Combating Transnational Organized Crime in Fisheries

COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL Mas Achmad Santosa Coordinator of Special Advisors ORGANIZED CRIME IN FISHERIES Presidential Task Force to Combat Illegal Fishing/Co-Lead Author of Blue Paper 16: “Organized Crime in Fisheries” TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME (TOC) UNDER THE PALERMO CONVENTION

Article 2 of the Palermo Convention Article 3 of the Palermo Convention defines two elements of organized crime defines elements of TOC

Organized criminal group A crime can be constituted as transnational organized crime if: • structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in • it is committed in more than one State; concert with the aim of committing one or • it is committed in one State but a more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with [Palermo] Convention, in substantial part of its preparation, order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a planning, direction, or control takes financial or other material benefit place in another State; • it is committed in one State but involves Serious Crime an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more • conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least than one State; or four years or a more serious penalty • it is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State. DEFINING FISHERIES CRIME AS TOC

The Annual European Union Organised Crime Situation Report (2003) expands on TOC definition, noting that in order for something to be described as organized crime, at least six of the following characteristics are required; and it must have characteristics 1, 3, 5, and 11:

1. Collaboration of more than 2 people (in accordance with Art. 2(a) of Palermo Convention) 2. Each with own appointed tasks (in accordance with Art. 5 para. 1 of Palermo Convention) 3. For prolonged or indefinite period of time (in accordance with Art. 5 para. 1 of Palermo Convention) 4. Using some form of discipline and control (in accordance with Art. 23 of Palermo Convention) 5. Suspected of the commission of serious criminal offences (in accordance with Art. 2(b), 5, 6, 8 and 23 of Palermo Convention) 6. Operating at an international level (in accordance with Art. 3 para. 2 of Palermo Convention) 7. Using violence or other means suitable for intimidation (in accordance with Art. 23 of Palermo Convention) 8. Using commercial or businesslike structures (in accordance with Art. 2(c) of Palermo Convention) 9. Engaged in money laundering (in accordance with Art. 6, 7 of Palermo Convention) 10. Exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial authorities or the economy 11. Determined by the pursuit of profit and/or power* (in accordance with Art. 5 para. 1 of Palermo Convention) IUU FISHING AND TOC IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY Both IUU fishing and TOC in the fishing industry take place in the fisheries business, but enforcement approach against the two delinquent acts are different IUU Fishing Enforcement against violations/incompliance related to fishing activities, such as: • Fishing without license • Use of prohibited fishing gears • Unreported catch • Fishing outside the designated fishing grounds

TOC in the fishing industry Enforcement against all types of crime associated with fishing operations throughout the whole fisheries value chain Other crimes to maximize Planning (pre-operation) Fishing operation economic profit • Forgery • Using Flags of Convenience • Tax crime • Recruitment through human • Transhipment at sea • Money laundering trafficking modus operandi • Trafficking of illicit goods (drugs, • Bribery weapons) • Smuggling of goods (fuel) • Modern slavery IUU FISHING AND TOC IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY Both IUU fishing and TOC in the fishing industry take place in the fisheries business, but enforcement approach against the two delinquent acts are different IUU Fishing Enforcement against violations/incompliance related to fishing activities, such as: • Fishing without license • Use of prohibited fishing gears • Unreported catch • Fishing outside the designated fishing grounds

FRAUD IN FISHERIES Organized fisheries activities usually cover their illegalities and identity through forged documents and identifications in order to avoid monitoring and surveillance. Types of fraud in fisheries include: • Forgery of registration certificates and license documents – e.g. Sunrise Glory forged Indonesian fishing licenses to cloak its drugs smuggling operation • Identity fraud (changing names, flags, and AIS identity) – e.g. MV NIKA spotted using other vessel’s AIS identification to cloak its identity • Inaccurate catch records and falsifying catch species – STS-50 falsified fish species to cover the Antarctic Toothfish that was caught illegally

ECONOMIC CRIME IN FISHERIES Economic crimes are used to facilitate operations, cover their criminal activities with legitimate businesses, and maximize profit by evading taxes. Types of economic crimes include: • Corruption – e.g. actors in the Bengis case (South Africa) bribed fisheries officers to facilitate illegal harvest of South Coast lobsters • Tax crime (unreported tax, misreported tax, and tax evasion) • Money laundering TYPES OF CRIME IN THE FISHERIES VALUE CHAIN

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES Low cost labours are usually used to maximize profits of fishing operations. The labours are usually recruited through trafficking and being forced to work under poor working environment, poor salaries, without social security and health insurance. These fish workers also sometimes endure physical and mental abuses. Types of human rights abuses on fishing vessels include: • Forced labour • Human trafficking All forms of these human rights abuses • Modern slavery were found in Benjina case

TRAFFICKING OF ILLICIT GOODS AND SMUGGLING OF GOODS • Fishing vessels are sometimes used to facilitate trafficking of illicit goods, such as narcotics, weapons, fuel, and even endangered wildlife – e.g. Sunrise Glory used fishing vessels to smuggle drugs from Indonesia • Fishing vessels are also used to smuggle goods, such as fuel, and migrants. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ON FISHING VESSELS

Child Substandard And Labour Fraudulent And Inhumane Living Condition Deceptive Recruitment

Withholding Personal Documents

Working Without No Social Security Payment

No Working Agreement

Physical And Mental Abuse

Homicide & 18-20 Hour Health And Safety Sexual Abuse Workdays Violations

8 FV VIKING Part of the notorious illegal fishing group called “Bandit 6”

FV Viking’s chain of criminal activities

• FV Viking was owned by Spanish owners through shell companies in Seychelles, Panama, Hong Kong, and Nigeria, and was operated by an agent in South East Asia which domiciled in several countries. It was also operated from Singapore for crewing, logistic and financing. • FV Viking forged several documents, changed its flag more than 10 times, and changed its name more than 10 times in order to cloak their operations. At least 25 flags were found on board FV Viking. • FV Viking targeted Patagonian Toothfish, a high-valued species which can be sold at around US$30 per kilograms.

9 FV VIKING’S CHAIN OF CRIMINALITY

Spain Mongolia N. Korea Owner Claimed nationality Claimed nationality Libya Claimed nationality

Japan Claimed nationality Honduras Togo Claimed nationality Claimed nationality Hong Kong 1 company listed as owner

Panama Singapore 1 company listed as owner Operator/ Seychelles agent Nigeria 1 company Chile 1 company listed as owner Nationality of the Captain listed as owner Australia Indonesia Nationality of Uruguay Equatorial Guinea Manning agency agent/operator Claimed nationality Claimed nationality HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN BENJINA Hundreds of fishing crews were trafficked to work on fishing vessels in Benjina

• 682 fishing crews identified as victims of trafficking originated from Thailand, Myanmar, Lao, Cambodia, and Vietnam. They endured physical and mental abuses, working under poor environment, and only paid with poor salaries. • One of the owners is a company registered in British Virgin Islands that is affiliated with a Hong Kong company owned by two Thai citizens. • Most fishing vessels in Benjina were built in Thailand and using at least Indonesian, Thai, and PNG flags • Caught fishes from Indonesia which then transhipped to Thai reefer in the PNG waters 11 SILVER SEA 2 Helped illegal fishing vessels through transhipment at sea

Silver Sea 2’s chain of criminal activities

• Silver Sea 2 was found committed illegal transshipment with Indonesian fishing vessels in PNG waters for the fish to be illegally exported in Thailand. • Suspected of having affiliations with a fishery company that committed human trafficking and modern slavery in Benjina. • Silver Sea 2 forged PNG-issued clearance documents and deactivated AIS during transshipment and during its course from PNG to Thailand to avoid monitoring and surveillance.

12 SILVER SEA 2’S CHAIN OF CRIMINALITY

UK Insurer

Thailand Beneficial owner

Sabang Arrested

Ambon & Benjina Vessel agent Arafura Sea Papua New Guinea Illegal transshipment Vessel agent STS-50 Also known as ANDREY DOLGOV, SEA BREEZE, and AIDA

STS-50’s chain of criminal activities • STS-50 committed illegal fishing in the CCAMLR convention area, targeted Antarctic Toothfish. • STS-50 was found to be falsifying catch species when inspected by Chinese Authorities. • STS-50 illegally used Togolese flag when entering Indonesia. • STS-50 was owned by Russian owner who resides in South Korea. The vessel’s owner is listed as a company based in Belize. • STS-50 is affiliated with a manning agency based in Indonesia who supplied Indonesian fishing crews to work on board the vessel.

14 STS-50’S CHAIN OF CRIMINALITY

Rusia Owner, vessel captain

China Escaped during apprehension; found to falsify catch species

Weh Island Togo Arrested Falsify nationality Indonesia Crews Mozambique Escaped during apprehension Australia & New Zealand Wanted for illegal fishing SUNRISE GLORY

• Fishing vessel that carried 1,6 ton of methamphetamine and was using forged Indonesian fishing license. • Sunrise Glory was flagged to Singapore and had 4 Taiwanese crews on board.

Image Source: http://pescadolus.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/07/24789307036_ef683725d3_o.jpg

16 MV NIKA Fishing vessel claimed as general cargo vessel, with association to STS-50

Crab pots found inside MV NIKA

• MV NIKA committed identity fraud by registering in Panama as General Cargo Vessel. Based on the physical inspection, MV NIKA is actually a fishing vessel that carries fishing gears (crab pot) and has fish processing units inside the vessel. • MV NIKA used other vessel’s AIS identification to cloak its identity when entering South Georgia and Sandwich Islands (UK jurisdiction) and repeated the identity fraud when entering Indonesian EEZ. • MV NIKA is owned by the same company that owned STS-50. MV NIKA’S CHAIN OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

Russia Owner

South Korea Operator/Agent

Panama Identity fraud: claimed as general cargo vessel Indonesia Board and Inspect

South Georgia & Sandwich Islands; Falkland Island Marshall Islands Identity fraud (using other vessel’s AIS identification) Owner’s company address and suspected illegal fishing operation

• MV NIKA operate through a company based in Marshall Islands, owned by a Russian, and was assisted by an operated/agent based in South Korea. • MV NIKA’s suspected illegal fishing operation is located in the South Georgia & Sandwich Islands and Falkland Island (CCAMLR Area). • MV NIKA was claiming as a General Cargo Vessel based on its registration in Panama. MULTINATIONAL INVESTIGATION TEAM TO HANDLE THE CASE OF MV NIKA

USA US Coast Guard assists in extracting electronic information for digital forensics Indonesia Board & Inspect and investigation Panama Requests for Board and Inspect by Indonesian Government Australia AFMA and CCAMLR UK INTERPOL (Lyon) Secretariat dispatched Conducted Facilitate personnels to inspect Board & Inspect coordination MV NIKA in June 2019 between countries for Board & Inspect

• In June 2019, INTERPOL sent Inspection Report written by CCAMLR and UK inspectors to Indonesia, notifying about a fishing vessel named MV NIKA which claimed to be General Cargo Vessel under Panama Vessel Registry. • Following request from Indonesia, MV NIKA is inspected and investigated by Multinational Investigation Support Team (MIST) comprises of personnels from Indonesia, Australia, USA, INTERPOL, and CCAMLR. • Before MV NIKA was intercepted, Panama sent official request to Indonesia for conducting Board & Inspect the vessel to look for possible violations, including to confirm the identity fraud committed by MV NIKA MULTINATIONAL INVESTIGATION TEAM TO HANDLE THE CASE OF MV NIKA

Document inspection

Coordination with INTERPOL

Vessel inspection

Board and Inspect WHAT ARE THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR A COUNTRY TO COMBAT TOC IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY?

• DETERMINED POLITICAL WILL (NATIONAL LEADERSHIP)

• EFFECTIVE LAWS AND REGULATIONS – laws that are equipped with extra- territorial reach, corporate criminal liability, multi-door approach, tough punishments embedded with minimum sanctions

• EFFECTIVE NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT AGENCY – represented by all enforcement institutions under one-roof with strong power and effective integrity system

• EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION – utilizing global, regional, and bilateral cooperation as reinforcements in the fight against TOC in the fishing industry (e.g. MIST)

• STRONG ROLE OF INTERPOL – strengthening the role of INTERPOL is important to facilitate enforcement cooperation between member countries in combating TOC in the fishing industry (utilizing various tools provided by INTERPOL: Notices, information exchange, investigations assistance, facilitate MIST, and capacity building activities)