Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context
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0/-*/&4637&: *ODPMMBCPSBUJPOXJUI6OHMVFJU XFIBWFTFUVQBTVSWFZ POMZUFORVFTUJPOT UP MFBSONPSFBCPVUIPXPQFOBDDFTTFCPPLTBSFEJTDPWFSFEBOEVTFE 8FSFBMMZWBMVFZPVSQBSUJDJQBUJPOQMFBTFUBLFQBSU $-*$,)&3& "OFMFDUSPOJDWFSTJPOPGUIJTCPPLJTGSFFMZBWBJMBCMF UIBOLTUP UIFTVQQPSUPGMJCSBSJFTXPSLJOHXJUI,OPXMFEHF6OMBUDIFE ,6JTBDPMMBCPSBUJWFJOJUJBUJWFEFTJHOFEUPNBLFIJHIRVBMJUZ CPPLT0QFO"DDFTTGPSUIFQVCMJDHPPE MIXED-MEMBER ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT TAIWAN, JAPAN, and BEYOND EDITED BY NATHAN F. BATTO, CHI HUANG, ALEXANDER C. TAN, & GARY W. COX New Comparative Politics Mixed- Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context Reformers have promoted mixed- member electoral systems as the “best of both worlds.” In this volume, internationally recognized political sci- entists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the coniguration of political parties. The con- tributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Signiicantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system— especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly—can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. Part I of the book provides an in-depth comparison of Taiwan and Japan, both of which moved from single nontransferable vote systems to mixed- member majoritarian systems. These cases demonstrate that the higher the payoffs of attaining the executive ofice and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed- member systems and ind that executive competition has the same effect on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia. The indings presented here demonstrate that the success of elec- toral reform depends not only on the speciication of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context— and especially the constitu- tional framework— within which such rules are embedded. NEW COMPARATIVE POLITICS Series Editor Michael Laver, New York University Editorial Board Ken Benoit, Trinity College, Dublin Gary Cox, Stanford University Simon Hix, London School of Economics John Huber, Columbia University Herbert Kitschelt, Duke University G. Bingham Powell, University of Rochester Kaare Strøm, University of California, San Diego George Tsebelis, University of Michigan Leonard Wantchekon, Princeton University The New Comparative Politics series brings together cutting-edge work on social conlict, political economy, and institutional development. Whatever its substantive focus, each book in the series builds on solid theoretical foundations; uses rigorous empirical analysis; and deals with timely, politically relevant questions. Curbing Bailouts: Bank Crises and Democratic Accountability in Comparative Perspective Guillermo Rosas The Madisonian Turn: Political Parties and Parliamentary Democracy in Nordic Europe Edited by Torbjörn Bergman and Kaare Strøm Political Survival of Small Parties in Europe Jae-Jae Spoon Veto Power: Institutional Design in the European Union Jonathan B. Slapin Democracy, Dictatorship, and Term Limits Alexander Baturo Democracy, Electoral Systems, and Judicial Empowerment in Developing Countries Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee The Latin American Voter: Pursuing Representation and Accountability in Challenging Contexts Edited by Ryan E. Carlin, Matthew M. Singer, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister The European Union and the Rise of Regionalist Parties Seth K. Jolly Gender Quotas and Democratic Participation: Recruiting Candidates for Elective Ofices in Germany Louise K. Davidson-Schmich Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context: Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond Edited by Nathan F. Batto, Chi Huang, Alexander C. Tan, and Gary W. Cox MIXED- MEMBER ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond Edited by Nathan F. Batto, Chi Huang, Alexander C. Tan, and Gary W. Cox University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor Copyright © by the University of Michigan 2016 All rights reserved This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publisher. Published in the United States of America by the University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America c Printed on acid- free paper 2019 2018 2017 2016 4 3 2 1 A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data Names: Batto, Nathan F., editor. | Huang, Chi, 1953– editor. | Tan, Alexander C., editor. | Cox, Gary W., editor. Title: Mixed- member electoral systems in constitutional context : Taiwan, Japan, and beyond / edited by Nathan F. Batto, Chi Huang, Alexander C. Tan, and Gary W. Cox Description: Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2016. | Series: New comparative politics | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identiiers: LCCN 2015038638| ISBN 9780472119738 (hardback) | ISBN 9780472121588 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Proportional representation— Taiwan. | Proportional representation— Japan. | Representative government and representation— Taiwan. | Representative government and representation— Japan. | Political parties— Taiwan. | Political parties— Japan. | Elections— Taiwan. | Elections— Japan. | Electoral systems | BISAC: POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / Elections. Classiication: LCC JQ1536 .M59 2016 | DDC 324.6— dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015038638 Acknowledgments The genesis of this volume lies in an attempt to answer a basic research question that surfaced in a roundtable of the second annual Asian Elec- tion Studies Conference held at the Election Study Center (ESC) of the National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taiwan, in May 2010. Why was it that Taiwan and Japan, two similar East Asian countries that had both switched from similar single nontransferable vote to similar mixed-member majoritarian legislative electoral systems, had displayed such divergent speeds and degrees in moving toward the theoretically expected consolida- tion of their party systems? A brainstorm with Gary Cox during his visit to the ESC in November 2011 sparked the idea of taking into account the constitutional context in which the electoral systems operate. As with any book- length project, we have a number of people and institutions to thank. We thank the ESC and its director, Lu-huei Chen, for continuous administrative support throughout the life of the project. A book with twenty- one coauthors based in ifteen institutions spanning four countries needs some sort of institutional base, and the ESC provided that home. We also wish to acknowledge our four home institutions, the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, National Chengchi Uni- versity, the University of Canterbury, and Stanford University. In addition to paying our salaries, the four institutions have allowed us the time and resources necessary to complete this book. All the chapters are original contributions prepared speciically for this book. Earlier versions of most of the chapters in this volume were presented at the workshop on “Elections in Taiwan and Japan under the vi Acknowledgments Mixed- Member Majoritarian System” held on April 20, 2012, at ESC of NCCU in Taiwan. The workshop was funded by the Election and Citi- zens’ Participation (ECP) Project, a Top University grant from the Min- istry of Education in Taiwan with Chi Huang as the principal investigator. We would like to extend thanks to all the scholars from Taiwan, Japan, the United States, and New Zealand who participated in the workshop and patiently worked with us on completing this edited book project. We express our deepest appreciation and admiration to Lu-huei Chen, Yin- lung Chou, Shih-chan Dai, Tzu-ping Liu, Hung-chung Wang, Chung- li Wu, and Misa Nishikawa for their intellectual contributions and toler- ance in the face of our unreasonable requests. Finally, we have more personal debts of gratitude. Nathan Batto thanks his wife, Lavai Fu-yi Yang, for her patience, encouragement, and inspira- tion. Chi Huang thanks Election and Citizens’ Participation Project assis- tant ZeQui He for his help in compiling the manuscript for this edited volume during the review process. Contents List of Abbreviations ix Introduction: Legislature- Centric and Executive- Centric Theories of Party Systems and Faction Systems 1 Nathan F. Batto and Gary W. Cox PART I. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MMM ON POLITICAL COORDINATION IN TAIWAN AND JAPAN ONE The Consequences of MMM on Party Systems 25 Chi Huang, Ming- Feng Kuo, and Hans Stockton TWO The Consequences of Constitutional Systems on Party Systems 52 Jih- wen Lin THREE LDP Factions under SNTV and MMM 73 Yoshiaki Kobayashi and Hiroki Tsukiyama FOUR Executive Competition, Electoral Rules, and Faction Systems in Taiwan 102 Nathan F. Batto and Hsin- ta Huang FIVE Innovations in Candidate Selection Methods 135 Eric Chen- hua Yu, Kaori Shoji, and Nathan F. Batto SIX Post Allocation, List Nominations, and Preelectoral Coalitions under MMM 165 Kuniaki