Hans Von Spakovsky
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Andrea Gyger From: von Spakovsky, Hans <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:30 PM To: SoS Rulemaking Subject: 8 CCR 1505-1 Attachments: Heritage-Internet voting.pdf Please find attached a policy paper on the dangers of Internet voting, including the electronic delivery of voted ballots. Hans von Spakovsky Manager, Election Law Reform Initiative and Senior Legal Fellow The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6207 heritage.org 1 BACKGROUNDER No. 3034 | JULY 14, 2015 The Dangers of Internet Voting Hans A. von Spakovsky Abstract Those who believe that it is “possible given current technology” to cre- Key Points ate a secure online voting system are dangerously mistaken. Accord- ing to computer experts, Internet voting is vulnerable to cyber-attack n Although being able to cast a and fraud—vulnerabilities inherent in current hardware and software, ballot from your home computer, as well as the basic manner in which the Internet is organized—and like being able to order and buy products and services through it is unlikely that these vulnerabilities will be eliminated in the near online Internet transactions, future. Internet voting, or even the delivery by e-mail of voted ballots might make voting more conve- from registered voters, would be vulnerable to a variety of well-known nient, the extraordinary secu- cyber-attacks, any of which could be catastrophic. Such attacks could rity problems of such a remote even be launched by an enemy agency beyond the reach of U.S. law and Internet voting system present could cause significant voter disenfranchisement, privacy violations, an unacceptable risk to elec- vote buying and selling, and vote switching. The biggest danger, how- tion integrity. ever, is that such attacks could be completely undetected. n The overwhelming conclusion of computer experts is that hose who believe that “voting online is the future” or that it is those security vulnerabilities are T“possible given current technology” to create a secure online inherent in the architecture and 1 organization of the Internet and voting system are dangerously mistaken. According to computer the software and hardware in experts, Internet voting is vulnerable to cyber-attack and fraud— common use today. vulnerabilities inherent in current hardware and software, as well n Without major technological as the basic manner in which the Internet is organized. It is unlike- changes, there is almost no pos- ly that these vulnerabilities will be eliminated at any time in the sibility that a secure Internet vot- near future. ing system can be designed for State legislators and secretaries of state who are considering the foreseeable future. implementing Internet voting, or even the delivery by e-mail of n State legislators and secretar- voted ballots from registered voters, should reconsider such mea- ies of state who are considering sures. These programs would be vulnerable to a variety of well- implementing Internet voting, known cyber-attacks, any of which could be catastrophic. Such or even the delivery by e-mail of voted ballots from regis- tered voters, should reconsider This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg3034 such measures. The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE n Internet voting is definitely a Washington, DC 20002 technology whose time has not (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org come—and may never come. Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. BACKGROUNDER | NO. 3034 JULY 14, 2015 attacks could be “launched by anyone from a dis- National Science Foundation. In 2001, a report affected lone individual to a well-financed enemy commissioned by the National Science Foundation agency outside the reach of U.S. law.”2 They also (NSF) reached a similar conclusion. The experts “could result in large-scale, selective voter disenfran- convened by the NSF found that although remote chisement,” privacy violations, vote buying and sell- Internet voting would maximize convenience, “it ing, and vote switching “even to the extent of revers- also poses substantial security risks” that “cur- ing the outcome of many elections at once….”3 The rent and near-term technologies are inadequate to biggest danger, however, is that such attacks “could address.” In fact, “remote Internet voting systems succeed and yet go completely undetected.”4 pose significant risk to the integrity of the voting process, and should not be fielded for use in public Expert Analyses of Internet Voting elections until substantial technical and social sci- California. Convened by former California Sec- ence issues are addressed.”8 retary of State Bill Jones, the California Internet The NSF report also noted that “Internet-based Voting Task Force performed the first serious evalu- voter registration poses significant risk to the integrity ation of Internet voting. The task force used its prox- of the voting process, and should not be implemented imity to Silicon Valley—the heart of the U.S. comput- for the foreseeable future.” It argued that the “voter er industry—to involve front-line computer experts registration process is already one of the weakest in its evaluation of the feasibility of and security links in our electoral process” and that “introduction issues involved in Internet voting. Those experts of Internet-based registration without first address- came from a variety of software and hardware com- ing the considerable flaws in our current system would panies and institutions including Compaq Comput- only serve to greatly exacerbate the risks to which we ers, Oracle, Cisco Systems, and the California Insti- are already exposed.” The NSF report concluded that: tute of Technology. In its final report, issued on January 18, 2000, While information already in the domain of elec- the task force defined Internet voting as “an elec- tion officials may be updated remotely, given tion system that uses electronic ballots that would appropriate authentication protocols, initial reg- allow voters to transmit their voted ballot to elec- istration conducted online cannot establish the tion officials over the Internet.”5 It concluded that identity of the registrant without the transmis- “[p]otential criminal electronic attacks on com- sion of unique biometric (fingerprint or retinal puter software, such as destructive ‘viruses’ or scan) data and an existing database with which ‘Trojan Horse’ software, create a serious threat to verify the data. Online registration without to Internet voting.”6 The group further believed the appropriate security infrastructure would be that “additional technical innovations are neces- at high risk for automated fraud (i.e., the poten- sary before remote Internet voting can be widely tial undetected registration of large numbers of implemented….”7 fraudulent voters).9 1. Markos Moulitsas, “Voting Online Is the Future,” The Hill, May 13, 2014, http://thehill.com/opinion/markos-moulitsas/206047-markos-moulitsas-voting-online-is-the-future (accessed July 6, 2015). 2. David Jefferson, Aviel D. Rubin, Barbara Simons, and David Wagner,A Security Analysis of the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE), January 20, 2004, p. 2, http://www.servesecurityreport.org/ (accessed July 6, 2015). 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. California Internet Voting Task Force, A Report on the Feasibility of Internet Voting, January 2000, p. 2, http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ivote/final_report.pdf (accessed July 6, 2015). 6. Ibid., p. 4. 7. Ibid., p. 2. 8. Internet Policy Institute, Report of the National Workshop on Internet Voting: Issues and Research Agenda, March 2001, p. 2, http://www.verifiedvoting.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/NSFInternetVotingReport.pdf (accessed July 6, 2015). The workshop was sponsored by the National Science Foundation, conducted in cooperation with the University of Maryland, and sponsored by the Freedom Forum. 9. Ibid., pp. 2–3. 2 BACKGROUNDER | NO. 3034 JULY 14, 2015 Pentagon Internet Voting Project. Because of attacks, denial of service attacks, spoofing, automat- the severe problems that overseas military and civil- ed vote buying, viral attacks on voter PCs, etc.”15 ian personnel experience when voting, Congress While it was not possible to estimate the prob- directed the Federal Voting Assistance Program ability of a successful cyber-attack on any one elec- (FVAP) office at the U.S. Department of Defense to tion, the experts pointed out that the attacks they develop an Internet voting system pilot project for were “most concerned about are quite easy to per- use in the 2004 federal election.10 FVAP is respon- petrate.” In fact, “there are kits readily available on sible for administering the Uniformed and Over- the Internet that could be modified or used direct- seas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, a federal law that ly for attacking an election.” The experts pointed requires all states to “permit absent uniformed ser- out “the obvious fact that a U.S. general election vices voters and overseas voters to use absentee reg- offers one of the most tempting targets for cyber- istration procedures and to vote by absentee ballot attack in the history of the Internet, whether the in general, special, primary, and runoff elections for attacker’s motive is overtly political or simply Federal office.”11 self-aggrandizement.”16 Military voters in particular have an unaccept- One of the most serious