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CDiSS COMMENTARY National Defence University Malaysia (NDUM) Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDiSS) cdisscommentary.upnm.edu.my No . 35 – 22 June 2021 CDiSS NDUM Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical issues and contemporary developments. CDiSS commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. These commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from CDiSS and due recognition to the author(s) and CDiSS. To contribute article and provide comment or feedback, please email the Editor at [email protected] CHINA’S BRI: STALKING HORSE FOR MILITARY EXPANSION? By Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat US study says Beijing will use BRI to expand military logistics bases. China’s rapidly growing military budget carries deep concerns for Indonesia given Beijing’s growing appetite for control over the entire South China Sea, including the Natuna area, an extensive shallow sea that extends from south of the Riau Islands, east of the Lingga Regency, and west of Borneo. 1 Twice in 2019 and 2020, Indonesia has had to scramble its forces to warn the intruding People’s Liberation Army Coast Guard that it was operating in Indonesian sovereign waters. Over the past few weeks, Beijing has shown particular belligerence involving Indonesia’s ASEAN neighbors, sending as many as 200 “fishing boats” actually crewed by military personnel to near Whitson Reef off the island of Palawan, which is well inside the Philippine exclusive economic zone. Not long after that, 12 PLA jets overflew the East Malaysian state of Sarawak, prompting diplomatic protests from both countries. China’s increasing military budget, which is expected to increase officially to RMB1.35 trillion (US $209 billion) in 2020, is a dramatic expansion over 2019 at US$ 177 billion. It is in line with Beijing’s expanding Belt and Road Initiative spending program although the official defense figure is believed to be far below actual spending, which most military analysts put as high as the equivalent of US$499 billion annually. The Chinese government argues that the increase is part of economic and military development, which began to expand since the reforms in the Deng Xiaoping era. Dhruva Jaishankar, a Fellow at the Australia-based Lowy Institute, argues, “what is, without doubt, today is that China today has the second-most potent military today after the United States, and this represents the degree to which Beijing has become a peer competitor to Washington as a global power. Its ability to play an offensive role in future conflicts has increased.” As Indonesia and China have become increasingly entangled economically, there is a growing danger for Jakarta. The most recent trade report in 2020, based on figures from Chinese Customs, estimated the value of Indonesia’s 2020 China trade at US$78.5 billion. The value of Indonesia’s exports to China reached US$37.4 billion, an increase of 10.1 percent from 2019, a deeply lopsided advantage for Beijing. In the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, Chinese investment in Indonesia increased by 9 percent in the first half of 2020 to US$2.4 billion from US$2.2 billion over the first half. This growing codependency, which obviously dramatically favors China, is the biggest reason for Beijing to approach Jakarta through the BRI and the Global Maritime Fulcrum or GMF. As a result, Beijing can be more flexible in expanding the discourse or expansion of its power in Indonesia, especially through military channels. In 2020, the US Defense department issued an annual report entitled “Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020,” a report met with deep skepticism, which nonetheless, stated that China hopes to use the BRI to open logistical military bases to support air, ground and naval operations in several countries, targeting Indonesia as well as Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan. The Pentagon report emphasized that China views Indonesia’s territory as the gateway to the BRI project, which would give it nominal control over the Strait of Malacca, which was once traversed by China’s predecessors as a silk or trade 2 route. That is in line with what happened in Djibouti in 2017 when China established logistical facilities cheek by jowl with US ones. Some analysts suggest China’s ambitions could stretch as far as Pakistan, where it has established the massive Gwadar port operation, and beyond. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi, responded with a prickly statement that “I want to emphasize that, in accordance with the lines and principles of Indonesian foreign policy, Indonesian territory cannot and will not be used as a military facility base. for any country […] I repeat, Indonesian territory cannot and will not be used as a military facility base for any country.” Nonetheless, the 2019 and 2020 intrusion of the coast guard into Indonesia’s waters is a strong warning for Jakarta to take a firm stance. There are strong indications that the government is responding to these concerns, as Asia Sentinel reported on June 16, by turning to Europe for arms procurement, and by growing closer to the west through a March defense agreement with Japan. The increasing intertwining of China’s military and domestic aspects is a warning to the central government in Indonesia, where a rivalry is playing itself out between Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, who is seeking to move the country diplomatically closer to the west, and Luhut Panjaitan, a retired four-star Army general serving as Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment, who is a close ally to President Joko Widodo, who has been using his position to maneuver Indonesia closer to China. In the absence of clear maritime regulation, Indonesia may lack sovereign rights in Natuna, allowing China’s military modernization to make a stronger bid to claim the area as part of its so-called “nine-dash line,” an argument rejected by the United Nations in a Law of the Sea case in the Hague in 2016. China has ignored the court’s decision and uses it as the rationale to claim most of the South China Sea. In this case, Indonesia may only have status over the 272 islands in the archipelago and China has the potential to claim sovereignty over the waters. China has the potential to freely operate its military up to the Strait of Malacca. If China can periodically open maritime routes through Natuna and Malacca, that threatens Indonesia’s sovereignty on some of Asia’s most important trade routes. Jakarta must give a firm response that it cannot be controlled indirectly by Beijing. It must uphold the principles of ZOPFAN, the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Retno argued that “Indonesia proposes to Asean foreign ministers that Asean issue a joint statement so that its commitment to the principles included in ZOPFAN are emphasized. ASEAN’s commitment to ZOPFAN must be strengthened again and so that the commitment of the parties to the Treaty of Amity Cooperation or TAC is also important to be reaffirmed.” 3 Indonesia must acknowledge its concern that China has strong interests in Indonesia. If we look at the planned map of the BRI, many of its initiatives won’t be realized without Indonesia playing a role. This article was published in Asia Sentinel dated 21 June 2021. Republished with permission from Asia Sentinel. CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES (CDiSS) National Defence University of Malaysia Sungai Besi Camp, 57000 Kuala Lumpur Phone: (+603) 9051 3400 ext. 4618 Fax: (+603) 9051 3031 E-mail: [email protected] 4 .