The Power of Ideas and the Perception of Political Karl-Heinz Breier (University of Vechta, Germany) “The own horizon is narrowed without the knowledge and practise in the studies of the great political thinkers. In order to perceive the actual situation of the world as something new, the traditional amplitude of political thinking is necessary.”1 As we assemble here in Bloomington to compare different kinds of government, we know that Karl Jaspers who is born in Oldenburg, the city I am living now, stresses an important and very significant issue. Jaspers speaks of the “amplitude of passed Political Thought” and anyone who is dealing with his political thinking knows that the amplitude of Political Thought characterizes his work. It is absolutely clear for Jaspers – and Eric Voegelin verbalized that in the New Science of Politics to the point – that “the contraction of political science to a description of existing institutions”2 must be avoided. Both, Jaspers as well as Voegelin, recognize the strong connection between political phenomena and their interpretation on the basis of political theory. The objects of our Political Science, according to that, not only are the incidents of actual politics; they also include patterns of understanding that allow us to gain access to the diversity of all political phenomena. Jaspers gets to the heart of this in “The Idea of the University”: “After examinations, one quickly forgets. The decisive factor after this is not the body of fact learned, but one’s judgement. What matters then is not factual knowledge by itself but the ability and initiative to go out and get the facts on one’s own, to think about them effectively, to know what questions to ask.”3 That is to say: Whoever wants to understand politics, according to Jaspers, must realize that the world of phenomena consists of a categorical order. Thus it is the task of Political Science to contribute to the enlightment of the categories of order. I think everyone of us knows Toqueville’s 1 Refer to: Karl Jaspers: Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?, 10th edition, Munich 1988, p. 207. 2 Eric Voegelin: The New Science of Politics. An Introduction, University of Chicago Press 1952, p. 2. 3 Karl Jaspers: The Idea of the University, London 1959, p. 59. 1 famous statement: “A new science of politics is needed for a new world.”4 which he wrote in his introduction in Democracy in America. The rising questions are the following: Which new categories does Tocqueville provide? What terms does Tocqueville use to examine the life of the Americans as well as their political life? “Let us look to America, not in order to make a servile copy of the institutions that she has established, but to gain a clearer view of the polity that will be the best for us; let us look there less to find examples than instruction; let us borrow from her the principles, rather than the details, of her laws.”5 If Tocqueville speaks about principles he will do so only to provide a categorical access for his compatriots, who are well inexperienced referring to conditions of freedom. Since the French Revolution, and all the following changes, freedom of citizens hasn’t become a part in their political life. Relating to the American paradigm of liberal self-government, Tocqueville uses the comprehensions and principles to help the French for a better understanding of their political life: “The laws of the French republic may be, and ought to be in many cases, different from those which govern the United States; but the principles on which the American constitutions rest, those principles of order, of the balance of powers, of true liberty, of deep and sincere respect for right, are indispensable to all republics; they ought to be common to all; and it may be said beforehand that wherever they are not found, the republic will soon have ceased to exist.”6 He intends to open the eyes of his compatriots, to introduce new terms and to remind them that the newly gained freedom should not be gambled with. Freedom is not a word to play. “In the last fifty years, during which France has been undergoing this transformation, it has rarely had freedom, always disturbance. Amid this universal confusion of notions and this general stir of opinions […], public 4 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. Volume 1, New York 1994, p. 7. 5 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, New York 1994, p. LXV (Author’s Preface 1848). 6 Ibid. 2 virtue has become doubtful and private morality wavering.”7 The new aspect of his Political Science is directed against the „confusion of notions“ and the „stir of opinions“. He worries that the liberal content of the new political order gets lost. Tocqueville analyzes the predominant habits of thinking and he is aware that the quality of politics is directly connected to the perception of politics. What kind of habits leads our thinking? Under which perspectives do we perceive political reality? How do we realize our political existence and what are our categories? “In an hour of crisis, when the order of a society flounders and disintegrates, the fundamental problems of political existence in history are more apt to come into view than in periods of comparative stability.”8 Eric Voegelin is right: Especially in times of staggering and confusion, we feel without bottom and radically bottomless. In this situation it is helpful and meaningful to foster the treasure of Political Theory and to use this treasure as advice. It is utterly important to revive the genuine experiences and comprehensions of fundamental political terms. It is our task to awake and bring them into discussions. Referring to the self-interpretation in a republic it is the duty of the Political Science to emphasize everything that constitutes a liberal lifestyle. That means to lead a life of a citizen. In the words of Max Weber: “The Social Science that we want to practise is a science of reality. We want to perceive the surrounding reality of life in its peculiarity. A life in which we are included as well as the context und the cultural meaning in its own single phenomena.”9 Indeed, Max Weber proves to be a Tocquevillian. As well as Weber, Tocqueville perceives politics as a reality, in which we are included. Tocqueville has a perception of politics that is enormously influenced by practice, as underlined by his functions as representative, member of the Constitutional Committee, vice-president of the National Assembly and a brief period as Foreign Minister of the Second French Republic. He experienced in person that politics are depending on the specific human reality, depending on the surrounding reality. We perceive this reality in its qualitative peculiarity in our actions. We are not impassive and do not act as a counterpart of a so- 7 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America. Volume 2, New York 1994, pp. 208-9. 8 Eric Voegelin: The New Science of Politics. An Introduction, University of Chicago Press 1952, pp. 1-2. 9 Refer to: Max Weber: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Tübingen 1988, pp. 170-1. 3 called objective reality. Thomas Nagel sees this difficulty in The View from Nowhere. In his opinion humans do not possess a unitary point of view by nature. He emphasizes that human aspiration for objectivity is narrowed by the definition of the distance to human affairs. The only possibility to reach an objective point of view is to leave the human perspective behind: “An objective standpoint is created by leaving a more subjective, individual, or even just human perspective behind; but there are things about the world and life and ourselves that cannot be adequately understood from a maximally objective standpoint.”10 Nagel highlights that phenomena of the human world are “connected to a particular point of view”11 that allows the specific perception of the human being. We are thoroughly put in coherences of life, which means we are contained into contexts of significance that emboss us, as well as our reality. This perception of politics strongly differs from the perspective that is averted from the world from which authors of the Tocquevillian age tried to perceive politics. Their narrow view, without any practical experience, is heavily criticized by Tocqueville. They try to find a kind of Archimedean point of view that creates a vast distance to human affairs. Because of this approach to politics, which is characterized by their theoretical rationality, they are excluded from the phenomenality of politics. In their euphoria of planning, which causes the flattening and levelling of political reality, they achieve their exclusion from the insight of political peculiarity. As a political human being in a specific way, Tocqueville is aware of the contingency of politics that forces every actor to avoid the rules of logic while acting. It is obvious that Tocqueville’s arguments strive against Rousseau and the idealistic theorists of state who are trying to develop politics through categories of will. In contradiction to the Anglo- American political thought, which centers the constitution and its qualities, the predominant European habits of thinking are characterized by the focus on the state and its dependent category of domination. Politics are imbedded into the state and the state is the sovereign. In Germany, we are used to say “Vater Staat”, “Father State”. Following this view, the state is seen as one actor with one will. We think the state is an independent subject and as an ultra large singular being, it represents a so-called indivisible identity. Through this point of view the plurality of human beings – of the acting of human beings – is 10 Thomas Nagel: The view from nowhere, New York/Oxford 1986, p.