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502

PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

IN LIMITED WAR SITUATIONS

Hugh F. Lynch

Since 6 Augll:ot 1945, when the and Nagasaki was not rcally I Iurry Tru­ United Statcs employed the fir::t atomic man's. Writing in Political Studies, device in warfarc, Presidcnt Truman'8 D:lI1iel Snowman argued forcefully that deeision to employ that weapon has a n~ason:lhh: alkrnalivl~ wall 111~nil:(1 IllIl been both roundly praised and thor­ COlI\millllt.'r in Chid, th:lt IIHllly lim· oughly condemncd. It has been the iting deeisions had preceded tlw dl~ath subject of apologia by participants in of Frallklin Roosevelt, that with only the wartimc decision making process; it onc execption all of thc President's has becn elucidated by thc members of adviscrs favored lise of thc Ilt'W weapon the scientific advisory eommiLLee ap­ against .I apancsc eitil$, and that the pointed by Presidcnt I{ooseve\t; and it cirellm:otane($ :1IIc1 gmlls of till: war and has been dcfcnded by thc most promi­ the investment of $2 billion and 3 Y(lan, nent statesmcn of the century. 1 of work-including that of some o'f the Presidcnt Truman in his Memoirs has most talented scientists in the world­ unequivocally claimed responsihility for compelled an affirmative dccision. 3 the decision on the w;c of the bomb in In implying that Trumun's politiral tllC'sl' words: "Thl' final decision to USI' life demillllh'd a('ll'lies('('n!'c in :t d('('i­ tllC' bOIll!. was ul' 10 1111'. 1.1'1 IllC'n' lit' nn sinn whil-h W:IS in fad Ilnlsidl' of hill lIIislake ahnut it. "2 ('nntrol, i\lr. Snnwman I'nslII lali'll :r I'nlll­ Two 1II'I'adl's la(('r an inll-rl'siing hul hinalinn of ('ir('ulllstillll'I'S whi..J1 only somewhat alarming study conll-ndl'd Ihl' ('haraeler of a Lil\{loln ('ollid dl'fy. th:lt the decision to l)Omb II iroshima Bllt the most disquicting e1clllllnt of 503

Snowman's monograph is his assertion' worldwide n:cognition of the irratio­ thnt the factors which helped to pro­ nality of unrestrieled thermonlldear ducc the compliance of 1945 still hombardment undl'r any ein:umstanees. prevnil.4 I\Jany nuelear strategists and ordinary The Unitcd Stntes today continues to eitil'.l:JJs alike dOllbt the wisdom of any fight its longest war, enduring some of bilateral or multilateral use of /luclenr the most restrictive rules of I'ngagemenl weapons. I t is a Gommon fear on both cver voluntarily endured hy a major sirles of the "} ron Curtain" that any power. In our second major war since cmploYlnent of tactiealnuc1ear weapons Hiroshima, tIll: leaders of lhl~ Armed in Europe will introduce an element of Forccs of the United Stall:s find thal instahility whieh could rapidly esealnte their political supcriors have done whaJ to the intercontinental nuclear conflict General I\JacArthur said could not he equally feared by all. Thus it would done: instead of ~ekillg complete vil:­ appenr more important to cxamine the tory, thl'y have pursucd limited goals.s l110re tClllpting dl~eision to employ t;I(:­ Some military leaders IlOW helieve our tical nuclcnr weapons in limited wars Iluclear weapons have heen needlessly outside the NATO/Warsaw Pact area. hut tightly shaeklcd, with ~rl'at dl'lri­ This is the deeigion whieh the President nll'nt to our national inten'i.'ti.'. Promi­ of the Unitl:d Statl's will IIlOgt lik,'ly ncnt among these men is GI'n. Curtis K face in the periodie crises and pro­ Lemay, former Chief of Staff of the Air tracted local wars likely to occur in the Forcc.6 last third of thc 20th century. Whilc hoth I\Jr. Snowman's conten­ Before proceeding further, it would tion and thc fl:ars of Gcneral Lemay be useful to define the term "limited may well hc far from the truth of till: war." A number of reccnt books have situation today, they point up the need provided excellent definitions of the for investigation of the Presidential "limited war" concept, one of which is dechlionmaking process regarding the Rohert O~ood'g, published in 1957: usc of nueIcar wcapons. Our Chief Execlltivl: should lIeillwr he so n:­ ... ra war I in which the hel­ strieled by till! lack of f(!asihlc options ligercn ts restriet the purposes for on the haLLleficld that he is fon:ed to which they fight to concrete, well­ abandon the ealltion pn!scrilll'd hy his ddilll,d ohjl!etivl$ that do not own judgmcnt nor so limited by extra­ demand the utmost effort of neolls factors that he cannot authoril'.e whieh the belligerents are cajJ'1lhle the IIS(! of nuclear wcapons when Ill: and that ean he aeeommodated in feels they must he employed. n IlI'gotiatl:d sl'LLI,:rrwnl. Generally I t is the purpose of this paper to speaking, a limited war nctiveiy examine the Presidential dccisionmaking involves only two (or very few) process in order to identify those forces major helligerents in the fighting. which n'striet the President's freedom The battle is confined to a local of action on the nuclear question and, geo~raphic an:a and directed furthcr, to determine whether or not against sclcded targets-primarily freedom of choice actually remains with those of direct military imp or­ tl\(: Comlllllllller in Chil'f. tmH'e. It dl'nHIIII}s of the hellig­ In thii.' d,'('adl' thl' 1'1"III,'nt of dwicI' I'n'nts only iI frat,tional ,'omlllit­ for tIll' liN.' or n.lnll:',' of 1IIH'II';lr llH'nt of their hnlllan a'llll'hysil';11 '\'l'allllns ,ltws not 1II'nland dO:'I' I"\allli­ n'Stlurt'"s, It lH"rmits Ih"ir 1'("0- nut ion in thl' ,'ontcxt of ~"n,'r;ll nnclear nOlllil', social, and political pat­ wur so mlleh as in the limited or lo,'al ll'rns of cx istelll'e to COil tinu,~ 7 war cnvironn~l:nt, for there hus been without serious disruption. 504

This dl'finition ad'!({IJat('ly desl:rilH's tlw rt:~an!t:d almo~t :I~ an allal'k u(lon tlw eOlll'I'pL of limited war for the purpost:s United Statl's iL"t'lf. This pfeHenLly of Ihis papt'r. unique ~ituation thus defi(·s thc defini­ Tadical nuclear weapons are more tions and eonsiilt'raLions of this paper. A defiant of aCI:IIrate description. Indccd, different Et:L of rules applie~. The ability it has heen said LhaL iL appears impos­ of eiLher side to resLrid allY haLLlefronL sihle Lo draw a shnrp line IwLween the ill Ellropt~ to "limited war" or to avoid two classes.s This difficulty is notunn:­ rapid esealaLion to general nudear war, laled to the larger proult'm of esealation following tlw use of taeLi(':l1 nue!t'ar onee nudear wt'apons have het:n inLro­ wt:np,inc(: Lheir yields were of a size WiLh that :-:ingle exception we will pro­ now regarded as falling entirely wiLhin eeed Lo look aL Lltt: force5 which im­ Lhe tadieal r;rnge."9 pinge upon the President in arriving:lL Any atLempt aL quantificaLion of the his deeision on till: usc of nudl:1lr par;rllleters of tacLical nuclear weapons we:lpons. can only he a very rough approx ima Lion ancl may he quickly rendered obsolete Advisers. Consenters and Dissenters. by virtue of anoLher generation of weap­ A Europ('an, ('ol1lmenling Oil nucle:lr onry. Therefore, at LIlt: risk of arbiLrari­ stnlLl'gy and dt:lerrenc(: in N,\TO, 01\('(\ ness and in disagn:emenl wilh Brodi(', daillll,d IhaL what rt:ally mallt'n:c\ was the following funcLional definition hy not so much to have n finger on II\(' l; It,nn I I. Snyder will he acct'pl(:d: nuclt:ar trigger, huL raLlwr "to partid­ " ... tal'li('al nudt:ar weapons an: shorl­ palt: fully in Ihe formulalion of idt'as, runge weapons of relatively low explo­ I'0liey and ~trategy thaL logt:llwr makl: sive power, deployed on or lIear the lip the doctrine on which tlw decision haUldidd art!a, to Ire used for sLriking oft h e American Pn:sidell L must at miliLary targels in the eOlllhat urea or depend. "II It is this prot:(:ss of the directly behind it.,,1 0 formulaLion of nuclear doeLrine which While the above definiLions arc gen­ we shaH now examine in order to eral enough Lo apply to mosL cOlllpeti­ determine if the President is a t:aptive of tive siLuaLions beLween a major nuclear the political sysLem whieh Iw heads or a power and the agent or proxy of free agent with full power to employ or another major nuclear power, direct not employ nuclear weapons. eonfronLaLions of Lwo major nuclear Any President's decision on the usc powers simply eannot be {'atcgorized in of nllclear weapons should be (!onr!i­ this nHI\IJl('r. By a proel$S of for1l1al tioned hy many ye:lrs of eX)lt:rienc(\ in illliilJl(:1' anti rqlt'alt't1 diplo1l1atil' pro- (;ovl:rnnJt:nl. Ilopt:fnlly, Ihe individual 11011ll"('1I1('nt ... IIH' 1I11ilt'ti Stalt's ha,; sl ralt'l!il' It'nst's Ill' wl'ars will hI' I'm"t" definer! our intere:-:t in NATO as "vital." fully grolllltl hy extensiv(! l'llIltacL wilh '\n aLLaek by the Warsaw PacL niltions Lhe more relevanL Lheories of deterrence upon our European allies would be and with an intimate knowledge of the 505 game of practical intcrnational politics. The doubts of anothcr adminis­ Evcn our more well-prepared Presidents, tration in another decade were reflected however, have usually been bcttcr in Bobby Kennedy's book on the Cuban trained for the domestic arena through missile crisis published after his own many years of campaigning and· poli­ death. In Thirteen Days, he wrote of ticking. Further, there arc practical JFK's impressions on the military advice limits to anyone man's preparation for received: all the decisions referred to a President for final resolution. The Commander in But he was distressed that the Chief must rely to some extent, on the representatives with whom he decisions of his predecessors and the met, with the notable exception options prcsentcd by his advisers. of General Taylor, seemed to give One might plausibly assume that so lillIe consideration to the im­ preeminent am~mg these advisers would plications of the steps tlwy sug­ b(~ the Joint Chiefs of Staff mill the geRled .... On tllllt faleful SlIIlIlay large staffs supporting thcm. However, morning when the Russians this is not true. The most significant answered they were withdrawing structural evidcnce of the cxisting lac\­ their missiles, it was suggested by of apprcciation for the military vicw­ one high military advisor that we point is the absence of the Chairman of attack Monday in any the Joint Chiefs from the statutory case .... President Kennedy was membership 'Df the National Security disturbed by this inability to look Council. Although his opinions may b(! beyond the limited military field. prescntcd p(~rsonally upon invitation to When we talked about this later NSC meetings or through the member­ he said we had to remember they ship on the NSC of thc Secretary of were trained to fight and wage Defense, his presence is not required by war-that was their life. Perhaps law. we would feci more coneerned if One need only examine the recent they were always opposed to lit!'rnturc on Pn~sidl"ntial polities a 1111 IIsillg anns or mililary Illeans-for foreign affairs to find repeated rcfer­ if IIu:y would not he willing, who eIWI!S to Presidentialmistrnst of military would be'? But thiR expcriem!e advice on the usc of nuch!ar weaplllls Jloinlt:d Oil t for liS all tlll~ illlpor­ since 1945. Former Secretary of State tance of civilian direction and in recalling the out­ control and the importance of spoken, public advice from thc Defense raising probing questions to mili­ 1 Establishment on employment of the tary recommendations. 3 atomic bomb during the wrote: Whilc this last statement demon­ stratcs the basic skcpticism among poli­ In August, Secn:tary of the tical Icadcrs for military solutions, at Navy Francis P. Matthcws in a thc same time it also reveals a respect Rpe(!ch in Boston called for pre­ for the duty of the Joint Chiefs to "tell ventivc war. Hll was made Amba&­ it like it is," to report the military sailor to I rcland. Then Co enernl siltllliion as mililary men, and after that On-iII(' Anderson, Commandant of for Ihl' politil~al h:aders 10 make the tIll' Air War ColIl'!!l', 1Il1nOUI\l'I'" politil'al dl'l'isiom~ mill sland n'sponsihle that tIll' Air Fon'l', l'qUipPl'd mill for thl'lll. ready, only l\Waited orders to On the nuclear issue lIlany con­ drop its bombs on Moscow. He flicting positions have been taken by was retired.12 high-ranking men in uniform. For every 506 one who would recommend the use of and the burgeoning staff of the National nuclear wcapons in limited war, thcre Security Council. I 6 has been anothcr like Vice Adm. Charles E. "Cat" Brown, former Commander, It is very important to remember the 6th Fleet, who publicly stated: "1 have influence of such advisers on the formu­ no faith in so-call cd controlled usc of lation of stratcgy and in crisis manage­ atomic weapons.... I would not rccom­ ment. Their background briefings and mend the use of atomic wcapons, no policy papers provide the intellectual matter how small, whcn both sides have blinders through which any Prcsidcnt thc powcr to destroy thc world. " will view a crisis. Admiral Brown addcd that he did not A I though thcse "defense intel­ bclicve there was any dependable dis­ lectuals" can be found in any numhcr of till(:tion between taetieal, or loeali:r.ed age·neies frolll OSI) (Ofliee' of til(: Seen:­ and restricted targets or situations, mill tary of Defense:) to nEt> (Offi('(! of strategic or unlimited situations.! 4 Emergency Preparedness), thos(: who It often happens that Presidents will, are closest to the President will have in times of crisis, turn for advice not to greatest influence. The "President's the military, but to a group of Ameri­ Men" serve a most valuable function. cans not always respectfully referred to Their ability to advise the President as "the intellectuals." Since World War without reference to bureaucratic pro­ II the number of people outside the cedures or compctitions will always Military E!;tablishment professionally cneourage Presidcntial trust in a small engaged in the study of defe:nse policy group of able men. From ont: adminis­ has grown from a handful to hun­ tration to anothcr, their collective name dreds. 15 The President of the United may change-for example JFK's States can now choose among defense "EXCOM" and LBJ's "Tuesday intellcctuals from rcsearch corporations Luneh "-but their function will remain and l'UIIIIllISPS for allernutive sources of till' ~ame. The' e'ompo~ition of thi~ /!fOUP udviee. The growth of "think tunks," lIIay be virtually the' ~:une a~ tht' such as the Rmul Corporation, the National See'urity Cmllwil or lIIay in­ Institute for Strategic Studies, and the clude fcw of thosc positions, depcnding Hudson Institute, has been more than on the style of the Presidcnt. He can use matched by the: growth of sc:lf-styled the: NSC as little or :Hi ,"lI<:h as he institutes thut have appeared on tlw wishes. lIe is solely n:s(lon!iihle for campuses of the finest universities in the determining what policy mattcrs will be country. These academicians have had a handled within its framework.! 7 It is strong impact on the formulation of for this reason that thc President can policy in Washington through their and should be held accountable for his writings and consultative services. decisions. Though the system he uses The "McNamara phenomenon" may limit the options or advice that arc introduced a group of these intellectuals prcsented to him, it is the President called "the whi:r. kids," and it would he himself who dctcrmines his working politically naive not to reeogni:r.e! that environmcnl. 18 This dominance of the this element is here to stay. The military pe:rsonality of onl: man disturbcd poli­ servic:es should carefully note-as one tical scientists in thc y(:ars bdore professional \V hitt: I\ouse: ohserve:r has nudear power lind now gelH'raLc:s (:vcn notcd-tllilt tlH! young Ph.D.'s who t:om­ more (!oneern. In 1941 Erlwin Corwin pose this group have! heen found quill: or Princeton ex 1'1"(!g.~ed fear that the useful. They stilI hold key positions in Presidcncy had he:collle dangerously pcr­ the Office of the Secretary of Defense sonali:r.ed in two ways: 507

.•. fir!'t, thallhe I,~aden;hip whieh is lIlt: Congn:s!', Yet it has beeu in the il affords is dependenl alto~elher fidd of foreign affairs amI str.ategy­ on the aecidenl of personality making when: Congress, at h~a!'t until a(!:aillsl which our hapha1.ard the late I 9 (,()'s. !'howed its gn:ate!'l nll!thpd of !'clc(:till(!: presidents of­ weaklll'!'s. The fl:w Conl!res~lIlen who fers no /!:uarantee; and, sl'colldly, have I,,:.:n c~x I)(~rts in defense policy havc tlUll there is 110 governmental ad.:d ehil!lly as lohhyists with the exee­ body whidl eUI1 III' rdied upon to ulive hrandl. Instead of seeking strength ~i\',: the Pmsidmlt illllependent ad­ in Congrf:ss for their poinl of vicw, most vicI! mul whieh Iw is Iu:verthl''''!'s hav(~ used tlH:ir rcsourc(',; Lo get a 22 boulld to eOl1sull. 19 hearing with tlw Prcsident. One !'tudy, hy James Hobinson. in i\lnrl' n:c('ntly, UI'ury Sh'l'le COIII­ whieh he tabulal!:s foreign jloli,'y and IlJa~I:r ,:xpn::;''i"d his vil:ws on Pro'sidl'n­ dl'fl'n!'l: issu($ from Ihe lale 19:1O'" to tial power from a diffl:n:nt aspecl: IWI I, shows dominanl infhwllce hy Congress in only one case oul of s(:ven, ... the po!'ses.~ion of power ('n- , tIll! 1954 rleeision nol to intervene with I!OUr:I/.!:I'S mill l:vI'n I:n:all:s eOIl­ ilrJIl!'!I forc'l: (sonH: ,;ay ineluding IIII1:h'ilr ditions whil'h :'1'('ln to n'qllin: ils wl'apons) .111 I III I01' I'IIna. 23 '1'1 1<11 0111' usc, alld ... the grl'ater aud more decision symholi1.':s for Con!!:f('ss today !:onchl!'!V(: .tIH: power tIll! stron/!:cr a sLate or affairs which it hopes to tlw argument\ for its IISC. Tho~l: achievc in the lwar future. who 1;I~sscss authority wanl to ,\ecording to Chalmcrs Roherts of I'xerei~e il: childrell, teacher~, the JVa,~hillgton Post, certain congrcs­ bos.~es, hureaucrat!', (:ven !'olrlier:; !'ional Icaders were invitcd in j 954 to amI statesnll:n .... Men who pos­ the StaLe Department to consider a joint sess powl:r think it a shame to I('l resolution to be pn:!'ented to Congress po\\'I'r go to wa:,II' mill "onll,tiIllI'S. which would III'r1nil Ihe U!'I: of nil' and IlI'rhal's lllll'on:wiously, tlw), lIIan­ naval (l0wl'r in I IlIlnehilln, Two Sl'nnlnrs Ilfal'lllrl' silnalions in "hi('h il m'(' rl'porl!'d 10 hnve asked 1llIl'!'lions of lIlust he u!'ed .... All Ihis wa!' Ihe briefers. Firsl. SenaLor ClenwnL'i daug('wus hul not intoler,lhle in nsked whether the Chairman of Ihe 1111: pm-atomic ,lgI~; il is uo IOllgl'r Joinl Chids had 11u: .supporl of hi!' 2 tolerabk 0 l:olI,:agues mI(l was told thatlHIIII: of tlu: other I:hids approved. Tlu:n Sellator ,\11 1111: fon:goill(!: mighl suggl:st Ihal Lyndon B. Johnsoll asked wlU:llu:r any tIll' Pro'!'idl'nt IJa~ ('omplete frl!l'dolll, U.S. allies had Iwen eOllsulll~d nnd was afll:r all Ihe adviee is in, to US(: or nol 10 told tlll'y hnd not been. Bolh answers u!'e Ihe nudear wI:apons under his !:Oln­ wen: unsatisfa<:Lory, nnd tl\l: resolu Lion lIIarlll. Sui'll a eOll!'lu"ioll would he was IU:VI:r referred to Ihc full Congn:ss I'rrolwous. For as oue l:xperil'IIl:(:d for (!onsideration?4 I t is significant White House advisl'r has cOlllnwlIlI'd, I'ven in this one eas(~ of effeelivl! con­ "Iill is dl~ar •.. Ihat a Presidl'nl's gn~ssional persuasion that, of thl' mili­ aUlhority is lIol as grl'al as his respon­ tary, Admiral Radford stood alone in gibility alld tlUll what is desirahll: is dl'fl:nSl~ of tlw proposed (!oursl: of always lilllill'd by what is possiblt, or adion. and our allies had nol yl~t pcrmissihll'. ,,21 eo II I'urrl'c\. II would III' fooli"h for a Pn'"idl'nl 10 Pnn'n 11H'lil'ally, (; I'n('ral I~ idgway 's il!lIon' IIII' opposilion and limitation" III: l'Ol\lnwnts on this episode. wriLlen in r,\(:('s oulside 1111: I'Xl'('utivc hralldl. Thl' 19!i(). inl'lude, among otlwr things, this gn'ah'st ('hl'ck!lII tllI~ Pro'sident's po\\'('r relevant slatel\lent: 508

. . . that same old delusive idea recognized -eilrly in the J 9M, campaign . was advanced-that we could do Said Time magazine: "While Goldwatl:r things the cheap and easy way, by vt:llCmently protests thaL he is not nuke­ going into Indo·China with air and happy, il is this rt:pu tation tll(lL is naval forces alone. To me this had ruining his chances for e11!ction. Unless an ominous ring. For I fell sure and until he can rid himself o[ the that if we committed air and naval image, he hasn't a hope of entering the power to that area, we would have White House. ,,28 Whether such a cam­ to follow them immediately with paign prohibition appreciably affects ground forces in support. Presidential decisions once in office is probably known only hy the office­ I also knew thal none of those holders themselves. Certainly there have advocating such a step had any been outstanding demonstrations of accurate idea what such an opera­ political independl'nee by Presidents not tion would cost in blood and faced with reelection. Harry Truman 2 money and national effort. 5 faced a strong reaction in his handling of General l\IaeArthur and his accep­ It is also interesting to look b

Qucmoy alld {\Iatsu in L957. Whcn On this enorlllous land mass artillcry picces capable of firing nuclear true victory in war could only be weapons wcre transportcd to Quemoy, ohtaincd by ddeating thl! cnemy's thc mcssagc was not lost on the main­ armed forces, d('stroying his hope land Chincsc. Thcir shclling of thc island for victory and his will to resist, 3 droppcd off precipitously. 1 But thc and establishing control ovcr his mcssagc was also reccivcd in Great land and people. Mass destruction Britain, and Harold Macmillan was of his' industrial resources is only quick to point out, quoting Winston one way to ncutralize his capacity Churchill's statement during L1w to wage war. Sueh destruction 1954~1955 crisis: "A war to kecp the may not destroy his will to resist; coastal islands for Chiang would not bc it may strengthen his determi­ dcfensible" in Brit:lin.3'2 Eisenhower nation. It may have but little also noted in his mcmoirs: "The usc of effect initially on his forces in the evcn small atomic bombs could scarcely field. It estahlishes no ultimate fail to rcsult, for a while, in a worldwide control over his land. fceling of revulsion against the , a feeling which might be lesscncd Furthermore, to my mind, if these relatively small weapons were such mass destruction is repug­ uscd solely against military installations nant to thc ideals of a Christian minimizing fallout and civilian casu­ nation. It is incompatiblc with the al ties. ,,3 3 basic aim of the free world in war From thc foregoing it is rcasonable which is to win a just and lasting to conclude that, on thc nuclear issuc, peace. Lasting peace can only be the President is rcsponsive to many won by changing the defeatcd pressurcs from Illany quarters: Congr(!ss, i1gl!ressor into a constructive mem­ pllblic opinion, ollr allies, and diffl'fl'nt lwr of the s(WieLy of fn'e VOil'I':; withill thl' admini::tratilln. III' l'ari lIal ion::.:\ 5 undouhtl'dly 1.1\' inllul'lIl'l'd ill his de('i­ sion, bllt tlHlt is not the same as It i:: to be hoped that tlw::l! fl~dings controlling it. HI! may havc less than arc shared not only Ly our own natiollal perfcct frcedom because of these pres­ leaders, but also hy the national leaders sures, but they by no mealls pre(!lIIpt his of our opponcnls. If thl! ('IWIlIY first authority. lit! will always havl! two re~orts to the use of 1IIIt:l(~m· w(:aponH, options: to usc or not to IISC nudear our option to refrain from silllilnr lI:;e is weapons. In a crisis situation, whcn the almost certainly foreclosed. It is incon­ need for sllch weapons is grcatest, he eeivablc to this writer that any President will havc the ability to choose either could resist the imperative to retaliate. option. Several circumstances might en­ courage a President to consider the use The Influence of Strategy. "Thc of nuclear weapons when his own beller atLraetiveness of limited war as an alter­ judgment dictated otherwisc. Any man nativc to total war," Brodic has writLcn, faeed with f(':;ponsibility for a large­ "starts from the fact that as a mallcr of seall! local defeat, a loss of "face," national policy we have conclusively prestige, natiomll honor, and the liv~s of forsworn prevcntive war. ,,34 This polic:y "American boys" may well conclude may be questioncd by somc of our more tlwt the attendant risks of esc:llation arc extrcme "hawks," hut we should ('on­ now les.'i illlportant. This situalion is not sitkr briefly the l'Ollllllcnt of Gellt'ral without historieal pr(!(:edenl. I II late Ridgway on tlw cffieaey of the bOlllh as 1950 Auwriean troops in Kon:<1 were a tool of war on the Asian Continent: threatencd with expulsion from the 510

peninsula unless reinforcements soon arsenal. They wiII always serve, just as arrived to bolster their defenses or a our strategic ICBM's do, as deterrents to political settlement could be achieved blackmail by any nuclear-armed enemy. with the North Koreans. Here the de­ They have been and are being used to mands of military necessity could have physicalIy define our most vital interests forcefully argued for the usc of nuclear in Europe. They will always provide the weapons. A Pusan evacuation might nuclear umbrella under which we elln have ended a disastrous campaign. Yet meet limited :Iggressions with conven­ the extremity of that situation stiII did tional force. not guarantee that nuclear authorization There lire many valid reasons for would be forthcoming. refraining from the first usc of nuclellr \V e may not necessarily be correct in weapons. Perhaps the most obvious assuming the enemy will again rceklessly hrake is acknowledgment that "the push us to the wall in the future. I II this moment we st:trt visualizing them being regard we must heed the example or used reciproeaIly, their usc ecasl~s to President Kennedy who, in the events of look overwhelmingly advantageous to , cautioned: "\Ve don't us. ,,40 Nuclear capabilities may prolif­ want to push [Khrushchev] to a preeipi­ erate, and it iR not inconeeiv:thle that tous action-give him time to (:on~ider. I nudear arllls will someday bl~ Iluuh: don't want to put him in a corner from available to many smaller states. In which he cannot escape. ,,3 6 Likewise, these circumstances it would be unwise the "initocr!lts of Soviet Russia and Cuba to "break the icc" by employing nuclear may have learned an important lesson weapons for a nonvital purpose. from the same experience. As Schelling In The Year 2000, Herman Kahn has pointed out, they may have come to contends that as many as 50 countries realize, in the wake of their under­ may have access to nuclear weapons.41 estimation of the U.S. reaction to the Long hefore that· time the Chinese crisis, that "however peaceable the Pres­ People's Republic will d('vclop and ident may want to he, there were hmndish taclie:tlnuclear weapons. Their political limits to his patience. ,,37 hehavior with respect to their small Another common reason favorinj!; the lIeighhors 011 the "rim of Asia" will he Uf;e of tactical nuclear wcapons is tlwir in part conditioned by the previous "cost effectiveness." By now tlH~ priee p(~rrormance of otlu:r nud(~ar POW(!r/;. of nudear weapons is less than the cost An ohl'Crvation of "Im:al wars" in Iii· of high cxplosivc weapons of equivalent c:ttes tll:lt fan:ttical local leaders often 3 yiekl and effectiveness. 8 l\lore re\(:v,mt life d(:termined tl) achieve their own is the fact that tens of thousands of political goals with liLLie regard for the tactical nuclear devices are already controls and :Igreements of the Great "paid for" and stockpiled. American Powers. The very obvious conclusion is gencrals have c1aimcd that this reason thal "indigenous self-restraint cannot alonc dictates the use of such ceonolll­ :tlw:tys be counted on to k(:e!, local 3 ical means. 9 Any such urging ignores confliets either local or limiled.'i42 The the considerations of the increased costs dangers that will accrue when and if in human and material rcsoun:es re­ these leaders possess crude nuclear sulting from the higher levels of destruc­ weapons arc obvious. tion obtninable throuj!;h nuclear warfare. Also restraining the President is thr. The :tvaihtbility of the dleap 1I11d(~ar tradilion of nonn:;e whidl has grown weapons to mall)' slaks af{!;UCS a{!;aillst a and is ~rowing. l~lIdl y(~ar Ilw "fin', cOl't-dfeel i\'e nue\ear strategy. break" bctwcl'J\ l~onventiOlt:\1 :11111 Thefe is no question of the nec,~ssity nuclear we:tpons becomes morro difficult for tactical nue\ear weapons in our to cross. One proponcnt of thc 511

"firebreak" theory, Thomas Schelling, situations where they were required. mainLains that upon the first use of One man who confounds such blanket nudmlrs the participants will have indietments is Harry Truman. With no moved out of the realm of the "Lac­ well-defined nuclear strategy to consult tical" into the highest levels of strategic and little time for reflection on the 4 bargaining. 3 He cautions: subject, he made the decision to drop atomic weapons on two Japanese cities. This is not an event to be squan­ Yet, when American troops were com­ dered on an unworthy miliLary mitted to combat in Korea, the same objeeLive. The first nuclear deto­ man used the utmost restraint even nation can convey a message of when his forces were being badly utmost seriousness; it may be a beaten. unique lIleans of ("ollllllllllieation In critieizing the theory of "massive in a mOlllenL of IIIl1lsual gravity. rd,llialion," CelH:ral Taylor revi,:ws this To dcgradl: the signal in advance, d;'cision, noting thai, even though the Lo depreciate the currency, to United States had a virtual monopoly of erode gradually a tradition that nuelear weapons, "for reasons sufficient might somedHY be shaLlered with un to our responsiblt: leaders at the diplomatic effect, Lo vulgarize time," the United States chose Lo fight a weapons that have acquired a limited war for limited objectives. He transcendent status, and to de­ also commented that "this was, and still mote nuclear weapons to the is, a hard fact for many military pole­ staLus of merely efficient artillery, mists to swallow. ,>45 may be to waste an enormous Among them was Lt. Gen. James M. assct of last resort.44 Gavin, who wrote in retirement:

The restrictive faeLors listed above ... when the Korean situation would seelll to weigh more heavily on hroke and the prospects of thl: tIm President than the factors whieh defeat of the Sth Army were real encourage tactical nuclear warfare. The and compelling, General Nichols l!apital investment and cost-effectiveness and I ... urged ... that we usc argumen ts have beell set aside in hoth uuclear weapons against the North major limited wars in whidl we hHve Korean I·'on:,:s. II woul,1 IllIve belm engaged, as w!!ll as in lIumerous heen militarily ilH:xeusahll! 10 lesser engagements. During this time, ullow the 8th Army to he de­ the uuclear capabilities of both the stroyed without even using the Soviet Union and the People's Republic most powerful weapons in our of China have grown. Now the hazards arsenal. Yet we almost did so! ... of engaging the proxies of these two The situation in the summer of Communist powers in a bipolar nuclear 1950 offered us a number of well confrontation arc increased. If the worthwhile tactical nuclcar targets reasons for avoiding the usc of nuclear if we had the moral courage to 4 weapons were compelling in the past, make the decision to usc them. 6 they are, therefore, even more compd­ ling now. Harry Truman had ccrtainly demon­ strated the rcquisite "moral courage" in Past Presidential Decisions. Stratqric the P'lst. And in a careful mwlysis of thc planners have voil'ed I:OI1('ern over Ihe Korean ea:;l" Ikrnanl Brndi,' ,Ioeu­ question of whether politil'al leaders melliI'd four good re,l:mns why Truman would have the nl:ees,';ary wiII ,md deter­ dedincd their use this time. Tlwy wert:: mination to usc nudear weapons in (I) the JoinL Chiefs of Staff and civilian 512 policymakcrs helieved that Lhc Korean released a second sLuLemenL designed Lo war wa~ a feillt hy thc Sovicts for the correct Lhe siLuution: " •.• by law, only prin<:ipal threaL whieh woul,) eome later the President ean authoril'.(: 'the USt: of in Europe; (2) loeal Ail' Force eOIl1- the uLom bomb und no such au Lho­ mallders reported thaL then: were 110 ril'.aLion hus been given.,>4 9 slIiLable targeLs for aLomic weapons ill President 'l'rumun had revealed his Korea; (3) our allie8 werc sLrongly attitude toward nuclear weapons in opposed to Lhe USI: of aLomie weapons previous sLaLcmcn Ls. "You have to in Korl'gieal and symbolic status of 5 cral Collins wriLes of the concern of Lhe nucleur weapons. 2 British in the conference of Deeernber BuL iL was in Lhis basic difference of 1950, previously referred to, and tlw aL\itudt~s, real or posed, LhaL the nuclear n~sul tin~ ap;reement: iS~lIe first ht~t:anw a politit'al footlHlII in Ihe 1952 d"t:tion. Prior to tIll! Rel'lIh­ In the filial eondusions of thl' liean Convenlion, Ikl' had St't'n no ('as), eouferces it \\lIS up:reed that a way to end Ihe war. On 5 .I111l(! he cease-fire Ullt! pcacd'ul solutioll of dt'dan~d: "I do not bdi,'vt' that in till! . the eOllfliel were de5iruble ill tlw presenL sillHltion there is any' c1ean·cuL immediaLe flltllre, if Lhey could he unswer Lo hringing the Korean \V ar to a st~eurcd Oil honorahle tt:rlll5, Ilow­ ~1I(:e,~~sl'lIl eondu~ion,,,5 J Two w,'eks ever, such a solution would noL he lalt'r, when nu:t!ling wilh the delt'gations burtered wiLh the Chine8e COIII­ from Oregon and Arizona, he refused to lIlunists ill excll:lllp;e for our with­ advocate esealaLion of the war. He drawing proLeetion from Formosa warned the delegates that seeking a or Illdo-Chinu, If no solu Lion miliLary vit:Lory on LIII: peninsula would could be obtuined, the Amerieun mcan risking a gencral war.54 In thus ulld British troops would fight on staLing his posiLion, General Eisenhower in Koreu unlcs,~ they were forced hroke publicly wiLh tlw MaeArthur-Taft out. The Secretary of Stutl' so strategy and thaL wing of the Repub­ in f ormcd Cent'ral I\IaeArthur. lican Party which had heen bcrating the (~:mphasis udded)48 J)'!lIlocraLie administration's limited war philosophy.55 In tht' rUlllou~ pre~s stut,'nu'nt whi('h Y 1'1 wht'n III' h"(',IIIW Pn'sid"III, I k,,'s prolliptt'" lilt' ulli"tI ':Olll't'I'I'IU"', Trllillan Ihrl'al 10 witl,'n Ih,' war mltl u:-;,' II 10111 it, h;ul hillll'd Ilwl, now Ihal lIlt' COIIIIIIU­ 1\I';I\,on:-; \1':1:-; t'rt'elilt',1 wilh hdllp: IIII' ni,:t Chin"H' WI'I'I' in tIlt' l\.ort'an \Iar, he 1II0si illlportant t'I('III,'nt in illlproving mip;ht use IIl1dear weapons. In Ihe up­ arillisliee nt'p:otiations.5 6 I t was this roar tlwt !'ollowetl, the White Iiouse willingness to threaten LIIl! liSt: of 513 nuclear weapons which also turned the For one thing, the Soviets had tide at Quemoy in 1958. After three used the intervening years to build nuclear-capable 8-ineh howitzers were up their nuclear strike force, brought ashore on the coastal island, the which now included a more formi­ Chinese rescinded their test of the will dable arsenal of hydrogen of the UniLed States.5'7 Likewise in weapons. I did not doubt our Korea in 1958, after similar capabilities total superiority, but any large­ were inLroduced there by the U.S. scale conflict stimulated here was Army, Chinese Lroops wiLhdrew from now less likely Lo remain limiLed 5 61 NorLh Korca. 8 to a conventional use of power. To point Lo such suecesscs' is noL to impute recklessness to the Eisenhower­ ] f the Eisenhower administration had Dulles game of brinkmanship. While Ike learned that nuclear weapons could he LhreaLencd the usc of nuclear weapons, purchased wiLh rubles as well as dollars, hc was fully aware of the asymmeLry of suhsequcnt Presidents would have to his adversary's arsenal. And his oLher acknowledge in their strategies that they moves demonsLrated a healLhy respect also can be purchased for francs, yen, for thc (:ssenLial diff(!rl!llce beLween and undoubtedly many other eurren­ conVl'nLionul and nudeur wenpon~. 1L is ci($. significant that during thc Lebunon The distinctive philosophy of the landing in 1958 the U.S. Army had an Eisenhower years was first introduced Honest John' rocket afloat off Beirut by Secretary of State John Foster but was not allowed Lo land it bceause it Dulles when he used the term "massive could fire an atomic warhead as well as retaliation" in a speech before the 5 a convenLional onc. 9 Council of Foreign Relations in January In the struggle over Quemoy, Ike und ]951),.62 Dulles had prepared u memo for the Dulles emphasized that the policy record which considered the opLions was a new one, resulting from some short of tactical nuclear weapons. In hasic policy decisions made hy the parL, it read: National Security Council. "The basic 'd eelSlon,.. "IIe sal(,'1" was to I Jepl:IH J If the Communists, aeLing on the primarily upon a great capacity to reLal­ supposiLion Lhat wc will not iall:, insL:lJltly, and hy nwans and nl aeLivdy inLervene, sel~k to take "I:\(:es of our own 'ello()~ing." 'I'It(: Quemoy by assauIL ... then: benefit was to be "more hasic security might be a period between Lhe at less cost. ,>6 3' . beginning of assault and irrevo­ This philosophy was to come under cable commitment whcn prompt lire from an Army man, Gen. Maxwell and subsLanLial U.S. inLervention Taylor, in his writings published be­ with conventional weapons might tween his term as Army Chief of Staff lead the Chieoms Lo withhold or for Eisenhower and later service as rcverse thcir aS5uult effort. OLher­ Chairman of the J oint Chiefs for Ken­ wise our inLervention would nedy. But the first official and public probably not be effecLive if it break in the application of this philos­ were limited to the usc of conven­ 6 oph)' came from within the ranks of the tionnl weapons. 0 aelive-service military serving the Eisen­ Further, in eonsirlerinl! tlw dlnlh'np:,~ hower arllllinistrnlion. On 12 NoV!'mlll:r to Formo:'u hy Chuirmnn l\lnll in IIII' 19!i7. in CiIH'innnli, Ohio, (:I'nl'rnl latl' sUJllmer of 19!iB, I ke noted the Lnuris Nor:;tud, thl'n Supreme Com­ change of circumstances since Lhe mander of NATO forces in Europe, previous threaLs of 1955. delivered a speech in which he stated: 514

"If ... we have means to meet less-than­ start using any kind of nuclear bang.,,6 8 ultimate threats with a decisive, but And there was concern in Defense less-than-ultimate response, the very that we might not h~ve adequate con­ possession of this ability would dis­ ventional defense to refrain from using courage the threat, and would thereby nuclear weapons when we would have provide us with essential ~olitieal and preferred to limit our response to ag­ military maneuverability. "6 gression. "The decision to employ tacti­ This was not then called the "strate­ cal nuclear weapons," testified Secre­ gy of flexible response," but it did tary McNamara before the House include the basic philosophy of a paper Armed Services Committee in January entitled "A National Military Program" 1963, "should not be forced upon us which General Taylor had prepared for simply because we have no other way to the JCS in 1956.65 This strategy was to cope with a particular situation.,,6 9 become the hallmark of the Kennedy! Another "defense intellectual," Alain McNamara years. Enthoven, stressed the same view in a Before he took office, President Ken­ major statement later the same year: nedy had read and was impressed by Taylor's book The Uncertain Trumpet. We will have no sensible alter­ He had campaigned on the so-called nalive to building lip our conven­ "missile gap," and once in office he tional forces to the point at which initiated a review of U.S. and Soviet they can safely resist all forms of ICBM capabilities. Before the results of non-nuclear aggression. Our forces this survey were known, JFK, in four will be adcquate if we can never separate passages of his first defense be forced because of weakness to message to Congress on 28 March ] 961 , be the first to have to resort to 7 renounced any intention to exerei~e a nuclear weapons. 0 first-strike option.6 6 I t was a !'peeeh intended as Illueh for Bus:;iall ear!' a:-; A fler Ieavillg II\(~ Dd"II!'!' )}('parl­ any others. And it, like future poliey mellt in 19MI, I\kNmllara r(!(~lIl1('(I: statements and actions, was ealeulah'd to remove much of the instability of the ... strategic nuclear forces in nuclear arms race. tllt!nu;t:\vl!s no longer eonsl i tu ted :t On tactical nuclear welll'0ns the mt:~ ert:tlible tlelerrt'llt 10 11u: hrolld sage was clear. Maxwell Taylor's out­ range of aggression, if indecd they look had been clearly stated in his ever had in the past. ... we could proposed "New National Military Pro­ not substitute tactical nuclear gram." "The question of using atomic weapons for conven tional forccs weapons in limited wars would be met in the types of conflicts that were by accepting the fact that primary most likely to involve us in the dependence must be placed on conven­ period of the 1960s. tional weapons while retaining readiness to use tactical atomic weapons in the WI' agreed, of COllrse, that an comparatively rllre cases where their u!',' effeeth'e taclil'al nudl,:tr capa­ would be to our national intercst.'>6 7 hility was eS!'l'nlial to our ov(:r-lIl1 The same attitudes were pervm~ive in strategy. But we also felL very the D(,fense E:-;Iablishment. Depllly strongly LhllL Ihe decision to en!­ S""rdar), Boswell (; ilpalri(: ~li(1 Oil () ploy slH'h 1I111'1.'ar w,'apolI:l shollld .11111(' IlJh I Ihlll Ill', for one, ha,1 "III'\'l'r 1101 hI' fort,(,tI IIpOIl II~ ~illlply believed in a so·called limited llul'lear because we had 110 oLher meallS to war. I just don't know," he con tinued, cope with COllnict. We recognized "how you build a limit into it on!:e you Lhell whaL has become so obvious 515

now, Lhat Lhere would inev!Lably II e eri tieized Senator (;oldwatel' be many situations in which it throughout the I 96t!. campaign, re­ would be neither feasible nor ad­ peating his theml: on lhis most sensitive visable to usc tactical nuclear subject. . He obviously subscribed to the weapons.7 1 theory of a nuclear firebreak when he added laler in Llw l:all1paigll: "1,1!l no When fael:d wiLh the tough deei~jon, one Lhink aLomie weapons arc simply President Kennedy was not at all in­ bigger and more desLructive than other clined Lo usc the nuclear weapon except weapons.... ,,75 in dire circumstances. In 196 I, when Seeretary of State Rusk reiterated considering inLervention in Laos, the Lhe adminislration's fear of nucle.tr esca­ qucsLion of the possihle alternatives for lation when he commented that once rescuing a contingent Lrapped in the you introduce lIudear wI:apons for tac­ landlocked counLry was rais(:c!. The tical purposes, "you hegill to movc 'n'~IH)lJge from the miliLary was Lhat pWlllplly allrl vl'ry fast inlo a general would have to be desLroyed, nuclear exehange.,,7 6 probably using nuclear weapons. P"resi­ I,'or 20 YI!ars, theil, the United States dent Kenncdy opted for diplomatic It:ls ruled out of its options the use of measures.72 Again, during thc Cuban nuclear weapons, save Lo protect those missile crisis, a member of thc join t nations the loss of which would dras­ Chiefs argued that the United SLates tically revise the world balance of could usc nuclear weapons on the hasis power. that our adversaries would use Lheirs The eonLinuing Lradition of nonuse againsL us in an attack. To Lhis Bobby of nuclear weapons in limited war, Kcnnedy would comment: "f Lhought, which we have traced above, is widening as I lisLened, of the many times that I the nuclear "firebreak" each year. And had hcard the military takl: pO!'itions Lhere arc no signs at present which which, if wrong, had the advantagc that would indieale ilny adlllinisirnlion in no one would be around at the end to Lhe ncar future would resort lo nudear k now. ,,73 T he diplomatic-military weapons to guarantee "vic Lory" in such combination was used instead. a war. While there may be subtle or The johnson administration eon­ overt hrnlldishmenLs of nuclear arm a- Linued in the same nuclear strall:gy. In 1II1:IILs in ddinition' of our most vilal opening his campaign on Labor Day, fronLiers with militant CommunisLs, I 96t!., Ll3j criticized his opponent by even there the circumstances and Liming implication in the most important cle­ of their cmployment remain suhject Lo ment of his speech: serious debate.

• . . Makc no mistakc, therc is Conclusions. The American political no such thing as a conventional process has been described as a struggle nuclear wcapon. For 19 peril­ beLween dusters cutting across govern­ filled years no nation has loosed menLal structure, political parties, and the atom against anothcr. To do inLerest groups and forming and reform­ so now is a political decision of ing around various causes or specific the highest order, and it would proposals.77 The decision for lise or lead us down .111 uncerLain palh of nonuSI: of nudeilr weil(lons in limiled blows and counlerblows who:::e Will' is flllly ex p()~,~d 10 Ihis (In)("e~s. oul('ollle none lIIay know. No \rlll,·,·d it is, atlll shoulll Iw, primarily iI I!resident of the Uniled Slales can polilieal deeit'ioll. The "mililary neecs· divest himself of the responsibility sity" for nuclear weapons in limited for such a decision.74 con f1ieLs has been and will be seeondilry 516 in imporLance Lo many overriding eon­ C'e'rtain situations. wc' 'We'd to sideraLions of domesLie and inLerna­ make that l'lear 10 the mililary Lional poliLies, as well as oLher eonsid­ long before the lime arisc's wllC';' eraLions of our overallnaLional sLraLegy. Lhe nuclc!ar weapons mighL hc! BuL as imporLanL as LIII! inlluenees of used. The miliL"ry needs Lo under­ Lhe domesLie poliLieal scene and Lhe sLand Lhe kinds of pressures whieh opinions of our allies and friends may Lhe civilian Icaders musL Lake in Lo he, Lhey can be eonLrolled or overrulc'd eonsidcraLion in deLerminin the hy a sLrong PresidenL eonvinl'ed of Lhe proper role of miliLary foree. 98 necessiLy for employmenL of LaeLieal nuclear weapons. The inLelligenL formulaLion and effec­ Our nuclear sLraLegy, howevc!r, is tive exeeuLion of our worldwide sLraLe­ eondiLioned by man)' fadors noL as gy depend on mu Lual undersLanding of easily manipulated in Lhe exeeutive our nuclear intenLions by boLh miliLary hrandl of ollr GovernmenL. The growing and civilian leaders. eapabiliLies of our encmies, the known RealizaLion of all these faeLs of poli­ weaknesscs of oLher free naLions, Lhe Lies and wur docs noL, however, c!xdude potl'nLialiLies of Lhe ycL undeveloped LIH! effeeLivI: lISI! of Pre$iclc!n Lial jnclg­ nudear arsenals of medium and minor menL on Lhe elllploymenL of ladic'al powers-all Lhese clements musL be nuelear weapons. As long as we relllain weighed carefully by a PresidenL ahouL within Lhe conLexL of limiLed war, the Lo reic!ase authority for Lhe employmenL foreseeable eireulIlsLances which coulll of nudear weapons. Thc!y ,111 Lend Lo compel the Pre~idenL Lo auLhorize LIII! diseourage his seleeLion of Lhe nudear firsL usc of nuclear weapons arc very opLion. difficulL Lo projc:cL. Evc:n the possibiliLy The historieal pre!ee'denLs and adviee of defeuL in limiLed w.ar would noL sway of five PresidC'nt~ will IIndouhl!!clly have a sLrong PresidenL iT he felL oLher fueLors substantial influC'ncl' on tlw dc'c:i:,ion:' of recommended ahsLenLion raLher Lhan [uture! Pre'~idc!nt~. Thc'ir rc'slraint oYc'r employmenL. Tlw clamor ami cries at tlw lasl 25 ),c!ars will make it more! home mighL be f'Lronger Lhan LllOsr. in diffieulL for any SIIl'ees.'.;or Lo ehoosc! tlte i\laeArLhur episode. BuL the require­ nudear weapons as a means of gaining IIlI'nt~ o[ our nalional Slralc'/!y ancl our oiJjeeLivc:s in limilc'c1 war. eon."idc!f:ltions of inlc'rnal ional Jlolilil'~ The impaeL of all these faeLors, for­ would sustain a Pn:~idc:nL eonvineecl o[ eign and domes Lie, on Lhis deeision­ Lhe corrl'cLllI!ss of his decision. making proeess musL he undersLood lIy On ~he oLher hand, when Llw sLakes our miliLary leaders. AL leasL in Lhe ,Ire raisc!d, wlwn tlu: threat is I'c~cld"ilH~c1 higher levels of command, our generals as u reriolls and lInfavoruble readjusL­ and admirals musL know undcr just menL of Lhe world balunce of power, what eirelllnsLanees Lhey can c!x pc!eL Lo only overriding clemen Is of our world­ be permiLLccl the usc' of nudear wc'ap­ wide sLrategie posture could resLrain Lhe ons. The case for Lhis clear definiLion President from employi~'g taeLical nu­ wu~ made hy MorL Hulperin uL Lhe Lime clear weapons. Such a Lhreat could grow of Lhe crisis in 19()j. out of a war begun as a local aggression employing only conventional weapons. I f we do inLend Lo rulc! ouL the USC! It might well end with the first nuclear of taC'tieal IIIwit'ar wC',lpons in deLonution in combaL since Nagasaki. 517 FOOTNOTES

1. See espeeially Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Bomb," Harper's Magazine, Pebmary 1947, p. 97-107; U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Trallscript of lJearings before Personnel Security Board in Matter of Dr. 1. Robert OppellTlP.imer (Washington: U.S. Govt. Prillt. Off., 1954), p. 12-34; Winston S. ClmrchiIl, Triumph and Tragedy (Cambridgt~: HOllllhton Mifflin, 1953), p. 637-M·0. 2. H:lrry S. Truman, l\1emoirs, Years of Deci.

37. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 33·39. 33. James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New York: Harper, 1953), p. 265. 39. Ibid.; Lemay, p. 159. 40. Brodie, Strategy, p. 32l. 41. Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 246. <~2. Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, Controlling Small Wars (New York: Knopf, 1969), p. 10. 43. Schelling, Arms, p. 111. 44. Ibid., p. 115-116. 45. IVlaxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (Ncw York: Harper, 1959), p. 14. 46. Gavin, p. 116. ·H. Brodie, Strategy, p. 319-320. 43. J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 233. 49. "Presidrnt Warns Bomb May Bc Used," , I Deccmber 1950, p. 3:l. 50. Harry S,: Truman, quoted in David E. Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years 1945-1950 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 391. 51. Schelling, p. 153. 52. Ibid. 53. "The Transcript of General Eisenhower's First Press Conference Giving His Political Views," The New York Times, 6 June] 952, p. 10:1. 54. "Eisenhower States Delcgate Policy," The New York Times, ] 9 .Tunc 1952, p. 14:2. 55. Ronald J. Caridi, "The G.O.P. and the Kor('an War," Pac(fic Historical RI'IJil' III, November 1963, p. '~37. 5(1. [bid., p.44l. 57. Eisl'nhow('r; p. :10:1. 53. U.S. Dept. of State, A Historical Summary of United States·Korean Relations (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1962), p. 33. 59. Taylor, p. 9. 60. Eisenhower, p. 692. 61. Ibid., p.293. 62. Brodie, Strategy, p. 24·3. 63. Ibid., p. 243-249. 64. Ibid., p. 337. 65. Taylor, p. 30-3