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Vedran Obućina: A War of suvremene TEME, (2011.) god. 4., br. 1. CONTEMPORARY issues, (2011) Vol. 4, No. 1

UDK: 323.1(497.115)”200”=111 Prethodno priopćenje Primljeno: 21.9. 2011.

A War of Myths: Creation of the Founding of

VEDRAN OBUĆINA Politea: Association for Promotion of Social Sciences and New Media,

A distinctive Albanian is present in the shaping of Kosovo’s statehood. The official politics of and identity diminish the importance of other ethnic communities and focuses on Albanian , represented by mixture of contemporary and historical personalities, events, places and memories. Integrative and European-leaning from outside, Kosovo is more and more particular and Albanian from inside, leaving many doubts and uncertainties about the intercultural future of ’s newest state.

Keywords: Kosovo, Albanians, founding myth, memory, identity politics

1. Introduction in this paper it will be regarded only as an op- posite to the new myths of the Albanian side. Kosovo mythology might be perceived as The other one, the Albanian one, is the basis one of the indirect causes for bloodshed sur- for Kosovar nation-building. These mythologies rounding the wars, conflicts and atrocities made proclaimed themselves as saviors of the na- in this newly independent state. Kosovo might tion and civilization. In a poor attempt to follow also be regarded as the place where the vio- Samuel Huntington’s version of the clash of lent dissolution of began. The 1981 civilizations, and Albanians unconsciously student unrest in Prishtina, the province’s capi- followed the ideas of Fernand Braudel, Oswald tal, showed the fragility of post-Tito Yugosla- Spengler and Arnold Toynbee in arguing that via, as an for future years (Ker-Lindsay, states were significantly influenced by their civili- 2009; Ramet, 2000; Udovički, 2000). Kosovo was zational position (Hansen, 2000: 346), i.e. based again, in 1989, a centre of a nationalistic out- on their historical and religious identities, in this break. Then President of Socialist of case presented by Christian Orthodox Serbs and , Slobodan Milošević gave a speech on mostly Muslim . Although the Kosovo () Field, marking the 600th concept of Huntington’s of civilizations anniversary of the Kosovo battle, with a refer- (at least understood in a way as Braudel under- ence to the possibility of “armed battles”. Ten stood them) was disputed and still is the subject years later, Serbia attacked Kosovo Albanians, of complex discussions, he correctly pointed out and twenty years later Kosovo was already an the importance of cultural and historical back- independent state. Throughout all these years ground for the events and conflicts in modern two myths fought for the about Kosovo, two world, and especially so in the . The aim political myths with anti-democratic sentiments, of this paper is to explain how and why Kosovo extreme nationalism and new authoritarianism. Albanians use the history and to promote One of them is the Serbian one which perceives “Albanianess” of the new Kosovo state. Opinions Kosovo as the heart and of Serbian national expressed here are focused on politics of history and religious identity; this one is well known and and identity, on places of memory and specific

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 30 www.cpi.hr Vedran Obućina: A War of Myths suvremene TEME, (2011.) god. 4., br. 1. CONTEMPORARY issues, (2011) Vol. 4, No. 1 events which form the overall official politics of groups. At the same time, this is where interna- Kosovar identity, but which bear an unofficial Al- tional organizations have failed. It would not be banian mark. Under the pretext of a European- conceivable in any specific way to convince, for oriented new state, built upon the togetherness example, Albanians, Goranis and Ashkalis to be of six ethnic communities, this paper shows how, one Kosovar nation, as all three have an already in fact, there is little or no mention of other com- established national consciousness. In this re- munities, except the Albanian one, in the build- gard, the international community put all its ing of the youngest state in Europe. effort and energy in the biggest national group, the Albanians, as the core of the Kosovar nation. 2. Building a New Nation In this way, they jeopardized the possibility for other ethnic groups to perceive themselves as Nation-building gained broad acceptance in part of the Kosovar nation. the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. Numer- In Hippler’s opinion, a crucial component of ous multi-national states experienced heavy con- nation-building is the development of a function- flicts and the policy of nation-building came after al state apparatus that can actually control its peace operations conducted by various interna- national territory (Hippler, 2005: 9). In Kosovo, tional organizations, primarily , a substantial role is carried out by international NATO, and African Union. Koso- organizations, including the protection of nation- vo is one such case. The United Nations Mission al territory, and it thus lacks the Weberian prin- in Kosovo (UNMIK) authorities, together with the ciple of statehood: monopoly of legitimate use military presence of North Atlantic Treaty Orga- of physical force in the enforcement of its order. nization (NATO) and the European Union Rule of In that way, state-building is an important aspect Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), with the help of nation-building, with loyal personnel that does of other European Union (EU) initiatives, and not identify primarily with individual social, eth- the Organization for Security and Cooperation in nic or religious communities, but rather with the Europe (OSCE) are making the nation-building state and the nation. Without social mobiliza- process coming true. Jochen Hippler considers tion and political integration, there is no nation nation-building as a policy that “constitutes a state in pluralistic societies and no process of hinge between foreign, development and military socio-political development, which ideally allows policy for the purpose of preventing or manag- initially loosely linked communities to become a ing violent conflicts, achieving local and regional common society with a nation state correspond- stability, and facilitating development” (Hippler, ing to it. Hippler acknowledges it takes quite 2005: 4). Such a presence of various interna- an amount of luck for everything to be solved tional organizations in Kosovo bears a question correctly, because the new nation has to bear of legality to enter internal state-building, despite economic integration, cultural integration, politi- the principle of non-interference under the UN cal centralization, bureaucratic control, military Charter, which can always be overruled by the conquest or subjugation, creation of common Security Council. External nation-building, like in interests, democratization and establishment of the case of Kosovo, is thus always questioned common citizenship or repression. Hippler also and disputed. Hippler conceives nation-building understands a problem which heavily persists as a three-fold process, including a process of in Kosovo, namely if belonging to the nation is socio-political development, a political objective, to be determined according to language, ethnic as well as a strategy, and integrative . origin or rather than on the basis of civil The latter includes the founding myth of the Kos- equality. Hippler sees two arising problems here: ovar nation. Nation-building will only be success- ful in the long term if it stems from an integrative “First, there is a danger that ethicizing the po- ideology. This is not an easy task. Hippler sees litical discourse in the context of latent conflicts nation-building necessarily as a process of form- and social mobilization will lower the threshold ing of a nation which has no specific identity or for violence and trigger violent conflicts which loyalty attached to a tribe, a clan, or an ethnic are ethnically structured. Secondly, such a or ethno-religious group (Hippler, 2005: 8). In context transforms the nation-building pro- Kosovo, as we shall see, this is not so easily dis- cess: instead of striving for or achieving the tinguishable, even among the Kosovo Albanians integration of society as a whole, the alterna- themselves. Integration of a society is what Hip- tive then arises of conducting nation-building pler names as the core pattern of communica- either as a repressive project of hegemony tion between different and loosely associated by one over others or bringing

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 31 www.cpi.hr Vedran Obućina: A War of Myths suvremene TEME, (2011.) god. 4., br. 1. CONTEMPORARY issues, (2011) Vol. 4, No. 1

about a situation of competition between dif- of the future state (Ahtisaari, 2007). Ahtisaari ferent nation-building projects conducted by stressed the importance of a multi-ethnic soci- the various ethnic groups. Both lead to the ety, with several official languages. But, the situ- intensification of existing conflicts and the risk ation on the ground is quite different. Albanians of these being waged in a violent manner in basically can offer quite big minority rights be- the future” (Hippler, 2005: 12). cause they themselves are the overwhelmingly biggest ethnic group in Kosovo. Of the 230.000 In Kosovo, this problem arises from the bot- Serbs and other non-Albanians who fled Kosovo tom up. The , much differ- before the international peace-keeping troops from most surrounding countries, does not arrived only a small number returned. The Alba- recognize one particular ethnic group as a domi- nians themselves are victims of terror, corruption cile nation. The preamble is approved by “the and organized crime. Kosovo institutionalized people of Kosovo”, and Article 2 states that “The ethnicity (Bieber, 2004: 2) and the power-shar- Republic of Kosovo is a state of its citizens”. The ing lacks fundamental features of cross-ethnic peoples are not mentioned as nations or ethnic cooperation. Based on Arend Lijphart’s model groups, but as communities, and the names of of consociative democracy, Kosovo can also be these communities are mentioned only in the ar- understood as a failed attempt of power-sharing, ticles about the division of power in the state. Ar- because it has a fragile territorial autonomy and ticle 64, Paragraph 2, on Structure of Assembly, basically poor veto rights, which include only a explicitly names the communities: possibility to delay procedure (Bieber, 2004: 3). Apart from provisions in the parliament, also, the “In the framework of this distribution, twenty international community did not show much re- (20) of the one hundred twenty (120) seats spect for democracy, especially in early years. are guaranteed for representation of commu- Council of Europe’s rights envoy Álvaro nities that are not in the majority in Kosovo Gil-Robles stated: as follows: (1) Parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent candidates hav- “…it is clear that the very structure of the in- ing declared themselves representing the Ko- ternational administration as well as certain sovo Serb Community shall have the total powers retained by its various branches, sub- number of seats won through the open elec- stantially deviate from international human tion, with a minimum ten (10) seats guaran- rights norms and the accepted principles of teed if the number of seats won is less than the rule of law” (Gil-Robles 2002: 4). ten (10); (2) Parties, coalitions, citizens’ ini- tiatives and independent candidates having The problem from the international law stand- declared themselves representing the other point is also that Kosovo is not a fully recognized Communities shall have the total number of state, nor a UN member. In fact, NATO, for ex- seats won through the open election, with a ample, is still conducting its mission Kosovo minimum number of seats in the Assembly Force (KFOR) based on UN Resolution 1244, guaranteed as follows: the Roma community, which does not perceives Kosovo as an inde- one (1) seat; the Ashkali community, one (1) pendent state. Kosovo is also under heavy influ- seat; the Egyptian community, one (1) seat; ence of Western forces and particularly United and one (1) additional seat will be awarded States. Self-determination is thus one of the cen- to either the Roma, the Ashkali or the Egyp- tral demands and concepts of Kosovo Albanian tian community with the highest overall votes; nationalistic politics. It is best conceived in the the Bosnian community, three (3) seats; the Vetëvendosje movement (which literally means Turkish community, two (2) seats; and the “Self-Determination”), a quasi-movement nation- Gorani community, one (1) seat if the number alistic party in Kosovo, which considers UNMIK of seats won by each community is less than administration to be a non-democratic regime, the number guaranteed.” and requests full self-determination and inde- pendence immediately (Party Manifesto). In the In the government, power-sharing insists on meantime, United States Institute for Peace stat- one Serbian representative and one represent- ed in its report that the Albanian question “will ative for other ethnic communities. The con- almost surely require more extensive regional stitutional provisions are a direct effect of the arrangements than exists today” (USIP, 2002: Ahtisaari package, transformed in his compre- 4). Reports like this, however, place a heavy bur- hensive proposal which determines the outlines den on Balkans politics. If the Albanian question

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 32 www.cpi.hr Vedran Obućina: A War of Myths suvremene TEME, (2011.) god. 4., br. 1. CONTEMPORARY issues, (2011) Vol. 4, No. 1 is to resolved everywhere in the Balkans, then dius. , on the other hand, included all it must be perceived as one common territory. historical documents of bigger importance, start- This is, at the same time, the greatest desire of ing from the Croatian principalities in 7th century ultra-nationalistic Albanian forces in Kosovo, but and ending with the Homeland War in the 1990s. also in some neighboring countries. The spirit of Kosovo’s constitution is noticeably different from Greater , thus, has not yet vanished in many other former communist countries. Firstly, the history of great nationalistic ideas’ failures. Kosovo and Albania were under foreign rule for centuries, but central power (either of , 3. Mythology and Politics or ) was indeed very weak, and Albanians did not know the classic totalitar- The end of the 20th century has shown a re- ian or authoritarian institutional , but a markable return to political mythology, history deeply patriarchal and clan-divided society. Only and old-fashioned national and ethnic identity. with Enver Hoxha in Albania came a new kind of It was often accompanied by a conflict, some- paternalism. After the fall of , the re- times very violent one, just as was the case in vival (Rilindja) was in fact a start anew. The pre- the republics of ex-Yugoslavia. New political amble of Kosovo has no historical reference and communities arose, with the need of establish- is very short. It is more like a plea, stating that ing the political , but also comprehen- the people of Kosovo are determined, committed sive and mutual history, remembrance and his- and convinced to freedoms and equalities, de- torical legitimization. The context of Central and mocracy and prosperity, stability and peace, and South-eastern Europe was particularly under in- with an intention to enter Euro-Atlantic integra- fluence of historical revisions and the search for tions. But, at the same time, Kosovo prepared a true national identity. This middle-space, Mit- itself for building of national founding myths, as teleuropa or Zwischeneuropa, shares the cultural the basis for future state, with a distinctive Alba- and religious “raw cosmopolitanism”, meaning a nian character. plethora of religious denominations and cultural The renowned 20th century philosopher Ernst backgrounds living one next to another. The real Cassirer explained that in man’s practical and Mitteleuropa has a distinctive Catholic character, social life there is a defeat of rational thought, with early and the history of con- much different from scientific researches which flict with . Yet, they share quite much of the consists a basis of our everyday life influenced mentality with the rest of the region, essentially by modern technology and scientific break- in conceiving themselves as a threatened nation, throughs. He perceives myth not only as a prod- with a feeling of a profound tragic and suffering, uct of intellectual processes; it sprouts forth loneliness from other nations, lack of solidarity from deep human emotions (Cassirer, 1946: 43). among the neighbors and open prejudices. In the However, Cassirer stressed that myth cannot past, all of them have had illiberal, authoritarian be described as a bare emotion because it is and totalitarian regimes, often with xenophobic the expression of emotion: “The expression of and anti-Semitic elements. The particular case a feeling in not the feeling itself – it is emotion of Yugoslavia had several reasons for difficult turned into an image” (Cassirer, 1946: 43). In- nation-building: unfavorable geopolitical condi- deed, this image, in the creation of myth of the tions, extreme differences in the level of eco- state, is intertwined with culture, , , nomic development, great cultural heterogene- . Cassirer said: “To the true romanticist there ity, and dual process of nation-building, romantic could be no sharp difference between myth and nationalist idea, different of nation-building ; just as little as there was any separa- and state-building, no hegemonic nation that tion between poetry and truth. Poetry and truth, could successfully keep its dominant position myth and reality interpenetrate each other and (Zakošek, 2007: 36, 37). When the Berlin Wall coincide with each other” (Cassirer, 1946: 5). fell and a new democratic wave spread across The more poetic it is, the truer it becomes. Myth the former communist states, nations began to is filled with the most violent emotions and the re-write their constitutions. This constitutional most frightful visions, says Cassirer. But in myth engineering was various, but many included vast man begins to learn a new and strange : the preambles with historical references going back art of expressing, and that means of organizing, to the early stages of statehood. , for his most rooted instincts, his hopes and . It example, found its roots in the Great Moravian is not at all a new phenomenon in history of man- Principality, a medieval vassal state founded kind’s thought. But, the core issue is whether this with the help of St. Brothers Cyril and Metho- brings happiness and prosperity to the mankind.

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Plato thought it doesn’t. In his famous dialogue myth in order to become closer and to “invent Gorgias points out that the of , a ” in the words of Eric Hobsbawm, or Nomos, Taxis (Reason, Lawfulness and Order) to “imagine a nation”, like Benedict Anderson constitutes beauty, truth and morality. It appears would say. The nation is a big solidarity, says Er- in art, in politics, in science, and in . nest Renan, and it is based on victims and their They are the virtue of each thing, of a soul or any sacrifice which is understood as necessary in live creature and it is the of rightness. the past, present and in the future (Renan, 1995: Maybe we can conclude that, as men are by na- 56). Political myth transcends logic, it is elusive, ture imperfect, this triad is of perfect and divine but because of this elusiveness, it has a coher- nature, so Plato strived for impossible. The myth ent and complete system. There is neither destroys the very foundation of Plato’s Republic. legitimacy nor logic other than its own. Tismane- In his research on mythology of the post- anu mentions major themes around which such communist countries, the Romanian political sci- political mythologies revolve: (inno- entist Tismaneanu stated that political myths are cence lost, glorious patriarchal beginnings, the “responses to the sentiments of discontinuity, fall into modernity); victimhood, martyrdom, trea- fragmentation, and the overall confusion” (Tis- son and conspiracy; salvation and the advent of maneanu, 1998: 6). This trend, in fact, is not the millennium; charismatic saviors (who can be new. It persisted during the whole period of com- heroic individuals, allegedly predestined class- munism, hidden within the myth of brotherhood es, or biologically defined races); and ultimate and unity among socialist nations. Post-com- bliss in the form of revolutionary chiliasm, when munist nationalism is a political and ideological leader, movement, nation, and mankind become phenomenon with a dual nature: as an expres- one, whether in life or death (Tismaneanu, 1998: sion of an historical cleavage, it rejects the spuri- 9). Its principal function is to imagine a reality in ous internationalism of communist propaganda accordance with certain political interests. and emphasizes long repressed national values; Historical places and events form a particu- also, it is a nationalism rooted in and marked larly important part of political mythology. His- by Leninist-authoritarian mentalities and habits, tory has great significance in legitimizing current directed against any principle of difference and political regimes, especially if they are identified primarily against those groups and forces that with a charismatic savior with a sense of history champion pro-Western, pluralist orientations (Tis- (like Franjo Tuđman in Croatia, who was a his- maneanu, 1998: 7). Tismaneanu showed vividly torian himself, or the Gandhi-like leader of the the examples of and Serbia, where Kosovar Albanians, Ibrahim ). Common post-communist governments were formed by history produces common feelings and strength- ex-communist forces. In the case of Slobodan ens the nation. If it is connected to live emotions Milošević, he recognized an astute demagogue of particular people, it is prone to intimate use who cynically exploited Great Serbian national- in every aspect of their life. In a research made ism to further his own hegemonic-dictatorial pur- by Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen on popu- poses. lar uses of history in American life, a 50-year- In post-communist mythological landscape, old African American high school counselor from the myth of suffering is omnipresent. According Alabama described how a focus on experience to this vision, no other nation has suffered as grounded his reflections on the past: much as the one of the speaker, who simply can- not understand why the outer world is so insensi- “If you didn’t live through certain things, you tive to his or her nation’s unique plight (Tismane- just go by what people say, what history says. anu, 1998: 8). It is evident in conspiracy theories If they lived through it they know what they in the case of Serbia, where the whole West, are talking about. I lived through segrega- Freemasons and Vatican together against tion. My grandchildren are learning about it in bravery and patriotism of the Serbian people. school. It’s hard for me to know anything that In Croatia it is profoundly present in the myth of I didn’t come through. I didn’t come through Croatian soldiers who never fought in conquer- times. But integration times I came ing wars and in the character of the Homeland through. When my kids read something they War as a just, defensive and fight for can say, ‘Is it true?’ and I know because I was the independence long dreamed of. The suffer- there” (Rosenzweig and Thelen, 1998: 37). ing on Kosovo is entrenched in a parallel sys- tem of life, in an imposed isolation (see below). Members of the nation are gathered around this

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 34 www.cpi.hr Vedran Obućina: A War of Myths suvremene TEME, (2011.) god. 4., br. 1. CONTEMPORARY issues, (2011) Vol. 4, No. 1

Memory of one person is not only individual the anthropologist Reineck observes suffering memory, however: it forms our identity and se- (vuajtje) as a fact of life, because the Albanians cure the context for certain thought or “identify themselves as a backward, forgotten, which are partly learned, partly borrowed, and plundered people, characteristics which they feel part of common complex itself, constructed, main- make them special” (Clark, 2000: 45). tained and forwarded by family, community and Kosovo Albanian mythologies persisted over culture (Moore, 1992). In situation of common centuries, but their true realization came after suffering of particular ethnic group, like Kosovo NATO’s operation in 1999, the first military op- Albanians in the 1990s, this version of the story eration in the history of the Alliance, and the be- is very social-integrative and it legitimizes cer- ginning of international missions of UN, EU and tain idea or regime. It is especially important in OSCE. At that time, the number of Serbs dimin- big historical events like war. Heroes and places ished, as well as of some other ethnic groups. of memory form significant part if this legitimacy Few of them returned, mainly in Serbian autono- and the recollection of “true” version of events, mous municipalities like Gračanica and Štrbce. encoded in historical books and official historical Kosovo Albanians, on the other hand, gained account. According to Croatian political scientist much power and freedom to establish a rule of Tihomir Cipek, for a political order to be legiti- order according to their needs and ideas. mate, a common conception of history accept- Kosovo’s constitutional framework bears no able to the majority must be formed. He points marks of historical rootedness of the new estab- out that a capability of forging a dialectical con- lished country. The flag and the emblem give a nection between collective memory and an inter- of a unified nation. The blue flag bears pretation of the past is profoundly necessary to a yellow geographical form of Kosovo with six found a democratic political community (Cipek, yellow around it, confirming Kosovo’s de- 2011: 27). The context of memory shapes the termination, as vested in the Constitution itself, national identity and vice versa. In the case of to strive towards Euro-Atlantic integrations. The France, for example, it went so far that the French six stars represent six ethnic communities liv- Parliament voted on an act on memory, lois mé- ing in Kosovo. The flag is basically an answer morielle, in order to regulate the nation’s relation to Ahtisaari proposals which include “own, dis- to its own history. Otherwise, common amne- tinct, national , including a flag, seal sia might blast the whole historical version into and anthem, reflecting its multi-ethnic character” oblivion. Transiency is one of basic characteris- (Ahtisaari, 2007). Everyday showing of the flag tics of memory, with periodical “flashbulb memo- is a bit different. Although there are visible Ko- ries”, often conceived as a vital part of testimo- sovo’s flags, an overwhelming number of flags nies on war criminal courts like ICTY (Dulanović, in Kosovo, on tops of houses and on the roofs 2011: 35). Dimitrijević (2005) classified types of of many buildings, are Albanian. It is a red ban- history in question as: (1) History that is the past, ner with a double-headed black . Heraldic left to historians, and without much significance history of the Albanian flag suggests its origin for current events, (2) History integrated in col- in Byzantium, but it is also believed to have its lective memory, segments that represent social, origins in the seal of the greatest Albanian cultural and political foundation of communal life, . A variation of Albanian colors is (3) Heritage of the old regime, comprising institu- present also in the emblems and flags of the tions and values, personalities and processes in (UÇK). In highly unof- previous, mostly anti-democratic regimes, and it ficial and unscientific research, the author of brings with it the economic, political and lawful this article found out from citizens of Prishtina heritage, as well as the heritage of evil. In this how these two flags are mutually compatible. way the past very much influences contempo- “Kosovo is our country”, say the most of them, rary political and social development. “and thus we embrace the Kosovo flag”. “But”, they continue, “we are Albanians, and the flag 4. The Mythology of Kosovo Albanians of all Albanians is red-black”. Surely, their ethnic relatives in neighboring countries embrace the As many other founding mythologies, so was Albanian flag as well, giving a sense of together- the Albanian also perceived as a fight against ness and commonness, although living in quite injustice. The victim role is very visible in the Al- different surroundings. banian history in Kosovo. Historian Marco Dogo accused Kosovo Albanians of having “construct- ed a historical pedagogy based in self-pity”, while

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5. Places of Memory Kosovo, called for reconciliation in Prekaz. Re- appearance of blood feuds based on Also, other visible marks bear an Albanian was not welcomed by everyone. A human rights accent. The most important place of memory in activist Pajazit Nushi, whose organization had Kosovo today is the Prekaz valley, pretty much recorded some 40 blood feud related murders opposed to the former most important place of from 1999 to 2003 (Judah, 2008: 29), perceives memory on (Gazimestan), incorpo- blood feuds as “a consequence of the poor func- rating the Serbian myth. Prekaz is a small village tioning of law and order and the institutions that in north-western Kosovo with martyr . regulate the law”. Stephanie Schandwer-Sievers The story begins in December 1991, when Ser- thinks it derives from Roman law, and today it bian police surrounded the village and opened has become part of the canon of Albanian iden- fire. Villagers resisted. Albanian political leaders tity (Fischer and Schwandner-Sievers, 2002). reacted almost immediately, calling for a peace- Kanun, however, is not only a blood feud code. ful solution. The police raided the village, looking It includes the pillars of the very essence of Al- for and his brother, who were ac- banian identity: honor (nderi), hospitality (mik- tive against Serbian oppression. They escaped pritja), right conduct (sjellja) and loyalty to one’s to Switzerland, helped by a schoolteacher Jakup clan (fis). The supreme expression of the Alba- , a former political prisoner and current nian code is the vow, , which was an chairman of Kosovo Parliament. In 1993, Jashari extremely important part of cohesiveness of the returned and transformed his home in Prekaz to movement of civil resistance in the 1990s. Every a centre-place for forming the Kosovo Libera- hero and every martyr bears these characteris- tion Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës). On 22 tics. Additionally, in the most marginalized areas January 1998, police attacked the Jashari fam- of northern Albania the collapse of the former re- ily compound in Prekaz. The Serbian forces re- gime provoked recourse to pre-communist cus- turned on 5 March, surrounding the village and toms. Here, a revitalization of traditionalist killing Adem Jashari and more than 40 members and has occasionally produced a fragile of his family. Today, their graves form a memorial order; including the negotiation of local authority center. It consists of white graves, among them and the redistribution of land (although this has the grave of Adem Jashari guarded by a ceremo- mostly benefited particular interest groups at the nial guard, with the nearby fountain resembling expense of those who could not claim land rights a traditional Islamic prayer fountain. There is a through descent). Reference to Kanun here is path leading to the hill above, with a secret com- contested and situational, unpredictable, pro- pound for kaçak fighters (Albanian guerrilla fight- voking new conflicts and subject to an abuse of ers) involved in battles around Prekaz. Jashari’s local power which many locals detest and wish burned and destroyed house is preserved in- to see replaced by the more predictable exertion tact, while visitors pass by pictures and murals of state law (Schwandner-Sievers 1999). Lastly, of Adem Jashari and his fellows. The bearded criminal interest groups, often deriving from the of his image is also present everywhere most disadvantaged parts of northern Albania in Kosovo. There is also an center and Kosovo, have used “tradition” to conceal built in modern victorious architecture style. The their informal interests and to enforce group cohe- scenery is packed with red-black Albanian flags sion via the threat and usage of violence against and symbols of UÇK. Strangely enough, there is those defined as “traitors”, both inside and out- no mosque in Prekaz, and Islamic symbolism is side the country (Schwandner-Sievers 2001). present only in form of a crescent on the graves Another martyr place of memory is the village of country’s martyrs. of Raçak. In early 1999, the massacre of civil- Prekaz brings additional symbolism for Al- ians, including women and children, drew atten- banians. This memorial site is called the field of tion of Louise Arbour, prosecutor for the Interna- peace. In early 1990s, this was the site where tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Albanian families came for a ritual of reconcilia- (ICTY). The head of OSCE’s mission in Kosovo tion and ending of blood feuds and blood venge- described the atrocities as following: “A village ance. This tradition began to spread after the that had one KLA member would be subject to fall of communism, based on centuries of feuds being surrounded by artillery, being surrounded according to the Kanun or Canon by the army, being surrounded by the police, be- of Lëke Dukagjini, which enshrined the princi- ing bombarded for hours; the police units would ple. A retired professor Anton Cetta, fearing the then go in, separate the men and the boys, take danger of disunity among Albanians on troubled them off and essentially pillage and loot and burn

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 36 www.cpi.hr Vedran Obućina: A War of Myths suvremene TEME, (2011.) god. 4., br. 1. CONTEMPORARY issues, (2011) Vol. 4, No. 1 the village” (Pond, 2006: 103). Raçak is today Jashari is the new Skanderbeg, the real na- a vital commemoration site, whose red graves tional icon for Kosovo Albanians. His image is bear the two-headed black eagle sign. ubiquitous; he embodies the struggle and con- tinuous resistance of Albanians. His image and 6. Albanianism as Religion founding myth of Kosovo is so strong, that he be- comes a visual and symbolic icon even for Alba- It should be noted here, as Tim Judah does in nians living outside Kosovo. Islam, on the other his introduction book on Kosovo (Judah, 2008), hand, does not a vital role among kaçaks, that these martyrs cannot be compared to sha- although Jashari, his whole family and almost all hids (a traditional name for Islamic martyrs who kaçak fighters in Prekaz were Muslims. In 2000 fought and died for the faith). Quite contrary, there were estimations to be around 60 thou- Albanian martyrs are called dëshmorëte kom- sand Albanian Catholics in Kosovo, and very bit (martyrs of the nation), and they, in the very few Orthodox Albanians (Judah, 2008: 7). It fol- essence, represent the sacrifice for their coun- lows the pattern of Albania proper, where some try and their unrecognized or oppressed nation. 10 percent of population is of Catholic religious These kaçak warriors stem from the 1912 revolts background, and some 20 percent belong to in Kosovo. They were fighting against Serbian, Orthodox churches, among them mostly to the and later Yugoslav rule. Their most famous mili- Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania (CIA tary leaders were Azem and Shota Bejta, and the World Fact Book, 2009). The estimates of Mus- political leadership was vested in the Committee lim population are between 70 and 79 percent, for the National Defense of Kosovo. They sup- although all of these are data for religious back- ported rebellion inside Kosovo, lobbying for the ground, and not for practicing religion. Generally liberation and re-unification of Albanian lands. speaking, Albanians are a very secular people Their general of rules in 1919 was the same (Judah, 2008: 8). Quite a number of practicing as in 1990s (Clark, 2000: 27). These included Muslims, on the other hand, belong to the liberal peace with all local Serbs who do not stand with Sufi, Bektashi group, regarded as heretical by weapons in their hands, and protection of all most Muslim worshippers in Islamic world com- houses and churches. In response, Belgrade brought munity (ummah). Islam in Kosovo adopted local četnik brigades. Azem Bejta made eight demands . Kosovo was once a central point of in 1919, which again echo in 1990s (Clark, 2000: Balkan Sufism, standing on Via Egnatia, a - 27): recognize Kosovo’s right to self-government, jor link between Istanbul and Balkan countries. stop killing Albanians, stop taking their land, stop Towns like (Peć), Djakovë (Đakovica) and the colonization program, stop army actions on , together with Albanian centers in Alba- the pretext of “disarmament”, open Albanian nia proper (, Gyirokastër, Krujë and ), schools, make Albanian an official language and and in (/Shkup, Tetovë) were stop interning the families of rebels. According to centers for important Sufi brotherhoods, especially some historians, kaçaks made strong symbolic Ria’iyya and Bektashiyya (Norris, 2006: 9). Broth- demonstration of the fact that many Kosovo Al- erhoods acted like secret societies, and the Bek- banians did not accept the legitimacy of Serbian tashi order started to have more a rational and or Yugoslav rule; and they seriously obstructed free-thinking aura, bearing a political message. the colonization program, to the point where many No wonder, thus, that the brothers Frashëri, of- would-be settlers were reluctant to go to Kosovo, ten considered as the founding fathers of Alba- and many who went returned home (Clark, 2000: nian nation, were Bektashi, and Naim Frashëri’s 28), which again resembles the situation in 1990s. major work is called Bektashi Pages (Norris, In the Second World War, however, kaçaks were 2006: 10). Influenced by Turkish and especial- regarded as fascist collaborators in the later Yu- ly Persian thought and poetry, Albanian Sufis goslav official history, although theBalli Kombëtar spread an idea of togetherness and equality. (National Front, BK), was in fact a resistance Also, it is noteworthy that the Illyrian tribes of movement against the Italian occupation of Alba- Dardanians, who are favored among the Albani- nia, but in 1943 the cooperation with the commu- an ethno-genetic researchers of Kosovar ances- nist-led National Liberation Movement of Albania tors, were fiercely Catholic, closely connected to broke down. The communists openly started to Vatican. This connection never ended, and there interpret the fighting with BK as anti-fascist strug- are speculations given from a close associate of gle. In response, BK became openly collabora- Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of Kosovo Albani- tionist, with an open goal of the unification of Ko- ans, Catholic priest Lush Gjergji that he convert- sovo with Albania (Clark, 2000: 29).

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 37 www.cpi.hr Vedran Obućina: A War of Myths suvremene TEME, (2011.) god. 4., br. 1. CONTEMPORARY issues, (2011) Vol. 4, No. 1 ed to Catholicism before he died.1 Although the ism, expressed in the thought of Rousseau (Ypi, Catholics were in a worse condition than Ortho- 2007: 671), but focused on a specific difference: dox believers in the Ottoman times, the Catholics Albanians had hardly ever experienced citizen- promoted Albanian education. Jesuits set up an ship in an autonomous political community, but “Illyrian College” in in 1574, and there was a for the mythical Illyrian age and the short season widespread phenomenon of crypto-Catholicism, of anti-Ottoman resistance under Skanderbeg. i.e. families who publicly adopted , but These two form, therefore, the very foundation received Catholic sacraments in private (Clark, of the Albanian nation. But, the future might bring 2000). The identity of Albanians, however, does some unexpected turns. The center of Prishtina not stem from religion, but from Albanian national is packed with Christian symbols. Mother The- consciousness. Albanian Catholic poet Pashko resa Boulevard forms the pedestrian zone in the Vasa wrote in 19th century that “the religion of the very city center, finished with her statue. Mother Albanians is Albanianism”, which was included Theresa, born Agnes Gonxha Bojaxhiu in Skop- in the slogan of the nineteenth century League je, was of Albanian Catholic origin (although her of Prizren, the first experience of real Albanian family was in fact Vlach). At times of Rugova’s nationalism. This body fought for unification of rule her image spread across Kosovo, as a sym- the Albanian lands and the establishment of an bol of peaceful Albanian desire and plea. Around Albanian state within the . Later the University of Prishtina compound, which also on, the League opposed Istanbul and started to forms the very center of Prishtina, there are fight against it. In 1878, 300 Albanian delegates also two churches. One is an unfinished Ser- from four Ottoman provinces () where Al- bian Orthodox Church (the so called Milošević’s banians lived (Kosovo, Monastir (today Bitola), Church, because the Serbian leader started to Janina and Scutari or Shkodër) gathered in the build churches all around Kosovo in 1990s, sym- city of Prizren in southern Kosovo to form the bolizing the Serbian character of Kosovo), and League. The purpose was initially to protect Al- the other one is Mother Theresa Catholic Cathe- banian lands against assaults from neighboring dral, the ownership of in Albania countries - , , Serbia and Montene- and Kosovo. The biggest mosque, however, is in gro, and it was the first such organization made up the Old Town (çarshia). The Muslim movements by both Muslim and Christian Albanians. It was a now request that the central Kosovo mosque be herald of new Albanian rebirth or or built around the University, next or opposite to the Rilindja (Trix, 2010: 359). It was the beginning of Catholic Church, shouting at the same time about Albanianism as a religion. Albanians would need Christian occupation of Albanian Muslim identity. a national narrative to make their sovereignty Otherwise, identity formation is very ambiguous in claims sound plausible: from pieces of tribes, Kosovo; people change their ethnic identity or con- they had to defend the cause of an Albanian na- vert to another religion without completely forget- tion and create one distinctive Albanian culture. ting the legacy of previous identities. Their belief Sami Frashëri wrote at that time: “Albania runs systems are thus based on unconscious and un- greater risks that will show their roots in times of reflective fusion and borrowing (Duijzings, 2000). peace, without blood and arms. It is the war of Although religion plays a complex role in the schools and , the war of nationalism (...) development of group identities, Albanians have The , the Slavs and the other neighbor- never really stressed the importance of religion for ing countries do not want to recognize the ex- their society. But, Duijzings reminds that even Al- istence of Albanian nation. Each of them uses banians at one time attempted to use religion as a their own faith to attract those Albanians sharing marker, but it failed, because the nation is divided their religion”. This is why the attractive force of into at least three, or as Duijzings suggests, possi- religion in providing to the collective associa- bly four religious traditions: Muslim, Catholic, Ortho- tion was dangerous for Albanians. They are a dox and Bektashi. The heterodox Islam in the Bal- threat to nationalistic religion and precisely the kans is especially in focus here as it gave rise to a reason why Albanians turned out to be quite an number of identities. The religious differences were “atheist” people (Ypi, 2007: 667). Language and blurred: “Muslims and Christians of different ethnic history became indicators of the country’s au- background have visited each other’s sanctuaries, thenticity and formed the basis for Rilindja (Ypi, worshiped each other’s saints and ignored the evi- 2007: 668). Ypi compared the rise of the Alba- dent theological objections of religious orthodoxies” nian nation to the classic idea of civic national- (Duijzings, 2000: 2). Thus, common pilgrimages or Crypto-Catholicism were possible. And all these de- 1 See http://balkanupdate.blogspot.com/2006/01/rugova- died-christian.html. velopments were political constructs, as Duijzings

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 38 www.cpi.hr Vedran Obućina: A War of Myths suvremene TEME, (2011.) god. 4., br. 1. CONTEMPORARY issues, (2011) Vol. 4, No. 1 suggests: “...the formation and transformation of distortion and its effect in any public discus- ethnic and religious identities is determined by wid- sion on TV or elsewhere is to pre-empt any er political developments (Duijzings, 2000: 22). Albanian from putting across a different view or attempting some clarification of history... 7. A New Politics of History The was not a confronta- tion solely between Serbs and Turks. It was a Prekaz is the founding myth of new Kosovo battle fought by all the people of the Balkans and Jashari is the new hero, but Kosovo has a united against an invader. All the list deep desire to defend itself, in a way, from “other the names of the Balkan peoples who fought heroes”. One of them is for sure Miloš Obilić, a alongside one another against a common dis- mythical character of Serbian history. He is the aster: Serbs, , Albanians and Roma- legendary assassin of Ottoman , a nians... The Battle which should have been holy warrior canonized in Serbian Orthodox Church, preserved in memory as a symbol of friend- although his historical presence in the Battle of Ko- ship between the Balkan peoples was appro- sovo, and the battle itself, is often contested by priated by criminal Serbs to serve their pur- various historians. Albanians contest the very na- poses.” (Judah, 2008: 24, 25). tionality of Miloš Obilić, although in those times the notion of nationality used to be somewhat blurry Albanians claim descent from the ancient Il- and instable. According to the Albanian version, lyrians, while Slavs did not arrive in Kosovo until Miloš was in fact Kopiliqi, an Albanian version of the sixth and seventh centuries AD. This claim is the contested true name of the Serbian hero. In very important, because Serbian authorities, re- that way, Albanians diminish the importance of garding this as an Austrian-instilled myth (in early Kosovo Battle for the Serbs, and paradoxically 20th century, before Albania gained independence), revoke Albanian traditional resistance to every treat Albanians as immigrants and twice in the foreign rule, including the Ottoman Empire. That twentieth century they have sought to “repatri- is one of the reasons why a town near Kosovo ate” Albanians in (Clark, 2000: xx). battlefield is still called Obilić (Obiliq), and has Called the modern day Skanderbeg, Jashari not changed its name, like some other towns in stands next to the biggest hero of Albanianism. Kosovo. Skanderbeg is omnipresent in every part of Bal- The politics of history gains ground in Kosovo kans where Albanians live. His statues adorn the today. It derives from the “founding fathers” of main squares in Albanian cities. A very ambiva- Albanian nation, brothers Frashëri, who turned lent , Gjergj Kastrioti was born in their people “from a scattered array of clans into 1403, as a son of an Orthodox Christian Alba- a nation”. Albanians consider themselves as Il- nian nobleman. He was later sent as a hostage lyrians and Dardanians, calling thus sometimes to Istanbul, where he converted to Islam and took Kosovo Dardania, meaning the Pear Country. Ko- the name Skanderbeg, from the Turkish İskender sovo is a name of Slavic origin, meaning blackbird , meaning “Lord Alexander” (Judah, 2008: field, and bears special significance for Serbs, as 25). In 1443 he returned in Albania, converted “the cradle of Serbian civilisation” and “Serbian back to Catholic and began his fight Jerusalem”. The Kosovo Albanian leader Ibra- against the Turks. His vision was vivid among him Rugova toyed with the idea of renaming Ko- 19th century Albanians, although most of them sovo Dardania (Judah, 2008: 31). The question were Muslims. Projecting the images in con- “who was here first” was always a fierce debate temporary world about past is often difficult to among Albanian and Serbian historians. Alba- prove scientifically, especially because Skander- nian biggest contemporary writer beg’s daughter was married to a Serbian prince. has showcased the common Albanian stand- Skanderbeg both allied with and fought against point to it: the Serbs. Overall, Skanderbeg was a truly Al- banian hero, combining all possible , “Any discussion on Kosovo today begins with friends and foes of , keeping the the cliché: ‘ territory for the Serbs’; Albanian readiness to fight for the homeland. the ‘cradle of the Serbian nation.’...The core Over the centuries his religious orientation, the of [Serb] mythology goes as follows: at the defender of Christianity, as he was known in the time of the Battle in 1389, the Serbs were a Christian world, was avoided, as well as his real majority in a region that was at the heart of domain, which never included Kosovo (Fischer their Kingdom; the Albanians only came into and Schwandner-Sievers, 2002: 43). Skander- the territory after the battle. This is a crude beg’s 25-year revolt against Ottoman rule is also

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 39 www.cpi.hr Vedran Obućina: A War of Myths suvremene TEME, (2011.) god. 4., br. 1. CONTEMPORARY issues, (2011) Vol. 4, No. 1 a proof for Serbians who regard Albanians as vi- The prospect of violent conflict in difficult tal ally of Turkish rule over the Balkans. In fact, times was vigorously announced in Slobodan Albanians continued to take part in conspiracies Milošević’s speech at Gazimestan Field. Albani- and military campaigns against the Ottoman Em- ans easily understood the message. All violent pire, and there were frequent local revolts against and armed rebellion would finish in too many vic- new taxes, , or attempts to disarm the tims and it will be crushed by Yugoslav People’s local population. Some also used banditry as a Army (Jugoslovenska narodna armija, JNA). Kos- form of defiance (Clark, 2000: 25). ovo Albanians started to build their identity linked to non-violence, with the image of Ibrahim Ru- 8. Peaceful Resistance gova as a modern-day Gandhi. Village football teams got new names, such as Durim (Endur- Among Albanians, education was always re- ance) or Qendresa (standing firm) (Clark, 2000: garded as a national breakthrough. Over the centu- 46). The formative experiences for this strategic ries various conquerors and governments refused decision came from Trepča miners, who went to give education in , fearing it through cold and snow for five full days, sticking could spread . Education was the protest columns and inviting for the protest also one of the ways for peaceful resistance, an- manifestation. Some 400.000 people protested other founding myth, vested in the cultural rising and the event went without a single broken win- in Yugoslavia and the parallel education system in dow, any kind of vandalism or destruction (Clark, 1990s. The cultural revival came with the opening 2000: 48), while avoiding any gesture or slogan of the University of Prishtina, and with the Prishtina which could insult the Serbian people. Resist- Radio and TV, and the Rilindja publishing house. ance was often symbolically understood as a The University was especially necessary, since a rebellion of Albanians, workers and , be- little number of Albanian students traditionally went cause the Serbian attitude was perceived as an to study to Belgrade or Zagreb. Although it boasts attack on all three components. The vacuum left with many faculties, the most important ones were after the fall of communism was filled with new and social sciences. A huge amount of organizations, prone to introduce democratiza- Albanian students enrolled, with little or no pro- tion and Europeanization of Kosovo. In the first fessional perspectives afterwards. The cultural half of 1990, some of these organizations is- re-awakening spread also in the countryside. sued an important declaration “For Democracy, Ibrahim Rugova recalls cultural and literary eve- Against Violence”, giving accent again on non- nings and festivals in 1970s, especially in Prizren, violence as the option for survival. Philosopher where Kosovo Albanians discovered themselves Shkelzen Maliqi often regarded non-violence as and ended blood feuds, and also some academic being imposed on Kosovo Albanians: “The strat- connection was possible between Prishtina and egy of nonviolence was somehow self-imposed Tirana (Clark, 2000: 40). There, Albanians redis- as the best, most pragmatic and most efficient covered their historical heroes and events, com- response to Serbian aggressive plans.” (Clark, pleting in this way the politics of memory, places 2000: 66). and events. It ended with uprisings and riots in The non-violent liberation movement, howev- 1980s, labeled in the academic community as na- er, ended in armed resistance. Kosovo Albanians tional awakening and demonstrations sparked by waited hastily for some sort of Dayton Agreement socioeconomic conditions and grievances. Some in Serbia, after Milošević signed the treaty. When called for the unification with Albania, but this style Serbian military and police operations turned from of irredentism (especially called so in Belgrade) Bosnia to Kosovo, young Kosovars, disappointed was not very plausible. As socio-economic condi- with the international community and Rugova’s si- tions were among the major reasons for uprisings, lent opposition, turned violent. This was the crea- it would be difficult to expect for people to call tion of the Kosovo Liberation Army that started for the unification with Albania, which was in far guerilla warfare for freedom (Pond, 2006: 102). greater economic difficulties, as well as under harsh dictatorship of Enver Hoxha. The main call 9. Conclusion was – Kosovo Republic! Albanians wanted their own republic within the Yugoslav federation, which The collapse of Yugoslavia was often con- would change boundaries, taking in some parts of sidered by cultural scholars as a consequence Macedonia, Serbia and , as well as full of primordial Balkan mentality, ancient hatreds respect of their national rights, recognizing Albani- between Balkan tribes. Although the nationalis- ans as one of the federative nations. tic sense of necessity for belonging is crucial in

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 40 www.cpi.hr Vedran Obućina: A War of Myths suvremene TEME, (2011.) god. 4., br. 1. CONTEMPORARY issues, (2011) Vol. 4, No. 1 this area, it nevertheless diminishes the impor- ans wanted to merge with Albania, and 6 percent tance of what I call “raw cosmopolitanism”, i.e. said they would like to live in an independent the necessity to live next to Other and to tolerate Kosovo (UNDP, 2007: 16). After independence, the Other. Kosovo might be an extreme case of this thinking changed vastly. According to Gallup primordial or essentialist nationalistic outburst, Survey made in 2010, 81 percent of Albanians in because the rate of inter-ethnic marriages or Kosovo supported the idea of Greater Albania, connections between the communities was and 62.8 percent in Albania proper, and 51.9 percent still is rare. Nevertheless, it did not diminish of Albanians living in Macedonia.2 Albanian pres- the ethnic living in Kosovo yesterday, ident Sali reacted instantly and in sever- as well as today, although on a smaller scale. al occasions, repeating that Tirana had no desire International influence and instrumentalization for a Greater Albania. Still, under the banner of by political leaders such as Slobodan Milošević common country, there is a distinctive Albanian surely favored the conflict, but I would stress the cover, incorporated in official history, museums, vital conclusion of Beverly Crawford, that post- places of memory, commemorative centers, mon- war institutions of ethno-federalism in Yugoslavia uments, graveyards, names of cities, streets and cemented the logic of identity politics in the Yu- squares, use of language (Serbian, as second goslav federal structure (Crawford, 1998: 206), official language is practically spoken only in especially after constitutional changes in 1974., Serb enclaves, coupled with the usage of the which brought the decline of central power and Cyrillic alphabet), and separation of ethnic com- diminishing of loyalty to the federal state (Craw- munities in enclaves. Official history shapes the ford, 1998: 231). of new generations and leaves little or no Objective account of history is an academic space for alternatives or for common history of discipline, but rarely a political one. The creation all ethnic communities living in Kosovo. This po- of Kosovo state is a very modernistic achieve- litical imaginary has no academic backup, but as ment. Successful displays of ethnic symbolism is usually the case in politics of history, it does in 1980s and 1990s, often artificially contrived, not need one. History is a reference point for a drew attention to those ethnic divisions perpetu- particular political agenda and interest. It does ated by past institutional incentives (Crawford, not diverge much in Kosovo today, from Kosovo 1998: 199). In the best manner of classic 19th yesterday. Contemporary Albanian political my- century national rebirth, Kosovo Albanians com- thology is very similar in power, focus and meth- bined national myths, stories, memories and ter- ods to Serbian political mythology about Kosovo. ritorial pretensions with political maneuvers and Combined, they make a powerful clash point, a current political possibilities. But, Kosovo might war of the myths which ended in violence and be regarded as a special case. The country that armed conflict. The Albanian myth prevailed. In has not yet fully gained recognition in the world that way, Kosovo Albanians are heading toward as an independent country, gives an image of a the politics of oblivion, with total annihilation of state based on civic nationalism, with wide pro- earlier history, and their role, positive and nega- tection of every ethnic community’s rights and tive, in historical events. It is the common view with profound sense of Kosovar nation based that the nation with previous authoritarian or to- on mutual respect and no specific ethnic back- talitarian past should look more into the future, ground, as well as the constitutionally expressed leaving the burden of heavy history behind. But, desire for Euro-Atlantic integrations, shown also at the same time, they are not dealing system- in the euro as a national currency. However, the atically with political, cultural and moral heritage image and policies show that Kosovo govern- of the past, and it threatens to fall into historical ment and most of its citizens perceive their state subjectivity, isolating certain events from broad- as an ethnic Albanian country. Many even ques- er picture, and to historical revisionism, which is tion whether Kosovo really is considering stay- a legitimate scientific act, but can be very much ing an independent country or is the creation instrumentalized by political actors. of Kosovo merely a first step toward a Greater Albania, comprising of Albania proper, Kosovo, Western Macedonia, and parts of Montenegro, Serbia and Greece where Albanians live as a majority. The opinion polls about this question are ambivalent. United Nations Development Program in Kosovo made a poll in 2007 which 2 See Gallup, 2010, http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/index. showed that only 2.5 percent of Kosovo Albani- php/dashboard.

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 41 www.cpi.hr Vedran Obućina: A War of Myths suvremene TEME, (2011.) god. 4., br. 1. CONTEMPORARY issues, (2011) Vol. 4, No. 1

References

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Vetëvendosje Party Manifest Ypi, L. (2007). The Albanian Renaissance in Political Thought: Between the Enlightenment and , East European Politics and Society, 21 (4): 661-680 Zakošek, N. (2007): The Heavy Burden of History: Political Uses of the Past in the Yugoslav Successor States, Politička misao, 44 (5): 29-43

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 43 www.cpi.hr Vedran Obućina: A War of Myths suvremene TEME, (2011.) god. 4., br. 1. CONTEMPORARY issues, (2011) Vol. 4, No. 1

Rat mitova: Stvaranje utemeljiteljskog mita kosovskih Albanaca

VEDRAN OBUĆINA Politea: udruga za promicanje društvenih znanosti i novih medija, Zagreb

Poseban albanski karakter prisutan je u oblikovanju kosovske državnosti. Služ- bena politika povijesti i identiteta umanjuju važnost ostalih etnničkih zajednica i usredotočuje se na albansku mitologiju, predstavljenu kroz mješavinu sadašnjih i povijesnih ličnosti, događaja, mjesta i sjećanja. Integrativno i usmjereno Europi, Kosovo je sve više partikularno i albansko iznutra, ostavljajući mnoge dvojbe i neizvjesnosti o interkulturalnoj budućnosti najnovije države Europe.

Ključne riječi: Kosovo, Albanci, osnivački mit, sjećanje, politika identiteta

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