It DIAMOND RESOURCES AND CONFLICTS IN AFRICA:
A CASE STUDY OF THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT (1985- 2002)
BY
TWALIB ABDALLAH MBARAK
C50/P/8554/2004
A PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE
REQUIREMENT OF A MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN ARMED CONFLICT
AND PEACE STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
2009 DECLARATION
THIS IS MY ORIGINAL WORK AND TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE,
HAS NOT BEEN PRESENTED FOR A DEGREE IN ANY OTHER UNIVERSITY
Q (ll __
TWALIB ABDALLAH MBARAK
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN SUBMITTED WITH OUR APPROVAL AS
UNIVERSITY SUPERVISORS
11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my thanks to my wife who in the year 2001 fully encouraged and supported me to join the University of Nairobi as a self-sponsored student. That is the time when I started my diploma in “armed conflict studies” and began developing an interest in issues of peace and armed conflict thus decided to pursue further studies. This project paper is a culmination of this endeavor. I have managed to reach this stage as a result of the support from my family and the lecturers at the Department of History and in particular my supervisors Prof. Vincent G. Simiyu and Dr George Gona. I do also thank all Kenyan military officers who accepted to be interviewed for the purpose of this research. These officers had served in Sierra Leone under UNAMSIL. I also thank all those who in one way or another helped me in carrying out this research. It will be difficult to mention each of them by name. It is my hope that this project will add value to the quest of managing armed conflicts in the world and specifically in Sub -Saharan Africa.
iii TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION...... II ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... Ill TABLE OF CONTENTS...... IV ABBREVIATIONS...... VI ABSTRACT...... VIII MAP OF WEST AFRICA...... IX MAP OF SIERRA LEONE...... X MAP OF SIERRA LEONE...... XI CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION...... 12
1.1 Background to the study...... 12 1.2 Resource conflicts in perspective...... 16 1.3 Statement of the Research Problem...... 19 1.4 Objectives of the study...... 21 1.5 Research hypotheses...... 21 1.6 Justification of the study...... 21 l .7 Scope and Limitations...... 23 1.8 Literature Review...... 24 1.9 Theoretical Framework...... 34 1.10 Methodology...... 44 1.11 Conclusion...... ,...... 46 CHAPTER TWO: DIAMOND INDUSTRY IN COLONIAL SIERRA LEONE, 1930 - 1961...... 47
2.1 Introduction...... !...... 47 2.2 The Colonial Era ...... 49 2.3 The Diamonds and the Arrival of Multi-National Corporations...... 51 2.4 The Beginning of Local Discontent...... 56 2.5 Conclusion...... 63 CHAPTER THREE : THE DIAMOND INDUSTRY IN POST COLONIAL SIERRA LEONE, 1961 - 1992...... 65
3.1 Introduction...... 65 3.2 The M argai Regime (1961-1967)...... 68 3.3 Siaka Stevens Rule 1968- 1985...... 72 3.4 Joseph momoh rule, 1985-1992...... 80 3.5 Conclusion...... 84 CHAPTER FOUR: THE CIVIL WAR, 1992-2002...... 86
4.1 Introduction...... 86 4.2 The Revolutionary United Front (RUF)...... 87 4.3 The Fragile Peace Accords...... 92 4.4 Conclusion...... 110 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION...... I ll BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 116
IV APPENDICES. 126 APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE ...... • •••• . 126 APPENDIX II: PICTORIAL...... ••••••••••••••••••••••••••« . 128
S ABBREVIATIONS
AFRC Armed Forces Ruling Council
APC All Peoples’ Congress
CDF Civil Defence Forces
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Displacement
ECOMOG Economic Community Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EO Executive Outcome
ICC International Criminal Court
IDP Internal Displaced Persons
KPM Kono Progressive Movement
MADA Mining Area Development Administration » OAU Organization of African Unity
NDMC National Diamond Mining Company
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRC National Provision Ruling Council
RUF Revolutionary United Front
SLA Sierra Leone Army
SLPP Sierra Leone People’s Party
SLST Sierra Leone Selection Trust
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission for Sierra Leone
VI UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone ABSTRACT
This historical research is an analysis of how mineral wealth fueled a conflict in Sierra
Leone to the disadvantage of its citizens. The study demonstrates how mismanagement of natural resources can create a systematic destruction of state institutions leading to a climax of political, economic and social discontent thus fueling a prolonged and brutal armed conflict. The study also postulates that the management of natural resources can inevitably lead to or fuel an armed conflict. The study focuses on a systematic historical narration showing how the diamond sector in Sierra Leone was mismanaged from the colonial to post colonial era. The study further shows how the international community played a role in the mismanagement of the diamond industry in Sierra Leone through a corrupt and disjointed international diamond marketing system.
The study tested two hypotheses: first, if the-mismanagement of the diamond industry was # the one that fueled the conflict in Sierra Leone and secondly, if regional instability affecting the diamond industry exacerbated the conflict in Sierra Leone. The study used both primary and secondary sources to arrive at the conclusion of this study.
V lll MAP OF WEST AFRICA
(PORT, i _ _ _ . Qlbraltariii'-i Algiers : Tun(s MALTA L Lit J N "Valletta TUHJfclA Sf APf JK A McaiterraMcM’ ■..as.ihlamu. ISLWDS'PORT.. Marrakech
CANARV ISLANDS * (SP) f
MAURITANIA Nouakchott
Ttimbou CAPE VERDE* Dakar, CHAP Praia Eh EGA Niamey Banjul Bamako j v ; THE GAMBIA •Kano * Bissau?. Ouagadou .J : N'Djame na GUINEA-BIS&U^ GUINEA B ETiin NIGERIA Conakry \ \ * Abuja Freetown COTE " D'IVOIRE G| .Ogbomoso SlEfl Yamoussoukro .Ibadan / CEM LEO Monrovia Porto CAMEROON, LI BE Novo Bangui, Malabo*"' EQUATORIAL GUINEA — ----- 9 Y ao u n d e PENEDOS de Quit of Guinea PEDRO £ SAP PAULO .Rninn SAO TOME (AND PRINCIPE ^
Google, “Map of West Africa” http://www.westafricacrossroads.com/maD.htm Accessed 22 July 2008
IX MAP OF SIERRA LEONE
• Towns — Major Roads — Rivers ♦ Diamonds Alluvial Diamonds
Source: Diamond Industry Annual Review, Sierra Leone 2004: www.pacweb.org/e/pdf/sierraleone e.pdf.
(Accessed 28 April 2007)
X MAP OF SIERRA LEONE
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K M a J i A N G U I N E A , X, 1i ' rr . •. ; 1 Duia^.-M \~ / /trr i. , ' 5’;Ld«i | X ) , ------' >... \l/ - / ./, A. \/ U. BodouO \ | / “ Porjioko > ' MaflburakaQ./ v . . / Tefeya/, MjfVomadu • <’ * [ / I JU /C£“' / I. j ' '°LUn*'r . . ,V. .l a ------Masingbi J J • / K j,, Se(iJu , Y j K o i i d w d i e n o u 1 / k.-- •- ^ S r pano Bomi Kailahun ‘ . /- . . ^ panguma r, Man6waQ' OGiehun , C .Dambara •Xanbu0,'*' ' (XLb.. — -^' ^ °Bendu vAMano / \ Laflo, SbangA SambahinqS^ U T H E R N^Bo „*( S^"T ‘9 ' 1ur0a laS # ' /PoloriiJT ' ( (-W ) * M } pGorahun ^ ATLANTIC OCEAt / “Y i.N /V 1 j afarnc},.} _ i Zim ^ ■& „. /. SIERRA LEONE -'X i ;' ' V>.nd.i.N ,L IBER 1 ^ /Til . \ * l.- a c O National capital ■I ^ BopolUp ^ j d> P rovincial capital N vx V V ■ 13* X ' 13- 00' 12* 30 11* M' 11*00' • 10* X ' - J______I______I______I____ —l___ S -/:. I / Mdfi hac M o ; h#y i kJNfTLL NATIONS D«p«nm«ni of Public Infoimniion 0 «»m (M r 1IM Caitogrtphic Section XI CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background to the study The Republic of Sierra Leone covers an area of 71,740 square kilometers with a population of about 4,297,000 by 1996 according to the United Nations estimates. The capital, Freetown, had a population of about 670,000 before the outbreak of the war in 1991.' Majority of the population is rural based. Sierra Leone shares border with Liberia towards the south and Guinea Conakry towards the northeast. The country forms part of the long stretch of equatorial forest that stretches from Cameroon to Guinea Bissau. Sierra Leone is covered with dense tropical forest with thousands of permanent streams that flows into the Atlantic Ocean. The relief is relatively flat with permanent swamps due to heavy tropical rain forest. This has made rice farming to be quite common in rural areas. t The country is very rich in diamonds such that by 1970 the production was estimated to be over two million carats. Other than diamonds the country is also endowed with huge deposits of rutile, gold, iron, bauxite and zinc. Rutile, a mineral composed of titanium oxide is found in Bonthe district of Sierra Leone. Until late 70s, it used to be mined by the Sierra Rutile Company, a subsidiary of the American company, Nord Resources of Columbus Ohio. Other virgin deposits of rutile are said to be located in the southern part of Sierra Leone. Bauxite is said to be found in Mokanji, Moyambo district while vast deposits 2 2 United Nations press release, SC/6653, 1 1th March 1999. Smillie, Gberie & Hazleton “Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone Diamonds and Human Security” < http://www.pacweb.org/e/pdf/heart%20ofD/o20the%20matter.doc > (Accessed 24 February 2006) 12 of rutile remain untapped in the north of the country.3 Gold is mined mainly as alluvial deposits in a disorganized manner thus attracting a lot of illegal miners from neighboring Guinea and Liberia. Other than minerals Sierra Leone’s marine resources are said to be some of the richest in the entire north-west African coast. To investors therefore, whether in mineral or marine resources, Sierra Leone presents an enticing commercial prospect. The main ethnic communities in Sierra Leone are the Temne (30% of the country’s population), which is spread in the central and western parts of the country.4 To the south, are the Mende, which spread into Liberia hence, having strong cultural connections that extend to Ivory Coast. The Mende are the same size demographically as the Temne in Sierra Leone but among the poorest. They are also located where the diamond mines are found in Sierra Leone. The other important ethnic peoples, who are well exposed socially and economically endowed, are the Creole.5 These are descendants of freed slaves who were freed by the British frigates and brought at the end of eighteenth century to Sierra # Leone when Britain was starting to abolish the slave trade. A large number of ‘Recaptives’ (Africans from slaves ships arrested on the high seas by ships of the Freetown-based Royal Navy anti-slavery squadron) landed and settled in and around Sierra Leone peninsula from 1807 onwards. The recaptives, many of them victims of conflict in regions interior to the Gulf of Guinea, or from as far a field as Angola and intended by their captors for slave markets in Brazil and the Caribbean, had no local language in common. The recaptives Koroma A.K, Sierra Leone: The Agony o f a Nation, Freetown, Andromeda Publications, 1996. Pp 1 &2. 4 Fyfe C, A History o f Sierra Leone, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1962. p 46. The Krio were descendants of slaves who opted to be settled from Britain back to Sierra Leone hence their interaction with the whites made them more educated and exposed to other economic activities than the indigenous Sierra Leonean. 13 outnumbered the original Freetown population and after several generations, a new community known as Creole emerged within Freetown and its environ with its own language, Krio. This community assumed a dominant position relative to the indigenous African population. The Creole entered British colonial service, developed schools and business. They are the founders of Fourah Bay College, Freetown, established in 1827 where many students from all over West Africa were educated. Other than the above- mentioned communities, there are also smaller groups such as the Bulom, Limba, Loko, and the Manes.6 In terms of religion the country’s population is a mixture of Muslims, Christians and African beliefs and practices. Sierra Leone achieved independence from Britain on 27 April 1961 and was ruled by Milton Margai (1961-1964) who was later succeeded by his brother Albert Margai (1964- 1967). Both governed the country (1964 to 1967) under Sierra Leone People’s Party, SLPP. The Mende ethnic community that is mainly found in the south dominated the » (SLPP). The party lost elections in 1967 to the All People’s Congress, (APC), a party under Siaka Stevens (formed on 17 October 1960 to counter the Margai influence in Sierra Leone). Stevens, a Temne with Limba maternal ancestry ruled the country until 1985. The powerful ethnic community in Sierra Leone, the Temne, dominated the APC through an alliance with smaller communities in the central and northern parts of Sierra Leone. This is one of the main reasons why the APC remained the most dominant political party in Sierra Leone from 1967 to 1991. 6 Crooks J.J, A History of the Colony of Sierra Leone, London, Longman, 1972. Chapter One. 14 During his rule, Stevens transformed the country into one-party state and the country’s parliament became a mere rubber stamp for his political decrees. There was more to this corrupt regime, the country fell under economic crisis since the late sixties with the common citizens sinking into economic hardships.7 A few political elites with Lebanese business clique controlled the country’s wealth through what was seen as corrupt practices.8 In 1982, the dominant foreign mining company, Sierra Leone Selection Trust, (SLST), left Sierra Leone’s diamond mines due to what it termed as chronic “corruption and under carpet deals” between the political elites and Lebanese business clique. Stevens retired from politics in 1985 and handed over power to a former army commander, Joseph Saidu Momoh.9 The elevation of Momoh was done single handed by Stevens ignoring all democratic principles of power transition. This saw the build up of dissent against Momoh and the deterioration of governance. This was the same period when neighboring Liberia was engulfed in a full-scale civil war. Sierra Leone government « soldiers started escaping into Liberia. Unemployed youths from the Mende found it easy to move into northern Liberia where the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, (NPFL) under Charles Taylor, recruited them. Charles Taylor, a Liberian of American freed slaves descent, was one of the pioneer rebels against the military rule of Master Sergeant Samuel Doe. Doe was a former army sergeant who in 1980 overthrew the civilian government of Richards P, Fighting for the Rain Forest; War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone , Oxford, James Currey, 1996. pp.40-41. 9 Campbell G, Blood Diamonds, Oxford, Westview Publishers, 2004. Pp 62-69. Aboagye F. B, ECOMOG: A Sub -Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia, Accra, Sedco Publishing Limited, 1999.p81. 15 William Tolbert. The NPFL was fighting the Samuel Doe’s rule with the covert help from Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso and Libya.10 On 23rd March 1991, a small group of insurgents comprising of Sierra Leonia’s youthful refugees, Liberians and Burkinabe invaded the eastern part of Sierra Leone at Bomaru, Kailahun district. These insurgents were led by Foday Sankoh a former corporal in Sierra Leone army. Initially there was confusion that Charles Taylor’s group had invaded Sierra Leone only to be realised that the group was an insurgency, Revolutionary United Front, (RUF), led by Foday Sankoh. The (RUF) unleashed the most brutal insurgency in Africa where innocent civilians, including children, had their hands maimed. The RUF was at war with the people as its trademark practice that of burning villages and either killing or mutilating innocent civilians." 1.2 Resource conflicts in perspective ' » Recent debates on causes of conflicts have revolved around two perspectives, one, the abundance of resources that leads to greed motivated rebellion and two, the scarcity that sparks off civil war out of competition for resources. This study pursues the first perspective with regard to Sierra Leone. The study postulates that the mismanagement of natural resources can inevitably lead to or fuel an armed conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, the pattern of intra-state conflicts in Africa underwent a drastic change from that of politically driven agenda to what is now viewed as ‘War Economies’. In Angola, the National Union for Total Independence of Angola, (UNITA) changed its approach by „ Nugent P, Africa Since Independence, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. pp. 471-471 Aboagye F.B, “ECOMOG: A Sub- Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia”, p. 7 5 16 shifting its strategy of trying to capture ground under the control of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, (MPLA) to the control of areas that were endowed with natural resources, the diamond fields. By 1992, UNITA was controlling 70 % of Angola’s diamonds outside legal management framework, hence creating illegal opportunities to 19 local traders, middlemen and military commanders. In Sierra Leone, a rebellion erupted in 1991 by the Revolutionary United Front, (RUF) from the southern part of the country' bordering Liberia that was characterized by horrific brutality and control of the country’s diamond fields. Between 1991 and 2001, the war is estimated to have claimed over 5,000 lives, caused half a million Sierra Leone’s citizens to become refugees. Almost a half of the country’s 4.5 million people were internally displaced. In 1999, Sierra Leone was placed the last by the United Nations Development I T Programme, UNDP in world’s developing index. The Sierra Leone armed conflict was partly viewed as a crisis of modernity, caused by the failed patrimonial systems of # successive post-colonial governments. Other reasons such as widespread public disenchantment with the failing state, mismanagement of the country’s natural resources, corruption and lack of opportunities have also been alluded to as factors that either caused or sustained the conflict. This is what William Reno alludes to with his concept of shadow state: a concept, which explains the relationship between corruption and politics.14 It is this that leads to the culture of primitive accumulation of resources that otherwise would be Berdal M and Malone M (eds), Greed and Grievances: Economic Agenda in Civil Wars, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2 0 0 0 . p. 164 See the Human Development Index (HDI) in United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 1999: Globalization with a human Face, New York July 12, 1999. Sierra Leone is the last in the list at number 174. Reno William, “Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars” in Mats Berdal and David M. Melone Greed and Grievances: Economic Agendas in Civil War, Lynne and Rienner London p. 185 17 spent for services, devoting them instead to payouts to key strongmen in return for obedience and support. A shadow state ruler thus logically seeks to make life less secure and more materially impoverished for the subjects.13 The economic opportunity presented by a breakdown of law and order sustained violence at the levels that have plagued Sierra Leone since 1991. The point of the war may not actually have been to win it, but to engage in profitable crime under the cover of warfare. The mismanagement of the diamonds industry is suspected to have fueled Sierra Leone’s conflict if not caused it, destabilizing the country for the better part of three decades, stealing its patrimony and robbing an entire generation of children. By 1999, Sierra Leone was among the poorest countries in the world despite its vast natural resources.16 The first diamonds to be discovered by a white man in Sierra Leone was in 1931 by a British colonial administrator, John Dudley Pollet and sixty years later these precious » minerals were thought to have been the main cause of armed conflict instead of injecting development and prosperity to the citizens. 17 * From 1930 to 2002, the management of the diamond industry’ is believed to have been haphazard, marred with corruption perpetrated by both locals and outside interferences. This study therefore intends to give a comprehensive historical analysis of how the diamond industry played a role in the building up of discontent to the eruption of a fully-fledged armed conflict in Sierra Leone, which rocked the country from 1991 to 2001: i6 ^eno "Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars” p. 193 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1999: Globalization with a Human Face, New York, July 12, 1999 Crooks, A History of the Colony of Sierra Leone ” p71 18 1.3 S ta te m e n t of the Research Problem Many factors have been advanced to account for the emergence of armed conflict that rocked Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002. Historians, political scientists and other observers have advanced ethnicity as one of the main factors responsible for the conflict.18 Of particular concern has been the existence of a political divide between the two prominent ethnic communities in Sierra Leone, the Mende and the Temne. Ethnic differences between the two groups have manifested themselves in a very strong manner in their political affiliation. For instance, the Temne dominated the country’s politics after the end of (SLPP) rule in 1967.The All Peoples’ Congress, (APC) a Temne dominated party took power in 1967 through Siaka Stevens while the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) a Mende dominated party was relegated to permanent opposition after the end of Albert Margai rule in 1967 . In this sense the conflict arose out of the marginalization of some ethnic groups in the political developments in the country. t Apart from ethnicity, poor governance especially during the period of Siaka Stevens, (1968) to Joseph Saidu Momoh transition (1985) has also been seen as cause to the conflict. This is more focused during the transition of Stevens to Momoh in 1985. It is believed that this transition was done under the influence of Stevens with little regard to the country’s political stakeholders. Overall the transition lacked transparency. 19 Regional instability has also been touted as having led to the conflict in Sierra Leone. In this regard 19 J^oroma A.K, Sierra Leone: The Agony o f a Nation, Freetown, Andromeda Publications, 1996, p.3 Ibid.P.36 19 the civil war that took place in neighboring Liberia before and after the fall of Samuel Doe is believed to have contributed to the conflict. These explanations, however, have largely ignored the role of diamonds in the conflict in Sierra Leone. While it is acknowledged that natural resources (diamonds and other minerals) can be a source of development in some countries and a source of conflict, this dictum has not been verified with regard to the Sierra Leone conflict. Even more significant is the fact that there are some countries in Africa that have vast amounts of mineral resources including diamonds but have not been in conflict. There are several African countries with vast mineral resources including diamonds and are quite peaceful such as Botswana, Tanzania and Namibia. Botswana is separated from Angola by the narrow Caprivi Strip and the two decades instability in Angola did not lead to any spillovers of conflict into Botswana because of diamonds. Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in Africa yet its diamond and Other mineral resources have never become a 0 source of conflict. In fact the country is one of the most stable countries in Africa. South Africa for instance, arguably has the largest and most diverse mineral resources in Africa. However, apart from apartheid and related liberation struggle, it has never experienced all out conflict as a result of these mineral resources. So what is special about the diamond industry in Sierra Leone that had the potential to cause conflict? This is the problem that this study addresses. 20 Macqueen N, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960, London, Longman 2003. p, 181. 2 0 1.4 Objectives of the study The objective of this study is to: i) Establish the link between Diamond, Instability and the Civil War in Sierra Leone, ii) Assess the extent to which the diamond industry was central to the conflict in Sierra Leone. This study, therefore, focuses on the diamond industry and tries to explain the role of the diamonds in this conflict. It seeks to achieve this through survey of the key historical developments in Sierra Leone and possibly show how the diamond industry catapulted the war in that country in the period 1991 and 2002. 1.5 Research hypotheses This study tested the following hypotheses: 0 i) The mismanagement of the diamonds industry fueled Sierra Leone’s conflict. ii) Regional instability affecting the diamond industry exacerbated the armed conflict in Sierra Leone. 1.6 Justification of the study Whereas resources especially diamonds have peripherally been identified as a possible cause of the Sierra Leone conflict, many studies of this conflict have put a lot of emphasis on ethnicity, colonial legacy, bad governance, and external interference.21 Apart from these See for example, Campbell G, Blood Diamonds, Westview Publishers, 2004, Hirsch J.L, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001; Rupert J, “Diamonds 2 1 factors, little literature or studies exist that concisely discuss mineral resources management as a direct source of conflict. Increasingly, minerals resources have proved to be a fertile ground for conflict i.e. Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Chad and others. This study will seek to undertake analysis of resources (diamonds) in Sierra Leone as an integral causal factor in the conflict dynamics of the country. This will add to the existing information in academic discourse. It will incrementally add to the existing literature from a new perspective that would guide further academic pursuit in the field of conflict management and peace building in particular in African States that are endowed with natural resources but are in a vicious cycle of armed conflict. Scholars and students of conflict management and peace studies will also develop more insight into the area on issues arising there-from. The study will therefore go along way to help in the understanding of conflicts generated by struggles over resources, mismanagement of resources, access to resources, distribution, i appropriation, and the involvement of external forces in these resources and the legality of marketing these resources from states in conflicts over them. Critical analysis of conflicts with specific focus on causes of conflict is nominally the beginning point in conflict management and peace building. Sierra Leone conflict has now reached the stage of peace-building and re-construction. The main pre-occupation now of policy makers is how to avoid resurgence' of conflict in the country and elsewhere in W w T FUel Africa s Brutal Wars" The Washington Post, October 16, 1999; Aboagye F. B, ECOMOG: A Limited‘C\9 9 9 ^X^er'enCe ™ (~on^ ‘ct ^ eso^utlon, Management and Peacekeeping, Accra, Sedco Publishing 22 Africa. Invariably it is important that the cause of the ten year conflict be brought to bear. This study, therefore contributes to the peace building process by providing the much needed information on the link between mineral resources and conflict in Sierra Leone and Africa in general. The study will also help in policy formulation on resource management within Africa. 1.7 Scope and Limitations While the study focuses on the period of 1961 to 2002, it will be necessary to go back to the time diamonds were mined using conventional /capitalistic modes in Sierra Leone (1930’s) in order to draw links with the civil war. By way of review, therefore, the study will focus on the diamond industry in Sierra Leone from 1930 when the first diamonds were discovered to 2002(when the conflict ended). Critically however, the study will concentrate on the management of the country’s diamonds in the immediate pre-conflict period and during the decade of conflict from 1991 to 2002 when a comprehensive t ceasefire came into effect with the subsequent deployment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, (UNAMSIL). The main limitation in this research was the financial which constrained the research to Kenya without visiting Sierra Leone. Primary data collection was thus being restricted to interviews with Kenyan military officers who had served in the UNAMSIL. Sierra Leonean diplomats in Kenya were also interviewed. More data could have been obtained th h 6XaCt ^3te as t0 w^en diamonds were discovered in Sierra Leone is still not very precise. It is agued , a| ! e indigenous people were already in diamond mining prior to the arrival of British colonialists only a in t e 1930s, the colonialists started large scale mining o f the diamonds. 23 from other UNAMSIL military observers but this was confined to Kenyans who had served in UNASMSIL only. 1.8 Literature Review The literature on the conflict in Sierra Leone and the historical background of the country is plenty. Most of the books and other written materials tend to focus on the conflict period (1991- 2002). These books cover the entire West Africa as a region with a few directly concentrating on Sierra Leone. Crooks J.J, in his book, “History of the Colony of Sierra Leone ” gave a clear background on the formative stage of Freetown and its hinterland (later to become Sierra Leone) with the arrival of white and movement of indigenous ethnic communities. His book looked into details of the culture and way of life of the local communities. Towards the end of his book he briefly mentioned the economic activities of the people of Sierra Leone which included » Diamond mining. Crooks book gave a rich general background of Sierra Leone. However he did not dwell much about the diamond sector hence lacked historical perspective of the diamond sector and the genesis of the conflict at pre-colonial period. Kup A.P, in his book “Sierra Leone: A Concise History”24 did not dwell on any issues relating to the diamond industry in Sierra Leone. The book provided useful information on the background of Sierra Leone which included the first inhabitants in that country, the regional ethnic influence to the communities in Sierra Leone and the colonial expansion in Crooks J. J, A History of the Colony o f Sierra Leone, London, Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1972. Kup A.P, Sierra Leone: A Concise History, London, David & Charles (Holdings) Limited, 1975 24 Sierra Leone. He also covered in detail the initial stage of the political set up of post colonial Sierra Leone up to 1973. Kup’s work was too general on the mining sector as it lacked detailed information about the diamond industry. Laan H. L in his book ''The Sierra Leone Diamonds: An Economic Study covering the years 1952-1961 ”25 is very detailed on the history of the diamond industry in Sierra Leona particularly from the time the mining came under the capitalistic mode. The work of Laan showed the local discontent, use of colonial administration to bring the mining industry under the full control of the colonialists through Sierra Leone Selection Trust, SLST. Laan further showed how the product and exports level progressed with detail quantification of diamond exports. Laan’s biggest gap created in his work is in two forms. First he was too apologetic to the colonialists with use of terms such as illegal miners’ referring to indigenous population t who were independently mining diamonds. Secondly, Laan tried to paint a scenario that the mining of diamonds under colonial influence was in order and that the local mining was disruptive and illegal. Further to that, he failed to show in his work any meaningful development the colonial mining of diamonds brought to the local population. Laan’s work is commendable but it is heavy Eurocentric hence it failed to address critical issues that brought discontent in the diamond sector in Sierra Leone during colonial time. Laan, H. L, The Sierra Leone Diamonds: An Economic Study covering the years 1952-196/.Oxford, Oxtord University Press, 1965. 25 Scott C, in his book “Insurgency” provides summarized but clear insights as to why rebellion and insurgency occurs particularly in many developing countries. Scott mentions struggle for meager national resources, lack of presentation of the minorities and general marginalization of the minority. He also mentions the external interference as the main cause o f insurgency. While mentioning all these, Scott’s work is too summarized hence it lacks the in-depth analysis of whatever he has written. This put a scholar in a dilemma of look in g for more works based on what Scott had written. Reno, W, in his book “Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone ” provided a very detailed work on the hidden unofficial networks within an African state. His main work linked the secret relationship between foreign multi-national corporations and the ruling elite."7 Reno explained how private networks are used to exploit relationship with the sole aim of looting state resources i.e. diamonds in Sierra Leone. All these according to Reno became the major cause of the collapse of the state in Africa. Reno’s book has several gaps t in that almost all developing countries are in this kind of a trap by foreign domination but most of them did not collapse or degenerate into full scale civil war like Sierra Leone. It appears that there are other factors that contributed or fuelled the conflict in Sierra Leone that need to be fully researched upon. Nugent P, in his work, “Africa Since independence ”27 28 covers broadly the conflict in Sierra Leone and concentrates a lot on issues of democracy as the main cause of instability. His analysis tends to put serious blame in the Sierra Leone conflict on the issue of poor 27 ^COtt C’ lnsurgency, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1970. pp. 23- 29 28 r.eno’ ^ orruPtion and state politics in Sierra Leone, London, Cambridge University Press, 1995. ugent P, Africa Since Independence, pp.471-473 26 democratic practices that were common in West Africa until mid nineties. One is likely to ask why a country like Guinea Conakry and even Ghana never degenerated into civil war whereas both countries were under military dictatorship for a long period. Guinea Conakry has been under the dictatorship of Ahmed Sekou Toure and Lansana Conte since it got independence from France yet the country has never experienced a civil war.29 Nugent’s study on RUF insurgency highly suggests that its rise was attributed to a mounting social crisis in Sierra Leone itself.30 The rule of APC (All People’s Congress) had followed the classic clientele model, but as economic crisis in Sierra Leone worsened in 1980s, there were fewer resources to redistribute. Moreover, while the ruling elite and powerful expatriate community continued to amass wealth in the illicit diamond trade, the government revenues declined. This was actually the period when a number of multi national corporations involved in diamond and iron ore mining withdrew from Sierra Leone due to what they claimed to be chronic corruption in the mining sector. $ This resulted in economic hardships for the common citizens and their sense of despair. 1 he middle class was completely eroded contrary to its existence when the country became independent in 1961. Nugent further explains that this situation led to disillusionment with the APC regime even after the departure of Siaka Stevens in 1985. The new leader Joseph Momoh had no capacity of steering the country into an economic recovery. This Since independence in 1960, Guinea Conakry has been ruled by two dictatorial regimes of Ahmed Sekou mire (1960-1983) and Col Lansana Conte( 1983 to date) ugent, P, Africa Since Independence, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 27 explanation is quite convincing that the recipe for an insurgency in Sierra Leone was ready and it was just a matter of time and a cause that was waiting. N u gen t’s overall assessment of the conflict in Sierra Leone and in particular its relationship with the mineral resources is very brief and appears to have generalized the whole issue. Nugent further focused on corruption in the mining sector and left other important aspects such as management, which included the mining, ownership, marketing and recouping of the benefits of mining by the common people. Nugent like many other writers on Sierra Leone, has flavored his writings with euro-centric approach portraying the conflict as another common civil war driven by the inability of Africans to govern themselves both politically and economically. His mention of the diamonds never touched on the relationship of the industry on the pre and post-independent Sierra Leone. Somehow, this does not explain any wrongs in the industry during colonial period. » Other than democracy, Campbell G in his book, “Blood Diamonds ”31 is of the opinion that illicit trade of natural resources i.e. diamonds and, timber were also to be blamed for the civil war in Sierra Leone. Basically, there are no objections to his analysis but one may be quick to observe that his analysis lacks a broad based approach to the entire conflict in Sierra Leone. The analysis fails to look into the possible links between the illicit trade of natural resources and the systematic breakdown of management of natural resources in Sierra Leone and to be more specific the'diamond industry. Such analysis could have 31 Campbell, G, Blood Diamonds, Oxford, Westview Publishers, 2004. 28 unearthed how natural resources can be a curse rather than a blessing to a country if not well managed. Abdullah 1 and Muana P, “The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: A Revolt of the Lumpen Proletariat” confined their analysis on two aspects. First they dwelt too much on the modus oparandi of the RUF. Secondly, they looked at the social class of the country and its contribution to the armed conflict. Their argument on RUF is that it was a product of a disgruntled class of Sierra Leonean youths who found themselves in a state of hopelessness due to alienation by the ruling clique. According to the two authors, this situation was fully exploited by foreign key personalities both state and non-state actors. Charles Taylor of Liberia and Blaisse Campaore of Burkina Faso systematically funded the RUF with the objective of benefiting from the conflict by secretly supplying arms in exchange of illicit diamonds. » Looking at the first observation, many African countries have literally failed at lifting the standards of living of their citizens who include the youth yet most of these countries have never experienced brutal conflict to the magnitude of which was experienced in Sierra Leone. In Africa, gerontocracy is still prevailing in all spheres of political and economic life yet disgruntled youths have never become a potential threat to eruption of civil war despite the country’s being located in one of the unstable regions of the African continent. These observations could mean that the analysis by Abdullah and Muana need to be scrutinized further to bring out more regarding the conflict in Sierra Leone. 32 African Guerillas, Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1998 (Abdullah 1 & Muana P. e Kevolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: A Revolt of the Lumpen proletariat”) pp. 124-126 29 Hirsch J, in his book, “Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy" has divided the origins of the Sierra Leone crisis into five phases. He looks at the ethnic composition before the country’s independence, the diamonds and its role in the conflict, the country in post independence period, the transition from Siaka Stevens to his former army chief, Joseph Momoh and the cross border war that is from Liberia to Sierra Leone.” Looking at the second phase of his analysis regarding the root causes of the conflict, Hirsch looks at the easy mode of diamond mining (alluvial mode) as a misfortune since many informal diamond prospectors rushed to the Kono region, hence attracting foreigners. This allowed the influx of migrants from both Guinea Conakry and Liberia. There were also alleged investors, export-import managers, and mining engineers, all with the intention and sole purpose of engaging themselves in illegal diamond mining. Hirsch also points at the monopoly of the SLST, ^a De Beers subsidiary of its ninety-nine year » monopoly as a source to the conflict between the colonial administration and the locals. According to the writer this was the starting point of what was later on to erupt as an armed conflict in Sierra Leone.34 The observations made by Hirsch are very vital in understanding the relationship between the diamond industry and the conflict in Sierra Leone. However, the author did not put connectivity and other key aspects that could have further elaborated linkage of the general administration of the diamond industry since its Hirsch J.L, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. pp.21-26 Ibid.pp.28-32 30 d iscovery in pre-colonial Sierra Leone to the time the conflict erupted in early nineties. This includes questions such as: i) What went wrong with the action plan set by the colonial administration in 1955 when it established the Mining Area Development Administration (MADA) whose objective was to put socio-economic development to the people of Kono based on the diamonds proceeds? ii) Did the colonial administration successfully clamp down on foreign illicit miners in Kono area in 1955? iii) Why did the foreign illicit miners immediately return to Sierra Leone after independence? iv) Was the government of Sierra Leone in full control of its borders with Liberia and if not why? These questions requires further analysis. ' t By 1990’s, it is quoted that the diamond industry in Sierra Leone was worth US$ 400 million annually but only ten percent of this industry was in the control of government while the rest was in the hands of illicit dealers:35 Was this situation due to weak government or a manipulated and orchestrated plan by senior government officials both inside and outside Sierra Leone whose objective was to benefit from the industry on personal gain instead of the common citizen? Rupert J, ‘Diamonds Hunters Fuel Africa’s Brutal Wars,” The Washington Post, October 16, 1999. 31 Aboagye F. B in his book, ECOMOG: A Sub-Regional Experience in conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping, analysed the Sierra Leonean conflict (1991-1999) with a strong bias to the political machinations that the country experienced since independence in 1961 up to the April 1992 coup d’Etat by Captain Valentine Strasser. He starts by narrating the 1967 chaotic parliamentary elections that saw a brief coup d’Etat followed by the installation of Siaka Stevens as the president of Sierra Leone in the same year. He also highlights the second coup d’Etat attempt in March 1971 (it failed after Guinea troops suppressed it), which he believes worsened the stability of Sierra Leone. He summed up his analysis with blame on Joseph Momoh rule that was marred with serious elections irregularities. Momoh stayed in office after the controversial win in the May 1991 elections, which according to many observers were flawed, hence followed by a coup d’Etat on 2nd April 1992. The writer appears to suggest that these political upheavals were the sole cause of the » armed conflict in Sierra Leone. The second part of his book focuses on the chronological events of the RUF insurgency and subsequent peace efforts until the signing of the fragile July 1999 Lome Peace Agreement. Aboagye dwelt so much on historical ethnic tensions and the political problems with almost no mention on how the natural resources played a role in the conflict. Malone D and Berdal M, “Greed and Grievances’’’’ argue that, “much of the violence witnessed in the world today has been driven by powerful economic motives and Aboagye F. B, “ECOMOG: A Sub-Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping.” pp.233-251 32 agendas.”37 Collier.P, suggests that, “economic agendas are central to understanding why 10 civil wars get going” This is the point William Reno asserts when he argues with reference to the conflict in Central Africa that “warfare is better understood as an instrument of enterprise and violence as a mode of accumulation” In such circumstances, the continuation of war represents not so much the collapse of one system as the emergence of a new one; but one that benefits certain groups, government officials, traders, combatants, and international actors who stand to gain from dealing with local actors while further impoverishing other sections of the community. Koroma A.K. in his book “Sierra Leone: The Agony of a Nation” wrote in detail about the political leadership of both Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh. The work is very rich considering that writer had served as a cabinet minister in both regimes of Stevens for eight years and Momoh for six years. Koroma’s work is detailed showing the political manipulations by the two rulers and at the expense of merit, professionalism and ordinary principles of bureaucracy. While the writer’s work is mainly political, it gave the linkage to the, the civil war. However Koroma himself failed to do a detail narration of the entire mining sector in Sierra Leone and to be specific, the diamond sector. Being a former minister in the two regimes, he must have been in a picture of the intrigues of the diamond industry in Sierra Leone. His work could have been more valuable had he injected some aspects of the mining sector.38 3940 38 p''a'| 33 Oberie Lansana in his book, “A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone” provides very useful information about the civil war in that country. His book gives credible account of the civil war and the main players involved both inside and outside Sierra Leone. He focused on cross-border incursions from the Sierra Leone - Liberia borders and gave a good link of the diamonds cartel that is suspected to have been the main catalyst for the civil war. Gberie narration and analysis of the failed peace attempts and the role and personality of Foday Sankoh is very enriching. However his book seems to be very focused on the civil war period leaving one of the most important historical linkages to the same civil war. In this regard, Gberie’s work helped in details about the conflict period but had limitations on the historical background which linked to the systematic breakdown of the state until the emergence of the civil war.41 1.9 Theoretical Framework Concisely defined, a theory is a logical system consisting of a set of interactive concepts » from which testable propositions can be deductively derived.42 A theory denotes a set of systematically organized ideas that explain a given phenomenon. It is a tool employed in understanding why certain phenomena occur or take place. If theories are by any means useful as they undoubtedly are, then this rests with their descriptive, explanatory and prediction attributes. These attributes make theoretical framework an indispensable part of research. A theory will delimit the extent of a research and define a boundary in an attempt to provide a projection of the outcome of the research. Without theory, any meaningful Gberie Lansana, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and Destruction o f Sierra Leone, London, Hurst & Company, 2005. 1996 <~^laVa anc* Nachmias, D., , Research Methods in Social Sciences, Martins Press, London, 34 research is un-attainable. Theories also provide the range of concepts that the researcher uses in the process of analytically describing and presenting the research findings. To frame the discussion on the Sierra Leone conflict using one theory is a futile exercise given the complexity of the problem. To get a better understanding of the issues this study adopted two theories namely realism and Marxism in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the role that diamonds played in the armed conflict that rocked Sierra Leone. Realism focused on the power struggle in the political leadership while Marxism focused on the political economy of the diamond industry and in particular the place of the local population in the exploitation and management of the industry. Broadly, this study relied on realism as a framework of analysis. However, a narrow state centric approach that classical realism postulates in assessing conflicts (particularly in Africa) is, both of limited analytical value'and policy relevance. To historians and social # scientists, the importance of economic factors to the understanding of any particular conflict will always be a source of dispute. Comparatively, little systematic attention has been given to the precise role of economically motivated actions and processes in generating and sustaining contemporary conflicts.43 Mitchell, C. postulates the Conflict Research Paradigm derived from world society. The approach contends that, conflictual behavior in society results from the actors’ perception of the environment in which they live. Conflictual behavior is therefore a learnt behavior, conditioned and directed by Mats B. and D. Malone. Greed and Grievances: Economic Agendas in Civil War, Lynne and Riener, London,2000 p.87 35 environmental circumstances. According to Burton J.W44 conflicts are endemic because of the existence of many diverse decision making centers in a society. And because each decision making center is different, it is normal that different points of view will emerge. It is in these perspectives that the study puts the conflict in Sierra Leone focusing on diamonds as the economic variable that sustains the conflict. This trend leads to the emergence of war economies controlled by rebels and warlords linked to international trading networks under the guise of political discontent. It is important to highlight the tenets of realism from which the above argument derives. Realism is epitomized in four key works. Edward Hallett Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis (1946)45 and Hans J. Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations (1948)46 are considered the preeminent examples of "classical realism" (or what Mearsheimer has recently termed "human nature realism "), Kenneth N. Waltz' Theory of International Politics (1979)47 had a major impact with his formulation of'"structural realism" or neo-realism" (termed » "defensive realism " by Mearsheimer), and John J. Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001)48 * has received recent acclaim for his development of “offensive realism.” The core tenets of realism lie in the supremacy of power, the pursuit of it, its maintenance and demonstration. Within realism there are two strands, those who perceive power as an end in itself and those who view power as a means to an end. It is this latter strand that is o f importance in this study. “ Burton, J. W„ 1989 pp. 51 Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International £j“atl0ns’ 2nd ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1946. orgenthau H.J and Thompson K.W., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New „ Kalyani Publishers, 1995 48 k. 3*12’ ^ ennet^ N- “Theory o f International Politic", pp. 128-129 ears e'mer’ t°hn J. “ The Tragedy o f Great Power Politics p 71 36 In Morgenthau’s44 perspective, ‘international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.” 1° later editions of his book Morgenthau’0 delineated six central “principles of political realism,” The first principle is that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. The second is that the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. The third principle is that interest is defined as power. This is not universally valid under all situations. The fourth principle is that universal moral principles can not be applied to the actions of the states in their abstract universal formulation. The fifth principle is that political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. The sixth principle is that political realism maintains the autonomy of the political sphere as real and it is profound t .Two principles are directly applicable in this study. His second principle concerns the assumption that “landscape of international politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” and his sixth concerns realism’s emphasis on “the autonomy of the political sphere as real and it is profound” hence power considerations in formulating and evaluating policies over such alternative considerations as wealth, law, or morality. ^ Whatever goals states appear to be pursuing, then, their policies are created with power considerations in mind, and they are evaluated with respect to their impact on national power.50 * 50 ibjj p£n^laU’ Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace” p. 13 orgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace" pp 4-17 37 Following from the centrality of power concerns, Morgenthau argues that “all political phenomena can be reduced to one of three basic types. A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power.” On the other hand it describes power as a means rather than an end in an anarchic international system. It is in this perspective that we put the Sierra Leone conflict. Thus, the pursuit of power through armed conflict is just but a means to control of resources (diamond). Like the classical realists, Mearsheimer4 argues that “calculations of power lie at the heart of how states think about the world around them,” with states recognizing that maximizing one’s relative power is the key to survival in an anarchic world. Although realists emphasize power and/or security as the primary concerns of state leaders, realists generally recognize that states sometimes pursue other goals not directly related to # power or security. Waltz (1979: 126) and Mearsheimer (2001: 29-36) argue that there is a clear hierarchy of state goals, with security being the primary concern. Once survival is assured, states can safely seek such other goals as wealth, ideology, or human rights: but only to the extent that pursuit of these goals does not come into conflict with the pursuit of security goals. To some scholars, evidence that states pursue different issues by different means (e.g., evidence that territorial issues are more likely to lead to armed conflict than are other types of issues) offers evidence against realism’s emphasis on a single goal of *54 ,3 'bid p p 21-22 54 MaUZV • ^ eory ° f International Politic ” p. 126 ears eimer, John J. . "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’’, pp 29-36 38 power/security. To a number of realists, there are other issues such as territory that are valued by leaders to the extent that they can be used to increase a state's power. The study recognizes the state as the unit of analysis within the realist school of thought as an inherent weakness in its use as a theoretical framework in this study. This is because; the conflict under study was largely perpetrated by non-state guerilla combatants. Realism overemphasizes inter-state conflicts whereas in this case the conflict is largely intra-state. On the other hand, it is important to note that these groups were all in pursuit of control of the state and hence power. However, realism’s recognition that continuous conflict within societies are a result of scrambling for resources, is worth noting as a rider to our initial postulate on economic perspectives to theory of conflict by contextualizing the pursuit of power as a means to control of resources both political and economic (natural). Classical realism postulates that peace is not achievable and no institution in the world can bring peace and order in totality.55 This is in no way contradictory to this case study. Indeed, $ absolute peace remains a mirage; however relative peace is achievable within a nation state structure. In any case part of the success in Sierra Leone peace process is attributable to the intervention of international institutions and personalities. In a uni-polar world, hegemonic state (world power) holds the systemic responsibility to ensure peace unlike in a bi-polar world where the same is guaranteed by balance of power (terror). However, in the Sierra Leone case, powerful state(s) are seen to have abdicated the role of ensuring international peace by involving themselves in the Sierra Leone orgenthau and Thompson , “ Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace ” p. 147 39 conflict when it was too late. The intervention is seen to have resulted from lack of direct economic interest in these countries. In realist terms the world power (Morgenthau) did not see it expedient to intervene due to lack of strategic economic interests that would have completed the power equation. This was actually different from what transpired in Yugoslavia (1990s) where the powerful nations had direct interest. Their security and economic interests were at stake. The heart of Europe could not endure massive influx of refugees from Yugoslavia thus posing both security and economic threat to the continent that is viewed as a showpiece of security, social, economic and political environment to the rest of the world. The import of this analogy is that in an interdependent world, internal state problems are easily categorized as international in nature. This touches on sovereignty, which has become a subject of debate by neo-realists and interdependentists. Robert Koehane and Joseph Nye"6 broach the reality of interdependence in international system that to a large extent eclipses the state as an i international actor and thus challenges the concept of sovereignty. The concept of state sovereignty will thus be another point of focus. To this end the study will look at how sovereign Sierra Leone as a state was managing its natural resources. In addition, did the state enjoy the monopoly of force within its borders? According to idealists, the world can achieve permanent peace hence the conflict in Sierra Leone could have been solved and peace achieved through negotiations whether the country had or did not have diamonds. Kn h e ane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, third edition, New York: Addison wes ey Longman, 2001. pp. 63 40 The application of realism to the study of Sierra Leone conflict has some limitations. While realism recognises that continuous conflicts within societies are as a result of scramble for resources, the study of Sierra Leone needed a broader outlook than what is confined to realism. Realism does not consider such issues as international trade and its shortcoming in regulating and marketing of high value minerals from developing countries, Other issues that can not be ignored in this study that are outside realism include the role of personalities within African leadership in determining stability and peace and negative ethnicity within African states and its contribution to conflicts, Other than realism, this study also employs Marxism as an additional theory. Marxism, a political theory developed by Karl Marx in the nineteenth century asserts that class struggle is the central point of social change. According to Marx, class struggle in any society is composed of two opposing forces; those who own the means of production who he termed as capitalists and the workers who provide skills as labourers who he termed as » the proletariat. Marx further explains that the proletariats are in constant suffering since they have to work for the capitalists in order to survive. Marx viewed this system as exploitative and economically irrelevant.57 Marxism in relation to the conflict of Sierra Leone tries to relate the indigenous population with the proletariat. These are the people working in the Colonial owned diamond mining company, SLST. They are working under poor conditions in the diamond mines at the expense of huge profits made by the Multi- National Company. Other than the economic exploitation, they have also been robbed a resource in form of land ownership in order to facilitate a capitalist mode of production. Mahajan V.D. “Political Theory” New Delhi, S.Chand &Company Ltd, 2005. Pp 745-747. 41 According to Marxism, the Multi- National Company controlling the diamond mining and the government of Sierra Leone both during the colonial period and post-colonial will be considered as the capitalist. These two entities hence become the focus and root cause of conflict in Sierra Leone. The structure of the diamond industry in Sierra Leone fell under three main players. First the capitalists who owned the means of production, the SLST and second the indigenous population that acted as the workers under exploitation. According to Marxist, capitalism undermine national boundaries hence in its search for raw materials and market, it penetrates all comers of the world drawing the most backward nations into their fold, i.e. Sierra Leone.38 In its projection to new nations capitalism created another group in form of an artificial bourgeoisie. Herein we refer to the local elite mainly drawn from the top government leadership including the military. / 0 Marx pointed out that the gap between the rich and the poor usually widened as a result of persistent exploitation of the proletariat by the capitalist.* 59 As for the diamond industry in Sierra Leone, the indigenous population working in the diamond mines sunk into misery and exploitation while the SLST and top government executive thrived in richness. The cause of conflict emerged due to a small group that enjoyed the resources at the expense of the majority of the population that was languishing in poverty. IncHa^*2 oo^e’ ^ ^ ^ amaswarT|y S A History of Political Thought,Plato to Marx ” New Delhi, Prentice Hall- 59 Mahajan, V .D . “Political Theory” 42 Critically, Sierra Leone like many least developed countries lacked a clear class structure as defined by Marx. The entire diamond industry was foreign owned by the SLST. The few local miners were leaving hand to mouth and there was no capital accumulation. The class that existed in Sierra Leone was in form of corporate capitalism which meant a small group of rich individuals but not wealthy. Additionally, Sierra Leone lacked a class of Comprador bourgeoisies. This is a class whose interest is closely tied to an imperialist system. They are drawn from the local population usually employed by the foreign Westem/Capitalist companies in their native countries. After a certain period, they end up owning some shares in the companies they have worked for hence the term Comprador. In Sierra Leone, the state protected the SLST without a comprador bourgeois which resulted in a more fragile alliance. The role of the state was to protect the foreign capitalist (SLST) in extracting the diamond against a very hostile indigenous population. With time this » system became unsustainable and different actors both local and foreign went into the diamond business. For instance, using this framework the intervention of Charles Taylor and his Lebanese cronies would be put in focus as a probable explanation for sustained conflict over the ten-year period. Marxism has been criticised for overemphasizing class struggle in understanding social change, including conflict. Sierra Leone like many other African countries lacks a clear class structure as defined by Marx. The class definition described in Marx’s works is too Eurocentric considering that it was done during the industrial revolution that was sweeping 43 across Europe and in particular Germany, Britain and France. The Sierra Leone society is basically peasantry hence Marxism can not be fully applied as a theory to explain this conflict. The other important aspect of the Sierra Leone conflict is the role that corruption contributed to the conflict. This issue is silent in Marxism. Many conflicts in Africa have partly been attributed to persistent and chronic corruption that brought down state institutions.. 60 1.10 Methodology a. Primary Sources The study utilized primary data obtained through direct interview with Kenyan military officers who have worked with the United Nations’ Mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL. I established contacts with some ex-military observers who had served in Sierra Leone as part of the Kenyan military contingent. My interviews with the officers were on one to one. The interview was in form of questionftaire distributed to each officer. Fifteen officers were targeted to answer the questions, however, only eight responded. The questions and answers are part of the appendix I (page 113) of this project. It would have been better for the study to interview Sierra Leonean citizens. However, due to limited resources this was impossible. Nonetheless, this has not significantly affected the outcome of the study since the identified Kenyan peacekeepers and military observers in Sierra Leone had a wide experience both with the local people and the rebels. They therefore presented a valued mix of perspectives of the people, the rebels and the government officials and a touch of objectivity. A snowball sampling approach was also utilized in cases where more officers 6o p , "I iqqo^ l P * ^ a'oz L “Africa Works: Disorder as political Instrument” Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1 Chapter 7. 44 were identified as willing to be interviewed. I also managed to get photographs for Sierra Leone during the civil war from the Kenyan military officers. The photographs regarding the conflict in Sierra Leone forms part of the appendix II (page 115) of this project. b. Secondary Sources The secondary data was collected from books, journals, and articles drawn from public and private universities libraries. This included United Nations Peace Support Centre, National Defense College and Defense Staff College all located at Karen, Nairobi. Internet services were also utilized, especially to extract previously conducted interviews with Sierra Leonean citizens by reputable institutions and researchers. The dates and times of retrieval were meticulously being noted. c. Data Analysis The field data was analyzed qualitatively dnd descriptively. This was combined with the secondary data and collated to help to prove or disprove the set study hypotheses. Consequently, this facilitated the drawing of conclusions with reference to the research. The study is divided into five chapters, chapter one provides an Introduction to the study and methodology. Chapter two discusses “The diamond industry in colonial Sierra Leone (1928-196I f Chapter three provides a detailed overview of “The diamond industry in post- colonial Sierra Leone (1961-1992)”, while chapter four is on “The conflict period (1992-2002)”. Finally, Chapter five provides a conclusion. 45 1.11 Conclusion Sierra Leone forms a country with a rich background of vast mineral resources against a background of a predominantly peasant society. Just like many African countries; it faced the wrath of colonialism through the penetration of British based Multinational Corporation and for this case the SLST. Prior to its full independence from Britain, the colonial administration sowed seeds of discontent through what appeared to be unfair distribution of the national wealth. The follow up of the same continued with the post colonial Sierra Leone hence abetting a potential conflict. This chapter has tried to fuse all this into a scholarly approach in addressing the problems through a scientific approach which will be able to come out with the relationship between natural resources and conflict. The next chapter will focus on the diamond industry in colonial Sierra Leone. 46 CHAPTER TWO: DIAMOND INDUSTRY IN COLONIAL SIERRA LEONE, 1930 - 1961 2.1 Introduction Sierra Leone was to a large extent inhabited by the Temne people in the pre-colonial period. Historically, the Temne were living along the northern coast of present-day Sierra Leone when the first Portuguese navigators reached the region in 1460. The Portuguese landed on the Siena Leone Peninsula, naming it Serra Lyoa (Lion Mountains) after the mountains located there.61 Beginning 1500, European traders stopped regularly on the peninsula, exchanging cloth and metal goods for ivory, timber, and small numbers of slaves.62 63 In the mid-16lh century Mende-speaking people migrated into Sierra Leone from present-day Liberia, and eventually established the states of Bullom, Loko, Boure, and Sherbro. In the early 17th » century, British traders became increasingly active along the Sierra Leone’s coast. In the early 18th century, Fulani and Mende-speaking people from the Fouta Djallon region of present-day Guinea converted numerous Temne of Northern Sierra Leone to Islam. Sierra Leone was a minor source of slaves for the transatlantic slave trade during the 17th and 18 th centuries.64 * 62 brooks , “ A History o f the Colony of Sierra Leone” p.92 63 Fyfe , “ A History o f Sierra Leone” p.46 64 ^ee generally Kup, “Sierra Leone: A Concise History" p. 139 rooks, “ A History of the Colony o f Sierra Leone” p.25 47 Following the American Revolutionary War (1775-83) attempts were made to resettle freed slaves who had sided with Great Britain in Africa. In 1787, 400 persons (including 330 blacks and 70 white prostitutes) were shipped by the American government and arrived at the Sierra Leone Peninsula. They bought land from local Temne leaders, and established the Province of Freedom near present-day Freetown.6" The settlement did not fare well, and most of the inhabitants died of tropical diseases in the first year. A renewed attempt at settlement was made in 1792, when about 1,100 freed slaves under the leadership of the abolitionist, Thomas Clarkson landed on the peninsula and founded Freetown. They were joined by about 500 free blacks from Jamaica in 1800.66 In 1808, Freetown was made a British Crown Colony. And British administration was confirmed to cover Freetown and its environs. In different parts of the world, Britain had allowed a number of its big companies to take charge of some territories on its behalf and later on took full charge of the colonies. In East Africa, the Imperial British East Africa Company » was a classic example. The same applied to West Africa and in particular Sierra Leone whereby the Sierra Leone Company, SLC, took charge of Freetown as colony. The company, (SLC), forcefully held off the Temne while the settlers supported themselves by farming.67 66 j,u®ent' "Africa Since Independence”, p.64 6? p lrSc^ > "Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy”p.26 rooks, A History of the Colony o f Sierra Leone 48 In 1807, Great Britain outlawed slave trade, and in early 1808 the British government took over Freetown from the financially troubled Sierra Leone Company. The British /• o government consequently converted the colony into a naval base for anti-slavery patrols. Between 1808 and 1864 approximately 50,000 liberated slaves settled at Freetown. Protestant missionaries were active there, and in 1827 they founded Fourah Bay College (now part of the University of Sierra Leone), where Africans were educated. Most of the freed persons and their descendants, known as Creoles or Krios, were Christians. They became active as missionaries, traders, and civil servants along the Sierra Leone coast and on Sherbro Island as well as in other regions of coastal West Africa, especially among the Yoruba of present-day South West Nigeria.68 69 From Marxism, a class structure emerged in Sierra Leone which became the main theory applied in this chapter. 2.2 The Colonial Era Sierra Leone was a British possession to which freed slaves were taken in the late 1700’s. » They formed a social class, which hardly integrated with the indigenous people. During the periods 1821 to 1827, 1843 to 1850, and 1866 to 1874, British holdings on the Gold Coast (present-day Ghana) were placed under the governor of Sierra Leone.70 In 1863 an advisory legislative council was established in Sierra Leone. The British were reluctant to assume added responsibility by increasing the size of the colony, but in 1896 the interior was proclaimed a British protectorate, mainly in order to forestall French ambitions in the region, and the Colony and Protectorate of'Sierra Leone was established.71 68 w M 69 F Uf f iena Leone: A Concise History ” p. 92 70 ,? e ’ ^ History o f Sierra Leone ” Chapter One 71 x|r°0kS’ ^ History of the Colony o f Sierra Leone” p71 agent, Africa Since Independence ”.pp.30-31 49 The protectorate was ruled “indirectly” , through the rulers of the numerous small states, rather than by creating an entirely new administrative structure and a hut tax was imposed in 1898 to pay for administrative costs. In 1898 Africans protested the tax in a war which was led in the north by Bai Bureh and in the south by the Poro secret society. However, the British quickly emerged victorious and there were no further major armed protests. Under the British, little economic development was undertaken in the protectorate until the 1950s, although a railroad was built and the production for export of palm products and peanuts was encouraged. According to Kenya military observers who had served in UNAMSIL, there is no historical infrastructure in Sierra Leone which could ascertain that the colonial administrators had developed the country during their colonial rule. After World War II, Africans were given more political responsibility. Equally, educational opportunities were expanded/In the economic sphere, mining (especially of » diamonds and iron ore) increased greatly. The Creoles of the colony, who had been largely excluded from higher government posts in favour of the British, sought a larger voice in the affairs of Sierra Leone. A constitution adopted in 1951 gave additional power to Africans. However, the Creoles were a small minority in the combined colony and protectorate, and in the elections of 1951 the protectorate-based Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), led by Dr. Milton Margai, a Mende, emerged victorious.72 72 Fyfe, A History o f Sierra Leone, pp.83-82 50 2.3 The Diamonds and the Arrival of Multi-National Corporations Historically, Sierra Leone has been known for Minerals. Indeed, even in the pre-colonial period, use of valued minerals was a traditional practice. By and large, even though official discovery of diamonds in Sierra Leone is set at the years 1927- 1930,7’ it is strongly believed that the indigenous knew and used diamonds much earlier.74 * Commercial exploitation of diamonds in Sierra Leone commenced in 1931 in Kono District by Consolidated African Selection Trust (CAST), a British mining company based in Gold Coast (now Ghana). CAST, formed a subsidiary company jointly with the De Beers Company (the world’s largest diamond mining company) to form the Sierra Leone Selection Trust, SLST in 1935.77 The SLST Company was given exclusive diamond mining and prospecting rights over the entire country for 99 years. This marked the controversial entrance of Multi-National Corporations in diamond mining « in Sierra Leone.76 By 1956, however, there were an estimated 75,000 “illicit” miners in Kono District - the heart of the diamond area - leading to smuggling on a vast scale, and causing a general breakdown of law and order. The buyers and smugglers at that time were mainly Madingo from Guinea and Lebanese traders. With the tightening of security between Kono and Freetown in the early 1950s, Lebanese smugglers began moving their illegally acquired diamonds through Liberia destined for Belgium. Israeli-based diamond merchants soon noticed the booming diamond trade in Monrovia, and many established 74 ^aan’ ■’ The Sierra Leone Diamonds: An Economic Study Covering 1952 - 1961, pp.42-45 eno Shadow States and The Political Economy of Civil War” in Greed and Grievances: Economic Agendas in Civil War. pp. 167-169 76 LlrSC •• ^'erra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy ” pp.57-59 ’ Sierra Leone Diamonds: An Economic Study Covering 1952 — 1961", 51 offices there. Indeed, De Beers itself set up a diamond buying office in Monrovia in 1954 to keep as much of the trade under its control as possible. In addition, the Monrovia office was strategic because it was a major conduit for diamond smuggling from Sierra Leone since there were no taxes imposed, which consequently meant big profits realised from the trade. Illicit diamond dealers and smugglers preferred the Monrovia market as it guaranteed higher profits. Africans, who had seen the prospecting teams of SLST at work, began in the late 50s with their own attempts to dig diamonds. This digging was first restricted to the reserves of SLST in Kono. Illicit digging became a serious problem for the company and the existing measures put in place to protect the interest of SLST were no longer appropriate. Two ordinances provided protection. The ‘Minerals Ordinance’ enacted in 1952 forbade any mining without the permission of the Government and also the possession of unlawfully obtained minerals. The ‘Diamond Industry Protection Ordinance’ of 1936 had been designed precisely to prevent diamond smuggling.77 The protection of the SLST works was left to a ‘Diamond Protection Force’, a semi-police force organised and paid by the company. In 1952, the deterioration with respect to the theft and illicit digging prompted the government to station a detachment of the police at Mortema near the headquarters of SLST. However, the police deployment never helped to curb the smuggling, which continued unabated. Ironically the police became part of the smuggling network. Between January 1952 and September 1953 uncut diamond to the value of Sterling Pounds 110,910 n n enerally’ Laan, “The Sierra Leone Diamonds: An Economic Study Covering 1952 - 1961 "Chapter 52 were seized from illicit traffickers. In another case a Gambian who was on transit from Sierra Leone to Beirut in Lebanon was arrested for unlawful possession of 1, 319 carats of diamonds with an estimated value of Sterling Pounds 20,000. He was consequently jailed but the diamond exhibits later disappeared in the hands of the police. This incident confirmed that the police were also accomplices in the diamond smuggling. The illicit mining of diamonds in Kono region demanded an intervention by the colonial government in a bid to reduce revenue losses as a result of the illegal trade in diamonds and the emerging build up of rebellion in the hinterland due to what was seen as the exploitation by colonialists in collaboration with the Sierra Leone coastal elite. As Hirsch, J. notes: The British colonial government sought to maintain political stability in the rebellious hinterland in the face of decreasing financial support from London. Their solution was twofold: to institute indirect rule through the » traditional paramount chiefs and to use a tributary system where miners received a share of any gold or diamonds they recovered in lieu of 80 wages. According to William Reno81, these dual arrangements progressively degraded the state’s control and thwarted the development of a strong legitimate governmental institution to prevent corruption. From 1930 onwards, the diamonds sector was in principle under the 79 Ibid> PP, 6 80 !b,d PP. 17-21 81 d 'rSC^. ^ lerra Leone: Diamonds and the struggle for Democracy" p 26. eno Shadow States and The Political Economy of Civil War” in Greed and Grievances: Economic agendas in Civil War., 53 control of successive British control. The colonial administration granted paramount chiefs control of settlement and local migration in order to placate the local population. As local chiefs obtained the power to decide who would live in Kono, illicit mining grew apace in the 1940s and 1950s as those with money and connection found ways to circumvent the SLST monopoly. The massive entry of Sierra Leonean indigenous people including peasants into the mining sector had deleterious consequences beyond the patterns of corruption and illicit activity. Agriculture was adversely affected as most peasants abandoned farming and joined illegal miners. The situation was worsened by the unexpected influx of migrants thus chronically undermining the capacity of local administration to address the socio-economic and health problems in the area. The consequence was civil disobedience in 1955. In the same year, the colonial authorities scrapped SLST’s nation-wide monopoly, confining its operations to Yengema and Tongo Fields, an area of about 450 square miles. t In 1956, the colonial authority introduced the ‘Alluvial Mining Scheme’, under which both mining and buying licenses were granted to indigenous miners. This allowed the locals to engage in legalised small-scale mining operations. Many of these licenses came to be held by Lebanese traders who had begun to settle in Sierra Leone at the turn of the century. The administration however began a process of clamping down on foreigners (Lebanese, Guineans and other West Africans) forcing about 40,000 of them out of Kono.82 The establishment of the Mining Area Development Administration (MADA), in 1955, sought Reno "Shadow States and The Political Economy of Civil War” p. 147 54 to provide additional resources to develop the region’s economic potential as well as to keep it stable for continued mining. This development was a tactical attempt by the colonial authorities at ensuring that the proceeds from diamonds benefited the locals through social service provision. Development came to be seen as a political tool for officials in both Kono and Freetown Between 1954 and 1956 a rapid growth of diamond mining was witnessed in Sierra Leone. It was first a geographical expansion with digging spreading to Bo and Kenema districts in early 1954. The diamond mining came with dire economic consequences. Food security was threatened with fewer rice (the staple food) fields being put to use. The result was that prices of foodstuff rose beyond the means of many laborers. Calls for higher wages by Trade Unions led to riots in which 18 people lost their lives. The withdrawal of the SLST monopoly paved the way for what has technically been called the legalisations of the diamond rush.83 The objective of introducing these legislations was to license mining of i diamonds on a small-scale, which allowed substantial participation of the people of Sierra Leone. The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs back in Britain admitted in London that suppression of illicit mining was not viable. He noted: ‘I think the trouble is that diamonds are scattered so plentifully in Sierra Leone that it is very difficult to impose an effective control over illicit mining’.84 Kilson M, Political change in West African State: A Study o f the Modernisation Process in Sierra Leone, Cambridge , Harvard University Press, 1966 p.47 Ibid p . 12 55 In 1956, a compromise was made between the indigenous people and the SLST. The negotiations for licensed mining were led by the then Minister for Mines Mr. Siaka Stevens, a former trade unionist who was very conversant with the intrigues of the diamond mining in Sierra Leone and the Minister for Local Government Mr. A. M Margai and the Chief Minister M. A. S. Margai (the Margais were brothers).These were colonial ministers. Principally, it was agreed that diamond reserves of the country would be O f divided between the SLST and the indigenous population. Those in Bo and Kono districts except parts of lower Bambara chiefdom went to the local diggers, while those in Kono districts and upper Bambara went to SLST. 2.4 The Beginning of Local Discontent Contingent to the previous experience with attempts to control illegal mining, granting of monopoly to SLST and the consequent reversal of all these, local discontent was already simmering/6 By 1956, illegal diamond rrtining had become a serious problem that the colonial authority had to deal with. The division of diamond rich areas between the individual diggers and the SLST further exacerbated local divisions between regions. Within Kono district, no diamond-bearing land was left to the licensed diggers. This was the beginning of strained relations between Kono District Council and the Central Government. Locals in the district thus felt short changed because they had little or no opportunity to benefit from the licensing project since the SLST had the first choice and 86 86 Th^3 ^tevens 'ater became the president of Sierra Leone from 1967 to 1985 when he retired. e Colonial British administration initially recruited local community chiefs by duping them with etary inducements and offering employment to their kins and cronies as a way o f controlling the locals. 56 only the poorer diamond-bearing land would be left to the licensed diggers. Illicit digging thus continued unabated in the district. 87 Further influx of non-indigenous people to the diamond mines did little to reduce the problems. Foreigners, especially from Guinea and Liberia, increased dramatically in 1955, and were noticed by J. Hare, the Minister of State for the Colonies who called it one of the two major problems of the country.88 As he put it; The Mandingoes from Guinea swamped the local population in the diamond areas, and that housing conditions were appalling.• 89 The presence of the Mandingo and other foreigners was a potential problem especially in the diamond rich Kono district. So big was the problem that on October 31st 1955 after consultations between the Colonial Governor and the Chiefs, Tribal Authorities and members of the Kono District Council an ultimatum was issued to foreigners who had # crowded into the mining areas - Makaras, Mandingoes, Foulahs, Senegalese and others from various parts of the West Africa - to leave Sierra Leone within three weeks. Whereas pressure on social amenities was given as the explanation for the expulsion, their activities in illegal diamonds mining rather than their presence led to their expulsion. It was generally perceived that they carried away all the wealth, which should have been enjoyed by the people of Sierra Leone. * 87 L' « *8 ^ ‘erra Leone Diamonds: An Economic Study Covering 1952 -1961 "p 22 Quest R., The Shackled Continent: Africa 's Past, Present and Future, London, Macmillan, 2004.p.56 57 Local resistance and disillusionment with the SLST monopoly in Kono continued quietly as diggers went on with their illegal business in the SLST leased areas. In August 1957 a large group of illegal diggers attacked a washing SLST plant at Koidu.90 Whereas the attack was seen as a well-planned operation to steal as many diamonds as possible, it was also a forceful expression by the indigenous diggers that they wanted to be left alone. From their perspective, the police and the security guards were a nuisance, which prevented them from working regularly and successfully on the plots they had chosen inside the SLST lease. By 1959, the conflict between the diggers and the law enforcement agents had gotten out of control. To protect SLST interest, more police officers were added to the Kono region and controls on movement were tightened with the assistance of the native chiefs. The modem mining of diamonds reversed the original native chiefs and colonial authority relations. The colonial authorities seized lipon the opportunity to establish more direct state control over revenue collection and economic development through collaboration with European mining companies. Since European mining companies demanded, and were gladly provided, a monopoly on mineral exploitation, chiefs enjoyed only a marginal inclusion into the formal mining economy. Most Kono residents enjoyed none at all.91 * The exclusion of Kono residents from diamond mining signaled a major unwarranted extension of colonial state power over their authority. This was significantly different from the previous scenario where sharing of both formal and informal authority had created a 91 ^aan’ "The Sierra Leone Diamonds: An Economic Study Covering 1952 -1961 ”. p.71 eno’ Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone”. P. 46 58 class of strongmen equipped with social networks to directly resist rearrangements in this political terrain. Consequently, an inevitable defiance of chiefs emerged. The immediate reaction from the colonial authorities was reforms geared towards increasing state capacity to directly control diamond wealth. At the same time the colonialists hoped to address ICono’s increasingly vocal popular dissatisfaction with the pace of development and the chiefs’ privileges. This dissatisfaction emanated from the assumption by the colonial powers in 1927 all mineral rights after the discovery of alluvial Gold deposits. They did not envision any significant role for Sierra Leonean commoners in mining apart from serving as labourers. Local chiefs and other indigenous people were excluded from decisions concerning mineral exploitation while state institutions collected revenue and directed the spending. The exclusionary policy, while presented as a logical evolution of colonial rule, clashed with local officials and accommodations With chiefs. Chiefs increasingly identified their » informal involvement in the areas of economic development as an additional “customary” right.41 This led to diverging interests between the monopoly holder - SLST, local officials and chiefs. To mitigate growing discontent led by the chiefs, the colonial administration encouraged payoffs to chiefs to pacify them. As the Kono Colonial District Commissioner put it: Payments will only encourage them to support us if they see financial gain in it”44 9394 93 ^ e n o > “Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone ”. P.46 94 ^eno, “Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone", p.48 ®urke, L. J., “ A Short History of the Discovery of the Major Diamond Deposits in Sierra Leone London, ° xf°rd University Press,, 1959, Vol. 12, pp. 235 -238 59 However, even as the SLST began a policy of informal pay offs, chiefs continued to permit illegal mining. Utilizing their growing administrative capacities and considerable economic powers, chiefs played an informal intermediary role between the diamond industry and Kono residents who felt unfairly excluded from the regions wealth. Since colonial rulers already conceded that chiefs were owners of land in a socially enforceable sense and responsible for law and order, chiefs exercised great control over the terms of settlement of strangers illicitly seeking Kono’s diamond wealth. The local community chiefs’ started colluding with non-native illegal miners (mainly Guineans) by allocating them plots instead of local people. For instance, in Nimikoro chiefdom in the heart of SLST mining area, a local chief by the name of Bona allocated plots to strangers rather than to local residents.1^ The strangers paid a “consideration" fees for use of the plots. Thus a share of the diamond sales went directly into the chief s » pockets. In addition the strangers and illegal miners operated in gang-like manner, armed with crude weapons and exhorting their men to resistance. The problem was thus twofold; first, the chiefs’ intervention in the diamond business enhanced and financed their growing personal armed forces and privilege. The reward of great personal wealth for successful chiefs also reinforced links between state office and private gain.96 This development led to increased colonial fears of local discontent and increasing lack of support from the chiefs. 95 Reno, “Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone ”. p. 71 6 Hailey, William, M., Native Administration in British African Territories, London HMSO, 1951, p.309 60 This open recognition of the problems and feelings of the locals created a two-pronged dilemma to the colonial authorities. There was fear of disorder from organised gangs that had the chiefs on their side and public revolt emanating from a feeling of exclusion from benefits of their own natural resources. In an attempt to get back the support of the chiefs, the colonial authorities increased benefits to the chiefs including their salaries, loans for cars, home construction, and education for their sons.97 Riots and disturbances by the indigenous people took an increasing and uncontrollable trend in mid 1950s, a situation, which deeply worried the colonial authorities. To forestall the growing unrests, the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme was consequently introduced, as the then Governor put it: “Enable the landholders, headmen, and chiefs to exercise power, which they themselves believe they hold...as such the scheme will create a much healthier and more law abiding atmosphere in those chiefdoms where it is introduced”.98 * * Consequently, Africans were to benefit from diamond resources but only under government control. Illegal miners were thus asked to apply for licenses from the District Commissioner, a role that was further transferred to the chiefs in 1955." This new formal authority gave chiefs additional rent seeking opportunities. It also favoured wealthier foreign miners since they could afford to pay for the licenses whose payment had 97 Reno William, “Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone ” p.53 w Government of Sierra Leone, Report on Administration, Government Printers, Freetown, 1955. Laan , “ The Sierra Leone Diamonds: An Economic Study Covering the years 1952-1961 ”, pi 4. 61 informally increased.11111 These payments depended on the mining potential of assigned plots. The wealthy foreign miners offered chiefs’ their support, since they owed their continued presence to the chiefs’ approval. Indeed, some strangers even occupied positions in the Native Authorities since the Chiefs manipulated councillor’s lists. For example, a 1971 audit of Kono chiefdom lists revealed that more than half of all councilors were non-Kono persons.101 This reduced Kono ethnic representation in formal political organizations and left the Kono persons economically dependent on outsiders. As Sierra Leone edged closer to independence (1957 to 1961), and given that Africans were voicing political demands, local colonial officials faced unwelcome pressures from the local administration. Emerging political parties likewise began to take shape. Colonial officials sought out chiefs and followers belonging, as Reno102 calls to the “right” political » party. This came to mean chiefs support for Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), which opposed a more radical regional Kono party, the Kono Progressive Movement (KPM) in the 1957 and 1962 elections.103 The radical party attacked government restrictions on African access to diamonds in a language that stressed themes of domination and oppression. Claiming that SLST was an agent of foreign imperialism and that diamonds were Kono property, the KPM challenged the very basis of Freetown’s control of 160 Minch inton, W.E., “The Sierra Leone Diamond Rush”, in Sierra Leone Studies, 19, 1966, p.46 102 Sierra Leone Gazette, 16th June 1971 103 ^eno ’ “Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone” p.67 Hayward, Fred, “The Development of a Radical Political Organization in the Bush: A Case Study of Sierra Leone” in Canadian Journal o f African Studies, Vol. 6 , No 1, 1972. 62 accumulation and, therefore the autonomy of state power to allocate resources.104 The K.PM had a populist political approach that called into question state policies that favoured SLST and some local community chiefs over most Kono people. Even though the populist JCPM challenge to elite privilege which began in 1957, ultimately failed in most of its objectives, it taught the inheritors of the colonial state that rivals appealing to popular dissatisfaction radical increase the cost of building a secure political base. 2.5 Conclusion The realization that there were large amounts of diamonds in Sierra Leone changed its history significantly. Even though locals developed discontent with the colonial authorities because of the harsh realities of colonisation, diamonds brought a new economic dimension. Even the local Chiefs that had largely collaborated having been duped into doing so realised by mid 1940s that they stood to lose significantly from the benefits of diamonds wealth since the proceeds ended-up with the colonial government. The unilateral 0 granting of monopoly to multi-national corporations, especially the SLST, sounded the alarm bells that the locals stood to benefit very little from the diamonds. This likewise came at a time when the colonial government was under pressure to generate local revenue for its sustenance and diamonds were a real blessing for them. They had no intensions at all from the beginning to allow the locals direct benefit from the resource. Consequently, disharmony, discontent, sabotage of SLST activities and illegal mining became the pre occupation of most locals. 104 Hayward, Fred, “The Development o f a Radical Political Organization in the Bush: A Case Study of Sierra Leone” in Canadian Journal o f African Studies, Vol. 6, No 1, 1972. 63 By the time Sierra Leone got independence on27th April 1961, “private militia/vigilante groups” had already emerged either around local chiefs or mineral barons benefiting from illicit mining activities. The building blocks for unstable new state were thus already laid with no clear and strong state system to contain it. The two main political parties (Sierra Leone People Party, SLPP and All People’s Congress, APC) that were to dominate Sierra Leone politics during the post independence time focused their agenda on the country’s wealth mainly attributed to the diamonds sector which is discussed in the next chapter. 64 CHAPTER THREE : THE DIAMOND INDUSTRY IN POST COLONIAL SIERRA LEONE, 1961 - 1992 3.1 Introduction A decade before Sierra Leone became independent there was growing pressure from young blacks and educated elite who started to demand for independence from Britain. In 1951 Dr. Milton Margai a British trained medical doctor formed the Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP). The founding members included Albert Margai, step brother to Milton, Siaka Stevens (former Secretary General of the Mine-Workers Union) and others. The National Council of Sierra Leone, NCSL suffered a resounding defeat by the SLPP at the 1952 general elections, giving way to SLPP members in the enlarged Legislative Council to be selected to serve as ministers on the Executive Council in 1953. Dr. Margai himself became the Chief Minister in 1954.l(b However, the Creoles who constituted only 5% of the country’s population retained a disproportionately high representation in the cabinet » and the civil service. The post colonial economy enjoyed a period of boom with increases in the production of diamonds. However, economic benefits still did not seem to trickle down to improve living conditions of the country’s indigenous population. The situation was worse for the indigenous Sierra Leone living in the hinterland. This precipitated a labour strike in 1955 followed by unrest in the north, affecting mostly the chiefs whose authority was more dependent on the British colonial authority. Local farmers refused to pay taxes, disobeyed 105 Kup, “Sierra Leone: A Concise History",pp. 214-218 65 orders to perform communal labour and also discontinued their customary tributes to the chiefs who depended on the British for their security in power. As the rioting continued the chiefs’ properties around the country were destroyed, prompting far-reaching reforms in the existing system of local governance.106 From 1956 to 1961, diamond smuggling by the locals became rampant hence eating into the profits of the SLST. According to the local police, smuggled diamonds were accumulated by traders in Bo, Blama and Kenema and then taken over the border into Liberia. There were two prominent diamond smuggling routes, one over Koidu and another in Kailahun. Another route for smuggling diamond was by river canoe over Mano River into Guinea Conakry.107 According to the estimates published by Sierra Leone Government, the following were the estimated values of smuggled diamonds: ^ 0 Table 1: Summary of Diamond Export Year Amount in British Pounds IT956 14,500,000 fl 957 9,500,000 1958 11,000,000 1959 8,500,000 to 9,000,000 1960 4,000,000 Source: Laan H. L, The Sierra Leone Diamonds: An Economic Study covering the years 1952—1961, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965. p i35. In 1956, the colonial administration reviewed the country’s constitution and made Provisions that catered for representation in the House of Representatives by direct election )07 Fyfe, “A Short History o f Sierra Leone”, pp 206-208. Laan, uThe Sierra Leone Diamonds: An Economic Study covering the years 7952-/961”, Chapter 10. 66 instead of nomination. It however, reserved seats in the House for paramount chiefs with the intention of maintaining their loyalty in order not to tamper with the diamond mining activities by the SLST. From the table, there was significant improvement of government revenues from diamond exports between 1957 and 1958 as the rate of smuggling came down. The reservation of Legislative Council seats to paramount chiefs built internal confidence to the locals who got assured that ultimately, the proceeds from the diamonds will directly trickle to the local and indigenous people. During the 1957 general elections, SLPP won majority of the seats in the House of Representatives. This enabled Sir Margai to become the first Prime Minister of Sierra Leone.108 Margai was old and conservative compared to other emerging West African nationalists.109 The situation made his government unable to control the political and economic affairs of the state. One of the effects was the resumption of diamond smuggling that saw the slump of diamond export from 1958 to 1959. Export earnings from the # diamond export plunged from 8,500,000 pounds in 1959 to 4,000,000 pounds in 1960. In 1959, Albert Margai together with Siaka Stevens broke away from the SLPP to form the Peoples’ National Party (PNP) but when talks in London led to an agreement to grant independence to the colony, another party, United Front Coalition , (UFC) was formed with Dr. Milton Margai as the leader and Albert Margai as the Minister of Agriculture. In I960 Siaka Stevens broke away and formed the All People’s Congress (APC), a party identified with a radical philosophy based on socialist ideas, to tone down the influence of i(^koroma, A.K, Sierra Leone: The Agony o f a Nation, Freetown, Andromeda Publications, 1996.P 3 Richards, “Fightingfor the Rain Forest; War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone’’, pp 38-40. 67 the all-powerful Sir Milton Margai during the independence discussions. Stevens quickly gathered support from the Northern Province, the rural areas and parts of the Western half of the country. ll0Backed by the belief that his support base was enough to win a national election, he initiated a campaign against the talks. He demanded that national elections be held before independence was granted to the country. To drive home his point Stevens started an operation of violence and thuggery aimed at sabotaging the independence process. The Prime Minister ordered his arrest and that of his followers, forcing them to remain incarcerated until the granting of independence on 27th April 1961. 3.2 The Margai Regime (1961-1967) Milton Margai had a soft and non-radical approach towards the former colonial powers, Britain, and France unlike other regional leaders such as, Kwameh Nkrumah of Ghana and Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea respectively. When Sierra Leone became independent in 1961, Margai never articulated new policies^particularly on the country’s main source of t foreign income, the diamond industry. He was knighted by the Queen of England in 1961 for being a pacifist and a non-violent man by nature. He became Sir Milton Margai.111 This elevation to some extent assured the British multi-national corporation of investment continuity in post colonial Sierra Leone. The SLPP was headed by Sierra Leone’s elite and educated citizens. The party also enjoyed support from diverse ethnic and regional representations. The diamond industry just like the iron and bauxite mining was in full control of the SLST, a British Multi- no ,, KuP , “Sierra Leone: A Concise History pp. 209-215 Koroma, “Sierra Leone: The Agony o f a Nation ”, p.6. 68 National Corporation. Margai, a Mende started breaking relations with the indigenous population leading to serious political differences. He was accused of being a stooge of the British and the Creole.112 The accusation was based on his lukewarm approach in dealing with the indigenization of the diamond industry. Sierra Leone’s opposition remained very vocal throughout the decade, openly criticising the Prime Ministers’ members of the cabinet of elitism while ignoring the poor. The criticism focused mainly on the diamond revenues where the APC claimed that the government was not interested in nationalising the SLST. Most APC members had modest education having worked as clerks and supervisors in mining industry. In the 1962 elections, Stevens and his party, APC won 20 out of the 62 seats in parliament. Support in the North, the West and Kono district expanded as the party came to be seen as the defender of the suppressed. During this period it came as no surprise when Stevens was voted as the Mayor of Freetown due to'his previous record as an agitator for the $ indigenization of the economy.113 The Creole were very dominant in the public sector and other economic activities due to their early exposure to education that the indigenous communities seriously lacked. The first cabinet instituted immediately after independence had five ministers of Creole origin. This number was considered high since the community constituted a mere 5% of the entire population of Sierra Leone. Even though' the Creole were a very small community compared to the Mende, Temne and the Limba they had the highest literacy rate, 80% jJj Laan, “The Sierra Leone Diamonds: An Economic Study covering the years 1952-1961”, pp. 12 to 16. Koroma, “Sierra Leone: The Agony o f a Nation”, 1996. pp 1-7 69 compared to 6% that of the indigenous population. Apart from the British workforce in the diamond mining industry, the Creole were the most prominent in the mining and marketing of the mineral. The indigenous or locals had little access and economic benefit from the diamond sector. The indigenous people viewed the Creoles as collaborators of the Multi-National Corporations and a conduit of diamond exploitation in the country. The economy of Sierra Leone at the time of independence was heavily dependent on two main sectors, agriculture and mining. Agriculture was dominated by palm oil production and groundnuts. The mining sector relied on diamond, iron ore and bauxite but the former contributed almost a half of the earnings. The agricultural sector employed directly and indirectly about seven hundred thousand people out of the two million citizens.114When Sir Milton Margai suddenly died in office in April 1964 due to poor health, his younger brother Albert Margai replaced him in a very controversial political scheming.115 # The regime change brought serious consequences for the SLPP. It resulted in political pressure from the opposition, All People’s Congress, APC. The leader of (APC) was Siaka Stevens.116 Stevens, a Temne with a Limba maternal ancestry believed that the Dr John Karefa, a Temne, should have succeeded Milton Margai. Karefa had replaced Siaka Stevens as Minister for Mines after the May 1957 elections. During his tenure as Minister for Mines, Karefa tightened Government’s control on the licensed diamond dealers hence Gberie L, “A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and Destruction o f Sierra Leone”, pp 18 -26. Wikpedia http{/ www bockrag^ocm MillorvMagtMi-1 "EncyckpediaofWarld Biogapty’ 2006. (Accessed 17.12007) 116 u - Hirsch, “Sierra Leone; Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy”, p. 28. 70 enhancing government revenues through strict monitoring of diamond industry.• j 117 The Creole who were close to Milton Margai started joining APC after sensing that Albert Margai’s popularity was dwindling very fast and it was just a matter of time that the Sierra Leone People’s Party, SLPP was going to lose political power in Sierra Leone. Albert Margai, a British trained lawyer started a nationwide campaign to introduce one-party state. He was indirectly supported by the British government through the SLST, which was enjoying the monopoly of diamond mining at commercial level. Both the British government and the SLST were very cautious on Siaka Stevens who was viewed as a radical and a politician whose tendencies were influenced by communist Soviet ideology.118 Incidentally, Albert Margai’s reign had been known as one of the most progressive in the history of Sierra Leone. A boom in the economy allowed him to open many schools and his legal background permitted him to recognise the benefit of a free press. He had no » problems incorporating the ideas of the opposition into government policy. Meanwhile, Stevens took the time to build formidable political machinery aimed at galvanising support from all the comers of the country through his one party campaign.119 However, shortly before the 1967 general elections, Margai had literally abandoned the one party campaign. His popularity went down steadily immediately he took power from his brother Milton. In spite of Margai’s advantage of incumbency, Siaka Steven’s APC won the 17 March 1967 election even though it was not by a large margin. ^Taan , “The Sierra Leone Diamonds: An Economic Study covering the years 1952-1961", p. 24 ! Koroma, “Sierra Leone: The Agony o f a Nation ”, pp. 3-10. Hirsch, ‘‘‘'Sierra Leone: diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy", p.28 71 Shortly before the announcement of the final election results in 1967, the army chief Brigadier David Lansana stopped the swearing ceremony of Siaka Stevens as the new Prime Minister of Sierra Leone. Thereafter, both Siaka Stevens and the Governor - General, a Creole were arrested and locked up in the Pademba Road Prison, Freetown. Brigadier Lansana accused the Governor -General of acting unconstitutionally in announcing Siaka Stevens as the winner of the controversial elections. A day after these arrests, three army majors unseated Brigadier Lansana and setup a National Reformation Council (NRC) under Major Andrew Juxon-Smith. A year later, April 1968, the NRC was overthrown by junior officers and set up the Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Council, which promptly handed over power to Siaka Stevens in the same year, 1968. 3.3 Siaka Stevens Rule 1968 - 1985 The post-Margai era was a period of political upheavals in Sierra Leone. The ouster of Juxon paved the way for the return of Siaka Stevens from exile in Guinea and the eventual # restoration of parliamentary democracy. Siaka Stevens and the APC were brought back to power with Chief Justice Teja-Sie as the Governor General on 26 April 1968. He had been overthrown by the Army Commander, Brigadier David Lansana on 21 March 1967. Stevens was sworn in as Prime Minister, and a coalition government of APC and SLPP was formed.121 On 19th April 1971, Sierra Leone became a republic and Siaka Stevens became the first executive president.122 For Stevens, the immediate problem for his regime was consolidation of power. One of his first actions was to shore up his relation with the military. His lesson was terse, the survival of democracy and the regime depended on how ^ Kup , “Sierra Leone: A Concise H istory”, pp. 218-221. Koroma,, “Sierra Leone: The Agony o f A Nation”, pp 9-13 Ibid, p.220. 72 he could constantly divert the military away from ever developing an interest in political affairs.123 Stevens had problems in retaining state access to diamond resources through SLST. The public wanted and campaigned for greater access to diamonds. He strived to have greater control over diamonds but feared that his weak government could face an embargo on US and British aid incase he went ahead and nationalised the mining sector. He devised a way of surviving by removing diamonds from the official government control in order to have an opportunity to reward his henchmen. Stevens went ahead and created a new mining company known as National Diamond Mining Company, (NDMC).124 This saw official diamond production and purchases fall instead of rising due to mismanagement by the NDNC of the diamond industry. In the year he came to power, diamond production dropped to 1.86 million carats and went # further down to 1.4 million carats in 1973. The largest decrease of diamonds came from the alluvial class signaling the rise of illicit mining which actually was more practiced by the indigenous people since it did not require high capital investment. It was clear that the formation of the NDMC was a ploy by Stevens to legitimise diamond smuggling through the approval of Ministry of Mines. Licenses for mining were actually not coming from the ministry but State House through a clique that was close to the President. Kup , “Sierra Leone: A Concise History”, pp.281 -222 Reno, “Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone", pp.88. Reno, “Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone pp.79 73 Lebanese immigrants first came to West Africa in the middle of nineteenth century. The first Lebanese in Sierra Leone arrived in 1893, the first group being Maronite Christians then followed by Shia Muslims. By the start of World War I, Lebanese had become an economically powerful community in Sierra Leone concentrating in business and general merchandise. In 1919, Sierra Leone experienced rice scarcity and riots broke against the Lebanese blaming them for the shortage. This was one of the major incidents that contributed to the Lebanese having a negative image in Sierra Leone. The situation persist to date due to their closeness to suspected powerful government officials in any given 19 f \ regime in Sierra Leone. The table below shows the breakdown of licenses issued to both dealers of African and Lebanese heritage covering the period of 1968-1973 purported to be from the Ministry of Mines. Table 2: Export Licenses L eb an ese A frican Year Number of Dealers % Number of Dealers % 1968 28 15 151 85 1969 27 16 143 84 1970 60 36 104 64 1971 42 33 86 67 1972 90 55 73 45 J973 107 78 30 22 Source: Compiled from Ministry of Mines reports, in Government of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Gazette (Freetown: Government Printer, 1968-1973) In 1968, Africans who were issued with licenses were 85% while Lebanese were just 15%. % 1973, 78% of those who were issued with licenses were Lebanese while only 22% were Sierra Leonean - Lebanese 74 Africans. The Lebanese surpassed Africans in acquiring the licenses due to systematic and deliberate favors given to Lebanese through suspected bribery and patronage which was being done by Stevens’ cronies. Stevens made changes in his government and those of proven loyalty were deployed in sensitive and lucrative areas i.e. internal security and the mining ministries. Voluntary military enlistment slowly gave way to enlistment through political patronage. Politicians and well-connected persons were given special cards, which they gave out to young men of their choice to join the army. These cards excluded recruits intending to join the Sierra Leone Army, SLA from undergoing vigorous physical fitness test before being considered for enlistment. This system produced a serious diminishing of military standards since characters of all shades were recruited irrespective of prevailing military requirements. 127 The new government passed through a period of instability caused by serious political bickering between supporters of APC and SLPP that culminated in another coup attempt » that forced Stevens to declare a republican constitution under the commonwealth in April 1971. In the 1970’s there was a near collapse of government presence in Kono. Distribution of state resources drastically disappeared. The locals felt alienated and marginalized from Freetown. A third of the government’s budget came from diamond revenue. Illicit diamond mining and smuggling was directly eating' into the diamond industry hence reducing government revenue. The indigenous people preferred illicit sale of diamonds to smugglers 127 . . Kup, Sierra Leone: A Concise History ”, pp. 218-222. 75 to selling to De-Beers Company because returns were high for them. The smuggled diamonds (usually through Liberia and Guinea) did not attract any government taxation. All important decisions were now made by the prime minister and his right hand man, a Lebanese businessman, Jamil Mohammed. The same period saw the government revenue collection from the diamond proceeds dropping by almost 60%. This caused the government to be in a hard economic situation. In 1973, Stevens called for general elections which took place as the last elections were held in 1967.128 These elections gave Stevens an opportunity to consolidate his political power by getting rid of the party of members who he perceived to be his enemies. He managed to drop a number of APC top officials particularly from Freetown and Bo. Subsequently, he asserted personal control and influence over APC although this did not go down well with the population. This contrasted sharply with inherited colonial notions of a sovereign state power where the indigenous population was under total control of the 0 government. According to Reno: “In contrast to colonial rule, Stevens aimed to create a firm link between himself and local political interests. Not able to rule over society, Stevens had to rule society itself’.129 In 1973 Siaka Stevens and William Tolbert of Liberia signed a treaty forming the Mano River Union to facilitate trade between the two countries - with Guinea joining in 1980. The treaty was expected to regulate trade within the three countries hence curbing the smuggling of Sierra Leone diamonds through the porous borders of both Liberia and 129Koroma > “Sierra Leone: The Agony o f a Nation”, p.20. Reno, “Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone", p.102 76 Guinea.130 From 1974 to 1982, the distribution of dealer licenses in the diamond industry rose sharply with Lebanese outnumbering Africans. This actually reversed the intended purpose of passing more influence/control to Africans in the diamond mining. What came out clearly was that Stevens grossly abused his powers by patronizing the issuance of these licenses to his political cronies and Lebanese who were actually bribing senior government officials to acquire licenses. In 1974, the Minister of Finance through the influence of Stevens announced that the government was granting private export licenses to five individuals to export 20% of Sierra Leone diamonds. The move was meant to reduce DeBeers monopoly in overseas marketing of Sierra Leone’s diamonds. DeBeers feared that this new directive would spiral illicit mining and sell of diamonds hence it offered and assisted the government to increase the capacity to produce and manage diamond resources. The approach by DeBeers offered little control over distribution and marketing of diamonds. The aim of Stevens in granting 0 private export licenses was to reward political allies. Out of the 20% private export licenses hived from DeBeers, 12% went to an Afro- Lebanese dealer, Jamil Said Mohamed and his three associates. The four were close associates of Stevens. 130 Hirsch, “Sierra Leone; Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy”, pp.24 & 63 77 Tab!e3: Distribution of Diamond Dealer Licenses, 1973-82 L eb an ese A frican Year Number of Shares % Number of Shares % 1973 107 78 30 22 1974 152 75 52 25 1975 134 79 36 21 1976 110 65 57 35 1977 88 64 49 36 1978 99 70 42 30 1979 139 66 72 34 1980 102 56 79 44 1981 104 62 63 38 1982 96 73 36 27 Source: Compiled from Ministry of Mines, “Government Notices- List of Alluvial Diamond Dealer Licences.” 1983 Going by the above figures, the distribution of diamond dealers was being dominated by Lebanese businessmen. This distribution seriously affected the overall revenue collection from the diamond industry hence the government got starved financially. Arising from Stevens actions of patronizing the diamond industry, political agitation continued throughout the reign of Stevens clouding both the 1973 and 1977 elections. The SLPP was the loser in both as the APC used its position of incumbency to ensure its hold on power although the party was unpopular nationwide. In May 1978, the APC-dominated parliament passed a law making Sierra Leone a one party state. The civil service and the judiciary subsequently suffered flagrant interference from APC party politicians. SLPP members in parliament were allowed to remain as APC supporters and some were given cabinet positions. From a turnover of over two million carats in 1970, legitimate diamond exports dropped to 595,000 carats in 1980 and then to only 48,000 in 1988. 78 When Stevens came to power in 1968, the diamond industry was reasonably under the SLST. The government got revenue from the diamond sector in a transparent procedure. By 1984, the situation was gloomy as mining was more in the hands of unscrupulous and corrupt businessmen who were always evading paying any taxes to the government. In 1984, SLST pulled out of Sierra Leone and transferred all its shares to a Canadian owned |T| # company, Precious Metal Mining Company, (PMMC). The reason behind SLST pull out was unfair competition in the diamond industry from smugglers who enjoyed patronage of government officials. The diamond mining industry was now in a very chaotic position with PMMC inheriting a number of problems including ageing machines, debts and managerial difficulties. Almost 90% of the diamond industry was operating under Lebanese cartels with direct blessings from Siaka Stevens. By 1985, Sierra Leone’s official diamond export stood at a paltry 50,000 carats per annum. Official corruption compounded with the collapse of the state # infrastructure made much of the diamonds into the hands of smugglers and illegal cartels with patronage from businessmen and high ranking government officials.132 Stevens retired in 1985, after a period of misrule through corruption and patronage mainly through diamonds proceeds that were to benefit the state but instead went to individual pockets. He handed over a bankrupt state to his handpicked successor, the lackluster army |3* Koroma, “Sierra Leone: The Agony o f a Nation”, p.92 Smillie, Gberie & Hazleton “Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone Diamonds and Human Security” < http://www.pacweb.Org/e/pdf/heart%20ofVo20the%20matter.doc > (Accessed 24 February 2006) Richards, “Fighting for the Rain Forest; War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone”, p.41 79 commander Joseph Momoh.134 Stevens lived peacefully in Freetown till he died of a stroke at an estimated age of 85 years. 3.4 Joseph Momoh Rule, 1985-1992 At the APC national convention in August 1985, Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh the commander of Sierra Leone Army was elected as the Secretary General of the party. It was evident that Stevens had been grooming him for succession to the throne instead of Sorie Ibrahim Koroma who was the first Vice-President of the republic and expected successor, in accordance with the country’s constitution. Following Momoh ascension, Koroma resigned together with Stevens giving room for General Momoh as the only contesting candidate. Momoh subsequently won the November 1985 elections with over 99% of the votes. He was sworn in as the President of Sierra Leone on 26lh January 1986.135 The new President’s strong links with the army^and his verbal attacks on corruption earned # him much needed initial support in the country. During the last days of Stevens, negotiations had been opened with the IMF and World Bank that ended up in the acceptance of IMF conditionalities and the floating of the national currency, the Leone. However, little had changed with the coming of Momoh. There were no new faces in the cabinet thus criticisms soon arose that Momoh was simply perpetuating the rule of Stevens.I3<1 To counteract, Momoh called early general elections in 1986. He returned many of the old faces to power but his firm control of the situation prompted Stevens to believe that Momoh was not the person he had believed to be. Momoh was simply not 134 |3jGberie, “A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and Destruction o f Sierra Leone”, pp.34-35. , Koroma , “77ie Agony o f a Nation”, pp. 53-56 Hirsch, “Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy", p.30 80 controllable as per Stevens’ strategy when he single hand- picked him as his successor. A coup attempt led by Stevens’ former bodyguard was foiled, but some 60 people including top cabinet members were arrested and unconfirmed rumours held that Stevens was under house arrest.137 Sixteen of the alleged plotters were later charged, six were hanged, six sentenced to life imprisonment, and four released. A cabinet reshuffle was necessary to bring into place staunch Momoh supporters. Momoh inherited a divided APC, very weak army, and an economic crisis. Between 1984 and 1992, official diamond exports declined as a percentage of total exports from 31 to 21 percent, and 33 to 50 percent of diamonds were suspected to be smuggled out of the country. During the same period, state spending on health and education declined by 60 percent. In 1988, Sierra Leone was unable to pay arrears on the country’s foreign debts. From 1985 to 1989 Sierra Leone economy was bedeviled with chronic mismanagement of the diamond industry. Momoh defused the situation by sacking the culprits who included top cabinet ministers. To formalise his war against corruption, he announced a “Code of Conduct for Political Leaders and Public Servants”. The code generally barred cabinet ministers and senior civil servants from engaging themselves in business and contracts associated with government but Momoh lacked resources to enforce government control.139 A British Broadcasting Corporation, documentary, Trade Slaves, appearing in 1990, showed a detailed economic and political rot in Sierra Leone. The mining sector, m Gberie, “A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and Destruction o f Sierra Leone”, p.35. Adebajo, “Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea- Bissau”, p.81. Reno , “Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone”, pp. 160-166. 81 particularly of diamond and titanium, were under a small clique of foreigners. This assertion was supported by a number of Kenyan military observers who served in the UNAMSIL and were interviewed during this research. They unanimously agreed that diamonds revenue never benefited the common citizen in Sierra Leone.140 The observation on the ground showed poverty and all signs of misrule and chronic corruption. The documentary showed the potential of a wealthy country endowed with natural resources, one of the leading diamond producers in the world, rainfall throughout the year, clean snow-white sandy beaches and a population that is 70% at its productive level. However, this was the same country that lacked communication infra-structure, the country’s life expectancy stood at forty two years, and the civil service and army were in salary arrears.141 142 The overall export of diamonds from Sierra Leone in early seventies to late eighties was a continuous downfall. During the same period, the neighbouring countries of Guinea, Liberia and Ivory Coast realised significant diamond export even # though these countries produced no diamonds at all.14- While the revenue earnings from the country’s diamond were dwindling, another challenge emerged to face Momoh. The wave of democratisation that was sweeping across Africa after the end of the Cold War put him under pressure to introduce multi- party democracy. He initially refused to accept multi-party democracy in 1990 because he thought it would Interviews with Kenyan military officers who had served with UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone. The officers did not wish to be named. For a review o f the documentary , see Chris Simpson , ‘A lost Cause ’ BBC television documentary 20Ih October 1991 142 Smillie, Gberie & Hazleton “Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone Diamonds and Human Security” < http://www.pacweb.Org/e/pdf/heart%20of%20the%20matter.doc > (Accessed 24 February 2006) 82 further polarise the country on ethnic grounds, but in August the same year he conceded to constitutional reforms that limited the Presidency to two five-year terms and introduced multi-party democracy. The new constitution was approved by a 60% vote in a 75% voters turn out.143 During the period of 1990 to 1992, Momoh was fighting three types of enemies. First and foremost he was fighting for his legitimacy before a strong opposition and the public who viewed him as a puppet planted by Stevens. Secondly, there was runaway inflation and a collapsed economy exacerbated by rampant corruption in the diamond industry. According to Paul Richards: “Momoh was unable to resolve the major contradictions, now increasingly apparent, between official aid-supported state on one hand and a shadow state largely funded from clandestine diamond operations on the other”144 Thirdly, the war that was started by the Revolutionary United Front, RUF rebels under Foday Sankoh in 1990 became the final blow that brought down his regime. The economy » was in decline; a freefall for the value of the country’s currency, the Leone. There was chronic shortage of essential commodities (fuel and medicine). The education system collapsed compounded with rampant corruption both in the private and public sectors. Nepotism and tribalism were prevalent. The life expectancy drastically dropped. The government revenue was at its lowest ebb with almost a complete diminishing of diamonds Abdullah, I, (ed) Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War, University o f South Africa Press, 2004.p.82 144 Richards , “Fightingfor the Rain Forest; War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone", pp.41-41. 83 revenue which normally accounted for almost half of the country’s export earnings. The profits from diamonds were now being pocketed directly by Momoh and his cronies. 145 146 The beginning of the 1992 civil war culminated in non payment of salaries and allowances to the Sierra Leone Army, SLA. By 1999 troops deployed to counter the RUF insurgency had gone for three months without pay. One group of soldiers led by a 26 year old lieutenant Solomon Musa abandoned their military positions at the eastern front and marched to the capital, Freetown and on 29th April 1999 they seized the State House, the official residence of the Head of State. President Saidu Momoh tenure ended on that day as he fled to neighbouring Guinea and asked for political asylum.146 3.5 Conclusion During the reign of the Margai’s (Milton and Albert) the diamond industry was fairly managed save for the exploitation by the SLST. The discontent was due to the struggle $ over the control of the minerals between the SLST and the indigenous population. Margai like the British failed to address the problem of genuinely transferring the ownership of the diamonds industry to the full state control. Illicit mining and smuggling was still rampant but the government was collecting revenue from the sector at a reasonable rate. Despite this challenge Sierra Leone was a well functioning state. Siaka Stevens came to power through rhetorical political gestures that he would ensure the diamonds sector came under the control of the indigenous people. He knew from his past 145 146 Reno , “Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone ”, pp. 150-175 Jackson M, In Sierra Leone, London, Duke University Press, 2004. pp. 142-143. 84 experience in the mining sector that this was what the locals wanted to hear. When in power, he immediately started the decentralisation of the mining sector allowing more licenses to local and Lebanese dealers. From the face value, this sounded convenient to the citizens of Sierra Leone. However, what emerged later was that Stevens actually used the localisation of the diamond not to benefit the citizens but to ensure that the diamond sector was put under the control of his cronies and supporters for political and personal enrichment. Stevens deserves full blame of running down the diamond industry as demonstrated by the export figures during his tenure. When Momoh came to power in 1985, an opportunity arose to correct the wrongs made by Stevens in the diamond sector. Clearly, this was another missed opportunity as Momoh proved no better than Stevens. He was a carryover of Stevens if not worse. Momoh lacked the political and economic art of steering Sierra Leone from the woods. During Momoh’s rule like that of Stevens, he allowed his associates a free hand to mine and sell diamonds # through organised smugglers mainly of Lebanese origin . He turned the country into a personal entity the same way Stevens had done. Sierra Leone was under the control of a clique of informal businessmen in collaboration with a small clique of powerful political elite and government officials with little interest in carrying out formal state functions. The post colonial leadership of Sierra Leone was nothing but a chain of corrupt leaders that brought the country to its knees. The precious stones (diamonds) that were to bring peace and prosperity became the source of a decade long conflict as we shall see in the next chapter. 85 CHAPTER FOUR: THE CIVIL WAR, 1992-2002 4.1 Introduction gy 1990, Sierra Leone was almost a collapsed state. The government organs were non functional. The education sector was grounded to a halt. The Sierra Leone Army, SLA was in disarray as the soldiers were more occupied in corrupt activities including smuggling of diamonds and illegal logging of timber since the state could not meet their monthly salaries. The State coffers were empty. Frontline troops deployed at the border with Liberia had gone for three months without pay.147 The chronic diversion of state resources (diamonds) through patronage networks led to the creation of what Reno termed as a ‘Shadow State’.148 149 Diamond exports by the government from 1991 to 2001 were at the lowest level while export of the same minerals from non diamond producing countries shot up. During this period (1991-2001) Liberia and Guinea suddenly became the biggest exporters of rough diamonds from Africa.14? 0 In this chapter, we shall discuss the war in relation to the diamond sector with a focus on the peace accords that were negotiated and signed to end the conflict. The chapter also discusses the role that the neighbouring countries played in sustaining the conflict through the sponsorship of the RUF by the Liberian president, Charles Taylor in return for illegal mining and smuggling of diamonds for personal enrichment and sustenance of the conflict. 14 ? Gberie , "A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and Destruction o f Sierra Leone", p.68. 148 Reno , “Shadow States and the Political Economy o f civil Wars," pp. 43-68. 149 Global Policy Forum, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000) Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone S/2000/1195 20 December 2000. 86 Realism is the main theoretical framework/paradigm that guides the analysis in this chapter. The chapter concludes with a description of the new initiative of certifying the diamonds in global transactions as a way of monitoring ‘Conflict Diamonds’ and how this endeavor finally managed to stop the war in Sierra Leone. 4.2 The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) On 23rd March 1991 about sixty Sierra Leonean, Liberian and Burkinabe soldiers/rebels led by Foday Sankoh (a former corporal with the Sierra Leone Army) attacked two border villages in eastern Sierra Leone from neighbouring Liberia.IMI Four days later, 300 fighters captured the town of Buedu. Sierra Leone forces repulsed the attack into Liberia's Lofa County. Fighting ensued again in Kailahun, Sierra Leone's Eastern Province. Despite the backing of ECOMOG’s troops who were already deployed along the Sierra Leone and Liberian common border (April 1991), efforts by government forces to contain the insurgents failed for lack of equipment, poor pay and lack of political support.Anti- Taylor Liberians in Sierra Leone and Guinea offered their military support to the Sierra Leone government and formed the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia, (UL1MO) under Al-Haji Koroma. ULIMO advanced into the diamond mining and timber areas of eastern Sierra Leone and western Liberia. Hirsch , “Sierra Leone; Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy", p 61 In April 1991, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Guinea deployed troops under ECOMOG mandate along the Sierra Leone and Liberian border to repulse incursion into Sierra Leone from the remnants ex-Liberian soldiers of Samuel Doe, RUF and Charles Taylor’s fighters. See Aboagye pp 232-233. 87 In the diamond areas, local populations were displaced for ‘security’ reasons, and military groups engaged themselves in illegal diamond mining.1'2 On 29lh April 1992 junior military officers carried out a bloodless coup overthrowing Joseph Saidu Momoh. Momoh fled to Guinea, Conakry. The coup plotters formed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) and named a twenty seven year old Captain Valentine Strasser as Chairman. Strasser joined the army as a cadet under the patronage system which had been devised by the APC during Siaka Stevens’ period. The patronage system was meant to keep the army compliant to the APC leadership. Strasser was a battalion paymaster.133 He promised to end the civil war and worked towards the restoration of democracy, but fighting intensified. The government lost total physical sovereignty in the south with RUF controlling the entire diamond mining region. In May 1992 the RUF extended an olive branch to the NPRC, called a halt to ambushes, and invited the NPRC to hold talks on developing a joint programme aimed at bringing the # war to an end. According to the RUF, the initiative got no response and NPRC representatives traveled to Nigeria and Ghana seeking military aid. Foday Sankoh claimed that the RUF insurgency was not intended to be a war of securing posts in Sierra Leone but to remove a corrupt regime from power.154 In September-October 1992, the RUF pushed from Kailahun into the diamond-rich Kono District. This may have been aided by military indiscipline on the side of SLA which was part of the repercussions and effects of an army that had been recruiting its staff through corruption as opposed to merit. 152 Richards, “Fightingfor the Rain Forest; War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone", p. 12. Gberie, “A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and Destruction o f Sierra Leone”, pp.68 to 71. Jackson, “In Sierra Leone", p.142. 88 The Liberian leader Charles Taylor used his position as president to import arms secretly purporting to be for the Liberian government but the same weapons were being smuggled into Sierra Leone for the RUF. The weapons supplied to RUF by Taylor were small arms. These included AK-47 rifles, light portable mortars, hand grenades, rocket propelled grenades and landmines. In return the RUF allowed Taylor to access illegal diamonds fields in Sierra Leone that were under the rebels’ control.155 The diamonds fields of Sierra Leone became part of NPFL Empire as all the diamond mining was under the indirect control of Charles Taylor through the RUF.156 Taylor had three main motives in supporting the RUF: benefit from the chaotic/ corrupt diamond trade in Sierra Leone, force Sierra Leone to withdraw from ECOMOG and to install if possible a puppet leadership in Freetown.157 Captain Strasser was under international pressure to return Sierra Leone back to democratic governance. In response, Strasser announced a two-year transition to democratic rule, with elections to be held by the end of 1995. However, RUF adopted very brutal tactics which were mainly meant to instill fear into the civilian population. Democracy could not happen under these circumstances with inhuman acts which included amputation of children’s limbs, abduction of young girls most of them between the age of seven and twelve years and forcefully marrying them off to rebel soldiers. Child soldiers 155 Global Policy Forum, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution • 306 (2000) Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone S/2000/1195 20 December 2000. 89 were rampant within the RUF.158 The child soldiers were initiated through open brutal execution of innocent civilians followed by use of drugs in order to make them more brutal and merciless.159 The NPRC declared 'total war' on the RUF, but by April 1996 the insurgents had become active in the centre of the country and the army launched new offensives. Subsequently, the rebels changed tactics, opting for a policy of lightning raids in the centre and in the north. The inability of the government to pay its soldiers led to massive desertion into the RUF ranks. It is estimated that as much as 40 per cent of the new recruits in the Sierra Leone army had deserted and joined the rebels by the end of 1996. Public and international goodwill towards the NPRC plummeted as the young soldiers indulged in drugs, corruption and abuses against opponents and ordinary civilians. In the countryside, evidence grew of some soldiers milking the war economy for personal gain and collusion with the RUF in attacks on civilians. The RUF was in firm control of Kono and Yengema $ regions controlling the entire diamond mining sector of Sierra Leone.160 The RUF launched attacks on the provincial centres of Bo and Kenema, as well as a major refugee camp near Bo guarded by Nigerian troops. The insurgents attacked rutile and bauxite mines further south, seizing more hostages, destroying plant equipment and carrying off loot. The RUF took control of hills near Freetown. lSg For more about child soldiers, read ( Ilene Cohn & Guy Goodwin-Gill, Child Soldiers: The role o f Children in Armed conflict, Geneva, Clarendon Press-Oxford, 1994) Campbell G, Blood Diamonds, Oxford, Westview Publishers, 2004.pp. 157-160. 60 Aboagye, “ECOMOG: A Sub -Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution", pp 82-83. 90 Expatriates and other foreigners were advised to leave the country by their respective governments. The NPRC turned to mercenaries to shore up their military fortunes. This was after a contingent of Gurkhas (British infantry soldiers of Nepalese origin) was mauled in an ambush by the RUF.161 The British government had sent these troops as an attempt to secure Freetown from RUF take over. A South African led mercenary group, Executive Outcomes (EO), was also hired by the Sierra Leone government to counter RUF incursions. In return, the EO was given some concessions in the diamond industry. The EO was formed in 1989, following the conclusion of South African border wars in Angola and Namibia. It drew most of its soldiers from retired members of the South African Defence Forces, (SADF) particularly from the units that were fighting in Angola and Namibia. The soldiers were notorious in carrying out covert assassinations of government opponents, and worked to bypass the United Nations anti-apartheid sanctions by setting up overseas companies.162 In March 1995, Executive Outcomes signed an # agreement with the Sierra Leone government to contain the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) with the aim of regaining control of the diamond fields, and force a peace deal with the rebels. To evade being termed as a mercenary group, the EO operated under the cover of private security company. The EO sourced its weaponry from the former Soviet 161 Richards , “Fightingfor the Rain Forest; War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone”, pp 16. International Crisis Group , Conflict Prevention and Resolution ,< http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfin?action=conflict search&l= 1 &t= 1 &c countrv=96 >(Accessed ^November 2006) 91 Republics. EO cleared the RUF from the environs of Freetown, retook the bauxite and rutile mines and secured the Kono diamond fields within a few months.163 4.3 The Fragile Peace Accords Towards the end of 1996, it became clear that the conflict in Sierra Leone required more of a diplomatic solution rather than a military approach. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, a lawyer and a former United Nations employee became the president of Sierra Leone on 17,h March 1996 after defeating John Karefa Smart of United National People’s Party in a runoff election Both the international community and regional leaders started engaging the warring groups in serious dialogue with the aim of a peace agreement. On 30th November 1996, a peace agreement was signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF in Abidjan. The agreement was known as “Abidjan peace agreement”. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, signed on behalf of the government of Sierra Leone while Foday Sankoh signed on behalf of the RUF.. Those who witnessed the signing of the agreement were the # President of Cote d’Tvoire, Henry Konan Bedie, United Nations’ special envoy for Sierra Leone, Berhanu Dinka,a representative of the Organisation of African Unity, OAU, Adwoa Coleman and a representative of the Commonwealth Organisation, Moses Anafu.164 The accord contained 28 articles. In articles 1 and 2 both sides to the conflict agreed to end the war with immediate effect to ensure that a total cessation of hostilities was to be observed forthwith and to give the establishment and consolidation of a just peace priority. 63 Sm Smillie, Gberie & Hazleton “Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone Diamonds and Human Security” < bBB://www.pacweb.org/e/pdf/heart%20of)/o20the%20matter.doc > (Accessed 24 February 2006) Sierra Leone Web “Abidjan Peace Accord” < http://Avww.sierra-leone.org/abidianaccord.html > (Accessed 25 August 2007) 92 A National Commission for the consolidation of peace was to have been established within two weeks of the signing of the agreement to monitor implementation of its provisions. Article 3 established a peace commission to coordinate and facilitate the work of six new bodies: a Socio-Economic Forum, Citizens’ Consultative Conferences, A Multi-Partisan Council, a Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace, a Demobilization and Resettlement Committee, and a National Budget and Debt Committee. The peace commission was to have tremendous powers in the pursuit of its mandate. For example, it had the power to organize its work in the manner in which it deemed most appropriate and was to make its findings public. It was also to be provided with an office, adequate communication facilities and adequate secretariat support to carry out its duties; it could make recommendations on measures to help the implementation and development of the provisions of the agreement; prepare preliminary legislative drafts necessary for the implementation of the agreement; and inspect any activity or site linked to the implementation of the accord. In addition no action could be taken by the government or RUF on any matter relating to the accord without consulting the commission. Both the government and the RUF were expected to comply with the conclusions of the Commission. The proposed trust fund was to provide funding for the implementation of the Accord.1 65 165 165 e. oierra Leone Web “Abidjan Peace Accord” < http:///www.sierra-leone.org/abidianaccord.html > (Accessed 25 August 2007) 93 Article 4 laid out the provision for the formation of Yearly Citizens’ Consultative Conferences to ensure popular participation in the national political process. Article 5 addressed the issue of disarmament of the Combatants in designated assembly zones, and their demobilization and reintegration into society were to be done as soon as practicable after the disarmament. The government and the commission, assisted by the international community, were entrusted with the responsibility to look after the welfare of encamped combatants. Article 6 was on the formation of demobilization and resettlement committee that was to co-ordinate the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement of the RUF/SL combatants. Article 7 covered on the movement of combatants in designated assembly zones. This was to be followed by the identification of the genuine ex- combatants by the demobilization committee within three months from the signing of the accord. The international community was asked to help supervise'and monitor the encampment, disarmament, » demobilization and reintegration processes. Article 8 focused on the formation of a joint monitoring group, comprising representatives of the government and the RUF. This group was to observe the work of all stipulated activities at all stages. In addition, a neutral monitoring group from the international community, which was to be deployed for an initial period of three months, was responsible for monitoring breaches of the ceasefire (Art. 11). The peace commission was, as a priority, to make recommendations on the restructuring of the military. The RUF combatants who wished to enlist in the national army can become part of the new unified armed forces within a framework to be discussed ^d agreed upon by the Commission. 94 Article 10 involved the issue of foreign troops and was about the South African mercenary outfit Executive Outcomes (EO). The outfit was to be withdrawn five weeks after the deployment of the neutral monitoring group, confined to barracks and supervised by the joint and neutral monitoring groups. Other foreign troops were to be repatriated not later than three months after the deployment of the neutral monitoring group or six months after the signing of the Agreement, whichever was earlier. The RUF was allowed to register as a political movement within thirty days of the signing of the accord. The international community was to be approached to contribute resources to a trust fund to help the RUF transform itself into a political party. No judicial action was to be taken against any member of the RUF/SL in respect to the participation in the war pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization up to the time of the signing of the agreement. Furthermore, legislative measures were to be taken to ensure that RUF combatants and political exiles would enjoy their full civil and political rights within the 0 framework of the law. The mandate of the existing National Unity and Reconciliation Commission was to be expanded to help heal the wounds of the war, and to promote civic education, national unity and reconciliation (Art. 15). An Ombudsman was to be created to raise the standards of accountability, probity and integrity in the public service (Art. 16). There was to be a reform of the electoral system to ensure full participation of citizens and their organizations in the political process, and the independence and integrity of the National Electoral Commission (NEC). The RUF, the government and other political parties were to nominate people of professionalism, 95 integrity and objectivity to the NEC not later than three months after the signing of the accord. No member of NEC was to be eligible to hold political office in any government formed as a result of an election they were mandated to conduct (Art. 18). The government and the RUF agreed to respect the basic civil and political liberties of all individuals as enshrined in international declarations of the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, and to release all political prisoners and prisoners of war (Arts. 19 and 21). An independent National Commission on Human Rights was to be established to promote human rights education, monitor violations and institute legal proceedings where appropriate. It was to seek technical and material assistance from the UN Special Commission on Human Rights, the UN Centre for Human Rights (now the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights), and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (Art. 20). x- The independence of the judiciary was to be strengthened, and the existing Judicial and Legal Service Commission was to be reconstituted to help defend the independence of the judiciary from both the state and political parties. Representatives from the lay public were to be appointed to join judges, other legal officers and civil servants who already constituted the Legal Commission (Art. 24). There was to be a review and re-orientation of the police force in order to deepen its professionalism and respect for the rule of law and to Protect it from political, ideological and social pressures. Furthermore, the police council 96 was to draw its membership from a broad section of society to ensure that it upheld its truly civilian and non-partisan character (Art. 25). In the pursuit of the goals of reconstruction, rehabilitation and development, special attention was to be given to rural and urban poor areas, war victims, disabled persons and other vulnerable groups (Art. 22). The values of grassroots participation, the empowerment of rural communities and the urban poor in productive activities and decision-making processes, and the equitable distribution of national resources would inform the socio economic policy of the country. A broad-based Socio-Economic Forum was to be responsible for the elaboration and pursuit of improving the quality of life of the population (Art. 26 and 27). The government of Cote d’Ivoire, the UN, the OAU and the Commonwealth were to act as moral guarantors to the accord (Art. 28). The accord also called for a nationwide sensitization programme, which would inform the public about the reality of the end of hostilities, the reasons- for demobilization, the opportunities for # reintegration of combatants, and the need for reconciliation. This programme was to be pursued by both the government and the RUF. Hardly a month after the signing of the Abidjan Peace agreement, December 1996, cracks started emerging and the entire process started breaking down. The implementation of the process appeared fine on the surface as both President Kabbah and the RUF leader Foday Sankoh were both in contact.166 RUF sent four of its officials (Fayia Musa, Ibrahim Jalloh, Agnes Deen Jalloh and Michale Sandy) to Freetown on 19 December 1997. The four were to 66 Yusuf Bangura, Reflection on the 1996 Sierra Leone Peace Accord httpj7www.unsvstem.org/ngls/documents/publications.en/voices.africa/number8/9bangwa.htm Accessed 18 July 2007. 97 join their counterparts from the government side in launching the Commission of Consolidation of Peace (CCP) whose role was to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement.167 168169 In late December 1997, Sankoh started complaining that the government of Kabbah was not honoring the agreement. He complained of constant harassment of the RUF by the Kamajors in the countryside. The Kamajors were a rug-tug militia that was armed by the government in order to counter the RUF in the rural Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leone army, in turn, intercepted a radio message from Sankoh to his field commanders saying that he signed the peace agreement as a tactical move in order to give the RUF more time to buy new arms and continue the war. In mid-January 1997 communication between Kabbah and Sankoh collapsed. The four RUF officials who were based in Freetown broke ranks with Sankoh. On 6 March 1998, Sankoh secretly flew to Lagos with two unnamed associates. The Nigerian government suspected that the trip was meant to be a secret arms-purchasing mission. The Nigerian government intercepted Sankoh and put him in a confinement at Sheraton Hotel, Abuja. By April 1997, the Abidjan Peace Agreement had collapsed. ^ # On 25 May 1997 Kabbah was overthrown by junior officers who named Johnny Paul Koroma as the chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).164 Koroma invited the RUF to join the junta and Foday Sankoh became his vice chairman. AFRC/RUF forces took control of Freetown. The international airport, Lungi, was under the control of ECOMOG troops. Apart from the airport, the military junta and the RUF launched an offensive in the diamond rich areas which they managed to take under their control. Equally worrying was the increasing number of 167 Hirsch , “Sierra Leone; Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy”, pp.54-55. 168 Ibid. 169 Hirsch , “Sierra Leone; Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy” 98 clashes between Kamajors and soldiers throughout the country in an apparent struggle for tactical advantage and control of diamonds.170 171 According to a United Nations report on the conflict in Sierra Leone, there were clear indicators that the country’s diamonds were being smuggled to various destinations in the world through Liberia and Guinea. The Liberia Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy informed the UN panel that 1998 official diamond export was only 80,000 carats, while in the same year Belgium recorded imports of diamonds from Liberia at 2.56 million carats. The export of the diamonds from Liberia to Belgium was done by 26 companies whose ownership could not be established. The smuggling involved both state and non-state actors. Statistics on diamond sale showed serious discrepancy between what is known as ‘country of origin’ and ‘country of provenance’. Country of origin indicated where the diamonds were mined while country of provenance refers to the country from which diamonds were last imported. The report found serious anomalies in countries that were exporting and importing diamonds. # Below is a table showing Guinea’s/Belgium’s exports and imports of diamond from 1993 to 1999, a period when Sierra Leone was at the peak of the conflict: 170 Global Policy Forum, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000) Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone S/2000/1195 20 December 2000. 171 Global Policy Forum, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000) Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone S/2000/1195 20 December 2000. 99 Table 4: Exports by Destination Year Guinea Belgium Exports (Carats) Imports (Carats) 1993 374000 1030000 1994 381000 876000 1995 452000 780000 1996 364000 440000 1997 380000 533000 1998 355000 596000 1999 357000 554000 Sources: Global Policy Forum, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000) Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone S/2000/1195 20 December 2000 (http:www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sierra/report/001220.htm (Accessed 12 February 2007) The capital of Guinea, Conakry, had been the location of informal conflict- diamond trades. Usually Sierra Leonean disgruntled soldiers traded small pieces of rough diamonds in exchange for fuel. This practice was common since members of SLA had problems in getting their salaries on time from Freetown. Sometimes they would stay up to six months 179 «• without pay. From 1993 to 1997, Guinea exported 2.6 million carats of official diamond exports at an average price of US $ 96 per carat to Belgium. During the same period, Belgium, through Diamond High Council (Belgium self-appointed watchdog organisation) reported imports from Guinea of 4.8 million carats averaging US $ 167 each. The United Nations military observers pointed out that the diamond mining regions had substantial population of Guinean and Liberian diamond dealers but no permits from the Sierra Leone government. 172 172 Richards, P, Fighting for the Rain Forest; War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone, Oxford, James Currey, 1996. pp 13-14.' 100 This clearly showed a contradiction and confusion over the figures which were mainly attributed to unaccountable diamonds smuggled into Belgium. The same is suspected for 17T other diamond import countries such as Israel, Netherlands and Hong-Kong. The table below shows the export of diamond from Sierra Leone during the conflict period: Table 5: Sierra Leone Diamond Exports (1992-2002) Year Carats Amount in US $ 1992 331,800 $31,290,013 1993 157,997 $20,167,284 1994 255,108 $30,196,365 1995 213,776 $22,002,272 1996 270,452 $28,307,189 1997 114,439 $11,802,845 1998 15,818 $1,780,337 1999 9,320 $1,244,825 2000 77,372 $10,066,921 2001 222,520 $26,022,492 2002 351,859 $41,732,130 Source: Martin Rapaport “Sierra Leone: Eliminating Conflict Goes Beyond Diamond Industry” http//www.diamonds.net/news/NewsItem.aspx> Accessed 17 May 2007 During the peak of the civil war in Sierra Leone (1992-1998), Liberia exported more rough diamonds than South Africa, 6 million carats of the gemstones a year. However, a United Nations report confirmed that Liberia produced an estimate of 200,000 carats of industrial diamond from its poorly managed mines. Liberia through the patronage of Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh, managed to sustain the civil war by allowing the RUF to launder Sierra173 173 Global Policy Forum, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000) Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone S/2000/1195 20 December 2000. 101 Leone diamonds under a cover provided by the diamond industry.174 * Smuggled diamonds from Sierra Leone found their way to international diamond centers including Tel Aviv, Brussels, London and Amsterdam. The diamonds would appear in the world market as imports from Guinea, Conakry and Liberia. In February 1998, Nigerian forces backed by Civil Defence Unit, (CDF) units launched an offensive against the AFRC and RUF alliance that had controlled the country for nine months. The junta was quickly forced out of Freetown and several provincial towns. In March 1998, Kabbah returned to Freetown under the auspices of the Organisation of Africa Unity, (OAU), but still faced with the military threat of the undefeated RUF rebels and renegade AFRC soldiers, many of whom had retreated into the north of the country, where the civil defence movement was weakest. Attempts to mop up the junta remnants were bogged down by logistical problems, while the restored government prosecuted and executed captured junta members. Sankoh returned to Freetown in custody. But the vulnerability of the government increased as Nigeria inched towards restoring a civilian government after the death of its military ruler, Gen Sani Abacha in June 1998. In July 1998, the UN Security Council agreed to send a military observer group to Sierra Leone.176 ECOMOG brought reinforcements into Freetown, while the junta forces registered a string of battlefield gains in the Kono diamond fields and in the north. RUF 174 Smillie, Gberie & Hazleton “Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone Diamonds and Human Security” < http://www.pacweb.Org/e/pdf7heart%20ofyo20the%20matter.doc > (Accessed 24 February 2006) 174 Aboagye, “ECOMOG: A Sub -Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia”, pp.88-91. 176 Hirsch , “Sierra Leone; Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy", pp.70-90 102 field commander Sam Bockarie stated in a satellite phone interview that the RUF wanted the immediate and unconditional release of Sankoh and peace through dialogue rather than the use of foreign troops inside Sierra Leone. Echoing accusations made by the Sierra Leone Government and ECOMOG official on the Liberian involvement in the offensive, the UN called on Liberia to stop support for RUF activities emanating from its territory. In July 1998, RUF fighters began seizing peacekeepers and UN military observers at a demobilization camp at Makeni after a dispute over the return of disarmed combatants. The confrontations spread to other areas in the north and east.177 178 In an attempt to reach a peaceful settlement the UN's Special Representative to Sierra Leone, Nigerian Oluyemi Adeniji held talks with Sankoh who accused the UN of triggering the crisis by attempting to forcefully disarm combatants. The RUF leader was unmoved by diplomatic pressure from Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Burkina Faso in accepting a ceasefire. ^ # At the end of January 1999, West African leaders held an impromptu meeting in Guinea. The consensus was for dialogue. A Nigerian spokesman said that ECOMOG had finally retaken control of Freetown, but would not be able 'to clean up the whole country'. President Abubakar, successor to Abacha, said he hoped to have all Nigerian troops out of Sierra Leone by the time he hands over power to a civilian government in March 1999.179 177Hirsch, “Sierra Leone; Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy", p. 95 178 Gberie, “A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and Destruction of Sierra Leone”, p.166. 179 . Adebajo, “Building peace in West Africa"' p.89. 103 Diplomatic activities involved pressing Kabbah to agree to participate in negotiations with the RUF. American diplomats said they favoured all the parties being at the negotiating table. Nigerian diplomats enlisted the public support of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi as a possible host of face-to-face talks between Kabbah and Sankoh. Also involved in efforts to encourage negotiations were the UN, the Commonwealth and the OAU. Ultimately, ECOWAS remained the focal point for negotiations and Togo's President Gnassingbe Eyadema, then chair of ECOWAS, became the convener. Late in February 1999, Francis Okelo, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative in Sierra Leone, met with RUF representatives in Abidjan to discuss conditions for substantial negotiations.180 The Abidjan meeting led to preliminary talks in Lome reuniting Sankoh with some of his field commanders and civilian backers. Freed from detention in Abuja for the meeting, Sankoh stayed on in the Togolese capital. Detailed negotiations began in Lome after the promise of eventual freedom to Sankoh and 0 enforcement of a ceasefire.181 After two months of negotiations, the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone reached a settlement; the Lome Peace Agreement. According to the Lome Agreement, both parties reiterated their commitment to the implementation of the cease-fire agreement signed by the two parties on 18th May 1999 in Lome. The agreement also included power-sharing between the elected Kabbah government and the RUF rebels, a blanket amnesty for crimes committed up to the signing, disarmament and demobilization, and the establishment of human rights and truth and 180 Ibid. pp. 84-86 l81Sierra Leone Web “Lome Peace Accord” < http://www.sierra-leone.org71omeaccord.html> (Accessed 27 July 2007. 104 reconciliation commissions. The agreement granted Sankoh the status of Vice President and chairmanship of a Commission for the Management of Strategic Mineral Resources, National Reconstruction and Development.182 183 Other RUF and AFRC members were to receive several cabinet posts and places within the administration. The parties also agreed to the deployment of a neutral peacekeeping force, leading to a shift from reliance on ECOMOG to a more diverse UN contingent of peacekeepers and military observers the UNAMSIL and UNOMSIL. This clause was to address the apprehension by the RUF that most member states in West Africa were no longer neutral in the conflict. The implementation of key areas of the agreement was painfully slow. Disarmament and demobilization deadlines were not met and deployment of peacekeepers was blocked. 183 The UN force retained contingents from Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea, as well as new contributors, Kenya, India, Jordan, Bangladesh and Zambia. Humanitarian access to rebel controlled areas was limited. Nonetheless, all sides claimed publicly that they were committed to peace and making the agreement work. By July 1999, there were new horrifying developments where the RUF soldiers started murdering, mutilating, abducting and raping of women and looting of villages. Massive displacement of the civilian population around the areas of Port Loko, Makeni, Kambia and Kabala took place due to RUF terror. Lawlessness and impunity by rebel soldiers including extortion, petty theft, and acts of intimidation against businesspeople, civilians 182 Aboagye, “ECOMOG: A Sub -Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia”, p.99. 183Aboagye, “ECOMOG: A Sub -Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia ”, p.254 105 and expatriates within the Freetown were routine.1X4 Rebel forces refused to release all civilian abductees and prisoners of war. They also refused to allow full humanitarian access to rebel controlled areas. Women were often sexually abused and villagers were often abducted to carry the looted goods to rebel bases. These developments brought serious questions on the commitment of the RUF on the Lome Peace Agreement. In May 2000, less than a year after the Lome Peace Agreement was signed, the RUF abducted and murdered UN peacekeepers. Although disarmament had formally begun in October 1999, as of March 2000, the RUF had not participated significantly in the programme. This changed in April 2000 when disarmament centres opened in the RUF strongholds of Makeni and Magburaka. A few RUF soldiers reported to the camps against the wishes of their commanders. The UN refused to heed the RUF’s demands to close the centres and return their men.18" Women protested in front of Sankoh's Freetown residence, calling for the RUF to abide by the Lome Agreement. UK troops began arriving to secure » the international airport and evacuate their nationals. Sankoh fled from his residence after a second demonstration turned violent and shots were fired by his bodyguards. Nineteen people were killed, including several RUF members. Reports suggested that the RUF was moving towards Freetown creating panic in the city. Johnny Paul Koroma, former junta *185 Human Rights Watch “Recent Violations of the Lomd Peace Accord” < http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sleone/violations.htm >January 2000.Accessed 22 July 2008. 185 Eric G. Berman, “Small Arms Survey”, A publication of the Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. l(Dec 20001 106 leader and RUF ally, publicly called on current and former government soldiers and CDF to go on the offensive against the RUF. Fresh fighting erupted when the RUF killed an army corporal of the Kenyan peacekeeping contingent. Several hundred members of the Zambian battalion sent to assist the beleaguered Kenyan contingent was taken hostage by the RUF outside of Makeni. A sector commander from Kenya, Brigadier James Mulinge was one of the captives. Kenya had a complete battalion in Sierra Leone split and deployed under different command. UNAMSIL had its own internal problems, some military units lacked proper training and equipment. A confidential report prepared by General Jetley, a senior UN official accused senior Nigerian military officials of colluding with the RUF rebels to prolong the conflicts in order to benefit from the diamond trade.186 187188 A week later, Sankoh’s supporters opened fire outside his house into a crowd of civilians demonstrating against the abduction of the UN peacekeepers. A number of protesters were killed and dozens more were injured. On # 17 May 2000, the government of Sierra Leone detained and subsequently arrested Sankoh. Once again another peace accord, “the Lome Peace Accord” failed to bring peace to Sierra Leone. After the collapse of the Abidjan Peace Accord in April 1997 and Lome Peace Agreement in May 2000, there was a change of approach towards the Sierra Leone conflict. There was overwhelming evidence that smuggled diamonds from Sierra Leone, Angola and the 186 Campbell, “Blood diamonds", pp.84-86 187 Sourced from an interview with a Kenyan military observer. l88Adebajo A, ‘‘Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea- Bissau", Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2002. P 101 107 Democratic Republic of Congo were the source of funding for both arms and logistical back up in many insurgents groups across Africa. During this period of civil war in Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor was the primary external backer of RUF. He bought smuggled diamonds from the rebels in exchange of arms supply and other logistical back-up for the rebels.189 A meeting of African leaders from diamond producing countries and representatives form the United Nations Security Council took place in May 2000 in Kimberly, South Africa. The countries in focus were Sierra Leone, Angola and The Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC. The meeting discussed the trade of conflict diamonds that were seen to be the main contributor to armed conflicts among their countries. A system of regulating diamond mining and marketing was initiated by the countries that were main exporters and importers of rough diamonds. The system was known as the “Kimberly Process Certification Scheme” (KPCS). The new system provided a global regulatory framework 0 requiring rough diamond exporting and importing countries to certify the country of origin and legal exports.190 To keep conflict diamonds from entering legitimate trade, participating countries were required to meet various and specific regulations. For example, tamper-proof containers must be used for the shipment of all rough diamonds, and all shipments must be accompanied by a Kimberley Process Certificate. This certificate identifies the country of origin of the stones, the size and value of each shipment, and the identity of the exporting authority. 189 United Nations Department of Public Information “Conflict diamonds: Sanctions and War” < http://www.un.org/peace/africa/diamond.html > Accessed 14 October 2007 190 Associated content “Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme” < http:www.associatedcontenet.eom/article/81233/conflict_diamomds_the_kimberly_process.html.cat=46 > (Accessed 14 October 2007) 108 Charles Taylor started cooperating with the United Nations after realizing that the whole conflict in Sierra Leone was no longer a money venture as the Kimberly Process of Certification Scheme, (KPCS) had become effective globally. There was no global market for the Sierra Leone’s conflict diamonds.191 192 In June 2000, the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan recommended the reinforcement of the peacekeeping force from 9,250 to 13,000 troops. On 28 August 2000, he further recommended the increase of both peacekeepers and military observers to a total strength of 20,500 troops. This marked the end of the country’s civil war. Immediately the war ended, the United Nations embarked on the process of disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of ex-combatants I O '} commonly referred to as DDR. The United Nations Mission for Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL managed to effectively sustain the ceasefire and two years later, in May 2002, Sierra Leone conducted both parliamentary » and presidential elections which saw the re-election of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah for another five year term to 2007. The successful elections earned praise all over the world that the international community could help in restoring peace in troubled areas once the mandate is given to regional or international bodies such as ECOWAS/ECOMOG and the United Nations. But this would not have happened if the trade in blood diamonds had continued. 191 Gberie, “A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and Destruction o f Sierra Leone", p. 190. 192 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations < http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/background.html > (Accessed 15 May 2007) 109 4.4 Conclusion The climax of the conflict in Sierra Leone was from 1996 to 2000. During this period two attempts were made to bring peace into the country through the Lome and Abidjan peace accords respectively. These two initiatives did not work since the main cause of the conflict was not fully addressed; the flow of blood diamonds into the world market. The illicit diamonds fully funded the conflict through regional leaders under international cartel. The diamond export figures shown in this chapter highly suggest that the main economic activity that Sierra Leone had during the conflict period was illegal exports of conflict diamonds through neighbouring countries namely Guinea Conakry and Liberia. Even though there were initiatives of peace, supply of blood diamond was still on. It is the 'Kimberly Process’ that proved to be the death nail on the civil war in Sierra Leone. The civil war in Sierra Leone ended in 2002. 110 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION This research has shown that natural resources in a weak state could fuel armed conflict. Diamonds were strongly associated with the civil war in Sierra Leone: they not only fuelled the conflict but were also the root cause. The high value of diamonds made and encouraged a covert looting process. Control of the diamond sector by the colonial power and successive post colonial governments proved unworkable. The cause of local discontent within the diamond mining areas in Sierra Leone started during the colonial period in 1930s. The indigenous were alienated from the benefits of the diamonds proceeds by the British colonial administration. From 1930s when large-scale mining started under the monopoly of colonial supervision, the industry was marred by smuggling of the precious stones by the indigenous population. In 1950s, foreigners from neighbouring Guinea (Conakry) and Liberia had joined the bandwagon of illegal smugglers. Shortly before independence, 1955, the colonial government silently acknowledged that # there were indicators of a possible conflict with the local population due to lack of access to state resources (diamonds). In trying to counter this problem, the Mining Area Development Administration, (MADA) was established in 1955. The objective of this authority was to provide additional resources to develop the diamond mining regions both economically and socially in order to address the local discontent. Initially, the MADA initiative worked fairly well and by 1956, diamond mining rapidly expanded and spread to Bo and Kenema districts. However, the indigenous people were quick to observe that the benefits coming through MADA were not commensurate to the mining activities hence diamond smuggling and illicit mining started thriving. In August 1957, a big group of local 111 miners attacked a washing SLST plant at Koidu. The attack was a sign to the colonial government that the indigenous people were running out of patience as far as diamonds proceeds were concerned. The regions where diamonds are mined are the least developed in Sierra Leone.193 The biggest miscalculation by the colonial authority was to assume that they would be able to mismanage the diamond sector with impunity. Sierra Leone’s diamonds are found in alluvial deposits and the mode of extraction is simple and require little expertise and capital. The size of diamonds also makes it easy for individuals to smuggle these precious stones. With this kind of scenario, it was easy for the local population to circumvent controls put by the colonial authority. The country’s infrastructural development during colonial time was very pathetic. According to Kenyan military observers with the UNOMSIL, interviewed by this researcher, Sierra Leone has no historical infrastructure development, in spite of the diamond wealthTn the country. The same was mismanaged by » British investors who mined and transferred the profits to Britain. The officers’ observations (five officers out of eight) were based on their comparisons with other countries that they had visited such as South Africa, Botswana and Namibia.194 By the time Sierra Leone was becoming independent in 1961 disgruntled youth groups were already getting entrenched in the diamond mining areas. There was clear evidence suggesting that the management of the diamond industry in post colonial Sierra Leone was generally poor with corruption and patronage being the order of the day. The situation 193 Interview with Kenya Military observers in Sierra Leone,(See Appendix II: Answers No.6) 194 Interview with Kenyan military observers who had served with UNAMSIL.(see Appendix 1) 112 appeared to have worsened during the Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh regimes with the former taking the discredit of initiating or worsening the rot in the diamond industry. Since diamonds accounted for almost 70% of the entire foreign exchange earnings of Sierra Leone, the long period of mismanagement had direct effect on the country’s economy. The collapse of the economy had several effects on the state institutions and in particular the security organs, health and education sectors. Indeed, by 1990 the entire Sierra Leone government had literally collapsed. At the peak of the conflict, the international community failed to bring peace from several peace accords namely the Abidjan and the Lome Peace Accords. Despite these accords and initiatives, supply of blood diamonds was still on. Through several international panels set by United Nations and other western countries notably Canada and Britain, it emerged that the conflict was sustained through an illicit diamond cartel. In Chapter Four, it is observed that smuggled diamonds from countries such as Sierra Leone were found to be the source » of funding for both arms and logistical back up in the conflict. During the civil war in Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor was the primary external backer of RUF who facilitated the flow of smuggled diamonds from the rebels to foreign market and in exchange for arms supply and logistical back-up. Blaise Campaore, the president of Burkina Faso was also involved in illegal sale of diamonds and smuggling of weapons to the rebels including guerilla training in collaboration with Taylor. Notably, there were other supportive factors that encouraged the conflict. As observed in Chapter Four, lack of an international regulatory body that could regulate the sale and 113 movement of diamonds from the country of origin permitted the flow of blood diamonds in the world market. The United Nations report disclosed a lot of anomalies in international transaction of the diamond industry. The leading importers of suspected blood diamonds were Belgium, Israel, Britain and the United States of America. Driven by profits, conflict/blood diamonds moved freely without verifying their country of origin. This irregularity allowed the sale of conflict diamonds to thrive and huge profits realised by those involved in the cartel. In return international criminal gangs with support from legitimate governments, (Liberia, Guinea and Burkina Faso) went on sponsoring the RUF to unleash terror and onslaught against a collapsed state (Sierra Leone). The profits assured the flow of illegal arms to sustain the war. More youths were lured into joining the RUF since they found it an ideal employer due to lucrative remuneration emanating from the diamonds revenues. The absences of strong government institutions in Sierra Leone became an opportunity that » was exploited by Charles Taylor (Liberian President) who sponsored an insurgence, Revolutionary United Front, under Foday Sankoh. From its ‘modus operandi’, as noted in Chapter Four, the RUF lacked all the ingredients of a standard insurgent group. A number of insurgents groups in Africa have taken over power and formed credible government or went out to form credible opposition movements under democratic principles after their struggles were over. For the RUF, the entire movement including its leadership vanished after the war. An international initiative spearheaded by South Africa came up with a mechanism that stopped the international market of illegal diamonds, the Kimberly Process of Certification Scheme, KPSC. The process got full backing of the United Nations 114 through the Security Council. This process brought to an end the flow of conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone hence starving the illegal supply that ultimately brought the RUF to its knees. The study established that natural resources such as alluvial diamonds, which are exploited without the need of heavy capital injection, can be a serious cause of civil war. This was the case with Sierra Leone. There is evidence suggesting that mismanagement of the diamond industry fueled the conflict in Sierra Leone. The study met its objectives as it established that there were strong links between diamonds, instability and the civil war in Sierra Leone and also proved that the diamond industry was central to the conflict in Sierra Leone. The study further proved correct the two hypotheses; one, the mismanagement of the diamonds industry fueled Sierra Leone conflict, second, the regional instability affecting the diamond industry exacerbated the 0 armed conflict in Sierra Leone. The two theoretical frameworks (Realism and Marxism) applied in this study adequately guided the research throughout the project. However there were some few shortcomings in the two theories during the research considering that the two theories are Eurocentric by origin. For instance it was sometimes difficult to come out with a clear class structure within Sierra Leone as defined by Marx considering that the society lacks a strict class structure as define by Marx. 115 BIBLIOGRAPHY i) Books and Articles Abdullah, I, “Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front”, in Africa Development, Vol XXII, Nos.3/41997. Abdullah, I, (ed) Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil lfar,CODESRIA, Dakar, 2004. Abiodun, Alao, “Sierra Leone: Tracing genesis of a controversy”, in Royal Institute of International Affairs Briefing No.50, June 1998. Aboagye F. 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When did you serve in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and for how long? 3. Did you ever visit any of the areas in Sierra Leone where diamond was mined or is still mined? 4. Can you explain briefly what you saw in terms of the activities and general development of the area? 5. During your stay in Sierra Leone, at what level did you interact with the local community? 6. Sierra Leone is known for its vast mineral resources i.e. Iron ,Bauxite and diamonds, how can you compare the^country’s development with its minerals in » terms of standard of living of the citizens and the general infrastructure of the country? 7. There is a general perception in Africa that mineral wealth does not benefit the common person and instead it becomes a loot for the ruling elite and multi - national corporations, What are your views on this? 8. Diamond smuggling in Sierra Leone has been said to be rampant since the discoveries in early 1930s, do you have any idea as to what permitted this kind of situation? 126 9. Have you ever been to any other country apart from Sierra Leone where minerals resources benefits can be empirically observed to the development of the country? 10. During your stay as a military observer, what was your impression and assessment on the management of the diamond industry in Sierra Leone? I.e. is the industry well /poorly managed? 11. How can Sierra Leone achieve maximum benefits from its minerals and in particular diamond? 127 APPENDIX II: PICTORIAL A sample of Kimberly Process of Certification. World Diamond Council “eliminating conflicts Diamonds” 2008. 128 Many of the prisoner-laborers who work Sierra Leone's open-pit mines end up in shallow graves, executed for suspected theft, for lack of production, or simply for sport. (© Jean- Claude Coutausse/ CONTACT Press Images. ( Amnesty International Magazine “Blood Diamonds” http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestvnow/diamonds.html) Accessed 20 August 2007. 129 Below: This Child soldier, here awaiting demobilization, was recruited at age 11. Vila Nova, 1998. UNICEF / HQ96-008 / Giacomo Pirozzi (United Nations Department of public Information “Conflicts diamonds: Sanctions and War” Below a UNAMSIL sector commander, Maj-Gen James Mulinge from Kenya presiding over a ceremony of UN troops deployment. (Source: Kenya Military Observer, UNOMSIL) 130 131 Above: Foday Sankoh, RUF leader having discussion with a UNAMSIL officer in an RUF stronghold. (Source: Kenyan Military Observer, UNOMSIL) Below UNAMSIL soldiers unearthing hidden ammunition in one of the rebel stronghold in Kono District. (Source: Kenyan Military Observer, UNOMSIL) 132 This seventeen-year- old lost both hands to rebels’ machetes. Waterloo camp, Sierra Leone, 1998. UNICEF / HQ96-0566 / Giacomo Pirozzi (United Nations Department of public Information “Conflicts diamonds: Sanctions and War” < http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html> 21 March 2001) Accessed 23 July 2007. 133