Vulnerable Populations Survey Sri Lanka 2011

Colombo, Sri Lanka

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sri Lanka is a multi‐ethnic, multi‐religious society with four major religions: Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Roman Catholicism. As the country emerges from decades of war, new ethno‐religious dynamics are emerging which have implications for peace and coexistence between communities. This survey is meant to help uncover some of those dynamics, especially as they relate to Sri Lanka’s Muslims. In Sri Lanka, ethnicity and religion are intertwined. Buddhists are Sinhalese; Hindus are Tamils; Muslims comprise a separate ethnic category and are still referred to as ‘Moors’, especially among older Sri Lankans. While Muslims’ mother‐tongue is Tamil, they are not Tamils. Christians are either Sinhalese or Tamil, and the overwhelming majority is Roman Catholic.

The concerns of Sri Lanka’s Muslim community have largely been left out of the “national question” due to the dominance of the Sinhalese‐Tamil political and social conflict. However, the growing demographic strength of the Muslim community is likely to interfere with this binary narrative about peace, conflict, and coexistence, and in the future, lead to a multiplicity of national questions. The Muslim community’s size in relation to other communities’ will be brought into sharper relief in late 2012 with the conclusion of the first all‐island household census since 1981.

Within this complex and evolving landscape, The Asia Foundation conducted the Vulnerable Populations in Sri Lanka Survey in late 2011 to gain a more grounded understanding of people’s perceptions of religious beliefs and practices, influence of religious leaders, inter‐religious relations, and the extent to which it contributes to tension and violence particularly as it relates to Sri Lanka’s Muslim population. The survey revealed the following key findings:

 A large plurality of Sri Lankans believe the country is moving in the right direction, however religious minorities are less positive than Buddhists. Overall, 43 percent of Sri Lankans believe the country is moving in the right direction while just 15 percent see it moving in the wrong direction. An additional 23 percent feel some things are going in the right direction and some things the wrong direction. Differences in perception can be seen between religious groups: 49 percent of Buddhists feel the country is moving in the right direction compared to 38 percent of Muslims and just 22 percent of Hindus. Nearly twice as many Muslims (21%) and Hindus (23%) as Buddhists (12%) believe the country is moving in the wrong direction. Infrastructure improvements and the end of the war are seen are the main reasons for those who feel the country is moving in the right direction. Increases in the price of goods and an increase in corruption and bribery are the main reasons for those who feel the country is moving in the wrong direction.

 Most Sri Lankans feel that the conclusion of the war has not brought an end to ethnic conflict in the country but that it has been reduced. Over half (53%) of Sri Lankans feel that the end of the war has not ended ethnic conflict in the country but that it has been reduced, while 32 percent believe that the conclusion of the war has indeed brought an end to ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Seven percent believe the end of the war has not changed anything.

 Sri Lankans overwhelmingly perceive their society as becoming significantly more religious. Nationally, 63 percent believe people are much more religious now than 5 years ago. More Buddhists (70%) and Muslims (53%) say they are “much more religious than other either Hindus (39%) or Catholics (44%).

 Observance of core Islamic practices is very high among Sri Lankan Muslims, and certain practices have increased in recent years. More than 90 percent of Muslims fast during Ramadan and pray five times a day. Three quarters of Muslim women in Sri Lanka now cover, representing a marginal increase (+12%) compared to five years ago. However, most Muslim women only cover partially, and primarily as a matter of personal choice. The majority of Muslims (51%) prefer to consult the Holy Quran to determine whether or not a certain action is against the teachings of Islam, while one quarter would consult their local imam.

 A majority of Sri Lankan Muslims believe that at least to a certain extent traditions and practices of Islam in Sri Lanka are different from other countries with Muslim populations. While not exhibiting a strong opinion, Sri Lankan Muslims generally feel that their brand of Islam is different than other countries with 43 percent saying they “somewhat agree” with the notion and 18 percent strongly agreeing. Only 18 percent of Muslims disagree with the idea that Sri Lanka’s brand of Islam differs from other countries.

 Muslims generally view foreign influence on their religious teachings positively, Buddhists view it negatively. A plurality of Muslims (38%) believe foreign influence on their religious teachings is a good thing, compared to just 9 percent of Buddhists. For Muslims, the countries perceived as having the greatest influence are Saudi Arabia (39%), Pakistan (18%), and India (18%). Buddhists cite India (27%) and the United States (20%).

 Local religious leaders are by far the most respected leaders in the country for Sri Lankans of all faiths. Nationally, 80 percent say local religious leaders are ‘very well respected’, compared to 32 percent for GN officials and just 12 percent for politicians. While the majority of Sri Lankans (66%) believe religious leaders should not be involved in politics, Muslims are relatively split on the issue, with just under half (42%) believing religious leaders should have some role to play in politics. Among Muslims, 52 percent consider the Maulvi to be their local leader while 43 percent consider their Imam. Rather than indicating internal disagreement, this split in views among Muslims likely reflects the fact that in some communities Maulvis—who are primarily religious scholars—often also play the role of Imam, leading prayers and providing spiritual guidance.

 Sri Lankans unanimously believe religious leaders should play a central role in community level development, however few are currently involved. While Sri Lankans believe local religious leaders should stay out of politics, a staggering 84 percent think that religious leaders should be involved in the development of neighborhood amenities. A further 81 percent believe that if religious leaders are not consulted on the problems facing an area, political leaders will make mistakes. Despite this sentiment, only a quarter (26%) say religious leaders in their area are actually participating in local development on a regular basis, and among Muslims the rate is even lower (17 percent).

 Religious education is increasingly important for Sri Lankans of all faiths. Nine out of ten Muslims and Buddhists say that religious education is more important today than five years ago. Nearly three‐ quarters of Muslims respondents or their family are currently attending or have attended a religious school, and the rate is even higher among Buddhists (87%). Religious education among Sri Lankan Muslims is almost always pursued domestically with only a small proportion (4%) indicating they have

studied abroad, the vast majority doing so in Saudi Arabia. If presented with an opportunity to pursue religious studies abroad, Muslims overwhelmingly would prefer to do so in Saudi Arabia.

 Religious minorities, including Muslims, are more likely than Buddhists to perceive discrimination by the government. Overall, Sri Lankans believe that the rights of minorities have improved at least to some degree compared to five years ago (47% much better, 32% somewhat better), however Buddhists believe improvement has been much more substantial than minorities themselves who are more likely to feel only minor or no change has taken place. Nine in ten Buddhists (90%) believe that people of all religions are treated equally in the government job market, compared to 66 percent of Muslims and 45 percent of Hindus. Over two‐thirds (66%) of Sri Lankans feel religious leaders are most active in working to ensure that the rights of religious minorities are safeguarded, while only 2% feel local officials or national politicians are the most active. Roughly twice as many Hindus (50%), Muslims (41%), and Catholics (41%) than Buddhists (21%) strongly believe that government should enact special initiatives to protect the land and assets of minorities.

 A majority feel the country is vulnerable to violence stemming from extremist religious views. When it comes to violence in the country, while Sri Lankans perceive the majority of it to be related to either criminal activities or political operations, 15 percent cite religious or ethnically inspired violence and this rate increases to a quarter among Muslims and Hindus. Furthermore, 51 percent of all respondents feel the country is vulnerable to violence related to extremist religious views. Muslims are divided regarding the existence of intra‐religious conflict in their community. While relatively few Muslims outright agree (12%) with the assertion that there are differences of opinion among Muslims on matters of religion that are leading to conflict, less than half (45%) disagree with the assertion and a further 43 percent are neutral or do not answer.

 Ten geographic areas of Sri Lanka consistently show high levels of inter‐religious tension and support for the use of violence to achieve religious or political objectives: Mannar Island, Akurana, Kaluthara‐ Beruwala, Puttalam, Southern Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Ampara, Batticaloa, southern Nuwara Eliya, Badulla. In these areas the survey revealed:

o Intolerance is high for certain forms of religious expression. Sixty‐four percent of Sri Lankans believe attempts to convert people from one religion to another should not be tolerated, a perception that is relatively consistent across the four surveyed religious groups. Erecting religious statues or places of worship in public places continues to be divisive between and within all religious groups. Forty‐two percent of Buddhists believe religious statues or places of worship should be allowed in public places compared to 30 percent of Muslims and just 23 percent of Hindus. At the same time, nearly equal proportions within each group believe statues or places of worship should not be allowed in public places. While most Sri Lankans, including religious minorities, say they feel free to express religious opinions in their local area, a noteworthy 13 percent of Muslims and 23 percent of Hindus do not feel free to express themselves anywhere or only amongst friends and relatives. Muslims feeling restricted are largely concentrated in Puttalam, Batticaloa, and Ampara.

o Government sponsored displays of religion are a source of tension. Significantly more minorities than Buddhists believe government organizations should not display religious symbols or signage. Sixty‐seven percent of Muslims and 66 percent of Hindus oppose

government use of religious symbols and signage compared to 46 percent of Buddhists. More than twice as many Buddhists (38%) as Muslims (15%) believe government should be allowed to display religious symbols or signage.

o A sizable minority of Muslims and Hindus do not reject the use of violence as a means to achieve religious or political ends. Philosophical views on the use of violence are mixed and vary by religious group. Approximately one out of every five Muslims (19%) believes that violence is necessary to make a point or be heard. Roughly 1 in 3 Muslims and Hindus believe violence is acceptable to settle political rivalries. Forty percent of Hindus and 34 percent of Muslims believe violence is acceptable for punishing those whose actions offend their religious values. Fifty‐three percent of Hindus and 35 percent of Muslims believe violence is acceptable to uphold moral standards. While most Sri Lankans believe terrorism cannot solve problems, a notable minority of Muslims and Buddhists do not outright agree with the notion Twelve percent of the Buddhists and 6 percent of Muslims believe to at least some degree that terrorism can solve problems.

METHODOLOGY

*See Annex II for full methodology report

The survey questions and structure were developed by The Asia Foundation and administered by Nielsen Lanka Company (Pvt) Ltd between August 2 and September 23, 2011. The survey was administered across nine provinces, and included 5553 face‐to‐face interviews yielding an overall margin of error of +/‐ 1.3% at 95% confidence level.

The sample is comprised of respondents from Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu and Roman Catholic1 communities in Sri Lanka, and is designed primarily to provide an understanding of each of these four religious communities at the national level. The sampling plan provides a wide spread across the country, covering all provinces for Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus. For Catholics, who constitute a relatively low percentage of the Sri Lankan population, a group of provinces were targeted that contain over 80 percent of the total Catholic population in the country. Additionally, to allow for analysis of some religious groups in selected provinces, oversamples were done as follows: Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists in the Eastern Province; Muslims and Hindus in the Northern Province; and Muslims in the Western Province.

Overall, margins of error at the national level for the four religious groups are as follows: Muslims +/‐ 2.2%; Buddhists +/‐2.7%; Hindus +/‐ 2.7%; Catholics +/‐ 3.5%. All samples were split 50%‐50% by gender.

1 Roman Catholics were selected to represent the Christian community as whole because they constitute approximately 90% of the Christian population.

Sample Size and Margin of Error by Religious Group Population above Sample Size Margin of 18 years Percentage error %

Buddhist 8,592,000 69% 1344 2.7

Hindu 1,755,000 14% 1356 2.7

Muslim 1,185,000 10% 2070 2.2

Roman Catholic 898,000 7% 783 3.5

Total 4 groups 12,430,000 100% 5553 na

Respondents were randomly identified from citizens living in households (own/rent etc.) in all the provinces during the survey time, aged between 18‐70, and belonging to the targeted religions—Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Roman Catholicism. All nine provinces were included in the survey however some parts in the Northern Province were not included due to accessibility issues.

A stratified random sampling technique was utilized with the 5553 sample split by province and the province sample further distributed across all districts. The sample in each district was again split in order to cover the various Divisional Secretariats (DS divisions). In each DS division GN divisions were selected as clusters using SPSS software random number generation process. For 5553 interviews, the total number of sampling points was designated at 556, however 563 sampling points were taken to compensate for areas in which interviews were not completed due to security related issues. Quotas were kept for each religious group, and urban – rural split was maintained based on actual proportions.

In each selected sampling point, 10 interviews were targeted and broken into two sets by starting the interviews from two separate starting points to enhance the representativeness of the sample. Five interviews were conducted in each starting point in every GN until 10 interviews were completed. Popular landmarks were selected as starting points for household identification and the interviewers used the right hand rule of field movement while selecting the households. In urban areas every 3rd household was selected while in rural areas every 2nd household was selected. Within households, respondents were selected using a Kish Grid.

GPS handsets were used by field staff to mark the coordinates of the 563 sampling points across the country where the clusters of 10 interviews were conducted. The GPS coordinates of the sampling points serve to provide a reliable reading of the location and an indication of whether certain viewpoints are geographically related. Maps demonstrating the geographic dimensions of opinions from the four religious groups have been included in this report.

Overall, 22 percent of interviews were subject to quality control checks, and 10 percent of interviews were accompanied by supervisors from the field partner organization.

NATIONAL MOOD

A sizable plurality of Sri Lankans believes the country is moving in the right direction, however religious minorities and respondents in the near North and East are less positive. Overall, 43 percent of Sri Lankans feel the country is moving in the right direction, while just 15 percent feel it is moving in the wrong direction. A quarter of the country (26%) takes the middle ground, indicating that some things are going in the right direction but others in the wrong direction. Fewer religious minorities than Buddhists feel the country is moving in the right direction. Forty‐nine percent of Buddhists compared to 38 percent of Muslims and just 22 percent of Hindus say the country is moving in the right direction. Nearly twice as many Muslims (21%) and Hindus (23%) as Buddhists (12%) believe the country is moving in the wrong direction. A clear geographic trend also emerges, specifically respondents who feel the country is moving in the wrong direction reside almost exclusively in Mannar, southern Vavuniya, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa.

Infrastructure improvements and the ending of the war are seen are the main reasons for those who feeel the country is moving in the right direction. Respondents who indicated that the country is moving in the right direction or said some things right/some things wrong were asked why they felt things were going in the right direction. The two most commonly cited reasons are infrastructure improvements, cited by 35 percent of respondents, and that the war has ended which is mentioned by 30 perceent of respondents.

Increases in the price of goods and an increase in corruption and bribery are thee main reasons for those who feel the country is moving in the wrong direction. More than half of respondents cite either increases in the pricce of goods (33%) or increase in corruption and bribery (20%) as reasons they believe the country is going in the wrong direction. Interestingly, while at the time the survey was conducted several highly publicized incidents involving random attacks—mainly on women—had taken place throughout the country by so called “greased devils”, relatively few respondents cited increases in crime (6%) or increases in harassment or issues related to the security of women (6%).

An exception to this trend can be seen in Muslim and Hindu communities, where about one in six cited increases in harassment/threats to security of women as a reason for believing the country is going in the wrong direction.

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES

Sri Lankans overwhelmingly perceive their society to be more religious today than five years ago. Nationally, approximately two out of every three Sri Lankans believes that people are more religious today than they were five years ago. Just 9 percent feel people are ‘a little’ or ‘much less’ religious than five years ago. Broken down by religion, the data reveals that in all groups a majority perceive society to have become more religious to at least some degree. By a significant margin, more Buddhists (70%) than other religious groups indicate that people are “much more religious”. Muslims fall second behind Buddhists in perceived increase in religiosity with over half Do you think people are more religious today than five years ago? (53%) claiming to have become much more religious. Hindus show the lowest level of perceived increase in religiosity with 39 percent saying they are much more religious, while Catholics fall in the middle with 44 percent much more religious. Notable is that more Hindus and Catholics also claim to be less religious than other religious groups, although the proportion is still low at 13 percent each (9% a little less religious, 4% much less religious).

Most Sri Lankans prefer local religious leaders as their main source of guidance on religious matters with the exception of Muslims who prefer holy books/Quran. Respondents were given the opportunity to select multiple sources from which they obtain guidance on religious matters, and the results show that more than three‐quarters (77%) consult their local religious leader, while 37 percent utilize holy books, and 22 percent other religious literature. Muslims deviate from other religious groups in that holy books are the preferred source (76%). This Most often sought source of guidance preference may be explained by the high literacy rate in Sri Lanka which allows for direct immediate access as well as the reality that that it is not customary for Muslim women to interact with Islamic leaders, making holy books the default option for essentially half of all Muslims.

Observance of core Muslim practices is very high among Sri Lankan Muslims. In Islam, two important indicators of religiosity are how many times per day people pray and how often they fast during Ramadan. Nearly all Muslims pray five times a day. A Observance of core Islamic practices similar rate of Muslim respondents (95%) indicate that they fast during Ramadan , while a slighhtly lower but still substantial proportion claim to recite the Holy Quran everyday (72%. ). The rate of performing Haj or Umrah is 18 percent. While performing haj may be seen as an indicator of religiosity, it is not obligatory for those who are either physically or financially unable.

Three quarters of Muslim women in Sri Lanka now cover representing a marginal increase compared to five years ago, however most only cover partially and primarily as a matter of personal choice. Currently, 75 peercent of Muslim women in Sri Lanka cover, a 13 percent increase compared to five years ago. While a large majority of Sri Lankan Muslim women cover, the survey revealed that most only wear abaya (62%) rather than fully covering with abaya and niqab (13%). Interestingly, the data also shows that the increase in covering that hass occurred during the past five years has almost entirely involved adopting abaya only (partially covering), with the percentage of women fully covering with abaya and niqab staying essentially the same (11% current vs. 9% five years ago).

Whether women are/were wearing abaya/niqab?

CURRENTLY WEAR FIVE YEARS AGO

Female Muslim respondents who cover were asked why they do so, and correspondingly male Muslim respondents were asked why the women in their house cover. The responses of males and females closely match, with the most common response by both genders that covering is done as a matter of personal choice (female 49% male 45%). The second most cited reason, again for both females and males, is that that Islam requires that abaya/niqab must be worn (female 27%, male 30%), followed by “in accordance with culture” (female 7% male 8%). Interestingly, only 4% of women indicated that they wear abaya/niqab because their husband or father insists they do so.

Most Muslims prefer to consult the Holy Quran to determine whether or not a certain action is against the teachings of Islam. Respondents were asked if somebody were to tell them that a certain action was against the teachings of Islam who or what they would consult for validation. Just over half (51%) of Muslims would consult the Holy Quran, while roughly one quarter (26%) would consult their local imam. The preference for consulting the Holy Quran versus imams or other Islamic leaders does not necessarily reflect selective bias against local religious leaders for such matters. Rather preference might be largely influenced by several factors relating to If somebody were to tell you that a certain action was against the accessibility. First, while in many teachings of Islam, who or what would you consult for validation? countries with Muslim populations rates of literacy are low and the Holy Quran is only available in Arabic, in Sri Lanka literacy rates are high and Tamil language versions of the Holy Quran are widely available and therefore convenient references. Second, women do not customarily approach imams or other types of Islamic leaders for advice, leaving the Holy Quran or other holy books as the default option for validating teaching of Islam.

Agree or disagree: ‘Some traditions and practices of Islam in Sri A majority of Sri Lankan Muslims believe Lanka are different from those of Muslims in other countries.’ that at least to a certain extent traditions and practices of Islam in Sri Lanka are different from other countries with Muslim populations. While Muslims don’t feel strongly that their traditions and practices of Islam are different than other countries, they generally agree with the notion, with 43 percent saying they “somewhat agree” and 18 percent strongly agree. Only 18 percent disagree that Sri Lanka’s brand of Islam differs from other countries.

Muslims generally view foreign influence Is it a good thing for their religious teachings to be influenced by on their religious teachings positively, other countries or international trends? while Buddhists view it negatively. A plurality (38%) of Muslims view foreign influence on their religious teachings positively, while 18 percent say it is neither good nor bad and 33 percent view it negatively. This compares to just 9 percent of Buddhists who believe foreign influence is a positive force on their religion and a substantial 65 percent of Buddhists who feel it is bad or very bad.

Muslims cite Saudi Arabia, India, and Pakistan as the countries having the greatest influence on their religious values and practices. For Sri Lankan Muslims, Saudi Arabia is perceived as having the greatest influence on their religious values and practices. The second most commonly cited country(s) of influence for Muslims is Pakistan (18%) and India (18%). Meanwhile, 27 percent of Buddhists cite India, and 20 percent the United States. Regarding influence by the United States, given the absence of a commonly shared religion with the vast Which countries have the greatest influence on religious values and majority of Sri Lankans, it is likely practices in Sri Lanka? that respondents considered the influence of the United States on their religious values in the context of general cultural influence/international trends (movies, television, etc), and perhaps negatively so.

ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS

Muslims are relatively split in terms of who they consider to be their local religious leader. Just over half of Muslims (52%) consider Maulvis to be their local leader while a nearly equal proportion (43%) identifies Imams. Rather than indicating internal disagreement, this split in perception among Muslims likely reflects the fact that in many communities Maulvis—who are primarily religious scholars—also often play the role of Imam, leading prayers and providing spiritual Who do you consider your local religious leader? guidance. Among other religious groups, Buddhists consider monks (99%) as their local religious leader, Hindus point to priests (86%) and Catholics to priests (67%) and bishops (27%).

Local religious leaders are by far the most respected leaders in the country for Sri Lankans of all faiths. Respondents were asked to gauge the level of respect people have for a range of local leaders in their GN division. A substantial 80 percent of respondents say their local religious leaders are ‘very well respected’. This compares to 32 percent for GN officials, and just 12 percent who say politicians are ‘very well How well respected are the following leaders in your GN division? respected. Only 2 percent say religious leaders are ‘little respected’ or ‘not respected’ compared to 55 percent who say politicians are little or not respected. Perceptions are relatively similar across each of the 4 religious groups.

Respondents were asked to identify which leaders they believe are most active in taking steps to safeguard the rights of minorities. Across all religious groups, religious leaders are unanimously (66%) viewed as being most active, while local Who ranks first among those taking steps to safeguard the rights of religious minorities? and national politicians are seen as highly inactive in safeguarding religious minority rights, cited by just 2 percent of respondents.

*Buddhists responding considering religious minorities. Others considering their own religious community.

A large majority of Sri Lankans believe that religious leaders should abstain from involving themselves in politics, however nearly half of Muslims believe religious leaders should have some role in politics. Overall, more than two‐thirds (66%) of respondents believe that religious Should religious leaders be involved in politics? leaders should have no role to play in politics, while 20 percent say they should have a small role and just 8 percent a large role. Muslims stand out with more (42%) believing religious should have at least some role to play in politics (30% small role, 12% large role), while Buddhists are the most averse to involvement of religious leaders in politics (16% small roll, 6% large roll).

Should religious leaders have a role in the development of neighborhood amenities? While Sri Lankans strongly believe local religious leaders should stay out of politics, a staggering 84 percent think that religious leaders should be involved in the development of neighborhood amenities. This unanimous view is shared among Muslims, with 81 percent saying religious leaders should have either a major or at least a small role in local development efforts.

Consistent with the belief that religious leaders should be involved in local development efforts, respondents also strongly feel that ‘If religious leaders are not consulted on the problems facing an politicians should consult local area, political leaders will make mistakes’ religious leaders in problem solving. Eight in ten respondents agree (41% strongly, 40% somewhat) that if religious leaders are not consulted on the problems facing an area, political leaders will make mistakes.

However, only a quarter say that religious leaders participate in local development efforts on a regular basis, and the rate is even lower among Muslims. Despite overwhelmingly believing religious leaders should be involved in community development efforts, just 26 percent say religious leaders in their GN are How often do religious leaders participate in development in your GN actually participating on a regular division? basis. This gap between desired involvement and actual involvement of religious leaders is even greater among Muslims, only 17 percent of which say their leaders regularly (12% ‘frequently’, 5% ‘all the time’) participate in local development efforts.

Nearly three‐quarters of Muslims respondents or their family are currently attending or have attended a religious school, and the rate is even higher among Buddhists. Respondents were asked whether or not religious education is more Are you or members of your immediate family currently attending or have you/they attended a school providing religious education? important today than 5 years ago, and virtually all Sri Lankans (89%) confirm that religious education is more important. This belief is consistent across all groups, including over 90 percent of Muslims and Buddhists who confirm increased importance. The perception that religious education is more important today than five years ago is supported by actual reported rates of attendance in schools providing religious education. Rates are highest among Buddhists, with nearly nine in ten (87%) confirming current or past attendance. Attendance is also high among Muslims, with nearly three quarters (73%) confirming, and only slightly lower among Catholics (70%). By a significant margin, Hindus (42%) report the lowest rate of attendance.

Religious education among Sri Lankan Muslims is almost always pursued domestically, with only a miniscule proportion (4%) indicating they have studied abroad, the vast majority having done so in Saudi Arabia. In addition to asking Muslim respondents if they have travelled abroad to pursue religious education, the survey also asked respondents to Which countries would you prefer to go to for religious education? specify which countries they would hypothetically prefer to go to for religious education Muslims overwhelmingly point to Saudi Arabia (62%), followed distantly by India (5%), Pakistan (4%), and Egypt (4%).

INTER-RELIGIOUS RELATIONS

A majority of respondents feel that the end of the war has not brought an end to ethnic conflict in the country but that it has been reduced. Over half (53%) of Sri Lankans feel that the conclusion of the war has not ended ethnic conflict in the country but that it has been reduced, while a third (32%) believe that the conclusion of the war has indeed brought an end to ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Just 7 percent believe the end of the war has not changed anything. Views are consistent across ethnic groups with the marked exception of Hindus, among Has the end of the war in Sri Lanka brought an end to the ethnic whom fewer believe that the conflict in the country? conclusion of the war has brought an end to the conflict (21%) and more believe that nothing has changed (16%).

Sri Lankans believe that the rights of minorities have improved at least to some degree compared to five years ago, however Buddhists believe the improvement has been much more substantial than minorities themselves. Just under half of all respondents (47%) feel the rights of minorities are much better now compared to five years ago, while a third (32%) believes they are only somewhat better. Fifteen percent feel rights are unchanged, while just 4 percent feels they are How are the rights of minorities now compared to 5 years ago? worse. Breaking the results down by religious group, it can clearly be seen that religious minorities, especially Hindus and Muslims, are markedly less positive than Buddhists in evaluating trends in minority rights. Thirty‐four percent of Muslims feel the rights of minorities have become much better compared to 56 percent for Buddhists, while a notable one in four Muslims feel the situation has not improved or has become worse compared to just one in ten Buddhists.

A majority of Sri Lankans believe people of all religions are treated equally in the government job market, however a significantly larger proportion of Buddhists feel this way than minorities themselves. While over two‐thirds of Muslims (66%) Are people treated equally or do some face discrimination in the government job market? believe that people of all religions are treated equally in the government job market, this proportion is still markedly below the 90 percent of Buddhist who feel the same. Highlighting the gap in perceived discrimination between Buddhists and minorities most starkly, only half as many Hindus (45%) as Buddhists (90%) believe people of all religions are treated the same in the government job market, and roughly one in five Hindus believe they face discrimination.

Religious minorities feel much more strongly than Buddhists that the government should make extra efforts to protect their interests, including land and assets. While overall, a majority from all religious groups including Buddhists support special government protections for minorities when it comes to land and assets, the intensity of support varies considerably by group. Specifically, roughly twice as many Hindus (50%), Muslims (41%), and Catholics (41%) than Buddhists (21%) strongly feel the government should take extra steps to protect the land and assets of ‘Government should make extra efforts to protect the land and assets of religious minorities.’ minorities. Furthermore, markedly more Buddhists disagree (29%) that government should provide special protections compared to minorities (Hindus 7%, Muslims 11%, Catholics 16%).

RELGIOUS EXPRESSION AND TOLERANCE

While respondents from all religious backgrounds generally believe that Sri Lanka is a country for all ethnic and religious groups and everybody lives freely, the sentiment comes with notably more reservations among religious minorities than Buddhists. Over two‐thirds of Buddhistss (69%) say they ‘strongly agree’ with the notion that Sri Lanka is a country for all ethnic and religious groups and everybody lives freely. Less than half of respondents from each of the thrree religious minority groupps strongly agree, with respondents more inclined ‘Sri Lanka is a country for all ethnic and religious groups and everybody lives to say they ‘somewhat agree’ here freely’ or ‘neither agree nor disagree’. Forty‐four percent of Muslims strongly agree, 37 percent somewhat agree, while 12 percent express neutrality. Virtually no Buddhists disagree with the notion, however roughly one in five Hindus (18%) disagree.

Inter‐religious/inter‐ethnic tension related to religious expression is high in specific geographic areas of the country. The survey sought to examine the issue of construction of prominent religious symbols or places of worship in public areas given that it is increasingly common in multi‐religious localities across Sri Lanka, in some cases possibly as a show of exclusivity and strenggth. Respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement “Religious statues and places of worship should not be allowed to come up in public places”. Nationally, the data reveal a near split opinion, with a combined 43 percent agreeing (17% strongly, 266% somewhat) that it should not be allowed, versus 38 percent who disagree that it should not be allowed (22% strongly, 16% somewhat). In terms of the geographic location of respondents expressing a strong opinion on the matter, as seen in the accompanying map respondents with strong opinions are concentrated in a number of areas in the country. Two locations of particular note are Batticaloa and Ampara, as they possess a concentration of Sri Lankans

16 both strongly for and against allowing statues and places of wworship to be erected in public places (See Annex I for description of these geographic locations as well as others mentioned in this report).

Interestingly, the data reveal that within each of the four religious groups, a similar lack of consensus on the matter exists. At the same time, a clear trend emerges when cross comparing the four groups—among religious minorities, more respondents are against allowing statues or places of worship in public areas than are for it. In the case of Muslims, 45 percent agree while 30 percent disagree that statues or places of worship should not be allowed in public spaces. Conversely, aamong Buddhists more believe it should be allowed (42%) than not (41%). Additionally, more Buddhists ‘strongly disagreee’ (26%) with banning religious statues and places of worship than minorities, especially Hindus (10% strongly disagree).

Government sponsored displays of religion are also a source of tension. Significantly more minorities than Buddhists believe government organizations should not display religious symbols or signage. Sixty‐seven percent of Muslims and 66 ‘Government organizations should not display any symbols or signage that percent of Hindus oppose is religious inn nature’ government use of religious symbols and signage compared to 46 percent of Buddhists. Additionally, more than twice as many Buddhists (38%) as Muslims (15%) believe government should be allowed to display religious symbols or signage.

Several areas of the country possess concentrations of citizens that believe government organizations should not display symbols or signage that is religious in nature. The map shows sampling locations where at least 60 percent of respondents either strongly agree or strongly disagree with government organizations displaying religious signs/symbols. This issue can potentially serve as one indicator for tension between some Buddhist communities (and pro‐ Buddhist government organizations) and minority religious groups with whom they share public spaces. Geographic locations showing the strongest opposition to government displaying religious signage or symbols include Ampara, Batticaloa, southern Vavuniya, Mannar island, southern Nuwara Ellya, and Jaffna.

Inter‐religious tension and conflict resulting from attempts at religious conversion has been highly publicized in recent years, particularly in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami. The survey sought to gauge current feelings about conversion, and accordingly respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement, “Converting people from one religion to another should be tolerated”. Two‐thirds (64%) of Sri Lankans disagree with the idea that attempts to convert peoplle from one religion should be tolerated (47% strongly disagree, 17% somewhat disagree). This anti‐conversion feeling is relatively consistent across religious groups, with only Catholics slightly less adamant. Just 18 percent of Sri Lankans agree that religious conversion should be tolerated (9% strongly agree, 9% somewhat agree). Geographically, while opposition to conversion is widespread throughout the country, the same locations indicating tension regarding public displays of religion again appear to reveal religious tension, this time on the issue of conversion.

Overall, while most Sri Lankans (91%) feel free to express religious opinions almost everywhere in their local area, a noteworthy minority of Muslims and Hindus feel restricted. About one in eight Muslims (13%) and one in four Hindus do not feel free to express themselves anywhere or only amongst friends and relatives. Muslims feeling restricted are largely concentrated in Puttalam, Batticaloa, and Ampara.

VIOLENCE AND EXTREMISM

When it comes to violence in the country, while Sri Lankans perceive the majority of it to be related to either criminal activities (59%) or political operations (25%)), a notable 115 percent cite religiously or ethnically inspired violence. The What types of violence are taking place in the country? frequency of reporting these two types of likely interrelated violence is even higher among Muslims and Hindus, totaling roughly a quarter of responses. Broken down, ethnically inspired violence is mentioned by 14 percent of Muslims and 15 percent of Hindus, while religiously inspired violence is cited by 12 peercent of Musliims and 10 percent of Hindus. Even among Catholics, a combined 22 percent point to relligiously (11%) or ethnically inspired (11%) violence. Notably fewer Buddhists cite these two types of violence (ethnically 7%, religiously 4%).

Geographically, the accompanying map reveals that respondents citing religiously or ethnically inspired violence are concentrated in many of the same locations where tension relating to religious expression was suggested in maps presented in the previous section. Areas where both types of violence are cited include Batticaloa, Akurana, Trincomalee, and Kalutara. While religiously inspired violence was cited almost exclusively in areas where respondents also pointed to ethnicaally inspired violence, in some locations it is primarily ethnically inspired violence that is cited by large concentrations of respondents. These areas include Mannar, southern Nuwara Eliya and Ampara. While the question inferred a distinction between ethnically and religiously inspired violence, the results demonstrate that ethnicity and religion are often discussed interchangeably in Sri Lanka.

(Note: because of location overlap for these two types of violence, dots have been slightly offset to ensure all results are visible)

Despite perceiving most current acts of violence as either criminal or political in nature, a majority (51%) of

‘Sri Lanka is vulnerable to extremist religious views and violence’ Sri Laankans feel that their country is vulnerable to violence stemming from extremist religious views. Among Muslims, 53 percent believe the country is vulnerable while just 21 percent say it is not vulnerable. Both Muslims and Hindus express stronger agreement (25% and 29% respectively) than the national average (20%) that the country is vulnerable.

Sri Lankans indicating that the country is vulnerable to extremist views and violence are concentrated in many of the same areas where religious tension was implied in the previous section, including Mannar Island, southern Vavuniya, Ampara, Batticaloa, and Akurana. (See Annex I for description of these geographic locations)

Muslims are divided regarding the existence of intra‐religious conflict in their community. Relatively few Muslims outright agree (2% strongly, 10% somewhat) with tthe assertion that there are differences of ‘There are differences of opinion among some Muslims on opinion among Muslims on matters of matters of religion that are leading to conflict.’ religion that are leading to conflict. Yet interestingly, less than half (45%) choose to express disagreement with the assertion (26% strongly disagree, 19% somewhat disagree), and a further 43 percent are neutral (21%) or do not to answer ((22%). One noteworthy geographic finding is that among the 12 percent of Muslims expressing agreement, a large proportion resides in Ampara and Puttalam.

Geographic areas of the country consistently suggesting high levels of religious tension are also likely to express support for the use of violence for religious or political ends, especially among Muslims and Hindus. Philosophical views on the use of violence are mixed and vary by religious group. Use of violencee to uphold moral standards, punish those offending religious values, or to settle political rivalries is largely eschewed, however a sizable minority of Muslims and Hindus in particular do not reject the use of violence in these circumstances. Roughly one in five Muslims agree (2% strongly, 17% somewhat) that it is sometimes necessary to use violence to make a point or be heard, while 15 percent of Hindus (3% strongly, 12% somewhat) feel the same. This compares to just 5 percent of Buddhists (2% strongly, 3% somewhat). As the accompanying map shows, Muslims who feel violence is sometimes neccessary to make a point are concentrated in Mannar Island, Southern Vavuniya, Ampara, Trincomalee, and Puttalam.

Furthermore, roughly 1 in 3 Muslims (31%) and Hindus (33%) believe violence is acceptable to settle political rivalries. Just 8 percent of Buddhists feel the same. Muslims expressing support for the use of violence to settle political rivalries are largely concentrated in Mannar, Southern Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Ampara, and Batticaloa. Hindus expressing support are concentrated in Batticaloa, Badulla, southern Nuwara Ellya, and Jaffna.

Forty percent of Hindus and 34 percent of Muslims believe violence is acceptable for punishing those whose actions offend their religious values. Muslims who indicate that violence is acceptable are concentrated in Mannar, Southern Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Ampara, and Akurana. Hindus expressing support for violence to punish those whose actions offend their religious values are concentrated in the same areas as Hindus that indicated support for violence to settle political rivalries: Badulla, Batticaloa, southern Nuwara Ellya, and Jaffna.

Fifty‐three percent of Hindus and 35 percent of Muslims believe violence is acceptable to uphold moral standards. Muslims who indicate that violence is acceptable are concentrated in Mannar, Southern Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Ampara, and Akurana. Hindus suppporting the use of violence are again concentrated in the same four areas identified in the previous three maps regarding support for violence: Batticaloa, Badulla, southern Nuwara Ellya, Badulla, and Jaffna.

While most Sri Lankans believe terrorism cannot solve problems, a notable minority of Muslims and Buddhists do not agree with the notion. Respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement, “Terrorism cannot solve problems”. The data reveal that the vast majority of Sri Lankans agree that terrorism cannot solve problems. However, a notable 6 percent of Muslims say they disagree that terrorism cannot solve problems, and a further 6 percent neither agree nor disagree with the notion. Meanwhile, an even greater proportion (12%) of Buddhists disagree that terrorism cannot solve problems and a further 4% neither agree nor disagree. While Muslims respondents expressing support for the use of terrorism to solve problems are relatively few in number, some degree of geographic concentration among them can be discerned, namely in Mannar, Kandy‐Akurana area, Kalutara, and Trincomalee. Buddhists who belieeve terrorism can solve problems are concentrated in Gampaha, Kegalle, and Kalutara.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

 Ten geographic areas of Sri Lanka were identified in which findings from the survey suggest the existence of ethno‐religious tension and potential for localized violence. Going forward, it will be important to triangulate the findings for each of these “hot spots” with secondary sources and to conduct in‐depth qualitative research to better understand key issues and concerns emerging from these areas. One step has already been taken through a qualitative study following the survey (see Annex 1) in 6 of the 10 hot spots identified, which examined unique factors in each location that may be fuelling conflict as well as common structural factors among all locations such as level of diversity and nature of segregation. Further research will also be necessary to determine the political economy of conflict in the ten hotspots, more specifically whether or not there are actors at the local level that are engineering tension and conflict for political gain. Finally, follow up surveys will also be required to track indicators of tension and violence in the hotspots, as well as to identify new areas that may be emerging.

 The survey also highlighted that religious education is very important for Sri Lankans of all faiths, and that the vast majority are currently attending or have attended a school providing religious education. Religious institutions play a critical role in delivering religious education. Going forward the Foundation would like to work with the Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs (MRCA), specifically the Department of Buddhist Religious & Cultural Affairs and the Department of Muslim Cultural Affairs, to develop a curriculum on religious tolerance with the aim of institutionalizing the curriculum as part of the regular training provided through religious institutions. This will involve the development of two curriculums: one for Buddhists and one for Muslims. The curriculum development process will be led by two national‐level religious institutions, representing the two religious communities, that will work closely with the MRCA and religious and social leaders from the 10 identified locations (‘hotspots’). In addition, religious education is also being delivered through the formal public education system where it has been thoroughly integrated with secular curriculum and daily activities. Public schools are now largely segregated based on religious affiliation, and the central role that religion plays in formal education is likely a key driver of increasing religiosity and formation of more narrow or insular ethno‐religious identities. Accordingly, steps should be taken to introduce curriculum into the public school system that promotes religious tolerance.

 Lastly, the survey revealed that religious leaders are highly influential among all religious groups and there is a strong desire among the public for greater involvement of these leaders in improving local social and economic conditions. The desire for greater involvement is likely driven by the critical but ad hoc role the public has witnessed religious leaders playing in promoting reconciliation and mediating of new conflicts between ethno‐religious communities both during the war and in the current peace‐building process. Because religious leaders have been a moderating influence on deep ethno‐religious divisions that characterize many localities in the country, going forward it will be important that support be given to them to jointly work with local officials in such critical interventions on a more systematic level.

ANNEX

I Qualitative Study on Inter‐Faith / Inter‐Ethnic relations in selected communities in Sri Lanka

1. Introduction

The Vulnerable Population Survey conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2011 pointed to significant inter‐ religious, inter‐ethnic tensions in a number of geographical locations, namely Ampara, Baticaloa, Vauniya, Mannar, Anuradhapure South, Akurana and Kaluthara‐Beruwala. The purpose of the present in‐depth study was to conduct a series of interviews with a cross selection of people in these areas to determine the underlying factors contributing to apparent tension in the above areas. More specifically attention was focused on a number of questions, some exclusively focused on the Muslim community.

The survey questions were as follows; a.) Religiosity: why people from across the four religious communities are more religious today b.) Religious guidance: Why Muslims rely on holy books for guidance c.) Practice of Islam: Why Muslims believe that the tradition and practice of Islam in Sri Lanka is different from other countries with Muslim populations d.) Religious leaders: Why religious leaders are more respected than other leaders (political leaders, professionals, Grama Niladhari Officers etc) in society e.) Violence: what people mean by violence; what kind of violent incidents are occurring; why people believe that violence is necessary to make a point or be heard; and why violence is accepted to punish those whose actions offend their religious values. f.) Extremist views: why Sri Lanka is vulnerable to extremist religious views and violence g.) Intra‐religious conflict: Specifically amongst Muslims

Interviews were conducted with a view to finding answers to these seven questions, besides finding out what sort of inter‐religious, inter‐ethnic relations are prevalent in the respective areas and what sort of local circumstances shape such relations.

This report presents the results of the qualitative field research conducted over the last few weeks in the selected areas. The report is divided in to four sections. In section one, a brief account of the methodology of the study is presented. Section two provides socio‐economic and demographic sketches of the field sites. In section three results of the in‐depth interviews are analyzed. And finally, section four examines the circumstances that led to inter‐community tensions in the areas covered by the qualitative study.

2. Methodology:

Field work was limited to a small number of in‐depth interviews in each selected locations. However in order to ensure the quality of the data collected, three experienced research assistants were deployed in the field under the guidance of a senior researchers. The three research assistants were drawn from the three main ethno‐religious groups in the country, namely Sinhalese‐Buddhist, Hindu‐Tamil, Islamic‐Moor. The senior researcher who accompanied the research assistants in the field was trilingual and speaks Sinhala, Tamil and English. Given the short duration of the field work, it was felt that ethno‐religious background of the research team would help establish rapport with the respondents more easily.

The key research questions were discussed by the research team before their commencement of the field work with a view to formulating some guidelines for interviews. Initial field work was conducted at Kaluthara and de‐briefing session was organized the following day to review the outcome of interviews. This helped clarity issues and prepare the research team for subsequent interviews in other field sites.

The respondents for interviews were selected in such a way as to ensure this diversity in terms of age, gender, class, ethnicity, religion, education and occupation. Interviews were conducted in the language that the respondents found themselves to be more comfortable with the members of the research team were able to conduct their interviews in any of the three languages spoken in Sri Lanka. Interviews were written up as detailed interview reports by the research assistants following the interviews based on notes based on notes taken down during the interviews.

A total of sixty one interviews were conducted at seven field locations. Several de‐briefing sessions were conducted following the completion of interviews. The data collected during fieldwork was discussed at length at these de‐briefing sessions in order o draw conclusions from the data.

3. Socio – economic and Demographical Background In this session, we provide brief sketches of the several field sites covered by the present study. The sites were drawn from the North, East, Southern, and Central Provinces of the country. The distributions of field locations are given below.

Province Locality

Northern Province Vavuniya , Mannar

Eastern Province Ampara , Baticaloa

Central Akurana

Southern Kaluthara, Beruwala

Vavuniya is the southern gateway to the Northern Province. It’s population is predominantly Tamil, though a Sinhala minority is also found there. There is a small Muslim minority in the Vavuniya town which is a growing urban centre in the region.

Mannar is largely inhabited by Tamils but a majority of them are Roman Catholic by faith. There is a sizable minority of Muslims and the rest of the population is mostly Hindu Tamils. A majority of residents in Mannar island depend on fishing and related activities, while those resident in the mainland areas in the district are mostly engaged in agriculture. Muslim residents in Mannar had to caused the area during the

26 war due to the threat posed by the LTTE. Following the end of the war, many Muslims have returned to their old resettlement.

Ampara Town is almost entirely inhabited by Sri Lankan Buddhists, while there are also Tamil‐Hindu as well as Muslim villages in the surrounding areas. Some of the other towns in the district of Ampara are dominated by Muslims. These include Kathankudi, Kalmunai, Saindamarthu, Samanthurai and Akkaraipattu. Majority of the inhabitants in ampara district (42%) are Muslims while the remainders are almost equally divided between the Sinhalese and the Tamils.

Baticaloa town is inhabited mostly by Tamils though there is a minority of Muslims both in urban as well as rural areas. With the improvement of roads connecting Ampara with other towns, transportation of goods and people between the two towns has increased tremendously, leading to greater interaction between communities.

Akurana is a predominantly Muslim town in the Central province, surrounded by mostly Sinhala‐Buddhist villages. The town is a thriving business centre and most of the businesses are owned by Muslims. Sinhalese‐Buddhist villagers living in the surrounding areas are engaged in agriculture and depend on the town for various day today needs.

Kaluthara – Beruwala area is inhabited by both Sinhala‐Buddhists as well as Muslims. Yet they live in almost exclusive ethno‐religious neighbourhoods. Muslims are mostly concentrated in urban centres, while the Sinhalese‐Buddhists are largely settled in the surrounding villages. Kalutara town is a well known Buddhist centre due to the presence of a landmark Buddhist monument that attracts Buddhist worshippers from the surrounding areas as well as from other parts of the country. On the other hand, Beruwala is a well‐known Islamic Centre.

As mentioned earlier, the present study has been focused on seven specific questions that have arisen from the Vulnerable Populations Survey. While some of these four questions have been common to all religious groups in the country, the remaining three being related to the Muslim community. In the next section, the discussion will initially focus on the four common questions. The section will conclude with several general conditions based on the data.

4.1 Increased Religiosity among Sri Lankans

In depth interviews conducted among all major religious groups, namely Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims and Christians, indicate that there has been an increase in religiosity among all of them. This is understandable in view of the fact people belonging to all religions have been exposed to similar circumstances in the recent past.

One of the key factors that has contributed to the above state of affairs is an increased sense of insecurity and uncertainty created by the war and the major natural disasters like the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. While it is true that only certain section of the country is population was directly affected by the war and the Tsunamis, the scale of the conflict and the Tsunami was such that almost the entire population of the country was affected in one way or another. The mass media, in particular the electronic media played a major role in instilling a deep sense of fear and insecurity among the people when graphic and horrific

27 details of the consequences of the war and the disaster were repeatedly displayed on TV screens on a daily basis.

The population in the North‐East, directly exposed to the war, naturally lived in constant fear and uncertainty for an extended period of time. Families, relations and friends of security forces personnel stationed in the war zone also lived in constant fear. The deaths, disappearances and injuries of combatants continued to be a regular occurrence during the period of the war while individual families conducted religious rituals in the villages to bestow divine blessings on their loved ones, mass public rituals organized by religious organizations, often with state patronage, were also common in many part of the country. Such heightened religious activity contributed to increased religiosity among people.

In more structural terms, the social transformation that followed economic liberalization in the late 1970’s appears to have been another major factor contributing to increased religiosity in the country. Growing economic pressure, increasing mobility of people between rural and urban areas and mass migration of Sri Lankan workers for employment overseas often leading to family disorganization and greater uncertainty have affected many people in the country irrespective of their ethno‐religious background. Many religious leaders have focused attention on the issues arising out of the above social transformation. The emergence of Hela Urumaya led by several Buddhist monks, in particular the late Gangodawila Soma Thero, was partly facilitated by the ‘moral outrage’ given rise to by the adverse consequences of rapid social and economic change that followed the introduction of open economic policies. Religious leaders belonging to all major religions expressed their concern in their religious sermons. This was clearly evident in Buddhist sermons, particularly on television.

It is also significant that the electronic media became a major instrument for propagating religious functions and talks. This has been particularly so in the case of Buddhism. Leading Buddhist monks appear on television regularly for both sermons as well as public discussions on social issues. Major religious events are telecast live on TV, reaching out to the wider population instantly. What is also noteworthy is that a number of Buddhist monks emerged as leading figures attracting a mass following for their sermons and public rituals, largely with the support of media institutions.

The North East war also increased the visibility of religious leaders both at a local and national level. Through various initiatives such as inter‐faith dialogue on reconciliation and co‐existence, religious leaders belonging to different religious groups began to play a significant mediatory role at a community level where the conflict had led to inter‐community violence. Such efforts had brought people affected by the war closer to their respective religions.

Increasing religiosity among people belonging to all religions has made distinct religious communities more visible particularly where diverse religious groups live side by side in the same geographical area. In fact increasing religiosity has made their differences starker, often leading to inter‐religious competition. The construction of prominent religious symbols in public places, use of loudspeakers to reach out to a larger audience when religious rituals or sermons are conducted, etc are quite common in multi‐religious localities. The resulting greater sense of competition in turn appears to reinforce religiosity among people.

4.2 Increasing Respect for Religious Leaders

It is in the context of increased religiosity that the evident respect for religious leaders needs to be examined. While it is true that there has been a certain erosion of credibility of some religious leaders at a community level due to instances of corruption and immoral behaviour on the part of local religious

28 leaders, the close attachment to religion has enhanced their respect for religious leadership in general. This is particularly so among Buddhists. The general disillusionment with political leaders and alienation from public institutions such as the judiciary, state bureaucracy and law enforcement agencies have contributed to enhanced respect for religious leaders. The fact that many religious leaders have played a mediatory role in conflict areas by working together across religious divisions has also earned them considerable respect from the people. Many religious institutions have provided shelter to civilians fleeing from violent conflict.

As mentioned earlier, religious leaders have paid greater attention to existential problems of the ordinary people. They have emphasized the need to follow religious prescriptions to avoid trouble and bring up children in a religious environment. State patronage extended to religious institutions to propagate religious education of children has also enhanced the influence of religious leaders in society. While children’s attendance in religious classes on Sundays has become the norm, in all part of the country, exposure to religious teaching has also persuaded younger generations to respect religious leaders more than other leaders.

4.3 Greater Tolerance of Violence as a means of Attaining Objectives

The respondents from different religious persuasions agree that their religions do not condone violence. Yet, they see increasing competition among religious groups for public goods such as land and public space leading to use of force, at times resulting in physical violence. This is particularly so in areas where ethno‐ religious groups live in segregated communities. In fact, this pattern is prevalent in many of the field areas surveyed. In a few localities, religious groups live in mixed neighbourhoods where closer inter‐community relations have evolved and people belonging to different religious groups do not perceive each other as competing or conflicting groups. Inter‐group marriages and sharing of public goods such as schools have facilitated inter group co‐operation. This was observed in Vavuniya, particularly among Buddhists and Hindus. Another locality where such inter community cooperation has evolved is Akkaraipattu in Ampara District.

The use of violence to achieve political objectives has been common in many parts of the country in the recent past. JVP violence in the South and LTTE violence in the North and East as well as elsewhere in the country, use of force by para military groups to deal with political decent are too well known to need any elaboration. On the other hand, deprived or agitated communities and groups have also tended to use aggressive means to send a message to authorities. The cases in point are protests against law enforcement officers who fail to act impartially or violate the law, agitations against public authorities that failed to maintain public amenities such as roads, violent demonstrations stated by unemployed graduates seeking government jobs and workers protesting against perceived injustices.

Instances of violence mentioned above usually do not involve ethno‐religious groups as rival parties. On the other hand, violent incidents such as physical assault, arson, etc that take place following road accidents often turn in to inter‐community rivalries depending on the location of the accident and the parties involved. For instance, if a vehicle driven by a member of one community is involved in an accident leading to an injury or death of a person belonging to another community, the members of the latter community that come forward to defined the interest of the victim, may react violently against the offending driver. Respondents referred to many such incidents in Kalutara, Ampara and Akurana. Such incidents indicate the prevailing, underlying tension between ethno‐religious communities in the areas concerned.

The underlying inter‐community tensions do not always lead to violent incidents. The likelihood of violence depends on the prevailing power balance between communities, the nature of community leadership and the spatial distribution of the respective communities.

In Kalutara/Beruwala area Muslims are concentrated in urban centres while the surrounding villages are inhabited predominantly by Sinhala‐Buddhists. In the past, several violent incidents have occurred after traffic accidents in urban centres when Sinhala‐Buddhist drivers of the vehicles were assaulted by Muslim groups. Following such accidents, retaliatory attacks have occurred when Muslim persons drive through Sinhala‐Buddhist dominated areas. Given the apparent balance of forces in the area, there has evolved a tacit understanding among community leaders that it is best to avoid confrontation. However, the situation is different in areas like Ampara and Akurana, where the level of tension between Sinhala‐Buddhist and Muslims is high. While Ampara town is dominated by Sinhala‐Buddhists, several thriving towns in vicinity like Kalmunai, Kalavanchikudi and Saindamarusu are mostly inhabited by Muslims. Sinhalese businessmen and transporters have to drive through these Muslim towns to reach Baticaloa for business and other purposes. If they are involved in any accidents hurting local residents in their towns, they face the threat of violent attacks by local Muslim groups. On the other hand, many respondents point out that the Sinhalese Buddhist elites control Ampara town and prevent Muslim businessmen from getting a foothold there.

Akurana town in the central province is dominated by Muslims, while many villages around the town are inhabited by Sinhala‐Buddhist peasants who depend on the town for marketing their produce and buying household goods. Many villagers feel powerless against Muslim domination in the town.

Mannar is quite different from other field areas due to the fact that the Tamil community there is divided in to Hindu and Catholic communities. Muslims also constitute a significant minority there. There is considerable tension between religious groups there. Muslims who fled the area due political violence have been returning to their former habitats following the end of the conflict. They often receive special assistance due to the intervention of their political leaders. This has apparently generated some tension between them and their Tamil neighbours who are also struggling to emerge following the end of the war. Some of the Tamils are refugees themselves returning from India and internal refugee camps.

There is also inter‐religious conflict between Catholics and Hindus. Some poor Hindus are allegedly converted to Christianity and the Hindus appear to resist this trend by denying legitimate land rights to the converted. They want the converted families to leave the area.

Though there is considerable tension between religious groups in Mannar, people seem to desist from the use of violence to demonstrate their frustrations. This is due to a general tendency among all groups to avoid conflict against a backdrop of violent conflict in the recent past that disrupted their lives in an unperfected manner. On the other hand, increasing intergroup competition leading to the marginalization of some has created a sense of injustice and discrimination in the minds of people who are adversely affected. This is evident in many areas where interviews were conducted, particularly in Mannar, Baticaloa, Ampara and Akurana.

The strong attachments to religion and religious practises have persuaded people to defend the religious institutions and their right to engage in religious activities undeterred by outsiders. Attacks on religious institutions, priest and devotees in the past have reinforced the above tendency. Many people expressed the opinion that use of force is legitimate to defend their religion, religious institutions and practices. A high level of religiosity among the member of one religious group tends to reinforce a similar tendency among

30 the members of other religious groups. This is particularly evident in Kalutara, Akurana, Mannar and Ampara.

4.4 Extremist Religious Views;

There is no consensus among respondents regarding the meaning of extremist religious views. While some consider strong attachment to religious doctrine as a form of extremism others refer to fundamentalist groups either within or outside the major religious traditions. This division of opinion could be observed among most respondents irrespective of their religious persuasions.

Strict adherence to Islamic teaching and associated social and cultural practices is the norm that most Muslim respondents do not want to deviate from. Some of the deviations are due to the differences in religious beliefs and practices among Muslims themselves. Others are due to the need for adapting to local conditions. For instance, Muslims in some locations support Buddhist temples and work closely with Buddhist devotees without moving away from their own religious beliefs and practices. Such instances were evident in Baticaloa, Anuradhapura and Vavuniya. Such adoptions reduce the gap between religious groups and facilitate co‐existence.

On the other hand, in the areas where population is highly segregated on religious lines and distinct religious groups assert themselves in their public display of exclusivity and strength, people feel that there is some form of religious extremism there.

Though there have been certain deviations from the mainstream religious traditions, these deviations are not necessarily regarded by people as extremist tendencies. People feel that mainstream traditions are strong enough to remain unchallenged by such ‘deviant’ groups and practices.

4.5 Intra‐ Religious Divisions

While there are divisions within all major religious traditions, they are not clearly visible or important at a community level. In many cases, different religious practices within the tradition take place at a local level and the devotees do not perceive it as an issue. Only one major conflict arising out of intra – religious division among Muslims was recorded and this was at Kalutara where two Muslim factions clashed over the issue. Among Buddhists and Hindus, diversity of religious practices is quite common and the devotees do not perceive such diversity as a major issue.

Intra – religious diversity among Muslims are partly the result of external influences and partly due to internal differentiation. The following distinct religious grouping were evident in the localities surveyed.

a.) Thableek Jammath b.) Thowleeth Jammath c.) Jama athe Islami d.) Thareeka e.) Tharkiya f.) Sunnathul val Jammath g.) Thaaha

Thableek Jamath is the largest group and is dominant in many areas, particularly in rural areas. Those who follow this largely oral tradition are more conservative and are not very much exposed to modernizing forces. On the other hand, Thowleeth Jammath is more urban and is adhered to by more educated, professionally oriented Muslims. They are exposed to the outside world and rely on textual material for guidance. Other groups have a small following and are not found every where.

Jama athe Islami and Thareeka are the result of Indian influence and display such influence in the way they conduct their prayers.

Some of these divisions have led to violence, particularly between Thableek Jammath and Thowleeth Jammath.

Tharkiya group is found only in Kaluthara area. They believe that dead people act as mediators between People and God. In 2001, there had been a major clash between members of these groups and Thowleeth Jammath members leading to two deaths and several injuries.

Besides the main Muslim groupings namely Thableek Jammath and Thouheeth Jammath,there was a small group identified as Thaaha in Batticoloa whose members follow the fasting schedule derived from Saudi Arabia.

In spite of the presence of small Muslim religious sects in several parts of the country, the main division appears to be between more traditional Thableek Jammath and civil society oriented Thowleeth Jammath. These internal divisions are important within the Muslim community but do not appear to undermine their religious and ethnic identity which is the main factor influencing their relationship with other ethno‐ religious group in all parts of the country.

4.6 Muslims Reliance on Quran for Religious Guidance

Some of the statements of Muslim respondents indicate why they overwhelmingly rely on Quran for religious figures. “Quran is the word of God; that is why we respect it”, “religious leaders also have to follow Quran”, “Religious leaders cannot exist without Quran”, are some of the statements of Muslim respondents interviewed in different localities.

High literacy rate even among Muslim women in Sri Lanka and the availability of Quran in local languages have enabled the Muslim population in many parts of the country to rely on Quran for religious guidance. Besides, Muslim religious leaders do not emerge as very prominent figures at a community level though they play an important role in Muslim communities.

4.7 Practice of Islam: Why it is different in Sri Lanka?

Respondents recognize that the socio‐cultural environment in Sri Lanka has influenced the practice of Islam in the county but they still feel that they have not deviated from the basic teachings of Islam. Muslims continue to practice Islam according to the basic teachings of Islam guided by Quran and religious leaders. On the other hand, Sri Lanka is not a Muslim country and its legal system is different compared to Islamic countries.

Though certain Islamic traditions are dominant in the country, some Muslims have come under the influence of minor local traditions specific to certain localities.

Conclusion

The qualitative study presented in the report was conducted in seven selected locations in the North and East as well as in three sites in the rest of the country. These locations were selected on the assumption that the presence of diverse religious communities there would affect inter‐community relations.

It is important to emphasize here that religious divisions in the country by and large follow ethnic divisions, though there are exceptions in some areas. So, religious identity is often confused with ethnic identity. The exceptions occur when the Sinhalese are divided into Buddhist and Christian faiths or when the Tamils are split between Hindunism and Christianity. On the other hand, ethnic differences are often displayed by respective ethnic groups in terms of religious practices, in particular, the public display of religiosity. This is particularly so between the Sinhalese and the Muslims.

In most of the localities where the fieldwork was done, ethno‐religious communities tend to remain physically segregated. For instance, many towns and villages are almost exclusively inhabited by one or another community. This is particularly the case in Ampara, Baticaloa, Akurana, Kaluthara and Beruwala.

The members of ethno‐religious communities under such conditions tend to develop mutual suspicion. Prevailing inter community tension at times leads to violent conflicts. Different religious groups belonging to the same ethnic group are not any better in overcoming mutual suspicion and inter community rivalries. In Mannar, Tamils are divided between Hindus and Catholics. Their common ethnicity and the collective experience of the adverse consequences of the war have not narrowed the gap between them.

Following the end of the conflict in the North and the East, people belonging to all communities are busy settling down in their respective habitats. Those who left their villages to escape from violence are also returning to their former habitats. This process is not smooth and often opens up all wounds when disputes arise with regard to land rights and state patronage. Many people feel that deprivation and discrimination follow religious and ethnic lines. This was particularly evident in Mannar and Batticaloa. Political leaders who have come forward to facilitate the resettlement process often represent the interests of the members of their respective communities. This has further reinforced ethno‐religious divisions.

In localities where ethno‐religious communities are not living in spatially segregated settlements, people have tended to transcend narrow ethno‐religious divisions. Such harmony and co‐existence have been facilitated by diverse circumstances such as the presence of far sighted community leaders, mutual dependence between communities, sharing of common amenities etc. Yet, these are exceptions and in most localities surveyed, competition, tension and mutual suspicion characterise the relations between ethno‐religious communities. In spite of significant differences between ethno‐religious communities, religious leaders have played a significant part to mediate between communities. Many people feel that it is political leaders who keep the communities apart and contribute to disharmony.

It is in this context that people have greater faith in religious leaders, particularly at a community level. Today it is common place for religious leaders representing different faiths to take part in community events and this usually has a moderating influence on deep ethno‐religious divisions that characterize many of the localities surveyed.

II. Methodological Report

1.1 Survey Period

The survey questions and structure were developed by The Asia Foundation and administered by Nielsen Lanka Company (Pvt) Ltd between August 2 and September 23, 2011.

1.2 Sampling plan

The sample is comprised of the four major religious groups in Sri Lanka: Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu and Roman Catholic2. The sampling frame is designed primarily to provide an understanding of each of these religious communities at the national level, but also in selected provinces (section 1.5 below).

It is estimated that there are around 19 million people living in the nine provinces and 25 districts. Based on the census data from 1981 and 2001, it is estimated that there are 12.4 million people aged 18 and older. No accurate statistics are available for the Northern Province after the 1981 census. Estimations were used for the purpose of this survey, however those figures are at the overall population level, and the gender, ethnic, religious, and age breakdown were not adjusted. Additionally, demographic population data for the Eastern Province is available to only a limited extent. Therefore, data on population percentage of religious groups in the Northern and Eastern Province are based on census figures from 1981.

Population of religious groups by province (18 years and above, rounded)

Roman Buddhist Hindu Islam Catholic Sri Lankans

Western 2,603,000 183,000 282,000 416,000 3,483,000

Central 1,028,000 356,000 155,000 42,000 1,579,000

Southern 1,424,000 23,000 48,000 NA 1,494,000

North Western 1,054,000 30,000 155,000 179,000 1,415,000

North Central 656,000 8,000 59,000 NA 722,000

Uva 614,000 114,000 34,000 NA 760,000

Sabaragamuva 1,011,000 101,000 50,000 NA 1,161,000

Northern Province 20,000 639,000 44,000 116,000 818,000

Eastern 186,000 305,000 362,000 113,000 965,000

All Island 8,592,000 1,755,000 1,185,000 866,000 12,394,000

2 Roman Catholics were selected to represent the Christian community as whole because they constitute approximately 90% of the Christian population.

1.3 Target Population

Any Sri Lankan citizen living in households (own/rent, etc) in all the provinces during the survey time, aged between 18‐70, and a follower of the four major religions—Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam or Roman Catholicism—were defined as the target population for the survey. All nine provinces were included in this survey, however in the Northern Province, parts of Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu Districts were not included because of accessibility related to security issues. Individual persons were considered as the sampling unit.

1.4 Sample Size and Margins of Error

The total sample size of 5553 includes 2,070 respondents from the Muslim community, 1344 Buddhist respondents, 1356 Hindu respondents, and 783 Roman Catholic respondents. The sampling is designed for analysis at the national level for each of the four religious groups as well as in selected provinces.

As detailed in Table 2, the overall margin of error for the national sample is +/‐ 1.3% at 95% confidence level. Margins of error for the four religious groups at the national level are: Muslims +/‐ 2.2%, Buddhists and Hindus +/‐ 2.7%, and Catholics +/‐ 3.5%.

Table 2: Sample size and Margin of error by religious group

Population above Margin of 18 years Percentage Sample Size error %

Buddhist 8,592,000 69% 1344 2.7

Hindu 1,755,000 14% 1356 2.7

Muslim 1,185,000 10% 2070 2.2

Roman Catholic 866,000 7% 783 3.5

Total 4 groups 12,430,000 100% 5553 1.3

1.5 Sample Composition by Province

The sampling plan provides a wide spread across the country covering all 9 provinces for Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus. For Catholics, who constitute a relatively low percentage of the Sri Lankan population, a group of provinces were targeted that contain over 80 percent of the total Catholic population in the country. This was primarily done to avoid sensitivity associated with locating Catholic respondents in provinces in which they are very small in numbers.

Table 3: Sample composition by religion across provinces

Province sample Buddhist Hindus Muslims Roman Total Catholic

Western 285 94 446 333 1158

Central 109 191 247 53 600

Southern 151 37 83 0 271

North Western 113 21 268 221 623

North Central 73 31 93 0 197

Uva 68 62 57 0 187

Sabaragamuva 113 62 68 0 243

Northern Province 31 429 403 130 993

Eastern 401 429 405 46 1281

All Island 1344 1356 2070 783 5553

Additionally, to allow for analysis of selected religious groups in certain provinces, oversamples were done as follows: Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists in the Eastern Province; Muslims and Hindus in the Northern Province (Table 4). The survey sought to explore the Northern and Eastern Provinces in‐depth as these were the provinces that were most severely affected by the war, and as shown in other nationwide surveys harbor views and concerns unlike the rest of the country.

Table 4: Margins of error for oversampled religious groups in Northern and Eastern Province

Northern Province Eastern Province

Buddhists n/a 4.9% 4.7% 4.7% Hindus

Muslims 4.9% 4.9%

1.6 Process of selecting sampling points and details of sampling point replacement

A stratified random sampling technique was used to select sampling points. The 5553 sample for each religion was split by province and the province sample was further distributed across all districts. The sample in each district again was split in order to cover the various Divisional Secretariats (DS). In each DS division, Grama Niladhari (GN) divisions were selected as clusters using SPSS software random number generation process.

In each GN Division, 10 interviews were targeted for the survey. GN Divisions were categorized based on each religious population as follows:

1. 100‐81% population in one religious group 2. 80‐61% population in one religious group 3. 60‐41% population in one religious group 4. 40‐21% population in one religious group 5. less than 20% population in one religious group

The Department of Census and Statistics provides data on religious community populations by DS divisions. This data was used in each province to select the DS divisions where the interviews were to be conducted. The Grama Niladhari (GN) divisions within these DS divisions were then selected based on local knowledge of settlements collected from key actors in the community. For each of the minority religious groups (Muslims, Hindus and Catholics), areas with higher concentrations of their followers were sampled wherever possible. However, if a small number of citizens were randomly selected in a GN in which their religious group was low in population, interviews were still executed. For example, if in a Buddhist majority sample point (GN) a few Muslim households were randomly selected, those interviews were carried out.

For 5553 interviews the total number of sampling points was designated at 556. However, because of challenges that occurred during the fieldwork, problematic GN’s were replaced rather than risking further problems and delays. Therefore, in some sampling points less than 10 interviews were conducted, resulting in a necessary increase of sample points. The final total of sampling points was 563.

Sampling point replacement was necessary in a limited number of cases for two main reasons: . Due to the non‐availability/insufficiency of population figures for some areas, the target religious population in a selected GN turns out to be limited. . Security issues and public disorder associated with the “greased devil”3 situation that took place during the fieldwork period.

Additionally, a small number sampling point replacements were required in Jaffna (Northern Province) due to it being a high security zone.

Table 5: Sample point distribution by province Province Total

Central Province 64

Eastern Province 130

North Central Province 22

North Western Province 61

3 The “greased devil” situation refers to a series of mysterious sexual assaults and robberies of women that took place in several villages throughout Sri Lanka in August 2011. The acts were allegedly carried out by masked strangers covered in black paint, hence “greased devils”, and were believed to be coordinated. The bizarre incidents sparked widespread fear and a breakdown of law and order in several communities, marked by violence and clashes between citizens and police over response /lack of to the problem.

Northern Province 86

Sabaragamuwa Province 30

Southern Province 29

Uva Province 21

Western Province 120

Grand Total 563

1.7 Details of starting point selection

In each selected GN, 10 interviews were targeted for the survey and broken into two sets by starting the interviews from two separate starting points to enhance the representativeness of the sample. Five interviews were conducted from each starting point in every GN until 10 interviews were completed. In each GN, easily identifiable landmarks were used as starting points, such as junctions, religious places, schools, etc. Due to security threats associated with the Grease Devil situation, if problems arose in sampling areas the interview was stopped and restarted from another starting point in the same GN or revisited another day.

1.8 Household selection

The following procedure was adopted to select the households in each selected sampling point:

 Household selection for interviews was done using the right hand walk method from a pre‐ determined starting point. All the households were approached until a successful interview was completed. The religious quota for each GN was pre‐defined.  To ensure a spread in the area where the interviews were conducted, in urban areas every two households were skipped and in a rural areas one household was skipped.  This process continued until five interviews were completed (10 interviews total from two starting points)  In a few GNs, depending on the total sample size in the DS Division, less than 10 or more than 10 interviews were completed. For example, in some sample points a small number of additional interviews were conducted as a result of the concentration of minority religious communities.

1.9 Respondent Selection Process

The survey was conducted in households with respondents above the age of 18 years from the specified religious communities. The process of selecting a respondent from a household covered the following aspects:

 Introduction  Description of similar studies conducted and purpose of this survey  Identifying suitable members availability in the household  Selecting one respondent from the household randomly

The Kish grid was used for randomizing the target respondents within households. The interview continued only if the respondent was willing to answer, otherwise the interview was terminated and the next household was approached. Call‐back was allowed if the respondent was available to be interviewed later on the same day in the same location.

2.0 GPS readings

GPS handsets were used by field staff to mark the coordinates of the 563 sampling points across the country where the clusters of 10 interviews were conducted. GPS coordinates were not taken for each household due to the likelihood of leading to refusal to participate in the interview. The GPS coordinates of the sampling points serve to provide a reliable reading of the location and an indication of whether certain viewpoints are geographically related.

2.1 Call back or substitution and percentage of refusals and non‐contacts

The survey was conducted during weekends, holidays and on days where most household members were available at home. Call back and substitution were not allowed in the case of refusals and non‐contacts.

Table 6: Refusals and Non‐Contacts

Household refused to answer 11%

Individual selected person refused/ couldn’t answer 2%

Language issues 2%

Other reasons 2%

2.2 Quality Control

Overall 22 percent of the interviews were subject to quality control checks and 10 percent were accompanied by supervisors from the field partner organization (Table 7). Interviews were back‐checked, via the supervisor or other staff visiting the household after the interview was completed (typically two or three days after) to check if the interviews had been conducted properly. The quality control checks verified whether the random walk method was conducted properly, respondent selection using the Kish grid was done correctly, and that no respondent substitution was made.

Table 7: Accompanied and Back Check

Total District Sample AC % BC %

Gampaha 393 8% 30%

Colombo 557 6% 19%

Ampara 304 20% 37%

Badulla/Monaragala 177 5% 29%

Anuradhapura/Vauniya 152 11% 34%

Kalutara 182 13% 24%

Kurunegala/Puttlam 401 5% 16%

Kegalle 100 25% 39%

Rathnapura 117 4% 26%

Polonnaruwa 119 23% 11%

Matara/Galle 204 13% 44%

Hambantota 49 35% 35%

Matale 85 45% 12%

Kandy 311 15% 19%

Neliya 182 14% 11%

Jaffna 298 7% 8%

Vavuniya/Puttalam/Kilinochi 583 4% 14%

Trinco 285 6% 29%

Batticaloa 371 15% 23%

Ampara 290 9% 24%

Colombo 100 0% 17%

5260 10% 21%

2.3 Weighting scheme

Two weighting schemes were used for the data:

Weighting scheme 1 was calculated using religion as the focus. The weighting factor was calculated by working out the proportion of the number of people from a certain religious community from a particular province as part of the total population of that same community nationally. For example, there are 2,603,000 Buddhists in the Western province. This forms 30% of the nation Buddhist population which is 8,592,000. The Buddhists from the sample in the Western province are given an appropriate weight to make it of a similar proportion as the population. The data by religious communities, provinces, gender and other segments are weighted by this particular weight scheme.

Weighting scheme 2 was calculated focusing on the population of the country as a whole. All sample numbers achieved for a particular religious community in a province were brought at par with the actual proportion of this religious group from a particular province in the national population. For example, Buddhists in the Western province form about 21% of the national population (18 years and above). The sample of Buddhists from the survey is given an appropriate weight to make it of a similar proportion as the actual population. The national level numbers (‘All Island’4) have been weighted using weighting scheme 2.

4 It should be noted that “all island” includes the 4 major religious groups but not small segments such as other sects of Christianity and minority religious groups that constitute a very low percentage of the population.