SENATE—Monday, January 29, 2001
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The Collision of Institutional Power and Constitutional Obligations: the Use of Blue Slips in the Judicial Confirmation Process
The Collision of Institutional Power and Constitutional Obligations: The Use of Blue Slips in the Judicial Confirmation Process Ryan C. Black Michigan State University Ryan J. Owens University of Wisconsin Anthony J. Madonna University of Georgia The authors would like to thank Mitchell Sollenberger for making his data available. Additional thanks to Ryan Bakker, Jamie Carson and Richard Vining for helpful comments. Abstract In recent years, judicial nominations to lower federal courts have been blocked privately by negative blue slips returned by home state senators. We examine the conditions under which senators return these negative blue slips and whether judicial qualifications can mitigate the possible negative effects of ideological distance. We discover two results. First, consistent with existing work, ideology plays a strong role in blue slipping. Second, and more important, we find that nominee qualifications mitigate ideological extremism--but only for district court nominees. That is, while past presidents could nominate well-credentialed ideologues to the circuit courts of appeals and see them confirmed, today’s presidents cannot. In short, if presidents nominate ideologues--even those who are well qualified--to circuit courts, we will continue to observe lengthy vacancies and bitter nomination struggles between the president and Congress over those important courts. 1 Former Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once stated about government: “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants” (Brandeis 1913). While few would argue with the normative premise behind Brandeis's comment, many consequential policy decisions occur in private. Perhaps nowhere is the deviation from transparency-in-government more profound than in nomination politics, where the Senate's most unique institutional power (to defeat measures via obstruction) intersects with its most unique constitutional power (advice and consent) and can thwart the goals of nominating presidents. -
What's Behind All Those Judicial Vacancies Without Nominees?
April 2013 What's Behind all Those Judicial Vacancies Without Nominees? Russell Wheeler ast week, Senate Judiciary Committee ranking member Charles Grassley (R-IA), said “we hear a lot about the vacancy rates. There are currently 86 Lvacancies for federal courts. But of course, you never hear the President mention the 62 vacancies that have no nominee. That is because those 62 vacancies represent nearly 75 percent of the total vacancies.” This brief paper, after noting the considerable power that home state senators have over judicial nominations, reports that: • Considerably fewer of the vacancies without nominees on April 12, Russell Wheeler is a 2013, could reasonably be expected to have had nominees by then, Visiting Fellow in the Brookings Institution’s based on patterns in the previous two administrations. Governance Studies Program and President of • Of the vacancies without nominees, almost half are in states with two the Governance Institute. Republican senators, and those vacancies are older than those in other Data for this report come from the Administrative states. Office of the U. S. Courts Judicial Vacancies • There are many more nominee-less vacancies now than at this point in Webpage, the Federal President George Bush’s presidency. Judicial Center Federal Judicial Biographical • Of the vacancies that have received nominations, the time from Directory, and my own data set. I welcome corrections. vacancy to nomination was greater in states with two Republican senators. • Although it is difficult to apportion responsibility for the number and age of nominee-less vacancies and the longer times from vacancy to nomination, we should consider a specific proposal for more transparency about pre-nomination negotiations that might produce more nominations, more quickly. -
Constitution Over Comity: Toward Ensuring That the Senate's Advice and Consent Power Does Not "Take a Seat" to the Opportunistic Use of Senate Rules Michael C
Santa Clara Law Review Volume 58 | Number 2 Article 3 8-3-2018 Constitution Over Comity: Toward Ensuring that the Senate's Advice and Consent Power Does Not "Take a Seat" to the Opportunistic Use of Senate Rules Michael C. Macchiarola Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Michael C. Macchiarola, Constitution Over Comity: Toward Ensuring that the Senate's Advice and Consent Power Does Not "Take a Seat" to the Opportunistic Use of Senate Rules, 58 Santa Clara L. Rev. 295 (2018). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol58/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. CONSTITUTION OVER COMITY: TOWARD ENSURING THAT THE SENATE’S ADVICE AND CONSENT POWER DOES NOT “TAKE A SEAT” TO THE OPPORTUNISTIC USE OF SENATE RULES Michael C. Macchiarola* TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction .............................................................................296 I. The Senate’s Advice and Consent Power ..............................298 A. The Constitutional Basis of the Appointments Clause ............................................................................. 299 B. The Purpose of the Appointments Clause ................. 302 II. The Tradition of Senate Decorum ........................................304 A. Jefferson’s Contribution .......................................... 304 B. Senate Comity is Tested ........................................... 307 C. Stricter Guidelines for Senate Decorum – The Introduction of Rule XIX ...................................... 309 D. Invocations of Rule XIX .......................................... 309 E. Recent Rule XIX Forbearance .................................. 313 F. -
The Senate in Transition Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Nuclear Option1
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\19-4\NYL402.txt unknown Seq: 1 3-JAN-17 6:55 THE SENATE IN TRANSITION OR HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE NUCLEAR OPTION1 William G. Dauster* The right of United States Senators to debate without limit—and thus to filibuster—has characterized much of the Senate’s history. The Reid Pre- cedent, Majority Leader Harry Reid’s November 21, 2013, change to a sim- ple majority to confirm nominations—sometimes called the “nuclear option”—dramatically altered that right. This article considers the Senate’s right to debate, Senators’ increasing abuse of the filibuster, how Senator Reid executed his change, and possible expansions of the Reid Precedent. INTRODUCTION .............................................. 632 R I. THE NATURE OF THE SENATE ........................ 633 R II. THE FOUNDERS’ SENATE ............................. 637 R III. THE CLOTURE RULE ................................. 639 R IV. FILIBUSTER ABUSE .................................. 641 R V. THE REID PRECEDENT ............................... 645 R VI. CHANGING PROCEDURE THROUGH PRECEDENT ......... 649 R VII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL OPTION ........................ 656 R VIII. POSSIBLE REACTIONS TO THE REID PRECEDENT ........ 658 R A. Republican Reaction ............................ 659 R B. Legislation ...................................... 661 R C. Supreme Court Nominations ..................... 670 R D. Discharging Committees of Nominations ......... 672 R E. Overruling Home-State Senators ................. 674 R F. Overruling the Minority Leader .................. 677 R G. Time To Debate ................................ 680 R CONCLUSION................................................ 680 R * Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy for U.S. Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid. The author has worked on U.S. Senate and White House staffs since 1986, including as Staff Director or Deputy Staff Director for the Committees on the Budget, Labor and Human Resources, and Finance. -
Senate Consideration of Presidential Nominations: Committee and Floor Procedure Name Redacted Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process
Senate Consideration of Presidential Nominations: Committee and Floor Procedure name redacted Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process March 9, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov RL31980 Senate Consideration of Presidential Nominations: Committee and Floor Procedure Summary Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President shall appoint officers of the United States “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” This report describes the process by which the Senate provides advice and consent on presidential nominations, including receipt and referral of nominations, committee practices, and floor procedure. The vast majority of presidential appointees are confirmed routinely by the Senate. A regularized process facilitates quick action on thousands of government positions. The process also allows for lengthy scrutiny of candidates when necessary. Each year, a few hundred nominees to high-level positions are subject to Senate investigations and public hearings. Committees play the central role in the process through investigations and hearings. Senate Rule XXXI provides that nominations shall be referred to appropriate committees “unless otherwise ordered.” Most nominations are referred, although a Senate standing order provides that some nominations to specified positions will not be referred unless requested by a Senator. The Senate rule concerning committee jurisdictions (Rule XXV) broadly defines issue areas for committees, and the same jurisdictional statements generally apply to nominations as well as legislation. A committee often gathers information about a nominee either before or instead of a formal hearing. A committee considering a nomination has four options. It can report the nomination to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation, or it can choose to take no action. -
History, Rules & Precedents Senate Republican Conference
History, Rules & Precedents of the Senate Republican Conference THE 116 TH CONGRESS Chairman John Barrasso blank HISTORY, RULES & PRECEDENTS of the SENATE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE Table of Contents Preface ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... 1 Rules of the Senate Republican Conference ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....2 A Service as Chairman or Ranking Minority Member ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... 4 B Standing Committee Chair/Ranking Member Term Limits ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... 4 C Limitations on Number of Chairmanships/ Ranking Memberships ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... 4 D Indictment or Conviction of Committee Chair/Ranking Member ....... ....... ....... .......5 ....... E Seniority ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... 5....... ....... ....... ...... F Bumping Rights ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... 5 G Limitation on Committee Service ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ...5 H Assignments of Newly Elected Senators ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... 5 Supplement to the Republican Conference Rules ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... 6 Waiver of seniority rights ..... -
Lieutenant Governor of Missouri
CHAPTER 2 EXECUTIVE BRANCH “The passage of the 19th amendment was a critical moment in our nation’s history not only because it gave women the right to vote, but also because it served as acknowledgement of the many significant contributions women have made to our society, and will make in the future. As the voice of the people of my legislative district, I know I stand upon the shoulders of the efforts of great women such as Susan B. Anthony and the many others who worked so diligently to advance the suffrage movement.” Representative Sara Walsh (R-50) OFFICE OF GOVERNOR 35 Michael L. Parson Governor Appointed June 1, 2018 Term expires January 2021 MICHAEL L. PARSON (Republican) was sworn in The governor’s proposal to improve economic as Missouri’s 57th governor on June 1, 2018, by and workforce development through a reorgani- Missouri Supreme Court Judge Mary R. Russell. zation of state government was overwhelmingly He came into the role of governor with a long- supported by the General Assembly. Through time commitment to serving others with over 30 these reorganization efforts, government will be years of experience in public service. more efficient and accountable to the people. Governor Parson previously served as the The restructuring also included several measures 47th lieutenant governor of Missouri. He was to address the state’s growing workforce chal- elected lieutenant governor after claiming victory lenges. in 110 of Missouri’s 114 counties and receiving Governor Parson spearheaded a bold plan to the most votes of any lieutenant governor in Mis- address Missouri’s serious infrastructure needs, souri history. -
10:55 AM 10:55 AM Lv. Kansas City Downtown Airpo
This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu PAGE SIX Saturday, June 27, 1992 9:30 AM Lv. Kansas City Downtown Airport Executive Beechcraft 816/842-8484 AIRCRAFT: US Tobacco Hawker TAIL NO.: N 24 SB PILOT: Dave Fontanella CO-PILOT: Frank Desetto MANIFEST: Senator Dole Walt Riker Chris Swonger, UST Sara Lowe, NRSC 10:05 AM Ar. Springfield, Missouri Regional Airport City Fueling 417/869-1990 MET BY: Randy Kammerdiener Political Director Missouri Republican Party DRIVERS: Senator Dole & Walt Riker: Randy Kammerdiener ('91 Cadillac) Chris Swonger & Sara Lowe: Eric Feltner ('92 Oldsmobile) DRIVE TIME: 20 minutes 10:25 AM Ar. University Plaza Hotel & Convention Center 333 John Q. Hammond Parkway 417/864-7333 CONTACT: Tony Hammond Executive Director Missouri Republican Party 314/636-3146 314/636-3273 (FAX) 10:30 AM- PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH MAJOR DONORS TO 10:50 AM MISSOURI REPUBLICAN PARTY 10:50 AM- Holding Room 10:55 AM 10:55 AM INTRODUCTION OF SENATOR DOLE -- SENATOR KIT BOND Page 1 of 71 This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu PAGE SEVEN 11:00 AM- KEYNOTE ADDRESS -- SENATOR DOLE 11:25 AM Missouri Republican Party Convention CROWD SIZE: 2,500 Delegates and Alternates 11:30 AM Lv. University Plaza Hotel & Convention Center 11:50 AM Ar. Springfield Regional Airport City Fueling 417/869-1990 12:00 PM Lv. Springfield, Missouri AIRCRAFT: us Tobacco Hawker TAIL NO.: N 24 SB PILOT: Dave Fontanella CO-PILOT: Frank Desetto MANIFEST: Senator Dole Walt Riker Chris Swonger, UST Sara Lowe, NRSC 3:00 PM Ar. -
Congressional Record United States Th of America PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES of the 110 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
E PL UR UM IB N U U S Congressional Record United States th of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 110 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION Vol. 153 WASHINGTON, MONDAY, MAY 14, 2007 No. 79 House of Representatives The House met at 10:30 a.m. and was sions and huge fireballs that lit up the liament and others claim there were called to order by the Speaker pro tem- night sky in Baghdad. significant casualties. Which story is pore (Mr. COSTA). News footage and amateur video were true? Satellite images, aerial photo- f shown on television in the Middle East, graphs, videos and written accounts and a BBC reporter described the explo- that purport to be firsthand can be DESIGNATION OF SPEAKER PRO sions as immense. In the days following found online. I will enter into the TEMPORE the attack, U.S. military officers in RECORD a list of some of these sites so The SPEAKER pro tempore laid be- Iraq repeatedly said that the damage that people can see for themselves. fore the House the following commu- would not degrade U.S. military capac- Internet sites which contains video, photo- nication from the Speaker: ity and that the attack did not injure graphs, or written accounts of the attack on Camp Falcon on October 10, 2006: WASHINGTON, DC, or kill anyone at the base. May 14, 2007. In a briefing on October 12, 2006, http://www.cawa.fr/destruction-du-camp- americain-falcon-explosions-d-armes-a-l-ua- I hereby appoint the Honorable JIM COSTA Major General William Caldwell told to act as Speaker pro tempore on this day. -
Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointments Process
GERHARDT.DOC 06/08/01 1:54 PM Essay NORM THEORY AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS MICHAEL J. GERHARDT† INTRODUCTION The way George W. Bush became the forty-third President of the United States was extraordinary in ways that we are still assessing.1 In addition to Bush’s contested presidential victory, the election pro- duced an unprecedented 50-50 split in the Senate, with Vice President Richard Cheney able to cast a tie-breaking vote. Because many Sen- ate votes on presidential appointments are likely to be close,2 George W. Bush’s presidency provides a unique setting for testing the robust- ness of appointments norms: the behavioral regularities of presidents and senators regarding appointments that persist in the absence of formal rules and that deviations from which trigger sanctions.3 Copyright © 2001 by Michael J. Gerhardt. † Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I am grateful to Jack Balkin, Erwin Chemerinsky, Michael Dorf, Chris Eisgruber, Deborah Gerhardt, Paul Schwartz, and David Strauss for helpful discussions regarding the subject of this Essay. 1. These circumstances are well known: George W. Bush became President after winning a majority of the Electoral College by the second-smallest margin in American history. Bush is also the first person in over 100 years to have won the presidency despite having lost the popu- lar vote. Moreover, Bush became President after an intense, postelection contest over Florida’s electors, a contest ultimately settled by the Supreme Court’s controversial 5-4 decision in Bush v. Gore, 121 S. -
Heinonline ( Wed Nov 3 15:16:23 2010
+(,121/,1( Citation: 45 Willamette L. Rev. 701 2008-2009 Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org) Wed Nov 3 15:16:23 2010 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your HeinOnline license, please use: https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do? &operation=go&searchType=0 &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0191-9822 FRAGMENTED FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUTION'S UNITARY EXECUTIVE SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH* The assertion that the original Constitution creates a "unitary executive" can be understood as a claim that the Constitution empowers the President to control the execution of federal law. This generic assertion has as many as three sub-claims: that the President, as the "constitutional executor" of the laws,' personally may execute any federal law himself; that the President, as Chief Executive, may direct all executive officers in their execution of federal law; and that the President, as the Supreme Executive Magistrate charged2 with ensuring faithful law execution, may remove executive officers. For many advocates of the unitary executive theory, these three mechanisms of control are "absolute" powers.3 Despite Congress's various legislative powers, it cannot preclude presidential execution of federal law; it cannot bar presidential direction of executive officers or authorize executive officers to disobey presidential instructions; and it cannot prohibit or regulate presidential removal of executive officers. With their focus on the originalist bona fides of the unitary executive4 and the modem administrative state's numerous violations of the theory, 5 unitary executivists have neglected the Constitution's * Herzog Research Professor of Law, University of San Diego; James Madison Fellow, Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, Princeton University. -
State Campaign Finance Law: an Overview and a Call for Reform
Missouri Law Review Volume 55 Issue 4 Fall 1990 Article 3 Fall 1990 State Campaign Finance Law: An Overview and a Call for Reform Thomas P. Dvorak Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Thomas P. Dvorak, State Campaign Finance Law: An Overview and a Call for Reform, 55 MO. L. REV. (1990) Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/3 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Dvorak: Dvorak: State Campaign Finance Law Comments State Campaign Finance Law: An Overview and a Call for Reform Corrupt influence, which is itself the perennial spring of all prodigality, and of all disorder; which loads us, more than millions in debt; which takes away vigour from our arms, wisdom from our councils, and every shadow of authority and credit from the most venerable parts of our constitution. - Edmund Burke., Speech on Economic Reform, 1780 In the General Election of 1988, only 54.8% of the population of eligible voters in Missouri went to the polls.1 Nationwide, the 1988 elections for President and Vice-President saw only a 50.2% turnout.2 This compares with nationwide turnouts of 95.4% in Australia, 86.9% in West Germany, and 76.9% in Great Britain3 .