Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Policy Studies 10 Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution? Rodd McGibbon East-West Center Washington Policy Studies A Publication of the East-West Center Washington Editor: Dr. Muthiah Alagappa The aim of Policy Studies is to present scholarly analysis of key contemporary domestic and international political, economic, and strategic issues affecting Asia in a policy rel- evant manner. Written for the policy community, academics, journalists, and the informed public, the peer-reviewed publications in this series will provide new policy insights and perspectives based on extensive fieldwork and rigorous scholarship. Each publication in the series presents a 15,000- to 25,000-word investigation of a sin- gle topic. Often publications in this series will appear in conjunction with East-West Center research projects; stand-alone investigations of pertinent issues will also appear in the series. Submissions Submissions may take the form of a proposal or completed manuscript. Proposal. A three- to five-page proposal should indicate the issue, problem, or puzzle to be analyzed, its policy significance, the novel perspective to be provided, and date by which the manuscript will be ready. The editor and two relevant experts will review pro- posals to determine their suitability for the series. The manuscript when completed will be peer-reviewed in line with the double-blind process. Complete Manuscript. Submission of complete manuscript should be accompanied by a two-page abstract that sets out the issue, problem, or puzzle analyzed, its policy signifi- cance, and the novel perspective provided by the paper. The editor and two relevant experts will review the abstract. If considered suitable for the series, the manuscript will be peer-reviewed in line with the double-blind process. Submissions must be original and not published elsewhere. The East-West Center Washington will have copyright over material published in the series. A CV indicating relevant qualifications and publications should accompany submissions. Notes to Contributors Manuscripts should be typed and double-spaced. Citations should be inserted in the text with notes double-spaced at the end. The manuscript should be accompanied by a completed bibliography. All artwork should be camera ready. Authors should refrain from identifying themselves in their proposals and manuscripts and should follow the Policy Studies style sheet, available from the series’ editorial office. Submissions should be sent to: Editor, Policy Studies East-West Center Washington 1819 L Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 Submissions can also be forwarded by e-mail to [email protected] Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution? Policy Studies 10 Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution? Rodd McGibbon Copyright © 2004 by the East-West Center Washington Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution? by Rodd McGibbon ISBN 1-932728-19-8 (online version) ISSN 1547-1330 (online version) Online at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications/ East-West Center Washington 1819 L Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: (202) 293-3995 Fax: (202) 293-1402 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org The Policy Studies series contributes to the Center’s role as a forum for discussion of key contemporary domestic and international political, economic, and strategic issues affecting Asia. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Center. This publication is a product of the East-West Center Washington proj- ect on Managing Internal Conflicts in Asia. For details see pages 99–107. The project and this publication are supported by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Contents List of Acronyms v Executive Summary vii Introduction 1 Prelude to Special Autonomy 6 Putting Autonomy on the Agenda 12 Drafting the Aceh Law 14 Drafting the Papua Law 18 Implications of Special Autonomy 22 Implementing the Laws 27 Aceh: From COHA to Martial Law 46 Papua: From Backsliding to Conflict 54 Lessons 64 Endnotes 71 Bibliography 79 iv Rodd McGibbon Appendix A: Main Elements of Law 18/1999 on Special Autonomy for Naggroe Aceh Darussalam 83 Appendix B: Main Elements of Law 21/1999 on Special Autonomy for Papua 87 The Aceh Conflict: Background and Map 91 The Papua Conflict: Background and Map 95 Project Information: The Dynamics and Management of Internal Conflicts in Asia 99 • Project Purpose and Outline 101 • Project Participants List 105 Policy Studies: List of Reviewers 2003–04 109 Policy Studies: Previous Publications 110 List of Acronyms ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BIN Badan Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Agency) COHA Cessation of Hostilities Agreement DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (national legislature) DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (local legislature) FORERI Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian Jaya (Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society) GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) HDC Henry Dunant Center IMF International Monetary Fund JSC Joint Security Council KNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian National Youth Committee) KRA Kongres Rakyat Aceh (Aceh People’s Congress) MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly) MRP Majelis Rakyat Papua (Papuan People’s Assembly) MPU Majelis Pemusyawaratan Ulama (Consultative Council of Islamic Clerics) vi Rodd McGibbon NGO nongovernmental organization NKRI Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) OPM Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organization) OTK orang tak kenal (unknown persons) PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuanganan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) PDP Presidium Dewan Papua (Papuan Presidium Council) PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) PNG Papua New Guinea SAMAK Solidaritas Masyarakat Anti-Korupsi (Solidarity for Anticorruption Society) SIRA Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh (Aceh Referendum Information Center) TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Defense Force) Uncen University of Cendrawasih Unsyiah University of Syiah Kuala Executive Summary This study examines the drafting and implementation of special autono- my laws for Aceh and Papua as part of the Indonesian government’s broad- er response to secessionist challenges in both provinces. I examine the background to the political decision to grant special autonomy to Aceh and Papua while also presenting a detailed examination of each law. The objective of this analysis is to provide a case study for policymakers and academics seeking to understand the dynamics of separatism. The analysis seeks appropriate policy responses to the challenge of secessionist move- ments and outlines the conditions under which granting autonomy may or may not be conducive to addressing separatist conflict. As this study illustrates, special autonomy laws were drafted in Indonesia as a response to rapidly growing independence movements in Aceh and Papua that followed the collapse of the authoritarian regime of President Suharto in 1998. Responding to mounting violence, the gov- ernment offered special autonomy laws in a bid to divert secessionist demands. This offer of “asymmetric” autonomy in fact contained signifi- cant and special concessions for Aceh and Papua. Special autonomy was the product of an opportune moment of Indonesia’s democratic transition in which the government faced multiple crises and central authority was at a weak point. With pro-independence movements intensifying their pres- sure on Jakarta, the government was impelled to make major concessions as a way of staving off crisis and keeping the country together. viii Rodd McGibbon It was not long, however, before the government was able to close down the political space for independence leaders and their supporters, and address other crises challenging the state. As the government reconsti- tuted central authority, the imperatives that had driven the decision to grant special autonomy eased. And as the government’s commitment to special autonomy faltered, it soon turned to more coercive measures to respond to separatist demands. By 2003, the government was pursuing an alternative strategy of imposing martial law in Aceh and subdividing Papua, a strategy that eclipsed special autonomy and signaled a return to a more coercive, less accommodating, posture. In presenting the case study of Aceh and Papua, this essay confirms a central theme of the comparative literature on autonomy: the fragility of such arrangements and their vulnerability to reversal. Special autonomy arrangements are exceedingly difficult to entrench as national elites almost always resist demands to devolve political authority and are suspicious of any initiative that may set a precedent for other regions. This is particu- larly the case in large multiethnic countries such as Indonesia where the state faces an array of possible challenges to its authority. A driving force in the Indonesian government’s backsliding, for instance, was the official concern that special autonomy was fuelling separatism rather than resolv- ing it. In conceding special rights to Papua and Aceh, officials feared a cas- cade of similar demands from other regions. All of this suggests that special autonomy, in and of itself, does not represent a solution to separatist conflict. Rather, the concessions