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Devolution and Disengagement in the :

A Study on the Effects of on Union-Wide Engagement in

Hannah Scheckelhoff

Honors Thesis

Dr. (advisor) with Edward Hasecke and James F.

18 2011

Scheckelhoff 2

Introduction

Devolution, the process by which both and were granted their own

regional assemblies, has drastically changed the of government, politics, and culture in the

United Kingdom in the last decade. As extensive over the logistics of devolution

continues after the first — including everything from calls for increased power for

regional governments in Scotland and Wales to demands for changes that would balance out the

asymmetry of the new UK governing structures— there are increasingly concerns that devolution

has not done all it was supposed to.

The result of years of protest and attempts at , devolution aimed to quell the

increasingly nationalist sentiments of Scotland and Wales, both of which were growing restless

in their positions of subordination the United Kingdom. Yet, in 2011, twelve years after the

devolved governments’ first , it is clear that these nationalist sentiments have not been

at all repressed by this change in governance. Both and the Scottish Nationalist

Party, both nationalist (read pro-regionalist pro-independence) parties in their given

, have held substantial if not focal power over these devolved governments since their

inception, and increasingly these parties bring up issues of independence from the United

Kingdom. This trend speaks to a specific concern about the purpose and aspirations of

devolution by those who implemented it.

The Labour Party, which won the government in the 1997 Election with a pro-

devolution platform and, in turn, mass support from the Scottish and Welsh , did indeed

fulfill its promise to devolve these governments and spread power to the other regions of the UK

in 1998. This has seemingly resulted in increased nationalism, evidenced by the presence of high

numbers of nationalists in the devolved governments, and continued thoughts of independence in Scheckelhoff 3

Scotland and Wales. Yet this is contrary to Parliament’s and even more the Labour Party’s intentions in supporting and initiating devolution: the Labour Party, while a major of devolution, in 1997 was also a major for the union and furthering the unity of .

Operating under the assumption that devolution was an effort on the part of Parliament not to lead Scotland and Wales down a path towards independence, but to reunite the UK by making concessions to the outer regions of the , the notable presence of these nationalist parties and sentiments in Scotland and Wales have forced the question, has devolution worked in the way in which it was originally intended?

After spending a few months in the United Kingdom around the time of the 2010 General

Election, I became more and more aware of the nationalist and unionist divisions in the UK.

After following the 2010 election closely and continuing my interest in the topic after my return

to the regions, I began to research this concept of devolution fulfilling its original purposes.

Throughout my research process, I developed two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Since devolution, nationalist sentiments have increased in Scotland as well

as in and Wales.

Hypothesis 2: As a result of these increased attachments to regions and not to the UK as

a whole, political interest and participation on the UK , by those who feel disengaged from

Britain, have lessened.

I have compiled empirical evidence to assess the validity of these ideas. While the data

on nationalist and unionist sentiments and their affect on engagement in UK politics differ from

to region, the general trends show that my hypotheses are valid to varying degrees in

England and Scotland, and are substantially less valid in Wales. This study will proceed with a

briefing on the history of the United Kingdom and devolution, a necessary component to Scheckelhoff 4 understanding the basis of this study. After that, we will take a look into the issues with devolution in each of the three UK regions included in this project and other studies similar to my own. Then, we will delve into the methodology and findings of my study, looking at the affects of nationalist identities on political engagement.

Literature Review

A Brief History of the United Kingdom

Because the modern United Kingdom looks notably different than it did even twenty

years ago, it is crucial to this study to understand the history and of the UK.

Major changes to the governing systems in the last years of the 20th century unveiled to the new

millennium a Britain with an increasingly dynamic population and new internal issues. Today,

the United Kingdom refers to a state that includes the of England, Scotland,

Wales, and Northern , but this modern state began as a with many different

occupants (from the Romans to the to different Celtic tribes), grew into a series of

separate states with their own , and much later came together in the way they exist .

The Welsh had a long-standing history of interaction with outside forces, beginning with

Norman of the 1000s and continuing to the English invasions of 1276 and 1277, both

of which represented major events in the tale of the loss of . Wales was

officially annexed by England in 1535, representing the beginning of a much longer process to

unite the archipelagic states under one common . The English Acts of 1536 and 1543

replaced with and added a Welsh Member of Parliament for each new

county. In addition, these acts established English as the primary language in the united

states of Wales and England (Pilkington 2002, 22-25). Scheckelhoff 5

Scotland, after years of fighting with the English, formally joined the union in 1707 with the Act of Union, though the of the two countries had long been connected with each other as a result of the two merging in one person: James I of England and James VI of Scotland in 1603 (Pilkington 2002, 27). The Act of Union allowed Scotland 45 seats in the

Westminster House of Commons and 16 elected representative peers. In addition, Scotland maintained its Presbyterian , its own , legal system, self-governing royal , and all hereditary positions were preserved (Pilkington 2002, 28). The preservation of these sorts of institutions has certainly aided in the maintenance of a Scottish national , which has remained quite strong over the of the three hundred years that Scotland has been a part of

the United Kingdom and not its own .

For the purposes of this study on devolution, Britain’s short relationship with Ireland and

subsequent inclusion of in the union is less important. However, it is important

to note, for the sake of thoroughness, that the whole of Ireland was once a part of the United

Kingdom, and as a result of nationalist demands for home rule, most of Ireland became an

independent state in the 20th century. Ireland, being the last to join the Union and the first to

leave, establishing an important for home rule, which would feed into nationalist efforts for devolution in later years.

Home Rule and the Separation of Northern Ireland: The Precedent for Devolution

As a result of the famines of the and subsequent failure of the government to properly attend to the needs of the , flourished in the mid 1800s (Pilkington 2002, 35). The nationalist sentiments grew through the remainder of the

19th century, culminating in a full-blown call for home rule in the . Led by Charles Parnell,

the Irish nationalists demanded independence from Britain (Pilkington 2002, 39). The first Home Scheckelhoff 6

Rule Bill of the 1880s failed, but was readdressed in the 1890s, and finally became a reality in

1912 under the Irish Home Rule Bill, renamed the and House of

Commons Bill (Pilkington 2002, 49).

Drastically delayed by the First War, the Irish, after some rebellion, resubmitted the bill to in 1919, which responded with plans for two devolved parliaments in

Dublin and (a in the northern of Ireland which expressed largely unionist sentiments) as well as a Council of Ireland which would “deal with all-Ireland concerns and work for unity” (Pilkington 2002, 73). Members of the Dáil, a rebellious group from the Sinn

Fein Irish nationalist party, rejected the offer, which resulted in “open warfare…between the

IRA [Irish Republican Army] on one side and the , the Royal Irish , and the specials known as and Tans on the other” (Pilkington 2002, 73). None the less,

the UK Parliament established the devolved parliaments in Ireland and the newly autonomous

Northern Ireland, both of which had their first elections in 1921. As a result of the political

tensions between the North and , the unionist inclined Northern Ireland became a member

of the United Kingdom shortly after (Pilkington 2002, 73). The inclusion of Northern Ireland and

its devolved government in the union brought issues of devolution in other regions to the

over of a few decades.

Stirrings of Devolution in Scotland and Wales

According to Colin Pilkington, “For the most part, the inhabitants of the

were content with the union as it existed in 1801, or at least they were not particularly excited at

the idea of political separatism” (Pilkington 2002, 35). One hundred later, after the separation of

Ireland from the union in the (with Northern Ireland remaining with devolved powers), the

dormant nationalism of the Scottish and the Welsh were rekindled with the thought of returning Scheckelhoff 7 to their original states of independence. As early as 1924, Scottish Members of Parliament (MPs) made proposals for a to handle the inner-workings of Scotland (Pilkington

2002, 53). Around the same time, Wales, while less united than Scotland (historically and at that time), began to propose various levels of devolution, as well (Pilkington 2002, 55). Beginning in

the late 1800s and continuing through the 20th century, small concession were made by

Westminster to stifle significant discussion of devolution in these two countries, such as the

Scottish Office, the Ministry of Welsh Affairs in 1951, and various government bodies set up in each country (e.g. Boards of Agriculture, , and Fisheries in Wales) (Pilkington 2002, 53-

56).

In spite of the efforts in Westminster to quiet calls for devolution and change with these minor compromises, nationalism in both countries (though especially in Scotland) grew through the whole of the 20th century, particularly in the 1960s, forcing the British government to face the reality that the issue of devolution would not go away. As a reaction to the extreme nationalist sentiments growing in Scotland, Britain established the on the

Constitution in 1968. The Commission “was supposed to look at the entire field of possibilities for constitutional reforms but which nevertheless concentrated its attentions on the issue of devolution for Scotland” (Pilkington 2002, 61). The Kilbrandon Report, which came out in 1973, was the result of all these efforts. While a bit confusing and contradictory in some ways, the report showed that the commissioners agreed on a few things. First, the UK Parliament had to remain sovereign regardless of any future changes (federalism and separatism were both rejected as major options). Second, any members of devolved assemblies, should they be created, would be elected directly (not nominated to their positions). Third, the elections to these devolved assemblies, should there be any, would use the method of proportional Scheckelhoff 8 representation (in contrast to the first-past-the-post system for the UK Parliament) (Pilkington

2002, 61).

Just a few years after the Kilbrandon Report was published, the Scotland and Wales Bill entered the House of Commons in 1976. While many previous efforts for devolution had previously been made by both Wales and Scotland separately, this bill included both purposefully to avoid the Labour government accepting one proposal and not the other. The Bill included provisions for devolved, directly elected assemblies in both Scotland and Wales, giving the Scots legislative powers and the Welsh powers. The assemblies would use a first- past-the-post and be funded by block grants, as they would have no raising powers. If the assemblies would take form however, it was crucial that neither state would lose its MPs in the UK Parliament and that the Secretaries of State would remain positions in the , so that in spite of increases in , the devolved regions would not be surrendering their representative role in broader UK decisions (Pilkington 2002, 62). The bill was defeated in 1977 (Pilkington 2002, 63).

After the presentation of the Scotland Act of 1978 and the Wales Act of 1978 (both of which were largely the same as the bill presented a earlier, only separate), a hugely important referendum was held in 1979 to decide whether to accept the provisions of each of these acts that had potential to ultimately give Scotland and/or Wales devolved governments.

The Welsh voted overwhelmingly against the referendum, with only about 20% of the voters supporting the changes. There was no question: Wales would not receive a devolved government. In Scotland, the majority of voters supported the changes with just over 51% in favor, which suggested that the region , in fact, gain a regional devolved government.

However, according to the BBC’s homepage on devolution, with only a 63% turnout for the Scheckelhoff 9 vote, the portion of the population that supported the change did not exceed 40% of the total

Scottish population as had been required by the UK Parliament. As a result, Scotland did not win a devolved government. The creation of a Conservative government led by in late 1979 put on hold all hopes of devolution for over a decade, as Thatcher moved to “reduce the role of government, and devolution would mean adding an layer of government”

(Pilkington 2002, 65). When the Conservative government was defeated in the late 1990s by the

Labour Party, stirrings of devolution once again came to the forefront of British politics.

The 1990s: Devolution Comes to Fruition

In 1996, , head of the Labour party, publicly proclaimed Labour support for devolution, promising another referendum and acknowledging the difficulty of the tasks ahead

(Pilkington 2002, 95). Devolution even played an important role in the New Labour manifesto in

1997, where the party aligned a transfer of powers to the outer regions of the UK with increased

unity within Britain. The manifesto, entitled New Labour, New Life for Britain worked to

redefine the Labour party in the post-Thatcher era as a party that was ready to “meet the

challenges of a different world” (Labour Party Manifesto).

Along with promises for improved and greater social welfare, New Labour said

this of devolution: “Our proposal is for devolution not federation. A sovereign Westminster

Parliament will devolve power to Scotland and Wales. The Union will be strengthened and the

threat of separatism removed” (Labour Party Manifesto), a statement which succinctly captures

the Labour sense of devolution and unionism functioning as one. After the issues with the

referendum in the , where the bill received most votes in support of the motion but not

enough to clear the required minimum percentage of total population support, Blair and the new

party manifesto specified that the new referendum would: 1) “take place before legislation was Scheckelhoff 10 placed before parliament and not afterwards as was the previous case”, 2) not require a minimum level of support in to pass, and 3) would ask the voters to agree with one or both specified questions (i.e. “I agree that there should be a Scottish Parliament” or “I agree that a Scottish

Parliament should have tax varying powers”) (Pilkington 2002, 95). After promoting a platform that all but enacted devolution in Scotland and gaining mass support from Scottish citizens, Tony

Blair was made Prime of the UK in 1997.

After he took office in 1997, Blair wasted no time in procuring the 1998 Scotland Act, in which he followed through on his campaign promises. The Act, which designed a Scottish

Parliament and ruled out the voting requirements of the 1979 referendum, passed easily through the House of Commons without much alteration and received Royal Assent in 1998. The Act included provisions for the specifics of the Parliament, from the number of members to how they would be elected. With 44.7% of the Scottish voters supporting a Scottish Parliament and 38.1% supporting tax-varying powers for that Parliament, Scotland won its long fought for devolved government with the unexpected addition of tax-varying powers (Pilkington 2002, 96). In May

1999, the Scottish Parliament held its first election, a moment years in the making for the

Scottish Nationalist Party and for many nationally inclined Scots (Pilkington 2002, 96-97).

A short week after the Scottish referendum was held in 1997, another referendum was held in Wales. Much like with the Scottish referendum, this referendum differed from that of

1979 in that it would not require a minimum vote percentage. However, because it was decided that the Welsh assembly would not have legislative powers, there was no need to the issue of tax-varying powers (Pilkington 2002, 122). Of the 50% of the electorate who voted,

50.3% voted for the creation of a Welsh Assembly, only 0.6% difference from large portion of the population that voted against it, which, in spite of the closeness of the votes, granted Wales Scheckelhoff 11 its own devolved government (Pilkington 2002, 125). Both of the UK’s new devolved regional governments in Scotland and Wales held their first official elections in 1999. Thus, as a result of many years of work by the Welsh and the Scottish, as well as the commitment of the Labour party to the nationalists causes and to the continued stability of the union, Britain ushered in the new millennium armed with a population that they hoped would be more content and more united than ever before.

To understand the impact of these new devolved governments on politics and political culture in the UK, it is crucial to understand how each is designed and how it functions in its region.

Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament is a unicameral legislative body with 129 members from across

Scotland that also has the power to vary (as long as both those legislative powers and tax- varying powers do no interfere with those explicitly for the UK Parliament). Seventy- three of these Members of Scottish Parliament (MSP) are elected from individual constituencies on a first-past-the-post basis, like that used in the United Kingdom Parliament elections. The fifty-eight additional MSPs are drawn from party lists on a proportional basis from eight larger regions. Thus, each Scottish voter casts two votes: one for their constituency representative and one for a party (Norton 2011, 276). This type of was conceived as an attempt to “move away from the adversary politics that characterized the Westminster

Parliament” (Norton 2011, 279).

Once the Members of Scottish Parliament are elected to their seats, the current of the United Kingdom appoints a First Minister (much like a Prime Minister). The First Minister nominates other ministers and junior ministers to the executive branch, as well as two law Scheckelhoff 12 officers— a advocate and solicitor general. In addition, these and the other MSP are put on to various : mandatory committees, which are included in the Scottish Parliament’s permanent design, (e.g. European and external affairs) and subject committees, which are chosen at the beginning of each parliament, depending on the needs or concerns of the country at that particular time (e.g. , energy, and ) (Norton 2011, 276-77).

While the Scottish Parliament has control over a variety of things in their region, the UK

Parliament, ultimately remains the sovereign and most powerful governing body, and thus has

“the power to legislate on any matters that fall within the competence of the Scottish Parliament, but the convention has developed that the UK Parliament will only do so with the of the

Scottish Parliament” (Norton 2011, 276). The areas in which the Scottish Parliament can legislate include environment, education, , agriculture, local government, the , housing, planning, economic development, tourism, the courts, , civic law, and some aspects of (Norton 2011, 276).

In the Scottish Parliament’s first election, the Labour Party took the plurality of seats, totaling 56 between the constituency and regional seats. relatively unsurprising, as the

Labour Party of the UK had made devolution in the first place. The second highest number of seats went to the Scottish Nationalist Party, who took 35 total seats. This election demonstrated the Scots’ commitment to both the Labour Party, which made possible the creation of the new Parliament, and to the Nationalist Party, even though the SNP initially opposed the idea of devolution (Pilkington 2002, 103). According to the Scottish Parliament’s website, in

2003 Labour again took the plurality of seats (50) with the SNP following behind with 27 seats

(Scottish Parliament 2003). In both 1999 and 2003, the Labour party, with a plurality of the seats in Scottish Parliament, formed coalition governments with the Liberal Democrat parties (Scottish Scheckelhoff 13

Parliament website). According to the BBC ’ coverage of the election in 2007, the SNP overtook the Scottish Labour party as the plurality seat holder in Scottish Parliament with 47 seats to Labour’s 46 and for the first time, the created a minority government, controlling the new devolved government.

Welsh Assembly

Similar in many ways to the Scottish Parliament, though different in a few very important aspects, the Welsh Assembly is a unicameral governing body with 60 members with four year fixed terms. Much like the mixed electoral system used in Scotland, forty of these Assembly members are elected in a first-part-the-post race in their individual constituencies. The additional twenty are chosen on a proportional basis from party lists. Not unlike the Scottish First Minister, the Welsh First Minister is appointed by the current Monarch, then selects up to 12 ministers and deputy ministers and a counsel general to bring into the executive (Norton 2011, 277).

Originally, the assembly had no powers to make primary legislation or vary taxes. The

Assembly, however, did have the power to “develop and implement policy” in areas such as agriculture, culture, economic development, education, environment, housing, , and transport (Norton 2011, 279), a set of powers which are notably different from those granted to the Scottish Parliament. Only a few years after their devolved government was established, the

Welsh called from more power (particularly budgeting powers), saying that the powers of the

Welsh Assembly were not “on par” with those of the Scottish Parliament. These concerns culminated in the Government of Wales Act in 2006. This act established that the “UK

Parliament may approve orders (legislative competence orders) that allow for legislative powers to be given to the assembly in relation to specified matters which all within the fields in which Scheckelhoff 14 assembly ministers are able to exercise executive functions” (Norton 2011, 280). In addition, this act separated the Welsh executive from the assembly (Norton 2011, 279).

In its first election in 1999, the Welsh Assembly voted in a minority government made up most of the Labour party, which received 37.6% of the votes (27 seats) in the constituency race, and won 35.5% of the regional list votes (1 seat), totaling 28 seats. Plaid Cymru, a Welsh nationalist party (or as Jonathan Bradbury and Rhys Andrews call it, an ethno-regionalist party), won 28.4% of the constituency vote, gaining 9 seats, and 30.5% of the regional list votes, which gave them another 8, for a total of 17 seats. This pattern, with Labour as the forerunner in seats in the Welsh Assembly and Plaid Cymru as the second, held true in the 2003 and 2007 elections

(Bradbury et al. 2010, 239). This demonstration of Welsh support for the Labour party and for the nationalist party, Plaid Cymru, is a useful indicator of nationalist sentiments and their translation into politics.

The Post-Devolution UK

Devolution, a “process not an event” according to one British politician (Norton 2011,

293), has resulted in a variety of issues in each of the UK regions.

England

By far the largest and most public malcontent today is that Scotland and Wales have fully functioning governing bodies with special powers. In contrast, England houses the United

Kingdom’s Parliament, but has no state governing body of its own, an issue which

Bryant has poignantly referred to as “the programme of asymmetrical devolution in the United

Kingdom” (Bryant 208, 665). Across England, citizens claimed this to be unfair, saying that devolution has been to the “detriment of England” politically and otherwise (Norton 2011, 293). Scheckelhoff 15

In contrast to the new devolved governments in Scotland and Wales, England has only one elected regional assembly— in Greater — as of 2000 (Norton 2011, 291).

This broad issue of asymmetry actually predated by twenty years the actual implementation of devolution, concisely addressed in the West Question. Scottish MP

Tam Dalyell from the constituency of made the following statement that succinctly summarizes the main focus of English qualms with devolution:

For how long will English constituencies and English Honorable Members tolerate not

just the 71 Scots, 36 Welsh and a number of Ulstermen but at least 119 Honorable

members from Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland exercising an important, and

probably often decisive, effect on English politics [through the UK Parliament] while

they themselves have no say in the same matters in Scotland, Wales, and Ireland?

(Pilkington 2002, 165)

In short, Scottish and Welsh citizens are allowed two major votes, one for their regional devolved governments and one for the UK Parliament, thus allowing them to affect changes in politics in their region and others in a way that is claimed to be unfair by the English, who can only vote in the UK elections (Norton 2011, 294).

In additions to concerns over control (that is, whose votes can affect which regions of the

UK), there was increasing agitation over the reality that funding in the newly reorganized UK undoubtedly favors Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The , named after

Joel Barnett, the minister who designed the formula in the late 1970s, “determines how annual increases in most aspects of public spending… should be divided between England,

Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland” (Bryant 2008, 668). Christopher Bryant, in his study of devolution and its effects on England, noted that in the 2005-2006 calculations, (expressed as an Scheckelhoff 16 index of 100 break down) England was at 97, Scotland at 118, and Wales at 110, demonstrating a clear preference, financially, towards Scotland and Wales (Bryant 2008, 668). Bryant cites this phenomenon as a major concern in England, particularly in the years after devolution (it is important to note that the Barnett formula pre-dates devolution by 20 years, though it became controversial in the media after 1998). In the same vein, Phillip Norton commented that “in

2006-07, if the U.K.-wide per capita average was 100%, the expenditure in England would be

97% and in Scotland 117%”, which shows the same sort of trend from the previous year (Norton

2011, 294).

The UK Parliament has attempted to settle some of these English concerns, beginning even before the first elections for the devolved governments by creating Regional Development

Agencies for each of the nine English regions. The RDAs, made up of 8-15 members drawn from the region, were given responsibilities in economic development and regeneration as a more mild form of devolution to these areas (Norton 2011, 292). In spite of their foresight in dealing with these types of issues post-devolution, the UK Parliament’s RDAs did little to ease English concerns about their lack of regional governance. For all their best efforts, the RDAs were deemed unimportant and the UK government abolished eight of the nine regional agencies, save that of , through the Public Bodies Bill in 2010. The Department for

Business and skills website also states that, “The London Development Agency

(LDA) is expected to cease operations by 2012, pending Royal Assent of the Localism

Bill. It is intended that all LDA assets and liabilities will be transferred to the Greater London

Authority (GLA) before the LDA closes” (Department for Business and Innovation Skills 2011).

In the last decade, a multitude of solutions to the English concerns have been offered besides the clearly failed RDAs and the reductions of Welsh and Scottish representation in UK Scheckelhoff 17

Parliament in 2005 (Gay 2010). Some people suggest that, in reality, the UK is in its best condition when left exactly as it is, with devolved governments in some, but not all regions.

Others have suggested that England have regional devolved governments to deal with those matters that pertain only to the English. Others still have suggested that England as a whole should have a devolved government, including a new Parliament that deals solely with English matters (also referred to as EVoEM, English Votes on English Matters). More extremist citizens have suggested total English independence as an option (Bryant 2008, 672).

Each of these solution options has received various levels of public support. For example in 1998, citizens formed the Campaign for an English Parliament (CEP), a group which favored and promoted a fully devolved English Parliament, which would have powers similar to those in

Scotland and Wales. In 2004, the CEP launched the English Constitutional Convention, in which this group of citizens drew out demands for an improved situation for England, including, “parity as a distinct nation in the UK; recognition of its national statehood; equality of respect as a culturally and historically distinct nation; and fair funding when compared with other parts of the

UK” (Bryant 2008, 671). These efforts were largely symbolic, and though the CEP addressed the

House of Commons with these ideas on several occasion, it was to no avail.

In 2008, Christopher Bryant published a study on English citizens’ opinions on devolution for England, which produced very interesting results. Bryant tracked a series of questions and their responses in the year immediately following the first devolved government elections through 2006. The first question (Q1) asked, “With all the changes going on in the way different parts of are run, which of the following do you think would be best for England?”, and was used in 1999, 2003, and 2006. The second (Q2) asked, “With all the constitutional changes going on in the way different parts of the UK are run, which are Scheckelhoff 18 creating national Parliaments for Scotland and Wales, which of the following do you think would be best for England?”, and was used only in 2006. The answer options for these questions were as follows: 1) England to be governed as it is now, with laws made by the UK parliament, 2)

Each region of England to have its own assembly that runs services like health, and 3) England

as a whole to have its own new Parliament with law-making powers (Bryant 2008, 666).

He found that in 1999, when asked Q1, citizens were most likely to respond that they

believed that the status quo was the best for England (with 62% of respondents selecting this

option). The other two answer options (regional devolution for England and total English

devolution) both received less than 20% of responses (at 15% and 18% respectively). In 2006,

when citizens were asked Q1, 45% responded that they would choose the status quo as the best

option for England, while regional devolution had the support of 17% of citizens and total

English devolution had 26%. This demonstrated a notable drop in support for the status quo and

an increased support for devolution in general, and total devolution in specific. When asked Q2

in 2006, which reminds citizens in the question that Scotland and Wales have been given their

own governing bodies, only 32% responded that they would choose the status quo as the best

option for England, while 14% offered regional devolution in England as the best option, and

41% responded that England as a whole making a new Parliament for itself was the best option

(Bryant 2008, 666).

We can take a few things away from these data. First, that there has been a trend towards

believing that devolution (regional or total) is increasingly a good and even preferable option for

solving the problems of asymmetry in the UK. Second, it demonstrates English concerns about

lack of power and political control in the current UK, highlighted by the fact that when asked a

question about the best option for England after mentioning the devolved governments of Scheckelhoff 19

Scotland and Wales, respondents were much more inclined to respond with the most extreme answer, that England should also have a devolved government.

As Scottish and Welsh nationalist sentiments continue to run high and these regions continue to gain powers, the lack of any notable changes in the English regional governance in

spite of its high levels of support certainly highlights the asymmetry of power in the modern

United Kingdom. This continued asymmetry threatens to bring issues of English regional

devolution to the surface of UK politics in the near future. While England has the most extensive

list of issues with devolution, it is not alone. As England grows increasingly concerned about

Scotland and Wales’ role in the politics of the UK and who was benefiting from these

monumental changes, other questions have been arising in the devolved governments.

Scotland and Wales

Especially in Scotland, the goal of nationalists for many years had been outright

independence, not necessarily devolution. The creation of the devolved governments certainly

appeared to many to be a step in that direction, but this was not the intended goal of the Labour

Party (Norton 2011, 293). The Labour party has long focused on maintaining a more unified

United Kingdom and strongly believed that devolution would further that aspiration. With the

Labour party’s commitment to and ultimate granting of the devolved governments, the message

was clear: we give you these powers so that you will remain content in the union.

Yet, in the early and continuing through today, some Scots again began to raise the

issue of independence, a fearful prospect for the United Kingdom which aspires to stay unified

under the UK government. The Scottish Nationalist Party, which consistently holds substantial

power in the Scottish Parliament, has held as its “core objective…becoming an

independent nation-state within the EU” (Stewart et al. 2010, 263). In the 2007 elections in Scheckelhoff 20

Scotland, the SNP overtook Labour as the leading party in government, demonstrating an increasing commitment to the values and ideals of the SNP, which promotes independence in

Scotland, versus commitment to the Labour Party, which on the national level promotes the stability of the union.

While confronting issues of independence with Scotland, the UK Parliament was also dealing with demands from the Welsh Assembly for more devolved power. Drawing comparisons with the Scottish Parliament in the first five yeas of their existences, the Welsh

Assembly and people felt increasingly dissatisfied with their limited power allocation (Norton

2011, 295). This resulted in the Governance of Wales Act of 2006, which did grant the Assembly more powers, but the discussion of increasing Welsh power continues, as the Assembly’s powers are still not “on par” with those of the Scottish Parliament (Norton 2011, 280).

Even more, concerns about the technical realities of devolution continue to arise. For example, Norton notes that the parties in power in the devolved governments are consistently not the same as those in power at Westminster. Specifically, the SNP has had a significant presence in the Scottish Parliament (holding the second highest number of seats in the Scottish Parliament after the 1999 and 2003 elections) and almost never has notable representation in the UK

Parliament. Likewise, Plaid Cymru, a Welsh Nationalist party, has held the second highest number of seats in every devolved election since 1999. Today, the SNP holds the most seats in

Scottish Parliament and the Labour Party holds the most seats in the Welsh Assembly, while a

Conservative government holds the most seats in the UK Government. This discrepancy in which parties have power threatens to make cooperation between the devolved regional governments and the sovereign UK Parliament more difficult than when the UK Parliament alone ruled each region. Scheckelhoff 21

Nationalist and Unionist Sentiments

With an understanding of the many issues surrounding devolution, we can begin to assess various other studies on the topic to develop support for my hypotheses. Several studies, in addition to my own, have analyzed the different nationalist/regionalist sentiments in the regions of the UK. Bryant, in his study of English devolution, discusses various options for devolution in

England as a solution to the asymmetry of power in the UK. He explains that there are several reasons why this hasn’t and perhaps never will happen. First, of all the regions of the UK,

England has the highest rate of identification with Britain as a whole, with 54% of English citizens responding that they felt only British or more British than English in 2003, compared to

Wales and Scotland, which were both at about 30% for feeling only British or more British than nationalist (Bryant 2008, 676). He also suggests that because England has a higher population of people who are disengaged with issues of identity, there is less or concern over not having an English devolved government (Bryant 2008, 676). This analysis seems to contradict some of my other research: while Bryant suggests that there is not much angst about the continued absence of a devolved English government of some sort, other authors, particularly

Norton and Pilkington, suggest that it is a major point of contention and an immediate concern in

England.

Adding support to Bryant’s claims that the asymmetry of UK governance is not and has not been a major issue, Susan Condor’s 2010 article “Devolution and National Identity: the

Rules of English (Dis)engagement” suggests that there are many reasons why “the expected

English backlash to the asymmetric UK devolution settlement has not yet materialized” (Condor

2010, 525). She suggests that the lines of reasoning utilized by those who believed that there would be an “English backlash” fall into a series of categories: the popular nationalism argument Scheckelhoff 22

(that the English view their as a sort of political entitlement), localite frames argument (that the English residents would find the highest levels of concern for issues

“understood to be personal, , and close to home”), reasonable pragmatism argument

(taking a stand on what is believed to be a common and popular interest), and the liberal cosmopolitanism argument (“principled opposition to national polities”) (Condor 2010, 538).

Condor suggests that while these are all useful and logical reasons for why the English public would push against the asymmetry that devolution has engrained into UK politics, she has found that these reasons do not translate into actual discontent and action in the English citizens or the government. Instead, she suggests that because of general apathy and indifference to their national identity as well as what other researchers have labeled a “cognitive deficiency” in the

English population, who have “somehow failed to recognize their identity, and hence their distinctive interests, as English”, the backlash has not materialized because it is not nor has it

been of great importance to most of the English citizens (Condor 2010 527).

In 2010, Jonathan Bradbury and Rhys Andrews published a study quite similar to

Bryant’s study of the English on the Welsh identity, how it has changed over time and how it affects political events and activities. After analysis of a series of recent surveys on national

identities, Bradbury and Andrews found that in the years after devolution, British national identities have been in decline in each of the regions of the UK (Bradbury et al. 2010, 229). In

1996, the British Social Attitude survey recorded that 52% of its respondents, “would describe themselves as British rather than English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, European, other nationality or don’t know” (Bradbury et al. 2010, 230). In 2005, only 44% of respondents answered this way.

The authors found that in Wales, this attachment to the “/region identity” was relatively high (Bradbury et al. 2010, 229). Scheckelhoff 23

In addition, they looked at data from 1979, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2007, which forced residents of Wales to choose between a Welsh or British identity. Over the 30 years, there was minimal fluctuation in each category, with 56% to 63% identifying themselves as Welsh and

26% to 34% identifying themselves as British. To add another level to this data, the authors also assessed changes in the “Moreno” nation identity question, first used to analyze national identities in the Spanish regions, which asks residents to choose whether they feel Welsh not

British, more Welsh than British, equally Welsh and British, more British than Welsh, or British not Welsh. The data shows that in the years from 1997 to 2007, there has been “a slight increase in the numbers of people feeling Welsh not British, but this appears to be balanced by a drop in those who simply feel more Welsh than British” (Bradbury et al. 2010, 233). The authors draw the conclusion that these trends, which show that the Welsh continue to hold onto their British identity much more than do the Scottish, “suggest that British national identity is more likely to an important part in the self-image of Welsh than ” (Bradbury et al. 2010,

233).

Bradbury and Andrews use of the Moreno question to analyze changing nationalist and unionist sentiments mimics parts of my own research. However, they exclude options for other identities or none of the given identities. I found this unusual, as they spent a portion of their study discussing the demographics of the UK and specifically Wales, which they note is made up of high foreign populations and portions of residents from other UK regions: “Whereas 87.2% of the Scottish population were born in Scotland, only 75.4% of the Welsh population were born in

Wales” (Bradbury et al. 2010, 234). Bradbury and Andrews’ main reason for including the demographic information was to note differences in nationalist inclinations according to where the respondent was born, though I believe this research could have been enhanced by the Scheckelhoff 24 inclusion of the options of other and none of these identities coupled with a question which indicated where the individual was born. Regardless of this minor shortcoming, Bradbury and

Andrews’ analysis of the Moreno question contributes some interesting insight and operationalization concepts to my study.

Not unlike Christopher Bryant’s 2008 study on devolution in England, Bradbury and

Andrews also include data on the constitutional preferences in Wales from 1997 through 2007.

The question leads them to a discussion on whether Wales should be independent of the UK but remain with an Assembly that has limited powers, or remain part of the UK without a devolved assembly. During the decade between 1997 and 2007, the percentage of the population who believed that Wales should be part of the UK but with a Parliament that has law and tax making powers has increased exponentially, from only 18% in 1997 to 42% in 2007. Those who felt that

Wales should remain in the UK without any form of assembly decreased dramatically from 37% in 1997 to only 16% in 2007. Support for Wales remaining in the UK with a devolved Assembly that has some powers and Wales becoming independent from the UK but remaining in the EU both remained somewhat consistent over the decade, only increasing or decreasing by a few percentage points. The exception to this is in 1999, Wales remaining part of the UK with a devolved Assembly with some powers spiked up to 35% support (compared to the 25% and 26% support in all the other years of the study). This is interesting because this in the otherwise consistent level of support coincides with the Assembly’s first election.

According to my research, then, my hypothesis that nationalist sentiments have increased since devolution should be valid in the cases of Scotland and Wales, but not of England.

Likewise, it suggests that my hypothesis that nationalist/unionist identities play a role in an Scheckelhoff 25 individual’s engagement and participation in politics should be valid in Scotland and Wales, but less so in England. With these studies in mind, we move into my data and findings.

Methodology

My data come from the British Election Studies (BES) from 1997 (pre-devolution), 2005,

and 2010 (both post-devolution). The British Election Studies are a collection of individual level

survey data from a representative sample of people of from all over the United

Kingdom. In order to assess the impact of devolution in terms of regional attitudes and state

unity, I am utilizing a variety of different variables to analyze the nationalist versus unionist

sentiments in years before and after devolution and its impact on engagement in politics. My analysis of the 2005 and 2010 data uses identical variables, while the 1997 data uses similar but different variables (the 1997 survey was organized by different researchers than the more recent

surveys and thus has slightly different but comparable variables). It is important to note that each

of these variables has been weighted to account for differences in data collection numbers in

each particular region. In the 2005 and 2010 data, the dataset was pre-weighted. In the 1997 data,

an additional variable for weight allowed me to manually switch on the weight.

My independent variables (IVs) focus on location (that is, in which UK region the

respondest resides), as well as feelings of nationality (loyalty to state versus the United

Kingdom). The first IV, region of residence, is a very basic nominal level variable which asked

respondents to note whether they lived in England, Scotland, or Wales. After the surveyor gained

this information, he/she would ask the question that informs my other three IVs: “Which, if any,

of the following best describes how you see yourself”. He/she would respond with X not British,

more X than British, equally X and British, more British than X, or British not X, with X being Scheckelhoff 26

English, Scottish, or Welsh depending on place of residence. Each of these three separate variables is ordinal.

My dependent variables (DVs) focus on describing and quantifying unity throughout the

UK (that is, loyalties to the UK government). These include attention to/interest in politics, interest in that particular year’s General Election, and voting in the General Election. All of these, particularly voting in the UK General Elections, demonstrate a measurable commitment to the UK government. Between 1997 and 2005, the questionnaire changed a bit. In 1997, the respondents were asked, “How much interest do you generally have in what is going on in politics?”, to which they could reply a great deal, quite a lot, some, not very much, or none at all.

In 2005 and 2010, the data added to this question by asking first, “how interested were you in the

General Election that was held on May 5th this year?”, to which the answer choices were very,

somewhat, not very, or not at all interested. In addition, the respondents were asked, “On a scale

of 0 to 10 how much attention to you generally pay to politics”, and chose any number from 0

(pay no attention) to 10 (pay a great deal of attention). Each of these variables, in the old and new forms of the question, functions on an ordinal level.

My final DV is a little different from the others. The question regarding voting in the most recent General Election remained the same, asking if the respondent managed to vote to which he/she could answer yes or no. Voting in the General Election is, for our purposes, an ordinal level variable, which indicates whether or not an individual participated in the most recent GE in the United Kingdom and therefore demonstrated commitment to the union. As a reminder, I hypothesized that post-devolution, Scottish and Welsh citizens, in particular, became more disengaged with politics at the UK level. Scheckelhoff 27

In my data, all these variables interact in a variety of different ways. When used in a univariate analysis, the IVs give fundamental (if basic) information. The univariate analysis of region of residence is useful in that it shows us the distribution of responses from each state. The univariate analysis of the nationality variables show changes in connection to state or union before and after devolution, much more useful to the point of this study. In addition to the univariate analyses, a series of bivariate crosstabulations between each DV and IV for the three

survey years show how state of residence and nation sentiments have affected citizen’s attention

and interest in politics, as well as their likelihood to vote in General Elections.

It is important to note in examining my findings that the data on three of variables (those which indicate a respondent’s nationalist or unionist sentiments) include options for feeling X not British (X being either English, Scottish or Welsh depending on where the individual lived), more X than British, equally X and British, more British than X, British not X, as well as none of these, and other. This is crucial to be aware as including the other and none of these answer options in the independent variables has the possibility of changing the outcome of the data compared to what it could be if they were excluded: these answer options have the potential to directly affect the strength, significance, and directional measures. As I will be keeping the other and none of these option in the data, it is also important to know that they appear in more than one way in each of the three survey years, specifically in 2010, an option for identifying with another nationality (“other”) was excluded entirely, which may have a minor effect on the directional and significance measures, as well.

While I could have removed these from the data, I felt they were important because of the notable populations of foreigners who reside in the UK who would not necessarily fall into the

other five identity category options. Also, by including them on the same side of the scale as Scheckelhoff 28 feeling more British than X, I have accounted for their weight by considering none of these, other, and British sentiments all in the general category of being not nationalist to the devolved

(or in the case of England not devolved) regions, which is the main focus of the data.

In addition to the oddity of including “other” and “none of these” options in the national

identity variables where many studies treat them as missing variables, my study also lacks a

multivariate analysis. A multivariate analysis adds control variables to a study to make note of

and adjust for different influences on the main independent and dependent variables. This type of

analysis has been left out of my research for two reasons. First, in many ways my data is self-

controlled, that is, it analyzes a series of IVs and DVs over several years, pre- and post-

devolution, and thus accounts for various factors that could influence each. Second, because of

the small numbers of respondent from Scotland and Wales, the main focus of my study,

multivariate analysis reduces these already low numbers to unacceptable representative sample

levels. Had multivariate analysis been an option, I would have been interested to see how things

like gender, age, education, and party identification affected my dependent variables regarding

interest and voting. In any case, the study in effect controls itself and can function without this

added level of analysis.

Findings

In each of the surveys that I am using for this study (i.e. British Election Studies from

1997, 2005, and 2010), I have four independent variables (IVs): nationalist versus unionist sentiments in England, Scotland, and Wales, as well as region of residence. The 1997 data has two dependent variables (DVs)—interest in politics and whether an individual voted in the

General Election— and the 2005 and 2010 data both have three dependent variables utilized in this study—interest in General Election, attention to politics, and whether or not an individual Scheckelhoff 29 voted in the General Election. This section reviews the univariate and bivariate analyses of my data, from which we can begin to assess the validity of my original hypothesis.

Univariate Analyses

There are several variables in this study that are useful to analyze both in univariate

capacities as well as bivariate capacities. First, through a univariate analysis of the region of

residence variable (region in this case referring to the entities within the UK, i.e. England,

Scotland, or Wales), we establish a baseline for regional distribution in responses. In the surveys

from 1997, 2005, and 2010, from the samples of 2900 to nearly 4800 people, the number of

English respondents far exceeds the numbers of those from Scotland and Wales. As you can see

in Table 1, the percentage of English respondents ranges from 85% in 1997 to 56.1% in 2005,

while responses from Scotland range from 9.1% in 1997 to 25.3% in 2005 of the total, and

responses from Wales range from 5.2% in 1997 to 18.5% in 2005. This is interesting because it

generally indicates that since devolution, the BES has placed more emphasis on including a

higher number of responses from Scotland and Wales, reaching its peak in 2005. While the 2010

data placed less emphasis on bringing in high numbers of responses from Scotland and Wales

than does the 2005 data, it still brought in substantially more responses from those regions than

the 1997, which was taken before devolution. Regardless of the fluctuation in actual percentages,

in each case England is the modal category.

Table 1 about here

Another useful univariate analysis is that of each of the national versus union identity

variables (i.e. which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself… X not

British, more X than British, equally X and British, more British than X, British not X, other,

none of these, or other, where X is English, Scottish, or Welsh depending on region of Scheckelhoff 30 residence). In a very simple way, observing the changes in these sentiments from 1997 to 2010 can give us a general indication of the change in the cultural environment since devolution in

1999. Our pre-devolution data indicates that a few years before devolution, a plurality of

residents in England felt equally British and English (45.4%) (see table 2), a plurality of

residents of Scotland felt more Scottish than British (38.4%) (see table 3), and plurality of

residents of Wales felt more Welsh than British (28.8%) (see table 4). In each region, those who

selected other or none of these as their identity category never totaled to more than 8% of the

sample population. The data generally demonstrate that before devolution people were

expressing equally nationalist and unionist sentiments, if leaning their particular region.

Across the board, no region’s majority felt more unionist sentiments than nationalist sentiments

or either extreme of the spectrum (feeling nationalist not British or British not nationalist). This

is consistent with my research, which indicates that during years leading up to devolution,

national sentiments were increasing; in many ways, these changing sentiments sparked the

recognition of a need for change to maintain stability, order, and unity in the UK.

The 2005 data, taken a few years after devolution, show that most residents of England

still felt equally British and English (44.9%) (see table 2). However, the univariate analysis

shows that most residents of Wales felt equally British and Welsh (32.7%) (see table 4), a shift

away from more nationalist sentiments in 1997, while most residents of Scotland felt Scottish not

British (31.8%), a shift towards even more nationalist sentiments than in 1997 (see table 3). The

data from Scotland indicates that 86.5% of all respondents answered that they were between

feeling Scottish not British and equally Scottish and British. Less than 10% of respondents from

Scotland indicated that they felt either more British than Scottish or British not Scottish. In

Wales, 67.7% of respondents fell between identifying themselves as Welsh not British and Scheckelhoff 31 equally Welsh and British, with about 25% identifying themselves as either more British than

Welsh or British not Welsh. In each region, those respondents who opted for the “other” or

“none of these” identity categories never totaled more than 11% of that region’s sample

population.

The 2010 data, a full decade after devolution and the first devolved government elections,

show a more notable change in attitudes. According to the BES, most respondents in England

still felt equally British and English (39.4%) (see table 2), most respondents from Wales still felt

equally British and Welsh (25.8%) (see table 4), and most respondents from Scotland still felt

Scottish not British (39.2%) (see table 3). While this doesn’t appear to demonstrate notable

change in these sentiments in that the majority categories remained the same from 2005, the

English respondents in the equally English and British category decreased by 5% from 2005,

those feeling equally Welsh and British decreased by about 8%, and those feeling Scottish not

British increased from 31.8% in 2005. However, in this data, we see a notable increase in the

general percentage of nationalist sentiments in all three regions. In Scotland, the majority of

responses remained nationalist rather than unionist (with 62.9% either feeling more Scottish than

British or Scottish and not British). In England, 20.5% of respondents felt English not British,

which increased from 7.5% in 1997. In Wales, 21.9% of respondents indicated that they felt

Welsh not British, an increase from 12.3% in 1997. However, the 2010 data also showed that the

highest and lowest nationalist sentiments of Wales (feeling Welsh not British or British not

Welsh) both increased.

In short, in England and Scotland, the years following devolution have shown a trend

towards more nationalist sentiments, while trends in Wales indicate a population that has moved

away from relatively neutral ideas on nationality, culminating in the very close split of responses Scheckelhoff 32 for feelings Welsh not British (21.9%), equally British and Welsh (25.8%), and British not

Welsh (23.2%) in 2010. This is a very simple but important indicator of changes to the cultural

and political environments since devolution.

Tables 2, 3, 4 about here

Bivariate Analyses

Keeping in mind how these nationalist and unionist sentiments have changed over the last

14 years or so, we move on to bivariate analyses which will examine how these changing

sentiments affect tangible commitment to the UK, for example voting in elections and remaining

interested in politics. First we will analyze the nationalist/unionist variables with DVs which

indicate how interested a respondent is in politics and how much attention he/she pays to politics.

These bivariate analyses will give us an indication for how much or little these sentiments play a

role in changes in political culture post devolution.

In England in 1997, the data generally indicate that respondents who felt more British

than English were more interested in politics than those who felt more English than British, who

were more inclined to be somewhat to not very interested in politics. As we can see in Table 5,

very few English respondents, whatever their feelings on national identity, answered that they

were not at all interested in politics. Chi-square tests indicate that this relationship is significant at the .001 level, which is very statistically significant (see table 7). Directional measurements confirm that there is a weak, positive relationship between there variables (positive in that the more British a respondent feels the more likely they are to be interested in politics).

In 2005, we first and foremost see a change in how this question is presented. In 1997, the question asked a person to assess how much interest they had in politics on a five-point scale

(from very interested to not at all interested). In 2005, this question is reinterpreted into two new Scheckelhoff 33 variables. The first asks how much attention the respondent pays to politics (a scale of 0 to 10 with zero being no attention at all and 10 being a great deal of attention), and the second asks how much interest the respondent has in the upcoming GE (on a scale of 1 to 4 with 1 being very interested and 4 being not at all interested).

Broadly speaking, the 2005 data (see table 6) shows that those respondents who fell in the range of English not British to equally British and English paid less attention to politics (with between 43% and 51% responding with a 5 or less on the 10 point scale). It also shows that those who felt British not English and more British than English were more likely to respond with a 6 or above on the scale (with about 58% of each of these identity groups). It is also important to

note that a substantial number of respondents who did not identify with any of these

nationalist/unionist made up a large portion of those who responded between a 6 and 10 on

this scale (nearly 50%), indicating that this group generally pays a great deal of attention to

politics. However, the chi-squared value indicates that this data is insignificant and that there is

no relationship.

Similarly, a bivariate analysis of nationalist/unionist sentiments and interest in the 2005

GE shows a positive relationship between feeling more British than English and being more

interested in the GE. While the data shows higher than average interest across the board,

directional measurements (gamma, somers’d, and tau-c) confirm that the relationship is positive,

but weak. The chi-squared value indicates that this relationship is statistically insignificant.

The 2010 data analysis of national/union sentiments and attention to politics and interest

in the GE shows comparable positive relationships in both cases, where those residents of

England who felt more unionist sentiments were more likely to be both attentive to politics and

interested in the upcoming election. Those who felt English not British, for example, had the Scheckelhoff 34 lowest rates of responding that they were either very or somewhat interested in the 2010 GE, and over 50% of the same identity group responded that between 0 and 5 on the 10 point scale of attention to politics. However, a major difference in this relationship compared to previous years is that in 2010 this relationship is not longer statistically significant (chi-squared value of .104).

Tables 5,6,7 about here

In Scotland in 1997, the data shows that, not unlike their English counterparts in the same year, Scots who felt more unionist sentiments were more interested in politics (a positive relationship). As is demonstrated in table 8, those Scots who felt more British than Scottish had the highest levels of political interest, with 45.5% responding that they had a great deal of interest of quite a lot of interest in politics. However, the relationship is statistically insignificant as well as weak according to the chi-squared and directional measurements, respectively (see table 10).

Looking at Table 9, in 2005, we see a similar trend in the data: those who felt more

British than Scottish had the highest rates interest in the GE and the highest levels of attention to

politics (excluding the categories of “other” and “none of these”, who for our purposes are of

note but not of importance). Those who felt Scottish not British had the lowest rates of interest in

the GE (over 40% said they were not very or not at all interested in the GE), as well as the lowest

rates of attention to politics. The relationship between national/unionist sentiments and interest in

the GE and attention to politics were both statistically significant, and both exhibited positive but

weak relationships. This indicates that across the eight years between these surveys, while there

was little change in the direction of the relationships in these variables (the 2005 data all show

that the more British a Scot feels, the more likely he/she is to be interested in/attentive to politics

and GEs) the change in significance level is very important: pre-devolution, identity did not play Scheckelhoff 35 a role in engagement in politics, but post-devolution, in 2005, identity did play a role in

engagement in politics.

In 2010, data shows similar positive relationships between Unionist sentiments and interest/attentiveness to politics, with the same identity groups taking the highest and lowest levels of interest in the GE and attention to politics. The relationships are somewhat stronger than in 2005, though still weak. However, the relationship between attention to politics and

nationalist/unionist sentiments is less statistically significant than in 2005 (significant at the .05

level), though is still significant. The relationship between interest in the GE and

nationalist/unionist sentiments also experienced a slight drop in significance (significant at the

.01 level) but also remained significant (see table 10). These three years of data show that before

devolution, nationalist sentiments in Scotland did not have an effect on interest and attention to

politics, but after devolution, these nationalist sentiments had a significant effect on interest and

attention. Since devolution, Scots who identify more with unionist sentiments and feel at least

equally British and Scottish if not more British, are more likely to show interest in the broad

arena of politics. These findings indicate that because a large portion of Scots do identify with

more nationalist sentiments, a large portion of the population is disengaged from UK politics.

Tables 8, 9, 10 about here

In Wales in 1997, the data indicate that those who felt more Welsh than British had the

lowest rates of politic interest, with about 44% responding that they were not very to not at all

interested in politics. Conversely, those who felt more British than Welsh showed the highest

levels of politics interest, with nearly 70% responding that they had some, quite a lot, or a great

deal of interest in politics. As shown in table 13, the data is decidedly statistically insignificant Scheckelhoff 36

(chi-squared value of .616) and thus, there is no relationship between nationalist identity and

engagement and politics here.

In 2005, our comparable DVs (interest in GE, table 11, and attention to politics, table 12)

both showed similar weak but positive relationships. The analyses between nationalist/unionist

sentiments and attention to politics as well as interest in the GE showed that neither was

statistically significant (see table 13).

In 2010, those who felt Welsh not British were, again, the least interested and least

attentive to politics, while those who felt more British than Welsh had the highest rates of

interest and attentiveness to politics. All of the previous relationships in Wales between

nationalist/unionist identities were statistically insignificant, save for that of identity and attention in 2010, which had a chi-squared value of .032. In contrast to Scotland, which across

the board shows a significant relationship between nationalist/unionist sentiments and attentiveness/interest in politics from 1997 to 2005, it appears to be an unimportant indicator on political commitment in Wales. In 2010, however, there is evidence that nationalist/unionist identities may begin to play a role in engagement, as they were shown to have a statistically significant effect on attention to politics.

Tables 11, 12, 13 about here

While attention to politics and interest in General Elections are very useful in this sort of study to assess a variety of levels of commitment to politics, the most important measure of political participation is, of course, voting, the most tangible representation of politic interest.

For this study, we will examine voting in the survey year’s General Election (the UK elections) as it is affected by nationalist/unionist sentiments in each of the UK regions. Scheckelhoff 37

Referencing Table 14, in England in 1997, of all the respondents who indicated that they had voted in the 1997 General Election (GE), 45.8% fell into the equally English and British identity category. The second highest voting category was the more English than British identity, which accounted for 17.2% of all 1997 GE voters, a substantial drop from the equally British and

English category. Of all respondents who said that they did not vote in the 1997 GE, 44.2% fell into the same equally British and English category.

Similarly, in 2005, 44% of all respondents who voted in the election fell into the equally

British and English identity category. Of all the respondents who did not vote in the GE, 47.4% of them also fell into the equally British and English category. The 2010 data follows the same trend, with both the highest percentage of voters and non-voters falling in the equally British and

English category.

The same bivariate analysis also shows voter turnout rates for each nationalist/unionist category. In England in 1997, those who felt more British than English had the highest voter turnout rate (82.4%), while those who identified themselves as English not British had the lowest voter turnout at 76.2% (note that the other and none of these categories were actually lower than this).

In 2005, those who felt more English than British had the highest turnout rate (82.2%),

while those in the more British than English, other, and none of these categories had the lowest

turnout rates (at 68.9%, 63.9% and 59.3%, respectively).

In 2010, those who felt more British than English had the highest turnout rate (86.5%), a

notable change from 1997 and 2005. The lowest turnout rates were in the equally English and

British (78.2%) and none of these (57.5%) identity categories. The relationship between these

two variables in each of the three years is statistically significant at the .001 level, very Scheckelhoff 38 significant, and shows a weak but positive relationship, i.e. the more English a person feels the more likely they were to vote in the GE (see table 15). These findings suggest that, post- devolution, those who identify more with an English nationality are less and less likely to participate in voting.

Tables 14, 15 about here

In Scotland in 1997 and 2005, of all those who voted in the GE, most fell into the category of feeling more Scottish than British (at 31.3% of the total and 30.3% respectively) (see table 16B). In 2010, the same was true (25.2% of all respondents who voted fell into the more

Scottish than British category), but was closely followed in percentage by those in the equally

Scottish and British category (at 21.5%). Those who were most likely not to vote fell into one of two categories: either feeling more Scottish than British (as in 1997 with 38% of all people who did not vote in this category) or Scottish not British (in 2005 with 34% of the non-voting total and in 2010 with 48.5% of the total of non-voters).

As far as voter turnouts from individuals in Scotland, all three years had the highest turnouts from groups with felt either more British than Scottish (85.4% in 2005) or British not

Scottish (88.9% in 1997 and 85.2% in 2010). In all three years, 1997, 2005, and 2010, the identity groups with the lowest turnout rates were those in the other and none of these categories,

and the Scottish not British category. In 1997, 21.3% of those who felt Scottish not British did

not vote, which rose to 34% in 2005 and dipped down again to 31% in 2010 (see table 16A). In

many ways, this is perhaps more important for our purposes, as it indicates which identity

categories have the highest rates of participation in UK politics.

Looking at the significance values in Table 17, we see that in 1997, the relationship

between these variables was clearly insignificant (chi-squared value of .922). In 2005, the data Scheckelhoff 39 still indicated a positive, weak relationship, but was statistically significant at the .01 level (very significant). In 2010, the relationship was statistically significant at the .001 level, showing a substantial increase in the validity of nationalist/unionist sentiments as an effect on voting in

GEs.

Tables 16, 17 about here

In Wales, the 1997 and 2005 data both show that of all the respondents who voted, the highest percentage of them fell into the more Welsh than British category (32.2% in 1997 and

32.2% in 2005) (see table 18B). In 2010, the highest percentage fell into the category of equally

Welsh and British (25.8%). Of all those who did not vote in the GE, the highest percentages fell into the category of equally Welsh and British (26.5% in 1997 and 34.6% in 2005) and British not Welsh (27.5% in 2010).

The highest voter turnout categories in each year were more Welsh than British (86% turnout in 1997) and more British than Welsh (83.1% in 2005 and 89.5% in 2010) (see table

18A). Maybe more important for my purposes however, are the categories which produced the highest non-voter turnouts, those who did not vote. In 1997, those who fell into an “other” category had 71.4% of the group not vote. Also of note, 30.8% of those in the more British than

Welsh category did not vote. In 2005, those who fell into the other category had the highest non-

voter turnout (36.6%) with those in the more Welsh than British category at 26%. In 2010, we

see that the “other” category again produced the highest percentage of people who did not vote in

the 2010 GE (42.9%), with those in the British not Welsh category following with 25.9% of the

group not having voted.

This data from all three years included in this study showed this to be a consistently

negative and weak relationship (i.e. the less British an individual felt, the more likely he/she was Scheckelhoff 40 to have voted in the GE). While the relationship was statistically significant in 1997 at the .05 level (significant), it was not significant in either 2005 or 2010 (see table 19). This indicates that post-devolution, nationalist/unionist sentiments is increasingly not a valid indicator of likelihood of an individual to have voted in Wales.

Tables 18, 19 about here

The short story here is that from all this data, no simple, consistent pattern emerges. Each region functions in a way that is different from the others. My thought that I could, in the end, draw broad but universal conclusions about these three regions is clearly not a useful or realistic option. However, there is some validity to each of my hypotheses, and though they do not work out as neatly as I hoped they would, we can still draw very useful and insightful information from this study.

Conclusion

My data indicate that I can accept each of my hypotheses as valid in at least one region of

the United Kingdom, but not all. My original hypotheses were:

Hypothesis 1: Since devolution, nationalist sentiments have increased in Scotland as well

as in .

Hypothesis 2: As a result of these increased attachments to regions and not to the UK as

a whole, political interest and participation on the national level, by those who feel disengaged

from Britain, have lessened.

The data show that in England and Scotland, individuals are increasingly inclined to

identify with their region rather than with the union as a whole. Thus, in these regions, my first

hypothesis is valid. In contrast, Wales, which in 1997 had a reasonable amount of nationalist

support and minimal commitment to the union over Wales, increasingly seems polarized Scheckelhoff 41 between feeling Welsh not British and British not Welsh, with a notable portion of the population simply feeling equally Welsh and British. Thus, in the case of Wales, my first hypothesis is not valid.

Assessing the validity of my second hypothesis is a bit more complicated as it requires us to look as the relationships between nationalist and unionist identities and engagement in politics. Engagement manifests itself in a variety of ways, which in this study are presented as interest in politics/elections, attention to politics, and voting in General Elections. In England, more British sentiments used to translate into more interest in politics (in 1997, before devolution). Increasingly, it is a less significant influence on both interest and attention.

However, the more unionist sentiments continue to have a positive and significant effect on voting. So to some extent, my hypothesis is not valid: nationalist and unionist identities do no have an effect on interest or attention to politics in England. Yet, to some extent, it is has support, as nationalist/unionist identities have a very significant effect on voting.

In Scotland, there is a more decisive trend towards nationalist and unionist sentiments

influencing participation and engagement in UK politics, as the more nationally inclined

population continue lose interest in politics, pay less attention, and vote less frequently as time

passes.

In Wales, there is also a clear trend in nationalist/unionist sentiments being an

insignificant influence on participation or engagement in UK politics with a few exceptions. In

1997, feeling more British than Welsh did have a significant but weak effect on voting, and in

2010, it had a significant effect on attention to politics with a slightly stronger relationship than

any other in this study, but the broader picture is one where this question of identity does not

play a role in the culture of politics in the region. Scheckelhoff 42

So we are left with a sort of rank order as to which regions’ populations are most politically influenced by their nationalist/unionist identities. Scotland demonstrated the highest levels of nationalist/unionist influences on politics, and we can conclude without much debate that my second hypothesis is valid in this region. In many ways, this is consistent with our knowledge of devolution, which shows that Scotland experienced the most change as a result of devolution, gaining a Parliament with significant powers.

England is a bit more complicated, as nationalist/unionist sentiments have a significant effect on some areas of political engagement but not others. Thus, we can say that while my second hypothesis is not entirely supported in this region, it also cannot be fully dismissed.

Again, this is consistent with the history of devolution, which shows that devolution did not

actually change much in England. i.e. it did not gain a new regional government. However, as

time passes, there are concerns in England that there is not a regional government where there is

one in each of the other regions of the UK. As these concerns increase, so too do the nationalist

sentiments in England and their effect on engagement in politics.

In Wales, we can safely conclude that in general, my second hypothesis is invalid in this

region, and that these changing nationalist and unionist sentiments do not play a major role in

defining Welsh engagement with politics. Again, this is consistent with historical knowledge of

Wales, which, while previously independent (before 1535), was never as united as Scotland. As a

result, the Welsh population generally feels lower levels of nationalist sentiments, which in turn

play less of a role in Welsh engagement in politics.

Before devolution, in 1997, these nationalist/unionist identities only had a significant

effect on the English population, which resulted in higher levels of interest in those who felt

generally more British. In 2010, over a decade after the first devolved government election, Scheckelhoff 43 feeling more nationalist sentiments in Scotland seems to drive individuals away from engagement in UK politics. On the other , where feeling British in England in pre- devolution years resulted in higher levels of engagement before devolution, it no longer does. In

Wales, these nationalist or unionist sentiments never seem to play a role in engagement, pre- or post- devolution, except in 2010, and only in one area of engagement.

It is clear that the way these identities influence their given political culture is changing, but also that in the end, devolution has not served one of its main intended purposes. Labour’s aspirations for the United Kingdom to emerge from devolution as a more unified political entity have not come to fruition. In fact, it seems that devolution has made already nationalist regions, like Scotland, more disengaged from the union, and made relatively content and unified regions, like England, less engaged in the union’s politics. Although no decisive actions have been taken in any region to translate disengagement into separation or further devolution, these concerns are clearly rumbling under the surface of British politics.

Scheckelhoff 44

Appendix

Table 1: Univariate Analysis- Region of Residence Distribution

1997 2005 2010 England 85.7% 56.1% 75.7% Scotland 9.1% 25.3% 14.9% Wales 5.2% 18.5% 9.4%

Table 2: Univariate Analysis- English National Identity Distribution (in percents)

1997 2005 2010 English not British 7.5 14.4 20.5 More English than British 17 12.3 14.4 Equally English and British 45.4 44.9 30.4 More British than English 14.2 8.2 8.7 British not English 9.2 10 11.7 Other 5.3 3.7 N/A None of these 1.3 6.6 5.3

Table 3: Univariate Analysis- Scottish National Identity Distribution (in percents)

1997 2005 2010 Scottish not British 23.2 31.8 39.2 More Scottish than British 38.4 29.3 23.6 Equally Scottish and British 26.9 25.4 20.2 More British than Scottish 4.4 4 5.1 British not Scottish 3.6 3.7 8.1 Other 2.4 1.4 N/A None of these 1 4.3 3.8

Table 4: Univariate Analysis- Welsh National Identity Distribution (in percents)

1997 2005 2010 Welsh not British 12.3 16 21.9 More Welsh than British 28.8 18.9 15 Equally Welsh and British 25.2 32.7 25.8 More British than Welsh 8.7 10.7 8.2 British not Welsh 18 14 23.2 Other 4.9 2.2 N/A None of these 2.2 5.4 6

Scheckelhoff 45

Table 5: Bivariate Analysis- How English National Identity Affects Interest in Politics (1997) and General Elections (2005, 2010)

not very none 1997 a great deal quite a lot some much at all English not British 9.7 24.7 31.2 28.5 5.9 More English than British 8.1 21.7 41.2 21.7 7.4 Equally English and British 7.8 20.8 38.2 27.2 6 More British than English 13 30.6 34.6 17.3 4.5 British not English 11.7 26.4 36.8 16.5 8.7 Other 18.8 28.6 27.8 21.8 3 None of these 12.5 3.1 46.9 25 12.5

very interested in somewhat not very not at all 2005 General Election interested interested interested English not British 33.4 39.3 18.5 8.8 More English than British 32.5 43.8 20.5 3.1 Equally English and British 28.4 44.7 18.1 8.8 More British than English 33.7 36.3 20.7 9.3 British not English 39.8 41.5 13.1 5.5 Other 32.3 40 14.2 13.5 None of these 34.5 40.2 16.1 9.2

very interested in somewhat not very not at all 2010 General Election interested interested interested English not British 42.9 31.1 16.9 9.1 More English than British 48.7 34.7 11 5.5 Equally English and British 45.8 35.3 11.9 7 More British than English 46.5 36.8 10.8 5.9 British not English 49.4 35.3 10 5.2 None of these 38.9 38.9 12.4 9.7

Scheckelhoff 46

Table 6: Bivariate Analysis- How English National Identity Affects Attention to Politics (2005, 2010)

10-a 0-no great 2005 attention 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 deal English not British 4.7 1.8 3.5 7.6 10.6 17 13.5 16.7 14.4 5 5.3 More English than British 4.5 1.7 6.5 7.9 6.5 16.1 17.8 18.2 15.1 4.1 1.7 Equally English and British 5.2 4 6.1 10.2 10.7 15.5 14.5 16.4 11.4 3.8 2.3 More British than English 3.1 3.6 5.2 9.9 4.7 16.1 12.5 17.2 17.7 6.8 3.1 British not English 3.8 1.3 3.4 9.7 8.1 15.3 15.3 19.9 12.7 4.7 5.9 Other 10.3 2.6 5.2 7.7 9 15.5 11.6 14.2 13.5 7.1 3.2 None of these 1.1 2.3 11.5 4.6 3.4 18.4 6.9 21.8 12.6 8 9.2

10-a 0-no great 2010 attention 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 deal English not British 6.8 3.6 8.7 6.4 8 17.1 13.4 14.4 10.5 3.9 7.3 More English than British 2.9 2.3 4.5 8.1 8.1 13 14.3 17.9 19.5 4.5 4.9 Equally English and British 5 4.2 5.9 8.4 7.7 15.9 12.4 15.6 15.6 4.4 5 More British than English 4.3 1.1 5.9 9.7 5.4 14.1 11.9 17.8 18.9 2.7 8.1 British not English 2.8 3.2 6 5.6 8 12.9 11.6 19.3 14.9 6.4 9.2 None of these 6.1 6.1 7 7.9 7.9 11.4 10.5 14 15.8 7 6.1

Scheckelhoff 47

Table 7: Significance and Directional Figured for English National Identity and Interest/Attention to Politics

Variable 1 Variable 2 Chi Squared Somers D Tau-c Gamma English/British 1997 Identity Interest in Politics .000 -.069 -.063 -.094 English/British Interest in GE 2005 Identity 2005 0.004 -.011 -.011 -.016 English/British Interest in GE 2010 Identity 2010 0.125 .026 -.024 -.037

English/British Attention To 2005 Identity Politics 0.624 -.024 -.026 -.034 English/British Attention To 2010 Identity Politics 0.104 .040 .040 .049

Scheckelhoff 48

Table 8: Bivariate Analysis- How Scottish National Identity Affects Interest in Politics and General Elections

quite a not very none 1997 a great deal lot some much at all Scottish not British 6.6 11.5 37.7 36.1 8.2 More Scottish than British 7 21 36 29 7 Equally Scottish and British 11.4 18.6 32.9 30 7.1 More British than Scottish 18.2 27.3 36.4 18.2 0 British not Scottish 11.1 11.1 33.3 33.3 11.1 Other 14.3 28.6 28.6 28.6 0 None of these 33.3 33.3 0 33.3 0

very interested in General somewhat not very not at all 2005 Election interested interested interested Scottish not British 23.1 36.1 27.5 13.3 More Scottish than British 25.2 48.3 20.1 6.4 Equally Scottish and British 32.8 47.9 12.7 6.6 More British than Scottish 41.5 39 19.5 0 British not Scottish 31.6 39.5 15.8 13.2 Other 22.7 54.5 15.9 6.8 None of these 21.4 50 14.3 14.3

very interested in General somewhat not very not at all 2010 Election interested interested interested Scottish not British 29.1 33.3 18 19.5 More Scottish than British 37.6 43.3 10.2 8.9 Equally Scottish and British 38.8 37.3 13.4 10.4 More British than Scottish 55.9 23.5 8.8 11.8 British not Scottish 48.1 35.2 11.1 5.6 None of these 40 20 16 24

Scheckelhoff 49

Table 9: Bivariate Analysis: How Scottish National Identity Affects Attention to Politics (2005, 2010)

10-a 0-no great 2005 attention 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 deal Scottish not British 10.8 5.2 8.6 9.3 9.3 17 9.9 14.2 9.6 4 2.2 More Scottish than British 4.7 2 6 9.1 8.7 18.8 12.4 17.4 14.4 3.4 3 Equally Scottish and British 3.9 1.5 6.2 8.1 11.2 12.7 15.4 17.4 13.5 6.6 3.5 More British than Scottish 0 2.4 7.3 2.4 7.3 17.1 12.2 29.3 9.8 2.4 9.8 British not Scottish 10.5 2.6 2.6 5.3 7.9 10.5 13.2 23.7 18.4 2.6 2.6 Other 2.3 4.5 4.5 6.8 2.3 11.4 15.9 18.2 22.7 4.5 6.8 None of these 14.3 0 7.1 0 14.3 0 35.7 7.1 14.3 7.1 0

10-a 0-no great 2010 attention 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 deal Scottish not British 12.6 5 8.8 11.5 7.7 14.2 7.7 10 11.5 6.5 4.6 More Scottish than British 5.1 5.1 6.4 7.6 8.3 13.4 10.2 14.6 15.9 5.7 7.6 Equally Scottish and British 3.7 1.5 6 4.5 14.9 18.7 10.4 11.9 15.7 6 6.7 More British than Scottish 8.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 11.8 8.8 11.8 14.7 11.8 20.6 British not Scottish 5.6 0 0 5.6 11.1 16.7 7.4 22.2 14.8 5.6 11.1 None of these 8 12 8 8 12 4 8 16 12 8 4

Scheckelhoff 50

Table 10: Significance and Directional Measurements for Scottish National Identity and Interest/Attention to Politics

Chi Variable 1 Variable 2 Squared Somers D Tau-c Gamma Scottish/British Interest in 1997 Identity Politics .975 -.101 -.092 -.138 Scottish/British Interest in GE 2005 Identity 2005 .000 -.126 -.120 -.177 Scottish/British Interest in GE 2010 Identity 2010 0.002 -.135 -.130 -.188

Scottish/British Attention To 2005 Identity Politics .019 .132 .125 .163 Scottish/British Attention To 2010 Identity Politics 0.031 .131 .128 .161

Scheckelhoff 51

Table 11: Bivariate Analysis- How Welsh National Identity Affects Interest in Politics (1997) and Interest in the General Election (2005, 2010)

quite a not very none at 1997 a great deal lot some much all Welsh not British 11.1 16.7 27.8 22.2 22.2 More Welsh than British 4.5 20.5 34.1 31.8 9.1 Equally Welsh and British 15.4 20.5 23.1 30.8 10.3 More British than Welsh 15.4 15.4 38.5 30.8 0 British not Welsh 3.7 29.6 33.3 25.9 7.4 Other 14.3 42.9 14.3 28.6 0 None of these 0 0 100 0 0

very interested in General somewhat not very not at all 2005 Election interested interested interested Welsh not British 23.1 36.1 27.5 13.3 More Welsh than British 25.2 48.3 20.1 6.4 Equally Welsh and British 32.8 47.9 12.7 6.6 More British than Welsh 41.5 39 19.5 0 British not Welsh 31.6 39.5 15.8 13.2 Other 22.7 54.5 15.9 6.8 None of these 21.4 50 14.3 14.3

very interested in General somewhat not very not at all 2010 Election interested interested interested Welsh not British 25.5 45.1 13.7 15.7 More Welsh than British 45.7 34.3 14.3 5.7 Equally Welsh and British 45 33.3 11.7 10 More British than Welsh 63.2 31.6 5.3 0 British not Welsh 61.1 24.1 5.6 9.3 None of these 64.3 21.4 7.1 7.1

Scheckelhoff 52

Table 12: Bivariate Analysis- How Welsh National Identity Affects Attention to Politics (2005, 2010)

10-a 0-no great 2005 attention 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 deal Welsh not British 8.1 3.2 7.3 9.7 8.1 16.9 17.7 9.7 10.5 2.4 6.5 More Welsh than British 2.7 4.8 7.5 8.9 9.6 19.2 15.8 13 14.4 2.1 2.1 Equally Welsh and British 5.1 2.4 7.9 7.9 9.5 19 11.9 17.4 13.8 2.8 2.4 More British than Welsh 3.6 6 6 8.4 12 10.8 21.7 13.3 12 2.4 3.6 British not Welsh 5.6 0.9 7.4 9.3 5.6 19.4 16.7 14.8 11.1 5.6 3.7 Other 9.5 0 4.8 7.1 14.3 2.4 21.4 19 16.7 2.4 2.4 None of these 11.8 5.9 0 0 0 17.6 17.6 23.5 11.8 0 11.8

10-a 0-no great 2010 attention 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 deal Welsh not British 12 4 6 12 16 20 16 6 6 2 0 More Welsh than British 2.9 2.9 5.7 8.6 14.3 14.3 11.4 20 5.6 2.9 11.4 Equally Welsh and British 6.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 11.7 20 5 18.3 15 8.3 5 More British than Welsh 0 0 0 5.3 5.3 10.5 15.8 5.3 36.8 10.5 10.5 British not Welsh 1.9 1.9 3.7 11.1 11.1 3.7 7.4 13 16.7 13 16.7 None of these 7.1 0 0 21.4 0 7.1 28.6 21.4 7.1 0 7.1

Scheckelhoff 53

Table 13: Significance and Directional Measures for Welsh National Identity and Interest/Attention to Politics

Variable 1 Variable 2 Chi Squared Somers D Tau-c Gamma Welsh/British Interest in 1997 Identity Politics .616 -.099 -.096 -.127 Welsh/British Interest in GE 2005 Identity 2005 0.221 -.048 -.048 -.065 Welsh/British Interest in GE 2010 Identity 2010 0.138 -.207 -.200 -.287

Welsh/British Attention To 2005 Identity Politics .607 .040 .039 .048 Welsh/British Attention To 2010 Identity Politics 0.032 0.217 .221 .256

Scheckelhoff 54

Table 14A: Bivariate Analysis- How English National Identity Affects Whether an Individual Voted in the Most Recent General Election (1997, 2005, 2010)

% within identity category (IV) 1997 Yes, voted No, did not vote English not British 76.2 23.8 More English than British 79.6 20.4 Equally English and British 79.1 20.9 More British than English 82.4 17.6 British not English 80.9 19.1 Other 68.2 31.8 None of these 38.7 61.3

2005 Yes, voted No, did not vote English not British 77.7 22.3 More English than British 82.2 17.8 Equally English and British 72.2 27.8 More British than English 68.9 31.1 British not English 79.7 20.3 Other 63.9 36 None of these 59.3 40.7

2010 Yes, voted No, did not vote English not British 78.8 21.2 More English than British 84.4 15.6 Equally English and British 78.2 21.8 More British than English 86.5 13.5 British not English 79.2 20.8 None of these 57.5 42.5

Scheckelhoff 55

Table 14B % within did or did not vote (DV) 1997 Yes, voted No, did not vote English not British 7.2 8.3 More English than British 17.2 16.2 Equally English and British 45.8 44.2 More British than English 14.9 11.7 British not English 9.6 8.3 Other 4.6 7.9 None of these 0.6 3.6

2005 Yes, voted No, did not vote English not British 15.2 12.2 More English than British 13.8 8.4 Equally English and British 44 47.4 More British than English 7.6 31.1 British not English 10.8 20.3 Other 5.7 40.7 None of these 2.9 36.1

2010 Yes, voted No, did not vote English not British 20.5 20.7 More English than British 15.4 10.7 Equally English and British 39 40.8 More British than English 9.5 5.6 British not English 11.8 11.6 None of these 3.9 10.7

Scheckelhoff 56

Table 15: Significance and Directional Measures for English National Identity and Voting

Variable 1 Variable 2 Chi Squared Somers D Tau-c Gamma English/British 1997 Identity Voted in GE .000 .019 .020 .041 English/British 2005 Identity Voted in GE .000 .068 .077 .134 English/British 2010 Identity Voted in GE .000 .038 .041 .082

Scheckelhoff 57

Table 16A: Bivariate Analysis- How Scottish National Identity Affects Whether an Individual Voted in the Most Recent General Election (1997, 2005, 2010)

% within identity category (IV) 1997 Yes, voted No, did not vote Scottish not British 78.7 21.3 More Scottish than British 81.2 18.8 Equally Scottish and British 82.9 17.1 More British than Scottish 83.3 16.7 British not Scottish 88.9 11.1 Other 66.7 33.3 None of these 66.7 33.3

2005 Yes, voted No, did not vote Scottish not British 66 34 More Scottish than British 75.5 24.5 Equally Scottish and British 78.8 21.2 More British than Scottish 85.4 14.6 British not Scottish 68.4 31.6 Other 70.5 29.5 None of these 50 50

2010 Yes, voted No, did not vote Scottish not British 69 31 More Scottish than British 79.6 20.4 Equally Scottish and British 79.9 20.1 More British than Scottish 82.4 17.6 British not Scottish 85.2 14.8 None of these 45.8 54.2

Scheckelhoff 58

Table 16B % within did or did not vote (DV) 1997 Yes, voted No, did not vote Scottish not British 22.6 26 More Scottish than British 38.7 38 Equally Scottish and British 27.4 24 More British than Scottish 4.7 4 British not Scottish 3.8 2 Other 1.9 4 None of these 0.9 2

2005 Yes, voted No, did not vote Scottish not British 28.8 39.9 More Scottish than British 30.3 26.4 Equally Scottish and British 27.5 19.9 More British than Scottish 4.7 2.2 British not Scottish 3.5 4.3 Other 4.2 4.7 None of these 0.9 2.5

2010 Yes, voted No, did not vote Scottish not British 36.2 48.5 More Scottish than British 25.2 19.2 Equally Scottish and British 21.5 16.2 More British than Scottish 5.6 3.6 British not Scottish 9.3 4.8 None of these 2.2 7.8

Scheckelhoff 59

Table 17: Significance and Directional Measures for Scottish National Identity and Voting (1997, 2005, 2010)

Variable 1 Variable 2 Chi Squared Somers D Tau-c Gamma Scottish/British 1997 Identity Voted in GE 0.922 -0.02 -0.02 -0.045 Scottish/British 2005 Identity Voted in GE 0.002 -0.07 -0.08 -0.136 Scottish/British 2010 Identity Voted in GE 0.000 -0.067 -0.075 -0.135

Scheckelhoff 60

Table 18A: Bivariate Analysis- Welsh National Identity and How it Affects Whether an Individual Voted in the Most Recent General Election (1997, 2005, 2010)

% within identity category (IV) 1997 Yes, voted No, did not vote Welsh not British 77.8 22.2 More Welsh than British 86 14 Equally Welsh and British 76.3 23.7 More British than Welsh 69.2 30.8 British not Welsh 77.8 22.2 Other 28.6 71.4 None of these

2005 Yes, voted No, did not vote Welsh not British 79.8 20.2 More Welsh than British 74 26 Equally Welsh and British 75.5 24.5 More British than Welsh 83.1 16.9 British not Welsh 80.6 19.4 Other 63.4 36.6 None of these 76.5 23.5

2010 Yes, voted No, did not vote Welsh not British 80.4 19.6 More Welsh than British 82.9 17.1 Equally Welsh and British 78.3 21.7 More British than Welsh 89.5 10.5 British not Welsh 74.1 25.9 None of these 57.1 42.9

Scheckelhoff 61

Table 18B % within did or did not vote (DV) 1997 Yes, voted No, did not vote Welsh not British 12.2 11.8 More Welsh than British 32.2 17.6 Equally Welsh and British 25.2 26.5 More British than Welsh 7.8 11.8 British not Welsh 18.3 17.6 Other 1.7 14.7 None of these 2.6 0

2005 Yes, voted No, did not vote Welsh not British 16.7 14 More Welsh than British 18.2 21.2 Equally Welsh and British 32.2 34.6 More British than Welsh 11.6 7.8 British not Welsh 14.7 11.7 Other 4.4 8.4 None of these 2.2 2.2

2010 Yes, voted No, did not vote Welsh not British 22.5 19.6 More Welsh than British 15.9 11.8 Equally Welsh and British 25.8 25.5 More British than Welsh 9.3 3.9 British not Welsh 22 27.5 None of these 4.4 11.8

Scheckelhoff 62

Table 19: Significance and Directional Measures for Welsh National Identity and Voting (1997, 2005, 2010)

Variable 1 Variable 2 Chi Squared Somers D Tau-c Gamma Welsh/British 1997 Identity Voted in GE .048 .109 .125 .217 Welsh/British 2005 Identity Voted in GE 0.211 0.005 0.006 0.011 Welsh/British 2010 Identity Voted in GE 0.29 0.076 0.087 0.158

Scheckelhoff 63

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