Assessing the Obama Administration's Global Engagement Strategy

America’s Extended Hand: JUNE 2010 Assessing the Obama Administration’s Global Engagement Strategy By Kristin M. Lord and Marc Lynch Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank, first, the dozens of dedicated U.S. government officials who spoke with us, often several times, during the course of our research (and to whom we granted anonymity to encourage frank conversation). Their insights were vital to this report and we hope our analysis serves them well, even and perhaps especially, where we were critical. We also wish to thank the external reviewers who provided extremely helpful comments: Sean Aday, Bruce Gregory, Goli Ameri, James Glassman, and Nick Cull. Finally, we received enormous – and enormously patient – support from our CNAS colleagues, especially Patrick Cronin, Abe Denmark, Andrew Exum, Ashley Hoffman, Christine Parthemore, Shannon O’Reilly, Travis Sharp, and Lizzie Threlkeld. Richard Fontaine, Bob Kaplan, and John Nagl gave particularly detailed and helpful comments. Eugene Chow deserves special mention for his research assistance, as does Will Rogers who laid out the report. Finally, we thank Nate Fick for editorial and substantive guidance that shaped and improved the final product. CNAS is a vibrant and supportive environment for fact- based, principled, and pragmatic national security research because of all of them. Cover Image In October 2007, then Senator Barack Obama addresses a crowd of more than 5,000 on Hayden Lawn, in front of West Hall, at a late morning campaign stop at Arizona State University. (TOM STORY) JUNE 2010 America’s Extended Hand: Assessing the Obama Administration’s Global Engagement Strategy By Kristin M. Lord and Marc Lynch America’s Extended Hand: JUNE 2010 Assessing the Obama Administration’s Global Engagement Strategy About the Authors Dr. Kristin M. Lord is Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security. Dr. Marc Lynch is Associate Professor of Political Science and the Director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. 2 | I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Engagement is a pillar and guiding principle of President Barack Obama’s foreign policy. At the beginning of Obama’s presidency, the United States faced a global public widely angry at America and distrustful of its motives. An unpopular war in Iraq and a controversial war on terror threatened America’s moral authority over- seas and divided even America’s allies. Despite substantial reorientation during the Bush administration, this sentiment lingered, providing an all too convenient rallying point for America’s enemies and intractable political obstacles to cooperation with the United States. Damaged credibility constrained American power. Barack Obama pledged to renew America’s relationship with the world, working in concert with other nations to address shared global chal- lenges. He signaled a strong break from the past and delivered an ambitious series of speeches designed to build a strong foundation of support for his administration’s foreign policy agenda. But while his efforts enjoyed early success - improving foreign public opinions of America and raising hopes globally – the administration struggled to deliver on its promises. It raised expectations that the administration could not fulfill in the short term and is scrambling to fulfill in the longer term. This paper assesses the administration’s global public engagement strategy and its implemen- tation to date. Though the administration’s commitment to engagement has encompassed a range of efforts such as negotiating with adversaries as well as allies, working through multilateral institutions, and a stronger commitment to diplomacy, we focus on just one key dimension of the president’s broader engagement strategy, which we term strategic public engagement and define as efforts to engage, inform and persuade foreign publics to advance U.S. national interests. We do not address engagement through state-to-state diplomacy | 3 America’s Extended Hand: JUNE 2010 Assessing the Obama Administration’s Global Engagement Strategy and we touch only briefly upon the challenge In assessing the success of public engagement, it is of combating violent extremism, which is the important to recognize both the limits and poten- subject of a separate paper by the Center for a tial of this nebulous instrument of statecraft. New America Security (CNAS). Public engagement is no silver bullet. If policies are unpopular, no amount of snazzy marketing In conducting this assessment, the authors met will make them beloved. If national interests are together or individually with dozens of key fundamentally at odds, no amount of dialogue government officials (to whom we promised will align them. Practitioners of public engage- anonymity to guarantee frank discussions) ment can aspire only to explain the motivation across the relevant agencies, reviewed a range of behind unpopular policies (that U.S. attacks on policy documents and initiatives, and analyzed al Qaeda are intended to counter terrorism, not the role of U.S. public engagement in key parts to wage war on Islam, for instance), put them of the world. Our goals are straightforward: to in context, and highlight the many areas where assess critically what has been done and what interests and values do overlap. Public engage- remains to be done in order to maximize the ment is also used most effectively in concert chances that the administration can succeed in with other instruments of power, as a sort of advancing America’s national security objec- diplomatic force-multiplier that can amplify the tives through public engagement. impact of agile diplomacy, effective development We examine, first, the administration’s over- activities and successful military operations. all philosophy regarding public engagement Finally, public engagement provides policymakers and show how it both differs from those of with options when other instruments of statecraft previous administrations and demonstrates are severely constrained. striking continuity with the last years of the We conclude that, in many ways, the Obama Bush administration. Second, we examine the administration has achieved its initial objective administration’s public engagement strategy in of “re-starting” America’s relationship with the three key policy areas – relations between the world. The administration clearly understands United States and the Muslim world, combating the importance of dialogue and of listening to violent extremism and promoting democracy foreign publics, and it is attempting to incor- and human rights - and in each of four coun- porate a sensitivity to public opinion into its tries - Iran, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan. foreign policy decision making and translate Third, we discuss the Obama administration’s public support into political leverage. It has efforts to build the institutional capacity neces- aggressively reached out to foreign populations sary to execute a “whole of government” public through mass media, embassies, and Internet- engagement strategy as recommended by more based social media. It has confronted directly than 30 earlier reports that criticized America’s issues of major political concern abroad, such as capacity to engage in successful, coordinated the Arab-Israeli conflict, while also working to public diplomacy. In particular, we focus on build partnerships that will advance lower-pro- the roles of the president himself, the National file but urgent issues of shared concern, such as Security Council (NSC), Department of Defense economic opportunity and education. President (DOD), State Department, Broadcasting Board Obama’s personal popularity is high. His widely of Governors, and the administration’s efforts to admired speeches, like his Cairo address to the synchronize the activities of these organizations. world’s Muslim communities and his words 4 | Figure 1: Positive Views of Key Countries According to 28 Nation Poll 60% 50% 40% EU UK 30% USA China Russia 20% Iran 10% 0% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Source: BBC World Service, "Global Views of United States Improve While Other Countries Decline" (18 April 2010). upon accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, have in Afghanistan, more support for the admin- riveted people around the globe. The adminis- istration’s policy on Iran, and an al Qaeda tration has also made behind-the-scenes changes organization on the defensive. The willingness of designed to strengthen interagency coordination 47 world leaders to convene in Washington for and improve the organizations that support U.S. the April 2010 summit on nuclear security further public diplomacy and strategic communication. demonstrated a new receptivity to U.S. leadership. Many factors contributed to all of these accom- Though it is challenging to discern clear instances plishments, of course, but more favorable public in which public engagement alone made an views of the United States created a political impact, the past 18 months suggest some tan- climate more conducive to success. gible results: greater support from NATO allies | 5 America’s Extended Hand: JUNE 2010 Assessing the Obama Administration’s Global Engagement Strategy Yet, at the same time, high expectations have needs more consistent development and execu- given way to skepticism as the administration tion of public engagement strategies for issues has struggled to deliver on its

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