TRIAL BY FIRE F OREST F IRES AND F ORESTRY P OLICY IN I NDONESIA’ S E RA OF C RISIS AND R EFORM

CHARLES VICTOR BARBER JAMES SCHWEITHELM

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE IN COLLABORATION WITH WWF- & TELAPAK INDONESIA FOUNDATION INDONESIA’S FOREST COVER

Notes: (a) Hotspots, showing ground thermal activity detected with the NOAA AVHRR sensor, represent an area of approximately 1 square kilometer. Data from August - December 1997 were processed by IFFM-GTZ, FFPCP

(b) Forest cover is from The Last Frontier Forests, Bryant, Nielsen, and Tangley, 1997. "Frontier forest" refers to large, ecologically intact and relatively undisturbed natural forests. "Non-frontier forests" are dominated by eventually degrade the ecosystem. See Bryant, Nielsen, and Tangley for detailed definitions. AND 1997-98 FIRE HOT SPOTS

CA, and FFPMP-EU.

ondary forests, plantations, degraded forest, and patches of primary forest not large enough to qualify as frontier forest. "Threatened frontier forests" are forests where ongoing or planned human activities will TRIAL BY FIRE F OREST F IRES AND F ORESTRY P OLICY IN I NDONESIA’ S E RA OF C RISIS AND R EFORM

CHARLES VICTOR BARBER JAMES SCHWEITHELM

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE IN COLLABORATION WITH WWF-INDONESIA & TELAPAK INDONESIA FOUNDATION TO COME Publications Director

Hyacinth Billings Production Manager

Designed by: Papyrus Design Group, Washington, DC

Each World Resources Institute report represents a timely, scholarly treatment of a subject of public concern. WRI takes responsibility for choosing the study topics and guaranteeing its authors and researchers freedom of inquiry. It also solicits and responds to the guidance of advisory panels and expert reviewers. Unless otherwise stated, however, all the interpretation and findings set forth in WRI publications are those of the authors.

Copyright © 2000 World Resources Institute. All rights reserved. ISBN 1-56973-408-9 Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 00-103990 Printed in the United States of America on chlorine-free paper with recycled content of 50%, 20% of which is post-consumer.. CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ...... V

Foreword ...... VI

PART I: THE 1997-98 FOREST FIRES IN INDONESIA: IMPACTS, COSTS, AND CAUSES

I. An Inferno in Waiting: Indonesia’s Forest Policy ...... 1 ’s Regime and the Fate of the Forest ...... 1 Forest Fires: The Policy Connection ...... 4

II. Historical Perspectives...... 5 A Recurring Phenomenon...... 5 The Great Fire of 1982-83 ...... 6

III. The 1997-98 Fires ...... 8 The Government Response ...... 8 The Politics of Fire ...... 12

IV. Counting the Cost: Impacts of the 1997-98 Fires ...... 15 Effects on Forest Fauna and Flora...... 16 Effects on Water Flows and Water Quality...... 17 Effects on the Atmosphere...... 17 Effects on Human Health...... 17

V. Direct Measures to Counter Future Fire Outbreaks: Recommendations ...... 21

Notes for Part I ...... 25

PART II: BEYOND THE FOREST FIRES: REFORMING INDONESIAN FOREST POLICY

VI. The Political Economy of Forests in the Suharto Era ...... 28 Logging Practices in the Suharto Era ...... 29 Industrial Timber Plantations...... 31 The Oil Palm Boom ...... 32 The ...... 33 The Million-Hectare Peat-Swamp Project in ...... 33

VII. Prospects for Forest Policy Reform ...... 38 Is Real Reform Possible? ...... 33

VIII. Recommendations for Forest Policy Reform ...... 42

About the Authors ...... 53

Notes for Part II ...... 54

References ...... 54

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE III FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Appendixes

Appendix A: BAPPENAS-ADB Methodology for Estimating Economic Costs of the 1997-98 Fires in Indonesia...... 62 Appendix B: What is Known (and Not Known) About the Ecological Impacts of the 1997-98 Fires ...... 64 Appendix C: Certification Procedures of the Indonesian Ecolabeling Institute (LEI) ... 67

Maps

Map 1: Indonesia’s Remaining Frontier Forests ...... 68 Map 2: Distribution and Intensity of “Haze” from Forest Fires in Indonesia, September-November 1997 ...... 69 Map 3: Distribution of Wild Population, Accumulated Hot Spots, and Protected Areas in Kalimantan, 1997-98 ...... 70 Map 4: Forest Uses and Areas Burned in 1997-98, Province ...... 71 Maps 5a-c: Land Clearing and Fire on the Central Kalimantan Million-Hectare Rice Project, May 1995-July 1997 ...... 72

List of Boxes

1. Indonesia’s Forest Resources...... 2 2. Indonesia’s Economic and Political Crises ...... 3 3. El Niño, Drought, and Forest Fires in Indonesia ...... 5 4. Fires in Tropical Forests ...... 6 5. Shifting Cultivation and Fire in Indonesia ...... 7 6. What Burned and Where? ...... 11 7. The Politics of Data Manipulation: How Much of East Kalimantan Burned During 1997-98? ...... 14 8. Human Health Effects of Smoke from Forest Fires ...... 18 9. The Forests of Kalimantan and Sumatra Before the Suharto Era ...... 28 10. Megaproject Madness: The Mamberamo Basin Project in Irian Jaya .. 37 11. Forest Policy Reform Conditionalities in the IMF Economic Bailout Package ...... 39 12. Integrated Conservation and Development Projects in Indonesia ...... 43 13. Community Mapping Strategies and Techniques ...... 44 14. Traditional Resource Rights and Conservation ...... 45 15. Forest Watch Indonesia: An Experiment in Citizen Monitoring of Forest Status and Development ...... 46 16. Timber Certification in Indonesia: The Indonesian Ecolabeling Institute (LEI) ...... 49

List of Tables

1. Estimated Extent of Spatial Damage by Fire, 1997-98 ...... 10 2. The Economic Costs of the 1997-98 Fires and Haze ...... 15 3. Health Effects from Fire-Related Haze Exposure in Eight Indonesian Provinces, September-November 1997 ...... 19 4. Timber Plantation Development to 1998 ...... 31 5. Oil Palm Plantation Development in Indonesia, mid-1980s to 1998 ..... 32 6. Losses Incurred by Seven Villages in the Mengkatip Watershed Resulting from Land Appropriation and Fires Associated with the Million-Hectare Rice Project ...... 35

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE IV FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

e would like to extend The report greatly benefited our thanks to the from external reviews provided by W many people and Emily Harwell, Hira Jhamtani, institutions who contributed to the Hariadi Kartodihardjo, Tahir Qadri, development of this report. and Michael Ross. At WRI, valuable comments, Valuable information and support, and guidance came from ideas were also provided by Mubariq Cristina Balboa, LauraLee Dooley, Ahmad, Longgena Ginting, Emy Antonio La Viña, Anthony Janetos, Hafild, Derek Holmes, Johannes Nels Johnson, Kenton Miller, Huljus, David McCauley, James Frances Seymour, and Nigel Sizer. Tarrant, and Tom Walton. At Telapak Indonesia, Abdon Finally, we would like to thank Nababan, A. Ruwindrijarto, Rezal the production staff at WRI: Kusumaatmadja, and Wardiyono all Siobhan Murray for preparing the provided crucial input and guidance. maps, Debbie Farmer, Carol Rosen, At WWF-Indonesia, we were greatly and Nancy Levine for their fine assisted by Agus Purnomo, Tim editing, and Hyacinth Billings for Jessup, Fernando Gonzalez, Martin managing production. Hardiono, Mariani Pangaribuan, and Carey Yeager. C.V.B. J.S.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE V FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE FOREWORD

he forest and land fires that Disastrous as the Indonesian The pillage of Indonesia’s As Indonesia embarks on this engulfed vast areas of fires were, they were only one symp- forests proceeded despite repeated new millennium, however, the T Indonesia in 1997 and 1998 tom of a far greater disaster–the warnings from a handful of coura- prospects for meaningful forest policy were an unprecedented human and systematic plunder and destruction geous and public-spirited government reform have greatly improved ecological disaster. A prolonged dry of Southeast Asia’s greatest rain- ministers and officials who did their because of the dramatic economic season caused by the El Niño climatic forests over the past three decades best to reform the forestry sector but and political convulsions of the past phenomenon created the conditions under the rule of the avaricious and found their efforts repeatedly stymied two years. While the flames raged for the conflagration. But the fires authoritarian “” regime and their hands tied. Hundreds of across and Sumatra in 1997 were mostly ignited deliberately by of former President Suharto. As this millions of dollars in development and 1998, smouldering political plantation companies and others report details, the fires of 1997-1998 aid was also spent on well-meaning tensions and economic stresses also eager to clear forest land as rapidly were the direct and inevitable out- “forestry policy reform” efforts during ignited. Long a star performer in and cheaply as possible, no matter come of forest and land-use policies the Suharto era, but with little effect. the East Asian “economic miracle” what the consequences. This was and practices unleashed by the As a recent World Bank assessment of the 1980s and 1990s, Indonesia’s not a “natural” disaster. Suharto regime and perpetuated by of the tens of millions of dollars it economy came crashing to earth Nearly 10 million hectares a corrupt culture of “crony capital- loaned to Indonesia for forestry and during late 1997. As the World burned, including parts of 17 pro- ism” that elevated personal profit forestry-related projects since the Bank’s 1998 report on Indonesia’s tected forest areas, shrouding many over public interest, the environment, mid-1980s concluded “the Bank economy concluded, “no country in towns in darkness at noon and or the rule of law. Top Suharto has so far been unable to influence recent history, let alone one the size exposing some 20 million people regime officials and their business the rate of deforestation or the of Indonesia, has ever suffered such across Southeast Asia to harmful cronies treated Indonesia’s forests as degradation of forests in Indonesia. a dramatic reversal of fortune.” smoke-borne pollutants for months their personal property for more than Extremely weak governance has Stripped of the gloss of rapid eco- on end. Economic damages from 30 years, liquidating valuable timber been the most debilitating problem nomic growth, Suharto was forced the resultant breakdown of trans- through reckless and destructive in the sector. . .[and has]. . .resulted from office in mid-1998 by a tidal portation, destruction of crops and logging practices, clear-cutting in corruption and illegal activity.” wave of demands for , timber, precipitous decline in forests for oil palm and pulp plan- turning over the government to tourism, additional health care tations, and running roughshod transitional President B.J. Habibie. costs, and other impacts have been over the interests of the millions of In mid-1999, Indonesians voted in conservatively estimated to have forest-dependent peoples living in their first free election in four totaled around $10 billion. The toll traditional communities throughout decades, and reformist President on Indonesia’s rich forest biodiversity the archipelago. As a result, assumed is unknown, but is thought to have according to a 1999 remote sensing office in October 1999. been extremely high as well. study, Indonesia lost at least 1.5 million hectares of forest every year from 1986 to 1997. Total forest loss since the advent of the Suharto era in the mid-1960s is thought to be at least 40 million hectares–an area the size of Germany and the Netherlands combined.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE VI FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE The stage is now set for a Many long-suffering forest- Trial by Fire: Forest Fires This report is the latest in a thorough house-cleaning in dependent Indonesians are not will- and Forestry Policy in Indonesia’s series produced by WRI’s Forest Indonesia’s forestry sector, and ing to wait for the government to Era of Crisis and Reform, written Frontiers Initiative (FFI), a five-year, government officials, academics, act. In March 2000, for example, by WRI’s Charles Victor Barber and multidisciplinary effort to promote environmental activists, and a rein- the Indonesian media reported that WWF-Indonesia’s James Schweithelm, stewardship in and around the vigorated press are now debating some 50 logging concessions covering uses the 1997-1998 fires as the world’s last major frontier forests by proposals that would have been 10 million hectares had been forced starting point for a detailed critique influencing investment, policy, and considered absurd–or even sedi- to suspend operations because of of forest policy in the Suharto era public opinion. It has been tious–in the mid-1990s. But many conflicts, sometimes violent, with and an elaboration of the key researched and written in collabora- interest groups and practices from aggrieved local communities, many reforms needed to both slow the loss tion with WWF-Indonesia and the the Suharto era are well-entrenched, of whom had occupied concessions of Indonesia’s forests and prevent Telapak Indonesia Foundation, two and change has been slow in coming, and thrown the loggers out. It seems future fire disasters. The report first of the most active and respected as the renewed outbreak of fires in virtually certain that sweeping analyzes the 1997-1998 fire disaster, Indonesian nongovernmental March 2000–deliberately set to clear changes in the relationships between reviewing the fires’ impacts, costs, organizations working on forest land for plantations, as in local communities, logging and and causes. The authors go on to policy reform. WRI is pleased to 1997–illustrates. plantation companies, and the place the fires within the larger acknowledge the German Federal government are imminent. The key context of the destructive forest and Ministry for Economic Cooperation question is whether government forest land-use practices and policies that and Development (BMZ), and AVINA policy will lead and smooth the way have characterized Indonesia for for their support for this project. for these changes, or will be dragged the past three decades. It is futile, along by popular action–which is they convincingly demonstrate, to Jonathan Lash likely to turn increasingly believe that the recurrent and President violent–at the grassroots. increasingly severe Indonesia fire World Resources Institute problem can be solved in isolation from more general reforms of the forestry sector and other sectors that affect the use of forest lands and resources. The specific reforms that they recommend, therefore, not only serve the goal of ensuring that Southeast Asia is not periodically shrouded in a choking haze, but also support forest biodiversity conserva- tion, sustainable forest-based fiber production, and recognition of the rights and interests of forest-dwelling peoples.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE VII FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE PART I

THE 1997-98 FOREST FIRES IN INDONESIA:

IMPACTS, COSTS, AND CAUSES I. AN INFERNO IN WAITING: INDONESIA’S FOREST POLICY

ndonesia received unaccus- The health and economic Indonesian forest policies tomed attention in the world's effects of the 1997-98 fires and haze Indonesian forest policies have provided powerful legal incen- I headlines during the latter on Indonesia and surrounding have provided powerful tives for “cut-and-run” resource part of 1997 as forest and land fires countries, in addition to the enor- legal incentives for extraction and have failed to create raged in Kalimantan (Indonesian mous impacts on tropical forest “cut-and-run” resource effective mechanisms for enforcing Borneo) and Sumatra. The fires ecosystems, biodiversity, and the extraction and have even minimum standards of forest pumped enough smoke into the air Earth's atmosphere, prompted some failed to create effective resource stewardship. In addition, to blanket the entire region in haze, observers to label the fires a global mechanisms for enforcing Indonesia has regularly been rated reaching as far north as southern natural disaster. Two elements of even minimum standards by businessmen as one of the most Thailand and the Philippines, with the catastrophe were of particular of forest resource corrupt countries on Earth, where Malaysia and Singapore being par- concern to many observers. First, stewardship. bribery and payoffs are an ticularly affected. The fires burned preliminary evidence indicated that entrenched way of life.4 Human out of control again in early 1998, most of the fires were set intention- rights abuse has been widespread the second year of perhaps the worst ally by timber and agribusiness (and has been frequently linked to El Niño-related drought ever recorded firms intent on clearing land as SUHARTO’S REGIME AND conflicts between local people and in Indonesia. cheaply as possible. Second, the THE FATEOFTHEFOREST elites over natural resources). Local Fires broke out once again in Indonesian government’s response Indonesia is currently in tran- police and military units have often July-September 1999 in parts of to the disaster was perceived as gen- sition from the iron-fisted 32-year served as a kind of private army to Sumatra and Kalimantan, with erally weak, uncoordinated, and rule of President Suharto, whose repress popular resistance to the satellites detecting over 500 “hot defensive, with the exception of the “New Order” regime ended with his exploitation of forests and other spots” in Sumatra’s Riau province Ministry of Environment’s monitor- resignation in May 1998. In the natural resources. alone over one week in late July. ing and public information efforts forest and natural resources sector, Reinforcing this forest Haze from the fires obstructed air and its forthright identification of the New Order political economy exploitation system was an official transport, forced school closures, the role of big business in setting was characterized by a heavily cen- ideology that excluded local and and raised pollution to hazardous many of the fires. tralized bureaucracy and industry, indigenous communities from levels.1 By mid-September, the sun Disastrous as they were, these effectively dominated by a small access to forest lands and resources was completely obscured for days in fires, and the weak government number of corporate conglomerates while at the same time using them parts of southern Kalimantan, response, are only a symptom of with close connections to top politi- as scapegoats for the negative con- hampering daily activities and long-standing forestry and land-use cians. These business groups and sequences of government policy and causing a rise of respiratory-related policies and practices that have their bureaucratic cronies were private sector behavior—such as medical complaints.2 The 1999 fires degraded and deforested vast areas essentially above the law for three forest fires. Although Suharto was were not of the same magnitude as of Indonesia and brought hardship decades, seeking short-term profits forced from office in May 1998, those of 1997-98, but they raised to millions of indigenous and local at the expense of the environment much of his heavily entrenched sys- fears that another prolonged dry people while enriching a small and local communities while enjoy- tem and the elite that profited from season, expected by some experts for group in the ruling circle. With ing the protection of a legal and it remain. 2000, could soon lead to a repeat of some 75 percent of the nation’s political system in which neither the 1997-98 disaster.3 land area legally designated as industry nor the bureaucracy could forestland, these policies and prac- be held accountable. tices have had profound effects on the nation as a whole, the forest fires being only the most recent and visible.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 1 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE 1 INDONESIA’S FOREST RESOURCES

Although some 143 million the world's flowering plant species, 12 per- of gross domestic product (GDP). Forest- hectares (ha)—nearly three-fourths of cent of all mammal species, 17 percent of related employment amounted to about Notes: Indonesia’s land area—are legally classified all reptile and amphibian species, and 17 800,000 in the formal sector and many 1. GOI, 1991: 9. 2. Bryant, Neilsen, and Tangley, 1997: 21. as “forestland” of various types, estimates percent of all bird species.6 The lowland more in the nonformal sector, and royal- 3. Sunderlin and Resosudarmo, 1996. from the early 1990s of actual forest cover forests of Sumatra and Kalimantan are ties and other government revenues from 4. World Bank, 1999c. The 1999 map- range from 92.4 million to 113 million among the most species-rich on Earth, forest operations exceeded $1 billion per ping exercise upon which the World Bank ha.1 A 1997 World Resources Institute and there is a wide range of other forest year.11 based its new deforestation estimates was carried out by the mapping and inventory (WRI) analysis warned, however, that only types, each with its own flora and fauna. Indonesia's forests yield many division of the Ministry of Forestry and about 53 million ha of “frontier In addition to acting as a store- nontimber forest products, the most valu- Estate Crops as one of the conditions forest”–relatively undisturbed areas of for- house of biological riches, Indonesia's able of which are rattan canes, which had required by the World Bank for its Policy est large enough to maintain all of their forests yield products that have helped an export value of $360 million in 1994.12 Support Reform Loan II to the govern- biodiversity–remain in Indonesia.2 develop the nation's economy and provide The forests also provide valuable environ- ment. The mapping was done at recon- naissance level only based on interpretation Although various sources had estimated income for millions of people living in mental services such as protecting the from digital Landsat imagery at a scale of the country’s annual deforestation rate at and around forests. At the end of 1995, hydrological balance of watersheds and 1:500,000, without field checks, and there- between 0.6 million and 1.2 million ha,3 585 logging concessions held 20-year storing carbon that would otherwise fore must be regarded as provisional. The a mapping effort carried out with support rights to cut timber from approximately 62 increase the concentration of greenhouse project used imagery from 1996 or later 7 wherever available, although in some from the World Bank during 1999 con- million ha, producing some $5.5 billion gases in the Earth's atmosphere. areas imagery from 1994 and 1995 had to cluded that the average annual deforesta- in annual export revenues (15 percent of Indonesia's forests are home to a be used. The methods used do not permit tion rate since 1986 has actually been the national total), in addition to supply- large but undetermined number of forest- an analysis of the quality of forest cover, about 1.5 million ha, much of it “caused ing the large domestic market.8 In dwelling or forest-dependent communities. only current distribution and regions and by forest fires, often ignited by people October 1998, the chair of the Indonesian Estimates of the precise number of these rates of removal. 5. Ibid. clearing land cheaply for plantations.” 4 Forestry Society reported that there were communities vary wildly—from 1.5 mil- 6. BAPPENAS, 1993. Some 30 percent of Sumatra’s forest cover 421 logging firms, 1,701 sawmill compa- lion to 65 million people, depending on 7. Brown, 1999. vanished during this period, according to nies, 115 plywood firms, and 6 pulp and which definitions are used and which 8. Sunderlin and Resosudarmo, 1996. the World Bank study. (See the Table paper companies. In mid-1999, the area policy agenda is at stake.13 Many of these 9. World Bank, 1999c. 10. “Many Timber Firms Facing Closure below.) It is probable, therefore, that the covered by active concessions had forest dwellers live by long-sustainable 9 in Indonesia,” Cable News Network, WRI figure is closer to the truth than earli- decreased to 51.5 million ha. The report “portfolio” economic strategies that com- October 7, 1998. er estimates. If current trends continue, noted that plywood exports in 1997 bine shifting cultivation of rice and other 11. World Bank, 1999a. virtually all nonswampy lowland forests in totaled 7.85 million cubic meters (m3), or food crops with fishing, hunting, gather- 12. De Beer and McDermott, 1996: 74. Kalimantan and Sumatra will be destroyed 80 percent of total Indonesian plywood ing forest products such as rattan, honey, 13. Zerner, 1992: 4. by 2010.5 production, and were worth $3.58 billion, and resins for use and sale, and cultivating Biologically, these forests are making Indonesia the world’s biggest ply- tree crops such as rubber. Many of these extremely diverse. Although Indonesia wood producer in that year.10 In 1996, local values of the forest are poorly appre- occupies only 1.3 percent of the world's total output from forest-related activities ciated, however, because they are not land area, it possesses about 10 percent of was about $20 billion, or about 10 percent reflected in formal market transactions.

Deforestation in Sumatra and Kalimantan, 1985–97

1985 1997 DEFORESTATION FOREST PERCENT OF FOREST PERCENT OF DECREASE PERCENT HECTARES TOTAL AREA TOTAL AREA 1985-1997 LOSS PER YEAR SUMATRA 23,324,000 49 16,632,000 35 6,691,000 29 558,000 KALIMANTAN 39,986,000 75 31,029,000 59 8,957,000 22 746,000 TOTAL 63,310,000 63 47,661,000 47 15,648,000 26 1,304,000 Source: World Bank, 1999c. Note: These figures should be taken as provisional and subject to future revision following further analysis of satellite data and ground-checking being carried out in 1999-2000.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 2 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE 2 INDONESIA’S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISES

The economic and political crises tively free and fair elections in 44 years— Generalized looting, arson, and President Habibie withdrew from the race just that have wracked Indonesia since mid- were held in June 1999. In October 1999, theft have increased dramatically through- days before the vote, in large part because Armed 1997 have transformed the political and the People’s Consultative Assembly 3 elect- out the country, sometimes driven by the Forces Chief declined to stand as vice- economic context for natural resource ed Abdurrahman Wahid president, and desperation of a populace sinking into president. As a result, Habibie’s party, , did management. They have profound impli- vice-president.4 poverty and hunger, but sometimes car- not field a candidate at all, leaving a two-way cations for efforts to prevent future forest Wahid lost no time in appointing a new ried out by well-organized gangs taking race between Gus Dur and Megawati. Gus Dur, a fires and for broader forest policy reforms. cabinet reflecting the broad range of advantage of the general chaos.7 Strikes legendary political deal-maker, made deals with The East Asian economic crisis political parties that contested the June and protests over the price of food and both the military and Golkar sufficient to ensure that began with the devaluation of the elections, elements of Suharto’s old basic necessities have become increasingly his election. Megawati, whose distaste for political Thai baht in July 1997 affected Indonesia administrations, and representation from common throughout the country. horse-trading is well known, apparently expected more severely than any other country in the armed forces. Hailed by the press as a Just as law and order are breaking her immense popularity with rank-and-file vot- the region. By July 1998 the value of its “national unity” government, it is unclear down in many areas, the legitimacy of the ers to carry the day in the presidential poll. Her currency had fallen by 80 percent, infla- at this writing how the change in govern- armed forces (ABRI), long a powerful supporters rioted throughout the country the tion had risen to more than 50 percent, ment may affect forest policy.5 political player, is at an all-time low, fol- night of her defeat, but appear to have been mol- and urban unemployment had soared to Virtually all elements of the political lowing revelations of its role in kidnapping lified by her election as vice-president and the unprecedented levels. The Food and spectrum have adopted the rhetoric of and torturing democracy activists, the warm embrace she has received from Gus Dur as Agriculture Organization of the United reformasi—democratization of politics, uncovering of mass graves of ABRI victims his “full-partner” in overcoming Indonesia’s Nations (FAO) estimated in that month respect for human rights, and the elimina- in the province of Aceh (where a long-sim- economic and political troubles. that about 40 million people, or 20 percent tion of “corruption, collusion, and nepo- mering separatist rebellion was brutally 5. Nur Mahmudi Ismail, the new Minister of of the population, were vulnerable to food tism” (KKN). But reformasi means very put down in the early 1990s),8 and the Forestry and Plantations installed in late October scarcity. The government reported that 40 different things to different people. For the mid-1999 debacle in .9 1999, told the press in his first interview only percent of the population was living below many holdovers from the old regime who are Adding to Indonesia’s woes, the that “I will consolidate the personnel of the min- the official poverty line, up from only 11 still in power or are biding their time, it 1997–98 drought caused by the periodic El istry, strengthen morale and attitudes and secure percent in 1996. Coming after nearly means removing the rough edges and the Niño climatic phenomenon was perhaps their commitment to manage the country’s nat- three decades of uninterrupted rapid eco- most blatant corruption from the current the worst the country had experienced in ural resources in the public interest.” (“New nomic growth, these developments repre- system but generally continuing business as some 50 years. Rice production dropped Ministers Look Ahead.” Jakarta Post, October 27, sent a unique historical debacle. In the usual. For students and other more radical drastically as a result,10 just as millions of 1999.) Trained in agriculture in the United words of the World Bank’s mid-1998 reformers, it means nothing less than the newly unemployed urban workers were States, Ismail is the co-founder and chairman of assessment, complete burial of the New Order regime returning to their villages in search of the Justice Party, one of the new reform-oriented and the creation of a democratic political livelihood. The drought also set the stage parties established during 1998. “No country in recent history, let system. In Aceh and Irian Jaya—restive for the forest fires, although it was just one 6. “Turning Point: Indonesia's Chinese Face a alone one the size of Indonesia, has ever provinces with long-standing separatist of many aggravating factors. Hard Choice—Stand Up for Their Rights or Seek suffered such a dramatic reversal of for- movements—many view reformasi as an a New Life Abroad,” Far Eastern Economic tune. The next years will be difficult and opportunity to gain at least a greater mea- Review, July 30, 1998. uncertain.” The economy is expected to sure of autonomy, if not independence, Notes: 7. “Police Say Indonesia Faces Rising Tide of contract this year [1998] by 10–15 percent, from the central government. And in vir- 1. World Bank, 1998a . Unrest,” Reuters, September 25, 1998; inflation could exceed 80 percent, and the tually all provinces, reformasi is equated 2. For accounts of the growing political tensions “Lawlessness Spreads as Looters Defy Army,” number of poor could well double.1” with greater decentralization of political during 1996 and 1997, see Forrester and May Straits Times (Singapore), July 20, 1998. power and increased local access to the 1999; for detailed accounts of the fall of Suharto, 8. “Indonesia: The Disappearing Army,” Sydney While political unrest had been profits of natural resource exploitation. see Forrester and May 1999; “Indonesia’s May Morning Herald, August 15, 1998. growing throughout 1996 and 1997, the The economic crisis and political Revolution, ” Far Eastern Economic Review, 9. A referendum on independence for this small economic crisis was a major catalyst for upheavals have been accompanied by an May 28, 1998; “Indonesia after Suharto,” Far ex-colony of Portugal, occupied by Indonesia the crescendo of opposition and violence increasing crescendo of civil violence. Eastern Economic Review, June 4, 1998; and M. since 1975, gave rise to a spasm of violence that drove President Suharto from office in Much of it is directed against Indonesia’s Scott, “Indonesia Reborn?” New York Review of against independence supporters perpetrated by May 1998. The legitimacy of his 32-year ethnic Chinese minority, long perceived by Books, August 13, 1998. the Indonesian military through the “militia” authoritarian rule was largely dependent many Indonesians as unfairly dominating 3. The People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis gangs it armed and trained. At present writing, on the delivery of continued economic the economy and benefiting from the Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) is composed Indonesia has formally renounced its claim on growth, in exchange for which many ele- largesse of the Suharto regime.6 In mid- of the elected members of the parliament, for- East Timor, troops have left, and a three-year UN ments of society were willing to tolerate May 1997, just before Suharto’s resigna- mally known as the People’s Representative Transitional Authority for East Timor (UNTAET) rampant corruption, regular abuses of tion, riots destroyed Jakarta’s Chinatown, Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR), has been established. The East Timor debacle human rights, and the absence of democ- left some 1,200 people dead, and were and a number of members appointed by the gov- was both a humiliation for the armed forces— ratic political processes. With the economy accompanied by horrifying rapes and ernment to represent various groups in society. which had vowed for decades never to give up spiraling into depression and prices of other atrocities directed at the Chinese. Under Indonesia’s constitution, the MPR elects the territory—and a major international expo- basic foodstuffs and other commodities Other incidents of anti-Chinese violence the president and vice-president every 5 years, sure of its casual and systematic use of terror, skyrocketing, support for the aging presi- have taken place since then in a number and lays down “Broad Guidelines of State arson, and murder to enforce its vision of “inter- dent—even among many who had long of cities across the country. Christian- Policy” for that period. nal security.” served in his government and military— Muslim violence in the eastern province of 4. Abdurrahman Wahid, commonly called Gus 10. In mid-1998, the Indonesian Central evaporated in an explosion of student-led Maluku left hundreds dead in the first part Dur in Indonesia, is a widely respected moderate Bureau of Statistics estimated rice harvest failure protests and violent riots.2 of 1999 and flared up again in July and Islamic leader, while Megawati, the daughter of resulting from the drought at 13 percent. An The demise of the New Order October 1999. In March 1999, hundreds founding president , was a key leader and agriculture climatologist at the Bogor regime left Indonesia in a state of political of migrant settlers from Madura, an island focal point of opposition to the Suharto regime Agricultural Institute reported, however, that his limbo under the transitional government close to Java, were killed by local ethnic in the mid-1990s. Her party polled the most votes research indicated a shortfall of 40 percent as a of Suharto protégé President B. J. Habibie. groups in . in the June parliamentary elections and was result of the drought (“‘Horrific’ Rice Forecast,” Parliamentary elections—the first rela- widely expected to win the presidential race. Reuters, July 25, 1998).

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 3 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Most official reaction to the Until recently, one could justify FOREST FIRES: THE 1997–98 fires by the Indonesian these incremental, technocratic, POLICY CONNECTION The fires of 1997 and government and the international and depoliticized approaches as the This report argues that the 1998 were just the latest community has been technical and best to be expected, from either the fires of 1997 and 1998 were just the symptom of a destructive managerial in nature, focusing on government or donors, in the latest symptom of a destructive sys- system of forest resource improving drought-predicting tech- atmosphere of the New Order. The tem of forest resource management management carried out nologies, strengthening administra- economy was growing rapidly, carried out by the Suharto regime by the Suharto regime tive coordination, acquiring Indonesia was repaying its debts, over 30 years. If the government over 30 years. modern firefighting equipment, and and opposition to New Order poli- —and the international donor the like. While these measures are cies was disorganized, muted, and community on which it so greatly certainly necessary, they will have rapidly silenced by Suharto’s strong depends in this period of economic The reform agendas for reduc- only marginal effects unless the and stable regime. But all that has crisis and recovery—are serious ing the threat of fire and for trans- underlying political economy of for- changed. about preventing future infernos, forming forest policy from a catalyst est resource use and management is The fires dramatically the solution lies not so much in for forest destruction into a guaran- significantly restructured. announced to the world that some- strengthening technical capacities tor of forest sustainability overlap to Indeed, the focus on technical thing was seriously wrong in for fire prediction, prevention, and a great extent, and the first agenda and bureaucratic responses to the Indonesia’s forests. The fate of mitigation as in a major restructur- cannot succeed without substantial forest fires may become an obstacle these forests, the third largest tract ing of relationships between the progress on the second. This report to meaningful action, to the extent of tropical forests on the planet and state, the private sector, and the mil- therefore addresses both the imme- that it turns the debate away from the largest in Asia, has always been lions of forest-dependent peoples diate causes and the impacts of the the broader forest policy issues that of international concern. (See Box living in and on the fringes of the 1997–98 fires and the broader ques- lie behind them. The official 1 and Map 1.) But the effects of nation’s forestlands. tion of how Indonesian forestry and response to the fires mirrors decades the 1997–98 fires on neighboring forest land-use policies have con- of government efforts to justify and countries made it clear that bad for- tributed to forest degradation and maintain the status quo and the est management in Southeast Asia’s deforestation processes—forest fires concurrent promotion by donor largest nation was an issue on being an important element of agencies of incremental and tech- which the international community these processes. nocratic “forest sector reforms” in a might demand—not just suggest— fashion palatable to the Suharto reforms. At the same time, the regime and its favored clients in the country’s economic collapse and the forest and agribusiness industries. resulting need for massive interna- tional assistance have increased international leverage for pressing for forest policy reforms.5 Finally, Suharto’s departure has trans- formed the political landscape and created, at least for the time being, an unprecedented window of oppor- tunity for domestic critics to influ- ence forest policies. (See Box 2.)

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 4 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

lthough the forest and severe El Niño events, however, months humid climate phases that correspond Periodic fires have been reported in land fires (simply often pass with no appreciable rainfall. to the heights of the interglacial the Danau Sentarum Wildlife Reserve termed “forest fires” in Spells of one to two weeks with no rain periods over the past 190,000 years. in West Kalimantan since the middle A 12 this paper) of 1997–98 were create conditions dry enough for Climatologists believe that the Earth's of the last century. The relatively unprecedented in their scale and intentional burning of degraded climate is currently in a relatively wet fire-prone heath forests of and effects, fire has been a regular feature forest and brush areas, but mature phase that is not believed to be associ- (Malaysia) burned sponta- of Indonesia’s forest ecosystems for intact rainforests will burn only ated with major fires in tropical neously or by human action in the as long as humans have inhabited after considerably longer dry periods. rainforests. 1880s, the early 1930s, 1958, 1983, the archipelago.6 The nation has a Humans probably had a role in and 1991.13 The rainforests of tropical climate with an annual A RECURRING starting forest fires in recent millennia Papua New Guinea are known to pattern of wet and dry seasons—the PHENOMENON and for tens of thousands of years may have burned during droughts, as result of monsoon winds that alter- Despite the common puzzle- have deliberately burned forests to indicated by the oral histories of nate seasonally between westerly and ment at the idea of “rainforests” improve hunting. As prehistoric indigenous peoples, charcoal buried easterly directions. The westerly burning (see Box 4), scientific evi- human settlers of the Indonesian in the soil, and historical accounts monsoon usually brings heavy rains dence based on radiocarbon dating of archipelago began to switch from over the past century.14 to the western portion of Indonesia charcoal deposits found in the soils hunting and gathering to growing The burning of Sumatra’s and from September to April; drier easterly of East Kalimantan indicates that crops, they used fire to clear agricul- Kalimantan’s forests is clearly not a winds blow the rest of the year. Every forest fires have repeatedly burned tural plots in the forest, a practice recent or geographically unique few years this pattern is disrupted by areas of lowland rainforest, starting that has persisted until the present. phenomenon, but in the past neither the El Niño phenomenon (see Box at least 17,500 years ago.7 The ear- (See Box 5.) naturally caused fires nor human use 3), resulting in a prolonged dry sea- lier fires are believed to have been Forest fires on the islands of of fire led to significant deforestation; son that, during severe El Niño naturally caused during severe Borneo and Sumatra have been both islands remained largely forested episodes, may extend into the next droughts, probably during the longer reported a number of times over the until recent decades. Earlier fires were regular dry season. dry seasons that appear to have past 150 years. Large forest fires are undoubtedly smaller in area and were Normal “dry” seasons are characterized Quaternary glacial reported to have occurred in what is probably more spread out over time actually relatively wet. Monthly dry periods.8 Studies of buried pollen in now Central Kalimantan, on Borneo, than the fires of the past two decades. season rainfall on the islands of Queensland, Australia, support the in 1877, seriously affecting large areas A 1924 forest map of what are now Sumatra and Borneo usually exceeds existence of alternating wet and dry of forest.10 Grasslands still cover the the provinces of Central, East, and 10 centimeters (cm), providing the climate phases in the past.9 These 80,000-ha Sook Plains in Sabah showed that 94 moisture needed to sustain the lush studies indicate an almost complete (Malaysian Borneo) as the result of a percent of this large portion of Borneo evergreen tropical rainforests. During absence of charcoal during more drought-related forest fire in 1915.11 was still covered by forest. It is only

3 EL NIÑO, DROUGHT, AND FOREST FIRES IN INDONESIA

El Niño is a periodic climatic phe- scarcity of surface water, and impacts on have scientists understood the mechanism Niño drought indeed increased the fire haz- nomenon caused by interaction between the forests, including tree mortality and disrupted that causes these events. Colonial records ard, but human actions were the direct atmosphere and abnormally warm surface cycles of flowering and fruiting.3 Over the past indicate that severe droughts affected agri- cause of uncontrolled fires. Poor forest water in the eastern Pacific Ocean off the coast three decades the El Niño phenomenon has culture and livestock production in the 19th management resulted in heavy fuel loads of South America. This sea temperature occurred in 1972, 1976,1982–83, 1987, 1991, century and resulted in forest fires.4 Unlike in logged or otherwise disturbed forest, and anomaly affects global climate, but its effects are 1994, and 1997–98. As an indication of the the fires of the past two decades, earlier fires undisciplined use of fire for land clearance particularly pronounced in Indonesia and severity of the 1997–98 event, the Wanariset were usually caused naturally or were used for provided the flame that ignited the fuel. other parts of the western Pacific, where Forest Research Station in East Kalimantan small-scale land clearing near what were then droughts often result. El Niño events occur received only 300 millimeters (mm) of rain sparse forest settlements. During the 1997–98 Notes: every 2 to 7 years, usually last about a year, in the 12 months ending April 1998, whereas drought, not only was the fire hazard very 1. Nicholls, 1993. and are sometimes followed by an unusually annual precipitation averages 2,700 mm in high as a result of extreme drought and 2. Malingreau, 1987. wet year.1 that area. heavy fuel loads in logged forests, but the 3. Wirawan, 1993. The severity of drought in Indonesia Indonesian rainfall records dating risk that fires would spread out of control 4. Allen, Brookfield, and Byron, 1989. varies significantly from one El Niño to back to the beginning of the 19th century was higher because of the large areas of another. Particularly severe events result in reflect periodic droughts believed to have disturbed forest and scrubland close to major shortfalls in agricultural production,2 been caused by El Niño, but only recently extensive land-clearing operations. The El

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 5 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE 4 FIRES IN TROPICAL FORESTS

Television viewers around the world low vegetation, grass, and dead wood in the Assessing the level of risk is much more Tropical rainforests recover even were perplexed to see dramatic pictures of form of logging wastes or fallen trees. The subjective because human attitudes and after a severe fire if they are left undisturbed Indonesia's rainforests burning. These images dryness of the fuel is related to how long motivations must be taken into account. and if there are seed sources nearby. clashed sharply with the lush green tropical vegetation has been dead or drought stressed, In the absence of drought, undis- Hundreds of years may be required to reach rainforests featured in nature programs. the period without rain, the relative humidity turbed mature rainforest is highly resistant a successional stage approximating the Rainforests burn because of a number of and temperature of the air, and wind speed. to burning because of the high humidity species composition that existed prior to interdependent natural and human-related ᔢ Fire risk is a measure of the probability below the forest canopy and the scarcity of the fire. High-intensity fire followed by factors. These complex factors are often that the fuel will ignite. It is usually related to fuel such as ground vegetation, leaf litter, frequent burning leads to conversion of obscured by politically charged rhetoric, careless human actions, such as deliberate and fallen branches.1 Fires can start forest to grassland. The slow recovery of oversimplifications, and lack of factual burning when fire hazard is high. Fire risk naturally in rainforests during periods of tropical rainforests after burning indicates information. can be increased by natural factors such as extreme drought; disturbed forest is much that they are not well adapted to fire, unlike The danger that a forest will burn lightning and by coal seams that catch fire. more fire prone. Forests adapted to growing monsoon forest formations in seasonally depends on the levels of fire hazard and Abandoned logging roads provide easy access on sandy and limestone-derived soils are dry parts of eastern Indonesia that recover fire risk, terms that are precisely defined by to otherwise remote forests, greatly increasing more susceptible to fire than forests growing quickly from frequent fires. scientists who study forest fires. fire risk when settlers use fire for land on other soil types. Peat-swamp forests are ᔢ Fire hazard is a measure of the amount, clearance near forests. particularly vulnerable to above- and Notes: type, and dryness of potential fuel in the Fire hazard can be rated with a rea- below-ground fires when water levels drop 1. Whitmore, 1984. 2 forest. Combustible fuel includes leaf litter, sonable degree of scientific accuracy. during droughts. 2. van Steenis, 1957.

since the advent of systematic logging accumulation of logging waste in the moist at that point, these were rela- Damage from the fires varied in dif- and other forms of forest degradation forest. Pioneer and secondary species tively cool ground fires, creeping ferent areas, from creeping ground in the late 1960s, coinciding with sprouted rapidly in logged-over areas slowly along the forest floor and not fires in primary forests to complete the establishment of the New Order and on abandoned logging roads, causing a great deal of damage. destruction of newly logged areas regime, that fire has loomed as a forming a dense ground vegetation in After a brief respite from drought at and peat-swamp forests. Some large-scale and recurrent disaster. place of the generally sparse ground the end of December, the situation 730,000 ha of the commercially cover found in primary rainforests. rapidly deteriorated. The first wave valuable lowland dipterocarp forests THE GREAT KALIMANTAN A severe El Niño-induced of fires had amplified the effects of were badly damaged, and another 2.1 FIRE OF 1982–83 drought struck the province between the drought, drying out the ground million ha were lightly or moderately The first collision between the June 1982 and May 1983. At three vegetation and the understory of the damaged. periodic El Niño phenomenon and the sites where measurements were forest and increasing the amount of Droughts and fire have been a Suharto regime’s forest exploitation taken during this period, rainfall litter. Accumulated logging waste feature of East Kalimantan’s landscape policies occurred in 1982–83 in the was only 30–35 percent of the nor- added to the easily combustible for millennia. What caused these 210,000 square kilometer (km2) mal amount. Lakes dried up, crops layer of material that covered much fires to metastasize into what was, province of East Kalimantan. Starting failed, river transport was cut off for of the forest floor. When the fires at the time, the largest forest fire in 1970, this vast province—almost many remote areas, and clean began again, much of the province ever recorded? A comprehensive completely covered by various types drinking water became scarce. By became an inferno. Canopy trees field study of the fires carried out in of rainforest, including dense stands November 1982, most of the nor- burned like torches, and whole trees 1983–89 with the support of the of commercially valuable dipterocarp mally evergreen canopy trees had exploded when their resin vaporized German Agency for Technical species—experienced an explosive lost their leaves, and many trees and was ignited. By April 1983, aerial Cooperation, pointed out that “it timber boom. Nearly all of the had died. Temperatures were transport in the province had come was not the drought which caused province was divided up into large unusually high—an average 3˚C to a complete halt, and the sun was this huge fire, it was the changed logging concessions, and by 1979 the hotter than normal at one monitor- blotted out in a perpetual shroud of condition of the forest” due to wide- annual cut had reached 9 million ing station—further intensifying smoky haze.16 spread and reckless logging activities cubic meters (m3) of logs. Logging drought stress on the vegetation.15 By the time rains finally came over the previous decade.17 Logging practices were wasteful and destructive, In November-December 1982, in May 1983, 3.2 million ha—an transformed the fire-resistant primary taking about 30 percent of basal area, fires started almost simultaneously area the size of Belgium or rainforest into a degraded and fire- damaging up to another 40 percent of across vast areas of the province. Taiwan—had burned; of this, 2.7 prone ecosystem. The drought forest stands, and leaving an enormous Since the forest was still relatively million ha was tropical rainforest. then set the stage for catastrophe as

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 6 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE 5 SHIFTING CULTIVATION AND FIRE IN INDONESIA The agricultural system based on a usually limited to less than 1 ha when Java and Bali. These systems, however, of years that a swidden plot lies fallow has cycle of forest clearing, cultivation, and hand tools are used for clearance. In contradict the irrigated rice-based system been shortened so much that regeneration fallowing, called swiddening or shifting recent years, chain saws have made it possible of the dominant Javanese culture, and they does not progress beyond pioneer vegetation. cultivation, has been adopted throughout for one family to clear significantly larger presented an obstacle to the exploitation of This trend has been accelerated by the desire most of the Indonesian archipelago over a plots. Typically, swidden plots are cultivated forest lands and resources by outsiders that to grow cash crops. Traditional swidden period of thousands of years.1 Swidden for one to three years. They are then left was promoted by the regime. Echoing farming at low population densities has only cultivation has continued into this century fallow for several years to allow natural colonial assessments and Javanese cultural a slight impact on forest biodiversity compared in parts of Indonesia where soils are too vegetation to regrow, creating a mosaic of biases, the government has long maintained with the accelerated system currently prac- poor to support permanent cultivation of pioneer and secondary vegetation patches that swidden cultivation and its practitioners ticed in many places. Extreme shortening of annual crops. Until recently, swiddening in the mature forest. are environmentally destructive, backward, swidden cycles can result in the conversion of was the dominant form of cultivation in Suppression of swidden cultivation and wasteful and has often blamed swid- forest to grassland, which may then be burned Kalimantan, and it is still practiced there, and its replacement by irrigated rice was a deners for outbreaks of fire in forest areas.2 annually to maintain grassland for improved as well as in Sumatra and other areas of major feature of Suharto-era forest and As traditional swidden systems have eroded cattle grazing or to facilitate hunting. Indonesia outside the densely populated agricultural policy. Traditional swidden or become more intensive, shifting cultiva- islands of Java and Bali. systems are well adapted to poor soils, low tion has become a much more negative envi- Notes: A major labor effort is required to land-to-labor ratios, and the livelihood needs ronmental factor. In areas with growing 1. Marten, 1986. clear mature forest, so swidden plots are of rural communities in the areas outside populations of forest dwellers, the number 2. Dove, 1985.

“small agricultural fires . . . escaped Evidence from the German- structure, meaning that “natural to prevent or combat fires. Even their bounds into nearby dry sec- assisted survey demonstrates con- succession will need several hun- more important, the two basic causes ondary and logged-over forests.”18 clusively that logging was the dred years to reach the stage of a of recurrent fires—changes in Burning for land preparation primary reason for the extent and typical tropical rainforest ecosys- vegetative cover caused by deforesta- is practiced as part of many agricul- severity of the 1982–83 fires. Only tem.”23 The researchers concluded tion processes and the practice of tural activities in the area, including 11 percent of undisturbed primary that “it is obvious that logging using fire to clear land—had not cash-crop farming, subsistence forests in the areas affected by the shortly before the fire had the most been dealt with at all. upland rice cultivation, and prepa- drought and fires actually burned. influence on the degree of damage.”24 By 1997, the processes of ration of garden plots.19 (See Box Even there, only ground vegetation Widespread fires reoccurred a deforestation and land degradation 5.) Although some of the fires were burned, and the forest had com- number of times in the decade fol- unleashed by the Suharto regime undoubtedly started by traditional pletely recovered by 1988. By con- lowing the great Kalimantan fire, had intensified and diversified into subsistence farmers, many were set trast, in an area of nearly 1 million burning an estimated 500,000 ha in the clearing of vast areas for timber by peppercorn and other cash-crop ha of “moderately disturbed” forest 1991 and nearly 4.9 million ha in and oil palm plantations, in addi- growers and by land speculators. (80 percent of which had been 1994.25 Haze from the fires blanket- tion to the continuing destruction Between 1970 and 1980, East logged prior to the fires), 84 percent ed Singapore and Malaysia, as well wrought by logging operations. Kalimantan’s population had dou- of the forest burned, and the dam- as large areas of Indonesia, disrupt- When the fiercest El Niño-related bled as a result of the timber and oil age was much more severe. ing air and sea transportation. In drought in at least a century swept booms, and many spontaneous According to the study, “The stand- the aftermath of both fire episodes, across the archipelago in mid-1997, migrants had arrived in the ing stock is heavily reduced, future the government adjusted its policies it heralded a conflagration that province to stake out cash-crop exploitation of these stands, with and established a variety of new would dwarf the East Kalimantan plots on the forest frontier, often fol- the exception of the dead hard- fire-control programs and commit- disaster and dismay the world. lowing logging roads into the inte- woods, will not be possible within tees, at least partly in response to rior.20 This influx was intensified by 70 to 100 years and even then the concerns voiced by neighboring the beginnings of the government’s rate of exploitation will be far below countries. A number of internation- transmigration program, which the exploitation rate of undisturbed al aid agencies provided support for brought about 91,000 new settlers forests of today.”22 In an area cover- fire-related programs.26 In 1997, from Java and Bali to the province ing 727,000 ha of heavily disturbed however, it became painfully evident between 1970 and 1983.21 forests (70 percent of which had that while these efforts had boosted been logged within 8 years before capacities to predict and monitor the fires), 88 percent burned, and fires, they had done virtually noth- fire completely destroyed the forest ing to strengthen Indonesia’s ability

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 7 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE III. THE 1997–98 FIRES

y early 1997, oceanographers Fires on other islands such as THE GOVERNMENT and atmospheric scientists Java and Sulawesi were smaller and RESPONSE During the fires, hospitals B were predicting that 1997 had more localized impacts. Irian Even as fires burned out of and clinics were filled would be an El Niño year. In June Jaya, a vast Indonesian province control into surrounding forests, peat with people seeking the trade winds reversed their direction occupying the western half of the swamps, and agricultural lands, treatment for a variety across the Pacific, and by early July island of New Guinea, was badly plantation owners and farmers of respiratory, eye, and sea surface temperatures off the coast affected by the drought, which started new fires to take advantage of skin ailments. of South America were already 4°C caused hundreds of deaths from the extremely dry conditions. This above normal—clear signs that an waterborne diseases, malaria, and caused the haze to intensify and El Niño was starting.27 These phe- food shortages. Fires also burned spread further, resulting in health In an important test case in nomena coincided with the normal there, but the total area affected was alerts and transportation disruptions October 1998, PT Torus Ganda, a dry season in Indonesia. Despite much smaller than in Kalimantan across the region. The government firm with operations in Riau warnings by the environment min- and Sumatra. Haze from the Irian announced a total ban on burning province, was taken to court by the ister, burning continued across vast fires, however, periodically spread as in mid-September, followed by threats Ministry of Forestry for destruction areas of Sumatra and Kalimantan far as Darwin in northern Australia. to punish offending firms. President of the forest by burning. Expert tes- to clear vegetation in preparation for (See Map 2.) Suharto publicly apologized on two timony by the Environmental planting crops and trees, a practice Large-scale burning has pro- occasions to neighboring countries Management Bureau (BAPEDAL) of that had escalated dramatically in duced persistent haze over large for the haze and demanded that the Ministry of Environment was recent years. The first fires were areas of Sumatra and Kalimantan Indonesians stop illegal burning. reportedly not taken seriously by the picked up on satellite images in during every dry season, but the These apologies were particularly court, which exonerated the planta- January 1997 in Sumatra’s Riau haze normally dissipates in embarrassing because in 1995 tion owners on all charges. The province, and the fires increased in September, when heavy rains extin- Suharto had assured Malaysia and firm’s operations were then frozen number and distribution as the dry guish the fires. This was not the case Singapore that transboundary air by decree of the Riau governor season began. in 1997. The rains failed, the fires pollution such as had occurred during pending action by the company to The use of fire for land clear- intensified, and the haze thickened the 1994 El Niño drought would not rectify its land-clearing practices, ance is not restricted to Borneo and and spread to neighboring countries. be repeated. but in July 1999 the local press Sumatra—fires were reported from Haze reached Malaysia and Singapore In late September the minister reported that the company was 23 of Indonesia’s 27 provinces in in July, and air quality deteriorated of forestry released the names of 176 ignoring the decree and conducting 1997-98—but by July the large dramatically in September, triggering plantation, timber, and transmigra- business as usual.29 number of fires set on those two an outburst of complaints that drew tion land-clearing firms suspected In another test case, in 1998 massive islands by plantation firms global media attention. of deliberate large-scale burning the Indonesian Forum for the and government projects clearing By late September approximately within their work areas. The suspect Environment (WALHI), a coalition tens of thousands of hectares at a 1 million km2 were haze covered, firms were identified by comparing of Indonesian nongovernmental time had produced enough smoke affecting about 70 million people. hot spots identified by U.S. National organizations (NGOs), brought a to create a blanket of haze that Land, air, and sea transport accidents, Oceanic and Atmospheric civil suit under the new 1997 spread hundreds of kilometers in all including a ship collision in the Administration (NOAA) satellites Environmental Law against 11 firms directions. Deliberately set fires in Straits of Malacca that killed 29 with Ministry of Forestry maps of alleged to have illegally burned to grasslands and scrublands escaped people, were linked to the poor visi- timber and plantation concession clear land in southern Sumatra. into adjacent logged forests that bility caused by the haze. Hospitals areas. The firms were given two WALHI sought damages of Rp 11 burned with greater intensity. The and clinics were filled with people weeks to prove that they were not trillion (more than $1 billion) to be fires eventually reached drained peat seeking treatment for a variety of guilty of illegal burning or risk paid to the state to rehabilitate burned swamps, where fires burned beneath respiratory, eye, and skin ailments. revocation of their timber-cutting areas. Detailed geographic informa- the surface long after above-ground Schools, businesses, and airports licenses (essentially, a land-clearing tion systems (GIS) information was fires had exhausted their fuel supplies. closed, and tourists stayed away, license in this context). A number of presented but was thrown out by the inflicting severe economic hardship licenses were revoked but were mostly court, leaving only eyewitness testi- on the region. reinstated in December. As of mid-May mony. Two of the firms were found 1998, not a single company or person guilty, but the court merely directed ordered by a company to clear land them to pay court costs, correct their by burning had been brought to trial. 28 fire management, and establish a fire brigade.30

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 8 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE The message of these cases is In December, the Association Fires continued to spread dur- clear, as noted by the study on the of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Neighboring countries ing March, and at the end of the fires by Indonesia’s National adopted a Regional Haze Action Plan began to fear a return of month a Japanese remote-sensing Development Planning Agency under which Indonesia pledged to the haze that had blan- system indicated that there were as (BAPPENAS) and the Asian improve its firefighting capability. 33 keted the region only many as 5,000 hot spots on the Development Bank (ADB): “These The rainy season, which usually three months earlier and island of Borneo, while other cases could well have far-reaching lasts at least six months in western were not reassured by the sources reported over 1,000. The consequences and may seriously Indonesia, began to taper off in less Indonesian government's Southeast Asian environment min- undermine other attempts at further than two months. By mid-January weak efforts to prevent isters met in during the first prosecutions. Even more significantly, 1998, new fire hot spots began to or extinguish new fires. week in April to discuss the fires, the the first case calls into question the appear on NOAA weather satellite third such meeting in four months. capacity of the government to issue images as the drought carried over The ministers concluded that fire- instructions with sanctions against into a second calendar year and a By the end of January 1998, fighting efforts should be focused environmental damage if these new rainfall cycle. The pattern of hundreds of hot spots, concentrated on containing existing fires and instructions cannot be properly 1997 was repeated in the coastal in coastal areas of East Kalimantan preventing new outbreaks. enforced in the courts.”31 swamps on Sumatra’s east coast and the coastal peat swamps of Riau Efforts to fight fires were ham- Sporadic firefighting efforts by from January through April. In and North Sumatra provinces, were pered by increasing water scarcity the Indonesian government with Kalimantan the fires were concen- evident on satellite images. These hot because the drought caused surface assistance from Malaysian volunteers trated in East Kalimantan, a province spots indicated the locations of newly water to dry up and the groundwa- and fire suppression aircraft from that had not been extensively set fires, smoldering peat that had ter level to sink below the reach of Australia and the United States were burned in 1997. The drought was burst into flame, and continued under- wells. In mid-April, a United largely ineffective. Poor coordination also beginning to cause food short- ground burning of coal seams. The Nations Disaster Assessment and (especially between air and ground ages due to below-normal harvests most extensive burning in January Coordination team estimated that operations), lack of equipment, lack and total failure of the rice crop in took place in East Kalimantan’s an effective firefighting effort would of funds, insufficient training, lack some areas. The plight of rural National Park, already badly damaged require at least 10,000 firefighters of water, and the remote location of communities, already reeling from by previous fires, logging, mining, supported by water bombers, but many of the fires were often cited as the effects of the fires, haze, and and agricultural encroachment. that sustained rain provided the the reasons for failure. Aerial drought, was worsened by the growing By mid-February the fires were only hope of extinguishing the fires suppression by water bombers was economic impact of the dramatic headline news internationally again completely. The difficulty of fire- hindered by the lack of accurate devaluation of the Indonesian cur- as haze returned to parts of Borneo fighting under such extreme land cover maps and infrastructural rency over the second half of 1997.34 and Sumatra, resulting in respiratory drought conditions is illustrated by support, and land-based efforts were Farmers began to clear even more problems and domestic airport the experience of the staff of the impeded by the reluctance of many land by burning, in the hope that closures.36 Neighboring countries Wanariset Forest Research Station rural people to fight fires on land they could increase the next harvest began to fear a return of the haze in East Kalimantan in fighting that was not theirs.32 The number of to make up for 1997 losses. Fears that had blanketed the region only repeated fires in the station's 3,500- fires began to decline during October arose that forest exploitation and three months earlier and were not ha research forest. Despite their and November, probably partly due related burning would increase as reassured by the Indonesian govern- vigilance, only 20 ha remained to mounting pressure exerted by the firms tried to offset the effects of the ment's weak efforts to prevent or unburned by mid-April.38 government on plantation firms but economic crisis.35 extinguish new fires. The army had also because the firms had burned agreed to take a more active role in as much land as they needed by fighting the fires than it had in that time. Peat swamps were still 1997, but it later reduced the num- burning in late November, but these ber of troops assigned to this duty in fires were partially extinguished order to prepare to combat civil when rain finally began to fall in unrest resulting from the economic December. crisis.37

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 9 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE The newly installed environment Heavy rains did fall during the The extent of the area affected warning his nation's broadcast minister, Juwono Sudarsono, estimated first part of May, extinguishing many by air pollution from the fires is media not to use the word haze that effectively fighting the East of the fires in Kalimantan and easier to determine. Indeed, the either, or risk having their operating Kalimantan fires would cost $2 Sumatra, but drought conditions international news media were ini- licenses revoked.47 In August 1999, billion.39 The minister compared the returned toward the end of the month. tially attracted to the 1997 fires by the Malaysian government went lack of government control over the By late May, consensus was growing the dramatic spectacle of a “thou- even further, making information fires in East Kalimantan to the law- among oceanographers and atmos- sand-mile shroud” spreading over on air quality an “official secret” lessness of the American Wild West pheric scientists that El Niño condi- an area of 1 million square kilome- and directing the firm awarded the in the 19th century and regretted his tions were abating and there was a ters inhabited by hundreds of mil- concession to monitor air pollution inability to create a sense of urgency shift toward ocean conditions that lions of people. Ramon and Wall to make its readings available only among government officials.40 A usually precede La Niña, a climatic (1998: 3) observed that “whereas for “private consumption.” The week later he admitted that the forest phenomenon that usually causes the impact of fires concerns mainly environment minister stated that fires were a low priority for the above-average rainfall in Indonesia foresters and conservationists, it is the measure was taken so as “not to Indonesian government, which was for a year or more.43 Heavy rains the smoke that causes politicians drive away tourists.”48 more concerned with countering began in June and led to floods in and economists to react.” In one Indonesia does not routinely the effects of the economic crisis.41 East Kalimantan in July. Indonesian town, it was reported, monitor air pollution levels, but Beginning in March 1998, In late 1998, hot spots again schoolchildren were tied to a rope to Malaysia and Singapore do. A read- Sarawak and Brunei were affected began to appear on NOAA and other prevent them from becoming lost in ing of 100 on the standard air pol- by the haze, and Malaysia and satellite data for Sumatra and East the haze on their way to school. In lution index (API) is considered Singapore worried that the normal Kalimantan, indicating that fire- April 1998, the 1,788-room palace unhealthy; 300 is hazardous. API shift of the monsoon winds from west setting behavior had not changed of the Sultan of Brunei was reported readings remained in the hazardous to east in May would again blanket much despite the recent experience.44 to have been almost invisible range for long periods in September the Malay Peninsula in smog. Brunei, Meanwhile, haze briefly reappeared behind a thick curtain of smog,46 as and October 1997 in the Malaysian which had escaped the haze in 1997, in Singapore, Sarawak, and southern was Kuala Lumpur’s landmark state of Sarawak, with a high of 849 took strong health precautions, Peninsular Malaysia in late November.45 Petronas Twin Towers, the tallest recorded. A reading of 1,000 was including closing schools for two It is difficult to determine pre- building in the world. Haze-related recorded in the interior of East weeks. By mid-April, authorities in cisely the total area burned during the transportation accidents were widely Kalimantan in early October 1997, Sarawak were again considering 1997–98 fires or to estimate what reported, as well. a level that was probably not declaring a state of emergency because vegetation types burned in which areas. Mixtures of visible suspended unusual in areas close to the fires.49 of the soaring air pollution levels, (See foldout map on inside cover.) airborne chemicals normally asso- Malaysians and Singaporeans were and schools were closed in several On the basis of the most recent esti- ciated with urban air pollution are informed when air pollution reached towns in the state.42 The World mates available in early 1999, it called smog, but government offi- unsafe levels and were warned to Meteorological Organization reported seems certain that at least 9.7 million cials in the region were anxious to take appropriate protective measures, at the end of March that El Niño ha burned. (See Box 6 and Table 1.) downplay the connection by calling but most Indonesians were unaware conditions would abate sometime it “haze.” Malaysian information of the level of health hazard. during June–August, but since those minister Mohammed Rahmat went months correspond to the middle of a step further in April 1998 by the Indonesian dry season, some meteorologists feared that rains heavy enough to extinguish the fires TABLE 1 might not fall until October. Estimated Extent of Spatial Damage by Fire, 1997–98 (hectares)

ISLAND MONTANE LOWLAND PEAT & SWAMP DRY SCRUB TIMBER AGRICULTURE ESTATE TOTAL FOREST FOREST FOREST & GRASS PLANTATION CROPS Kalimantan 0 2,375,000 750,000 375,000 116,000 2,829,000 55,000 6,500,000 Sumatra 0 383,000 308,000 263,000 72,000 669,000 60,000 1,756,000 Java 0 25,000 0 25,000 0 50,000 0 100,000 Sulawesi 0 200,000 0 0 0 199,000 1,000 400,000 Irian Jaya 100,000 300,000 400,000 100,000 0 97,000 3,000 1,000,000 Total 100,000 3,100,000 1,450,000 700,000 188,000 3,843,000 119,000 9,756,000 Source: BAPPENAS, 1999.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 10 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE 6 WHAT BURNED AND WHERE?

Obtaining accurate data about the Remote-sensing experts working on The WWF-Indonesia study found In the first part of 1999, a technical spatial distribution of the 1997–98 fires, the a European Union–funded Forest Fire that the 1997 Kalimantan hot spots were team funded by the ADB and working total area burned, and the proportion of Prevention and Control Project (FFPCP) most frequently found in peat swamps and through BAPPENAS aggregated and ana- different vegetation or land-use types that made a preliminary estimate, using satellite other wetlands but that lowland forests lyzed all available data sources and esti- burned is difficult because of the size and imagery in sample areas, that the 1997 fires had the highest number of detected fires.10 mated that the area burned during wide distribution of the burns, the remoteness burned 2.3 million ha in South Sumatra Using GIS to correlate hot spots with 1997–98 totaled more than 9.7 million of many of the sites, the inability of most province alone.6 The fires were almost human and natural features, they found ha, as noted in Table 1. satellite remote-sensing devices to penetrate evenly divided between and con- that fires tended to be clustered near rivers the thick haze while the fires are burning, and trolled burns. The project found that the and agricultural lands, not necessarily Notes: the need to verify interpretations of images. types of vegetation that burned, in descending close to settlements—supporting the 1. Malingreau, Stephens, and Fellows, 1985.

The 1982–83 fires in East order of importance, were wetland vegetation hypothesis that the fires were set to clear 2. Lennertz and Panzer, 1984.

Kalimantan, for example, were not detect- being cleared to prepare rice fields, secondary land for commercial plantations. Ground- 3. Schindler, Thoma, and Panzer, 1989.

ed by remote-sensing satellites for almost brush, scrublands and herbaceous swamp- based observations and interviews with local 4. For a discussion of the difficulties inher- three months.1 Basic descriptive informa- lands, dryland shifting agriculture plots, people indicate that smallholder plantations ent in accurately determining areas tion was not compiled until 1984, when a and grassland in coastal peat swamps. and home gardens, as well as oil palm and burned, see Fuller and Fulk, 1998.

relatively rapid aerial and ground survey The Singapore Centre for Remote other commercial plantations, were con- 5. Malingreau, Stephens, and Fellows, 1985. 2 11 of the affected area was completed. The Imaging, Sensing, and Processing (CRISP), sumed by the fires. 6. Ramon and Wall, 1998.

findings were revised after a later and using SPOT (Système pour l’observation de In late 1998, CRISP announced that 7. Liew and others, 1998. 3 more thorough analysis in 1989. The la Terre) satellite imagery, calculated that its analysis of satellite data of the 1998 fires 8. Fuller and Fulk, 1998. The discrepancy 1997--98 fires occurred over a much wider in 1997 approximately 1.5 million ha had revealed that 2.5 million ha had burned in between the CRISP and Fuller and Fulk area of the country, and compiling author- burned in Sumatra and approximately 3.0 East Kalimantan and 500,000 ha in Sabah, estimates may be due to differences in itative data on exactly what burned, where, million ha in Kalimantan.7 CRISP conclud- Malaysia. Combined with CRISP’s estimates data, methods, and coverage between the and how badly will take years.4 ed that most burning occurred in lowland of area burned in 1997 in Kalimantan and SPOT and NOAA satellites.

During the 1997–98 fires, the Ministry areas near rivers and roads; montane forests Sumatra, the total for both fire episodes 9. GOI, Ministry of Forestry and Estate of Environment and several other organi- were virtually untouched by fire in 1997. approaches 8 million ha.12 The East Crops, 1998.

zations tracked where fires were burning Another analysis, carried out by Kalimantan-based Integrated Forest Fires 10. Fuller and Fulk, 1998.

each day by monitoring hot spots that experts collaborating with WWF-Indonesia Management Project estimated that between 11. Gonner, 1998; Vayda, 1998; Potter and appeared on NOAA weather satellite images. calculated that between 1.97 million and 4 million and 5 million ha had burned in Lee, 1998a. 13 These data are received directly from the 2.3 million ha burned in Kalimantan East Kalimantan alone, mostly in 1998. 12. Straits Times, November 23, 1998. 8 satellites at several stations in Indonesia. during August-December 1997. The Ministry This figure was revised upwards in 1999 to 13. Schindler, 1998.

The NOAA data (also used to monitor the of Forestry and Estate Crops, however, officially 5.2 million ha, based on the results of a 14. Statement of Lothar Zimmer, German 1982–83 fires in East Kalimantan) can be estimated that in the country as a whole, detailed mapping exercise.14 (See Box 7.) Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation used to assess hazard by revealing the dry- only 165,000 ha of designated forestlands The discrepancies between the findings of the and Development, Consultative Group on ness of vegetation and ground temperature had burned in 1997.9 Forestry officials, two groups reflect the technical constraints Indonesia Meeting, Paris, July 28-29, 1999. patterns.5 Hot spots that appear on NOAA however, kept track of fires on the basis of inherent in this type of remote-sensing satellite images provide a general picture unverified reports from timber concession- analysis. The important points are that of the distribution of fires on a given day aires and plantation owners, who have no very large areas of Sumatra and Kalimantan but indicate little about the size of the area incentive to report fires accurately. burned in 1997 and 1998 and that many burned and nothing about what burned. different types of vegetation burned.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 11 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE THE POLITICS OF FIRE By 1997, the attitude of many The most outspoken and con- This action gave rise to consid- As soon as the Indonesian for- government officials had become sistent opinion leader in this period erable resistance from the industries, est fires and the resulting haze less defiant, but Sudjarwo’s line was was the minister of state for environ- and 121 firms sent rebuttals to the became headline news in September still being echoed by , an ment, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja. ministry.54 But the efforts of the timber 1997, a fierce political battle began outspoken timber baron and crony Beginning in early September, and and plantation industries to influence about who was to blame for the dis- of President Suharto. In October, taking advantage of the pressure public opinion tended to be defensive aster and what the most effective Hasan told the press that the extent from Malaysia and Singapore to do because the public had in large part response would be. of the fires had been exaggerated something about the haze, Sarwono already judged them to be the guilty The Indonesian government and that logging concessions bore was able to push the issue of the parties. Like some government offi- and its allies in the forestry and no responsibility for the burning.51 forest fires to the top of the public cials, many firms continued to accuse agribusiness industries have tradi- Later that month he said that and media agenda. As a result, shifting cultivators of setting the fires. tionally blamed forest fires on activists calling for sanctions on Indonesia was obliged, for the first But, in October, several of the biggest small-scale shifting cultivators and companies found to be using fire to time, to take the fires seriously. On timber barons—and also members of on periodic droughts and other clear land were influenced by com- September 8, President Suharto offi- the Indonesian Business Council vagaries of nature. In the aftermath munist agents.52 cially ordered that use of fire to for Sustainable Development— of the 1982–83 fires in East The power of Hasan and other clear land be stopped, and on announced that they would contribute Kalimantan, despite ample evidence entrenched timber industry cronies September 16 he publicly apologized 20 billion rupiah (about $5.5 million that poor logging practices were the largely blunted the good-faith efforts to neighboring nations at the open- at the exchange rate at that time) main factor in creating the condi- of Forestry Minister Djamaluddin ing of an ASEAN environment min- toward efforts to fight the fires and tions for the huge conflagration, Suryohadikusumo to take action isters’ conference. These actions provide assistance to affected com- Forestry Minister Sudjarwo told the against companies accused of setting put government agencies on notice munities. Details on the actual dis- press that “nomadic cultivators who fires, and Djamaluddin was widely that they had to act. bursement and use of these funds use the outdated [slash and burn] rumored to be close to resigning over Building on this momentum, were never made public, however. techniques” were the primary cause this predicament. (Suharto appointed Sarwono took the lead in fingering Apart from the two environment of the fire and that logging compa- Bob Hasan minister of forestry soon oil palm and timber plantation agencies, a number of other previously nies were “not responsible.” thereafter, in the short-lived cabinet companies as the major culprits in marginal government agencies Queried on the role of the vast that took office in March 1998.) creating the disaster, using overlays assumed important roles in shaping quantities of waste and dead trees The forest fires of 1997 opened of NOAA hot spot maps with maps public opinion during this period. left in the wake of logging opera- the way for a number of politically that showed the location of the While ultimately unsuccessful, the tions, he countered that “to be fair marginalized actors to take on plantation concessions. At the outset cloud-seeding projects carried out to them, it is not economical for important roles in influencing public he encountered stiff resistance from by the Technology Development them to clear the forest [after log- perceptions and opinions about the government forestry and plantation Agency (BPPT) and the armed ging]. The cost of clearing is very fires and about Indonesia’s natural agencies. But public and media forces across parts of Sumatra and high.” He went on to suggest that resource management policies in pressure grew, and in mid-September Kalimantan that began in the fire might be a blessing in dis- general. For a brief period (August- the Ministry of Forestry announced September served as a public symbol guise, since the government wanted October 1997), Indonesia’s mass media that 176 oil palm plantations, that the government was actually to clear a great deal of land in the were dominated by marginal actors, industrial timber estates, and trans- doing something about the fires. province, and with the fires “what including the minister of state for migration sites were suspected of The activities of BMG and LAPAN in you have is land clearing for free.”50 environment, the Environmental intentionally and systematically providing remote-sensing and other Impact Assessment Agency using fire to clear land in Sumatra data on the drought and the fires (BAPPEDAL), the Meteorological and and Kalimantan.53 In early October, gave those two agencies an unac- Geophysical Agency, the national the ministry canceled 166 timber- customed public role. Indeed, it space agency (LAPAN), and a variety cutting rights held by these firms, was their work, in cooperation with of NGOs. Statements coming from though it did not suspend or cancel the environment agencies, that timber and plantation firms, the any actual concession agreements. provided convincing evidence that Ministry of Forestry, and the Directorate plantation owners were major cul- General for Plantations in the Ministry prits behind the fires. of Agriculture took on a defensive and reactive character. The Transmigration Ministry and the armed forces chose to keep silent.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 12 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE NGOs in Jakarta played an The evolution of public opin- The on-the-ground government unprecedented role in influencing NGOs in Jakarta played ion about the forest fires had three response was also weak and equivocal. public opinion and policy through an unprecedented role distinct phases. First came realization By October 1997, the government the mass media. WALHI, for example, in influencing public that there was a serious problem and had essentially given up trying to produced a widely reported stream opinion and policy that it was affecting neighboring put out the fires and was waiting for of press releases rebutting government through the mass media. countries. In the second phase the the rains to return. Assistance efforts and industry statements concerning press and public blamed the timber offered by a number of nations (planes who was setting the fires, their extent, and plantation companies (and, by from the United States, firefighters and the probable economic losses. By the middle of October, how- extension, the government agencies from Malaysia) were dogged by poor The fires gave WALHI and other NGOs ever, press coverage fell off, responsible for regulating them), support and coordination on the a useful platform for their long- although the fires continued to and the industries concerned Indonesian side. Thousands of face standing critique of the government’s burn until the end of November. mounted strenuous efforts at rebut- masks donated by the United Nations industry-oriented and destructive One journalist noted that “the fires tal. In the final phase, faced with its Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in October forest policies.55 While WALHI and just weren’t news anymore,” and at own apparent inability to respond sat in the National Disaster Relief other Jakarta-based groups played an the same time the government effectively to the fires, the govern- Office in Jakarta for weeks due to important role in advocacy, many decided to place the blame for the ment made a vigorous effort to con- bureaucratic snafus in the distribu- local NGOs and youth groups fires squarely on El Niño. During vince the public that the fires were tion. An October 14, 1997, editorial in undertook the distribution of face the first week of October, senior fig- the result of a natural phenomenon the Bangkok Post entitled “Indonesia’s masks and medicine in the country- ures from the print and electronic occurring on a global scale and Shame Won’t Blow Away” summed side at a time when government media were summoned to a meeting thus were legitimately outside the up the impatience and anger in the relief efforts were largely paralyzed, with a number of key ministers held scope of human intervention. region at the government’s ineffectual and many groups physically fought at the Ministry of Information.56 Preventing and fighting fires and defensive performance: fires in the field. In addition, many The editors were told that henceforth on forestlands outside of densely NGO staff volunteered to help the they were to blame the forest fires on populated Java has never been a “For weeks, Indonesian big Environment Ministry operate forest El Niño and cease the “polemics” very high priority for the govern- business cleared forests for palm oil fire “command posts” to monitor that had characterized news coverage ment, and its regulatory approach cultivation, creating pollution that reports from the field, analyze satel- of the disaster up to that point. Only has been reactive rather than pre- enshrouded neighboring states, lite data, and coordinate distribu- the Ministry of Environment and its ventive. Despite provisions in the causing inestimable damage to the tion of assistance. Environmental Impact Agency 1967 Basic Forestry Law calling for health of millions, devastating agri- The role of the press in shap- resisted this line, telling the press in development of regulations to deal culture and local economies alike. ing public opinion and influencing mid-November that “the 1997 forest with forest fires, the government After trying to pin the blame on El policymakers about the fires was and land fires are largely due to only began this effort in the mid- Niño, an apology of sorts came but extremely important and probably land clearance activities using this 1980s, in the aftermath of the great without a pledge to stop the season- represented the Indonesian news method [fire]. El Niño is only an East Kalimantan fire of 1982–83. al devastation of the forests. And so media’s most outspoken and influ- additional factor. El Niño does not Additional regulations were issued the region can expect varying ential performance to date, at least start fires, but only makes forests following renewed large outbreaks degrees of airborne delayed death since Suharto came to power. Press susceptible to fire.”57 of fire in the early 1990s. As late as next year too, and the year after coverage reached a peak of intensity April 1997, however, the ministry that, and the year after that. It is from mid-September to mid- issued a regulation specifying pro- abundantly clear that the region October, with events such as cedures for “controlled burning” to will be laid to waste as long as gov- Suharto’s September 16 apology to clear land and only voided it in ernments remain enslaved to big ASEAN, release of the list of compa- another flurry of reactive decrees business.” nies suspected of intentionally set- when haze from the fires enveloped ting fires, the arrival of Malaysian the region in September 1997. firefighters in Sumatra, declaration of a state of emergency in Sarawak, the crash of an Indonesian airliner in Sumatra, and the outbreak of numerous fires on the island of Java.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 13 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Meanwhile, international aid Viewed through a political lens, Indonesia. This window of opportunity vanished from policymakers’ radar agencies fell over each other trying to the forest fires presented an unprece- for the critics did not last long, screens. The fall of Suharto in mid- respond to the disaster, with each, it dented opportunity for hitherto however, and basically slammed shut 1998 and the advent of the reformasi appeared, attempting to establish itself marginalized actors to publicly raise when the rain began to fall. The fires movement have once again opened as the agency taking the leadership fundamental questions about the vanished from the press, and the that window of opportunity. The role in the crisis. One senior govern- destructive relationship between effects of the fires on the health of extent to which this opening is likely ment official complained privately government natural resource policies the millions of people in Sumatra to be used to carry out meaningful that many of the bilateral offers of aid and the crony cartels that dominate and Kalimantan who for months forest policy reforms is discussed in were just “attempts to get Indonesia natural resource exploitation in lived under a blanket of smog largely Part II. to buy expensive firefighting equip- ment from firms in their country.” A July 1998 review listed more than a dozen projects by as many agencies, all claiming to be responding to the fires.58

7 THE POLITICS OF DATA MANIPULATION: HOW MUCH OF EAST KALIMANTAN BURNED DURING 1997–98?

The official position of the govern- upcoming session of the People’s “All in all, the forestry sector is the as of October 1999, made the accurate data ment, as of August 1999, was that some Consultative Assembly [MPR].”2 most important of the focal areas of our public and retracted its erroneous figure of 520,000 ha had burned in East Kalimantan In a meeting with staff of the cooperation. . . . It would therefore be highly 520,000 ha. province, and this figure was used by then- German-funded project several days later, irritating if recent reports from Indonesia President Habibie in a speech in East the governor indicated that he found the were even just partially accurate: . . . .We are Notes: Kalimantan that month. Unfortunately, results of the new study credible, but puzzled as to why the extent of recent fire- 1. “Permerintah Disinyalir Memanipulasi extensive remote sensing work, confirmed requested that they not be made public in inflicted damage to the forest differs by a Huas Hutan Yang Terbakar.” by ground-checks carried out by the order to maintain “peace in his province.” factor of 10, i.e. official estimates refuse to [“Manipulation of Burnt Area Pointed Out German-supported Integrated Forest Fires The project representatives reported that acknowledge the full extent of this cata- to Government.”] Suara Pembaruan, 10 Management Project based in East “the Governor refused to accept that a pro- strophe, namely that the burning of 5 million August 1999.

Kalimantan, produced convincing and active role of the Government, by accepting hectares in 1997-98 produced nearly one 2. Letter from D.M. Nasution, Minister of

comprehensive data in mid-1999 showing and using the results to implement the third of the world’s total CO2. . . .The EU Forestry and Estate Crops, to the Governor that the fires had in fact covered some 5.2 further necessary steps, would be beneficial Commission has prepared a draft resolution of East Kalimantan, “Re: Clarification of million ha, ten times the government’s to all parties” and concluded that “the letter on this matter and I strongly appeal to you the 1997–98 forest and grasslands fire official figure.1 of the Minister as well as the position of to give it the highest attention. Failing data,” SK 718/Menhutbun-V/1999, July 5, Informed of this considerable dis- the Governor are difficult to comprehend this, my government would be obliged to 1999. [Unofficial translation.]

crepancy, the Minister of Forestry and and could cause serious problems for the reconsider the future of our ongoing 3. Minutes of Meeting with Governor of Estate Crops, in early July 1999, wrote to future implementation of both [German- forestry projects. . . . I need not elaborate East Kalimantan, Head of the Provincial the governor of East Kalimantan with respect assisted fire-related] projects.”3 on the ecological but also international Forest Office and German-assisted forest to this “data gap,” and in essence instructed This concern was reiterated by implications of such a reversal in the—- and forest fires project staff, July 8, 1999, him not to allow the new data to be made Germany’s representative to the 1999 so far—reform-oriented forest policy.”4 Samarinda, East Kalimantan.

public: “Remembering current political Consultative Group on Indonesia—the Despite the exposure of this cover-up 4. Statement by Lothar Zimmer, German developments, we think it is necessary to annual meeting of Indonesia’s international and the serious concerns publicly expressed Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation protect national stability. Let’s not cause donors—in Paris several weeks later, where by a senior official of one of Indonesia’s and Development, Consultative Group on further debate [by making the data public] he stated: major aid donors, the government had not, Indonesia Meeting, Paris, July 28-29, 1999. that could harm preparations for the

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 14 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE IV. COUNTING THE COST: IMPACTS OF THE 1997–98 FIRES

o date there have been three The WWF-EEPSEA valuation In some cases it is impossible to major attempts to value the study, which estimated losses of nearly disaggregate from other factors the Much of the cost of the T costs of the 1997-98 fires $4.5 billion for 1997 alone, provides losses directly due to the fires and haze. fire damage probably and haze. One by WWF-Indonesia some sobering comparisons on the For example, the decline in Indonesia’s cannot be estimated. and the Singapore Economy and magnitude of losses. It noted that agricultural production during 1997 Assigning a dollar value Environment Programme for South total 1997 damages are: and 1998 was caused by drought as to the destruction of East Asia (EEPSEA), covering August well as by fire, while declines in some of the last intact 1 through October 31, 1997, yielded ᔢ more than the damages assessed tourism are attributable to the Asian lowland forest in a figure of nearly $4.5 billion.59 The for purposes of legal liability in the economic crisis and the political Sumatra, the death of a Environment Ministry’s Exxon Valdez oil spill and the Bhopal unrest in 1998 as well as to the haze. large percentage of Environmental Emergency Project (India) chemical release disasters All three analyses of the costs Indonesia's remaining combined; (EEP) gave a figure of $2.4 bil- incurred by the fires and haze were wild , or the ᔢ more than the amount needed lion.60 Neither estimate included shortened life span of to provide all of Indonesia's 120 conservative in their assumptions and medically vulnerable losses incurred from the 1998 fires. million rural poor with basic sani- did not take into account a number Building on these earlier tation, water, and sewerage services; of probable but difficult to quantify people made terminally ill studies, a technical assistance team ᔢ more than double the total for- costs such as long-term health by the haze is impossible. funded by the Asian Development eign aid to Indonesia annually; and damage, increased risk of cancer, and Bank (ADB) and working with the ᔢ equal to 2.5 percent of Indonesia's crop losses due to reduced photo- national development planning gross national product (GNP). synthesis and pollination. Research According to one researcher, because agency (BAPPENAS) concluded that by the Malaysian Rubber Board’s the haze of the fires weakened total losses from the 1997–98 fires research institute, for example, photosynthesis activity, rubber tree and haze were between $8.9 billion indicates that the fires reduced growth was affected and the volume and $9.7 billion (based on two sets photosynthesis by 10 percent. of latex produced dropped of assumptions about the value of noticeably.62 If these less quantifiable forest loss), with a mean value of costs could be reliably counted, it is $9.3 billion.61 These figures are likely that they would more than summarized in Table 2; method- offset distortions caused by the ological notes are provided in difficulty of disaggregating fire and Appendix A. drought economic losses in the cases of agriculture and tourism. A TABLE 2 total economic loss in the range of The Economic Cost of the 1997–98 Fires and Haze (million U.S. dollars) $8 billion to $10 billion therefore Estimated Economic Losses appears to be the most reliable SECTOR Minimum Maximum Mean estimate to date, based on current AGRICULTURE data and methodologies. Farm crops 2,431 2,431 2,431 Much of the cost of the fire Plantation crops 319 319 319 damage probably cannot be estimated. FORESTRY Assigning a dollar value to the Timber from natural forests (logged and unlogged) 1,461 2,165 1,813 destruction of some of the last intact Lost growth in natural forests 256 377 316 lowland forest in Sumatra, the Timber from plantations 94 94 94 death of a large percentage of Nontimber forest products 586 586 586 Indonesia's remaining wild orang- Flood protection 404 404 404 utans, or the shortened life span of Erosion and siltation 1,586 1,586 1,586 medically vulnerable people made Carbon sink 1,446 1,446 1,446 terminally ill by the haze is impos- HEALTH 145 145 145 TRANSMIGRATION AND BUILDINGS AND PROPERTY 111sible. But even this conservative and TRANSPORTATION 18 49 33 partial assessment of the monetary TOURISM 111 111 111 costs gives policymakers and the FIREFIGHTING COSTS 12 11 12 people of the region a tangible way TOTAL 8,870 9,726 9,298 of understanding the destruction wrought by the fires and haze. Source: BAPPENAS 1999.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 15 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE EFFECTS ON FOREST Forest vegetation. Where The proboscis monkey Summarizing all the data FAUNA AND FLORA fires are very hot, the soil surface (Nasalis larvatus), a threatened available by early 1999, the The effects of the 1997–98 hardens, making it difficult for species found almost exclusively in BAPPENAS-ADB study offered the fires on the rich forest biodiversity of seeds to sprout and causing nutri- riverine and coastal habitats, was following general conclusions: Kalimantan and Sumatra are largely ent-rich ash to be washed away by probably the primate species that unknown at this time, for several the first heavy rain. Damage tends lost the greatest percentage of its ᔢ Drought-assisted fires in 1997–98 reasons. First, only a few preliminary to be greater in logged and other- habitat to the fires. Some other pri- caused major biodiversity losses, field surveys have been carried out in wise disturbed forests. Peat-swamp mate species do not appear to be so particularly in Sumatra and 63 Kalimantan, although the vast the affected areas. Second, basic forests are particularly vulnerable to badly affected in the short term. spread and remoteness of many fire. Repeated cycles of burning, Birds. Bird populations were understanding about the functioning damaged areas makes it impossible probably seriously affected by the of rainforest and peat-swamp such as those Indonesia has experi- to obtain a precise estimate of losses. ecosystems, and about the basic enced, can completely transform fires. Many birds become disorient- ᔢ The massive areas burned in biology of most species in those forest into grassland or scrubland. ed in smoke and fall to the ground, Kalimantan resulted in large losses ecosystems, is extremely limited. Apart from the direct effects of the while fruit-eating species such as to the already shrinking lowland Third, it is difficult to disaggregate the fires, the opening of new areas for hornbills lose their source of food. evergreen and semievergreen forests impacts of fire from those of drought cultivation and settlement in previ- Hornbills disappeared completely and to swamp and peat forests, with and land-clearing activities. Finally, ously forested burned areas intensi- from study areas in East Kalimantan the most serious damage taking the direct effects of fire may be fies degradation of adjacent after the 1982–83 fires, presumably place in areas previously subject to dwarfed in the long term by the unburned forest areas by human for this reason. Insect-eating species logging and fire. ᔢ Some 17 protected areas were indirect impacts of accelerated activities. of birds tend to do well after fires damaged by fire, including the Primates. The fires had a because populations of wood-eating human occupation and use of for- nationally and internationally insects increase in response to the merly forested areas that, having been particularly severe impact on the important Kutai National Park in burned, became more accessible to orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus), enormous supplies of dead wood. East Kalimantan, which was severely humans. particularly in Kalimantan. (See Reptiles and amphibians. damaged. Much of the park had What is known about the effects Map 3.) Studies after the 1982–83 With the exception of species that previously been logged and burned, of the most recent fires on wildlife is fires concluded that orangutans live in relatively deep water, reptiles making it more susceptible to fire derived from a few preliminary field were able to alter their diet and and amphibians are extremely sen- damage in 1998. assessments and what can be recovered fairly well, but the scale of sitive to fire and appear to have suf- ᔢ Deaths of rare and endangered extrapolated from more extensive the 1997–98 fires exceeded their fered severe population declines in animal species due to the fires was studies carried out after the 1982–83 ability to adapt. Hundreds of adult areas burned during 1997–98. compounded by the hunting of dis- oriented animals for food and sale Kalimantan fires. These findings are orangutans were killed by villagers Insects and invertebrates. and the killing of some that strayed in Kalimantan as they fled from the Wood-eating species increase after summarized below and are discussed into human settlements. fires. Studies of the 1982–83 in detail in Appendix B. drought and fires, and hundreds ᔢ Severe damage was not limited more orphaned juveniles were cap- Kalimantan fire indicate that but- to natural biodiversity but also tured and sold on the illegal wildlife terfly populations also increased affected the biodiversity of agricul- market. Primatologists believe that and that the number of soil- and tural ecosystems, including locally the most recent fires mark the litter-dwelling invertebrates recov- evolved cultivars, many of which beginning of a steep decline in the ered within three years. The rich were probably lost. 64 Borneo orangutan population, but little-studied invertebrate fauna which was already dropping due to of the forest canopy, however, is pre- habitat loss and poaching. sumably completely destroyed along with the canopy.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 16 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE EFFECTS ON WATER FLOWS When large sediment loads are Peat forests cover about 400 AND WATER QUALITY washed into streams and rivers, million ha of the Earth’s surface. A resident of Sumatra’s As with fauna and flora, the aquatic life is smothered in mud. About 90 percent of peat swamps lie Jambi province told a impacts of the 1997–98 fires on The sediment brings with it large in temperate and boreal latitudes. reporter, “This morning, water flows and quality have not yet amounts of nutrients, especially The remainder are in the tropics, like most mornings, I been systematically studied. A good nitrogen and phosphorus, that pollute and Indonesia contains about 60 woke with a headache. deal is known, however, about the the water and cause algal blooms. percent of those tropical peat forests In my stomach I feel very general effects of fire on water flows Two years after the 1982–83 fires, (20 million to 30 million ha). strange, and my eyes, they and quality, and considerable data nutrient levels in streams draining Unlike forests and grasslands, peat- sting. Jambi cannot are available from the 1982–83 areas of burned forest in Sabah were lands accumulate carbon over handle these things. This fires in East Kalimantan. The main twice as high as those of streams thousands of years and thus repre- has gone on too long. point is that fires greatly increase draining adjacent unburned forest.70 sent an important carbon sink. The We have not seen the sun erosion potential. When a fire episode Changes in water chemistry after the total global carbon storage capacity for more than a month. is followed by a period of heavy rains, 1982–83 fires reduced fish populations of peat is 240 to 480 gigatons We are suffocating.” the amounts of ash, soil, and vegeta- already affected by a year of below- (Gt)–-about 20 percent of the total tive matter carried into water systems normal water levels. The incidence global organic carbon store and 200 increase dramatically. of disease in fish rose, and fish catches times more than the amount of car- carbon released into the atmosphere El Niño-related drought events fell. The endangered Mahakam bon released annually from the during the 1997-98 fires was 206.6 are sometimes followed by a year of River dolphin, a marine mammal combustion of fossil fuel and from million tons, over 75 percent of which above-average rainfall, called La Niña.65 adapted to living in rivers, suffered deforestation.74 was derived from the combustion of This was the case in Indonesia during an outbreak of disease.71 The loss of The total amount of carbon in peat. Unlike the case of above-ground the rainy seasons of 1983-84 and forest cover over streams also exposes tropical peat is at least 20 Gt. The vegetation, carbon emissions due to 1998-99.66 In 1983-84 the rains the water to direct sunlight, increasing ombrogeneous lowland forest peats peat fires are not offset over time by resulted in much heavier flooding water temperatures to levels that are of Kalimantan (6.8 million ha) and vegetation regrowth. In mid-1999 the along East Kalimantan’s rivers than unfavorable for some fish and aquatic Sumatra (8.3 million ha) store the World Bank claimed that would be expected from the amount organisms. highest amounts of carbon per of rain.67 The reason was that the hectare in the world—10 times that “Indonesia’s fires in 1997 were esti- fires had impaired the hydrological EFFECTS ON THE of tropical forest biomass.75 The mated to have contributed about 30 performance of the forest. In the ATMOSPHERE costs of carbon storage via afforesta- percent of all man-made carbon two previous dry seasons, the fires Most of the gases present in tion are estimated to be in the range emissions globally—more than the destroyed ground vegetation and leaf the haze created by the 1997–98 of $3 to $4 per ton of carbon. entire emissions from man-made litter (which usually slow surface fires play direct or indirect roles in Assuming that the average depth of sources from North America.”77 runoff), hardened the surface of the regulating the Earth’s atmosphere,72 Indonesian peat is 5 meters (m), the soil (thus restricting water infiltra- and their release made a large carbon store could be as high as EFFECTS ON HUMAN HEALTH tion), and reduced the capacity of contribution to the atmospheric 2,500 tons of carbon per hectare. Anyone unfortunate enough to the peat swamps to retain water. concentration of the greenhouse The value of these peatlands as a have suffered in the choking gloom Runoff from burned areas carried gases that are generally acknowledged carbon sink—in the framework of that enveloped the region intuitively soil, ash, and woody debris into rivers to cause global warming. Several the Clean Development Mechanism understands that the smog was bad and lakes, causing heavy sediment studies have attempted to quantify (CDM) being developed under the for health. A resident of Sumatra’s loads and biological pollution.68 the volume of biomass that was Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Jambi province told a reporter, “This (The magnitude of postfire erosion burned in the 1997 fires in order to Convention on Climate Change, for morning, like most mornings, I can be staggering. Researchers esti- estimate accurately the amount of example—is obviously very high, woke with a headache. In my stom- mate that in southeastern Australia, carbon dioxide released from above- ranging from $3,600 per ha to as ach I feel very strange, and my eyes, a moderate day-long rainfall that ground vegetation.73 But below- much as $18,000 per ha for deep they sting. Jambi cannot handle these occurred a week after a forest fire ground burning in peat-swamp peats.76 things. This has gone on too long. washed at least 22 metric tons of forests may in fact be the greater Burning peat releases vast We have not seen the sun for more soil and ash from each hectare of contributor to carbon release amounts of carbon that has been than a month. We are suffocat- burned-over forest.)69 because of the special characteristics stored for thousands of years. Smoke ing.”78 Assessing the health impacts of peat swamps. from peat fires contains high levels of in a systematic and quantitative way, sulfur oxides. The BAPPENAS-ADB however, presents serious method- study estimated that the total amount of ological problems.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 17 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE The severity of effects on human Indonesia. Unfortunately, the (TSP), which range up to 35 or 50 It is possible to estimate levels health from a “haze episode” such as spottiest and least reliable data micrometers (µm) in diameter and of PM10 (particles with a diameter of that caused by the 1997–98 fires come from Indonesia, where the thus cannot be used directly to assess less than 10 µm) in Indonesia from depends on the level of the constituent haze was heaviest and the most respiratory concentration of particles.80 general data on TSP levels, based pollutants and the length of exposure people were affected. Air quality Heil (1998) reports that a field check on sampling done at locations in of the population to them. (See Box monitoring in Indonesia is carried of Indonesian sampling methods neighboring countries where both 8.) It is not possible at this writing out by three government agencies, revealed various methodological types of data were collected during to give a comprehensive and reli- independent of each other.79 The 10 flaws that significantly bias TSP the fires. Samples taken in able account of how many people Indonesian government stations in sampling results downward. She Malaysia indicate TSP/PM10 ratios of were exposed to what pollutants, at Sumatra and Kalimantan that concludes, however, that the data 70 to over 80 percent. When parti- what level, and for how long during monitor air quality—like those still “reflect approximately the range cles are transported long distances, the 1997–98 fires. Without those throughout the country—only of concentrations that occurred the heavier ones tend to fall out of data, it is not possible to accurately sample for total suspended particles during the 1997 Indonesian haze.” the mix, elevating PM10 levels. Still, assess the magnitude of health Ferrari (1997) concludes that if the impacts. Nevertheless, the data that Indonesian TSP samples were taken do exist provide a sobering snapshot at locations “30–50 km from the of the likely health consequences. source of the fires, then it may be appropriate to assume that TSP val- ues would translate to PM10 levels of at least 50 percent.”

8 HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS OF SMOKE FROM FOREST FIRES

Emissions from forest fires are a the thoracic region (chest), generally PAHs are formed when combustion is at higher levels, hazardous. At particular complex mixture of solid, liquid, and come to rest in the trachea-bronchial area, incomplete because of an insufficient supply risk are children, the elderly, and those with gaseous compounds, and their composition and are removed over several hours to a day. of oxygen. Burning of wood and charcoal preexisting conditions such as asthma and varies depending on the chemical compo- Finer particles, below 6 µm, penetrate into yields a higher level of PAHs than does heart disease.7 Given the well-known car- sition of the burning biomass and the con- the air cells and passages of the lungs combustion of gas, petroleum, or coal. cinogenic properties of PAHs and the ditions and efficiency of combustion. (alveolae), and their elimination takes PAHs tend to adsorb on particles of 10 µm potential long-term effects on lung and Forest fires produce gaseous compounds, from days to years.2 Particles below 2.5 µm or less, and thus they penetrate deeply into heart function of extended exposure to them, 5 including carbon monoxide, sulfur diox- (PM2.5) have the most serious and long- the lungs along with the particles. it can be assumed that long-term negative

ide, methane, nitrogen oxides, and various lasting effects because they can most easily Elevated levels of PM10 particles in health effects are a probable outcome of organic compounds. From a human reach the lower regions of the lungs.3 the ambient air, especially when a signifi- elevated levels of exposure to these pollu-

health perspective, the most important Total particulate matter (TPM) emitted from cant proportion of PM2.5 particles is pre- tants. Malaysia and Singapore use the

component of smoke from forest fires con- forest fires with flaming combustion contains sent, are associated with an increase in same standard for PM10 as does the United 3 sists of suspended particles (a combination 80 to 95 percent fine particles (PM2.5); that acute health hazards ranging from “acute States (150 µg/ m ). Indonesia only has a of solids and liquids), mainly composed of from smouldering combustion contains respiratory symptoms and illness including standard for total particulate matter organic and elemental carbon.1 from 90 to nearly 100 percent.4 bronchitis, asthma, pneumonia and upper (TPM): 260 µg/ m3 in a 24-hour period. Of particular concern are particles The health effects of breathing respiratory infection, impaired lung func- with a diameter of less than 10 microme- particulate matter depend not only on the tion, hospitalization for respiratory and Notes:

ters (µm), termed PM10. When people size of the particles but also on the nature cardiac disease to increases in mortality. 1. Heil, 1998.

inhale particulate matter, particles are of the toxic compounds adsorbed (gath- The organic constituents have been shown 2. Ibid.

retained in various parts of the respiratory ered in a condensed layer) on their sur- to induce some inflammations and suppress 3. USEPA, 1998. 6 system according to their size. Particles face. In the case of smoke from forest the defense capability toward bacteria” 4. USDA, 1997.

over 10 µm in diameter come to rest in the fires, a class of more than 100 compounds The United States has set standards 5. Heil, 1998. 3 nose, throat, and larynx and remain there called polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons of 150 micrograms (µg) per m for PM10 6. Heil, 1998: 4. 3 only for several hours. Particles below 10 (PAHs), many of which are known to be and 65 µg/m PM2.5. Concentrations above 7. USEPA, 1998. µm in diameter are able to advance into carcinogenic, are of particular concern. these levels are considered unhealthful or,

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 18 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Using that ratio—PM10 levels These sketchy data probably The Environment Ministry’s situation in Malaysia and Singapore, at 50 percent of TSP—the figures underestimate pollution levels expe- fire and haze study estimated, on “almost no information was given to recorded for Indonesia in rienced in some provinces because the basis of data from eight affected the public concerning the level of air September-November 1997 are monitoring stations are located in provinces, that about 12.3 million pollution and the ensuing health extremely high. In late September, provincial capitals, some of which people were exposed to the haze effects.”86 Second, because of the TSP levels of 4,000 µg/m3 and are not representative of the during September-November 1997. difficulties of access, cost, and the above were reported for Jambi and province’s experience with the haze.84 Of these, 527 died, nearly 16,000 “chronic inadequacy of services,”87 Central Kalimantan provinces, and Data on the health impacts of were hospitalized, and more than Indonesians living in rural areas are another peak of around 3,500 the haze in Indonesia are sparse and 36,000 received some form of out- unlikely to visit a hospital or health µg/m3 was reached in mid-October. are based only on 1997 observations. patient treatment. (See Table 3.) clinic unless they are suffering Levels in other provinces were not A report from West Kalimantan’s While data from hospital acute symptoms of illness. Third, as high, but they nevertheless rose provincial health office noted admissions and outpatient visits to Indonesians, particularly those living at least an order of magnitude significant increases in respiratory doctors indicate significant health in rural areas of islands such as above Indonesia’s maximum 24- diseases in the capital city of effects from the haze, these figures Kalimantan and Sumatra, depend hour TSP standard of 260 µg/m3. 81 Pontianak.85 Heil (1998: 13) probably underreport the actual on traditional healers and herbal Several efforts to directly mon- observes that “health statistics impacts by an order of magnitude, medicines for a great deal of their 88 itor PM10 levels in Indonesia were registered a considerable increase of for three reasons. First, unlike the health care. carried out during the fires: upper respiratory infection, asthma, bronchitis and pneumonia, as well ᔢ A short-term study conducted as eye and skin irritation. Besides by BAPEDAL in Jambi province the physical effects, depression and during October 3–5, 1997, reported anxiety syndromes occurred more PM10 levels of more than 1,000 frequently. . . .The persistence of µg/m3—nearly seven times the exceedingly high particle levels leads maximum level considered safe by TABLE 3 to an overload of deposited particles the United States.82 Health Effects from Fire-Related Haze Exposure in Eight Indonesian Provinces, ᔢ The U.S. Environmental within the respiratory system, which September–November 1997 Protection Agency monitored is most likely to induce chronic, particulate matter (PM) at two long-term respiratory diseases.” HEALTH EFFECTS NUMBER OF CASES haze-affected sites in Sumatra Death 527 between November 4 and 8, 1997. Asthma 298,125 Levels of both PM10 and PM2.5 Bronchitis 58,095 exceeded U.S. national ambient air Acute respiratory infection (ARI) 1,446,120 quality standards (NAAQS) by large Daily activity constraint (number of days) 4,758,600 margins on all five days, with val- Increase in outpatient treatments 36,462 ues on several days reaching haz- Increase in hospitalizations 15,822 ardous levels. Most of the particles Lost work days 2,446,352 were PM2.5, and “the specific compo- sition of the particles and presence of particular PAH compounds are Note: The provinces studied were Riau, West Sumatra, Jambi, South Sumatra, West characteristic of wood smoke.”83 Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, and East Kalimantan.

Source: State Ministry for Environment and UNDP, 1998.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 19 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Faced with chronic (rather than Not all of the health effects of In Sarawak, as the smog Singapore, at the southern tip acute) symptoms, such as respiratory the haze were caused by breathing reduced visibility to a meter or less, of the Malay Peninsula, also experi- illness or skin and eye irritation, polluted air; for example 26 people a state of emergency was declared enced high levels of haze-related many rural Indonesians simply will were killed on a river in South on September 19, closing factories pollution, although the situation not visit a doctor. That leaves only Kalimantan when a water taxi col- and schools. The press reported that was not as extreme as in Sarawak the inferences that can be drawn lided with a tugboat towing a coal at least 5,000 people had sought and in much of Indonesia. from the fact that as many as 21 barge in visibility reduced to less medical help for haze-related com- Monthly PM10 values, which usually million people spent months breath- than 5 m by the haze.89 In North plaints; one report noted that 3,000 fluctuate between 30 and 50 µg/m3, ing undetermined but extremely Sumatra the haze was suspected to people had sought treatment on a increased to between 60 and 110 high levels of pollutants known to have been at least partly responsible single day. At one point the govern- µg/m3 during September-October cause both acute and long-term for the deaths of 234 people in the ment began to make contingency 1997. The incidence of medical health effects. (The figure 21 mil- September 1997 crash of an plans for evacuating all 2 million complaints related to the haze rose lion is the number of people living Indonesian Airbus near the city of residents of the state.93 about 30 percent during this period, in 1995 in the six provinces most . Haze from the fires was A World Health Organization but there was no significant affected by haze from the 1997 reported to be thick at the time in consultant, assessing the health increase in hospital admissions or fires–-South Sumatra, Riau, Jambi, the area, and the Medan airport impacts of the haze, noted that the mortality, indicating that the short- Central Kalimantan, South closed shortly after the crash limited availability of baseline mor- term health effects in Singapore Kalimantan, and West because of poor visibility. Aviation bidity and mortality information in were relatively mild. Of concern for Kalimantan.) experts noted that thick smoke Malaysia makes quantitative assess- the longer term was the finding that could also have caused the crash by ment difficult. However, the 94 percent of the particles in the creating turbulence or cutting oxy- Ministry of Health monitored the haze in Singapore were below 2.5 As many as 21 million gen flow to the engines.90 incidence of acute respiratory infec- µm in diameter—that is, they were people spent months Malaysia, Singapore, tions, asthma, and conjunctivitis at the fine particles that settle deepest breathing undetermined and Thailand. Haze from the three hospitals in Peninsular in the lungs and take the longest but extremely high levels 1997 fires raised air pollution in Malaysia during August and time to eliminate.96 of pollutants known to Malaysia to alarming levels. In late September, and similar data were One measure of the severity of cause both acute and September, the API reached values collected in Sarawak during the haze was its effects on southern long-term health effects. of over 800 in Kuching, Sarawak, September. Comparison of these Thailand, which lies some 1,200 and 300 in Kuala Lumpur. API val- data with same-day API data km from the nearest major clusters ues of 101 to 200 are categorized as showed a clear relationship between of the 1997 fires in Kalimantan and “unhealthy,” values of 201 to 300 the incidence of illness and concen- some 800 km from the major fire as “very unhealthy,” and values of trations of inhalable particulates areas in Sumatra. Although PM10 301 to 500 as “hazardous.” Values (PM10) at hospitals in the Kuala levels only reached an average high of 501 or more are considered to Lumpur area and for the state of of 69 µg/m3 during September, pose risks of “significant harm.” Sarawak.94 In early October, analysis of health data for the period These high values were caused by Malaysia’s deputy health minister “showed elevated and widespread elevated levels of suspended parti- told members of Parliament that short-term respiratory and cardio- cles in the air.91 Normal nonhaze there had been a 65-percent vascular health effects in the same 3 PM10 levels are about 50 µg/m in increase in asthma cases recently period. Approximately 20,000 visits Kuching and 65 µg/m3 in Kuala and that conjunctivitis cases had and 1,000 admitted cases are esti- Lumpur. At the height of the haze risen by 61 percent among adults mated as a lower end of excess these levels went as high as 931 and by 44 percent among children.95 health effects from the 1997 haze in µg/m3 in Kuching and 421 µg/m3 southern Thailand. The number in Kuala Lumpur.92 may increase or double if visits or admissions in private health facilities are included.”97

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 20 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE V. DIRECT MEASURES TO COUNTER FUTURE FIRE OUTBREAKS: RECOMMENDATIONS

s stated at the outset, the Following this advice, this ᔢ How much of each vegetation NGOs played an important most effective policy chapter recommends steps directly type burned? role in both monitoring fire impacts A reform measures that related to fire prediction and sup- ᔢ What are the relationships and distributing assistance to fire Indonesia can take to prevent pression that the government and among fire occurrence, vegetation and haze victims during 1997–98, another fire catastrophe during the its supporting donor agencies can type, land use, and land ownership? and at least some government Specifically, what constellation of next El Niño-induced drought are and should carry out immediately. 98 agencies accepted NGOs as full part- economic incentives, property Part II then moves on to the broader essentially congruent with the rights, land and forest exploitation ners in dealing with the disaster. broader forest policy reform agenda forest policy reform agenda that is practices, and human settlement With the fire emergency ended for discussed in Part II of this report. the context for effective fire control. patterns was most conducive to the the time being, government and This does not mean that incremen- ignition and spread of the fires? donor efforts have gone back to tal and technical steps to deal with ᔢ Study and learn from the ᔢ What human actions directly “business as usual,” with NGOs left the proximate causes of forest and 1997–98 fires. caused or exacerbated the fires; out of decisionmaking processes, brush fires in Indonesia should not Although a commendable what categories of people or firms except for token “consultations” be taken; such steps are urgently effort was made to study the were linked to each type of action; from time to time. The valuable needed, and must be integrated into impacts of the 1982–83 fires, many and what were their motivations? role of NGOs should be more for- ᔢ the larger forest reform agenda. As of the resulting policy and proce- What were the most serious mally recognized by the govern- effects on human health, forest Vayda (1998) has noted: dural recommendations were not ment and specifically funded by ecosystems, and wildlife, and what adopted by the government, and are the likely long-term impacts? donor agencies. There is a tendency . . . those that were adopted were gener- ᔢ What specific institutional and ᔢ certainly present among academics, ally not adequately funded or political factors led to the ineffective Identify high fire hazard policy analysts, and environmental- implemented. More important, government effort to prevent and areas. ists, to highlight allegedly deeper or causal factors were not thoroughly control the fires? Fire hazard is a measure of underlying causes and to be dismis- analyzed, especially the attitudes ᔢ What were the roles of drought the amount, type, and dryness of sive towards proximate and, espe- and motivations of the major and other natural factors in raising potential fuel in an area. There are cially, so-called accidental causes. . . groups thought to be responsible for fire hazard, and to what extent were two steps in identifying high fire . While it may be fairly argued that the fires. Some management needs these factors predicted and moni- hazard areas: assessment of the we need a 30-year perspective to and fire causes are already docu- tored? Would better forecasting amount and type of potential fuel, have mattered? understand why, under the Suharto mented well enough to guide initial and assessment (and prediction) of regime, vast areas of Indonesia’s pri- government actions. It is critical, drought. A fire danger rating system ᔢ Establish coordinated mary rainforests were degraded and however, that data analysis and field for monitoring fire hazard has been and flexible institutional developed by the German-funded thus became more fire-susceptible, investigations be continued and mechanisms for fire preven- Integrated Forest Fire Management future fire prevention will of course that the government incorporate the tion and suppression. need to take place not in the rain- findings into policy. The following Government responses to the Project and is already in place in 100 The system forests as they were prior to three questions have been partially 1997–98 fires were poorly coordinated East Kalimantan. proved its effectiveness in 1997, and decades of predatory resource answered in this and other reports both vertically and horizontally, other provinces prone to wildfires exploitation but rather in a world of but merit further investigation: leading to serious ineffectiveness. At should set up a similar system as degraded and more fire-susceptible the central level, the government soon as possible.101 forests [which argues for] serious needs to appoint one agency as “fire attention to the proximate causes. . . czar,” with the authority to coordinate .These two arguments are not mutu- and compel action from other ally exclusive, and policymakers, envi- agencies, particularly when a fire ronmentalists, foresters, and other emergency has been declared. A concerned people would do well to similar structure needs to be created heed both. at the provincial and district levels, especially in areas identified as having high levels of fire hazard and risk. Communications between levels of government, in technical as well as organizational terms, need to be modernized and streamlined.99

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 21 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Areas where there is likely to On oil palm, timber, and pulp In addition, technologies exist Fire education and awareness be a high level of potential fuel plantations, the government should in the United States and other campaigns are greatly needed in include logged-over concession phase in a requirement that planta- industrial countries for converting Indonesia. Both smallholders and areas, newly cleared timber and oil tions be established (and rotated) wood residues from land clearing commercial operators need to be palm plantations, and transmigra- using the “zero-burning” tech- into mulch used as fertilizer, nursery taught proper methods for conducting tion sites. As these are also areas of niques long utilized in Malaysia potting soil, and a soil enhancement controlled burns. (Traditional shifting high fire risk, they must receive spe- and accepted in principle by the medium for land reclamation.105 cultivators are already skilled in this cial attention in monitoring hazard Indonesian government.103 These technologies have not been regard, and their techniques might levels. Indonesia is already developing a tested in Indonesia and would prob- be transferable to the majority of The science for predicting system to certify logging operations, ably require initial subsidies to get Indonesia’s shifting cultivators, who major El Niño-related droughts has as discussed in Part II. Certification established. This would be a good are not from such traditional developed to the point where these of responsibly produced palm oil area to integrate into one or more cultures.) Indonesia, like other events can be foreseen months in and paper products would provide of the many donor agencies’ initia- countries, requires people who wish advance,102 as was true for Indonesia an additional incentive for firms to tives on fire control. to acquire drivers’ licenses to know in early 1997. Local drought condi- find alternatives to burning. how to drive safely. At least the same tions can vary considerably however Plantation firms must also be made ᔢ Reduce fire risk. level of care should be exercised in and need to be monitored in tan- legally and financially responsible Fire risk is the measure of the granting people permission to set dem with potential fuel loads. for the actions of contractors hired probability that fuel will ignite. The fires. to clear their lands. And a strong level of risk is usually related to Children need to be targeted ᔢ Reduce fire hazard by policy commitment to siting planta- negligent or deliberate human action, as well, through the school system. reducing logging and land- tions only on already degraded land and reducing fire risk is therefore a The careless use of fire is a learned clearing waste. would help as well. matter of managing people and behavior, transmitted from genera- Fire hazard must be not only Regulatory approaches can institutions, not managing fire. The tion to generation. Fire prevention monitored but also reduced. only go so far, however. Plantation total exclusion of fire from natural awareness campaigns in the schools Drought cannot be mitigated, but firms need concrete economic vegetation and agricultural areas are an important step in ensuring quantities of potential fuel can cer- incentives to reduce potential fuel would impose economic hardship, that the next generation has a tainly be decreased. On logging loads, which will happen only when could disrupt natural ecological greater appreciation for the damage concessions, the government needs there are uses for vegetative waste processes, and is impossible to that fire can do and a greater to demand and enforce better log- more financially attractive than the achieve, in any case. But currently, knowledge of how to use it safely.107 ging practices and to change the savings derived by burning them. A the use of fire to clear vegetation Although increasing the cer- current system of taxing log pro- 1998 study by the World Bank’s and dispose of agricultural wastes is tainty and severity of criminal pun- duction to one that will provide Economic Development Institute virtually unregulated in Indonesia. ishment for unlawful use of fire is incentives to minimize the amount predicts that a wood-chip market The circumstances under not a total solution to reducing fire of waste wood left behind by log- “will soon emerge in both Sumatra which fire may be legitimately used risk, it should be part of the govern- ging operations. A great deal of ille- and Borneo due to new and for these purposes need to be clearly ment’s approach. The laws are gal logging occurs on logging expanded pulpmill operations, defined in law and policy. Within probably strict enough; the prob- concessions. Making concession which require wood supply in excess that framework, Indonesia needs to lems lie in detecting violations and holders legally and financially of existing plantation establishment introduce and strictly enforce a obtaining convictions in court. accountable for suppressing illegal and growth rates.” The study notes burning permit system. Permits Detection of violations can be logging on their concessions would that two large pulp and paper mills should specify the area to be burned, improved through strengthened help minimize fuel loads. in Sumatra are already utilizing the term for which the permit is government fire-monitoring pro- “virtually all of the wood from land valid, requirements for firebreaks grams, both on the ground and via clearing.”104 Increased incentives and other control measures, and the aerial and remote-sensing methods, for this kind of waste wood utiliza- identity of the responsible owner or and through independent citizen tion, combined with a strong “zero- manager of the land. During periods forest-monitoring efforts (discussed burning” policy and the phaseout of high fire hazard, permits should in Part II). of current policies allowing pulp not be issued, and any burning during mills to cut surrounding forest for that period should be presumed to feedstock until their plantations be in violation of the law. 106 begin to produce, could change firms’ economic calculus and sig- nificantly reduce fuel loads.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 22 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE The problems in proving lia- ᔢ Monitor and mitigate If this information is made ᔢ Freeze issuance of bility that prevent cases from being health impacts. available during periods of fire- “salvage felling” permits for successfully tried in court point to a As noted, Indonesian capacity induced pollution, people will be burned-over forest areas need for legal and procedural changes. to monitor fire-induced air pollu- able to take action to protect them- until the government can The Regional Environmental Impact tion levels proved to be extremely selves. They need to be informed, effectively monitor and Assessment Agency (BAPEDALDA) in weak in 1997–98. It needs to be however, on what actions to take. enforce implementation of East Kalimantan, for example, substantially upgraded over the next In 1997–98 a great deal of atten- permit provisions and restrictions. obtained strong evidence of unlawful few years. Relatively simple and tion was focused on the distribution Indonesian regulations allow burning against three oil palm inexpensive technologies exist for of ordinary surgical masks, but logging firms to conduct limited plantation firms in early 1998, monitoring the levels and composi- these do not block inhalation of the “salvage felling” in burned-over including extensive eyewitness tion of pollution from fires. fine particles that are of most con- forest areas. Following on the 1998 reports and photographic evidence. Monitoring capacity should be cern, and the kind of mask that fires in East Kalimantan, however, But, in May 1998, the provincial developed particularly in those does block such particles is probably logging companies have blatantly police made it clear that they would areas that were shown to be at too expensive for mass public use in abused these regulations, using the drop their investigation of the firms, greatest risk of high pollution levels Indonesia. Simple measures such “salvage felling” exception to cut ostensibly because there was not in 1997–98. Monitoring, however, as remaining indoors and avoiding large areas of undamaged forest enough proof to take them to requires much more than wider dis- strenuous exertion are more realis- rather than to conduct a final cut of court.108 Whether this was an semination and use of monitoring tic self-help options.110 truly damaged areas. Despite policy evidentiary problem or a simple case devices. Monitoring stations need to Since haze greatly reduces vis- statements to the contrary, the gov- of collusion between the police and be staffed with well-trained techni- ibility, risks of transportation acci- ernment has done nothing to the firms is unclear. 109 cians, and systems need to be put in dents rise dramatically, as was the enforce these salvage regulations. place to ensure that data can be case in 1997–98. During such At the same time, there are in fact rapidly collected, analyzed, and times, the public—and public more than 1 million ha of severely made available to relevant agencies, transportation operators—should be damaged forests in East Kalimantan the press, and the public. Hospitals encouraged to avoid all unnecessary where no action at all has been and health clinics in high-risk travel and to take extra precautions taken, whether salvage felling or areas should ensure that their staff when driving or when piloting river rehabilitation efforts.111 Until keep accurate records of haze-related and seagoing vessels. effective monitoring and enforcement complaints and admissions. can be carried out, issuance of “salvage felling” permits should be stopped, and logging firms should be prohibited from conducting such operations.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 23 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE hose who do not learn from Given the dramatic negative history, it is often said, are Despite Indonesian decrees against the use of fire to clear impacts of the 1997–98 fires on T condemned to repeat it. land and international principles against causing environ- neighboring countries, these mat- Twenty El Niño episodes have mental harm to neighboring countries, little has changed . . . ters can no longer be considered occurred since 1877. There is cur- The fires and haze have their roots in cronyism and nepo- purely domestic policy issues. Even rently much debate about whether tism amongst corporate citizens–-the same problems that ASEAN—legendarily cautious about the frequency and intensity of these continue to beset relations between government and busi- “interference” in member-states’ episodes are increasing. A compre- ness in Indonesia and which contributed to Mr. Suharto’s “internal affairs”—has systemati- hensive statistical analysis conducted downfall. Laws and decrees against the use of fires to clear cally taken up the subject of in 1997112 concluded that the land are on the books, but remain unenforced. Indonesia’s forest fires.114 When the tendency toward more El Niño deliberate actions, or negligent events—and related droughts in Simon S.C. Tay, inaction, of one government poses a Indonesia—since the late 1970s is Chairman serious threat to the health and highly unusual and is unlikely to Singapore Institute of International Affairs welfare of citizens in neighboring be accounted for solely by natural International Herald Tribune, August 31, 1999 countries, both the governments of variability. Prudence dictates that those countries and the international policymakers should assume that community at large have the right another severe El Niño-triggered Each El Niño-related fire Most Indonesians, govern- and duty to demand action. drought will occur in Indonesia episode from 1982–83 to the pre- ments and residents of neighboring If the government of within the next several years and sent has triggered calls for govern- countries, and the global commu- Indonesia takes action forthrightly, should act accordingly. ment action. In recent years, foreign nity now believe that rapid and firm it can and should expect the contin- governments and multilateral action must be taken to control the ued financial and political support donor agencies have provided sub- indiscriminate and careless use of of the international community. If stantial financial and technical fire in Indonesia, reduce anthro- the government does not do so, and assistance for fire monitoring, pre- pogenic fire hazard and risk factors, the forests of Indonesia repeatedly vention, and suppression.113 This and improve the nation's ability to burst into flames, polluting the air assistance had little or no effect on manage fire by developing appro- and blotting out the sun across the severity of the 1997–98 fires priate policies and laws for preven- Southeast Asia in coming years, because the Indonesian government tion, preparedness, and suppression. Indonesia must expect anger failed to heed advice or take mea- greater than that occasioned by the sures to reduce fire risk and hazard fires of 1997–98 and the possibility through improved land manage- of substantial international political ment and agricultural practices. and economic sanctions.115 The renewed outbreak of fires in mid-1999—and the government’s failure once again to respond to them effectively—shows that little has changed in this regard.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 24 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE NOTES FOR PART I

1 “Indonesian haze hits hazardous lev- 7 Goldammer and Siebert, 1990. 34 The rural impacts of the 1997 currency 49 Ferrari, 1997. els.” AFP, August 4, 1999. devaluation varied a great deal between 8 Verstappen, 1980. areas. In regions where export commodities 50 “Wound in the World,” Asiaweek, July 2 “Haze from Indonesian forest and constitute a significant proportion of the 13, 1984, p. 43. ground fires creeps over south Borneo,” AFP, 9 Kershaw, 1994. local economy, farmers received a windfall September 20, 1999. from the devaluation. In areas where this 51 “Bob Hasan: ‘Bodoh, Pengusaha Hutan 10 Michielsen, 1882. was not the case, however, the rising prices Membakar Hutan’” [Bob Hasan: ‘It would be 3 Forest Fire Prevention and Control had severe negative economic impacts. See stupid for loggers to burn the forest’], Project, “Current Sumatra Fire Situation,” 11 Whitmore, 1990. Poppele, Sumarto, and Pritchett, 1999. Kompas, October 10, 1997. updated August 31, 1999. Available online at: http://www.mdp.co.id/ffpcp/overvw2.htm; 12 Giesen, 1996. 35 “Borneo Ablaze,” BBC, February 20, 52 Vidal, 1997. “Tahun 2000 hutan Sumatera akan kembali 1998. terbakar.” [“Sumatra’s forests will burn 13 Bruenig, 1996. 53 “Perusahaan Pembakar Hutan Jadi again in 2000.”] Republika, July 28, 1999. 36 “Renewed Indonesia Fires Worry 176,” [“176 Firms Have Set Forest Fires”] 14 Johns, 1989. Southeast Asia,” International Herald Republika, September 18, 1997. 4 In Transparency International’s 1998 Tribune, February 13, 1998. Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a “poll 15 Schindler, Thoma, and Panzer, 1989: 54 “Dephut suda Cabut 166 IPK,” of polls” on perceptions of the level of cor- 68–70. 37 “Smog decends as fires rage again,” [“Forestry Ministry Cancels 166 Timber ruption in 85 countries, Indonesia ranked The Age, February 22, 1998. Cutting Licenses”] Suara Pembaruan, 80th, nearly as low as Nigeria and Tanzania, 16 Ibid.: 70. October 8, 1997. and only marginally ahead of the three low- 38 International Herald Tribune, April est-ranking countries, Honduras, Paraguay, 17 Ibid. 22, 1998. 55 “Kebakaran Makin Hebat Penanganan and Cameroon. The CPI for Indonesia was Tetap Sama,” [“The Fires Increase but based on a composite of 10 separate polls of 18 Ibid.: 75. 39 Kompas Online, April 18, 1998. Response Remains the Same”] Kompas, businessmen concerning their perceptions of October 15, 1997. corruption. For further information, see 19 Mackie, 1984. 40 “Minister: Fires Out of Control in http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/in Indonesia,” Reuters, April 14, 1998. 56 The meeting was attended by the minis- dex.html. 20 Vayda, Colfer, and Brotokusomo, 1980. ters of information, forestry, agriculture, 41 “Forest Fires Low Priority Says transmigration, public works, and trans- 5 In the early 1990s, for example, the 21 Pangestu, 1989: 155. Minister,” South China Morning Post, April portation. World Bank was pressing for a number of 21, 1998. timber concession management reforms, 22 Schindler, Thoma, and Panzer, 1989. 57 “Environment Agency Denies El Niño including performance bonds, auctioning of 42 “Forests Die as Borneo Prays for Rain: Responsible for Fires,” Indonesian concessions, changes in the ways stumpage 23 Ibid.: 113. Drought Has Turned Forest into Tinder,” Observer, November 13, 1997. fees are paid, and other measures. At the International Herald Tribune, April 20, 1998. time, the Forestry Ministry, flush with cash 24 Ibid.: 113. 58 Dennis, 1998. and investments, resisted these reforms and 43 “Dry season boosts smog fear in S.E. essentially ended the World Bank’s forest sec- 25 BAPPENAS, 1999. Asia,” Reuters, May 22, 1998. 59 WWF Indonesia Programme and tor work in the midst of the preparation of a EEPSEA, 1998. large forest sector loan, the third in a series. 26 State Ministry for Environment and 44 The European Union-funded Forest Fire In negotiating the International Monetary UNDP, 1998. Prevention and Control Project picked up Fund–World Bank–Asian Development Bank 294 hot spots in the provinces of North 60 State Ministry for Environment and $43 billion economic bailout package during 27 “An Act of God,” The Economist, July Sumatra, Jambi, Riau, and South Sumatra UNDP, 1998. the first part of 1998, however, the govern- 19, 1997: 77–79. on November 24, 1998. The German-funded ment essentially committed to implementing Integrated Forest Fire Management Project 61 BAPPENAS, 1999. much of the World Bank’s long-standing 28 State Ministry for Environment and detected 41 hot spots in East Kalimantan on reform agenda as a condition of the bailout UNDP, 1998. October 23, 1998. 62 “Smog Cut Sun to Malaysia Rubber,” package. Reuters, September 25, 1998. 29 “Pemda Riau Membiarkan Kasus 45 “KC Hopes to Identify Cause of Sudden 6 The Indonesian government has adopted Pembakaran Hutan” [ Riau provincial gov- Haze,” Straits Times, December 1, 1998. 63 Yeager and Fredriksson, 1999. the term “forest and land fires” for the type ernment ignoring forest arsonist cases], of fires that ravaged the country in 1997–98 Republika, July 29, 1999. 46 “Sultan’s Brunei Palace Invisible in 64 BAPPENAS, 1999. to emphasize the fact that many of the fires Haze,” Associated Press, April 11, 1998. actually occur in areas that have been 30 BAPPENAS, 1999. 65 Nicholls, 1993. cleared of forest vegetation. Indeed, it is this 47 “Malaysian TV News Cautioned to Stay process of agricultural clearing that is a 31 Ibid.: 91. Quiet on Haze,” Associated Press, April 21, 66 “Rains Bring Hope, Concern to major cause of the fires. For purposes of this 1998. Indonesian Commodities,” Reuters, October report, “forest fires” should be taken to mean 32 David Wall, personal communication, 1, 1998. fires occurring either in forests or in areas 1998. 48 “Haze: Air Quality an ‘Official Secret.’” recently cleared of forest vegetation for agri- South China Morning Post, August 7, 1999. 67 Wirawan, 1993. cultural purposes. 33 ASEAN, 1997.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 25 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE 68 Boer, 1989. 84 For example, South Kalimantan’s capi- 99 For details on how communications 110 GTZ, 1998. tal, , sits on the south coast, systems for fire prevention and suppression 69 Leitch, Flinn, and van de Graaff, 1983. where prevailing winds in September- can be improved, see Hansen, 1997. 111 Personal communication, GTZ November 1997 blow from the sea. In IFFM/SFMP, Samarinda, Indonesia, October 70 Grip, 1986. October the city was relatively clear during a 100 Pickford, 1995; Ridder, 1995. 23, 1999. visit by one of the authors, while only 40 km 71 Wirawan, 1993. away in the interior the haze was so thick 101 Bird, 1997. 112 Trenberth and Hoar, 1997. that the sun was completely blotted out at 72 Wirawan, 1993. midday and visibility was reduced to 30 m or 102 Goldammer, 1997; see also Goldammer 113 For a review of donor-funded fire projects less. and Price, 1997. in Indonesia, see Dennis, 1998. 73 Liew and others, 1998; Ramon and Wall, 1998. 85 Cited in National Institute of Health 103 On zero-burning techniques for oil palm 114 See “Joint Press Statement, Fifth ASEAN Research and Development, 1998. plantation development, see Golden Hope Ministerial Meeting on Haze, Malaysia, 30 74 Rieley and Page, 1997. Plantations Berhad, 1997; Wakker, 1998. July, 1998.” ASEAN efforts to develop a 86 Ibid.: 13. regional haze action plan were funded in 75 Ombrogeneous peats are “true” peat 104 Blakeney, 1998. 1999 by a $1.2 million grant from the Asian swamps with an organic accumulation 87 Iskandar, 1997: 205–31, 221. Development Bank (ADB, “Technical greater than 50 cm and receiving their water 105 Ibid. Assistance for Strengthening the Capacity of and nutrient supply from aerial deposition 88 Zuhud and Haryanto, 1994; De Beer the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to only. Almost all of the Indonesian peats are and McDermott, 1996: 59–62. 106 Prohibiting all burning during severe Prevent and Mitigate Transboundary ombrogeneous; “topogenous [<50 cm and droughts would undoubtedly visit hardship Atmospheric Pollution.” Manila, February receiving nutrients from river flow] peat 89 “26 Found Dead in S. Kalimantan Boat on traditional shifting cultivators, who would 1998, TAR:OTH 32019). A related ADB grant occurs only in a few isolated locations and is Crash,” Jakarta Post, October 22, 1997. be effectively prevented from planting their of $1.2 million funded specific activities in comparatively insignificant” (Radjagukguk, crops under such conditions—at least where Indonesia (ADB, “Technical Assistance to the 1997). 90 “Airbus Crash on Sumatra Kills 234,” fire is an integral part of their cultivation Republic of Indonesia for Planning for Fire International Herald Tribune, September system, as is the case in many traditional Prevention and Drought Management,” 76 Diemont and others, 1997. 27–28, 1997. Indonesian societies. The inequities that Manila, March 1998, TAR: INO 31617). such a ban would inflict on traditional shift- 77 World Bank, 1999a. 91 USEPA, 1998. ing cultivators could, however, be ameliorat- 115 As fires once again spread in ed through the use of food subsidies given in Kalimantan and Sumatra in August 1999, 78 “ ‘We Are Suffocating’: No Escape for 92 Brauer, 1997. exchange for forgoing burning. This is not a Brunei was threatening to sue Indonesia the People of Jambi,” Asiaweek, October 10, perfect solution, but the Indonesian govern- (“Brunei Threatens to Sue Jakarta if Fires 1997, p. 38. 93 “Heavy Smog in Malaysia Puts Outside ment, like most other governments, regularly Not Contained,” Television Corporation of Off-Limits,” International Herald Tribune, provides a wide range of subsidies to different Singapore, July 29, 1999), and WALHI, the 79 The Meteorological and Geophysical September 20–21, 1997; “On Borneo, Anger social groups in order to achieve important Indonesian Forum for the Environment, was Agency (BMG) monitors total particulate at Lack of Haze Help,” International Herald societal objectives and could do so in this calling on Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei matter (TPM) every sixth day; the provincial Tribune, September 27–28, 1997; case during periods of extreme drought. to take Indonesia to the International Court departments of the Ministry of Health moni- “Malaysia’s Kuching Blinded as Smog Rises of Justice over its inability to prevent fires tor TPM, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, Sharply,” Reuters, September 23, 1997. 107 Indonesia already has a fire prevention and its tolerance of fire-based land clearing ozone, and carbon dioxide at weekly inter- mascot similar to “Smokey the Bear”— by forestry and plantation firms (“Experts vals; and the Ministry of Social Welfare mea- 94 Ibid. “Pongi the Orangutan.” Pongi, however, has Call for Indonesia to Face Court over Smog,” sures TPM, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, not yet been utilized in the intensive and Jakarta Post, August 6, 1999). ozone, and carbon monoxide irregularly 95 “Under the Haze, Illness Rises,” effective way that Smokey has in the United (Heil, 1998). International Herald Tribune, October 7, States. 1997. 80 Ferrari, 1997. 108 GTZ (German Technical Cooperation) 96 Singapore, 1998. Sustainable Forestry Management Project, 81 Heil, 1998. “Forestry Highlights from the Indonesian 97 Phonboon and others, 1998: 35. Press,” April/May 1998. 82 Ferrari, 1997. 98 For more detailed technical recommen- 109 Even if this were a case of police-firm 83 Ferrari, 1997. dations on preventing and suppressing forest collusion, it still points to a need for proce- and land fires, see State Ministry for dural legal reforms. The problem would not Environment, 1998; BAPPENAS, 1999. arise if the provincial environment agency possessed authority to bring a criminal case to court on its own, rather than having to convince the police to do so.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 26 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE PART II

BEYOND THE FOREST FIRES:

REFORMING INDONESIAN FOREST POLICY

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE VI. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FORESTS IN THE SUHARTO ERA

great deal of reporting on much more prone to accidental fires the 1997–98 fires in the The forest fires in Indonesia are the visible symptom of than the intact forest had been. In A international media con- structural problems that can only be solved by addressing addition, Indonesian peasants have veyed the impression that vast areas them at policy, legal, and institutional levels. Clearly spoken: long used fire as a defensive weapon of Indonesia’s primary rainforests the investment in costly fire emergency operations this year will against the takeover of their lands by were going up in smoke. Numerous not stop the fires nor solve the problems. They are only justified outsiders, and fire has been used as a researchers have pointed out, to the in order to save the lives and belongings of people and to protect weapon of conquest by commercial contrary, that most of the burning unique reserves of biodiversity which are global commons. interests seeking to take over forest- occurred in secondary and logged- lands from local communities.117 over forests, scrublands, plantations, Gerhard Dieterle, In short, the fires of 1997–98 and agricultural plots.116 Viewed in Haze Emergency Coordinator, were the logical and inevitable a time-bounded perspective, this is German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), result of long-standing struggles true: at the time the fires started, the Indonesia, April 23, 1998 over the control of forestlands and areas that burned were, for the most resources and a reflection of the part, not primary forest. imbalances and abuses of power that But almost all of the areas Since the beginning of the one region after another. Typically, characterized New Order natural that burned in 1997–98 had, in Suharto regime in the late 1960s, a large and poorly managed timber resource policies for three decades. fact, been covered by primary rain- progression of bad policies and concessions first open the forest and The result is a situation in which forest as recently as 30 years ago. practices concerning land and provide access via logging roads. vast areas of degraded, fire-prone (See Box 9.) Narrowing the per- resource allocation and use has brought Illegal loggers and small slash-and- forestlands already exist and spective to the situation circa about rapid forest degradation and burn farmers soon follow, complet- processes are at work that are August 1997 leaves us unable to the wholesale conversion of many ing the degradation begun by poor increasing the amount of such explain the factors that degraded forested areas to either agricultural harvesting practices. The areas thus degraded land. and cleared these vast areas of pri- land or to unproductive and biolog- degraded are then converted to tim- mary rainforest and reduced them ically impoverished brushland and ber or agricultural plantations or to to such a fire-prone state. We are grassland. These factors have inter- transmigration resettlement sites. then also unable to explain why so acted synergistically to open and Fire is the cheapest way to clear the many of the fires were set intention- destroy the country’s forest frontier in remaining vegetation, which is also ally and why so little was done to prevent or extinguish them.

9 THE FORESTS OF KALIMANTAN AND SUMATRA BEFORE THE SUHARTO ERA

Until the mid-20th Century, Century, the Dutch colonial administration and South Kalimantan, and limited timber During the violent years of World Sumatra and Kalimantan were for the began a long-running debate on the right harvesting in Kalimantan, the forests War II and the subsequent turbulence of most part forest-covered. They were only of forest-dwelling communities to harvest remained unaffected by commercial the independence movement and the early sparsely populated by forest dwellers who and sell nontimber forest products versus exploitation until the late 1960s. This is postindependence period, the forests of the subsisted by hunting, practicing swidden the right of the state to control and tax not to say that the forests were untouched outer islands were not logged, due to political agriculture, and gathering food and natur- these products.1 At that time, however, or that the two islands shared the same and economic instability. After World War II, al products from the forests. Since some of timber from the interior forests was not land-use history; land-use practices and rainforests began to be harvested elsewhere in those forest products were in demand in valuable enough to justify the cost of har- population densities of forest dwellers Southeast Asia, and demand grew for timber Java, other parts of Asia, and later Europe, vesting it and transporting it to market. developed differently on Kalimantan and species of the dipterocarp family. The chain trade networks developed on major river Several firms attempted to log the most on Sumatra. In general, Sumatra led saw, together with modern harvesting and road- systems, usually under the control of a accessible forests during the later colonial Kalimantan in growth of rural population building equipment, made logging tropical ruler based at a trading center at the river’s period, but only a few relatively small tim- density, intensification of agriculture, and rainforests technically feasible and profitable.2 mouth. Forest-dwelling communities ber concessions were commercially viable. orientation toward market crops. Within established use rights to large areas for Aside from the establishment of Kalimantan, West and South Kalimantan Notes: hunting and collecting. tobacco and rubber plantations in eastern developed more rapidly than Central and 1. Potter, 1988.

Around the beginning of the 20th Sumatra, oil and coal extraction in East East Kalimantan. 2. Whitmore, 1984.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 28 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE The four most important factors All four of these factors are LOGGING POLICIES AND Roads, towns, and other infra- in the recent and ongoing degradation animated by the same cross-cutting PRACTICES IN THE structure were built in Sumatra and of Indonesia’s forests are: characteristics of Suharto-era natural SUHARTO ERA Kalimantan in the wake of the timber resources policy: When the Suharto government bonanza, and the populations of ᔢ the logging industry, which since came to power in the mid-1960s, these islands grew substantially. the early 1970s has laid claim to nearly ᔢ centralized, top-down decision- economic planners took immediate The population of East Kalimantan, two-thirds of the nation’s land area; making processes made by sectoral steps to develop Indonesia’s weak where a simultaneous oil boom was ᔢ the government’s push, since bureaucracies strongly biased toward economy and began to develop the occurring, doubled between 1970 1990, toward rapid development of the interests of a small group of legal framework to permit private and 1980, transforming the land- industrial timber plantations to supply businessmen with close ties to the raw materials for the growing pulp firms to harvest and export timber. scape as agricultural settlers fol- Suharto family and other members 123 and paper industry; of the ruling circle; Sumatra and Kalimantan were the lowed the loggers into the forests. ᔢ the rapid development of oil ᔢ lack of effective legal or first targets of forest exploitation The timber industry went palm plantations; administrative mechanisms to hold because they had the largest stocks through a period of consolidation ᔢ the government’s transmigra- bureaucrats and their corporate of commercially valuable tree species in the early 1980s when a ban on tion program, which resettles people clients accountable for violations of and were closest to Asian markets. log exports was imposed, creating a from densely populated Java onto the law, usurpation of local access The Forestry Act of 1967 pro- few enormous vertically integrated the forest frontiers of the country’s to resources, corrupt practices, and vided the legal basis for awarding timber firms that concentrated on larger, less populous islands. other abuses of power; timber harvesting rights, and many plywood production. The number of ᔢ a systematic abdication of the large 20-year concessions were plywood mills in the country grew As a result of these ill-advised central government’s role in moni- granted soon afterward. Exports of from 21 in 1979 to 101 in 1985. toring use of natural resources, in land-use policies, East Kalimantan Plywood production rose from favor of private sector “crony unprocessed logs rose dramatically has since 1985 lost the single great- 3 in 1979 to nearly 4.9 capitalists.” These interests were in the 1970s, providing foreign 624,000 m est amount of forest of any province. 3 granted large natural resource exchange, capital to build Indonesia’s million m in 1985 and to more than In 1985, satellite mapping revealed 3 emerging business empires, and 10 million m in 1993, nearly 90 that some 90 percent of the province exploitation concessions, often in collaboration with provincial governors employment. From 1969 to 1974, for percent of which was exported. At was still forested. By 1998, that figure and other local officials intent on example, nearly 11 million ha of the same time, the industry became was down to 68.5 percent, represent- promoting rapid economic growth logging concessions were granted in increasingly concentrated in the ing a loss of at least 4.5 million (and their own enrichment); East Kalimantan alone.120 Whereas hands of a small number of firms ha.118 A survey during 1998 and ᔢ policies and practices that have in 1967 only 4 million m3 of logs were with connections to the regime. By 1999 concluded that the 1997–98 steadily eroded the legitimacy and cut from Indonesian forests—mostly 1994, the top 10 groups controlled fires by themselves affected 5.2 function of customary (adat) rights for domestic use—by 1977 the total nearly 24 million ha (37 percent) million ha (see Map 4), so the total and management systems related to had risen to approximately 28 mil- of the 64 million ha of logging area of forest lost between 1985–2000 natural resources, and have thus lion m3, at least 75 percent of which concessions in the country; the share may well be significantly higher.119 deprived forest-dependent commu- nities of their long-standing access was for export.121 Gross foreign was 64 percent in timber-rich East to forest resources. exchange earnings from the forest Kalimantan. These big firms formed sector rose from $6 million in 1966 a cartel that made Indonesia the to more than $564 million in 1974. world's largest plywood producer By 1979, Indonesia was the world's and succeeded in raising interna- major tropical log producer, with a tional plywood prices.124 41 percent share ($2.1 billion) of the global market, representing a greater export volume of tropical hardwoods than all of Africa and Latin America combined.122

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 29 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE By mid-1998, more than 69 These weak forest management A 1998 analysis by the Center million ha of forest area had been institutions have resulted in inefficient The most basic problem for International Forestry Research allocated to 651 concessions. Of extraction of timber, unnecessary with the government’s (CIFOR) predicted that the economic that area, 49 percent was operated damage to the remaining trees, management of logging is crisis is likely to intensify forest by concessionaires who were in their excessive waste wood left in the forest, that land was designated degradation from logging.135 In first 20-year term and 22 percent by unnecessarily severe impacts on as production forest with early 1998, demand for Indonesian concessionaires whose term had been animal populations, soil erosion, and little knowledge of the plywood from its major markets in renewed. The remaining 29 percent stream pollution.127 Low government characteristics of the land, East Asia had collapsed, and the (21.2 million ha) remains mostly royalties on timber and weak perfor- the traditional rights of international price of plywood had in limbo: 9.5 million ha are slated mance supervision give the conces- communities already plunged from $500 per m3 in 1997 for “rehabilitation,” 8.3 million ha sionaires little incentive to reduce living there, or the con- to $300 per m3. But, in April, are reserved for as yet unallocated timber waste, mitigate environmental servation importance of demand for Indonesian plywood in “other uses” (timber and oil palm impacts, or manage their concessions forest ecosystems. China and other Asian countries plantations and transmigration sites), sustainably.128 Virtually all of the surged, while Malaysia, another and 3.3 million ha are to be restruc- lowland forest in Sumatra and most important supplier, was curtailing tured as joint private sector-state of the economically harvestable In any case, the rate of cutting its exports. Prior to the crisis and the forestry corporation concessions. lowland forest in Kalimantan has is widely thought to be much higher forest fires, the plywood sector was Overall, forest degradation from been logged, leaving behind a legacy than that officially reported. The already facing severe supply difficul- logging concessions totaled some of social and ecological disruption, World Bank sector review reported ties due to overharvesting and poor 16.6 million ha by mid-1998.125 with little thought to managing the that for every cubic meter cut, at logging practices. The forest fires The most basic problem with logged forests sustainably. least an equal amount of usable destroyed significant amounts of the the government’s management of The state-sponsored expansion wood is left behind and that at least timber stock, and, as noted above, a logging is that land was designated of the plywood industry in the 1980s 8 million m3 are left rotting in the significant supply shortfall for wood as production forest with little created considerable overcapacity in forest every year.131 In addition, illegal processors is predicted for the next knowledge of the characteristics of relation to the amount of timber logging is widespread and systematic five years. “The combined effect of the land, the traditional rights of Indonesia’s forests can sustainably in many parts of Indonesia. Illegal the low price for Indonesian plywood communities already living there, produce. In September 1998, the removals are thought to be in the and potentially high demand, and or the conservation importance of minister of forestry and plantations range of 30 million m3 per year, restricted supply resulting from the forest ecosystems. The negative predicted that the wood-processing exceeding legal cutting.132 Illegal fires means that producers will effects of uninformed land allocation industry would face an annual log timber brokers flourish throughout search for stems in ever more remote decisions were exacerbated when shortage of at least 25 million m3 the country, supplying processors who and inappropriate places. The concessions were awarded to over the next five years. As of mid- cannot obtain adequate supplies potential for increased damage in companies and individuals with no 1998, that industry officially included legally.133 Logging concession roads production forests and unauthorized experience in timber harvesting, 1,701 sawmill companies, with a often provide illegal loggers with logging in recently logged production supervised by forestry officials who combined annual production of 13.3 access to the forest, encouraged by forests and some protection forests lacked the political support, incentives, million m3, 115 plywood firms with the lack of meaningful access controls appears to be high.”136 There are and resources to provide meaningful installed capacity of 8.1 million m3, by either the logging firms or local also indications that the rising price oversight of harvesting operations.126 and 6 pulp and paper companies forestry officials. Widespread and of kerosene is causing many people with production capacity of 3.9 million systematic illegal logging in two of to turn to wood fuel. m3. Taken together, and producing Indonesia’s showplace national parks, In short, logging has been a By mid-1998, more than at full capacity, these industries need carried out in collusion with local major factor in degrading Indonesia’s 3 69 million ha of forest 57 million m of timber, while the authorities, was extensively docu- forests and will continue to be so area had been allocated officially designated annual cut for mented by a research team and unless fundamental policy reforms to 651 concessions. the next five years is set at 31.4 reported in the media during are enacted and implemented. But million m3.129 This cutting target is 1999.134 The two parks, Gunung logging has been only the first stage in fact much higher than other Leuser in northern Sumatra and in the process of deforestation. estimates of a sustainable cut. The Tanjung Puting in southern World Bank’s 1993 Indonesia Kalimantan, are the two most Forestry Sector Review, for example, important protected habitats for the argued that a realistic level would orangutan in Indonesia. be only 22 million m3 per year.130

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 30 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE INDUSTRIAL TIMBER Despite its professed intentions, Feedstock for this intensive PLANTATIONS the timber estate program has in fact Despite its professed program will eventually come from About the time of the Fourth become a powerful engine of defor- intentions, the timber short-rotation plantations on already Five-Year Development Plan estation and is currently almost totally estate program has in degraded forestlands. By 1993, 33 (1984–1989), the Indonesian devoted to providing feedstock for fact become a powerful potential pulpwood plantation government launched an ambitious the rapidly growing pulp and paper engine of deforestation. concessions of 200,000 ha to 300,000 plan to establish vast areas of industry, which is annually adding ha each had been identified, although monocultural fast-growing timber some 13 million m3 of demand that as of June 1997 the government had plantations, particularly in Sumatra would not exist without this industry.141 Indonesia’s ambitious plan to allocated only 2.63 million ha to 13 and Kalimantan. The plan was Plantations have often been estab- become a major pulp and paper firms.145 In reality, only 60,000 ha accelerated around 1990. At the lished on degraded timber concessions producer is thus multiplying indus- to 80,000 ha of each concession are outset the government justified the by the very same firms whose poor trial demands on the forest resource actually being planted with new trees. program as a way to augment logging practices degraded the forest base. Pulp production rose from 1.1 The remainder of these plantations, supplies of timber from natural forests in the first place. As the World Bank million tons in 1991 to 3.1 million usually logged-over but sometimes and promote nature conservation.137 points out, “logging operations can tons in 1996, with pulp plantation unlogged primary forest, are cut to To this ostensible end, timber plan- degrade a site with little risk of serious projects covering some 5.1 million supply the designated mill operation tation entrepreneurs have received penalty, and in the process set them- ha.143 An added 10 million tons of until the rotation planting can supply interest-free loans from the selves up to receive a license to convert new pulp capacity is planned by pulpwood.146 Demand for pulp feed- “Reforestation Fund” collected from the site so damaged into a HTI [timber 2005, according to the executive stock thus competes with timber logging concessions. In addition, plantation] or tree crop estate.”142 director of the Indonesian Pulp and demand in firms’ investment deci- under a joint program of the Ministries Paper Association, although that sions on plantations (pulp versus of Forestry and Transmigration, target is unlikely to be met in the timber species). If all planned pulp introduced in 1992, the government current climate of economic crisis.144 and paper mills actually come on can supply 40 percent of investment, stream, as much as 30 million m3 of plus labor from specially established natural forest will have been used transmigration settlements, while TABLE 4 for pulpwood by the end of 2000.147 investors supply the remaining capital. Timber Plantation Development to 1998 (hectares) By the end of 1994, almost 39 percent of ALLOCATED REALIZED BY 1998 the area planted was in transmigration Sumatra 2,148,964 893,463 estates.138 Kalimantan 2,928,414 956,261 The timber estate program got Sulawesi 255,791 85,455 off to a slow start. In the late 1980s, Maluku 64,775 77,656 the government was planning to Irian Jaya 153,250 39,996 open 1.5 million ha annually and Other 48,730 352,215 to reach a total of between 4.4 million Indonesia 5,599,924 2,404,364 ha and 6 million ha by 2000. By Source: World Bank, 1999c. 1998, 2.4 million ha had been established.139 (See Table 4.) As of May 1998, the government had approved applications for 4.6 million ha in timber and pulp plantations, nearly 70 percent of which would be for pulp production.140

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 31 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE The rapid expansion of pulp- THE OIL PALM BOOM Expansion of oil palm planta- wood and other timber plantations Palm oil, extracted from the tions is probably the largest single Expansion of oil palm has led to numerous conflicts with fruit of a species of palm originating commercial force behind deforesta- plantations is probably local communities. Although the in Africa (Elaeis guineensis), is widely tion in Indonesia; the area covered the largest single com- effects of logging concessions on used as cooking oil and as an by these plantations grew from mercial force behind local communities can be onerous, ingredient in soap, margarine, and about 843,000 ha in the mid-1980s deforestation in Indonesia. people are still able to retain some a variety of other products. Global to nearly 3 million ha in 1998.152 access to forest resources in the con- production grew from 14.7 million (See Table 5.) Of this area, 46 per- cessions. Plantations, however, and tons in 1994 to nearly 16 million cent was held by private companies, The Suharto government aimed the clear-cutting that accompanies tons in 1997. Production in that year with smallholders and older state- to reach a total of 5.5 million ha of oil them, impose a much higher level was dominated by Malaysia, the run plantations making up the palm plantations by 2000—a target of deprivation on communities that largest producer (with 50.6 percent), rest.153 Most plantations are current- that was not met. Three million ha depend on the forest areas in question and Indonesia (28.8 percent), the ly in Sumatra, but Kalimantan is have been established, and an annual for their livelihoods.148 second largest. Global production is being rapidly developed, and Irian conversion rate of 200,000 ha to As noted above, industrial timber expected to grow by more than 7 Jaya is the primary target for future 250,000 ha per year seems likely.155 plantation firms were blamed for percent annually for the foreseeable expansion. According to a recent Indonesia's oil palm industry intentionally setting fires to clear future, and by 2005 Indonesia is study, “it can be said that almost all is dominated by some of the same land in 1997. Of the 176 plantation expected to produce some 12.2 million of the existing oil palm plantation domestic conglomerates that control firms identified as culprits by the tons, or 41.4 percent of the total.151 areas result from the conversion of the logging, wood-processing, and Forestry and Environment production forest.” This is because pulp and paper industries. Just four Ministries in September 1997, 28 the procedure for acquiring forest- companies held 68 percent of the 1 (16 percent) were industrial timber land is relatively easy and the firm million ha of estates in private hands plantations.149 In light of the can clear-cut and sell standing tim- in 1997.156 There is also considerable Environment Ministry’s statement ber, a profitable side business. As of foreign investment: as of the end of that “it has been proven that 85 1997, the agreed area of production 1998, 50 foreign firms were involved percent of the fires were set by oil forest to be converted for plantations in the oil palm sector, with total palm and industrial timber planta- had reached 6.7 million ha, in addi- investments valued at $3 billion.157 tion firms,”150 one can conclude on tion to 9 million ha proposed for As with timber plantations, the the basis of that estimate that further development of tree crop rapid expansion of oil palm planta- approximately 14 percent of the fires plantations on other lands.154 tions has given rise to widespread were set to clear land for timber conflicts with local communities. plantations.

TABLE 5 Oil Palm Plantation Development in Indonesia, mid-1980s to 1998 (hectares)

OIL-PALM AREA,OIL PALM AREA, NEW OIL PALM AREA OUTSTANDING APPLICATIONS MID-1980S 1998 SINCE MID-1980S FROM DEVELOPERS, 1995 Sumatra 805,800 2,240,495 1,434,695 9,395,697 Kalimantan 0 562,751 562,751 4,760,127 Sulawesi 11,800 101,251 89,451 665,379 Maluku 0 0 0 236,314 Irian Jaya 23,300 31,080 7,780 590,992 Other 1,800 21,502 19,702 1,777 TOTAL 842,700 2,957,079 2,114,379 15,650,286

Source: World Bank, 1999c.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 32 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Indonesia's haste to expand THE TRANSMIGRATION THE MILLION-HECTARE is impossible to grow economically the industry, and the privileged PROGRAM PEAT-SWAMP PROJECT viable crops.” In addition, their high political position of the major firms, Between 1969 and 1993, IN CENTRAL KALIMANTAN rates of subsidence when the area is has made land clearing for oil palm transmigration—the government’s Beginning in 1995, the drained for crops causes “considerable the largest single forest fire risk factor program for resettling people from Suharto regime embarked on its last difficulty in the establishment of in Sumatra and Kalimantan. Former densely populated Java and Bali to and most disastrous megadevelopment successful plantation agriculture” minister of agriculture Baharsja Sumatra, Kalimantan, and the project—a scheme to transform peat particularly for “top-heavy” crops estimated that 550,000 ha could have other “outer islands”—opened 1.7 forests covering more than 1 million like oil and coconut palm.167 been cleared by burning in 1997, as million ha of agricultural land and ha in the heart of Kalimantan into a This was, nevertheless, the place this was the amount of land targeted transported some 8 million people.163 rice-growing region colonized by that Suharto decided was suitable for conversion to pulp and palm oil The program affects a much greater more than 1.5 million transmigrants for massive, intensive settlement and plantations and for agricultural area, however, due to poor site choices from Java. The region in question agricultural development. Such was land settlement schemes.158 Burning and the land-clearing practices constitutes a large part of the largest the nature of his regime that not one is attractive to plantation firms employed. A 1994 World Bank peat-swamp floodplain in western of his ministers dared point out that because it removes waste wood and evaluation of the $560 million in Indonesia and contains some of the the project was doomed to fail–-a vegetation rapidly and requires rela- loans it made to Indonesia for the oldest and deepest peat deposits on conclusion that virtually anyone tively little heavy equipment or program during the 1970s and 1980s the planet. It is home to the largest would reach after an hour’s reading technical expertise.159 concluded that land clearing was contiguous population of orangutan in the extensive literature on devel- The minister of forestry at the not carried out according to agreed in the world, as well as countless opment in tropical peat swamps.168 time, Djamaluddin Suryohadikusuma, legal guidelines. Slopes of over 8 other rare and endangered species The project, commonly known announced that 46 percent of the percent had been cleared, trees had of flora and fauna. Thousands of by its Indonesian acronym PLG, hot spots appearing on satellite been bulldozed into waterways, indigenous have lived perfectly illustrates the close linkages images on September 28, 1997, were anti-erosion measures along con- in the region for centuries, benefiting between New Order forest and land- in lands granted for plantations.160 tours had not been taken, and no from the rich fish harvests in the use policies and the fire disaster of Ironically, plantation firms suffered attempt had been made to harvest swamps and rivers and harvesting 1997-98. The regime’s ill-advised heavy losses later in 1997 and in the commercial timber left partly numerous nontimber forest products policies on forestry, plantations, 1998 as fires spread out of control burned in the field. The effects on such as rattan. transmigration, and land claims by into established plantations. In early local communities, particularly Peat swamps are complex and indigenous people all came together April 1998, the minister of state for traditional indigenous groups, have fragile ecosystems that are essentially in this debacle, causing untold environment, Juwono Sudarsono, been extremely negative. In the case unsuitable for large-scale agriculture environmental damage, extensive estimated that 160,000 ha of plan- of the forest-dwelling Kubu of Sumatra, because of their hydrology, which is human suffering, and one of the tations had been damaged in East for example, the report concluded that “very difficult to manage,” and their worst single concentrations of fires Kalimantan during the previous “there has been a major negative and extremely acidic soils on which “it in 1997, with massive releases of three months.161 A researcher probably irreversible impact.”164 carbon into the atmosphere. investigating the role of plantations Over the past decade, the in the fires found that it was not emphasis of the transmigration uncommon for local people to pur- program has shifted away from posely set fire to tree crops to protest subsistence agriculture and toward loss of their land to plantation wage labor on industrial timber firms.162 The same researcher also estates and oil palm plantations. As interviewed farmers who believed noted above, almost 39 percent of that plantation firms deliberately set the timber estate area planted lies fire to their crops to reduce the in transmigration sites,165 and some compensation owed the farmers for 956,257 ha of oil palm plantations being displaced by plantations. with a formal link to transmigration sites had been established by the end of 1995.166

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 33 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE The PLG project was promoted mostly undrinkable. And everywhere by Suharto himself and was made "How could a grossly stupid project of this magnitude hap- the land has been systematically state policy in 1995 by Presidential pen in this modern age of advanced agronomic technology and deliberately torched.” 175 Decrees No. 82 and 83. Situated in and environmental awareness in which sustainable develop- Central Kalimantan province, the ment is the watchword? The answer lies with the autocratic Meanwhile, the project had area intended for the project covered government of President Suharto..." failed spectacularly as a rice-growing about 1.4 million ha. Of this, some effort. Suharto’s 1995 decree had 500,000 ha was to be converted from Jack Rieley, Director specified that rice had to be harvested peat-swamp forest to rice and other Kalimantan Tropical Research Project from the project within two years, and crop cultivation (adding to the School of Geography, University of Nottingham, about $350 million had been spent existing 80,000 ha of rice land in United Kingdom to that end (much of it, ironically, the project area), with the remaining (Rieley, 1999) taken from the Reforestation Fund).176 areas left under forest cover. More “That is an order that must be than 700 km of large canals, 25 m obeyed,” observed peat swamp expert wide and 5–6 m deep, as well as Meanwhile, dozens of portable these fires were particularly smoky Tejoyuwono of Gadjah Mada numerous secondary and tertiary sawmills worked constantly along the and largely accounted for the intense University. “[Officials charged with canals, were to be constructed to riverbanks to turn poorer-quality haze that blanketed Malaysia’s implementing the project] have just supply irrigation water and transport. wood–-that would rot in a few years–- Sarawak state during September. If been making it up as they go along. (See Maps 5a and 5b.) Some into housing for transmigrants.173 the project was not the single largest They have ignored all established 672,000 transmigrants from Java were Fire was used systematically source of haze, it was certainly one technical procedures.”177 Because slated to be settled in the area, nearly and pervasively to clear project lands. of the largest. Yet the government the soils are unfit for agriculture, 400,000 of them by the end of 1999,169 (See Map 5c.) Hundreds of tempo- did not officially acknowledge the key transmigration site officials confided with the total eventually rising to rary migrants moved up the rivers role of the president’s pet project in to one of the authors that they had 1.75 million (350,000 families).170 and canals into the area, seeking polluting much of Southeast Asia.174 to use up to 6 tons of lime per hectare Forest clearing and construction work with the construction compa- A journalist reporting from the to improve the pH of the soil enough of canals began in late 1995, six nies or the illegal loggers and PLG area in October 1997 accurately to support crops, which still were not months before the required environ- sawmills. Many were hired by the described the devastation: growing very well. Rieley (1999) mental impact analysis (EIA) was contractors to set fires. One project reported that by mid-1999, “not one initiated. The EIA concluded that only foreman estimated that about 90 “Suharto’s grand project is today fruiting head of productive rice has about 30 percent of the project area percent of the workers moving around one of the most desolate spots on been grown and a landscape of one was at all suitable for agriculture— his canal construction site were not earth–a vast, stinking, blackened, million hectares (the size of Northern a finding ignored by the government officially working for the project. smouldering and toasted place. Ireland) lies devastated and useless.” and its contractors.171 By 1997, some By mid-1997, the combination Thousands of square kilometers of Lack of water was another 13,500 transmigrants had been of drought, large amounts of logging land are shrouded in smog, as the major problem; the poorly planned brought in, and the project area had waste, and intentional burning had earth itself burns from deep below canals had actually cut off water become a free-for-all zone for illegal created an inferno that raged across in the peat of would-be paddy fields. supplies to many planned agricultural logging facilitated by deals between huge areas of the million-hectare . . . The whole hydrology of the area areas. Ignoring the information of the companies building the project project site from July through has been affected, with the water his own subordinates—the district infrastructure (canals, transmigration November. Because of the area’s table dropping several feet. The river chief had told the press two days before sites, and roads) and small logging high concentrations of peat swamp, has turned a bright green and is that “most of the irrigation canals companies. Among the contractors in the area have gone dry”178 —the was PT. Rante Mario, owned by the governor of Central Kalimantan in president’s youngest son, and sub- early September asked, “Who says sidiaries of the Salim Group, con- “Frodo and Sam gazed out in mingled loathing and wonder on there is a lack of water? The agriculture trolled by a long-time Suharto this hateful land. All seemed ruinous and dead, a desert burned project director there has already business partner, Liem Soe Liong.172 and choked. . . . Smoke trailed on the ground and lurked in fixed the problem.”179 By October 1997, floats of hundreds its hollows, and fumes leaked from fissures in the earth.” of logs of the area’s best timber were J.R.R. Tolkien, being continuously sent downriver to The Lord of the Rings the coast from the project area.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 34 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Of the planned 2,500 ha of be included in the survey—of Rp By mid-1998, the economic rice that were to be harvested in One million hectares, one 20,910,533,000, or nearly $7 million crisis and the fall of Suharto had mid-October—with Suharto in million wounds. at mid-1997 exchange rates.183 placed the eventual fate of the PLG attendance—only 279 ha were (See Table 6.) project in question. In May 1998, growing by the end of August.180 After Graffiti in Dadahup village, When aggrieved local leaders at the request of the minister of much suspense in the local press, Central Kalimantan sent a delegation to the district head public works, a World Bank water the president did not show up for the (Bupati) to demand compensation resources engineer conducted a harvest after all; the “thick smoke” for at least some of their losses, he short survey of the PLG project area. blanketing the region made travel too Traditionally, the Dayak have told them (and the press) that “in His report described in detail the difficult, it was explained.181 Indeed, claimed an area 5 km back from both line with policy from the Center scope of the disaster caused by the by October 1, about 5,000 ha in the sides of the river as their traditional concerning this national project, project. Noting that almost all of area immediately around the two (adat) land, using it for intensive there will be no compensation the primary canals were aligned already inhabited transmigration rattan cultivation, farming, fishing, whatsoever paid,” since the project over deep and medium-depth peat areas were aflame. Local residents hunting, and collection of grasses was for the good of the people anyway. conservation areas, the engineer reported to the press that the fires had and other useful products. With the He noted, however, that the com- warned that subsidence of the peat been burning since early August but arrival of the PLG project, fully 50 plainants would be given the chance would occur rapidly near the that they had observed “no efforts percent of their land was confiscated, to become “local transmigrants” in canals, compromising their whatsoever” to put out the fires by and many areas of rattan and other the nearby transmigration site—the drainage functions and causing either the government or the project crops were destroyed by the construc- one where agriculture had almost increasing susceptibility to fire. He contractors. The PLG project director, tion of canals. Then, in mid-1997, totally failed and houses were being also noted that no information was however, told the press that this fire the fires set to clear land for the built with substandard timber.184 available on damage to wildlife was in the “small category” and project spread out of control and This pronouncement flatly contra- habitat or about the impacts on the hence not much of a problem.182 destroyed most of the rattan areas dicted a formal April 1996 agreement, local indigenous people. He con- Difficult as life has been in the in the narrow strip along the river signed by the heads of the provincial cluded by calling for a halt to fur- PLG transmigration areas, it has been that the government had spared. and district development planning ther expansion of the project and a easy compared with the suffering of Local village leaders conducted agencies, to pay compensation for complete reevaluation, including a the indigenous Dayak people in the a systematic inventory of their losses. standing rattan and other crops at new EIA. Other sobering conclu- area. The Dayaks in the seven villages Together with the Indonesian Forum stated rates.185 sions included the following: along the Mengkatip River–-the first for the Environment (WALHI), they sector to be developed within the made a conservative estimate— project area—have seen their lives since many people’s losses could not largely destroyed by the project and by the fires that it caused. Until 1996, these people had lived a relatively TABLE 6 prosperous life practicing traditional Losses Incurred by Seven Villages in the Mengkatip Watershed agriculture, cultivating and selling Resulting from Land Appropriation and Fires Associated with the Million-Hectare Rice Project large quantities of rattan from carefully tended forest gardens, and NATURAL RESOURCE AMOUNT ANNUAL PRODUCTION FINANCIAL LOSS (RUPIAH) exploiting the bountiful fish stocks Rattan burned 3,492 ha 17,463 tons 4,017,375,000 found in peat-swamp pools (beje). Rattan confiscated 4,070 ha 20,351 tons 4,680,667,000 When construction of the PLG canals Fruit tree orchards 226,870 m3 6,816,111,000 and the associated land clearing Fishponds confiscated 487 tons 487 tons 730,500,000 began in April 1996, the first result Fishponds burned or dried up 1,200 tons 1,200 tons 1,800,000,000 was that the beje dried up and the Purun grass 75 stands 432 bundles/ ha 1,701,000,000 fish died. The massive runoff of lime Rice fields 382 ha 764 tons 1,146,000,000 from the transmigration sites turned Rubber 504 ha 5 tons 18,900,000 the Mengkatip River bright green, TOTAL Rp 20,910,553,000 and, according to local fishermen, all US$6,970,184a but two species of the formerly plentiful Note: a. Calculated on a rate of Rp 3,000 = $1, the exchange rate in mid-1997. river fish stocks completely vanished. Source: WALHI, 1999.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 35 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE “The whole water system needs “The channels have not, and The following month, the mention has been made of rehabili- to be redesigned and made compatible never could function, owing to the minister for transmigration and tating the nearly one million with soil and topographic constraints. contours of the land surface and the resettlement of forest encroachers hectares that is a “wasteland with It is not unlikely that—to reverse constraining physical properties of confirmed to the press that reevalu- little prospect for either economic the damage done—the major the peat itself. After only two years ation of the project was under way. development or hydrological and canals will have to be filled in . . . the main channels are losing their But rather than announcing the wildlife conservation.”192 And no At least Rp1.5 trillion ($500 water, their banks are collapsing ecological restoration and careful plans have been announced to million) has been spent on the pro- and they are silting up with peat assessment favored by the World compensate local communities for ject to date. Redesign of the project mud. They are already in a state of Bank’s evaluator, or the complete the immense losses they have suffered. means an even greater expenditure disrepair but are still being used as halt and payment of reparations In mid-1999, however, the than ever foreseen. At the same time conduits along which people gain demanded by the local people, he Indonesian Forum for Environment the agricultural area will be reduced access into the interior. As a result stated that the areas originally slated (WALHI) brought a lawsuit against to below 500,000 ha while rice yields all remaining timber is being for rice and other food crops would be the government, including the pres- and agricultural economics are removed and, in the process, debris offered to foreign investors to develop ident and eight cabinet ministers, uncertain. No benefit-cost engineer- is set alight and the surface peat oil palm plantations. “Right now, we seeking damages for the destruction ing-economic and sensitivity analy- catches fire generating the dense already have one Japanese investor caused by the PLG project. The suit sis has been undertaken to date, unhealthy haze that has beset who is interested. . . . We have to alleges that the project misappropri- especially one that includes settle- Southeast Asia in recent years.” 188 admit that this step will be difficult, ated Rp 527.2 billion (US$65.9 mil- ment and environmental mitigation because our NGOs are fierce. But lion) from the Reforestation Fund, costs as well as other irreversible In June 1998, the minister for according to me, exploiting the peat while ignoring an environmental losses. GOI [Government of transmigration and resettlement of forests [for oil palm] constitutes impact analysis and the aspirations Indonesia] owes itself such an forest encroachers (the actual name nature conservation.”191 of local indigenous communities.193 analysis in order to determine the of the ministry) announced that the As criticism of the project At this writing the case is in progress. desirability of further major expen- government would resurvey the whole mounted—and the government ran The wasteland left in the wake diture on this project.”186 project area before making a decision out of funds due to the economic of the PLG project has set the stage about the project. He acknowledged crisis—then-President Habibie for another massive conflagration Further analysis of the pro- the numerous calls to halt the project finally issued a decree (No. in the next long dry season. ject’s canal system has revealed that (based largely on the findings of the 80/1999) in July 1999 that formally Indeed, fires broke out again in the rather than irrigating the peat World Bank survey) but argued that recognized the failure of PLG, PLG area in August 1999; the media areas, the canals have served to sys- “if we stop the project just like that, revoked Suharto’s 1995 decrees, and blamed farmers who were burning tematically drain their moisture it would be the same as throwing essentially ended the project in its waste from earlier land clearance to into the sea because the land’s away Rp1.4 trillion.”189 present form. Future development get rid of rats threatening their rice topography was not taken into In August 1998, over 120 of the devastated PLG area has been harvests.194 It seems more likely, account.187 As a result, the water representatives from communities incorporated into development of a however, that this renewed burning table is falling, the remaining vege- whose livelihoods had been destroyed surrounding 2.8 million ha “eco- was at least in part a continuation tation is dying off, and the peat is by the project (including many nomic development zone” estab- of the cycle of illegal logging, burn- shrinking by 1 to 2 centimeters per from the Mengkatip River area) lished by Presidential Decree No. ing, and land clearing by commer- year—releasing large amounts of occupied local government offices 170 in 1998. Like PLG, the overrid- cial interests that has characterized carbon and increasing fire risk as in the Central Kalimantan capital ing premise in this new strategy is the area since 1996. the land dries out. Poor design, of Palangkaraya for a full week. that of land conversion to food construction and maintenance have They demanded that the project be crops and plantations, especially oil also resulted in rapid silting-up of halted, all lands returned to their palm and rubber. There is little ref- the canals, and many will be filled rightful owners, damaged ecosystems erence to environmental protection, in with peat within five years. In restored, and compensation paid for and what is mentioned, according the words of another expert: local financial losses. Local to Rieley (1999), is “inappropriate, government officials replied that the insufficient and of low priority.” No project was run by the central, not the local, government and so was not their affair.190

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 36 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE 10 MEGAPROJECT MADNESS: THE MAMBERAMO BASIN PROJECT IN IRIAN JAYA The Mamberamo basin is a huge River through a series of large dams to Indonesian and foreign investors, and pre- in the hands of the new government that river system of more than 7.7 million ha produce electricity that will transform the liminary studies are now in progress. came to power in October 1999, which is stretching from the central mountains of region. Upstream areas will be used for dams, Reports from the region state that the likely to be far more skeptical than its pre- Irian Jaya across lowlands and marshes to agroindustry, and logging, while industrial process of land appropriation has already decessor: In his first week in office, President the north coast. Most of the area is still estates, new settlements, and transport and begun, with the authorities using bribery, Wahid heaped scorn on another of ex- covered with tropical rainforest, although other infrastructure will be created down- threats, and trickery to take land from President Habibie’s hi-tech megaprojects, two-thirds has been allocated to timber or stream. Plans include a steelworks, metal local people. Some foreign investors have the development of an Indonesian aircraft plantation concessions. Its unique wildlife smelters, a pulp and paper factory, and a reportedly expressed interest. In April 1997, industry,2 and is likely to take a dim view includes crocodiles, tree kangaroos, cas- petrochemicals plant, forming the biggest a government workshop on the megapro- of the Mamberamo scheme as well. But as sowaries, parrots, and birds of paradise. industrial complex in eastern Indonesia. ject was attended by private companies the Kalimantan PLG megaproject has According to Indonesian government figures, As in the PLG disaster, the project from France, Germany, Japan, and the shown, uncontrolled land clearing for a the area has about 7,000 inhabitants, mostly area is being touted by its promoters as a Netherlands, as well as Indonesia. In project, even one that eventually fails and indigenous communities living a semino- future food supply center of national February 1998, Barnabas Suebu, a former is abandoned, can fundamentally change madic life of hunting, fishing, practicing importance, with possibly 1 million ha, to governor of Irian Jaya, announced that the ecosystem and make extensive fires horticulture, and harvesting sago palms. be irrigated from the dam scheme, set Australia, Germany, and Japan had agreed and other forms of degradation a virtual In an echo of the Central aside for rice cultivation. And as in the to invest in the project, and German and, certainty. It can only be hoped that the Kalimantan rice project (PLG) debacle, the PLG case, there are plans to resettle trans- to a lesser extent, Australian funding has lessons of the PLG project will be taken Indonesian government has set in motion migrants—about 300,000 families, or 1.5 reportedly been used to support many of seriously and that this ill-advised scheme plans to carve up Mamberamo for heavy million people—from the western parts of the feasibility studies. to pillage one of Indonesia’s last major industry, smelting, plantations, rice culti- Indonesia to provide the workforce for Despite a bad drought, Irian Jaya blocks of pristine forest will be aborted vation, and logging. Dreamed up by former agricultural projects. did not experience fires during 1997–98 before it does too much damage. President B.J. Habibie when he was minister The idea of building large dams on the same scale as Kalimantan and of science and technology, this megaproject and industrial complexes in such a geo- Sumatra, in large part because much of Source: is expected to take 20 years to complete. logically unstable zone is questionable. In the territory is still forested and the reck- Adapted from Carr, 1998. The terms of reference for the project pub- February 1996, the island of Biak off the less land conversion so common on the lished in 1996 show that the scheme, like north coast of Irian Jaya was hit by an other islands is still relatively limited. Notes: the PLG project, promises to be a logistic earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter The Mamberamo project is so 1. Agus Sugiyono, personal communication, nightmare, with 10 government departments scale. Another, registering 4.6, struck the ambitious and ill considered that it is September 21,1999.

and bodies named as executing agencies Mamberamo area in September 1997. unlikely ever to be completed. An official 2. “Indonesia’s Wahid Scorns Habibie Hi- and with 12 subprojects. Will the project actually happen? of the government’s technology office con- Tech Dreams.” Reuters, October 26, 1999. The project centers on harnessing As of mid-1998 the government had firmed in September 1999 that the project the power of the 650-km Mamberamo already held two workshops for potential had been “postponed.”1 Its future now lies

The PLG megaproject is only The project is emblematic of of Borneo, and whether it cancels the most egregious of many similar Look, if we don’t change Suharto-era policies and their similar disasters in the making projects that have degraded our ways, we won’t survive impacts on forest ecosystems and such as the Mamberamo megapro- Indonesia’s forests over the past three as a nation, all right? I forest-dependent communities, and ject and the proposed “Kakab” suc- decades and have provided the tinder hope by this time it’s it neatly sums how flawed develop- cessor to PLG, will serve as a useful and the spark for the worsening cycle clear to everybody. ment policies in the hands of an test of the extent to which the of megafires during that period. authoritarian and unaccountable reforms discussed in the next chap- Indeed, an even more implausible Sarwono Kusumaatmadja government, riddled with corrup- ter are being carried out over the megaproject has been planned for Minister of State for Environment tion, set the stage for fire disasters coming years. Irian Jaya’s 7.7 million ha October 6, 1997 like that of 1997–98. The steps that Mamberamo River basin. (See Box the government of President Wahid 10.) The suffering and losses of the takes, or fails to take, to make Mengkatip River Dayak people are amends for this disaster in the heart unique only in that the situation has attracted a larger than usual share of attention from journalists and environmental activists.195

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 37 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE VII. PROSPECTS FOR FOREST POLICY REFORM

eversing 30 years of ill- Taking immediate action to IS REAL REFORM POSSIBLE? At the same time, the economic considered forestry and address the proximate causes of A 1998 World Bank memoran- crisis has lent renewed urgency and R land-use policies and Indonesia’s periodic infernos is in no dum on forest sector reform legitimacy to policymakers’ calls for repairing the damage they have done way inconsistent with addressing the acknowledged that for the first time intensified short-term exploitation to Indonesia’s forests is a daunting much broader agenda of reforms since 1966 a consensus in favor of of the country’s natural resources, task. Much of the damage can needed to deal with the root causes sweeping reform has indeed formed to provide both food security and never be repaired within a time of the fires and other key forest among elements of the government, export income. This dynamic creates scale meaningful to humanity. The degradation processes identified in the private sector, donor institutions, further barriers to forest policy great lowland forests in much of Chapter VI. The broader policy reform and many NGOs. But neither the reforms that are accused of slowing Kalimantan and Sumatra, for agenda needs to be carried out in old systems of power and privilege recovery from the crisis and of example, are gone for good, and phases, as the World Bank suggests.199 nor the actors who benefited from hampering economic growth. countless species have been driven Some steps can be and need to be them have left the scene. In the countryside, the to extinction in the process. The taken immediately to secure the significant proportion of the populace peat-swamp forest areas devastated remaining forests from pressures “There remains a strong that cannot benefit from favorable by the million-hectare rice debacle that are intensifying as a result of the element in the forest industry, and commodity terms brought about by will remain, for all practical pur- economic crisis and to respond to the in the official forestry agencies, that currency devaluation is not waiting poses, a vast, grim monument to “a strong and growing political demand will resist reform, or at best will give for policy pronouncements on the crackpot, Stalinist-style plan to for reforms giving indigenous and it token acceptance while attempting topic. Facing massive layoffs in the reorder nature” that was “certain to other forest-dependent communities to preserve the privileges of the past. urban manufacturing and service fail because of its unmanageable greater access to the benefits that All that can be said, at this point, is sectors, and drastic rises in the prices scale and the unforgiving, little- forests provide. Other steps must be that the political predominance of an of basic commodities, millions have understood peat terrain.”196 taken immediately because of industry based on vested interest and turned to the forest as a ready source An important place to start is government pledges to the IMF as a institutionalized market distortion of income. For example, illegal with immediate measures to reduce condition of the economic bailout can now be seriously dealt with, in capture and export of wildlife, dri- fire hazards and fire risks and package. (See Box 11.) a manner that was not previously ven both by economic need and by strengthen firefighting capacities Other reforms will take a good possible.” 200 high export prices, has become an before the arrival of the next extended deal more time, in part because the epidemic unlike anything seen in drought and burning season, which issues are so complex and the changes Is substantial reform really the country in the past. “Now, it’s is likely to be associated with the being discussed are so sweeping. possible? One can only answer that back to every species for itself,” in next El Niño. Ninety-three percent Moreover, these major policy and the prospects for reforming the forest former environment minister Emil of all droughts in Indonesia institutional shifts can succeed only sector are better than they have been Salim’s words.202 between 1830 and 1953 occurred through an open and transparent for three decades but that reform is by The economic crisis has also during an El Niño event, as have process of public dialogue among no means assured. Suharto has been crippled the government’s already most of the droughts since then, competing interest groups—a ousted from office, but much of his weak capacity to supervise and including those associated with the political phenomenon that Indonesia regime and the people who have run monitor logging and plantation extensive fires of 1982–83, 1994, has not experienced in over three and profited from it—from Jakarta operations and enforce forestry laws and 1997–98.197 Recent experience decades, if ever. And finally, Indonesia to the most remote villages—are and regulations. Department bud- seems to indicate that El Niño must get its political house in order still in place. Old-guard forestry gets have been slashed across the events are occurring more frequent- so that forest policymakers who bureaucrats and the greater part of board, while the cost of travel has ly. The exceptionally long El Niño possess the mandate, political the industry oppose the reformasi increased. Simultaneously, the level event that began in 1991 peaked credibility, and long-term vision can movement to the extent that it aims of respect for (or fear of) the law–- only in 1994 and did not end until carry out a reform program. The to weaken their power and diminish or at least of those who enforce it–- early 1995, for reasons not yet well government that took power under their profits, and “both these groups that existed in the Suharto era has understood.198 This was followed, President Wahid in October 1999 still retain great control—both de largely evaporated, owing, in great just two years later, in 1997, by one has strong reformist credentials, but jure and de facto—over decisions part, to the low esteem into which of the strongest El Niños ever recorded. its capacity to actually implement determining the disposition and the Suharto regime brought “the If this El Niño frequency continues, forest and land-use policy reform is conversion of forest areas.”201 rule of law.”203 The current situa- Indonesia could begin this new mil- untested and unknown as of this tion presents parallels to what hap- lennium in flames once again unless writing. pened in the then-rich teak forests preparatory measures are taken. of Java when the Japanese conquered the island in 1942:

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 38 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE 11 FOREST POLICY REFORM CONDITIONALITIES IN THE IMF ECONOMIC BAILOUT PACKAGE

As Indonesia’s economy crashed in ᔢ An increase in the forest land tax. ᔢ linkage of forest royalties to world prices; a banking restructuring agency, a short 1997, the government opened negotiations ᔢ Direction of inflows to the Reforestation ᔢ reduction of export taxes on forest time frame was workable. Forest policies, with the IMF for a financial assistance Fund (collected as a production levy on log- products to 30 percent ad valorem imme- however, are complex, and many of the package. Agreement was initially reached ging operations) to the official government diately and to 20 percent by the end of 1998; actions mandated by the IMF, such as auc- in November 1997 on a wide-ranging set budget, rather than retention under the ᔢ introduction of an independent sys- tioning concessions, have no precedents in of basic economic and fiscal reforms that unmonitored control of the minister for tem for monitoring forest resources, including Indonesia. Thus, the deadlines for many the government agreed to undertake in forestry and other political leaders. Fund participation of local communities, by the of the forest policy-related conditions have return for assistance totaling about $40 monies had been misallocated for numerous end of 1998; been allowed to slip, although pressure to billion. The assistance was to be provided by nonreforestation projects, including the ᔢ a moratorium on issuing new logging complete the reforms continues. a consortium of donors, including the IMF, state aircraft corporation, which former licenses until these new measures are in place; It is worth noting that another set the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank President Habibie previously headed. ᔢ introduction of performance bonds of IMF-mandated reforms lifts export and (ADB), and various individual governments, ᔢ Abolition of existing forestry levies and on forest operations; and external investment restrictions on oil palm, notably Japan. their replacement by a resource rental tax. ᔢ development of sustainable forestry a move that is sure to increase forest con- The policy conditionalities and their ᔢ Removal of the restrictive forest land management targets. version. In a recent policy memo the World deadlines have been repeatedly revised since products marketing arrangements embodied Bank distanced itself from these measures, then. The changes reflect the roller-coaster in APKINDO, the exporters’ cartel run by one Some progress has been made on referring to them as “IMF-originated poli- nature of Indonesian political and economic of Suharto’s cronies, Mohamed “Bob” Hasan. implementing these conditions, but for cies,” but went on to say that those policies developments and, according to some ᔢ Reform of logging concession most, the very tight deadlines have not are not intended, and should in no way be observers, the flip-flops of the IMF and other regulations to allow for periodic review of been met. In general, Indonesia is not to interpreted, to mean that viable natural donors, who steadfastly stuck to economic stumpage charges, lengthening of blame; the unrealistic deadlines arose forest areas should be converted to oil analyses even though the mixture of the concession terms beyond the current from the political pressures on the IMF by palm. This is perhaps a well-intended economic crisis and the country’s volatile 20-year limit, and authorization to trade the governments that fund it to specify argument, but in fact those IMF-mandated politics was clearly the key dynamic that concession rights. The latter two provisions benchmarks on which to base disburse- policies are indeed intensifying pressures needed to be dealt with. (See Box 2.) were intended to give concessionaires a ment of successive tranches of funding. for conversion of natural forests, and there For one of the first times in its history of commercial incentive to practice better The IMF was understandably concerned to are virtually no restraints on such conver- prescribing structural adjustment measures forest operations and management. release funds as soon as practically and sion in the current policy environment.1 in return for emergency infusions of capital, ᔢ Competitive auctioning of concession politically possible to forestall further the IMF (and its partner institutions) in January rights. meltdown of the Indonesian economy and Source: 1998 prescribed among the conditions for the the feared regional and global “conta- World Bank, 1998b. bailout a number of forest policy reforms In April 1998, the World Bank gion” effects. But donor governments, Note: including: followed up with further policy reform sensitive to political resistance to using 1. Potter and Lee, 1998a. requirements. Specific measures proposed taxpayer money to bail out faraway foreign in the loan for the forest sector (supple- countries, demanded tangible indicators of menting or elaborating on those in the IMF reform by the recipient government. For program) were: many of the conditions, such as setting up

“The Dutch colonial government In an eerie echo of those violent desperation, anger at the government, Rebuilding the legitimacy and in Java, and the mystique that had times, mobs in East Java began looting and, in many cases, opportunistic capacity of the government bureau- permitted it to rule for nearly 150 the government-owned teak forests exploitation of the situation by well- cracy at the local level will clearly years, fell within ten days of the around several villages in August organized gangs of full-time looters, be a long and troubled process, but Japanese invasion. Forest villagers 1998. In the police operation with all parties using reformasi as such renewal will be essential for believed that the end had come to the mounted in early September in the justification for their actions.206 effective implementation of forest restrictions keeping them out of the response to the mass timber thefts, The legitimacy of Suharto-era local policy reforms at the local level. forest [and they] responded vehe- one villager was killed, several were officials has been called into question mently to the sudden change in the seriously injured, and hundreds were across the country, and thousands forest custodians. They ransacked forced to flee their homes.205 of village heads have been forced to remaining logyards, administrators’ Similar events are occurring step down.207 housing, and the forest itself.” 204 increasingly frequently across the archipelago, fueled by economic

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 39 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Despite these considerable Another group, the The 1997–98 fire catastrophe problems, there are real signs of Communication Forum for Rebuilding the legitimacy has lent additional momentum to hope that effective forest policy Community Forestry (FKKM), an and capacity of the reform. The fires marked the first reform may indeed be possible in independent group of academics, government bureaucracy time that the government officially the post-Suharto era. Already, a NGOs, forestry officials, and some at the local level will acknowledged the link between the number of broad-based groups have donor agencies, met for the first time clearly be a long and fires, with their disastrous effects, been formed to debate forest policy in June 1998 and produced a state- troubled process, but and the actions of private firms in issues and devise agendas for change. ment articulating the outlines of a such renewal will be the forestry and plantation sector— In June 1998, the minister of reformist vision. The statement, essential for effective a link that was widely reported and forestry and estate crops issued a which was delivered to the minister implementation of forest condemned within the country. In decree establishing the Committee of forestry and the parliament, policy reforms at the addition, the sharp international for the Reform of Forest and Estate argues that for reform to succeed, local level. reaction to the haze that spread Crop Development, a group composed across the region embarrassed the of officials, academic forestry experts, “First of all, parties and government. Most significant forest industry representatives, and stakeholders involved in the His statement went on to note perhaps, was that ASEAN took up several environmental NGOs. The implementation of national forest the “criminal” misappropriation of the haze problem as a legitimate committee’s mandate is sweeping, management should realize that money from the Reforestation Fund to regional issue, without objection covering the formulation of a broad the condition of the nation’s forests destroy vast areas of forest for the from Indonesia. As fires again forest policy and an institutional is now very poor, as indicated by million-hectare rice project in began to burn in mid-1999, ASEAN reform agenda and monitoring of increasing areas of cleared land, Central Kalimantan and argued that: member Brunei, concerned about progress in implementing reforms.208 land disputes, poor spatial planning, the threat to the Southeast Asian It is unclear to what extent the low productivity, limited access for “This carelessness demonstrates Games it was about to host in reform-minded views of its members local communities, and lack of gov- to us that the government has pro- August, threatened to sue Indonesia represent the general views of ernment recognition of local com- moted stupid development processes if it did not control fires on forestry officials: at least one member munities’ right to utilize the forest.” 210 which cause disasters both in terms Sumatra and Borneo. 211 and a number of observers have of forest resources and suffering for expressed frustration that recent In his report on the June 1998 the generations to come. This cata- official decisions and policy moves meeting, the Forum’s chair stated that: strophe is the result of both expert bear little resemblance to the com- consultants and the government mittee’s recommendations and “During the last three decades, apparatus adhering to inherently instead more or less perpetuate management of Indonesia’s forests flawed knowledge which has also existing policies,209 and one NGO has neither contributed to the people’s resulted in the economic crisis, politi- member has resigned in protest. welfare, especially local and indige- cal crisis, food crisis, forest fires crisis, But the very existence of this body is nous peoples, nor has it guaranteed and moral crisis.” a considerable departure from past the conservation of forest resources. practice in the ministry. The government has consciously It is worth noting that as deviated from its constitutional recently as early 1998 it would have mandate to manage forest resources been unthinkable for any but the sustainably and allocate as much as most daring environmental activitists possible for the prosperity of the to present publicly this kind of Indonesian people. The current rhetoric—which is now coming from forestry crisis is not merely the result mainstream academics in the leading of mismanagement, but rather is forestry schools and from some none other than the result of the government officials themselves. government’s adherence to the wrong paradigm of forest management.”

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 40 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Adding a realpolitik element to The new Forestry Law has pro- the pressure for forest policy reform The international community is giving Indonesia a hand in voked widespread condemnation is the package of forest sector reform its recovery from the Asian financial crisis. The forest fires, and opposition from, among others, measures agreed to by Indonesia as and the underlying economic and political policies, should a coalition of 125 NGOs and two part of the massive IMF bailout be on the international agenda. The International Monetary former ministers. Djamaluddin package. (See Box 11.) The IMF, Fund and the World Bank must see this as an issue of unjus- Suryohadikusumo, a former forestry the World Bank, and the ADB—the tified subsidies, unsustainable development and poor gover- minister, argued that “no part of three main partners financing the nance that is clearly withinin their mandate. this draft recognizes or protects the recovery initiative—need to be rights of local tribes living in the sensitive about seeming to bully Simon S.C. Tay, Chairman forests” and that the bill “will not Indonesia and raising nationalistic Singapore Institute of International Affairs change the mind-set adopted by our hackles. (, the former International Herald Tribune, timber companies of exploiting the president’s son, for example, called August 31, 1999 forests to the maximum,” noting the agreement with the IMF “neo- that logging concessions had colonialism.”212) But there can be destroyed nearly 17 million ha of no doubt that Indonesia must depend Most of the hundreds of logging Indonesian Ecolabeling Institute forests over the past three decades. on these institutions to keep the and plantation firms hold legal (LEI), the country’s official timber Former environment minister Emil country from spiraling into total contracts with the government to certification body, will be a key Salim also spoke out against the financial chaos and that they there- operate their concessions. Although institution in drawing the private bill, arguing that it would “result in fore have immense power to influence it would be possible for the current sector into the reform agenda. (See the rampant felling of trees in pro- various policy choices, comparable government to abrogate these Box 16.) Already, a number of log- tected forests and cause a boom in to their power in the early days of contracts, it is not politically or ging companies are seeking LEI the illegal timber trade.”215 In Suharto’s rule in the late 1960s. economically feasible, at least in the certification and are cleaning up another interview, Salim said, “The A key element for success will short term, and would most likely their practices to that end. whole law is very much government be to engage and enlist the private result in a massive number of court As of mid-1999, a considerable controlled, very much top down. sector in the process of reform. The cases that could drag on for years. number of new forest laws and Where is the role of the people? value of Indonesia’s forest-based In any case, it is a much wiser course regulations had been passed or were Where is the role of civil society? exports is expected to top $8 billion to provide firms that have existing under discussion, including a new It’s not there.” A World Bank official for 1999,213 and the timber, pulp, concessions and are obeying the terms Basic Forestry Law, passed by in Jakarta said that the law did not and paper industries, as well as the of their contracts with an opportunity Parliament in September 1999, and fulfill the reforms required by the fast-growing oil palm sector, will be to carry out a transition to more a new government regulation on Bank as a condition of an economic an important part of the Indonesian environmentally and socially sensitive logging and timber plantation bailout loan approved in May and economy for the foreseeable future. ways of operating, in line with reform concessions, passed in early 1999, pointed out that recommendations policies as they evolve. that included a number of the by the National Forest and Estate Such an approach does not provisions required by the IMF Crops Development Reform mean that companies that are vio- bailout conditions. An analysis by a Committee had been ignored. The lating their contracts and degrading member of the Forest and Estate official added, “We have been urg- the forest should not have their Crops Development Reform ing [the government] to set up licenses revoked—something entirely Committee, however, asserts that these some kind of consultative body within the law and the terms of their various regulations were hurriedly within the Forestry Department but agreements. But the brighter prospect passed to meet the IMF conditions and they obviously haven’t.” 216 lies in assisting progressive companies that forestry bureaucrats freely admit to change their practices toward a they will have “no implementation more sustainable and equitable model consequences.”214 of forestry. The recently formed

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 41 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOREST POLICY REFORM

With a new parliament and STABILIZE, LEGALLY PROTECT, ᔢ GRANT CLEAR LEGAL PROTEC- Unfortunately, only a very small president in power since October AND DEFEND THE REMAINING TION AS PERMANENT FOREST ESTATE percentage of this vast area is 1999, however, the fate of the new FOREST ESTATE. TO ALL REMAINING FORESTED AREAS. effectively protected. Most parks and forestry law is in doubt. A wholesale protection forests are subject to revision by the new parliament, in a ᔢ CARRY OUT AN ACCURATE On the basis of the inventory, pervasive encroachment for small- more reformist direction, is possible, INVENTORY OF VEGETATIVE COVER all remaining forest areas should be scale agriculture, conversion (legal especially if Indonesia changes its AND LAND USES LYING WITHIN THE given unambiguous legal protection or not) to plantation crops, illegal constitution to become a federal state, LEGALLY DEFINED FOREST ESTATE. as permanent forest estate not logging, wildlife poaching, and something that President Wahid has available for conversion to other uses mining. Even large, well-known spoken out in favor of. 217 A more One of Indonesia’s immediate (such as timber and oil palm parks such as Kerinci Seblat and likely scenario in the short term, priorities is to complete an accurate plantations) except in unusual Leuser in Sumatra—which together however, is that reformist pressures inventory, using both spatial and circumstances and through a represent the last relatively pristine will lead to issuance of implement- statistical methods to present the data, transparent and accountable large forest areas on the island and ing regulations that encompass a sig- of the vegetative cover lying within decisionmaking process. Conversely, have been supported with millions nificant proportion of the forest policy the 143 million ha of land officially an accurate accounting of areas that of dollars in international aid—are reform agenda promoted in 1998-99 designated as state forestlands. The are available for conversion to other being rapidly degraded. by the various forest policy reform technical difficulties are not great, uses (truly degraded forestlands and Halting the degradation of all committees and groups noted and some of the work has already lands already stripped of forest but these areas should be the ultimate above. The new law is certainly been carried out. A national forest still classified as forest) needs to be goal of Indonesian forest policy, but vague enough on many points to inventory was completed in 1995, but carried out as part of this process. in the short term, this is realistically allow for a significant degree of cre- the government has never officially impossible. Rather, as the World ativity in its legal elaboration and released the full results. There are, ᔢ STABILIZE KEY PROTECTED AREAS. Bank has recommended, the gov- its implementation in the field. however, significant gaps and needs ernment should give priority to a All in all, the climate for forest for updates. Existing data are scattered Stabilizing and defending the limited number (the World Bank policy reform is better than it has among various projects and offices; boundaries of those protected areas suggests 10) of protected areas that been in more than three decades. and significant data collected by the that are most important in preserving contain the country’s largest, rela- But, as the World Bank assessed the timber industry have been withheld representative samples of Indonesia’s tively undisturbed expanses of forest situation in its presentation to the from the public and even from the globally important biodiversity must and should initiate an intensive cam- July 1999 meeting of the donors’ Ministry of Forestry, in some cases. be given a high priority. By March paign, in collaboration with inter- Consultative Group on Indonesia The World Bank-assisted national 1998, Indonesia had (on paper) national and national conservation (CGI): forest cover mapping effort carried established 36 national parks (14.5 NGOs, to raise international funds out in 1998-99, discussed above, million ha), 177 smaller Strict for stabilizing the boundaries of “The political changes of 1998 should provide a useful baseline. Nature Reserves (2.4 million ha), 48 these areas and developing effective and 1999 have resulted in very The government should make an Wildlife Sanctuaries (3.5 million ha), protection regimes. Conflicts between important changes for forest immediate and nonnegotiable and a variety of smaller recreational protected areas and local communities resources. Government has put demand that the private sector and hunting parks totaling about 1.3 are common throughout the country, unprecedented energy into forestry publicly release, at its own expense, million ha, a total of 21.7 million ha. and efforts to reconcile community policy reform over the past year, but information on the timber industry. An additional 34.6 million ha were and conservation efforts have met there has been inadequate consulta- In turn, the government should make designated as Protection Forests due with mixed success. (See Box 12.) tion and acute uncertainty persists. the inventory public, in forms useful to their watershed values, steep slopes, This uncertainty amplifies the risk for to the academic community, the or fragile soils.219 Thus, some 56 forest resources because it induces media, NGOs, and the citizenry. million ha of the country’s forest further exploitative activity.” 218 Donor agencies and NGOs should lands—more than a quarter of its lend their support to the publication land area—are in theory off-limits The next few years thus provide of the inventory and its dissemination for any activities that degrade or an unprecedented window of oppor- to as broad an audience as possible. remove their forest cover. tunity during which the new gov- ernment, NGOs, reform-minded elements of the private sector, and the international community must act.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 42 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE 12 INTEGRATED CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN INDONESIA It has long been recognized that to be significantly enhanced as a result of At the root of the problem in Indonesia on some of the more traditional funda- traditional western models of protected current or planned ICDP activities. . . . is the fact that “parks and people” have mentals of protected area management. The areas management—the “Yellowstone” [M]any or the most immediate problems been pitted against each other in a struggle World Bank study cited above concluded that model in which all human economic faced by ICDPs reflect flaws in the basic over the small remnants of forestland that “the largest obstacle confronting ICDPs on activity is forbidden and penalized—are assumptions and planning, which are not have not been taken over by commercial the ground has been the lack of PHPA counterproductive in countries such as well-matched to the real threats and private sector interests allied with the gov- [Park Service] capacity,” and stated that Indonesia where numerous forest-depen- capacity constraints that conservation ernment—principally logging, plantation, stengthening the PHPA is clearly a key to dent communities commonly live near projects face in the field.” 2 and mining concessions. If access to these more effective forest protection. The study park boundaries or in enclaves within pro- Part of the problem with the ICDP lands currently occupied by private firms went on to note, however, that recent tected areas and have often occupied those model has been an uncritical acceptance were to be shared more equitably with “foreign technical assistance and institu- areas longer than the protected area has of the notion that local community use of local communities, as would be the case tional support have tended to substitute for existed. Accordingly, most recent conser- forest resources and protection of forest under the “community concession” model capacity development rather than to produce vation projects in Indonesia have followed biodiversity can always coexist. This has recommended in this paper, pressure on it.” Building real capacity to police park the integrated conservation and develop- led to an overemphasis on development of protected areas could be appreciably boundaries and punish poachers and illegal ment project (ICDP) model.1 local economic activity in “buffer zones” reduced. This is the most promising strat- loggers—tasks that foreign consultants or Unfortunately, the record of ICDP around protected areas, an approach egy for resolving conflicts between local NGOs cannot carry out—is a high priority. approaches to slowing degradation of pro- grounded in the dubious assumption that communities and priority protected forest tected forests in Indonesia has not been creating intensified local economic activity areas, although buffer zone approaches Notes: good. A 1997 report commissioned by the on the borders of parks will somehow keep still have a significant, if subsidiary role. 1. For a review of the theory and practice World Bank concluded that “very few of people out of it, rather than draw more In addition, the government and of ICDPs, see Wells and others, 1992; for an the ICDPs can realistically claim that bio- people into the area. the donors supporting its forest conserva- analysis of ICDPs in Asia, see Barber, 1995.

diversity conservation has been or is likely tion efforts need to put renewed emphasis 2. World Bank, 1997.

RECOGNIZE AND LEGALLY Redressing the continuous In the aftermath of the collapse For its part, the government PROTECT FOREST OWNERSHIP erosion of local and indigenous of the Suharto regime, a broad fears that if alternative sources of AND UTILIZATION BY community access to, and use of, spectrum of reformers is arguing livelihood cannot be developed for a INDIGENOUS AND FOREST- Indonesia’s forests has long been a that a reordering of the relations burgeoning and increasingly desper- DEPENDENT COMMUNITIES key objective of the Indonesian and between the government, local and ate rural population, further political AND ASSIST THEM IN international NGO community. The indigenous communities, the private chaos and civil violence may be MANAGING THE FOREST Suharto government steadfastly sector, and the forest is a central ele- sparked by rising unemployment in SUSTAINABLY AND refused to acknowledge the customary ment of a more just and sustainable the manufacturing and services sec- PRODUCTIVELY. rights of Indonesia’s numerous forest policy. The World Bank, for tors, combined with rising prices for indigenous forest-dwelling peoples example, maintains that at least 30 basic goods. Granting local commu- Once the true forest is legally (and, indeed, denied that Indonesia million people are highly dependent nities greater access to forest lands and secured, a process of reordering its had distinct, minority indigenous on forests for important aspects of their resources may thus be a tool for the uses—and users—can begin in peoples) or to recognize the plight of daily livelihood, that the economic government’s political survival, as earnest. And once there is an accurate the millions of other forest-dependent crisis is likely to increase their well as a way to visibly respond to accounting of unclaimed degraded local people impoverished by its numbers, and that any workable the growing clamor for reformasi. forestland available for other uses, logging, plantation, transmigration, forest sector reform agenda “must decisions can be made on the most and mining policies.220 give primacy to radically increased efficient and equitable distribution participation of forest-dwelling and If the state will not of those areas among various stake- adjacent communities in the man- recognize us, we will not holders. But before any zoning or agement, utilization, and actual recognize the state. allocation takes place on these lands, ownership of forests and forested the long-standing wrongs committed lands.” 221 Preamble, Decisions of the First by the Suharto government against Indonesian Indigenous Peoples’ the rights and livelihoods of indige- Congress nous and other forest-dependent Jakarta, March 21, 1999 communities must be corrected.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 43 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Key actions that need to be Indonesia’s forestry laws and be established whereby adat forests community with respect to mainte- taken on the customary ownership regulations should explicitly recognize are mapped and a written agreement nance of the forest (see Box 14), issue include the following: the principle that traditional (adat) is concluded between the Ministry of explicitly affirm the government’s communities own the forest areas Forestry and the traditional or recognition of the community’s ᔢ LEGALLY RECOGNIZE OWNERSHIP within their customary territories indigenous community, represented rights, and pledge the government’s OF FORESTS LYING WITHIN THE and have the right to utilize them by the leaders of their customary support in defending the forest CUSTOMARY TERRITORIES OF sustainably, provided that the areas institutions of governance. (See Box against encroachment and exploita- INDIGENOUS AND TRADITIONAL are maintained as permanent forest 13.) The agreement should care- tion by actors from outside the (ADAT) COMMUNITIES. estate. To this end, a process should fully specify the obligations of the community.

13 COMMUNITY MAPPING STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES

Mapping forest areas is an intrinsically Traditional communities in Indonesia discussion in early 1999,7 but it is mostly political act.1 Official Indonesian forest can, first of all, use this technology in support concerned with the decentralization of Notes: 1. “Forest maps pinpoint the location of maps establish the territorial claims of the of efforts to gain basic recognition of their functions from central to provincial and valuable and accessible timber and miner- state over 74 percent of the country’s land rights over particular forestlands. More than district government units. It makes no al resources . . [and] have been an impor- mention of negotiating boundaries with local tant tool for state authorities trying to area and demarcate the subordinate claims a map is required for this, of course—there exclude or include people within the same of a variety of concession holders who have needs to be some showing of long-term communities. Furthermore, it maintains spaces as forest resources.” (Peluso, 1995). close ties to the state apparatus and are occupancy and use, for example—but the long-standing requirement that 2. The first comprehensive forest-mapping 2 exercise in Indonesia was the development, engaged in natural resource extraction. without a georeferenced map, traditional boundaries be marked with concrete posts in 1981–85, of provincial consensus forest These maps exclude the settlements, land claims remain indeterminate and of a certain size and dimension before a land-use plans (Tata Guna Hutan resource uses, and traditional claims of difficult to press. Under the Suharto regime, forest boundary is officially demarcated.8 Kespakatan, or TGHK) that divided the for- est estate into various categories such as local communities to forest lands and even a well-made, georeferenced map Even if the regulations can be production, protection, and so on. resources. The unmapped uses and claims, supported by well-documented claims of reformed so as to accept and integrate Developed from old data, mostly without GPS-based community mapping and verification on the ground, these maps not overlaid with the official maps, pinpoint long-term traditional forest occupancy and only excluded all community claims and the myriad conflicts over forest resources use was unpersuasive in the face of unrelent- demarcation, a great deal of work is needed uses but sometimes placed whole towns that have plagued Indonesia for the past ing government hostility to recognizing such to build mapping capacity at the community within protected forest zones. A late 1980s effort, the Regional Physical Planning three decades. These conflicts must be claims under any circumstances. But times level. As Peluso (1995) notes: Program for Transmigration (RePPProt), resolved if forest management is to be made have changed, and some level of formal “While counter-mapping has some was developed from satellite and aerial more sustainable and more equitable. state recognition of traditional forestland potential to transform the role of mapping imagery to determine suitable locations for new transmigration sites and associated Utilizing community mapping techniques claims appears inevitable in the near future. from a “science of princes,” it is unlikely plantations. Although these maps dramati- and integrating them into land-use plan- Once such claims are accepted, to become “a science of the masses” simply cally improved the representation of vege- because of the level of investment required tative cover, they still did not include data ning, allocation, and management of there remains the problem of demarcating on local forestland uses and claims. forestlands is an important avenue for boundaries on the ground. Older surveying by the kind of mapping with the potential (Ibid.) progress in this regard. techniques were so slow and expensive that to challenge the authority of other maps. . . 3. See, for example, the 50 cases discussed in Poole, 1995. Community-level sketch-mapping they were effectively beyond the reach of What ultimately may be more important 4. Momberg, Atok, and Sirait, 1996. has been widely utilized for some time in almost all local communities. Indeed, the for the “masses” is not the technology 5. In 1996, the Ministry of Forestry esti- many countries as a tool for rapid rural Indonesian Ministry of Forestry, riding one itself, but the content of the maps pro- mated that of the 352,000 km of state for- est boundaries (both outer boundaries and appraisal, community forestry efforts, and of the world’s largest and most profitable duced and the way the knowledge and boundaries between functional categories) advocacy on behalf of traditional land claims timber booms, has been unable to demarcate information on the maps is distributed.” that needed demarcating, only 113,594 km (32 percent) had actually been demarcat- 5 Community mapping is not a against external threats. The advent of most of its own claims on the ground. GPS ed by 1994 (Ministry of Forestry, 1996). inexpensive and simple global positioning technology promises to make demarcation panacea, but it is an increasingly important The remainder, more than 238,000 km, is system (GPS) technology has made it pos- far less expensive and time consuming, and tool for establishing secure local claims over more than five times the circumference of the Earth. sible for such local mapping exercises to it is a simple technology that can be easily forest resources. And securing these claims 6. Poole, 1995. be georeferenced with national mapping taught. The terrain in question is a factor, is an important prerequisite for reducing 7. Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops, methodologies. Many successful examples of course: “Rivers make for fast work, while conflict over forest resources and providing 1999. 8. Poole (1995) cites a boundary demarca- exist around the globe3 and in Indonesia.4 forested mountains slow the process down.”6 incentives for their sustainable management. tion effort in the territory of Brazil’s In their efforts to challenge state forest For community mapping to become The challenge in Indonesia is to both build Kayapo tribe where the most expensive community mapping capacity and reform item in the $600,000 budget was the use of land-use allocations that ignore their own more than a sporadic pilot project phenom- helicopters to transport cement for boundary claims and interests, local communities now enon, the government’s regulations on forest government policies so that the results of markers required by Brazilian regulations. have the tools to speak the language of boundary demarcation must change. A community mapping become a part of forest dominant mapping systems and thereby new draft regulation on establishing and policy rather than a challenge to it. challenge them. demarcating forest boundaries was under

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 44 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE 14 TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS AND FOREST CONSERVATION

Proposals—whether by governments It is understandable that traditional considerations of public interest. One may These are demands that the Indonesian or by environmentalists—to recognize or communities in Indonesia would be skeptical hold full title to a house and land, for exam- government needs to consider seriously if it compensate traditional forest claims are of such restrictive arrangements: for ple, but not have the right to establish a toxic wishes to restore trust and civility to the cur- usually qualified by the assertion that such decades, they have watched while the state waste facility in the front yard. Similarly, a rently poor relationships between the state and recognition or compensation should be parceled out their territories and resources traditional community might be granted a forest-based indigenous communities. Very part of a quid pro quo arrangement in to outsiders who plundered timber and strong property right over its local forests but few communities, however, want to com- which the community agrees to certain other resources without regard for “sus- not the right to clear-cut watershed slopes, pletely cut themselves off from the modern conditions and guidelines for “sustainable tainability” and without interference by set fires during droughts, or exterminate economy and the dominant political system resource management.” For their part, the state. Now, suddenly, just as the state legally protected species of fauna and flora. and culture; rather, they seek to recapture con- advocates of indigenous rights over forests decides to recognize long-standing local For some indigenous communities trol over their traditional resources and terri- have often asserted that recognition of claims, it puts forward a whole series of with distinct cultures and territories apart tories and to ensure that their engagement such rights will invariably lead to forest restrictions on those claims. There is no from and predating the dominant culture with the dominant culture and economy is conservation, since indigenous people’s short-term solution for this problem: it will and state system—and many of these exist in within their control rather than forced on traditions predispose them to sustainable take years of good-faith actions by the state Indonesia—the issue is not the legal issue them. Most forest-dependent communities management. (This argument has been to help traditional forest communities of “property rights” but the political issue of in Indonesia are not discrete, isolated cul- very successful in recruiting environmental overcome the legacy of mistrust. “sovereignty.” The rights that communities tures seeking a “state within a state.” They activists for the indigenous rights cause.) But the assertion that “ownership is claim in such cases are more like those of seek, instead, recognition of their claims over As indigenous rights over forests are gradually ownership” is a red herring. Whether one a “state within a state” than a normal prop- resources that are integral to their economies recognized in various parts of the globe, looks to western systems of property law or erty right. That is, they seek the autonomy and cultures, respect for their cultural tradi- however, the argument is increasingly to Indonesia’s own rich legacy of traditional not only to “own” their territory but also to tions, and protection from outsiders who heard that “ownership is ownership:” if a adat property law, there are numerous shades be the legitimate political and lawmaking threaten these things. If the Indonesian gov- community’s traditional claims to a forest and varieties of “ownership” over land and authority within that territory and in external ernment can meet those expectations, negotiat- area are indeed valid, then the community resources. Property rights may be bounded relations: “The essence of hak ulayat [tra- ing for sustainable management of forest has the right to do as it pleases with the in time, restricted to certain uses, and limited ditional sovereign rights over territory] lies resources should not be so great a challenge. area, regardless of the impacts on biodiversity in many other ways. And everywhere, the in ‘autonomy’ and/or ‘sovereignty.’”1 and other factors valued by outsiders. exercise of property rights is limited by Note: 1. Zakaria, 1999.

ᔢ ESTABLISH A NEW “COMMUNITY of the forest and for carrying out monitoring systems to ensure that control, by itself, as a virtual panacea FOREST CONCESSION” RIGHT THAT MAY long-term activities such as tree the terms of the contract are met. As for environmental problems” and BE GRANTED ON STATE FORESTLANDS. planting and agroforestry on degraded discussed below, they should not be notes that “gaining control over lands. These contracts would be legally restricted to timber exploitation. long-term management of a resource Not all (or even most) forest- similar to the concessions currently While recognition of, and support may lead local people, especially if dependent communities in Indonesia given out for commercial logging for, local and indigenous forest access they have had the past experience of possess the long-standing connection and plantation operations, in the and use are increasingly seen as key booms and busts in particular forest to a particular forest area that sense that they would be for a fixed, elements of an effective reform products, not to conservation-oriented indigenous and traditional peoples renewable period of time and would strategy, it is dangerous to romanti- management but rather to their do. For these groups, a community clearly specify the rights and cize the prospects for ecologically own intensive exploitation of the forestry concession right should be responsibilities of the concessionaire. sustainable local management, even resource as long as it fetches a high available to legitimize their existing Recipients might be an organized by relatively isolated traditional price and remains fairly readily activities on state forestlands (where group of “forest farmers,” a family, communities, in a context of pervasive available.” Sanderson and Bird those activities are sustainable) and to or a whole community. As with timber global markets, ubiquitous demand (1998) have similarly warned provide them with long-term concessions, the contracts should for modern consumer goods, and against the “magic of tenure” incentives for serving as good stewards specify permissible uses of forest economic crisis. Vayda (1998) warns notion, whereby giving particular resources and establish criteria and against “regarding local people’s

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 45 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE people greater control over particular With those caveats in mind, it and local communities to gather resources is assumed to “guarantee is important that both the new legal and disseminate forest-related infor- Data collected by the better environmental outcomes.” framework for recognition of commu- mation must be strengthened. Ministry of Forestry and And the World Bank, while supporting nity forest rights and the process by It has long been recognized the private sector have long a “radical” shift in the direction of which that goal is eventually realized that data and information on forests been treated as secret and community access and control, across the Indonesian archipelago and forest policies in Indonesia are have been only reluctantly, cautions that include effective safeguards to ensure flawed and incomplete. Field data on if at all, shared with that local forest uses are in fact sustain- forest cover, deforestation, and the Indonesia’s citizens. “[T]he complexities of entitling able. This will be best accomplished impacts of logging, plantations, communities to forests, no matter through a system of government-led transmigration, and other activities how justified and urgent, cannot be oversight assisted by NGOs and the on forestlands are seriously deficient. For their part, NGOs and rushed: even in countries where members of each community. Information on the traditional forest affected local communities have long community title to large forests is management practices of millions of tried to document abuses of the law by an undisputed fact and has been in ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE forest dwellers has been sketchy and logging firms and other large-scale existence for years, or even centuries, MECHANISMS FOR INDEPEN- is often biased toward the interests of forest resource users, but their efforts the complexities, disputes and failures DENT CITIZEN MONITORING industrial forestry projects and have been piecemeal and have often to benefit some people within the OF TRENDS AND THREATS investors, with whom local commu- been hampered in the field by lack of community groupings have been RELATED TO FOREST LANDS nities are frequently in conflict. Data technical expertise and by opposition serious and potentially destructive AND RESOURCES. collected by the Ministry of Forestry from local authorities. NGOs have of the whole idea.” 222 and the private sector have long been also tried to document forestry success The current climate of refor- treated as secret and have been only stories, such as the sustainable local masi provides a chance to bolster reluctantly, if at all, shared with management of damar (Shorea spp.) the role of the institutions of civil Indonesia’s citizens. And the long- forests in the Krui area of Lampung society—NGOs and community- entrenched bureaucratic culture of Province, Sumatra, but have lacked based groups of forest-resource asal bapak senang (“keep the boss the capacity to do so systematically. users—as “watchdogs” over forest happy”) has meant that local forestry The recent effort by a number of NGOs policy and practice. But if civil soci- officials were reluctant to report poor to develop an independent forest ety is to assume an enhanced role logging concession performance, development monitoring network— in monitoring forestry policies and illegal logging, or conflicts over Forest Watch Indonesia—illustrates activities, the capacity of NGOs resource allocation and use. one strategy for developing citizen monitoring. (See Box 15.)

15 FOREST WATCH INDONESIA: AN EXPERIMENT IN CITIZEN MONITORING OF FOREST STATUS AND DEVELOPMENT

Since late 1997 a number of Indonesia's forests (type, coverage, condition, ᔢ documentation of forestry management the other, official efforts such as those Indonesian NGOs have been working infrastructure such as roads, utilization, success stories, including both well-managed proposed by the World Bank, to map current together to develop Forest Watch Indonesia human settlements, population, and logging concessions and local community forest status and monitor field performance (FWI), an independent, decentralized traditional claim areas), forest management systems. of concessions. early-warning monitoring network for ᔢ existing and planned development tracking logging, plantation development, projects (logging concessions, industrial Interest and support among NGOs Note: mining, and other large-scale development timber plantation concessions, estate crop and forest policy reformers within the 1. Forest Watch Indonesia is the national activities within and around Indonesia’s plantations, mining concessions, infra- government for the kind of independent “node” of Global Forest Watch, an initia- major remaining blocks of natural forest.1 structure projects, and transmigration forest monitoring network that FWI is tive of the World Resources Institute that FWI’s core task is to gather and analyze project areas), developing is strong. Needed now are supports development of a decentralized, information on Indonesia’s forestlands and ᔢ conflicts over forestlands and resources working linkages with sympathetic forest independent forest monitoring network resources and make it available to all interested (types of conflicts, parties involved, policymakers, technical experts, and donor spanning the major forest countries of the audiences in a useful and accessible form. Key description, location, time period, etc.), agencies. Of particular importance will be planet. Telapak Indonesia, a collaborating FWI datasets under development include: ᔢ data and analysis covering the eco- a two-way sharing of data and information partner of this report, hosts the secretariat nomic, political, and legal aspects of forest between the FWI on the one hand, and, on for Forest Watch Indonesia. ᔢ baseline data on the status of policy and related conflicts, and

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 46 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE The strong citizen participation ᔢ a centralized, pyramidal hier- Thus far, however, these and Two broad tasks have to be component in the newly launched archy and secretive processes for other dialogue processes have shown carried out in order to move the timber certification system is another making decisions about projects a Jakarta-centered bias. It is crucial current wasteful and inequitable useful example. (See Box 16.) and expenditures; that a similar process begin in key utilization of Indonesia’s natural ᔢ strong reliance on traditionally forest-resource provinces as well. forests toward sustainability and STRENGTHEN AND INTENSIFY trained professional foresters in top Provincial governments are much equity. First, the existing system THE MULTI-INTEREST management positions and a corre- less visible as policymakers than are under which timber is produced sponding lack of social science DIALOGUE ON FOREST high-level Jakarta officials, but they —both on legal timber concessions expertise and perspectives; POLICY REFORM THAT de ᔢ a close relationship between are often the ones making the and illegally—must be reformed. BEGAN IN 1998. the forestry service and the timber facto decisions about conversion of Second, the framework for natural industry, amounting in many cases forestlands to plantations and other forest utilization needs to be broad- Effective and durable forest to de facto control over policies by uses. And as pressure for decentral- ened to encompass an ecosystem sector reforms cannot take place major industry players; ization grows, the role of provincial perspective and to incorporate a without the participation and support ᔢ an urban and upper-middle-class and local governments will increase. wider range of forest resource uses of key stakeholder groups, including bias among policy-level foresters; and users than has been the case. concerned NGOs, representatives of ᔢ a strong colonial forestry tradition REFORM LOGGING To that end, the steps described indigenous and forest-dependent and background; PRACTICES AND BROADEN below need to be taken over the ᔢ peoples, the various elements of the patterns of forest sector donor FOREST UTILIZATION TO next several years. assistance that are technically based commercial forest resources sector, INCLUDE MULTIPLE USES and executed in cooperation with the ᔢ CARRY OUT FIELD-LEVEL the academic community, and rep- forestry bureaucracy—and that AND A WIDER VARIETY OF resentatives of local and national therefore tend to reinforce existing USERS. ASSESSMENTS OF ALL OPERATING government. This is a simple and structures and ways of doing things; LOGGING CONCESSIONS AND REVOKE obvious point that has been made and Commercial logging, as cur- THE LICENSES OF THOSE THAT HAVE countless times around the globe— ᔢ the belief that local land use rently practiced, causes the degrada- SUBSTANTIALLY VIOLATED THE TERMS OF THEIR CONCESSION AGREEMENTS. but it is worth noting that there has practices are destructive and the tion and eventual destruction of resulting assumption of a policing been no such process in Indonesia some 64 million ha of Indonesia’s It is widely recognized that a role to limit local access and use.223 in the past 30 years. Rather, the forests—the area allocated for great many of Indonesia’s more forest policy process has been char- production. From the perspective of The dialogue initiated by the than 400 logging concessions are acterized by: preventing fires, logging reform is violating the terms of their concession Reform Committee established by essential, for two main reasons. First, 224 the Ministry of Forestry and the agreements. One study in the early as was shown in the discussion of 1990s estimated that only 4 percent Community Forestry Forum, discussed the impacts of the 1982–1983 East above, is a hopeful sign that this of concessionaires followed the Kalimantan fires, logged-over regulations, and, in 1991, the minis- long-standing paradigm is beginning forests—particularly if large to change. These efforts need to ter of forestry himself estimated that amounts of slash are left behind— only some 10 percent of firms obeyed receive continuous support from are far more prone to burn than senior government officials, especially the law. In 1995, the head of East intact forests. Second, when produc- Kalimantan’s Forestry Service told a in the Forestry Ministry, and tion forest areas are degraded by Parliament, which is likely to play a researcher that at least “80 percent poor logging practices, they imme- [of concession holders] are liars” much stronger role in policymaking diately become targets for conver- with respect to their logging practices.225 than in the past. These groups should sion to plantations and other uses, a take advantage of the news media process that greatly increases the —now largely free of the heavy- incentives for, and probabilities of, handed censorship of the Suharto widespread use of fire to clear land. era—to get their ideas and proposals before the public.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 47 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE The legal power to revoke log- The capacity to monitor logging Given the vast areas to be Allocate concessions by auc- ging contracts for violation of their practices must be drastically improved covered and the large numbers of tion. This measure, also required operating terms is clearly spelled if poorly performing concessionaires individual concessions, these teams by the IMF agreement, will help give out in the 1970 Government are to be identified and eliminated. would have to strategically target their concessionaires incentives to main- Regulation on Forest Utilization This is a legal as well as a practical investigations toward concessions tain the value of forest resources and reiterated in the 1999 regulations matter: There are numerous cases in with especially bad reputations, under their stewardship, since they that replaced it.226 The main problems which logging firms called to account areas of high ecological value (such will have paid a substantial price to in the past have been lack of political by the Forestry Ministry have denied as those bordering important national obtain the concession and will have will on the part of the industry- the allegations and challenged the parks or watersheds), and areas the right to auction it off in the dominated Forestry Ministry and lack ministry to provide hard evidence— where concession operations are future. Originally, the IMF agreement of capacity to monitor concession something the ministry was frequently known to be the cause of social required that such a system be in performance in the field, a task that unable to do. conflicts. In making these strategic place by the end of June 1998. This is made more difficult by pervasive The independent Forest Watch decisions, the government monitoring was an unrealistic goal and was not collusion between logging firms and Indonesia monitoring initiative (see apparatus could rely in large part met, although auction options are local officials. The huge economic Box 15) is a potentially useful con- on information supplied by LEI and under active discussion in the Forestry clout of the industry, worth some $8 tribution to building capacity to by NGO initiatives such as Forest Ministry. The idea is good, but rushing billion in exports in 1999 (for timber monitor concession performance and Watch Indonesia. to implement it without adequate and pulp together), creates additional violations, but realistically, this effort discussion among stakeholders and disincentives for strong enforcement can at best only complement moni- ᔢ CHANGE THE ECONOMIC INCEN- without a period of experimentation measures, especially in the current toring by the government itself. To TIVES THAT ENCOURAGE WASTE AND may create more problems than it economic climate. that end, the World Bank has floated A “CUT-AND-RUN" MENTALITY BY solves. There must also be a clear But political will to get tougher a proposal to form three or four forest LOGGING CONCESSIONAIRES. division between those forest areas on errant logging firms seems to be operation inspection teams led by available for auction on the free Many of the timber industry’s growing. In September 1998, a top the Forestry Ministry but possibly market and those reserved for com- wasteful practices, including the official of the Forestry Ministry testi- including participation by the munity forest concessions. Local reckless use of fire, stem from the fying before Parliament was urged by Indonesian Ecolabeling Institute (LEI) communities—even with backing distorted economic incentives arising legislators to clamp down on violators. (discussed in Box 16) and other from donors and international from the current concession system. He responded that the government institutions such as NGOs and univer- NGOs—will never be able to match Reform of the concession system and had revoked the contracts of at least sity forestry faculties. Working with bids from the private sector for its taxation and pricing mechanisms 86 firms in the previous 10 years an agreed set of criteria and indicators, access to truly valuable forestlands, is a complex matter that has been (1988–98) and that many more firms these teams would carry out field and a policy that de facto restricts dealt with extensively elsewhere.228 had been fined for minor violations. inspections of concession operations. local communities to degraded Four basic measures, however, seem The legislators urged the ministry forestlands would work against the to be essential prerequisites for not only to revoke contracts but also objective of sharing greater forest- improving concession performance. to sue violators for breach of contract, based economic benefits with local pointing out that “where their con- and indigenous communities. cession permits are revoked, it is the government which in fact suffers the losses because it has to manage the damaged forests while the concession- aires have, in a way, benefited from the forests.” 227

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 48 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE 16 TIMBER CERTIFICATION IN INDONESIA: THE INDONESIAN ECOLABELING INSTITUTE (LEI) The Indonesian timber industry has LEI was officially launched in Indonesia’s onerous and complex regulatory agreement to resolve this issue and find been overtly concerned with timber certifi- September 1998. Since that time, five firms regime at about $98 million.2 If certification ways to harmonize the two systems, and cation since at least 1990. In that year, have sought certification. One operation in meant official regulatory relief, the costs of joint technical cooperation and interna- Indonesia hosted a meeting of the Sumatra has been certified, three were in the certification process might look extremely tional observation began in November International Tropical Timber Organization process as of March 1999, and one in East attractive to logging firms. One proposal 1998. LEI, for its part, wishes to achieve (ITTO) at which member states pledged Kalimantan failed due to forest fires in the currently under discussion would link the formal FSC recognition of the Indonesian that by 2000 all tropical timber in interna- concession during early 1998. degree of regulatory relief granted to a system and it believes that opening the tional trade would come from sustainably The LEI system is voluntary at present, company to the grade it received in its Indonesian system to international scrutiny managed sources. and it applies to specific forest management certification assessment. will increase its credibility. Given the close There was considerable concern in units, not entire companies. Procedures, Additional incentives arise from the substantive match between the principles Indonesia during the early 1990s that bans criteria, and indicators for all steps in the pressures for reform shaking Indonesia. It and criteria of LEI and the FSC, and and boycotts on tropical timber in importing process are spelled out in the LEI documents is becoming more and more difficult for Indonesia’s status as one of the world’s countries might mushroom into a significant mentioned above. There are essentially loggers to conduct “business as usual” in most important timber producers, it seems problem for the industry, and in 1993 the four stages to the process: preliminary the face of popular sentiment for fundamen- likely that an accommodation will be Indonesian Forest Industries Association evaluation by an expert panel; field assess- tal changes in forest policy and practice. reached, especially since Malaysia, another (APHI) formed a team of experts to develop ments by assessors certified by LEI, with Certified firms are less likely to find them- major producer, has recently adopted the principles and criteria for implementing comments by local stakeholders invited; selves in the firing line of populist anger same position vis-à-vis “mutual recogni- the ITTO target in Indonesia. At the end performance evaluation by an expanded and policy reforms. tion” with the FSC. of that year, the minister of forestry sup- expert panel; and certification, good for The greatest challenges facing certifi- In the longer term, LEI does not ported establishment of the Indonesian five years. (See Appendix C.) cation are to build capacity for assessing plan to restrict itself to certifying logging Ecolabeling Working Group, headed by At this early stage (the first official and monitoring logging management operations. Nontimber forest products, former environment minister Emil Salim. certification processes began in mid-1998), units and to create an efficient and speedy timber and other plantations, and marine This group worked quietly for four years to LEI is not only acting as a certifying body, bureaucracy to administer the certification products are all areas for which certification develop and test processes, criteria, and it is also conducting training programs for system. If the supply of efficient, honest, has been discussed. indicators for an Indonesian timber certifi- assessors and expert panel members, and and highly regarded certification services cation system. It brought in representa- carrying out some assessments in the cannot keep up with demand, the system Sources: tives from the APHI team of experts, the interim. LEI’s objective over the next sever- will wither away. This is an area in which LEI, 1998a, 1998b; ADB, 1997. Forestry Ministry, the National Standards al years is to leave both assessor training international aid agencies concerned about Agency, major forestry faculties, and NGOs. and field assessment to other educational the future of Indonesia’s forests should pro- Notes: Beginning in 1996, the working institutions and certifying bodies and vide strong financial and technical support. 1. Forty-three percent of Indonesia’s wood group tested its procedures, criteria, and restrict itself to accrediting and monitoring Finally, the LEI system needs to product exports goes to East Asian markets, indicators in the field with 11 logging con- the certifying bodies. secure international recognition. Many mostly in the form of plywood; 26 percent cessions that agreed to serve as experimental Why should Indonesian logging legitimate and less legitimate certification goes to Europe and North America, mostly subjects. In February 1998, the Indonesian firms want to seek voluntary certification? schemes have sprung up in the past decade, as finished products and molding and Ecolabeling Institute (LEI) was formally Given the main markets for Indonesia’s and international buyers are increasingly other wood-working products. The constituted as a legal body under the auspices wood—domestic for most sawnwood and confused. Allaying this confusion by provid- remainder goes to other Southeast Asian of the LEI Foundation, the board of which furniture, East Asian for 43 percent of all ing a “one-stop shop” for international countries, the Middle East, and Africa. The defines LEI policies. A detailed series of exports (mostly plywood)—it seems unlikely certification of certifying bodies is one of market for hardwood plywood is rising in process, criteria, and indicators documents that producers (aside from the small number the primary missions of the Forestry North America, however, in line with the were finalized soon thereafter in multi- that can cultivate special niche markets in Stewardship Council (FSC). But the idea use of panel products in building materi- stakeholder workshops and were officially western countries) will receive an appreciable of an international body “certifying” the als (personal communication, Mubariq adopted by the National Standards Agency “environmental premium” for certified Indonesian system—and therefore being Ahmad, Executive Director, Indonesian in June 1998 as the Sustainable Forest timber.1 Regulatory relief is a more somehow superior to it—is politically Ecolabeling Institute, March 28, 1999).

Management Certification System for persuasive incentive; 137 separate regulations unacceptable to the logging industry and 2. ADB, 1997. Production Forests. apply to logging concessions, and a recent to many other stakeholders within Indonesia. ADB study estimated the annual costs of In early 1998, LEI and the FSC signed an

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 49 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Institute area-based government This destructive incentive system Delink logging from processing management units (Kesatuan charges for timber extraction. should be replaced with an area-based industries. During the 1980s, the Pengusahaan Hutan Produksi, or Currently, concessionaires pay vol- charge levied on a per-hectare basis government, in an effort to boost KPHPs). The KPHPs would form the ume-based charges at set rates for the for the whole of a concession. value-added processing, primarily basis for allocating new concessions— timber they extract. This has two Because timber stand inventories for of plywood, obliged logging conces- and reallocating existing concessions, primary negative effects. First, it most concessions are incomplete or sionaires to establish their own where necessary—in areas large requires the government to monitor inaccurate, it is impossible, for the processing ventures. The result of enough to be economically viable the flow of logs in order to assess time being, to set variable rates on this policy was to create combined but within boundaries drawn through charges, or, as is actually done, to the basis of local conditions. A logging-and-processing firms with a a participatory process. This system, rely on the estimates provided by recent report by the Indonesia-U.K. single-minded devotion to acquiring it is hoped, will minimize the pervasive concessionaires. The government’s Tropical Forest Management enough raw material to keep their conflicts with local communities and lack of capacity to make its own Programme argues that area fees often inefficient processing facilities the overlaps with other forest and accurate assessments leads to cheating should initially be set at $20 per working at a profitable proportion development activities (such as and to diminished government rev- hectare, well below the available of capacity. As timber shortages have plantations) that have long enues. Second, since loggers are economic rent from the most developed,232 this arrangement has characterized the sector. Five pilot taxed on what they ship out rather productive concessions but probably boosted incentives for firms both to KPHPs had been established by late than on the volume of trees they cut close to total rent for less productive overcut their own concessions and 1996, and the government appears or otherwise damage, there are no ones. In the longer term, once more to acquire illegally logged timber. committed to continuing the incentives for avoiding waste. As a detailed stand inventories are avail- Delinking would allow logging development of this approach.233 result, according to the World Bank, able, the tax liability of each con- firms to sell their output to the The KPHP model provides the each year some 8 million m3 of cession unit can be based on local highest bidder, rather than subsidize basis for bringing the macro-scale timber are left by loggers to rot in conditions.230 Political support for their own processing plants, and mapping of the country’s forest the forest.229 this reform comes from the IMF would be likely to drive the more resource base and condition, rec- program, which calls for development inefficient processing facilities out ommended above, to the ground of a new forestry “resource rent tax” of business. That, in turn, would level. It also provides a potential of some kind. reduce demand for timber and vehicle for incorporating local decrease the pressures for overcutting community interests into decision- Introduce performance bonding and illegal logging. making about how the forest on concession operations. resources of a KPHP unit are to be Performance bonds, which are also ᔢ ACCELERATE THE EVOLUTION OF utilized. Once the legal basis for mandated by the IMF program, THE CURRENT CONCESSION SYSTEM community concessions is in place, would give the government additional TOWARD PERMANENT FOREST MAN- these legal understandings could leverage over concessionaires to AGEMENT UNITS. and should be incorporated into the ensure that their operations are well KPHP system. Since 1991, the Ministry of managed. The World Bank suggests Forestry, with assistance from the that 30 percent of average annual United Kingdom’s aid program, has operating costs be posted as bond or been developing a wholly new model that 40 percent be collected as a for organizing timber production at deposit on total resource rents payable. the field level. Essentially, this effort Interest would be returned to the seeks to redraw current concession operator, but the operator would be boundaries to reflect the actual state obliged to immediately replenish the of the forest resource, nonforest land bond if it is collected or drawn uses, and local community territories down by the government for any and needs, and to use this informa- breach of concession conditions.231 tion to establish permanent forest

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 50 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE RETHINK AND REFORM One approach that might ᔢ SAFEGUARD THE INTERESTS AND The fast-growing pulp and THE PLANTATION SECTOR ameliorate the inevitable industry LIVELIHOODS OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES paper and oil palm plan- and political opposition to such a IN PLANTATION AREAS. The fast-growing pulp and move would be to prioritize for early tation sectors are exerting paper and oil palm plantation sectors inventory provinces, and areas within heavy pressure on the forest The recent boom in timber and are exerting heavy pressure on the provinces, slated for plantation and were the main culprits oil palm plantations has caused some forest and were the main culprits development. The moratorium could behind the 1997–98 forest of the worst conflicts with local behind the 1997–98 forest fire disaster. then be lifted area by area, once an fire disaster. communities in forest areas. To The clear delineation of the nation’s inventory is conducted and areas of reduce the level of local conflict and permanent forest estate and the permanent forest estate and local use the great economic losses that local establishment of unambiguous are excluded from consideration. ᔢ REVISE THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE communities have been forced to bear, legal protection against its conver- FOR TIMBER PLANTATIONS SO THAT the government should establish sion, as recommended above, are the ᔢ BAN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMPANIES ARE NO LONGER meaningful “social acceptability” most important first steps in restrain- PLANTATIONS ON ALL BUT TRULY ENCOURAGED TO CUT NATURAL FOREST. criteria and mechanisms to ensure ing the destructive role that plantation DEGRADED FORESTLANDS. that plantation development is con- development is currently playing. The perverse system of incen- tingent on the full and informed Key additional actions that need to This is, in theory, already tives that encourages pulp and paper consent of local communities and be taken include the following. government policy, but it has been firms to rely on natural feedstock provides benefits to the community widely flouted by both timber and rather than on their own plantation equal to or greater than those they 234 236 ᔢ INSTITUTE A MORATORIUM ON oil palm plantations. Key to wood has been well documented. are obtaining from their existing GRANTING NEW CONCESSIONS FOR strengthening implementation of To change this, the following steps access to forest resources. The prin- OIL PALM, TIMBER, AND OTHER this policy is a restriction on the should be undertaken: ciple is that local communities PLANTATIONS UNTIL A NATIONAL power of governors to allocate lands must not be made worse off by INVENTORY OF PERMANENT FOREST for plantation development. In ᔢ Deny timber plantation firms plantation establishment. The ESTATE IS COMPLETED. their haste to promote economic access to large areas of forested determination should be made by lands as a source of feedstock. growth and increase their own wealth, the communities themselves, not by Freezing the allocation of new ᔢ Utilize the community conces- provincial governors have frequently actors (the company and the local lands for plantation development sion model recommended above to allocated permanent production government) with a vested interest will no doubt be difficult politically, transfer management (or shared forest areas, and even protection management) of truly degraded in seeing the plantation go forward. given the current economic crisis forests, for plantation development. and the government’s desire to boost lands to local communities that The role of provincial governments would grow pulpwood and supply it ᔢ STRENGTHEN RULES AND exports of pulp and oil palm. in drawing up provincial land use to existing mills as part of their PENALTIES AGAINST CLEARING Nevertheless, the only honest and plans and allocating plantation concession agreement. PLANTATIONS WITH FIRE. practical way to ensure that lands concessions needs to be overhauled. ᔢ For firms currently holding valid not suited for plantation development Frequently, the concession is granted concession contracts, establish “sunset When government satellite (forested lands, areas used by local and then the plan is changed clauses” setting specific dates analyses in September 1997 indicated communities, and nonforest lands 235 beyond which they may no longer use that plantations were responsible for accordingly. Until reforms that 237 better suited for other purposes) are make governors more accountable natural forest to supply their mills. a great proportion of the intention- not misallocated is to wait until at to the Ministry of Forestry—and to ally set fires, the government made least a preliminary inventory of their own citizens—are put in Further into the future, com- a big show of threatening to revoke forestlands has been carried out. place, their power to make land-use pletion of a reliable forest (and their operating permits. In the end, plans and allocate land for develop- degraded forestland) inventory will this came more or less to nothing, ment should be substantially allow siting of pulp mills in areas since any company that provided restricted by the central government. distant enough from permanent an alibi by a certain date—-hard forest areas that incentives for using evidence not being required—was natural forest feedstock will decrease, absolved of responsibility. Rules are and monitoring possible illegal already on the books limiting the transport of natural forest timber to use of fire for plantation develop- the mill site will be easier. ment, but they are not strict enough and, judging by the experience of 1997, are not much enforced.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 51 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE DECLARE A FIVE-YEAR Both transmigration and plantation First is the crucial importance For more than three MORATORIUM ON THE development should be limited to of developing transparent, multi- decades, since the exploita- TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM sites within that category and might stakeholder processes—both insti- tion of Indonesia’s forests AND RECONSIDER ITS be combined in joint initiatives, as tutional and political—for began in earnest, key OBJECTIVES AND METHODS is already the case. Indeed, very little debating, deciding on, and imple- policy decisions related land meets the tests of being suitable menting policy and institutional to forests (and almost The transmigration program for rice or other annual crop agri- reforms. Freedom of information everything else, for that has long been bedeviled by many of culture, not covered by forest that for the public, and effective ways of matter) have been tightly the same deficiencies found in the should be part of the permanent holding political leaders and policy- controlled by small groups plantation sector. Incomplete and forest, and not encumbered by legal makers accountable for their deci- of unelected officials and inaccurate data on the physical and or customary ownership rights. sions (such as free and fair their patrons in the large socioeconomic characteristics of Accordingly, any future transmigra- elections and meaningful legal cartels that have dominated prospective sites, combined with the tion programs should be linked to remedies with which citizens can the economy. government’s casual attitude toward cultivation of tree crops such as challenge and overturn bureaucrat- converting forest and displacing fast-growing pulp species or oil ic decisions), are essential elements local communities, has led to one palm rather than to rice cultivation. of such a process. To readers not Obtaining evidence strong disaster after another as sites were familiar with Indonesia’s recent enough to withstand a legal challenge developed on inappropriate soils and SUMMING UP political history, this may sound like from a company accused of burning in areas already being used by local a rather unexceptional point. But is a significant obstacle for the gov- people. Poor site preparation methods, This report has intentionally for more than three decades, since ernment, since its capacity to monitor such as the complete removal of tree refrained from offering detailed rec- the exploitation of Indonesia’s forestry activities in the field is limited. cover and the extensive compaction ommendations for restructuring the forests began in earnest, key policy Three steps would help remedy this of soil, have characterized the institutions that either formally decisions related to forests (and situation: program. control forest policy (principally, the almost everything else, for that mat- It would therefore be wise to Ministry of Forestry) or play an ter) have been tightly controlled by ᔢ The development of government declare a five-year moratorium on important direct or indirect role in small groups of unelected officials and independent citizen monitoring the establishment of new transmi- determining the fate of Indonesia’s and their patrons in the large cartels capacities would provide a much gration sites to allow time for com- forests (such as provincial governors that have dominated the economy.238 stronger factual basis for holding pletion of the national inventory of and officials in the transmigration, Changing this political system and corporate arsonists to account. mining, and infrastructure sectors). culture, together with recovery from ᔢ A regulatory change in the forest areas and degraded forest- The institutional questions will need the economic crisis, will be burden of proof in favor of the lands. With that information in government would help: where hand, new transmigration sites— to be worked out incrementally on Indonesia’s major preoccupations remote-sensing data provided prima should the government decide to the basis of needs that arise, institu- during the first decade of political facie evidence that a company was continue the program at all— tional deficiencies that are identified, reconstruction for the 21st Century. using fire to clear land, the company could be located in areas that are and political compromises that Questions related to forest policy will would be presumed guilty unless it truly degraded, are unencumbered must be struck in the process of by no means dominate that process. could produce sufficient proof that by private ownership rights, and formulating and implementing the But with three-fourths of the country it had not intentionally set fires. pose no substantial risks of conflict forest policy reform agenda. designated as “forestland” and with (The standard for such proof would with local land uses and resource Three principles related to the increase in violent conflicts over have to be defined.) governance and institutions, however, control of those lands and their ᔢ needs. Requiring companies to post a should animate the process of insti- resources, debates over forest policy performance bond similar to the one tutional restructuring and renewal will certainly be an important political recommended for logging concessions would put some teeth into government that must accompany forest policy issue. enforcement efforts and provide a reform. financial incentive for compliance.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 52 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Second, the issue of decentral- Before decentralization of Finally, the restructuring of It is important to remember ization of governance must be treated decisionmaking over forest lands the Ministry of Forestry—which that institutions are more than just very carefully or it may accelerate and resources is allowed to proceed, seems very likely to happen over the the sum total of their organization the rate of forest degradation and the principles of accountable and next several years—will be a charts and the regulations that they increase the level of social conflict transparent governance and multi- complex and drawn-out process. As live by and implement. Anyone who over forest resources. There is some stakeholder decisionmaking the World Bank points out, “Ministries has worked closely with the Ministry tendency to equate reformasi with processes that were discussed above of government—particularly large of Forestry on a day-to-day basis (as decentralization, since the tendency must be put into practice at the and powerful ones like the Ministry have the authors of this report) of the Suharto regime was to cen- provincial and sub-provincial levels. of Forestry—cannot be reformed— would agree that many tralize power and decisionmaking In addition, such powers should not or replaced—in a short time officials are dedicated professionals as much as possible. But without be given to provincial officials until frame.”240 But the reform processes who have long been disillusioned significant overhaul of the provincial the national inventory of permanent have to be implemented by the with the policies they were obliged and local systems of government, forest estate and lands available for existing bureaucracy; they cannot to implement and the behind-the- unthinking decentralization of land conversion is complete. Within that wait for the bureaucracy to be scenes collusion and corruption that and forest management powers to framework, accountable provincial restructured. Serious thought needs they saw but could not do anything provincial and sub-provincial levels governments should certainly be to be given to an interim institu- about. If Indonesia is to embark is likely to result in an explosion of granted a share of power in deciding tional arrangement that taps the upon this new millennium with forest conversion of forests to plantations what investments (a transmigration considerable expertise and policies that ensure a more sustainable and other nonforest uses. In the case site versus a timber plantation, for experience in the forestry bureaucracy future for the nation’s forests and a of East Kalimantan, the local gov- example) should be made on specific but at the same time provides over- more prosperous life for the country’s ernment “seems to be using reform pieces of land that have been deter- sight and enforcement to ensure millions of forest-dependent people, sentiment to boost its power and mined by the national inventory to that reactionary elements within the forces of reform that are storming speed conversion. . . .Turning be available for nonforest uses. But that bureaucracy do not slow or the walls of the forestry bureaucracy reform sentiment for greater regional delineation of the nation’s permanent sabotage reforms embodied in the must make common cause with autonomy to his advantage, the forest estate is a national matter new laws and policies that have been those inside whose hearts lie with governor said, ‘In the spirit of and should not be influenced or established or will soon be in place. the reformers and whose skills and reform, the [central] government is controlled by the vagaries of local experience are so important for the expected to issue a ruling which politics and vested interests. future of the reforms that so many will allow the local administrations Indonesians—and their friends to do all the licensing work [for new around the world—fervently hope oil palm plantations].’”239 will come to pass.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Charles Victor Barber is a Senior practices on coral reefs, protected James Schweithelm, a geographer World Wide Fund for Nature Associate in WRI’s Biological areas management, the Convention by training, first visited Indonesia as Indonesia Programme during the Resources Program. He has been on Biological Diversity, and on a doctoral researcher in 1985. His 1997-1998 forest fire episode, with WRI since 1989; since 1994, he issues relating to bioprospecting research focused on watershed putting him in a position to closely has been based in the Philippines. and access to genetic resources. management in South Kalimantan observe the tragedy as it unfolded. Dr. Barber is a specialist on Southeast Prior to joining WRI Dr. Barber province in cooperation with the He is familiar with forest issues Asia and has worked extensively lived in Indonesia for three years, Indonesian Ministry of Forestry and throughout the Asia-Pacific region on Indonesian forestry policy, working as a consultant on the East-West Center. Since then, he and worked on forest policy in conservation of marine biodiversity, Indonesian forestry and environmental has spent eight years in various Nepal for two years. He is currently and biodiversity policy. He has issues for a variety of international parts of Indonesia working on a a freelance consultant living with written numerous publications on donor agencies. He received a Ph.D. wide range of issues related to forest his family in Burlington, Vermont. Indonesian forestry policy and in Jurisprudence and Social Policy, law conservation and management. He political economy, strategies for degree, and M.A. in Asian Studies from was the Forest Policy Officer of the combating destructive fishing the University of California, Berkeley.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 53 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE NOTES FOR PART II

116 Byron and Shepard, 1998; Vayda, 1998. 139 World Bank, 1999c. 165 Potter and Lee, 1998b. 172 “The Mega-Rice Project, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia: An Appeal for 117 Tomich and others, 1998. On the histor- 140 Kartidihardjo and Supriono, 1999. 166 CIC Consulting Group, 1997. Intervention to the International ical use of fire as a weapon of resistance in Community,” 1998. Briefing dossier com- the forests of colonial Java, see Peluso, 1992. 141 “Wood-Processing Firms to Face Log 167 Maltby, 1997. piled by SKEPHI Support Office in Europe. Scarcity: Minister,” Jakarta Post, October 1, Amsterdam. 118 World Bank, 1999c. 1998. 168 See, for example, Rieley and Page, 1997; Maltby, Immirzi, and Stafford, 1996. 173 Vidal, 1997. 119 Personal communication, GTZ 142 World Bank, 1998b. IFFM/SFMP, Samarinda, Indonesia, October 169 Tim Teknis Pengembangan Lahan 174 In what may have been a form of silent 21,1999. 143 “Looking Ahead to the Next Century,” Gambut Di Propinsi Kalimantan Tengah protest, the Environmental Management Paper Asia, February 1997, pp. 7–10. [Technical Team for Peatland Development Agency (BAPPEDAL) main office in Jakarta 120 GOI and IIED, 1985. in Central Kalimantan Province], 1997. put on the wall of its reception area a large 144 “Indonesia Planning a Further Mass Landsat photo from early September of the 121 Romm, 1980. Pulp Capacity,” PPI This Week, July 29, 1996. 170 Boehm, 1999. PLG project burning and emitting huge quantities of smoke. 122 Gillis, 1988. 145 “Indonesia Prepares to Tap 171 The initial EIA was carried out by a Plantations,” International Woodfiber team from the respected Bogor Agricultural 175 Vidal, 1997. One of the authors (C. V. 123 Mackie, 1984. Report, June 1997. Institute, covering the first-phase area for the Barber) accompanied Vidal on his survey of project, approximately 227,000 ha. While the PLG project area in October 1997 and 124 Gellert, 1998. 146 World Bank, 1993. extremely detailed, the study adopted the returned to the area in November 1997. curious device of balancing the serious nega- 125 Kartidihardjo and Supriono, 1999. 147 Ibid. tive environmental impacts it predicted 176 The amount was Rp 1.1 trillion, equiva- against the “positive impacts” of implement- lent to about $350 million at the mid-1997 126 Barber, Johnson, and Hafild, 1994. 148 Barber, 1997. ing a policy that the government wanted exchange rate of approximately Rp 3,000/$1. implemented. Nevertheless, this study was “Rp. 1.1 Triliun Habis di Gambut” [Rp. 1.1 127 World Bank, 1995. 149 “BUMN, Grup Besar Ikut Bakar Hutan” not positive enough for the Public Works trillion spent in the peat swamp ], Kontan, [State firms, conglomerates, burned the for- Ministry, which produced its own EIA for the October 13, 1997, Jakarta. 128 Barber, Johnson, and Hafild, 1994. est], Media, September 18, 1997. entire project in early 1997. (See note 169.) This study came to the conclusion that while 177 Ibid. 129 “Wood-Processing Firms to Face Log 150 State Ministry for Environment, 1998: xi. Scarcity: Minister,” Jakarta Post, October 1, In a quantitative sense [the project] has more 178 “Di PLG Kapuas, Tak Ada Ganti Rugi” 1998. 151 CIC Consulting Group, 1997 important negative impacts than positive [In the Kapuas PLG Project there is no com- impacts....the negative impacts are compen- pensation], Palangkaraya Post, September 130 World Bank, 1993. 152 World Bank, 1999c. sated for by the positive impacts. This is 3, 1997. because the positive impacts, although few in 131 Ibid. 153 CIC Consulting Group, 1997 number, are of a strategic character for both 179 “Optimis, Oktober Ini Panen di PLG” the region and the nation. These include [Optimistic, there will be a harvest this 132 Indonesia–U.K. Tropical Forest 154 Kartidihardjo and Supriono, 1999. regional economic development, equalizing October at the PLG Project], Palangkaraya Management Programme, 1999. development among regions, and reducing Post, September 5, 1997. 155 Ibid. the burden on heavily populated areas such 133 “Timber Fencing and Smuggling Still as Java and Bali...” 180 “Akibat Kemerau, Penanaman di PLG Rampant”; “Legislators Urge Government to 156 Potter and Lee, 1998b. tak Penuhi Target” [Because of the drought, Stop Timber Brokers.” Jakarta Post, July 3, In short—and in clear violation of the harvest at the peat swamp project will not 1996. 157 Kartidihardjo and Supriono, 1999. Indonesia’s environmental impact laws— reach its target], Banjarmasin Post, August the important negative environmental 28, 1997. 134 EIA and Telapak Indonesia, 1999. 158 “Forest Fires Mostly in ‘Plantation impacts were discounted because they stood Areas,’” Jakarta Post, October 9, 1997. in the way of something that the president 181 “Warga Berharap Presiden Panen 135 Sunderlin, 1998. wanted to do. Perdana di Dadahup” [Residents hope the 159 Wakker, 1998. president will make the first harvest at 136 Ibid. Dadahup], Banjarmasin Post, September 160 “Forest Fires Mostly in ‘Plantation 29, 1997. 137 The 1991 Indonesian Forestry Action Areas,’” Jakarta Post, October 9, 1997. Programme stated that “the role of planta- 182 “Bara Api Terus Terlihat di PPLG Sejuta tion forests in supplementing natural forest 161 Reuters, April 3, 1998. Hectare” [Fires continuously reported at the resources will also be very important to con- million-hectare peat swamp project], servation objectives in the country ” (GOI 162 Wakker, 1998. Kompas, October 1, 1997. 1991, vol. 2: 60). 163 GOI ( ), 1993. 183 WALHI, 1999. 138 The main subsidy—apart from almost Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun free access to land—was a seven-year, Keenam (Sixth Five-Year Development Plan). 184 “Di PLG Kapuas, Tak Ada Ganti Rugi” interest-free loan covering 32.5 percent of Jakarta. [“In the Kapuas PLG Project there is no plantation establishment costs, drawn from compensation”], Palangkaraya Post, the Reforestation Fund (Potter and Lee, 1998b). 164 World Bank, 1994b. September 3, 1997.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 54 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE 185 “Notulen Rapat Tentang Pemantapan 193 “Walhi sues government over peat 210 Unofficial translation of Statement from 226 Government Regulation No. 6/1999 Pelaksanaan Program Lahan Gambut 1 Juta land.” Jakarta Post, September 23, 1999. the Communication Forum for Community Concerning Forest Industries and Harvest of Hectare di Kabupaten Dati II Kapuas” Forestry (FKKM) Meeting, June 22–23, 1998, Forest Products from Production Forests. [Minutes of a meeting concerning consolida- 194 “Smoke from Indonesian Fires Begins Jogjakarta, Indonesia, from World Bank, 1998b. The regulation provides sanction for a wide tion of implementation for the 1 million to Cast Pall over Sumatra, Borneo,” AFP, range of violations, including complete revo- hectare peat swamp project in Kapuas August 3, 1999. 211 “Brunei Threatens to Sue Jakarta if cation of concession rights, decrease in the District], April 24, 1996. This agreement nar- Fires Not Contained,” Television Corporation size of a concession, and monetary fines. In rowly defined the compensation to be paid as 195 The grim fate of Dadahup village on the of Singapore, July 29, 1999. a significant departure from past practice, applying only to standing crops, trees, fish- Mengkatip River was featured in The concession-holders may be sanctioned for ponds, and houses destroyed in the construc- Guardian, on CNN, and on BBC Television. 212 “Suharto’s Son Calls Accord with IMF failing to “build the capacity and include the tion of canals and set very low compensation This was in part because the traditional ‘Neocolonialism,’” Kyodo News Service, participation of local communities adjacent rates. At current exchange rates, for example, leaders in Dadahup were in contact with January 15, 1998. to and in the forest in concession activities” the valuable rattan gardens and beje fish- Jakarta-based NGOs, which steered journalists (Article 34(1)(g)). ponds were only valued at 5 cents per m3. to their village. Of the Dayak villages affected 213 Kartodihardjo, 1999. Even this minimal compensation was never by the million-hectare megaproject, Dadahup 227 “Ministry Revoked 86 Timber Permits paid, however. is most easily accessible from the outside world. 214 Kartodihardjo, 1999. over Last 10 Years,” Jakarta Post, September 25, 1998. 186 Herman, 1998. 196 Vidal, 1997. 215 “Revise Forestry Bill, Say Former Ministers,” Jakarta Post, June 16, 1999. 228 See, for example: Gillis, 1988; World 187 The elevation of the peatland rises grad- 197 Goldammer, 1998. Bank, 1993; Barber, Johnson and Hafild, ually from the Java Sea to the north end of 216 “Indonesia’s New Law Still Exploits 1994; World Bank, 1995; Gellert, 1998; World the PLG project area by approximately 12 198 Brookfield, Potter, and Byron, 1995. Forests and Land Rights,” Straits Times, July Bank, 1998b. Indonesia-UK Tropical Forest meters, meaning that the canals essentially 23, 1999. Management Program, 1999. create paths for water from the peatlands to 199 World Bank, 1998b. drain into the sea. In addition, water levels 217 “Indonesia’s new president wants feder- 229 World Bank, 1994a. in the area’s major rivers vary greatly, 200 Ibid. alism.” AFP, October 24,1999. depending on precipitation and other factors, 230 Senior Management Advisory Team, further accelerating the drainage effect 201 Ibid. 218 World Bank, 1999a. Indonesia–U.K. Tropical Forest Management (Boehm, 1999). Programme, 1998. 202 P. Waldman, “Desperate Indonesians 219 Tantra, Basuki, and Dwiyono, 1998. 188 Rieley, 1999. Attack Nation’s Endangered Species,” Asian 231 World Bank, 1998b. Wall Street Journal, October 27, 1998. 220 For analysis of Suharto-era policies 189 “Government Proposes Resurvey of towards indigenous and other forest-depen- 232 In October 1998, the minister of forestry Million-Hectare Peatland Project,” Antara 203 For a detailed discussion of the perver- dent communities, see Dove, 1988; Zerner, predicted that the country’s wood-processing News Agency, June 24, 1998. sion of the concept of “the rule of law” in 1992; Guiness, 1994; and Evers, 1995. industry would face an annual log shortage New Order Indonesia, see Barber 1997: of at least 25 million m3, or 45 percent of 190 “Bank Report Exposes Chaos at Central 49–53. 221 World Bank, 1998b. demand, over the following five years. The Kalimantan Mega-project,” Down to Earth, IMF-mandated expansion of log exports (via No. 39, November 1998, London. With 204 Peluso, 1992: 93–94. 222 Ibid. For a detailed analysis of the trou- reductions on export taxes), with an annual respect to the provincial government’s claim bled history of Papua New Guinea’s tradi- quota of 5 million m3 in the first year, was a that it had nothing to do with the project, it 205 “One Dead as Police Search for Teak- tional landowners—who control almost all of major factor behind this situation, according is ironic to note that the governor’s son is Wood Pilagers Turns Ugly,” AFP, September the country’s forests—and forest exploitation, to the minister. The supply shortage, he widely reported to control one of the major 11, 1998. see Filer and Sekhran, 1998. noted, “has resulted in rampant wood steal- contracting firms that cut the canals (Vidal, ing and illegal trade.” “Wood Processing 1997). 206 “Lawlessness Spreads as Looters Defy 223 Barber, 1997: 52. Firms to Face Scarcity: Minister,” Jakarta Army,” Straits Times, July 20, 1998. Post, October 1, 1998. 191 “Diteliti, Proyek Transmigrasi Yang 224 In September 1998 the Ministry of Ditelantarkan Perusahaan Inti” 207 K. Yamin, “Politics-Indonesia: ‘People Forestry reported to Parliament that there 233 Natural Resources Institute, 1996. [Transmigration projects abandoned by their Power’ to Some, Mob Rule to Others,” were currently some 421 private timber com- core companies investigated], Suara Interpress Service (IPS), August 18, 1998. panies with concessions totaling 51.5 million 234 Potter and Lee, 1998b. Pembaruan, September 16, 1998. The ha, while 6 state-owned forestry firms con- minister’s support for turning the PLG area 208 Komite Reformasi Pembangunan ducted logging on another 4.9 million ha. 235 Potter and Lee, 1998a. into a giant oil palm plantation accords Kehutanan dan Perkebunan [Forestry and “Ministry Revoked 86 Timber Permits over with the statement (made confidentially to Estate Crops Development Reform Last 10 Years,” Jakarta Post, September 25, 236 For a detailed analysis of the destructive one of the authors) by a member of the PLG Committee], Memorandum No. 1, 1998, 1998. impacts of the current timber plantation Environmental Impact Assessment team in Jakarta. The committee’s terms of reference incentive system, see World Bank, 1993. October 1997 that the whole rice-growing are included in this memorandum as 225 For a detailed review and analysis of justification for the project was a sham and Appendix III. timber concession noncompliance with 237 These recommendations are drawn that the real purpose was to establish the applicable regulations, see Gellert, 1998: from World Bank, 1998b. canal and road infrastructure necessary to 209 Kartodihardjo, 1999. 210–14. attract oil palm investors. 238 For a detailed analysis of the closed and nondemocratic nature of policymaking in 192 Rieley, 1999. Suharto-era Indonesia, see Schwarz, 1994; Mackie and MacIntyre, 1994.

239 Potter and Lee, 1998b.

240 World Bank, 1998b.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 55 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE REFERENCES

In addition to the sources listed ADB (Asian Development Bank). Barber, C. V., N.C. Johnson, and E. Brookfield, H., L. Potter, and Y. below, the following newspapers, 1997. Strategy for the Use of Hafild. 1994. Breaking the Byron. 1995. In Place of the magazines, and news services were Market-Based Instruments in Logjam: Obstacles to Forest Forest: Environmental and used: Indonesia’s Environmental Policy Reform in Indonesia Socioeconomic Transformation Management. Manila: and the United States. in Borneo and the Eastern Agence France Press (AFP) Environment Division, Office of Washington, D.C.: World Malay Peninsula. Tokyo: The Age Environment and Social Resources Institute. United Nations University Press. Antara News Agency Development. Bird, D. M. 1997. “National Brown, D.W. 1999. Addicted to Asian Wall Street Journal Allen, B., H. Brookfield, and Y. Guidelines on the Protection of Rent: Corporate and Spatial Asiaweek Byron, 1989. “Frost and Drought Forests Against Fire.” Distribution of Forest Resources Associated Press through Space and Time. Part Consultancy report for the in Indonesia; Implications for Bangkok Post II: The Written, Oral and Proxy Integrated Forest Fire Forest Sustainability and Banjarmasin Post Records and Their Meaning.” Management Project, presented Government Policy. Jakarta: Cable News Network (CNN) Mountain Research and at the International Workshop on Indonesia-UK Tropical Forest Down to Earth Development 9: 279–305. National Guidelines on the Management Programme Report The Economist ASEAN (Association of Southeast Protection of Forests against Fire, No. PFM/EC/99/06. September. Far Eastern Economic Review Asian Nations). 1997. “Regional Bogor, Indonesia, December 8–9. Bruenig, E. F. 1996. Conservation The Guardian Haze Action Plan.” Annex to the Blakeney, J. 1998. “Where There’s and Management of the Tropical Indonesian Observer joint press statement, ASEAN Smoke, There’s Fire!” Southeast Rain Forest: An Integrated International Herald Tribune Ministerial Meeting on Haze, Asia’s Forest Fires of 1997/98. Approach to Sustainability. International Woodfiber Report Singapore, December 22–23. World Bank Economic Cambridge, U.K.: CAB Interpress Service (IPS) BAPPENAS (National Development Development Institute Issues International/University Press. Jakarta Post Planning Agency). 1993. Paper. Washington, D.C. March. Bryant, D., D. Neilsen, and L. Kompas Biodiversity Action Plan for Boehm, V. 1999. “Problems Tangley. 1997. The Last Frontier Kompas Online Indonesia. Jakarta. concerning the Million-Hectare Forests: Ecosystems and Kontan BAPPENAS (National Development Rice Project (PLG) and new Economies on the Edge. Kyodo News Service Planning Agency). 1999. Final Presidential Decree 80/1999.” Washington D.C.: World Media Report, Annex I: Causes, Extent, Unpublished Report. Kalteng Resources Institute. New York Review of Books Impact and Costs of 1997/98 Consultants, Hoehenkirchen, Byron, N., and G. Sheperd. 1998. Palangkaraya Post Fires and Drought. Asian Munich, Germany. August 15. “Indonesia and the 1997–98 El Paper Asia Development Bank Technical Boer, C. 1989. “Investigations of Niño: Fire Problems and Long- PPI This Week Assistance Grant TA 2999-INO, the Steps Needed to Rehabilitate Term Solutions.” ODI Natural Reuters Planning for Fire Prevention and the Areas of East Kalimantan Resource Perspectives, No. 29 Republika Drought Management Project. Seriously Affected by Fire: Effects (April): 1–4. Suara Pembaruan Jakarta. April. of the Forest Fires of 1982/83 in Carr, F. 1998. “Mamberamo South China Morning Post Barber, C. V. 1995. “Integrating East Kalimantan towards Wildlife.” Madness.” Inside Indonesia, No. Straits Times Conservation and Development FR Report No. 7. Deutsche Forest 55 (July-September). Sydney Morning Herald in the Asia Pacific Region: Service/ITTO/GTZ, Samarinda, CIC Consulting Group. Study on Television Corporation of Singapore Projects, Policies, Problems and Indonesia. Palm Oil Industry and Potentials.” In Asian Brauer, M. 1997. “Assessment of Plantation in Indonesia, 1997. Development Bank and World Health Implications of Haze in Jakarta: PT Capricorn Indonesia Conservation Union (IUCN), Malaysia. Mission Report to the Consult, Inc. Biodiversity Conservation in World Health Organization the Asia Pacific Region. Manila. Regional Office for the Western Barber, C. V. 1997. Environmental Pacific.” November. Scarcities, State Capacity, and Civil Violence: The Case of Indonesia. Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 56 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE De Beer, J. H., and M. J. McDermott. Dove, M. R. 1985. “The Agroecological Gellert, P. K. 1998. “The Limits of Goldammer, J. G. 1998. “Land Use, 1996. The Economic Value of Mythology of the Javanese and Capacity: The Political Economy Climate Variability and Fire in Non-Timber Forest Products in the Political Economy of and Ecology of the Indonesian Southeast Asia: Impacts on Southeast Asia. 2d ed., rev. Indonesia.” Indonesia 39: 1–36. Timber Industry, 1967–1985.” Ecosystems and Atmosphere.” Amsterdam: Netherlands EIA (Environmental Investigation Unpublished Ph.D. diss. Presented at the Asia-Pacific Committee for IUCN (World Agency) and Telapak Indonesia. University of Wisconsin, Madison. Regional Workshop on Conservation Union). 1999. The Final Cut: Illegal UMI Dissertation Services. Transboundary Pollution, Dennis, R. 1998. “A Review of Fire Logging in Indonesia’s Giesen, W. 1996. “Habitat Types Singapore, May 27–28. Projects in Indonesia.” Draft. Orangutan Parks. London and and Their Management: Danau Goldammer, J. G., and C. Price. Center for International Forestry Jakarta. Sentarum Wildlife Reserve, West 1997. “Potential Impacts of Research (CIFOR). July 30. Evers, P. 1995. “A Preliminary Kalimantan, Indonesia.” Climate Change of Fire Regimes Department of Forestry and Estate Analysis of Land Rights and Wetlands International Indonesia in the Tropics based on MAGICC Crops, Indonesia. 1999. Indigenous People in Programme/Directorate General and a GISS GCM-Derived “Pedoman Penataan Batas Indonesia.” Draft Working of Forest Protection and Nature Lightning Model.” Climatic Hutan dan Pengukuhan” Paper. World Bank, Jakarta. Conservation, Ministry of Change (in press). [Guidelines for forest boundary Ferrari, L. 1997. “Haze Disaster Forestry. Bogor, Indonesia. Goldammer, J. G., and B. Siebert. delineation and demarcation]. Assignment: PM10 Instrument Gillis, M. 1988. “Indonesia: Public 1990. “The Impact of Droughts Draft No. 7. Jakarta. January. Measurement Training and Policies, Resource Management, and Forest Fires on Tropical Diemont, W. H., G. J. Nabuurs, J. O. Suspended Particle Concentration and the Tropical Forest.” In R. Lowland Rain Forest of East Rieley, and H. D. Rijksen. 1997. Assessment.” Report to the World Repetto and M. Gillis, eds., Kalimantan.” In J. G. “Climate Change and Management Health Organization (Indonesia) Public Policies and the Misuse Goldammer, ed., Fire in the of Tropical Peatlands as a on a Short-Term Consultancy. of Forest Resources, 43–104. Tropical Biota: Ecosystem Carbon Reservoir.” In J. O. Rieley Jakarta. November. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Processes and Global Challenges, and S. E. Page, eds., Tropical Filer, C., and N. Sekhran. 1998. University Press. 11–31. Ecological Studies 84. Peatlands. Cardigan, U.K.: Loggers, Donors and Resource GOI (Government of Indonesia). Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer- Samara Publishing. Owners: Policy That Works for 1991. Indonesia Forestry Action Verlag. Doi, T. 1990. “Present status of Forests and People Series No. 2: Programme. Vol. 2. Jakarta. Golden Hope Plantations Berhad. large mammals in Kutai Papua New Guinea. Jakarta: GOI (Government of Indonesia), 1997. The Zero-Burning National Park after a large scale Port Moresby: National Research Ministry of Forestry and Estate Technique for Oil Palm fire in East Kalimantan.” In H. Institute; London: International Crops. 1998. Forestry Statistics Cultivation. Kuala Lumpur, Tagawa and N. Wirawan (eds), A Institute for Environment and of Indonesia 1996/97. Jakarta. Malaysia. Research on the Process of Earlier Development. GOI (Government of Indonesia) and Gonner, C. 1998. “Conflicts and Recovery of Tropical Rain Forest Forrester, G., and R. J. May, eds. IIED (International Institute for Fire Causes in a Sub-District of After a Large Scale Fire in 1999. The Fall of Soeharto. Environment and Development). Kutai, East Kalimantan, Kalimantan Timur, Indonesia. Published in association with the 1985. Forest Policies in Indonesia.” Unpublished report Kagoshima University. Research School of Pacific and Indonesia: The Sustainable of the GTZ Sustainable Forest Dove, M. R. 1988. “Introduction: Asian Studies, Australian Development of Forest Lands. Management Project, Traditional Culture and National University. Singapore: 3 vol. Jakarta. Samarinda, East Kalimantan. Development in Contemporary Select Books. Goldammer, J. G. 1997. “Forest Fire Grip, H. 1986. “A Short Description Indonesia.” In M. R. Dove, ed., Fuller, D., and M. Fulk. 1998. “An and Smoke Management and of the Experimental Watershed The Real and Imagined Role of Assessment of Fire Distribution Policy Issues in Indonesia and Study at Sipitang, Sabah.” Paper Culture in Development: Case and Impacts during 1997 in Neighboring Countries of presented at the Workshop on Studies From Indonesia, 1–37. Kalimantan, Indonesia Using Southeast Asia.” Paper presented Hydrological Studies in Sabah, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Satellite Remote Sensing and at the International Workshop on Kota Kinabalu, April 28. Press. Geographic Information National Guidelines on the Systems.” Unpublished manu- Protection of Forests against Fire, script. World Wide Fund for Bogor, Indonesia, December 8–9. Nature, Jakarta.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 57 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE GTZ (German Technical Cooperation). Johns, R. J. 1989. “The Influence of Leighton, M. and N. Wirawan, Mackie, C. 1984. “The Lessons 1998. Haze Guide. Information Drought on Tropical Rain Forest 1986. “Catastrophic drought behind East Kalimantan's Forest and Recommendations on How Vegetation in Papua New and fire in Borneo tropical rain Fires.” Borneo Research Bulletin to Cope with Haze from Forest Guinea.” Mountain Research forest associated with the 1982- 16: 63–74. and Land Fires. Version 3b. and Development 9(3): 248–51. 1983 El Nino Southern Mackie, J., and A. MacIntyre. 1994. Jakarta. August. Kartodihardjo, H. 1999. “Toward Oscillation event,” in G.T. Prance “Politics.” In H. Hill, ed., Guiness, P. 1994. “Local Society an Environmental Adjustment: (ed.), Tropical Forests and the Indonesia's New Order: The and Culture.” In H. Hill, ed., Structural Barriers to Forest World Atmosphere, pp. 75-102, Dynamics of Socio-Economic Indonesia's New Order: The Development in Indonesia.” AAAS Selected Symposium 101. Transformation, 1–53. St. Dynamics of Socio-Economic Draft. World Resources Institute, American Association for the Leonards, Australia: Allen and Transformation, 267-304. St. Washington D.C. Advancement of Science, Unwin. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Kartodihardjo, H., and A. Supriono, Washington, D.C. Malingreau, J. P. 1987. “The Unwin. 1999. “The Impact of Sectoral Leitch, C. J., D. W. Flinn, and R. H. 1982–83 Drought in Indonesia: Hansen, J. M. G. 1997. “Proposed Development on Natural Forest: M. van de Graaff. 1983. “Erosion Assessment and Monitoring.” In Communications Systems to be The Case of Timber and Tree and Nutrient Loss Resulting from M. Glantz, R. Katz, and M. Krenz, Used in Forest and Land Fire Crop Plantations in Indonesia.” Ash Wednesday (February 1983) eds., Climate Crisis: The Spatial Prevention and Suppression Draft report for the Center for Wildfires: A Case Study.” Impacts Associated with the Activities.” Paper presented at International Forestry Research Australian Forestry 46: 173–180. 1982-83 Worldwide Climate the International Workshop on (CIFOR). Bogor, Indonesia. Lennertz, R., and K. F. Panzer. Anomalies, 11– 18. Boulder, National Guidelines on the Kershaw, A. P. 1994. “Pleistocene 1984. “Preliminary Assessment of Colo.: National Center for Protection of Forests against Fire, Vegetation of the Humid Tropics the Drought and Forest Fire Atmospheric Research; Nairobi: Bogor, Indonesia, December 8–9. of Northeastern Queensland, Damage in Kalimantan Timur.” United Nations Environment Heil, A. 1998. “Air Pollution Caused Australia.” Paleogeography, Report by DFS German Forest Programme. by Large Scale Forest Fires in Paleoclimatology, and Inventory Service, Ltd., for Malingreau, J. P., G. Stephens, and Indonesia, 1997.” Unpublished Paleoecology 109: 399–412. German Agency for Technical L. Fellows. 1985. “Remote report for the German Technical LEI (Indonesian Ecolabeling Assistance (GTZ). Sensing of Forest Fires: Cooperation (GTZ) project on Institute). 1998a. Lembaga Liew, S. C., O. K. Lim, L. K. Kwoh, Kalimantan and in Strengthening the Management Ekolabel Indonesia dan and H. Lim. 1998. “A Study of 1982–83.” Ambio 14(6): Capacities of the Indonesian Sertifikasi Pengelolaan Hutan the 1997 Forest Fires in South 314–21. Forestry Ministry (SCMP) and the Produksi Lestari [The East Asia Using SPOT Quicklook Maltby, E. 1997. “Developing Integrated Forest Fire Management Indonesian Ecolabeling Institute Mosiacs.” Paper presented at the Guidelines for the Integrated Project (IFFM). Jakarta. and the certification of sustain- 1998 IEEE International Management and Sustainable Herman, T. 1998. “Million Hectare able management in production Geoscience and Remote Sensing Utilisation of Tropical Lowland Swampland Project Visit forests]. Jakarta. June. Symposium, Seattle, July 6–10. Peatlands.” In J. O. Rieley and S. Observations and Recommend- LEI (Indonesian Ecolabeling Lilley, R. 1998. “Reptile and E. Page, eds., Tropical Peatlands. ations.” World Bank, Jakarta. Institute). 1998b. Minutes of Amphibian Survey in Central Cardigan, U.K.: Samara May 31. Meeting between YLEI Board of Kalimantan with Special Publishing. Indonesia–U.K. Tropical Forest Trustees and FSC. Jakarta. Reference to the Impacts of the Maltby, E., C. P. Immirzi, and R. J. Management Programme. 1999. Leighton, M. 1983. “The El Forest Fires.” Unpublished Stafford, eds. 1996. Tropical “A Draft Position Paper on Nino-Southern Oscillation Event report, WWF-Indonesia. No Peatlands of Southeast Asia. Threats to Sustainable Forest in Southeast Asia: Effects of lizards were found in open Gland, Switzerland: IUCN (World Management in Indonesia: Drought and Fire in Tropical burned peat swamp, but some Conservation Union). Roundwood Supply and Demand Forest in Eastern Borneo.” snakes were found in nearby and Illegal Logging.” Report No. Unpublished report, Department areas. Three land turtle species PFM/EC/99/01. Jakarta. of Anthropology, Harvard known to inhabit the area were Iskandar, M. B. 1997. “Health and University. not observed in burned or Mortality.” In G. W. Jones and T. unburned areas, but frogs and H. Hull, eds., Indonesia Assessment: tadpoles were observed in the Population and Human Resources. survey area. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 58 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Marten, G. G., ed. 1986. Traditional Natural Resources Institute, Pickford, S. G. 1995. “Fuel Types Radjagukguk, B. 1997. “Peat Soils Agriculture in Southeast Asia: A University of Greenwich (U.K.). and Hazard in the Bukit of Indonesia: Location, Human Ecology Perspective. 1996. “A Review of ODA Forestry Soeharto Project Area.” Final Classification and Problems for Boulder, Colo., and London: Sector Strategy for Indonesia.” consultancy report for the Sustainability.” In J. O. Rieley Westview Press. Report prepared for the Overseas Integrated Forest Fire Management and S. E. Page, eds., Tropical Mayer, J.H. 1989. Socioeconomic Development Administration. Project. Samarinda, Indonesia. Peatlands. Cardigan, U.K.: Aspects of the Forest Fire of October. Jakarta. August. Samara Publishing. 1982/83 and the Relation of Nicholls, N. 1993. “ENSO, Drought Poole, P. 1995. Indigenous Ramon, J., and D. Wall. 1998. “Fire Local Communities Towards and Flooding in South-East Peoples, Mapping and and Smoke Occurrence in Forestry and Forest Management. Asia.” In H. Brookfield and Y. Biodiversity Conservation. Relation to Vegetation and Land Samarinda, Indonesia: FR Report Byron, eds., South-East Asia's Peoples and Forest Program Use in South Sumatra Province, No. 8, German Agency for Technical Environmental Future: The Discussion Paper Series. Indonesia with Particular Cooperation (GTZ)/ITTO. Search for Sustainability, Washington, D.C.: Biodiversity Reference to 1997.” Unpublished Michielsen, W. J. M. 1882. “Verslag 154–74. Tokyo: United Nations Support Program. paper, European Commission, eener reis door de boven dis- University Press; Oxford, U.K.: Poppele, J., S. Sumarto, and L. Forest Fire Prevention and tricten der Sampit en Katingen Oxford University Press. Pritchett. 1999. “Social Impacts Control Project. Jakarta. riviersen in maart en april 1880” O'Brien, T.G., M.F. Kinaird, Sunarto, of the Crisis: New Data and Ridder, R. M. 1995. “Vegetation (Dutch). Tijdschrift voor A.A. Dwiyahreni, W.H. Rombang Policy Implications.” Draft Inventory, Forest Classification Indissche Taal, Land-en and K. Anggraini, 1998. “Effects paper prepared for the World and Fire Risk Mapping by Volkenkunde 28: 1–87. of the 1997 Fires on the Forest Bank. Jakarta. Remote Sensing and GIS.” Ministry of Forestry, Indonesia. and Wildlife of the Bukit Barisan Potter, L. 1988. “Indigenes and Consultancy report for the 1996. Indonesian Forestry Selatan National Park, Colonisers: Dutch Forest Policy in Integrated Forest Fire Management Action Program. Rev. vers. Jakarta. Sumatra.” Unpublished report, South and East Borneo Project. Samarinda, Indonesia. Momberg, F., K. Atok, and M. Sirait. Wildlife Conservation Society (Kalimantan) 1900 to 1950.” In July. 1996. Drawing on Local Indonesia Program and J. Dargavel, K. Dixon, and N. Rieley, J. O. 1999. “Death of the Knowledge: A Community University of Indonesia. Semple, eds., Changing Tropical Mega Rice Project! Creation of Mapping Training Manual. Pangestu, M. 1989. “East Forests: Historical Perspectives Another Monster?” Unpublished Case Studies from Indonesia. Kalimantan: Beyond the Timber on Today's Challenges in Asia, report. Kalimantan Tropical Jakarta: Ford Foundation, and Oil Boom.” In H. Hill, ed., Australia and Oceania. Peat Swamp Forest Research Yayasan Karya Sosial Pancur Unity and Diversity: Regional Canberra: Centre for Resource Project, School of Geography, Kasih, and World Wide Fund for Economic Development in and Environmental Studies. University of Nottingham, UK. Nature Indonesia Programme. Indonesia since 1970. Potter, L., and J. Lee. 1998a. “Oil August. 22. National Institute of Health Singapore: Oxford University Palm in Indonesia: Its Role in Rieley, J. O., and S. E. Page, eds. Research and Development, Press. Forest Conversion and the Fires 1997. Tropical Peatlands. Ministry of Health, Indonesia. Peluso, N. L. 1992. Rich Forests, of 1997/98.” Report prepared for Cardigan, U.K.: Samara 1998. “A Cohort Study on Health Poor People: Resource Control the World Wide Fund for Nature Publishing. Impacts of Haze from Forest and Resistance in Java. Berkeley: Indonesia Programme. Jakarta. Romm, J. 1980. “ Forest Fires.” Research design presented University of California Press. October. Development in Indonesia and at the Bi-Regional Workshop on Peluso, N. L. 1995. “Whose Woods Potter, L., and J. Lee. 1998b. Tree the Productive Transformation of Health Impact of Haze-Related are These? Counter-Mapping Planting in Indonesia: Trends, Capital.” Presented at the Ninth Air Pollution, Institute of Medical Forest Territories in Kalimantan, Impacts and Directions. Final Annual Conference on Research, Kuala Lumpur, Indonesia.” Antipode 27(4): Report of a consultancy for the Indonesian Studies, Berkeley, Malaysia, June 1–4. 383–406. Center for International Forestry Calif., July 31–August 3. Phonboon, K., P. Kanatharana, O. Research (CIFOR). Adelaide, Paisarnuchapong, and S. Agsorn. Australia. 1998. Health and Environmental Impacts from the 1997 ASEAN Haze in Southern Thailand. Bangkok: Health Systems Research Institute.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 59 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Sanderson, S., with S. Bird. 1998. Shimokawa, E. 1988. “Effects of Sunderlin, W. D., and I. A. P. Tomich, T. P., A. M. Fagi, H. de “The New Politics of Protected fire of tropical forest on soil ero- Resosudarmo. 1996. Rates and Foresta, G. Michon, D. Areas.” In K. Brandon, K. H. sion,” in H. Tagawa and N. Causes of Deforestation in Murdiyarso, F. Stolle, and M. van Redford, and S. E. Sanderson, Wirawan (eds), Research on the Indonesia: Towards a Noordwijk. 1998. “Indonesia’s eds., Parks in Peril: People, Process of Earlier Recovery of Resolution of the Ambiguities. Fires: Smoke as a Problem, Smoke Politics, and Protected Areas, Tropical Rain Forest After a Occasional Paper No. 9. Bogor, as a Symptom.” Agroforestry 441–54. Washington, D.C.: Large Scale Fire in Kalimantan Indonesia: Center for Today 10(1, January-March): Island Press. Timur, Indonesia pp. 2-11. International Forestry Research. 4–7. Schindler, L., W. Thoma, and K. Occasional Paper No. 14, Susilo, A. and J. Tangetasik, 1986. Trenberth, K. E., and T. J. Hoar. Panzer. 1989. The Kalimantan Research Center for the South “Dampak kebakaran hutan ter- 1997. “El Niño and Climate Forest Fire of 1982–3 in East Pacific, Kagoshima University. hadap perilaku orangutan Change.” Geophys. Res. Lett. Kalimantan. Part I: The Fire, Singapore. 1998. “Singapore (Pongo pygmaeus) di Taman 24(23): 3057–60. the Effects, the Damage and Country Report on the 1997 Nasional Kutai” (Indonesian). USDA (U.S. Department of Technical Solutions. FR Report Smoke Haze for the WHO Bi- Wanatrop 1(2). Agriculture). 1997. “Health Hazards No. 5. Jakarta: German Agency Regional Workshop on the Suzuki, A. 1988. “The socioecological of Smoke: Recommendations of for Technical Cooperation Health Impacts of Haze-Related study of orangutans and forest the Consensus Conference, April (GTZ)/ITTO. Air Pollution,” Kuala Lumpur, conditions after the big forest fire 1997.” Washington, D.C. June. Schindler, L. 1998. “Fire Management June 1–4. and drought, 1983 in Kutai Cited in A. Heil, 1998, “Air in Indonesia: Quo Vadis?” Paper Sowerby, J. and Yeager, C.P. 1997. National Park, Indonesia,” in H. Pollution Caused by Large Scale presented at the International “Fire effects on forests, forest Tagawa and N. Wirawan (eds), Forest Fires in Indonesia, 1997.” Cross-Sectoral Forum on Forest wildlife and associated ecosystem A Research on the Process of Unpublished report for the Fire Management in South East processes.” Unpublished manu- Earlier Recovery of Tropical German Technical Cooperation Asia, Jakarta, December 8–9. script, WWF-Indonesia Kayan Rain Forest After a Large Scale (GTZ) project on Strengthening Schwarz, A. 1994. A Nation in Mentarang Project, East Fire in Kalimantan Timur, the Management Capacities of Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s. Kalimantan, Indonesia. October. Indonesia. Occasional Paper No. the Indonesian Forestry Ministry St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and State Ministry for Environment, 14, Research Center for the South (SCMP) and the Integrated Unwin. Indonesia. 1998. “Analisis Pacific, Kagoshima University. Forest Fire Management Project Senior Management Advisory Team, Kebijakan: Penanggulangan Tantra, I. G. M., H. Basuki, and A. (IFFM). Jakarta. July. Indonesia–U.K. Tropical Forest Kebakaran Hutan dan Lahan Dwiyono. 1998. “Management USEPA (U.S. Environmental Management Programme. 1998. Tahun 1997” [Policy analysis: of the Forest Conservation and Protection Agency). 1998. Report “Draft Response to Proposed IMF response to the 1997 land and Protected Areas of Indonesia.” on U.S. EPA Air Monitoring of Forestry Sector Reforms.” Report forest fires]. Jakarta. March. Presented at the International Haze from S.E. Asia Biomass No. SMAT/98/EC/01. Jakarta. State Ministry for Environment and Forest Conservation and Fires. EPA/600/R-98/071. UNDP (United Nations Development Protected Areas Expert Workshop, Washington, D.C. June. Programme). 1998. Forest and Canberra, Australia, September van Steenis, C. G. G. J. 1957. Land Fires in Indonesia. 8–10. “Outline of the Vegetation Types Volume 1. Impacts, Factors and Tim Teknis Pengembangan Lahan in Indonesia and Some Adjacent Evaluation. Jakarta. September. Gambut Di Propinsi Kalimantan Regions.” Eighth Pacific Science State Ministry for Environment, Tengah [Technical Team for Congress, Vol. I Botany, 61–97. Indonesia. 1998. Forest and Peatland Development in Central Land Fires in Indonesia. Vol. 2: Kalimantan Province], 1997. Plan of Action for Fire Disaster “Analisis Mengenai Dampak Management. Jakarta. Lingkungan Regional Sunderlin, W. D. 1998. “Between Pengembangan Lahan Gambut Danger and Opportunity: Satu Juta Hektar Di Propinsi Indonesia’s Forests In an Era of Kalimantan Tengah” [Regional Economic Crisis and Political environmental impact analysis Change.” September 11, 1998. for the one million hectare peat Available at land development in Central http://www.cgiar.org/cifor. Kalimantan Province]. Jakarta: January.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 60 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Vayda, A. P. 1998. “Finding Causes Wells, M., and others. 1992. People World Bank. 1998a. Indonesia in Yeager, C., and G. Fredriksson. of the 1997–98 Indonesian and Parks: Linking Protected Crisis: A Macroeconomic Update. 1999. “Draft Paper: Fire Impacts Forest Fires: Problems and Areas Management with Local Washington, D.C. on Primate and Other Wildlife in Possibilities.” Report prepared for Communities. World Bank/World World Bank. 1998b. “World Bank Kalimantan, Indonesia during the World Wide Fund for Nature Wide Fund for Nature/U.S. Agency Involvement in Sector Adjustment 1997/98.” World Wide Fund for Indonesia Programme, Jakarta. for International Development. for Forests in Indonesia: The Nature Indonesia Programme. Draft. December 23. Whitmore, T. C. 1984. Tropical Rain Issues.” Unpublished memoran- Jakarta. Vayda, A. P., C. J. Pierce Colfer, and Forests of the Far East. 2d ed. dum. Jakarta. Zakaria, R. Y. 1999. “Masalah M. Brotokusomo. 1980. Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon World Bank. 1999a. “Ensuring a Agraria & Kelembagaan Adat: Interactions between People and Press/Oxford University Press. Future for Indonesia’s Forests (or Mari Menata Ulang Hubungan Forests in East Kalimantan. Whitmore, T. C. 1990. An Ensuring a Future Indonesian Raykat-Negara” [The agrarian Honolulu: East-West Center Introduction to Tropical Rain Forest).” Paper presented to the problem and adat institutions: Environment and Policy Institute. Forests. Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Consultative Group on a call to reorder society-state Verstappen, H. T. 1980. “Quaternary Press. Indonesia, Paris, July 29–30. relations]. Paper presented at the Climatic Changes and Natural Wirawan, N. 1985. Kutai National World Bank. 1999b. “Indonesia: Discussion Dialogue on the Environment in SE Asia.” Park Management Plan 1985- From Crisis to Opportunity.” Direction and Strategy for Agrarian GeoJournal 4(1): 45–54. 1990. Bogor: WWF/IUCN. Washington, D.C. July 21. Reform, Bogor, Indonesia, Vidal, J. 1997. “The Thousand Mile Wirawan, N. 1993. “The Hazard of World Bank. 1999c. “Deforestation March 16–17. Shroud: When the Earth Caught Fire.” In H. Brookfield and Y. in Indonesia. A Preliminary View Zerner, C. 1992. Indigenous Forest- Fire.” The Guardian Weekend, Byron, eds., South-East Asia's of the Situation in Sumatra and Dwelling Communities in November 8. Environmental Future: The Kalimantan.” Jakarta. Working Indonesia’s Outer Islands: Wakker, E. 1998. “Introducing Search for Sustainability, Draft, August 16. Livelihood, Rights, and Zero-Burning Techniques in 242–60. Tokyo: United Nations WWF-Indonesia and EEPSEA Environmental Management Indonesia’s Oil Palm University Press; Oxford, U.K.: (Economy and Environment Institutions in the Era of Plantations.” Report prepared Oxford University Press. Programme for South East Asia). Industrial Forest Exploitation. for the World Wide Fund for World Bank. 1993. “Indonesia 1998. The Indonesian Fires and Consultancy Report prepared for Nature Indonesia Programme. Forestry Sector Review.” Draft. Haze of 1997: The Economic the World Jakarta. April. Jakarta. April. Toll. Singapore and Jakarta. Forestry Sector Policy Review. WALHI (Indonesian Foundation for World Bank. 1994a. “Indonesia. Yajima, T. 1988. “Change in the Washington, D.C.: Resource the Environment). 1999. “Nasib Environment and Development: terrestrial invertebrate community Planning Corporation. Hutan Kita, Tidak di Tangan Challenges for the Future.” structure in relation to a large Zuhud, E. A. M., and Haryanto, eds. Rakyat: Studi WALHI Kebakaran Report No. 12083-IND. fire at Kutai National Park, East 1994. Pelestarian Pemanfaatan Hutan dan Lahan 1997/1998” Washington D.C. Kalimantan (Borneo), Keanekaragaman Tumbuhan [The fate of our forests, not in World Bank 1994b. “Indonesia Indonesia,” in H. Tagawa and N. Obat Hutan Tropika Indonesia the hands of the people: WALHI’s Transmigration Program: A Wirawan (eds), A Research in [Conservation and utilization of study of the forest and land fires Review of Five Bank-Supported the Process of Earlier Recovery the diversity of medicinal plants of 1997/1998]. Unpublished Projects.” Report No. 12988. of Tropical Rain Forest After a of Indonesian tropical forests]. report. Jakarta. Washington, D.C. Large Scale Fire in Kalimantan Bogor, Indonesia: Bogor World Bank. 1995. “The Economics Timur, Indonesia, Occasional Agricultural Institute and the of Long Term Management of Paper No. 14, Research Center Indonesian Tropical Institute Indonesia's Natural Forests.” for the South Pacific, Kagoshima (LATIN). Unpublished report. Jakarta. University. World Bank. 1997. “Investing in Yeager, C.P. 1998. “Interim Report Biodiversity: A Review of on Fire Impacts on Tanjung Indonesia’s Integrated Conservation Puting National Park.” and Development Projects.” Unpublished report, World Wide Draft. Jakarta. June 10. Fund for Nature–Indonesia. August.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 61 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE APPENDIX A BAPPENAS–ADB METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE 1997–98 FIRES IN INDONESIA

FORESTS AND TIMBER NON-TIMBER FOREST FLOOD PROTECTION, CARBON EMISSIONS PRODUCTS EROSION AND SILTATION The total area burned was The project team estimated estimated at 9.8 million hectares A socio-economic survey Based on a 1997 report cover- that 757.5 million metric tons of (ha), 49 percent (4.65 million ha) undertaken in East Kalimantan ing 39 river catchments, which esti- carbon dioxide (CO2) was produced of which is on forest land (forest of concluded that on average, rural mated the protection against flood during the 1997–98 fires (more all categories but excluding planta- households suffered a loss equiva- damage afforded by forests at than 75 percent of this as a result of tions, both logged and unlogged). lent to $722 for the year following $91.60/ha/year, combined with the the combustion of peat). Power Estimates of timber destroyed were the fires. It was not possible to assumptions about loss of tree cover generating companies that wish to based on average standing volumes extrapolate these data to give the described above, the value of lost offset their greenhouse gas emis- by island and forest type from the losses of non-timber forest products flood protection was estimated at sions by either preventing the loss of National Forest Inventory.1 for area of forest burned because $413 million. carbon into the atmosphere or fix- Estimates of the proportion of the socio-economic survey could The protection against erosion ing atmospheric carbon through standing volume burned were based not be linked to specific areas of and siltation provided by forests was afforestation projects are prepared on a logging residue survey under- forest. Surveys undertaken in a assigned a total value of $6,040/ha. to pay between $6 and $8 per ton of taken as part of the BAPPENAS-ADB national park, however, which were This assumes that when forest is carbon fixed or saved. Based on project and an extensive field survey linked to a specific and defined converted, it is lost forever. By calcu- these assumptions, the total cost of completed in a national park. extensive area of forest, showed that lating the discounted cashflow that carbon released into the atmosphere From this work it was estimated total non-timber forest production would yield a net present value of (based on $7/ton) was estimated at that 30 percent of the basal area in was estimated at $28/ha/year in $6,040, it is possible to estimate the more than $1.4 billion. This figure burned areas was destroyed by fires. 1998 prices. Based on the assump- protective function for the first few is conservative; other estimates have The value of the timber destroyed tions derived for the degree of years. When this figure is multiplied put the amount of CO2 produced at was based on two estimates of the burned and lost trees, and the by the area affected by the fires, an 3.7 billion tons, nearly five times economic rent of the forest by assumptions that non-timber forest estimated loss due to erosion and the figure used here. island group, one based on current production would gradually be re- siltation of $1.6 billion was deter- forest practices ($1.4 billion) and established over a 20-year period, mined. TIMBER PLANTATIONS the other assuming reform of the the aggregate loss of non-timber log market ($2.1 billion). forest production from the fires was Estimated losses on timber Losses of trees below harvest estimated at $586 million. plantations were calculated by age were also included by estimating assuming that the areas burned reduction in volumes growing into were evenly distributed over the dif- the exploitable size classes, discounted ferent age classes. Based on field into net present volumes, and given a observations, it was determined that value based on the two economic rent plantations less than 3 years old models noted above at $256 million were completely destroyed but that and $377 million, respectively. plantations more than 3 years were only 30 percent destroyed. The fig- ures for area burned were multi- plied by the establishment costs compounded to present day terms to give an estimate of the loss in terms of establishment costs. Estimates of profit foregone were also included. In this manner, the total loss of timber plantation value was esti- mated at $94 million.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 62 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE ESTATE CROPS HEALTH TOURISM OTHER LOSSES

Official area estimates of estate Official statistics for the health Tourism, an important eco- The officially reported losses crops destroyed tallied with the esti- impacts of the haze in 1997 were nomic sector for Indonesia, declined for damage in transmigration areas, mates of the BAPPENAS–ADB study, given in the Ministry of Environment significantly in 1997 and 1998, but transport losses, and firefighting costs and thus, the figure of $319 million valuation study. The 1998 smoke not all of this reduction can be have also been included, totalling determined by the Ministry of and haze event covered three attributed to the fires; other factors $46 million for these three items. Environment valuation study2 was provinces in Kalimantan for roughly such as the Asian economic crisis used. the same period and to the same and the political unrest in 1998 also Source: intensity as in 1997. It was therefore contributed. By analyzing the trends National Development Planning AGRICULTURE assumed that health impacts of tourist arrivals by region of ori- Agency (BAPPENAS), 1999. Final incurred in these provinces in 1998 gin, it is possible to predict the Report, Annex I: Causes, Extent, Agricultural losses incurred would be the same as in 1997. The numbers of tourists that would have Impact and Costs of 1997/98 during 1997 and 1998 were due to impacts were then multiplied for arrived had these events not Fires and Drought. Asian drought as well as fires and haze. standard health care costs and esti- occurred. Subtracting the actual Development Bank (ADB) Technical By analyzing past trends of agricul- mates for lost productivity to give a arrivals from the numbers predicted Assistance Grant TA 2999-INO, tural production it was possible to total health impact estimate of $145 by the trends produced an estimate Planning for Fire Prevention and predict the level of production for million. of the loss in the numbers of tourist Drought Management Project (April). 1997 and 1998 had there been no arrivals. Assuming standard profit drought, fires, or haze. Estimates of margins and overheads it was then Notes: lost production were derived by sub- possible to estimate the economic 1. Ministry of Forestry, 1996. Final tracting the actual production from loss in tourism due to the fires and Forest Resources Statistics Report. Jakarta. the predicted production. Findings haze, which was determined to be 2. State Ministry for Environment showed that rice production had $111 million (cf. the WWF-EEPSEA and UNDP, 1998. significantly decreased (beyond nor- estimate of $70 million for 1997 3. WWF Indonesia Programme and 3 mal variability) by 2.6 million tons alone.) EEPSEA, 1998. in 1997 and 7 million tons in 1998. The economic cost is the expense of trying to grow the crop (i.e., wasted seed, fertilizer, pesticide, labor, etc.) plus the profit foregone by the farmers—the equivalent of the farm gate price. The total economic cost of lost rice production was esti- mated at $1.9 billion, to which was added the net cost of importing rice as a substitute, for a total estimated agricultural loss of $2.4 billion.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 63 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE APPENDIX B WHAT IS KNOWN (AND NOT KNOWN) ABOUT THE ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF THE 1997-98 FIRES

The ecological impacts of the 1997–98 The immediate effect of a As noted above in the discus- Peat swamp forests present a fires have yet to be systematically forest fire is to reduce vegetation to sion of the 1982–83 fires, improper- special case, because they are par- assessed in the field, except for the nutrient-rich ash, which can nourish ly logged forests are particularly fire ticularly vulnerable to fire and pro- preliminary studies discussed below. the beginnings of a new forest. prone because excessive amounts of duce the most noxious smog of any Considerable prior information exists, However, if the fire is very hot, the waste wood are left on the forest forest type when they burn. A sig- however, about the ecological soil surface hardens, making it dif- floor and the forest canopy is opened, nificant portion of the haze in 1997 impacts of forest fires on tropical ficult for seeds to sprout, and causing causing ground vegetation and dead was generated by peat fires, which forest ecosystems generally—including the ash to be washed away by the first branches to dry out quickly. Heavily are quite different from fires in low- a great deal of data concerning the heavy rain.2 Intense burns and sub- disturbed forest tends to burn almost land forest. Peat fires typically burn East Kalimantan fires of 1982–83; sequent soil erosion result in the loss completely, leaving few live trees. underground as well as above, pro- these data are used to extrapolate of other soil constituents that facili- Pristine forest is much less likely to duce relatively low heat, generate probable impacts. tate vegetation regrowth, such as burn, and when it does, usually only large amounts of smoke, eliminate organic matter, soil organisms that ground-level vegetation is consumed the seedbank, and destroy the soil, FOREST VEGETATION accelerate plant matter decomposi- leaving the middle and upper tree which can take thousands of years tion, and specialized fungi that assist layers intact. Lightly-burned pristine to replace.4 The effects of fire on the vege- key tree species to absorb nutrients. forest is quick to recover after a fire. Research carried out in peat tation in forest ecosystems are com- A comparison of soil erosion rates Moderately to heavily burned forests forests affected by the 1997 fires at plex, varying with the type of forest, between burned and unburned for- take decades or centuries to regenerate Central Kalimantan’s Tanjung degree and recentness of disturbance, est in Kutai National Park after the due to an invasion of pioneer tree Puting National Park provides an level of drought, and incidence of 1982–83 fires showed that erosion species and the loss of seeds and indication of the impacts of fire on repeated fire episodes.1 Lowland had accelerated more than tenfold seedlings of species normally found peat swamp forest vegetation. (See rainforests and peat swamp forests, in the burned areas.3 Soil erosion in a mature forest. Heavily burned Table B-1.) Areas that burned in for example, two forest types partic- does not occur in the aftermath of forest may be converted to grasslands 1991 but were allowed to regenerate ularly affected by the 1997–98 fires, peat swamp fires, but ash and other by repeated intentional burning. without disturbance until 1998 react very differently to fire. fire residues are washed away and The primary vegetation ecology showed signs of rapid regeneration, the surface level of burned peat is question to be answered is whether whereas areas burned repeatedly lowered by combustion losses. repeated large-scale fires will upset with only short intervals between the stability of forest ecosystems the fires showed much lower stem beyond the point of recovery. densities and species diversity.5

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 64 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE WILDLIFE The fauna of East Kalimantan’s The 1982–83 fires caused The scale of the 1997–98 fires, Kutai National Park received the high mortality among reptiles and however, exceeded the orangutan’s It is difficult to document the most concentrated scientific atten- amphibians,13 and had a negative ability to adapt to stressful situations. effects of fire on rain forest animals tion immediately after the 1982–83 impact on swamp dwelling reptiles, Hundreds of adults were killed by and insects because their popula- fires, and in the half decade that but most, with the exception of the villagers in Central and East tions can vary seasonally or in followed. These studies showed that crocodile, eventually reappeared in Kalimantan as they fled from the multi-year cycles, and the ecology most large mammals were still in their former habitat.14 Snakes also forest to escape the effects of the of many species has not been well the area, with wild pigs (Sus spp.) reappeared in the forest, with the drought, smoke and fires. Immediately studied. Wildlife may be killed becoming abundant by taking exception of large species such as after the 1997 fires, a WWF-Indonesia directly by the heat and smoke of advantage of new food sources,8 pythons (Phyton spp.). In 1997, researcher encountered 14 live fires or may subsequently weaken and Banteng (Bos javanicus ) still forest lizards were completely absent orangutans in and around Tanjung and die from lack of food and water common because these large wild from burned areas of a national Puting National Park, an area with or habitat loss.6 Small, slow-mov- cattle also adapted their diets.9 Many park in Sumatra one month after it a large and well-studied population ing animals are most likely to be sambar deer (Cervus unicolor) and burned.15 A rapid survey in a peat of orangutans. A farmer outside the killed outright by fires, and animals barking deer (Muntiacus muntjak) swamp area of Central Kalimantan park told the researcher that he had with highly specific food, habitat, perished in the fires,10 but their immediately after the 1997 fires killed a large male orangutan with shelter, or climate requirements are populations appeared to have recov- yielded preliminary conclusions a spear as it ate pineapples in the most at risk during the immediate ered a year later.11 The Malayan that most land and arboreal reptiles farmer's field. Many orphaned post-fire period. Some larger crea- Sun Bear (Helarctos malayanus) had probably died from the heat of juveniles were sold for the pet trade, tures are capable of moving to other is thought to have declined in Kutai, the fires, whereas crocodiles, water but as of April, 161 mostly young areas to escape fire but often stray however, possibly beyond the point of turtles, and other species inhabiting orangutans were in the care of the into territory settled by humans and recovery, while small carnivores like relatively deep water had largely Semboja Orangutan Introduction are captured or killed, as happened the Malay civet (Vicerra tangalunga), survived.16 Center in East Kalimantan. Even to many orangutans in Kalimantan otter (Lutra spp.), leopard cat The charismatic and relatively this safe haven was threatened by during 1997. The loss of key organisms (Felis bengalensis), and flat headed well-studied orangutan (Pongo fire and food scarcity in the area. in ecosystems, such as pollinators cat (Felis planiceps) are thought to pygmaeus) was the animal species Primatologists believe that the and decomposers, can significantly have increased in numbers in the that received the most media atten- 1997–98 fires will mark the begin- slow the recovery of the forest years after the fires in response to tion during both the 1982–83 and ning of a steeper downward trend in ecosystem.7 The changing compo- an increase in prey animals.12 1997–98 fires. Researchers in Kutai the already declining population of sition of vegetation in a recovering found that while some orangutans Bornean orangutans. forest may provide alternate or even perished in the fires, and others were superior food sources for some displaced and malnourished in its omnivores, generalist herbivores and immediate aftermath, these omniv- insects, sometimes leading to dramatic orous great apes were able to switch increases in their populations after to eating bark and young stems fires, and thereby changing the until fruit reappeared in the forest.17 faunal composition of the forest. Susilo and Tangketasik concluded that maturing secondary forest offers more food value to orangutans than primary forest. As early as 1984, TABLE B-1 orangutans were observed carrying Mean Stem Density and Species Richness of Forest Vegetation in Relation to infants born after the fires, proving Fire Exposure at Tanjung Puting National Park, Central Kalimantan the species’ ability to adapt to the STEMS/HECTARE SPECIES/HECTARE new conditions.18 Burned in 1994 and 1997 165 11 Burned repeatedly, including 1997 113 7 Burned in 1991 235 24 Unburned 951 35

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 65 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE Other primates fared relatively Bird populations were reduced There appear to be no scientific well after the 1982–83 fires because by direct impacts of the 1982–83 reports describing the effects on Notes: they adapted their diets to replace fires. During the fires, birds were coral reefs and other nearshore 1. Sowerby and Yeager, 1997. figs and other favored fruits from observed by local people to become marine ecosystems when the heavy 2. Wirawan, 1993. trees that had suffered high levels of disoriented in the heavy smoke and rains of late 1983 flushed fire-gen- 3. Shimokawa, 1988. damage and mortality. Leighton fall to the ground.22 Fruit-eating erated sediment and polluted water 4. Yeager, 1998. reported that both pig tailed birds, especially hornbills, could not into the Straight. This 5. Ibid. macaques (Macacca nemestrina) be found in Kutai immediately after coastline is largely muddy due to 6. Boer, 1989. and gibbons (Hylobates muelleri) the 1982–83 fires, presumably the normal discharge of sediment 7. Yeager, 1998. in Kutai National Park took advan- because the fires had killed a large from several large rivers, but off- 8. Doi, 1990. tage of explosions in the popula- percentage of the fruit trees upon shore islands are ringed by coral 9. Wirawan, 1985. tions of wood boring insects which they depend for food.23 reefs. Corals are quickly smothered 10. Boer, 1989. immediately after the fires. He Insect-feeding birds enjoyed an and killed by even brief exposure to 11. Mayer, 1989. detected no change in the behavior abundance of food in the aftermath heavy sediment, and unusually 12. Doi, 1990. or activity of two gibbon families of fires because wood-eating insect high levels of fresh water discharge 13. Leighton and Wirawan, 1986. that he had studied prior to the populations exploded in response to from rivers can kill corals by reduc- 14. Boer, 1989. fires.19 Leaf eating monkeys the enormous supply of dead wood. ing the salinity of ocean water. 15. O'Brien and others, 1998. (Presbytis spp.) were very difficult Because of the short life cycles Coastal ecology can also be nega- 16. Lilley, 1998. to find after the fires, and even six of most insects and other inverte- tively affected because the impor- 17. Suzuki, 1988. years later their densities were low. brates, their populations react rela- tant fish nursery function of 18. Susilo and Tangetasik, 1986. Proboscis monkeys (Nasalis larva- tively quickly to ecological changes mangrove ecosystems may be 19. Leighton, 1983. tus) maintained their populations in the aftermath of fires. As men- impaired by excessive deposition of 20. Boer, 1989. in mangrove forest (Boer, 1989), a tioned above, the 1982–83 fires sediment. La Niña brought abnor- 21. Schindler, Thoma and Panzer, 1989. vegetation type not heavily dam- caused populations of wood-eating mally heavy rainfall towards the 22. Mayer, 1989. aged by the fires. Two primitive pri- insects to increase dramatically, and end of 1998, but even a normal 23. Leighton, 1983. mates, however, western tarsiers butterfly populations exploded as a rainy season would have serious 24. Wirawan, 1993. (Tarcius bancanus) and slow loris result of the abundance of nutrient- consequences for marine ecosystems 25. Yajima, 1988. (Nycticebus coucany), were extinct rich ash.24 One entomologist study- as the remains of rain forests are or extremely reduced in number by ing the effects of the 1982–83 fires washed out to sea. 1986.20 Seven years after the fires, on invertebrate ecology in Kutai natural succession favored figs, National Park found that the diver- lianas, and other important primate sity and numbers of soil and litter fruit species,21 boding well for the dwelling invertebrates declined recovery of most primate populations. somewhat after the fire, but recov- Proboscis monkeys are a ered within three years.25 The rich, threatened species found almost but little studied invertebrate fauna exclusively in riverine and coastal living in the canopies of tropical habitats. Because riverine forest was trees are presumably destroyed heavily affected by the 1997–98 along with their habitat. The recov- fires, this species has probably lost ery of arboreal invertebrate diversity the greatest percentage of its probably parallels forest regeneration. remaining habitat of any primate species in Borneo.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 66 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE APPENDIX C CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES OF THE INDONESIAN ECOLABELING INSTITUTE (LEI)

Preliminary evaluation. A The field assessment team car- Performance evaluation. The certification decision. firm seeking certification of one of ries out its assessment on the basis After the applicant makes payment LEI then issues a five-year certifica- its units submits an application of LEI’s set procedures, criteria, and to LEI to cover the costs of this stage tion, which is announced in the along with the documents and indicators, complemented by the of the process, LEI forms and briefs mass media. This decision is final, information specified in LEI’s special concerns raised by Expert Expert Panel II, which evaluates the although an appeals process is pro- guidelines. If the documents are Panel I. The applicant is required to management unit’s performance on vided under which any party can complete, the firm signs an agree- send one or more staff to accompa- the basis of the assessor’s field appeal the decision. (The firm in ment with LEI and pays the fees for ny the team and guide it in the report and additional information East Kalimantan that failed its the initial assessment of informa- field. The accompanying staff must that other stakeholders may have assessment due to fires in its con- tion contained in the documents. possess adequate knowledge and provided to LEI. Membership of this cession area has appealed the deci- This assessment is carried out by authority to directly clarify matters panel is the same as for Panel I, sion, giving the appeals process its Expert Panel I, which is appointed for the field assessment team as with the addition of four experts on first real test.) A maximum of three by LEI. Applicants are given a necessary. In parallel with the field the region where the operation in field audits may be carried out by chance to explain and elaborate on assessment, LEI provides public question is located. In addition to LEI during the five-year period, but their documentation before the notice (through local newspapers) studying the report, the panel is the first one must be carried out panel. If Panel I agrees that the to all stakeholders in the area that given an opportunity to directly within the first two years. These management unit is a valid candi- the management unit is under question the field assessors. The audits can result in upgrading, date for certification, it recom- assessment and invites stakeholders panel then ranks the performance downgrading, or revocation of the mends implementation of a field to contribute additional views or of the applicant’s management unit firm’s certification. assessment and notes areas to information. LEI also encourages (using as grades the terms gold, sil- which the field assessment should local NGOs, communities and other ver, bronze, copper, or zinc) and pay particular attention. stakeholders to form a regional makes its recommendation to LEI. forestry consultative forum to facili- Only those applicants attaining Field assessments. LEI itself tate the articulation of local con- gold, silver, or bronze rankings are does not carry out field assessments cerns relating to the certification eligible for certification. The panel but, rather, certifies assessors who process. also makes recommendations to the meet its published criteria. The Within 30 days of completing applicant on actions it should take applicant chooses the assessor from the field assessment, the assessor to bring its operation more into line among those meeting the criteria writes a report according to set with the LEI criteria for sustainable through a process of open bidding. guidelines and provides it to LEI. management. The winning bid is scrutinized by LEI, which, if there are no problems, issues a “no objections” letter. The applicant then concludes a contract for services with the assessor for the field assessment. Assessors may be private firms or NGOs, as long as they meet the requisite LEI criteria. LEI also designed the standardized curriculum and training manuals for field assessors. The first round of field assessor training, for 86 pro- fessionals, was held in June 1998.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 67 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE MAP 1: INDONESIA’S REMAINING FRONTIER FORESTS

Source: Bryant, Nielsen, and Tangley, 1997.

Notes: (a) "Frontier forest" refers to large, ecologically intact and relatively undisturbed natural forests. "Non-frontier forests" are dominated by secondary forests, plantations, degraded forest, and patches of primary forest not large enough to qualify as frontier forest. "Threatened frontier forests" are forests where ongoing or planned human activities will eventually degrade the ecosystem. See Bryant, Nielsen, and Tangley for detailed definitions.

(b) This map was completed prior to the 1999 release of the results of a World Bank-assisted forest mapping effort that concluded that deforestation rates since 1986 have been 50 percent greater than hitherto assumed. Actual forest cover is therefore probably less than shown on this map.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 68 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE MAP 2: DISTRIBUTION AND INTENSITY OF “HAZE” FROM FOREST FIRES IN INDONESIA, SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 1997

Source: Map composition by Y. Martin Hardiono, Telapak Indonesia, reproduced at World Resources Institute, 1999.

Notes: Haze distribution is the mean of cumulative haze distribution from September to November 1997. Derived from Earth Probe satellite data available on the NASA Total Ozone Monitoring System site at: http://jwocky.gsfc.nasa.gov/index.html

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 69 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE MAP 3: DISTRIBUTION OF WILD ORANGUTAN POPULATION, ACCUMULATED HOT SPOTS, AND PROTECTED AREAS IN KALIMANTAN, 1997-98

Source: WWF–Indonesia, 1999. Orangutan Action Plan. Jakarta.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 70 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE MAP 4: FOREST USES AND AREAS BURNED IN 1997-98, EAST KALIMANTAN PROVINCE

Source: Map composition by Y. Martin Hardiono, Telapak Indonesia, reproduced at World Resources Institute, 1999. Note: Fires data from German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) Integrated Forest Fires Management Project, Samarinda, Indonesia.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 71 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE MAPS 5A-5C: LAND CLEARING AND FIRE ON THE CENTRAL KALIMANTAN MILLION-HECTARE RICE PROJECT. MAY 1995-JULY 1997

LANDSAT-image (30 km x 42 km) of the Dadahup area of the Million-Hectare Rice Project, Central Kalimantan, May 10, 1996. Green areas are peat swamp forest.

Source: Kalteng Consultants, Hoehenkirchen, Germany

The Dadahup area on May 29, 1997. Clearcutting of the peat swamp forest and construction of new canals are shown in red.

Source: Kalteng Consultants, Hoehenkirchen, Germany

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 72 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE The Dadahup area in flames, July 29, 1997 (SPOT image).

Source: Kalteng Consultants, Hoehenkirchen, Germany

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 73 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

William D. Ruckelshaus Manuel Arango Aditi Kapoor Jonathan Lash Chairman Frances G. Beinecke Jonathan Lash President Bert Bolin Jeffrey T. Leeds Julia Marton-Lefèvre Robert N. Burt Jane Lubchenco Matthew Arnold Vice Chair David T. Buzzelli Mahmood Mamdani Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Deb Callahan William F. Martin Michael R. Deland Matthew Nimetz Anthony Janetos Sylvia A. Earle Ronald L. Olson Senior Vice President and Chief Program Officer Alice F. Emerson Yi Qian José María Figueres Peter H. Raven Marjorie Beane Shinji Fukukawa Florence T. Robinson Vice President for Administration and Chief Financial Officer David Gergen Jose Sarukhan John H. Gibbons Stephan Schmidheiny Lucy Byrd Dorick Paul Gorman Bruce Smart Vice President for Development William M. Haney, III Scott M. Spangler Denis Hayes James Gustave Speth Kenton R. Miller Cynthia R. Helms Ralph Taylor Vice President for International Development and Conservation Samuel C. Johnson Alvaro Umaña Quesada Calestous Juma Pieter Winsemius Donna W. Wise Yolanda Kakabadse Wren Wirth Vice President for Communications

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE

he World Resources Institute (WRI) is an independent center for policy research and technical assistance on global environmental and devel- T opment issues. WRI’s mission is to move human society to live in ways that protect Earth’s environment and its capacity to provide for the needs and aspirations of current and future generations.

Because people are inspired by ideas, empowered by knowledge, and moved to change by greater understanding, the Institute provide—and helps other institutions provide—objective information and practical proposals for policy and institutional change that will foster environmentally sound, socially equitable development. WRI’s particular concerns are with globally significant environmental problems and their interaction with economic development and social equity at all levels.

The Institute’s current areas of work include economics, forests, biodiversity, climate change, energy, sustainable agriculture, resource and environmental information, trade, technology, national strategies for environmental and resource management, and business liaison.

In all of its policy research and work with institutions, WRI tries to build bridges between ideas and action, meshing the insights of scientific research, economic and institutional analyses, and practical experience with the need for open and participatory decision-making.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 10 G Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002, USA http://www.wri.org/wri

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 74 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE

he World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) is one of the world's largest and most respected private conservation organizations. Based in Gland, T Switzerland, WWF has a worldwide network of 27 national organizations, 5 associated organizations and 21 program offices, with over 4.7 million supporters worldwide. WWF has been active in Indonesia since the 1960s, and currently runs more than twenty ongoing projects at different field locations throughout Indonesia. In September 1996, the WWF Indonesia Foundation was established as a step towards becoming a WWF National Organization, resulting in a change of name in July 1998 from the WWF Indonesia Programme to WWF-Indonesia. In the early years, WWF's mission in Indonesia was primarily to preserve endangered wildlife. But its current mission has expanded, and now embraces preservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of natural resources, and reduced consumption and pollution. WWF-Indonesia's national office is located in Jakarta, with additional offices in Bali, East Kalimantan, and Irian Jaya, each focusing on one of Indonesia’s major bioregions and working closely with local governments, NGOs, and communities.

TELAPAK INDONESIA FOUNDATION

elapak is an Indonesian nongovernmental organization (NGO) based in Bogor, West Java. Founded in 1997, Telapak’s objective is to support T and strengthen sustainable and equitable management of Indonesia’s forest and marine ecosystems and resources. Telapak works through field investigations, policy analyses, and the provision of information to policymak- ers, the media, and other NGOs. Its primary focus is on exposing policies and practices of government agencies, the private sector, and international finan- cial institutions that are prejudicial to Indonesia’s living environment and the interests of future generations, and proposing alternative policies for sustain- able and equitable development. Telapak is strongly committed to working with like-minded individuals and organizations at the grassroots level through- out Indonesia, and therefore directs a considerable amount of energy to helping empower local NGOs and communities to serve as strong defenders of living nat- ural resources in their areas. Telapak is the host institution for Forest Watch Indonesia, an independent forest monitoring network that is affiliated with Global Forest Watch, an international initiative hosted by the World Resources Institute.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 75 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE THE WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE

he World Resources Institute Forest Frontiers Initiative (FFI) is a multi-disciplinary effort to promote stewardship in and around the T world’s last major frontier forests by influencing investment, policy, and public opinion. The FFI team is working with governments, citizens’ groups, and the private sector in Amazonia, Central Africa, Indonesia, North America, and Russia. We also take part in pressing international discussions on forest policy.

We are motivated by the belief that there is a responsible way to use forests. We also see growing interest in finding alternatives to forest destruc- tion that take advantage of the full economic potential of forests, not just immediate revenue from logging and forest clearing.

For each frontier forest region, FFI builds a network of policy-makers, activists, investors, and researchers to promote policy reform. Efforts to minimize the negative impacts of road-building and forest-clearing for agriculture and to stop illegal logging are part of this work.

In collaboration with a variety of partners, WRI is creating Global Forest Watch—an independent, decentralized, global forest monitoring network— which will facilitate the collection of all relevant information on forests and how they are being used as well as provide mechanisms for making this information available to anyone with a stake in the forest.

Business has a leading role to play. WRI is working with the forest products industry and others to create greater production and demand for goods from well-managed forests. We are developing case studies with innovative firms to demonstrate to others the business impacts and opportunities that sustainability presents.

To get access to information about FFI findings and activities and to find out how to participate, visit our website at http://www.wri.org/wri/ffi/ or write to:

Forest Frontiers Initiative World Resources Institute 10 G Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002, U.S.A. Telephone: 202/729-7600 Fax: 202/729-7610 Email: [email protected]

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 76 FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 10 G STREET NE WASHINGTON, DC 20002 USA http://www.wri.org

IN COLLABORATION WITH

WWF-INDONESIA TELAPAK INDONESIA FOUNDATION KANTOR TAMAN A9, UNIT A-1 J1. SEMPUR KALER NO. 16 KAWASAN MEGA KUNINGAN BOGOR 16154, INDONESIA JAKARTA 12950, INDONESIA http://www.wwf.or.id [email protected]

ISBN 1-56973-408-9