The Power of Ideas and the Perception of Political
Karl-Heinz Breier (University of Vechta, Germany)
“The own horizon is narrowed without the knowledge and practise in the studies of the great political thinkers. In order to perceive the actual situation of the world as something new, the traditional amplitude of political thinking is necessary.”1
As we assemble here in Bloomington to compare different kinds of government, we know that Karl Jaspers who is born in Oldenburg, the city I am living now, stresses an important and very significant issue. Jaspers speaks of the “amplitude of passed Political Thought” and anyone who is dealing with his political thinking knows that the amplitude of Political Thought characterizes his work. It is absolutely clear for Jaspers – and Eric Voegelin verbalized that in the New Science of Politics to the point – that “the contraction of political science to a description of existing institutions”2 must be avoided. Both, Jaspers as well as Voegelin, recognize the strong connection between political phenomena and their interpretation on the basis of political theory. The objects of our Political Science, according to that, not only are the incidents of actual politics; they also include patterns of understanding that allow us to gain access to the diversity of all political phenomena. Jaspers gets to the heart of this in “The Idea of the University”:
“After examinations, one quickly forgets. The decisive factor after this is not the body of fact learned, but one’s judgement. What matters then is not factual knowledge by itself but the ability and initiative to go out and get the facts on one’s own, to think about them effectively, to know what questions to ask.”3
That is to say: Whoever wants to understand politics, according to Jaspers, must realize that the world of phenomena consists of a categorical order. Thus it is the task of Political Science to contribute to the enlightment of the categories of order. I think everyone of us knows Toqueville’s
1 Refer to: Karl Jaspers: Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?, 10th edition, Munich 1988, p. 207. 2 Eric Voegelin: The New Science of Politics. An Introduction, University of Chicago Press 1952, p. 2. 3 Karl Jaspers: The Idea of the University, London 1959, p. 59. 1 famous statement: “A new science of politics is needed for a new world.”4 which he wrote in his introduction in Democracy in America. The rising questions are the following: Which new categories does Tocqueville provide? What terms does Tocqueville use to examine the life of the Americans as well as their political life?
“Let us look to America, not in order to make a servile copy of the institutions that she has established, but to gain a clearer view of the polity that will be the best for us; let us look there less to find examples than instruction; let us borrow from her the principles, rather than the details, of her laws.”5
If Tocqueville speaks about principles he will do so only to provide a categorical access for his compatriots, who are well inexperienced referring to conditions of freedom. Since the French Revolution, and all the following changes, freedom of citizens hasn’t become a part in their political life. Relating to the American paradigm of liberal self-government, Tocqueville uses the comprehensions and principles to help the French for a better understanding of their political life:
“The laws of the French republic may be, and ought to be in many cases, different from those which govern the United States; but the principles on which the American constitutions rest, those principles of order, of the balance of powers, of true liberty, of deep and sincere respect for right, are indispensable to all republics; they ought to be common to all; and it may be said beforehand that wherever they are not found, the republic will soon have ceased to exist.”6
He intends to open the eyes of his compatriots, to introduce new terms and to remind them that the newly gained freedom should not be gambled with. Freedom is not a word to play.
“In the last fifty years, during which France has been undergoing this transformation, it has rarely had freedom, always disturbance. Amid this universal confusion of notions and this general stir of opinions […], public
4 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. Volume 1, New York 1994, p. 7. 5 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, New York 1994, p. LXV (Author’s Preface 1848). 6 Ibid. 2 virtue has become doubtful and private morality wavering.”7
The new aspect of his Political Science is directed against the „confusion of notions“ and the „stir of opinions“. He worries that the liberal content of the new political order gets lost. Tocqueville analyzes the predominant habits of thinking and he is aware that the quality of politics is directly connected to the perception of politics. What kind of habits leads our thinking? Under which perspectives do we perceive political reality? How do we realize our political existence and what are our categories?
“In an hour of crisis, when the order of a society flounders and disintegrates, the fundamental problems of political existence in history are more apt to come into view than in periods of comparative stability.”8
Eric Voegelin is right: Especially in times of staggering and confusion, we feel without bottom and radically bottomless. In this situation it is helpful and meaningful to foster the treasure of Political Theory and to use this treasure as advice. It is utterly important to revive the genuine experiences and comprehensions of fundamental political terms. It is our task to awake and bring them into discussions. Referring to the self-interpretation in a republic it is the duty of the Political Science to emphasize everything that constitutes a liberal lifestyle. That means to lead a life of a citizen. In the words of Max Weber:
“The Social Science that we want to practise is a science of reality. We want to perceive the surrounding reality of life in its peculiarity. A life in which we are included as well as the context und the cultural meaning in its own single phenomena.”9
Indeed, Max Weber proves to be a Tocquevillian. As well as Weber, Tocqueville perceives politics as a reality, in which we are included. Tocqueville has a perception of politics that is enormously influenced by practice, as underlined by his functions as representative, member of the Constitutional Committee, vice-president of the National Assembly and a brief period as Foreign Minister of the Second French Republic. He experienced in person that politics are depending on the specific human reality, depending on the surrounding reality. We perceive this reality in its qualitative peculiarity in our actions. We are not impassive and do not act as a counterpart of a so-
7 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America. Volume 2, New York 1994, pp. 208-9. 8 Eric Voegelin: The New Science of Politics. An Introduction, University of Chicago Press 1952, pp. 1-2. 9 Refer to: Max Weber: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Tübingen 1988, pp. 170-1. 3 called objective reality. Thomas Nagel sees this difficulty in The View from Nowhere. In his opinion humans do not possess a unitary point of view by nature. He emphasizes that human aspiration for objectivity is narrowed by the definition of the distance to human affairs. The only possibility to reach an objective point of view is to leave the human perspective behind:
“An objective standpoint is created by leaving a more subjective, individual, or even just human perspective behind; but there are things about the world and life and ourselves that cannot be adequately understood from a maximally objective standpoint.”10
Nagel highlights that phenomena of the human world are “connected to a particular point of view”11 that allows the specific perception of the human being. We are thoroughly put in coherences of life, which means we are contained into contexts of significance that emboss us, as well as our reality.
This perception of politics strongly differs from the perspective that is averted from the world from which authors of the Tocquevillian age tried to perceive politics. Their narrow view, without any practical experience, is heavily criticized by Tocqueville.
They try to find a kind of Archimedean point of view that creates a vast distance to human affairs. Because of this approach to politics, which is characterized by their theoretical rationality, they are excluded from the phenomenality of politics. In their euphoria of planning, which causes the flattening and levelling of political reality, they achieve their exclusion from the insight of political peculiarity. As a political human being in a specific way, Tocqueville is aware of the contingency of politics that forces every actor to avoid the rules of logic while acting. It is obvious that Tocqueville’s arguments strive against Rousseau and the idealistic theorists of state who are trying to develop politics through categories of will. In contradiction to the Anglo- American political thought, which centers the constitution and its qualities, the predominant European habits of thinking are characterized by the focus on the state and its dependent category of domination. Politics are imbedded into the state and the state is the sovereign. In Germany, we are used to say “Vater Staat”, “Father State”. Following this view, the state is seen as one actor with one will. We think the state is an independent subject and as an ultra large singular being, it represents a so-called indivisible identity. Through this point of view the plurality of human beings – of the acting of human beings – is
10 Thomas Nagel: The view from nowhere, New York/Oxford 1986, p. 7. 11 Ibid. 4 blinded. Opposed to that, Tocqueville’s perception of politics focuses exactly on the plurality and the political realm, in which human beings act. In Germany, it is the merit of Ernst Vollrath to develop the so-called reconstruction of political judgement, succeeding the Tocquevillian thinking. Alexis de Tocqueville starts from the plurality of human beings. His perception is soaked with the Anglo-American self-conception of institutional variety, not only the expression of some unitary will of the people. Tocqueville, some people say he is the Montesquieu of the 19th century, talks about pouvoir, not about vouloir. His issue is the power of acting people, not the inner moments and movements of a worldless will. For the characterisation of a liberal political order the following is essential: While on the one hand the constitution is only secondary to the state and in this view, citizens are only subservants to the dominating state; on the other hand Tocqueville highlights the quality of the civic order. Citizens themselves are the acting subjects that care for the quality and integrity of their political order. They are directly connected in political relations; they select their representatives; they entrust ministries; and they must demand a thoughtful and constitutional administration on their own. Political views and positions, in contradiction to laws of nature, cannot claim automatic validity. Only through our capability to extend our thinking and consider other opinions, we are able to reach consent.
“Political judgement, by which we mean political seeing, is not subjective, because it arises out of social interaction and out of the imaginative effort by individuals to see in common.”12
This perception is made possible with a common language that serves as link between the citizens. By talking with and listening to other human beings, I realize their peculiarity and their particularity. Self-development of human beings happens through acceptance of others as speaking and acting beings in a common order. Political actions only happen when consequences and results of human activity are put into common discussion and found the basis of new considerations. This leads to the stabilisation of the political order. Whereas simple addition of single actions does not cause a stable cohesion:
“But “we” and “our” exist only when the consequences of combined action are perceived and become an object of desire and effort, just as “I” and “mine” appear on the scene only when a distinctive share in mutual action is
12 Benjamin Barber: Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley, Los Angeles/London 1984, p. 171. 5 consciously asserted or claimed.”13
John Dewey highlights that it is not the sum of single interests that constitutes the political common. Politics take place in a political realm that is not only constituted by functions. In the words of Benjamin Barber – the author of Strong Democracy – the political realm is A Place for Us. The political character bases on the worldly connection of the political actors. Only through this, a horizon is established on which single phenomena can be visualized and named. Only speaking people are able to assure themselves and others of a common reality. Using their language, they categorize their political life. Political Science, in its originality, is an activity that men do. It is Tocqueville’s point of view to underline that Political Science is a kind of practise. That is the New Political Science Tocqueville is talking about. It is an activity and it is what Aristotle calls praxis. This practise includes to voice ideas. But those ideas are not only to be understood as mere opinions or just utopistic desires. Following his academic teacher Isaiah Berlin, who emphasizes the fundamental meaning of the idea for the constitution of human identity, the Canadian thinker Charles Taylor indicates that the purpose of our self-interpretations is to help us design our life. In this sense, ideas are not simply ideas about us, but they contribute to construe what we are. For Taylor, ideas are self-interpretations that form our practise of life. They are meaningful for our existence and they constitute the horizon of significance. Ideas emboss our self-conception and, in political terms, encompass the individual self-interpretations through connecting single contexts in order to create a perception of a common shared world. Thus, concepts and categories generate the intellectual forms; they are forms which represent the character of common sense and common experience. Our human perception of our self and the world are inseparably connected.
“Our identity is therefore defined by certain evaluations which inseparable from ourselves as agents. Shorn of these we would cease to be ourselves [...]; that our existence as persons, and hence our ability to adhere as persons to certain evaluations, would be impossible outside the horizon of these essential evaluations, that we would break down as persons, be incapable of being persons in the full sense.”14
As human beings, considered acting and speaking, we must rely and refer to significant meanings. Living in significant contexts is an essential part of our human condition, a part of the
13 John Dewey: The Public and its Problems, New York 1927, pp. 151-2. 14 Charles Taylor, What is human agency?, in: Charles Taylor: Human Agency and Language. Philosophical Papers 1, Cambridge University Press 1985, pp. 34-5. 6 undefraudable conditio humana. Hence Taylor justifiably warns of the decreased approach of Naturalism. Naturalism proclaims that ethic and political phenomena are to be treated as issues of the physical world.15 It is Taylor’s opinion that the naturalistic access to the world is simply faulty. Whenever the dimension of meaning of human action and speaking is embezzled, it causes the misjudgement of the peculiarity of politics. And whenever politics is treated like an issue of the physical world, political phenomena lose their original character. They are robbed of their meaning and thus they are meaningless. Even though concrete lifestyles always represent a selection of different possibilities, they should not be confused with the pure selection of objective facts. It is vital that they deal with actions. “Life is activity”16, as Aristotle writes in his Nicomachean Ethics. Our conception of our self and the world develops by performing activity through practice. That is the same way we have to understand Karl Jaspers as he postulates that freedom cannot be recognized and in no way be objectively thought:
“For myself, I perceive freedom not by thinking, but in its existence; not by watching and questioning it, but in practising it [...]. Freedom is not absolute, it is always dependent, not property, but gain.”17
In order to understand the quality of the political it is not helpful to see the institutional world as a finished construct. It is to be seen as a common shared coherence of life which must be continued every day. Tocqueville is often called the Montesquieu of the 19th century and indeed, especially referring to education, both are in the same traditional line. It is the tradition of pragmatism that starts with Aristotle and leads to John Dewey. In the center of this political tradition we find the keyword ethos: it is lifestyle, it is practice and it is the character of concrete action. In this way, we speak about the significant perception of political. “It is in republican government that the full power of education is needed.”18 A civil way of life does not automatically develop out of the human being. But it is the common care for the political order, including a political way of life. The concept of culture can be understood literally. The same way to nurture a tree in order to harvest its fruits, human talent must be influenced by external factors in order to foster the evolution from human beings into citizens. Without pedagogic effort human talent cannot develop. That means a constant challenge for the existing world because the achieved is never to be taken for
15 Refer to: Charles Taylor, Interpretation and the sciences of man, in: Charles Taylor: Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers 2, Cambridge University Press 1985, pp. 15-57. 16 Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford University Press 2002, 1175 a 12. 17 Refer to: Karl Jaspers: Philosophie II. Existenzerhellung, 1. Band, Buch IV, Kap. 5, Berlin 1973, p. 53. 18 Charles de Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws, Cambridge University Press 1989, p. 35. 7 granted. It is necessary to introduce the newcomers into the existing world and enable them the access to the facts. Liberal lifestyle is not guaranteed by historical automatisms. Thus, every citizen has to take constant care in order to sustain a world in order.
“Virtue is neither a condition of the soul (like lust) nor it is an ability; it is a feature of the character (êthos), memorized by instruction and practise, until it becomes a habit (ethos).”19
Eric Voegelin postulates the classic antique insight in contradiction to the new-age theory of the autonomous subject that believes to be able to develop everything on his own. Therefore, any formation of the character is contained in a coherence of a worldly life that is embossing its power with customs and habits as well as exercising the practice of life. The pre-political conditions of political actions are of eminent importance. Thus, Tocqueville’s sociological achievement consists of emphasizing the pre-political conditions of politics. Thereafter, he deals with politics in the way of leadership. The quality of leadership is measured in its possibility to realize the political options that exist in the tradition of the world of life, in Germany we say Lebenswelt. Leadership and citizenship belong together. They are inseparably connected because the only good office holder, in the republican sense, is the one who is able to introduce the predominant patterns of interpretations and self-interpretations of the citizens and is able to grant them a voice. The effort of political leadership is composed of being the role model of their political possibilities and capabilities. This is reached without swarming over them and without embarrassing them in their mediocrity. The best case scenario is that representation not only embodies the common man but also the best in man. Referring to that Siegfried Landshut formulates the core of the concept of representation in his essay Der politische Begriff der Repräsentation:
“For decisions that have an effect on the community it should not be decisive that everyone or many agree on, but it should be decisive that the decision is morally matured in order to sustain the collective good.”20
Whoever personates political qualities is able to extend and strengthen the capacities to act of his fellow citizens. Whoever shares this access into political coherences can act as a role model and
19 Refer to: Eric Voegelin: Aristoteles, in: Voegelin, Eric: Ordnung und Geschichte, Munich 2001, pp.43-4. 20 Refer to: Siegried Landshut: Politik als Wissenschaft – Grundbegriffe der Politik, in: Ders.: Politik. Grundbegriffe und Analysen, Bd. I, hrsg. von Rainer Nicolaysen, Berlin 2004, p. 430. 8 inspire other citizens to upgrade their qualities as well.21 Civil education, taken as exercise of civic qualities in a certain manner is, as Leo Strauss formulates, a “formation of character”22. But this formation of character is a difficult task refering to the modern conditions of being, where the independent self becomes the socio-dominant type of self-interpretation. Alexis de Tocqueville already warns of this development of modern society, which does not unfold until today, in the 19th century. He sensed the heralds of modern conditions of being seismographically. Therefore we have to agree to Charles Taylor that the “concepts of Tocqueville are the most useful”23 to analyze modern phenomena, especially the retreat to the private existence. Tocqueville writes:
“There is, indeed, a most dangerous passage in the history of a democratic people. When the taste for physical gratifications among them has grown more rapidly than their education and their experience of free institutions, the time will come when men are carried away and lose all self-restraint at the sight of the new possessions they are about to obtain. In their intense and exclusive anxiety to make a fortune they lose sight of the close connection that exists between the private fortune of each and the prosperity of all. It is not necessary to do violence to such a people in order to strip them of the rights they enjoy; they themselves willingly loosen their hold.”24
The social and career opportunities that are offered by existing equal conditions can lead humans, who are inexperienced with freedom, to retreat to themselves and leave their surrounding society alone. Tocqueville names this voluntary retreat from politics individualisme. Humans are in danger of pocketing themselves by their tireless seeking for prosperity and even subordinating themselves outright under the imperative of economics. Precisely because of this the American sociologist Richard Sennett radicalizes these tendencies in his book The corrosion of character. However, the german translation of The corrosion of character – Der flexible Mensch, does not grasp a bit of the dimension and radicalism of Sennett’s diagnosis of the crisis. He does not ask for flexible labour time, acceptance of longer ways to work
21 Refer to: Aristotle: Nicomachean ethics I, Oxford University Press 2002, 1099 b 18. 22 Leo Strauss: What is political philosophy?, University of Chicago Press 1988, p. 36-7. 23 Charles Taylor im Gespräch mit Hartmut Rosa und Arto Laitinen: Tocqueville statt Marx. Über Identität, Entfremdung und die Konsequenzen des 11. September, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung, 50/2002, Nr. 1, p. 127 ff, here: p. 135. 24 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. Volume 2, New York 1994, pp. 140-1. 9 or the suspension of laws of closing times of shops. The modern theorist of society is well aware of the fact that the individual has to be more flexible, elastic and adaptive. Sennett makes clear, in a radical escalating way, that the drift of the modern existence threatens to disrupt cohesions of life, to dissolve connections and to disroot individuals in the consequence. Facing this drift, this meandering, where “the flexible human reveals himself as a flotsam”25, social locations and connections of the human being are radically devaluated. The continuity of human biography can hardly be contained and self is in danger of volatilise. Only the people who live in a self-evident network are capable of using this modern dynamic as a stream that does not wash them away but that caries them. But whoever realizes this world already under the conditions of homelessness cannot be carried by the stream of settled significations. Thus, he is exposed to the drift, to the anchorless slipping. That is exactly what characterizes Sennett’s The corrosion of character. The characters become more and more fragile and for the civic education the task arises how the formation of character can outclass the corrosion of character. Every civic education that wants to challenge the corrosion of character must be rooted in the knowledge of the self. Discover yourself, as requested by Socrates. In the words of Karl Jaspers, who wrote in a letter to Hannah Arendt: “Philosophy must become concrete and practical without forgetting its origin for one single moment.”26 If existentialists talk about the „difficulty of existence“ (Heidegger), the „burdened character of being“ (Heidegger) and the „gravity of being“ (Arendt) they mean the concrete and practically experienced miseries of modern existence. They have to be accounted into serious civic education. Civic education must seriously try to encounter with our conditio humana as well as its immanent “Frageursprünglichkeit” (Heidegger). This enormous challenge, especially facing the impertinence of the modern times, shall not be interpreted in nihilistic terms. Education of citizens indeed embraces the whole existence. It is more than only taking over a role of citizenship.27 From my scholar and friend Alexander Gantschow I learned a lot and he especially mentions a fundamental topic of Karl Jaspers: Civic education, meant as existential education of citizens, shall be – in the words of Jaspers – a “help to self- becoming in freedom”. Also for Tocqueville freedom is the central category. But he does not perceive freedom as private independence of individuals. He perceives freedom as political freedom that appears as the possibility to act. Freedom and power are directly connected. If citizens are able to perceive this connection they are powerful. In order to be powerful to act on their own, they must exercise to associate in their political life. In this way, Tocqueville emphasizes that “the art of association then
25 Refer to: Karl-Heinz Breier: Richard Sennett, in: Riescher, G. (Hrsg): Moderne politische Theorie in Einzeldarstellungen von Adorno bis Young, Stuttgart 2004, p. 451. 26 Refer to: Lotte Köhler und Hans Saner (Editors): Hannah Arendt. Karl Jaspers. Briefwechsel 1929 - 1969, Munich 1985, p.95. 27 Refer to: Alexander Gantschow: Benjamin Barber interkulturell gelesen, Nordhausen 2005, pp. 76-7. 10 becomes […] the mother of action, studied and applied by all.”28 Tocqueville is impressed by any locations and institutions where citizens experience these connections between freedom and power. He is even more impressed by the power of the institutions and their educational effects. For the Frenchman, the common practise, as well as their emerged habits, makes the paradigmatic and important aspects of the experienced lifestyle:
“In the American townships power has been distributed with admirable skill, for the purpose of interesting the greatest possible number of persons in the common weal.”29
Political freedom as original freedom to act cannot be seen until this connection and cooperation with other humans has been a part of experience.30 Tocqueville’s contemporaries could hardly refer to this experience of political freedom.
“In the United States politics are the end and the aim of education; in Europe its principal object is to fit men for private life.”31
Tocqueville’s warning was and is current: Only through the habit of participating in the different areas of public affairs, the republic becomes the republic of the citizens. Pride and dignity of the citizens are able to develop to the extent of an “alliance of the citizens”.32 Only if many citizens embody these qualities they are able to form a fortress that abolishes any luring temptation of domination and tyranny. To put this into pedagogical words: Without an inner republic, that is supported by the habits, a stable outer republic cannot be established. Political institutions are the effluence and concept of the inner republic, platonically spoken. However, the nature of the inner order, of the formation of character, vitally depends on the political world of life as well as their perception. Therefore we can conclude: A republic is the institution of institutions. Tocqueville perceives the strengthening of the inner republic as the genuine challenge for the whole Political Science. Each Political Science, seen as Civic Science33, is also responsible for the world in which it is practising. A civic education, whose
28 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. Volume 2, New York 1994, p. 117. 29 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. Volume 1, New York 1994, p. 67. 30 Refer to: Karl-Heinz Breier: Leitbilder der Freiheit. Politische Bildung als Bürgerbildung, Schwalbach 2003, pp. 253. 31 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. Volume 1, New York 1994, p. 318. 32 Refer to: Manfred Riedel: Auf der Suche nach dem Bürgerbund. Die Idee des Politischen und die Sache der europäischen Demokratie, in: Schmidhuber, P. (Editor): Orientierungen für die Politik?, München 1984, pp. 83. 33 Refer to: Karl-Heinz Breier: Politische Wissenschaft als Bürgerwissenschaft. Hannah Arendt über Bürgerfreiheit in der Republik, in: Riescher, G./Berg-Schlosser, D./Waschkuhn, A. (Editor): Politikwissenschaftliche Spiegelungen. Ideendiskurs – Institutionelle Fragen – Politische Kultur und Sprache. Festschrift für Theo Stammen zum 65. 11 task is to take care for the inner republic, is in need of a demanding Political Science. This Political Science must be able to perceive the political world in its origins which means it must be founded in the power of ideas. If we demand self-government, if we demand citizenship and if we demand civic education, we have to take care that our self-conception is present: in this perspective it is evident that one or only a few philosopher kings can not be sufficient. What we need – especially as teachers or as teachers of the teachers – are well-educated philosopher citizens.
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