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The Great War for New Zealand Waikato, 1800–2000 Vincent O’Malley

No te taenga ki te kohuru i Rangiaohia, katahi au ka mohio he tino pakanga nui tenei, no Niu Tireni When it came to the (time of the) murder at Rangiaohia, then I knew, for the fi rst time, that this was a great war for New Zealand Wiremu Tamihana (1865) A monumental and heavily illustrated new account of the defi ning confl ict in New Zealand history. It was war in the Waikato in 1863–64 that shaped the nation in all kinds of ways, setting back Māori and Pākehā relations by several generations, marking an end to any hopes of meaningful partnership and allowing the government to begin to assert the kind of real control over the country that had eluded it since 1840. RRP: $79.99 | hardback 260 x 185 mm | 650 pages Spanning nearly two centuries from fi rst contact ISBN 9781927277577 through to settlement and apology, O’Malley’s book Publication: October 2016 focuses on the human impact of the war, its origins and aftermath. Based on many years of research, The Great Published by Bridget Williams Books War for New Zealand will become a major reference Winner of the Special Industry Award 2015 for all New Zealanders.

KEY POINTS • Reveals the Waikato War as a conﬂ ict comparable to the World Wars in its lasting eﬀ ects on New Zealand. • 200 illustrations and vivid writing bring this dramatic history to life. Distributor: David Bateman Ltd • Vincent O’Malley has a strong public profi le in the PO Box 100 242, North Shore Mail Centre, national debate for a new day of remembrance. Auckland 0745 | (09) 415 7664 extn 0 [email protected] • Based on many years of research, this monumental history will become a major reference Sales Manager: Bryce Gibson (09) 415 7664 extn 811 | [email protected] for all New Zealanders. Sales Representatives: Shane Delaney – South Island, Northland 021 626 746 | [email protected] Shane Williamson – Wellington, Taranaki, Manawatu, Hawke’s Bay 027 446 2650 | [email protected]

1. Introduction: Owning Our History 2. Remembering (and Forgetting) the Waikato War

PART ONE: BEFORE THE WAR 3. Early Waikato, 1800–1852 4. Settler Self-Government and Māori Responses 5. The Kīngitanga 6. War at Taranaki 7. Isolating Waikato 8. Governor Grey Returns 9. The Taranaki War Resumes 10. The Decision to Invade

PART TWO: THE WAR 11. The Contending Forces 12. The Invasion Begins 13. The Battle for Rangiriri 14. Peace Spurned (and Ngāruawāhia Occupied) 15. The War Spreads 16. Rangiaowhia and Hairini 17. Ōrākau and its Aftermath

PART THREE: THE AFTERMATH About the Author 18. An Uneasy Peace Vincent O’Malley is a professional historian and 19. The Impacts of War the author of a number of books on New Zealand 20. Proposals for Confiscation history including The Meeting Place: Māori 21. Legislating for Confiscation and Pākehā Encounters, 1642–1840 (Auckland 22. Raupatu on the Ground University Press, 2012), which was shortlisted in 23. The Military Settlements the general non-fiction section at the New Zealand 24. The Compensation Court Post Book Awards in 2013, and Beyond the Imperial 25. Land for Landless Rebels Frontier: The Contest for Colonial New Zealand (Bridget Williams Books, 2014). PART FOUR: THE LONG SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 26. Nineteenth-Century Protests, Appeals and Petitions 27. Legal Challenges and Deputations 28. Political Negotiations 29. Towards a Settlement

Editorial Note Glossary of Māori Words Abbreviations Endnotes Bibliography Index

On the morning of 30 March two surveyors, Gundry and G. T. Wilkinson, observed through a theodolite telescope a large number of Māori busily fortifying the Ōrākau site. Their discovery was reported to Brigadier General G. J. Carey, who after riding over to inspect the scene himself shortly after midday, decided to attack as soon as possible. He assembled a force of over 1,100 troops in three separate columns to march on Ōrākau during the night, timing their arrival for dawn. Carey was to advance with the main body of troops along the dray road to Ōrākau, while 250 men under Major Blyth were to take a circuitous route, crossing and re-crossing the Pūniu River and skirting a nearby swamp, to take a position to the rear of the pā. Meanwhile, a smaller party of one hundred men was to take up a position on the left flank of Carey’s column, effectively ensuring Ōrākau pā was surrounded. The different columns set off on their marches between 10 p.m. on 30 March 1864 and 3 a.m. the following morning. Although the Kīngitanga defenders were taken by surprise, they quickly opened fire on the advance guard and assumed their positions inside the pā. An immediate British assault on the pā was easily repelled, resulting in a number of casualties. Ōrākau was considerably stronger than the British had at first thought, and several subsequent rushes on the main line of entrenchments met the same fate. Morale among those inside the pā swelled as a result of these early successes. The defenders even began to debate whether they ought to seize the initiative. According to Hitiri Te Paerata: My father and other brave men urged that we should take advantage of the confusion the Europeans were in and attack them. It is an old saying of our fighting men, ‘Taka mua, taka muri (Quick to strike and quick to retire).’ Rewi would not consent, and the supreme lucky moment was lost. Given that the British parties which had attempted to rush the pā represented a small fraction of the total force available to Carey, Rewi Maniapoto had been very wise to resist the urge to counter-attack, and suggestions that the defenders should hold their fire until the British were just a few yards short of the pā’s outer defences were also rejected as constituting too much of a risk. After three unsuccessful efforts to breach its defences, Carey concluded that there was ‘no chance of taking the pa in this manner from the immense strength’ of the fortifications. He therefore ‘determined to desist from this mode of attack’ and instead ‘decided on surrounding the place, and adopting the more slow but sure method of approaching the position by sap’. Meanwhile, two 6-pound Armstrong guns were brought up and fired from the elevated Karaponia ridge in the direction of the pā, but as the distance was some 350 yards they made little impression on the defences. Carey now dispersed the force at his command evenly around the pā to prevent possible escape and ordered the engineers to commence a sap (a trench to cut through the outer earth walls of the pā). It was a timely decision, as the British soon discovered that there were reinforcements seeking to get into the pā. In the afternoon a party of around 200 men from Maungatautari appeared around 900 yards from the British positions. It was clear that they were trying to get into the pā, but (as Carey reported it) ‘seeing that it was scarcely possible to break through the line formed by our troops, they halted and commenced firing volleys, at the same time exciting the men in the pa to increased energy, by dancing the war dance, shouting, &c’. Those inside the pā had recited familiar chants in an effort to guide their potential reinforcements towards them, including a Kīngitanga haka that likened the government with its land hunger to a bullock devouring the leaves of the raurēkau shrub. The reinforcements, including Ngāti Hauā, Ngāti Raukawa and others, responded but remained reluctant spectators for the duration of the siege.

Bridget Williams Books | PO Box 12474 | Wellington 6144 | New Zealand | +64 4 473 8128 | [email protected] | www.bwb.co.nz Food, ammunition and water supplies within the pā quickly became depleted, and its formerly jubilant defenders were forced to reassess their situation. Some advocated a break out on the first night, though Rewi Maniapoto and others rightly guessed that the British would be anticipating such a move. Meanwhile, some of the Urewera chiefs, perhaps remembering the British actions at Rangiriri, suggested hoisting a white flag and firing on the troops as they advanced towards the pā, but were overruled by others who declared that they ‘would not agree to such treachery, because this was not after the manner of chiefs’. Rewi had previously intervened to prevent one of his men from cutting out the heart of a dead young soldier who had fallen just outside the pā’s defences in the initial attack. It was customary to make a sacrificial offering of the first fallen in this way, but Rewi reportedly insisted that ‘we are fighting under the religion of Christ’. For all the attempts by the British to portray Rewi as a man of violent and savage temperament, he appears to have been more of a stickler for military etiquette than were some of the British commanders. Contemporary reports written during the battle noted that Rewi Maniapoto was believed to be inside the pā. One British soldier who was present, William Race, even claimed that a price had been put on Rewi’s head. He recalled: it was known that Rewi the great fighting chief was in that Pah, and 500 £ was the reward for his head, dead or alive. He was considered the most blood thirsty rebel of them all, and this was what his sanguinary threat was. Known as Rewi’s ‘bloody threat’, translated ‘I will swim my canoes down to Auckland in the Pakehas blood, and give each of my men a white woman for [a] wife.’ There appears to be no other documentary record of ‘Rewi’s curse’, or indeed of a price being placed upon his head, dead or alive, although the British did resort to such a tactic after 1868 when pursuing the Tūranga prophet and military leader Te Kooti. It is possible that the promise of a reward had been made to the troops at some point during the Waikato War. Certainly, the British were desperate to catch Rewi, believing this would deal a devastating blow to the Kīngitanga war effort. For these purposes reinforcements were rushed to the scene on the first day of the siege. The British believed that the capture or killing of all those inside the pā, including Rewi, was virtually guaranteed given the lack of any escape route and the shortage of supplies among the defenders. As one newspaper report confidently asserted, ‘The natives are completely surrounded, and have not the slightest chance of escape’. It seemed just a matter of time before the sap broke the defences and the inevitable crushing victory was achieved. Once they discovered the sapping operation, however, the inhabitants of the pā concentrated their limited firepower on the head of it, inflicting a number of casualties on the British. According to at least one account, the pā’s defenders also commenced their own counter-sap, which was judged to perfection and might have caused panic among the troops were it not for their officer’s order to hold their position. When the second morning dawned, the pā was completely enveloped in a thick fog. Te Winitana Tupotahi of Ngāti Maniapoto, a cousin of Rewi and one of his lieutenants, reported the situation by this time: the greater part of our ammunition had been fired away, and ... there was no reserve of powder and bullets; also ... there was no water, and ... the people were eating raw kamokamo and kumara to relieve their thirst. This was the announcement made by Rewi Maniapoto: ‘Listen to me, chiefs of the council and all the tribes! It was we who sought this battle, wherefore, then, should we retreat? This is my thought: Let us abide by the fortune of war; if we are to die, let us die in battle; if we are to live, let us survive on the field of battle.’