from previous ones The essentials of the plan changed when is the attempt "to analyze the campaign in the Johnston withdrew his army from the Manassas context of current and enduring military doc‐ area to the Rappahannock River in early March trine" (p. viii). 1862. According to Dougherty and Moore, this As conceived by George McClellan initially, meant that Johnston would have positioned his the Peninsula Campaign (originally the Urbanna army between Union forces at Urbanna and Rich‐ plan) was an amphibious turning movement. In‐ mond. As a result, McClellan changed his plan, stead of attacking Confederate forces located at landing at Fortress Monroe, near the James River H-Net Reviews on the York-James Peninsula. After taking York‐ dangerous Confederate ironclad, Merrimack, was town, Union forces would advance to West Point. bottled up at nearby Norfolk. What was needed, Using the Richmond and York River railroad, Mc‐ the authors point out, was an informal, but never‐ Clellan would advance on Richmond and, in all theless, close collaboration based on the model of probability, initiate siege operations on the Con‐ Ulysses Grant and Andrew Foote in the western federate capital. Although Abraham Lincoln was theater; however, the personalities of both men skeptical of McClellan's plan, he was eventually prevented such collaboration. persuaded to support it. However, as the authors "Few can fault McClellan as an administrator, note, Lincoln's support was contingent on a num‐ builder of an army, or planner," the authors write. ber of conditions and the most important condi‐ "Instead, his fault lay in execution" (p. 140). In‐ tion was the requirement that Washington, D.C. be deed, two primary traits were responsible for Mc‐ furnished with enough troops to make it invulner‐ Clellan's inability to execute: his inflexibility and able to a Confederate attack. his contempt for civilian authority. In a number of After providing a straightforward narrative different contexts, the authors point out McClel‐ of the campaign, from the fall of the Yorktown lan's inflexibility. McClellan laid siege to Yorktown through the Seven Days battles and the Union re‐ because that is what he planned to do all along. treat to Harrison's Landing on the James River in He simply would not deviate from his plan, what‐ early August 1862, the authors turn to analysis ever the circumstances. A notable shortcoming re‐ and assessment. Since McClellan failed to take lated to inflexibility was McClellan's failure to Richmond or destroy the Army of Northern Vir‐ plan branches, options that are built into a plan ginia, and he had his own Army of the Potomac that are dependent upon victory, defeat, or stale‐ withdrawn from the banks of the James River, the mate. As the author's note, McClellan did not in‐ campaign was an obvious failure. Why did the corporate much in the way of surprise in his oper‐ campaign fail? And how does the performance of ations. He was predictable to his core. McClellan each major commander stack up against contem‐ preferred low-risk siege operations and lacked the porary standards of command? Dougherty and flexibility to boldly maneuver or take risks based Moore offer several sensible reasons for McClel‐ on what he thought the enemy might do. While lan's lackluster performance. For McClellan's cam‐ some of this inflexibility was the result of Union paign to be successful, he needed productive col‐ weaknesses (for instance, sub-par intelligence laboration with the U.S. Navy, and particularly gathering), much of it, according to the authors, from North Atlantic Blockade Squadron comman‐ was simply the result of McClellan's training and der, Louis Goldsborough. As an amphibious oper‐ temperament. When judged against many endur‐ ation, a good working relationship with the navy ing military concepts--the element of surprise, an‐ was essential. During the Civil War, however, the ticipation, or planning branches--McClellan's gen‐ theory of unified command or joint operations eralship was defective. was non-existent. Other than the commander-in- A by-product of his experience in Mexico, Mc‐ chief, there was no joint chiefs of staff to coordi‐ Clellan was suspicious of civilian leaders. During nate the various branches of the armed services. the Civil War, his tortured relationship with Abra‐ Hence, neither Goldsborough nor McClellan could ham Lincoln, the authors argue, contributed to his order the assistance of the other. McClellan, note failure on the Peninsula. Knowing, for instance, Dougherty and Moore, thought Goldsborough had that the President was skeptical about the Penin‐ promised him naval frepower to help reduce the sula Campaign largely because of fears about the fortifications at Yorktown; however, Goldsbor‐ safety of Washington, D.C, McClellan did little to ough saw his only duty as making sure that the 2 H-Net Reviews relieve the president's concerns. In fact, McClellan oped a plan to trap and destroy the Union army. failed to inform Lincoln of how he had arranged Throughout the Peninsula Campaign, it was Lee troops in the Washington environs and the who dictated the time and tempo of the campaign. Shenandoah Valley to respond to a Confederate Lee, according to the authors, implemented the threat. When the Confederacy sent Thomas J. important principle of simultaneity when he ad‐ "Stonewall" Jackson into the Shenandoah to vised Jefferson Davis to send Jackson to the threaten Washington, D.C., Lincoln took the bait Shenandoah and caused Lincoln to divert McDow‐ and withheld McDowell's corps from McClellan. ell's corps from reinforcing McClellan. The only "In spite of his knowledge of Lincoln's misgivings major shortcoming that plagued Lee during the about the Peninsula Plan and fears for Washing‐ Peninsula Campaign was formulating complicated ton," Dougherty and Moore write, "McClellan re‐ attacks that could not be simultaneously imple‐ fused to take the president into this confidence mented by generals who were not experienced and give him a sense of security" (p. 64). with offensive warfare. During the battles of Me‐ Indeed, while Lincoln's ideas of grand strate‐ chanicsville and Gaines Mill, uncharacteristic gy evolved in the spring and summer of 1862 and sluggishness by Jackson led to attacks that were would incorporate military as well as such politi‐ piecemeal and uncoordinated. In pursuing the re‐ cal and economic measures as emancipation and treating Federal army to Harrison's Landing, the confiscation, McClellan clung to his narrow defini‐ attacks at Savage Station were similarly uncoordi‐ tion of the war and failed to acknowledge the po‐ nated and ineffective. litical environment in which the president had to Dougherty and Moore have written a brief, operate. Not only did McClellan fail to keep his concise account of one of the major campaigns of commander-in-chief apprised of his plan early on the Civil War. Although sparse in terms of prima‐ in the war, his harsh descriptions of Lincoln and ry sources, the authors provide their readers with other cabinet officers demonstrate a complete a comprehensive account of the campaign and lack of subordination to civilian authority. Ac‐ solid analysis that judges the campaign according cording to Dougherty and Moore, McClellan did to the maxims of contemporary military doctrine. not exercise the military doctrine of objective that Although an effective analysis of the Peninsula is, taking clearly defined action that was subordi‐ Campaign, the monograph is less effective as the nate to the objectives as determined by his com‐ result of some minor deficiencies. For instance, mander-in-chief. "This represents one of McClel‐ the book gets off to slow start with a tedious col‐ lan's greatest shortcomings as Lincoln's subordi‐ lection of short biographies of the major and mi‐ nate," Dougherty and Moore note, "the failure to nor fgures of the Peninsula Campaign. Together understand the president's developing grand these short biographies read like the Dictionary of strategy" (p. 146). American Biography and provide, in the opinion When judged against McClellan as a comman‐ of this reviewer, an awkward way to approach der, Robert E.