BC Hydro's Dam Safety Program and Risk Management Processes
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BC Hydro’s Dam Safety Program and Risk Management Processes Stephen Rigbey Director, Dam Safety, BC Hydro BC Hydro Overview COMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURE . 80 dams at 41 sites . 31 hydroelectric facilities . ~ 9500MW installed currently . 1100 MW started construction . 3 thermal generating plants . Off-grid diesel stations . 18,500 kilometers of transmission lines Provincial ownership, but international implications 2 Concrete Gravity Dam BC Hydro has 19 Major Concrete Gravity Dams: Aberfeldie Buntzen, Clayton Falls Clowhom Comox Eko Elliott Falls River Ladore Peace Canyon Puntledge Diversion Quinsam Diversion Quinsam Storage Ruskin Seton Seven Mile Spillimacheen Stave Falls & Whatshan Large Embankment Dams WAC Bennett 183 m high; 2 km crest length Volume = 44 million m3 Large by height ; volume Mica 243m high 4 Consequences – Extreme category Columbia River : breach at Mica Dam - flood reaches US border in 22 hrs - peaks at 48m above river bank the next day Flooding all the way to Portland >>> 10,000 people US Nuclear Plant Fraser River : breach at La Joie, Terzhagi still about 10,000 people at risk All BC rail and road transportation routes All Power interconnects 5 Issues Database and Vulnerability Index Deficiencies Actual – known to exist, measureable Potential – require further investigation Normal Conditions Unusual Conditions flood seismic 6 Vulnerability Index- VulnerabilityRisk = Probability Index (Actual of- Dam) Failure = (Concern x Consequence Rating(AD)) x (Frequency of Demand Scaling Factor), or, 3 Vulnerability Index (AD) = 10x (Magnitude_ of _"Concern") ) x (1-(0.1 x Ln(1/AEF)) INDEX OF VULNERABILITY AND Logarithmic Scaling Factor FREQUENCY OF MAGNITUDE OF "DEMAND" OF THE "CONCERN" 1.0 "FEATURE" 0.8 AND 0.6 0.4 ScalingFactor 0.2 MAGNITUDE OF "IN"- 0.0 THE GAP CRITICALITY OF EFFECTIVENESS (bewteen actual THE "FEATURE" OF INTERIM 0.00E+00 2.00E-01 4.00E-01 6.00E-01 8.00E-01 1.00E+00 and preferred) MEASURES Annual Exceedance Frequency Vulnerability does not equal Risk Developed simply as a way to track and prioritize issues Does not justify need/urgency NOT a robust method to track risk Different consequences in many cases Different levels of residual risk not quantified 8 Quantifying the Proposedissues New Dam we’re Safety Indices dealing with… (All Dams) 180 Coursier decommissioning 160 New Coquitlam Dam Seven Mile upgrades Elsie rebuild 140 Known deficiencies Potential Deficiencies 120 100 80 Vulnerability Index Vulnerability 60 40 Combination of increasing knowledge (positive) 20 and deteriorating conditions (negative) 0 F02 Q2F02 Q4F02 Q2F03 Q4F03 Q2F04 Q4F04 Q2F05 Q4F05 Q2F06 Q4F06 Q2F07 Q4F07 Q2F08 Q4F08 Q2F09 Q4F09 Q2F10 Q4F10 Q2F11 Q4F11 Quarterly Reporting Metrics Vulnerability Index 250 200 150 VI Increases VI Decreases 100 Total VI Total Vulnerability For comparison against investigations and capital plans 50 0 F04 F04 F05 F05 F06 F06 F07 F07 F08 F08 F09 F09 F10 F10 F11 F11 F12 F12 F13 F13 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 10 Quarterly Reporting Metrics Reporting Quarterly F11 Q1 Risk Overall Very Low Low High Very High Extreme Consequence Consequence Consequence 20 15 10 Vulnerability Index Vulnerability 5 * Active risk reduction reduction risk Active project 0 Elko Elsie Elliott Mica* Seton* Wilsey Jordan Comox Ruskin* Ladore* La Joie* Duncan* Buntzen Terzaghi* Clowhom Aberfeldie Wahleach Puntledge Coquitlam Whatshan Alouette* Falls River John Hart* Seven Mile Revelstoke Sugar Lake Strathcona* Stave Falls* Quinsam (2) Bear Creek Cheakamus* Clayton Falls Spillimacheen WAC Bennett*WAC Dam Peace Canyon Walter Hardman Kootenay Canal* Heber Diversion* Salmon River Div. Hugh Keenleyside* Spillway Gates AN AU PU & PN Reduction Prioritization of Projects Vulnerability Index – only the starting point Vulnerabilities relative to Consequence (LOL, PAR, Economic) . Compile, sort and compare parallel lists Management practicality . Time to effect repairs . Sequencing with other planned work . Resource availability Enabling projects Corporate considerations BC Hydro’s 10-yr Capital Plan ~$20B 13 Corporate Risk Matrices - prioritization 5 Decreasing Probability RISK(logarithmic) = Probability X Consequence Decreasing 4 4+3=7 Frequency Additive if both are logarithmic or Probability 3 2 2+2=4 2+5=7 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 Increasing Consequence 14 Plants - General Safety, Environment and Business Dam Safety Quantitative: Financial 23 different descriptors Reliability Metrics Qualitative: Environmental Reputational Mixed: Accidents/Life Loss Corporate Risk Matrices How to equate consequences?? moral and ethical issues… And how to put them in logarithmic buckets? YOU DON’T! Consequences Corporate Response Try to Major Insurability Limit : Complete avoid, but Crisis Change of Corporate Corporate Business Leadership Restructuring as Usual Financial Health and Safety Reputational 18 Corporate Risk Matrices How to equate consequences?? moral and ethical issues… And how to put them in logarithmic buckets? Great for broadbrush representations to a Board, but Someone will eventually have to make the hard tradeoffs on the basis of corporate values 19 After the tradeoffs… we can’t do it all… Reduce the Hazard Reservoir lowered Nmax in effect at LAJ Reduce the Consequences Restricted Land Use underway at JOR Interim Risk Management Enhanced emergency preparedness Public Education 20 But what about the justification? - VI not the right tool - Corporate Risk Matrix simply not granular enough …..must discuss Tolerability of Risk 103 atalities f 4 10 Additional risk N control is required 5 CDA Revised Guidelines 10 Figure 6-2: Risk is tolerable, if 6 ALARP Example Societal Risk 10 Levels for Dam Safety 107 Risk is broadly Probability of Probability more than acceptable 1 10 100 1000 Number of fatalities, N 21 A quick history of Risk 1967 – The Farmer curves - Nuclear 22 1980’s: UK and Netherlands – other hazardous industries Different slopes based on different “anchor points” UK : chemical/nuclear industries Netherlands : dykes/large scale flooding Documented/ defensible - adopted nationally 1986: USBR “Guidelines to Decision Analysis” - no criteria 23 By 1993… move into hydro industry Early ANCOLD lines…. BC Hydro : Significant interaction with USBR Specific Risk and Cost Criteria for a single dam: 1 x 10-3 /yr $10,000/yr 24 BC Hydro use of Probability of Failure Use of Event Trees and the 10-3 line throughout the latter 1990’s: Concrete dam and spillway stability - Alouette, Ruskin, 7Mile, Stave Falls, Wahleach Debris Passage, Spill Capacity - LaJoie, Rip Rap Erosion - Terzaghi Internal Erosion - Coursier Liquifaction - Coquitlam - Hugh Keenleyside (>1 yr, > $1M !) 2 years later…. A major change in course: - Scientific, political and legal difficulties - Societal Risk concepts problematic - Vetting had not taken place - Use of probability without true understanding of uncertainties could not be justified in the BC Hydro context - Wouldn’t pass a ‘transparency test’ with Public Utilities Commissions - Use of both Subjective and Quantitative Probability discontinued - Moved to the Vulnerability Index approach 26 Why use of specifically defined risk criteria still won’t work... …at least for public utilities and private dam owners . Origins vs Current Practice . Variability in its use • Axes, mathematics • Definition of zones . Different Societal Risk Tolerances? . Ethics, transparency and public acceptance . Prioritization or Justification? . How to apply in real situations? 27 Origins BC Hydro and USBR (1993) . Specific Risk and Cost Criteria for a single dam . 1 x 10-3 /yr “Needs discussion: and vetting…” USBR (1999) • Rational for 10-3 line documented, but • “Logic needs to be re-evaluated…” 28 Origins Vetting and discussion STILL has not taken place… . Line ‘justified’ on basis of historical dam failure data set ..until recently: See P. Regan (2016 ASDSO): . Dam failure data set is now inappropriate for the purpose of evaluating current societal risk tolerance . Key numerical values based on possibly flawed calculations . Inconsistent with current guidance given by world-wide risk experts and with data compiled for other industries. Needs further discussion 29 Current Practice Although: - 1993/1999 thinking has not yet been tested/revisited - rarely if ever stated in laws and regulation for any other industry… - Approach is used in Dam Safety by various parties: . USBR, USACE, ANCOLD: NSW, HYDROTAZ… All show the 10-3 line, all look the same, but… 30 Definition of Axes vs Probability of Failure 103 atalities f 4 10 Additional risk N control is required 105 Risk is tolerable, if 106 ALARP 107 Risk is broadly Probability of Probability more than acceptable 1 10 100 1000 Number of fatalities, N 31 Definition of Axes Why fatalities? PAR? 103 atalities f 4 10 Additional risk N control is required 105 Risk is tolerable, if 106 ALARP 107 Risk is broadly Probability of Probability more than acceptable 1 10 100 1000 Number of fatalities, N 32 Choosing a Tolerability Line 103 atalities f 4 a)Follow the10 crowd Additional risk N ….but don’t ask questions control is required b) Attempt10 to5 logically select one? Risk is tolerable, if c) Have a 10societal6 debate? ALARP 107 Risk is broadly Probability of Probability more than acceptable 1 10 100 1000 Number of fatalities, N 33 Choosing a Tolerability Line for Canada? 1 0.1 Empress of India Halifax munitions explosion 0.01 0.001 Canadian disasters 0.0001 1918 flu epidemic 0.00001 0.000001 Comet strike (10-7) Annual Exceedence Probability (F) Probability Exceedence Annual 0.0000001