21St CENTURY

21st CENTURY

«NORAVANK» FOUNDATION

2 ( 8 )

YEREVAN

2010 21st CENTURY

Information and analytical journal

2 (8), 2010

EDITORIAL BOARD TABLE OF CONTENTS Gagik Harutyunyan (Coordinator) Ara Mardjanyan Gagik Harutyunyan Karen V. Karapetyan Development Strategy and Geopolitical Scenarios …... 3 Mushegh Lalayan

Sergey Grinyaev Sevak Sarukhanyan Mihran Dabag Tigran Sargsyan Endangered Memory: the Armenian Experience in the Context of New International Politics ...... 12 EDITORSHIP Gagik Harutyunyan Ara Papian (Editor-in-Chief ) On the Principles of Self-determination and so-called Sevak Sarukhanyan “Territorial Integrity” in Public International Law (Deputy Editor-in-Chief ) Anna Zhamakochyan (the Case of Nagorno-Karabakh) ...... 21 Eduard Danielyan Lilit Meliksetyan Ara Marjanyan (Managing Editor) RAND Corporation and We: Lusine Baghramyan Armenia-Turkey Relations …………………...... 38 (Executive Secretary) Ruben Melkonyan Ruben Melkonyan Tigran Harutyunyan On Some Problems of the Armenian National Minority in Turkey ...…...... 64

Tigran Ghanalanyan Armenian Protestants …...... 71

Vahram Hovyan The Armenian Protestant Community in Lebanon .... 81

Mitra Abdollahi Globalization and Education ………...... 95

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND GEOPOLITICAL SCENARIOS

Gagik Harutyunyan*

Stirring up the problem of Armenian-Turkish relations and the forthcoming centenary of the Armenian Genocide prompted to reconsider the current problems of the Armeniancy, and to turn to our political history and possible prospects. These tendencies are quite relevant because the changes that take place locally and in the world call for developing a national strategy adequate to the new realities. Of course, it is desirable to have continuous discussions on the issues of national importance. Back in the 19th century the British thinker John Stuart Mill expressed an idea along the lines that the absence of serious discussions on fundamental principles corrupts and distorts those very ideas and principles, and it is difficult to disagree with him on that. It is obvious that without new approaches, the solution of all-Armenian issues (and there are many of them) is at least problematic. Let us try to cover some of them briefly.

The Diaspora: Traditions and New Imperatives Even a fleeting glance cast upon the situation in the Diaspora is enough to conclude that along with some achievements there are serious problems and losses in this realm. The general impression is that the strategy directed to the survival of the “Armenian communities” is no longer sufficient today for responding adequately to the various challenges these communities face. The previously common way of the life is breaking down under the impact of different external and internal factors, and it is impossible to mitigate, let alone avert these impacts. It is no secret that these realities are in part pertinent to the situation in Armenia as well (RA, NKR and Javakhq). It can be stated that it is time for the Armenian elite to try reconsidering the traditional existing formats and contents of the family, communal, partisan, religious self-organization, and to develop new national concepts. However, if political innovations are to be actually carried out in the mentioned

* Executive Director, “Noravank” Foundation. 3 G.Harutyunyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 directions, one should avoid the “destroy the old, build the new” Bolshevik principle (especially when the ideas about “the new” are obscure, and no precondi- tions have been formed yet for moving to that “new”). Such quasi-revolutionary approaches lead to the so-called “gaps” in the national spiritual and intellectual domains that hamper the development of the society. In particular, today opinions can be heard that the Genocide issue has already been “exhausted” and it is time to unite Armeniancy not around the events of the “tragic past,” but around the “timely and positive” ideas. Such problem statement is undoubtedly dilettantish. It is necessary to clearly differentiate the issue of the national memory, political processes of the international recognition and the establishment and implementation of the new all-Armenian projects. From the spiritual point of view the Genocide and bereavement of homeland (perhaps it is worth to put the term “depatriation”1 into circulation and, along with “genocide”, assess it politically and legally) are a part of the national consciousness and, in that formulation, they cannot be subject to debates (of course, unless encountered with a total “brainwashing” through manipulative technologies). It also has to be noted that from the psychological point of view the memories of this trag- edy contain a motivation for compensatory actions and the political process of international recognition is one of their embodiments.

The Issue of the Genocide Recognition The process of the Genocide recognition is not only of moral but also of political significance for the Armeniancy. The approaches shaped in the international community regarding this issue affect the “rating” of Turkey and, partially, that of its ally Azerbaijan, determining them as “genocidogenic” states. Thus, the international recognition of the Genocide is a straitjacket of sorts against the possible Turkish- Azerbaijani encroachments, thus increasing the national security level of Armenia. This factor is also an additional substantiation for our stance in the NKR negotiations, and Armenia’s policy to some extent benefited from the international discussions of the issue over the course of the recent Armenian-Turkish diplomatic scuf- fles. It has to be mentioned also that the Genocide recognition processes are accompanied by such issues as preservation of the cultural heritage and litigation on some property and material assets, which are known to be rather effective and deserve special attention. At the same time, the political factor of the Genocide so far has been more frequently used by others. For example, the long-awaited word “genocide”, as men-

1 Some researchers offer term “patriocide”. 4 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 G.Harutyunyan tioned H. Nahapetyan’s article [1], was pronounced by US president back on April 22, 1981. In the US President’s Proclamation 4838 on Days of Remembrance of Vic- tims of the Holocaust, Ronald Reagan had stated: “Like the genocide of the Armeni- ans before it, and the genocide of the Cambodians which followed it — and like too many other such persecutions of too many other peoples — the lessons of the Holo- caust must never be forgotten”. Such statement suited the logic of the Cold War and was directed against the USSR, because the support to the rising national movements in the Soviet period in Armenia (as well as in other Soviet republics) was in the national interests of the United States1. Today the situation is different, and a US president is unlikely to pronounce the word “genocide” in the near future, because this time around it contradicts to the current foreign policy of this superpower. However, it is also clear that had even the whole world recognized the Geno- cide, it would have not implied the return of Western Armenia to Armenians, and if it would, even then all of our problems could not be resolved. Perhaps in this issue it is necessary to refrain from overestimating the Jewish precedent. The recognition of the Holocaust and reparations by Germany were determined by the latter’s defeat – the Allied armies were in Berlin and the well-known trial was taking place in Nurn- berg. It has to be also noted that Jews “readied” the creation of their state themselves by decades-long targeted intellectual, ideological, organizational and economic activities. In our case, recognition of the Genocide by Turkey (which is an overly hy- pothetic scenario and in no way relates to the current government of that country), most probably will look roughly like the regret expressed by the Serbian parliament with regards to the actions against the Bosnian population. Ankara would agree to restitutions only if it finds itself in a position of a disintegrated state. Consequently, it can be stated that while having a generally positive value, the process of international recognition of the Genocide has some efficiency restrictions and it cannot be treated as the ultimate goal for Armenia and Armeniancy. In other words, if the Armenian Genocide is recognized everywhere, there are no clear ideas on what would be the further political strategy of the Armeniancy after that. The absence of a definite answer to this question proves that there is no critical concen- tration of the necessary intellectual resources in our society for strategic planning, whereas the scale of such resources directly correlates with the concept of National Security (NS).

1 As it is known, the permanent national movement in the Second Republic was a key success factor for the victory in the Karabakh conflict, and it would be fair to say that assistance from abroad, however small it might have been, complemented our national interests.

5 G.Harutyunyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

The Contemporary Interpretations of National Security Today, the notion of NS is transforming and, in addition to the old concepts about the resources necessary for ensuring the national security, the capability to develop the society has become one of the important criteria for the NS [2, p. 3] [3, p. 38]. Particularly, it is supposed that the “challenge-adequate response” system which was believed to be efficient, under current situation is insufficient and using only that principle may even bring to a dead end1. According to A. Vladimirov’s fundamental work the new approaches assume that “coordination of the development and security paradigms is possible within the dialectics of the “security through development and development through security” principle.” Using such methodology to contem- plate the security issues leads to a rather simple conclusion that the human being and the human society are the ones “in charge” for the process of development (i.e. of security) or in other words, they are the critical infrastructure for that. The level of their development (in our interpretation – the abilities to organize, and to acquire and apply knowledge) determines the security of a nation and state. This also implies that development is one of the manifestations of a strategy that assumes advance- ment by both “small steps” and “breakthrough” (after a critical mass of achievements by “small steps” is accumulated), which according to the Chinese formulation, helps to “conquer the future and use it for one’s own purposes”. We do believe the development strategy comprehended in this context should evolve into a prevalent national strategy. Considering the future goals of Armenia and the Armeniancy against the aforementioned backdrop, it has to be stated that we have serious development problems. It is known that the quality of Armenia’s intellectual potential has dimin- ished over the last twenty years, whereas the development projects for this area do not seem plausible and, furthermore, their nature is theoretical. Meanwhile, the in- stitutionally significant structures of a state must constitute military and scientific systems, and though the former has been established in Armenia, there are many problems concerning the latter. It is remarkable that the priority goal of so-called strategic intelligence is the evaluation of the scientific and technological resources of the supposed adversary, i.e. primarily of its human resources – the knowledge and technology bearers [4, p. 27]. It is assumed that other sectors (army, industry, financial system and etc.) are the derivatives of the scientific and technological potential.

1 In this regard it should be mentioned that the classical principle “challenge-adequate response” is sort of a passive formulation and, apparently, it does not suppose creating preventive “challenges” to the competitors. As it is known, the principles of the NS were “edited” relatively not so long ago under the Bush administration, when the “hyper- preventive” doctrine was developed and implemented, reflecting in the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. 6 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 G.Harutyunyan

The situation in the Diaspora is even worse; comprehension of the need for a national science, and resultant thinking and culture have not been formed there yet1. As it is known, there are thousands of Armenian social and political organizations abroad, which, however, rarely turn to the scientific and educational area (let us note that many other nations with Diaspora have set up numerous foundations spon- soring scientific and educational activities). In this context it should also be stated that there is no understanding of “national capital – national science” correlation, which could have alleviated the situation in absence of the needed state resources (in this respect the exceptions are the ARG Company in Armenia and perhaps, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation in the Diaspora). Let us mention that here we do not take into consideration the communal and Sunday schools, the activities of which are mostly directed to the preservation of the Armenian identity. However, even in this dimension the current situation is critical, too. In our opinion this strategic oversight is conditioned not by the relatively scanty funds and resources2, but by the fact that the everyday mentality of the Ar- menian elite has not reached the level of the national conceptual vision approaches. Too often the process of the Genocide recognition is perceived as an exclusive priority, and for example, considerable funds are spent on lobbying for it in the US. A great importance is also attached to the construction of the churches and monuments. Of course, all of this is unquestionably very important, but at the same time things of paramount importance, such as the formation and development of the human capital are overlooked, thus endangering our national security. With that in mind it is probably worth asking the question: what are the exact objectives that the strategy and development of the national security should serve?

The Possible Geopolitical Shifts In the modern history the key events for Armenia and Armeniancy were connected to some geopolitical shifts. World War I and revolution led to the Genocide, loss of Western Armenia and part of Eastern Armenia, creation of the First and the Second Republics. After World War II there was a high probability for a clash between the USSR and Turkey, the outcome of which would have been obvious and which could have solved the Armenian Question to a certain extent, but controversies between the former allies – USA, UK and USSR – on “reshaping the world” hampered materi-

1 An example illustrating this phenomenon is that H2 ECOnomy, a hydrogen energy and fuel cells laboratory established under the patronage of the American businessman G. Cafesjian, which was one of a kind in the region and effectively functioned for eight years, eventually was shut down citing “low revenues”. 2 Let us note that this shortage of resources is conditioned, inter alia, by the underdeveloped scientific and educational sphere of the Armeniancy. In particular, there is no much Armenian capital (both in Diaspora and in Arme- nia) in the high-tech field, which is supposed to be the most profitable one today.

7 G.Harutyunyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 alization of that scenario. As a result of the First Cold War and collapse of the bipolar world, the Republic of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh Republic were created. In the meanwhile a new political situation is shaping up presently, which may cause new global shifts driven by the quite painful emergence of a multi-polar system. Such systemic shifts are known to be always fraught with some hardly predict- able ramifications, and it is not surprising that some political scientists compare the current developments to those on the eve of the World War II. According to some analytical viewpoints based on the trends becoming visible today, the current processes of “division” that fit well in the multi-polar system logic will be followed by formation of new associations based on civilizational characteristics. Under such conditions, the relative weakening of the US influence in the region becomes one of the most critical factors for Armenia as far as the prospective policy development is concerned. In particular, this is reflected in the difficulties that the USA had with Turkey while carrying out its mediatory mission in the Ar- menian-Turkish relations. It is also noteworthy in this context that the representatives of the US establishment often appeal today to the necessity for the US to follow the “isolation” policy (of course, relative isolation is meant). Meanwhile, according to some analysts, the American retreat may lead to an explosive situation in the Near and Middle East, and South Asia (the so-called Eurasian Balkans). Note that given the problems related to Iran and especially the processes occurring in Iraq, Afghani- stan and Pakistan, today this region is in a quite unstable condition as well, which has been mainly provoked by the USA itself. However, curiously enough the US presence ensures “the stability of that instability”. That means the current chaos is more or less controllable, but it will hardly remain so after the departure of the Americans, who as likely as not have foreseen this. It is a common belief that retreat of Anglo-Saxons is more dangerous than their attack… Obviously, creation of such an uncontrollable region where some countries either already possess or strive to possess nuclear weaponry (Iran being one of them) is a challenge for Armenia, facing which requires new resources and political part- ners. In this respect the new developments in Europe bring some opportunities.

Germany, Russia and “the Greater Europe”. As it is known the EU was created as an interconnectivity-based structure intended to hamper the ability of separate countries (first of all post-war Germany) to act independently and restore as a mighty power. This mechanism was quite effective in the bipolar system and fared well enough in the mono-polar system. Consequently, though being the largest economy in the world, the EU plays no serious geopolitical role at the global scale. However, in the multi-polar world and amid the financial crisis when the own na-

8 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 G.Harutyunyan tional interests became more important, some processes of division surfaced. This is exhibited both by the weakening of US-Europe ties and growing competition between them, as well as by the deepening gap in economic development and other areas between the EU countries. Germany appeared to be the best prepared to the new situation. Suffice it to mention that over the last 10 years the competitiveness of the German goods and services has grown by 25% as compared to other EU countries. As a result, Ger- many is currently not only the most powerful economy in the EU, but also the one who dictates (now relying less on France) the rules of the EU dealings. It is natural that Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor is often called “Frau Europe” in the global media. The military and political ambitions of this country have grown, too. Today representatives of the German elite voice ideas about reforming NATO (meaning to strengthen its European role), possessing nuclear weaponry, having the American bases withdrawn from the country, etc. This suggests that in the near future the “Germanized” EU or, according to some scenarios, Germany and some of its allies acting together outside the EU format, will endeavor to win a decent place in the global geopolitical arena (for example, see [5-7]). In particular, this country may con- template our region as a platform for attainment of its geopolitical ambitions (Germans show similar aspirations, for instance, in Afghanistan), and in this case such claims apparently would not contradict to our national interests. The following factors point to that: • Germany does not have any marked oil interests in our region, which are a key factor in the policy of the other Western powers, displayed in their partial attitude towards Azerbaijan. • The official Berlin has serious problems with Turkey and what plays an important role here, is that there are about 3 million Turks living in Germany, of which 1.7 million are Turkish citizens and a considerable part of them as a matter of principle do not wish to integrate into the German society, with some of them following direct instructions from Ankara. This factor have caused civilizational and demographic problems in the German society, which in its turn partially affected the foreign policy approaches.

The revised project of “Greater Europe” proposed by the German military circles “to face the Eastern challenges” is especially remarkable against this backdrop. It implies Russian membership to NATO and thus, a profound restructuring of this organization. It is obvious that such scenario above all implies preparedness of Russia,

9 G.Harutyunyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 especially given the latter’s wariness about NATO and its eastward expansion. None- theless, some present tendencies noticed in the Russian policies may make the “Greater Europe” a realistic project, and this is driven not just by the traditional ideas on the Moscow-Berlin geopolitical axis. At the moment Germany is the main economic partner of the Russian Federa- tion (RF); together they implement large-scale geo-economic energy programs. There are some agreements in the political arena as well (particularly, concerning Georgia’s NATO membership). The Europeans also highly praised the presidential elections in Ukraine indicating that this country transforms from an apple of discord between the RF and EU into a ground for cooperation. There are many such exam- ples and without going into details one may state that the idea of creating “Greater Europe” seems to be becoming acceptable to the involved parties by virtue of being adequate to both the logic of the civilizational commonalities and the multi-polar world realities. Under the situation concerned, the US and UK, in contrast to their distinctly negative earlier stance toward the relations between Russia and Germany, now should not be principally opposed to the “Greater Europe” project, because according to some geopolitical scenarios such alliance may become a natural obstacle to the potential expansion of China/East. In this new-type Third Cold War, Armenia most likely would be aligned with the conditional Europe-RF block, whereas our Turkic speaking neighbors would be in the conditional “East”. In this case Armenia may acquire the status of a “border” or “outpost” state (the one of Israel in the Middle East) with all substantial risks and opportunities attached. In case of some positive developments for us, these “opportunities” may include breakup of Turkey and reclaiming at least part of West- ern Armenia. Of course, the above mentioned scenario is but a theory and in this regard it has to be mentioned that developing such scenarios requires complex research carried out using state-of-the-art techniques. Yet one should always keep in mind that back in 1980 it was almost impossible to imagine that in a decade a war would break out and two Armenian republics would be established. At the same time it is known that materialization of any “positive scenario” is possible only through making prior efforts toward preparing such developments and bringing forth advantageous scenarios, which in its turn, is possible only under strategic development.

May, 2010.

10 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 G.Harutyunyan

Reference Sources and Literature 1. Наапетян А., Разве Соединненые Штаты не признали Геноцид армян? http:// www.noravank.am/ru/?page=analitics&nid=2430 2. Арутюнян Г., Идеология и информационная безопасность, 21-й Век, 2009, #4. 3. Арутюнян Г., Полиидеологические сообщества и информационная безопасность, О некоторых проблемах информационной безопасности (по материалам осенней шко- лы по информационной безопасности, организованной НОФ «Нораванк» и Госкоми- тетом по науке РА), Ереван, 2009. 4. Владимиров А., Государство и война. Политический класс, 2009, #2 (50), с. 95. 5. Washington Platt, Strategic Intelligence Production, New York, F. A. Praeger. 1957 6. Тер-Арутюнян Г., Россия-Германия. Возможные сценарии в контексте региональной безопасности. http://www.noravank.am/ru/?page=analitics&nid=24579. 7. George Friedman, Germany After the EU and the Russian Scenario, STRATFOR, http:// www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100524_germany_after_eu_russian_scenario 8. Российско-германские отношения в контексте европейской безопасности (под ред. проф. В.И.Дашичева). М.: ИЭ РАН, 2009.

ENDANGERED MEMORY: THE ARMENIAN EXPERIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Mihran Dabag*

9/11 was an unequivocal turning point in international politics. Perhaps, this is less so in terms of the real political intents and objectives of international political relations, which are still about the traditional political efforts based on interests and hegemony. The difference is that these efforts are currently pursued just in a more open and aggressive manner than it used to be in the past decades. However, a new phase of political reasoning and perspectives of international politics has begun. Indeed, today the political actors not only base their political statements on such aspects as shaping1 and responsibility, but also consider the possibility to implement these shaping transformations themselves. The horizon of such claims is constrained neither in national, nor in regional dimensions. It is about shaping the whole world. The early 21st century political projects again address things like identity, stability and power, and especially structures, order, hierarchy and power claims. The turning point in prospects of international politics that bears such im- mense consequences for the future sought by Armenians may be described as follows: a shift from perception of the world as a political background formed by multi- lateral cooperation on one hand, and conflicts on the other hand, to a perception of the world as a global society. This society is not about communities and their political forms, or states and their structures. Conversely, it is focused on regions and their risks. Therefore, we are talking about global actors and global arenas of activity in the world politics, and once again, about threats and risks. Since mid-1990s, the powers that shaped international politics were focused on so-called World Risks that the states of the world will face. Along with the weak-

* Director, Institut für Diaspora- und Genozidforschung (Ruhr-Universität), Bochum, Dr.-Prof. 1 Translator’s note: Here the author means activities aimed at transformation of societies.

12 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 M.Dabag nesses of the state and democracy, such processes were specified as emergence of the “New Weapon States” with irrational behavior1, varieties of religious fundamental- ism, international terrorism, global shortage of resources (e.g. water, oil), climate change and climatic disasters. When these risks were voiced at global political conferences of late 1990s, new processes surfaced in parallel that raised hopes for the carriers of the Armenian memory. Internet not only became a platform for inter- community networking, but also started facilitating the knowledge exchange. Estab- lishment of the International Criminal Court and extensive activities in the framework of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia promised a new chapter in the worldwide commitment against genocidal crimes and by that signified sensitivities toward genocide experience. It also seemed that international discourses, such as debates on “collective memory” or “memory culture” boded a place in the world history for the memories of the victims, as well as for the victims themselves. However, the belief that the world politics in the incipient 21st century of communication and networking would be thereby marked by a new openness, increased ethics of intelligence and responsibility, proved to be misleading. In this new context, it is important to get an idea about what really the emphasis on memories and memory culture brings in the form they appeared in politics: the pathway to the 21st century and new global world order must be based on the shared memory of wars and violence that had such a strong impact on the shape of the 20th century Europe. A closer look at political discourses in which the category of “memory” is a centerpiece, quickly reveals that the historical responsibility constitutes a memory-based responsibility for persecutions, violence, wars and displacements only indirectly, in a form of a special-type responsibility before the victims. On the other hand, the European- style policy of memory also covers such aspects as abuse of power, gaps in democracy and images of enemy in politics. When it comes to “memory,” a specific form of politics is involved. A universally binding, global memory is built in such politics, and the diversity of individual experiences is not in the focus at all. On the contrary, the interest is focused on constructing a commonly valid and non-specific experience of “memory” as a moral imperative. On the verge of the 21st century anticipations were high about such common memory, but the breakup of Yugoslavia and ensuing wars, as well as violent armed conflicts in different parts of the disintegrating Soviet Union caused a problem in the view of the European powers that was called a ghost; that is the ghost of newly formed ethno-national identity, for which a term was soon coined in political discourse – “balkanization.”

1 Editor’s note: i.e. new states that possess weapons of mass destruction. 13 M.Dabag «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

9/11 irreversibly swayed the balance of the world politics toward those who pointed out particularly in the context of Yugoslav wars that the “dangers” of identity politics of non-sovereign nations and ethnic groups, as well as diasporas are a new world risk. Quoting Mary Kaldor, a British political scientist whose analysis of “old” and “new” wars (New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stan- ford/Cambridge 1999) underlies the new policies of strengthening the state powers positions, it is about “disaffected groups living far away, often in the new melting- pot nations, who find solace in fantasies about their origins which are often far removed from reality.” In the recent years many political scientists agree with Kaldor in their studies and analyses that diaspora communities represent a significant threat. They argue that the “horizontal and vertical” networks and nationalistic identity politics constitute the dangerous nature of these groups, who defy state borderlines. Ulrich Schneckener, a renowned German political scientist, classified diasporas among the groups that “do not want peace” and clearly defined them as “troublemakers” in one of his analytical studies. His study lays special emphasis on describing structures, activities and behaviors of diaspora as “radical” and “autistic,” i.e. performing only self- related actions. The concept of “egoistic interests of risky actors” has become one of the most frequently used notions in international political theory after 9/11. Against this backdrop the Armenian demand for genocide recognition looks like a solely self- interest dominated retrograde stance that impedes political communication with Turkey and causes conflicts. At the same time these conflicts today are treated as if they had no previous history. In this regard conflicts are viewed as potentials for risks with hardly assessable patterns. With that in mind, since the global world is closely intertwined and interconnected, it is inferred that any conflict at the ends of the earth may pose a risk of shattering the whole world order. Because of this, mitigation and settlement of potential conflicts is brought to the forefront of the modern politics. This is exactly what comprises a major challenge that Armenians and the Armenian history currently face. If the international community insists that Armenia and Turkey should sit around a table to “talk about” the past and future, whereas the directly affected party, namely the Armenian diaspora, is excluded from the process, then this must be attributed exactly to the global strategy of the world powers that be. This strategy turns the historical veracity of the genocide and its social effects on entire generations into a mere political discord. As a political discord, which ultimately is nothing more than an overly long-lasting divergence of views, it can be made part of the day-

14 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 M.Dabag to-day business of politics. A strategy like this aims at mitigating the risks potential. At the negotiation table arranged by the international community for the memory of genocide, talks would be around reconciliation and maybe even token recognition of genocide by Turkey in a form of “yes-and-no.”1 However, arranging such negotiations pursues a single important goal, which is neither the recognition of genocide, nor stopping its denial. The goal is to ease the conflict so that it no longer causes political problems. The problem is not only in this strategy of forcing Armenians to negotiate about their own history. It is problematic that against the backdrop of the new world order policies no room is left today in global politics for drawing attention to such strategies. In that case it is proclaimed that the historical veracity of genocide is a matter of divergence of views and discord between two states. In that case the ideological approach of the perpetrators is disputed. In that case the insistence of Arme- nians on their history is not treated as a part of their historical identity, but rather it is interpreted as a manifestation of a chronic trouble-making pattern. Therefore, it can be seen that these new post-9/11 political strategies are actually directed against communities having radical experiences of facing a destructive violence, although after the World War II reminding about them has become a paradigm of memory culture determining the political rhetoric. Memory policies, as we experience them today, aim at an abstract memory culture detached from the carriers of these very memories; i.e. the victims and their successors. A memory about the experience of violence has to be built equally binding for everybody and common for perpetrators and victims, despite the fact that the experiences of the victims and perpetrators are fundamentally different and incomparable as they stand at diametri- cally opposite poles of violence. In this context of memory policy that tends to equalize the experiences of victims and perpetrators, the specific memory of the victims and their successor communities who insist on their own history without dissolving it in the abstract global memory, is interpreted as an extreme and reactionary obstinacy. In particular, this applies the Armenian community whose memory of the genocide experience has been discredited by Turkey’s policy of fierce denial and whose calls for recognition of its history are considered a dangerous annoyance hampering relations with an important ally and economic partner. Since the paradigm of memory culture cannot be questioned as it has become a political imperative after the experience of the Holo- caust, the policy to overcome this hindrance is then directed against these very

1 Translator’s note: The author has used a neologism combining the German words for “yes’ (ja) and “no” (nein) in a single word “jein”.

15 M.Dabag «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 memory bearers. Therefore, this policy of the West turns not againt the powerful Turkish nation-state which promotes a political denial, but rather against the Arme- nian diaspora, which follows the imperative of remembrance and demands adhering to it, consequently being almost unanimously discredited in the Western media as nationalist and extremist. This strategy is expressed not least by calls for a dialogue in which the veracity of the genocide becomes a matter of an opinion poll. In such dialogue, insisting on remembrance of the genocide and demands for its recognition are perceived as nationalistic as the genocide denial, and consequently the memory and denial are contemplated in parallel. This parallelism incidentally permeates the entire discourse around the “dialogue,” so in this context it is hard to find any component that does not equally refer to the "Turkish nationalism" and "Armenian nationalism." We encounter here the dual strategy of the world political actors and Turkey; namely, along with the state policy of denial, reduce the discourse about the genocide to a negotiable disagreement on one hand, and discredit and marginalize the Armenian diaspora as the carrier of this experience, on the other hand. This strategy is most vividly reflected in the calls for a dialogue between Armenia and Turkey, which is supposed to lead to reconciliation. The concept of “reconciliation” per se has a rather positive connotation and actually it was a key to political discourse after the World War II. Thinking of the "Franco-German reconciliation" after the World War II one may mention even some specific policies of forward moves to each other and cultural exchange. Therefore, “reconciliation” is not just an empty word reserved for anniversary events. However, in case of Turkey and Armenians the idea of reconciliation today may prove to be a political trap. A "policy of reconciliation" refers to political discussions and programs that enable conflicting parties, as in the example above – Germans and French, to sit together around negotiation tables after a conflict has ended. The two reconciling parties would have to make moves toward each other, be on an equal footing and in a symmetric relationship to each other. Thus, in a "policy of reconciliation" we observe solidarity of states. The "policy of reconciliation" should enable cooperation at international level and defuse conflicts in the global society by trying to round out the rough corners of conflicts. Nevertheless, it is difficult, if not problematic to talk about reconciliation after a genocide. This is because genocide is not a result of just a conflict between parties that are more or less on equal standing. The policy of genocide is distinctly charac- terized by unilateral use of force and targeted determination of the perpetrator, i.e.

16 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 M.Dabag clear intent of violence. Therefore, in genocide there are no conflicting parties, but rather “perpetrators” and “victims.” In this context it has to be asked under what conditions "reconciliation" could be possible after genocide is committed. Would such reconciliation require the perpetrator to acknowledge the fact and admit the guilt? Could there be a hope for forgiveness and hence, for reconciliation without admission of the guilt and plea of responsibility? Quite possibly, the process that started with pre-established concepts of “dialogue” and “reconciliation” and definitely contributed to a cautious opening in Turkey, may take another direction and lead to results different than the architects of this strategy had intended. However, this can only be expected if the Armenian side casts an attentive and critical look over the concepts and strategies. Thus, first of all it is important to note that today when it comes to reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey concerning the genocide, the initial idea of political reconciliation must be strategically pushed to the sidelines. When with reference to Germany we talk about full awareness of the Holocaust, we mean the work on reconsideration1. Such reconsideration and remembrance implies readiness to accept that the line between the victims and perpetrators will never disappear. Reconcilia- tion in Germany also means seeking reconciliation with the own past of having been the perpetrator, i.e. the acceptance of the past as perpetrator. In contrast, when a dialogue between Armenia and Turkey is called for, it implies negotiating the history with a purpose of replacing recognition and reconsideration by reconciliation. What remains to be done in the light of these developments and powerful, complex strategies? First of all, it is important not to be discouraged, but persevere with the same consistency, as well as formulate one’s own position and demands with a confidence and clarity. We shall do what causes the fear of the global world order powerful states who are concerned about peace and quiet in their own house: never stop claiming our action space in politics. Yet in doing so, the above mentioned paradigm shift in the strategies of international politics shall be duly regarded, and our own strategies realigned correspondingly. Here a special role is reserved for diaspora. This is because in the context of the new world order politics, it is required that the Republic of Armenia follows the nation-state logic of actions as a small state in an important geostrategic region. Conversely, diaspora is in position to break the hege- monic constraints of this logic of actions and become politically effective thanks to

1 Translator’s note: the term “Aufarbeitung”(“re-processing”) coined after WWII is used here, which encompasses the whole complex of work with the WWII violence and aggression experience in Germany, including both theoretical/ intellectual work and activities in culture/education.

17 M.Dabag «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 its decentralized and interrelated structures present in various world centers. Dias- pora can influence the policies of the respective Governments, pursue its right of having its own history and memory, and unlike a nation-state, diaspora can refute in a different manner the argument that it interferes with the schemes of alliance policies or development of the world financial markets. This difference in the domains of activity between a nation-state and diaspora leads to the aforementioned intense discrediting of the diaspora, targeted at its elimination from processes. It is not surprising that dialogue is always offered exclusively to the Republic of Armenia which is subject to the action logic of powers that be. However, in order to comprehend and influence the world politics, one must know its concepts and notions, as well as stay at its hotspots. Today, only our own voice at the world centers can help us succeed in securing a place for the Armenian memory, Armenian interests and Armenian future. Then, and only then it would be possible to explain it to the coming generations why it is so important to resist the world politics. The decentralized structure of diaspora must not weaken, precisely because such decentralized structure is essential for handling numerous roles and opportunities in various world centers. Quite the opposite, this structure must be strengthened and its networks must be optimized. At the same time we must realize that the question we ask today – what needs to be done in order to secure a place for the Armenian Cause in the world? – is not a new question at all. In fact, every generation has asked this question over and again for centuries. And as far as the future of Armenians is concerned, there have always been two answers to this question; one for the homeland, and one for the numerous communities abroad. Today we must equally strengthen both of these pillars. We have to form networks of knowledge and actively influence the politics through these networks. This is not only in our "own" and "selfish" interests. Rather, the mission of standing up against new hegemonies and nationalisms of states is currently pursued. While nation-states hoard all the rights in their hands and proclaim themselves keepers of the knowledge, guardians and warrantors of security, health and justice, what the diaspora communities have is not only an ancient history, but also a self-criticism of their past. Therefore the diaspora may claim the right of co- authorship to the preface of a world history that will be rewritten in the era of globalization. The time for recognition requests seems to expire, because the global world order is relying on a bastion of “strong states.” Our mission is to be a critical and dedicated potential in this bastion so as to make the diaspora a non-negotiable asset of the Armenian history as part of the global knowledge, and hence, the politics.

18 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 M.Dabag

For this reason I believe that considering the above mentioned arguments we have to re-conceptualize our activities till 2015, in order to change the direction of the discourse on the Armenian experience which is currently under threat of being taken away from its carriers. This means the discourse on genocide must be removed from the vicious circle of the currently dominant discussion "genocide - Yes or No," in which the victim is reduced to a status of a conflicting party and, being subject to the power of denial, is ultimately squeezed into the logic of the perpetrator. There- fore, intellectualization of own history and experience should be one of the priorities for Armenians. That is, the Armenian experience needs to be reflected and its importance for the fundamental aspects of thinking, social relations, individuals, ethics and politics has to be studied. Consequently, the relevance of this experience to the fundamental issues of individual and collective being would be clarified in a general framework, and the work with the Armenian experience could be protected from accusations of nationalism or grudge-holding. In my opinion, it would be important, for instance, to resume and continue those multi-aspect literary, artistic and philosophical works on rethinking the Armenian experience, which were commenced in 1920s. It has to be clear though, that in this case we will have to deal with some very distinctive and far-reaching reflections of a typical modern experience far beyond the Armenian specifics. Here are several concrete, but certainly not exhaustive proposals on how these basic ideas could be materialized: • Promotion of historical research, which no longer focuses on or even is restricted to seeking proofs, but reviews all aspects of annihilation of the Arme- nians in the Ottoman Empire (background history, implementing structures, ideological aspects, identification of culprits, etc.). With this, a framework would be set for a complex and in-depth scientific work on the subject matter, free from the necessity to search for evidences. • Promotion of interdisciplinary approach in dealing with the issue of genocide and its effects. It is also worth considering, inter alia, to incorporate the perspectives of social psychology, sociology, trauma research, literary studies and art history. • Establishment of research and doctoral scholarships for scientists involved in the genocide history studies in the mentioned manner. Creation of a special foundation for targeted research and funding policy should be contemplated. • Translation and republishing of written reflections on Armenian experience in the literature of the 1920s.

19 M.Dabag «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Eventually, it may become possible to remove the memory of genocide and insistence on its recognition from the forefront of the political postulate, and primarily counter the political instrumentalization of genocide discourse described in the required “dialogism.” Moreover, against the backdrop of the current geopolitical developments mentioned above, in conceptualizing our strategies in future it is extremely important that at conferences, hearings and other activities, as well as in formulation of our claims (compensation, restitution, etc.) we consult with scientists and politicians who are fully knowledgeable about global political developments and interpretation of concepts. Time has come for the knowledge to take over the postulate of morality, which so far has been determining our efforts. This is a necessary precondition for being able to decisively intervene in the discourse and regain control over the definition of notions (categories). In my view this is the only way we can overcome the posture of a beggar and get rid of the self-induced dependence on third parties who feel so comfortable in their role of "rational, objective mediators."

September, 2010.

ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND SO-CALLED “TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY” IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (THE CASE OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH)

Ara Papian*

We are not going to negotiate over the right of the people of Artsakh (Karabakh) to self-determination. Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, 1 June 2010

It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people. Judge Hardy Dillard, International Court of Justice, 16 October 1975

The notions of “self-determination” and “territorial integrity” are often used with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Unfortunately, these legal terms are largely misused mostly due to political motives. One of the grave misinterpretations of the said notions was by Ambassador-to-be (or not to be) Matthew Bryza when he declared: “There's a legal principle of territorial integrity of states, there's a political principle of self-determination of peoples.” As a matter of fact, it is just the opposite. There is a legal principle of self-determination and there is no such principle of territorial integrity. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter declares merely: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. Thus, this has nothing to do

* Head of “Modus Vivendi” Center. 21 A.Papian «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 with absolute “territorial integrity”, (i.e. preservation of the territory of a state intact) but, according to authoritative interpretation of the United States Foreign Rela- tions Law, it is simply the rule against intervention, a “prohibition of use of force”1 and purely calls to refrain from “the use of force by one state to conquer another state or overthrow its government.” 2 In order to have adequate understanding of the status, scope and content of the principles of “self-determination” and so called “territorial integrity” in contemporary international law, we need to elaborate more on the issue.

Self-determination

Self-determination: Historical Background Self-determination is an ancient political right that is cherished by every people. The word “self-determination” is derived from the German word “selbstbestim- mungsrecht” and was frequently used by German radical philosophers in the middle of the nineteenth century. The political origins of the concept of self-determination can be traced back to the American Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776. The American Revolution is considered to be “an outstanding example of the principle of self-determination.” 3 The principle of self-determination was further shaped by the leaders of the French Revolution. During the nineteenth and in the beginning of the twentieth century, the principle of self-determination was interpreted by nationalist movements as meaning that each nation had the right to constitute an independent State and that only nationally-homogeneous States were legitimate.4 During World War I, President Wilson championed the principle of self-determination as it became crystallized in Wilson’s Fourteen Points (8 January 1918) and consequently was discussed in the early days of the League of Nations. The Mandate system was a compromise to some degree between outright colonialism and principles of self- determination. While discussion of the political right and principle of self-determination has a long history, the process of establishing it as a principle of international law is of more recent origin. Since the codification of International Law today is mostly

1 Restatement of the Law (Third), The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, The American Law Institute, Wash- ington, 1987, v. 2, § 905(7), p. 389. 2 Ibid., p. 383. 3 Umozurike O.U. Self-Determination in International Law, 1972, Connecticut, 1972, p. 8. 4 Thurer D. Self-Determination, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. IV, Amsterdam, 2000, p. 364.

22 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Papian achieved through an international convention drawn up in a diplomatic conference or, occasionally, in the UN General Assembly or similar forum on the basis of a draft with commentary prepared by the International Law Commission or some other expert body1, we must follow the development of the discussed notions through international instruments. It must be stressed that if the rules, incorporated in the form of articles in the conventions, reflect the existing customary international law, they are binding for states regardless of their participation in the conventions2.

Self-determination: Development under the Aegis of the United Nations 1. Incorporation into the UN Charter The principle of self-determination was invoked on many occasions during World War II. It was proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter (14 August 1941). The provisions of the Atlantic Charter were restated in the Washington Declaration of 1942, in the Moscow Declaration of 1943 and in other important instruments of the time. Owing to these declarations already at the days of establishment of the United Na- tions, the notion of self-determinations was seen as a principle of international law. Ultimately, “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” was incorporated into the United Nations Charter. The Charter [Article 1(2)] clearly enunciated the principle of self-determination: “The purposes of the United Nations are: To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determinations of peoples” and self-determination is conceived as one among several possible “measures to strengthen universal peace.”3 Chapter IX (International Economic and Social Co-operation, Article 55) lists several goals the organization should promote: “With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” Under Article 56, “all Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.” The principle of self-determination, as it follows from Article 55 of the UN Charter, is one of the fundamentals of peaceful and friendly international relations. In other words, there can be no such relations without the observance of this principle. The same article says it is the duty of the United Nations to promote respect for

1 Rosenne S. Codification of International Law, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, v. I, Amsterdam, 1992, p. 633. 2 Ibid. 3 Thurer D. op. cit., p. 365.

23 A.Papian «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 fundamental human rights (para. c) and, consequently, for the nations’ right to self- determination. And since the establishment of friendly relations between peoples and the promotion of respect for human rights figure among the United Nation’s most important tasks, it is obvious that this organization is entitled to raise the question of a people’s self-determination1. The Charter is dominant over all the other international documents. This provision is set down in Article 103 of the Charter, and is accepted by all the members of the UN. It is clear that the UN considers the self-determination of peoples (self- determination, not just the right of people for self-determination, i.e. the application of this right) as not only one of its basic principles but also as a basis for friendly relations and universal peace. Hence, rejection of self-determination hinders friendship and universal peace. In addition, Article 24, Point 2 holds: "In discharging these duties [the maintenance of international peace and security] the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." It means that, in the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council must be guided by self-determination of peoples because it is one of its principles.

2. Development through UN Practice The concept of self-determination was further developed by the United Nations. Through its resolutions the United Nations has expounded and developed the principle of self-determination. In Resolution 637A(VII) of December 16, 1952 the General As- sembly declared that: “the right of peoples and nations to self-determination is a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights.” The General Assem- bly recommended, inter alia, that “the States Members of the United Nations shall uphold the principle of self-determination of all peoples and nations.” In 1960, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514(XV) entitled Decla- ration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which declares that: [para. 2]. “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” The Declaration regards the principle of self-determination as a part of the obligations stemming from the Charter, and is not a “recommendation”, but is in the form of an authoritative interpretation of the Charter2.

1 Starushenko G. The Principle of Self-determination in Soviet Foreign Policy, Moscow, 1963, p. 221. 2 Recueil des cours de l’Academie de droit international, The Hague, 1962, II, p. 33. Annual Report of the Secretary- General , 1960, 2. Chief Judge Moreno Quintana, International Court of Justice Reports, 1960, pp. 95-96.

24 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Papian

Later on, the principle was incorporated in a number of international instruments. In 1966 two conventions on human rights entered into force – the Interna- tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Covenants have a common Article 1 which states: “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” Consequently the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among the States in accordance with the Char- ter of the United Nations [General assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 1970] confirmed the principle that self-determination is a right belonging to all peoples and that its implementation is required by the UN Charter: “By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference , their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.” M. Zahovic, rapporteur for the Special Committee on Principles of Interna- tional Relations concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among the Nations, remarked: “Nearly all representatives who participated in the debate emphasised that the principle was no longer to be considered a mere moral or political postulate; it was rather settled principle of modern international law. Full recognition of the principle was a prerequisite for the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations and cooperation among the States, and the promotion of economic, social and cultural progress throughout the world.”1

Self-Determination: The Principle and Human Rights The principle of self-determination developed from a philosophical to political concept in international relations and has now matured into a fundamental principle of positive international law. It has developed recently as an aspect of human rights belonging to the group rather than to the individual2 and therefore rightly belongs to both Covenants of Human Rights, as it was mentioned. On 25 June 1993, representatives of 171 States adopted by consensus the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Hu- man Rights (June 14-25, 1993). The final document agreed to in Vienna, which was

1 Umozurike O.U. op. cit., p. 192. 2 Ibid., p. 271.

25 A.Papian «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 endorsed by the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly (resolution 48/121, of 1993), reaffirms the principles that have evolved during the past 45 years and further strengthens the foundation for additional progress in the area of human rights. The document recognizes interdependence between democracy, development and human rights, including the right to self-determination. The final document empha- sizes that the Conference considers the denial of the right of self-determination as a violation of human rights and underlines the importance of the effective realization of this right1 [para. 2]: “The World Conference on Human Rights considers the denial of the right of self-determination as a violation of human rights and underlines the importance of the effective realization of this right”.2 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tur- key, and co-sponsors of the OSCE Minsk group as well (Russian Federation, USA, France) are parties to this convention. International organizations which are concerned with human rights and world peace have given full recognition to the fact that respect for self-determination is a condition for world peace. Fundamental human rights are meaningful in the context of a people enjoying self-determination.3 The raison d'être for the principle of self-determination is the enjoyment by all peoples, regardless of race, religion, or sex, of full democratic rights within the law, free from internal or external domination. It seeks to provide the opportunities for the political, economic, social, and cultural development of all peoples. The basic objective of the principle is to guarantee that all peoples have a government to their choice that responds to their political, economic, and cultural needs4. Thus, denial of the right to self-determination is a human rights violation and constitutes a breach of international law.

Self-determination: Development of the Principle through Other Organizations The International Commission of Jurists (affiliated to the International Court of Justice) has held numerous conferences on the rule of law attempting to provide a clear and comprehensive definition of rule of law and better measures of implementation in the context of protecting human rights. Its first congress was held in Ath- ens in 1955, where the participants gave effect to the Act of Athens which resolved: “(9) The recognition of the right to self-determination being one of the great achievements of our era and one of the fundamental principles of international law,

1 Hillier T., Sourcebook on Public International Law, London-Sydney, 1998, p. 192. 2 Documents, UN General Assembly, A/CONF.157/23; 12 July 1993. 3 Umozurike O.U. op. cit., p. 188. 4 Ibid., p. 273. 26 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Papian its non-application is emphatically condemned. (10) Justice demands that a people or an ethnic or political minority be not deprived of their natural rights and especially of the fundamental rights of man and citizens or of equal treatment for reasons of race, color, class, political conviction, caste or creed”.1 The First World Conference of Lawyers on World Peace through Law, in their Declaration of General Principles for a World Rule of Law (Athens, July 6, 1963), adopted a resolution which stated: “In order to establish an effective international legal system under the rule of law which precludes resort to force, we declare that: (…) (6) A fundamental principle of the international rule of law is that of the right of self-determination of the peoples of the world, as proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations.”2

Self-determination: Development of the Principle Through the ICJ The principle of self-determination is exemplified in the decisions by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). For example, in the South-West Africa Cases (December 26, 1961, and July 18, 1966) Judge Nervo, dissenting, expressed the belief that the concept of equality and freedom “will inspire the vision and the conduct of peoples the world over until the goal of self-determination and independence is reached.”3 The Advisory Opinion of the International Court relating to the Western Sa- hara Case (October 16, 1975) reconfirmed as well “the validity of the principle of self-determination” in the context of international law.4 Also in the decision of June 30, 1995, concerning the East Timor Case (Portugal v. Australia) the International Court reaffirmed that the principle of self- determination of peoples is recognized by the UN Charter and by its own jurispru- dence as being “one of the essential principles of contemporary international law.”[Para. 29]5

1 Ibid., p. 185. 2 Declaration of General Principles for a World Rule of Law, American Journal of International Law, 58, (1964) pp. 138- 151, at 143. 3 International Court of Justice, Reports, 1966, v. IV, p. 465. 4 ICJ Reports (1975) 12 at 31-33. See also the Namibia Opinion, ibid. (1971), 16 at 31; Geog K. v. Ministry of Interior, ILR 71, at 284; and the Case Concerning East Timor, ICJ Reports (1995) at 102. 5 Thurer D. op. cit., p. 370.

27 A.Papian «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Self-Determination: Status, Scope and Content in Contemporary International Law Both the United Nations and the majority of authors are alike in maintaining that the principle of self-determination is part of modern international law. Due to developments in the United Nations since 1945, jurists now generally admit that self-determination is a legal principle.1 The principle has been confirmed, developed and given more tangible form by a consistent body of State practice and has been embodied among “the basic principles of international law” in the Friendly Relations Resolutions.2 The generality and political aspect of the principle do not deprive it of legal content.3 Furthermore, having no doubts that the principle of the self- determination of peoples is a legal principle, currently many declare self- determination to be a jus cogens (peremptory) norm of international law.4 Accord- ingly, no derogation is admissible from the principle of self-determination by means of a treaty or any similar international transaction.5 It must be underlined that the right of self-determination is the right to choose a form of political organization and relations with other groups. The choice may be: independence as a state, association with other groups in a federal state, or autonomy or assimilation in a unitary (non-federal) state.6 A situation involving the international legal principle of self-determination cannot be excluded from the jurisdiction of the United Nations by a claim of domestic jurisdiction. International customary law is binding on all states regardless of consent; and in any event, states have bound themselves under the Charter to respect the principle.7 The claims of the states that the implementation of the principle of self-determination infringes on their rights or is contrary to their “constitutional processes” cannot be made a pretext for depriving other peoples of their right to self-determination.8 Presently self-determination as a principle is truly universal in scope.9 It is also unconditional because most of the UN members also hold that realization of the right to self-determination should not have

1 Brownlie I. Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, 1998 (5th ed.), p. 600. 2 Thurer D. op. cit., p. 366. 3 Brownlie I. op. cit., p. 600. 4 Hillier T. op. cit., p. 191. Supporters of the view that the right of self-determination is part of jus cogens include: I. Brownlie, op. cit., (4th ed.), Oxford, 1991, p. 513. A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, Oxford, 1989, p. 136; J. Craword, “The Rights of Peoples: Some Conclusions”, in J. Crawford, (ed.), The Rights of Peoples, Oxford, 1988, pp. 159-175, at p. 166; H. Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination, Implementation of United Nations Resolutions (1978), para. 85; and the UK’s and Argentina’s statements in the context of the Falklands/Malvinas dispute (1982) 53 British Yearbook of International Law, pp. 366-379. 5 Cassese A. Self-determination of Peoples, Cambridge, 1995, p. 134-35. 6 Brownlie I. op. cit., p. 599. 7 Umozurike O.U. op. cit., p. 196. 8 Starushenko G. op. cit., p. 209. 9 Thurer D. op. cit., p. 369.

28 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Papian any strings attached to it.1 All these conceptions were summarized in the statement by Hans Brunhart, Head of Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Principality of Liechten- stein, during the Forty-Seventh Session of the General Assembly of the United Na- tions (September 23, 1992, UN Doc. A/47/PV.9) [para. 6]: “The right to self- determination as principle is now universally accepted. I would recall not only that self-determination is one of the foundations of the Charter, but also that most States represented in this Assembly are already under certain specific legal obligations in this area by virtue of Article 1 of each of the great human rights conventions of 1966. [i. e. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Interna- tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.] There it is formally and with legally binding effect acknowledged that: “All peoples have the right of self- determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” 2 Despite all this, and with some notable exceptions, the practical and peaceful application of the principle of self-determination has often been lacking. Time and again have dominant powers hindered oppressed peoples from availing themselves of their right to self-determination despite the obligations assumed in sign- ing the UN Charter. So how is one to establish that a people wants to be the mas- ter of its own destiny? There are different ways of establishing the will of the people demanding self- determination. The will of the people may be determined by a plebiscite. A plebiscite or, what amounts to the same thing, a referendum means the right of the majority of the population to determine the political and legal status of the territory it inhabits.3 The will of people may be expressed by parliament or by any other representative institutions elected by the self-determining people.4 By and large there are plebiscites without a popular vote on the questions concerned. In such cases, the population of the self-determining territory elects a representative organ which then expresses the people’s will. If the elections to these or- gans and the vote in them are conducted on a democratic basis, this method of ex- pressing the people’s will is quite legitimate.5 This is the situation that we had lately (23 May 2010) in Nagorno-Karabakh during the elections of the Parliament of the

1 Starushenko G. op. cit., p. 210. 2 Self-Determination and Self-Administration, A Sourcebook, (ed. W. Danspeckgruber and A. Watts), London, 1997, Appendix 2, The Liechtenstein Initiative at the UN, p. 405. 3 Starushenko G. op. cit., p. 214. 4 Ibid., p. 213. 5 Ibid., p. 215-6.

29 A.Papian «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). The will of the people may also be expressed in the form of mass protests (civil disobedience, demonstrations, rallies, newspaper articles, etc.). Lastly, it may find expression in armed uprisings or wars for national liberation. The latter is an extreme measure and people resorts to it only if forced to do so. A rule of customary international law has emerged, according to which the principle of self-determination includes a right of secession and, as a consequence, the legality of wars of national liberation and third party interventions on behalf of the secessionist movements.1 The use of force to achieve self-determination and for the assistance of national liberation movements has increasingly been claimed as legitimate in recent years, on the ground that it furthers the principles of the UN Charter.2 There is no rule of international law forbidding revolutions within a state, and the United Nation’s Charter favors the self-determination of peoples. Self- determination may take the forms of rebellion to oust an unpopular government, of colonial revolt, of an irredentist movement to transfer territory, or of a movement for the unification or federation of independent states.3 It should be especially stressed that whatever way is chosen, no “central authority” or any other people can solve the problem for the self-determining people, for that would be contrary to the very principle of self-determination.4 While establishing the scope of self-determination, a question must be answered: Are the peoples and nations which have already implemented their right to self-determination subjects of this right? The answer is “Yes”, inasmuch as the UN Charter recognizes the right to self-determination of all peoples and nations, without distinguishing between those which have attained statehood and those which have not. The question is answered analogically in the General Assembly resolution on the inclusion of the clause on human rights in the International Covenant on Human Rights.5 It has been strongly advocated that a nation which has been divided into States by outside interference and without the clear consent of the population still possess the inherent right of self-determination including the right of reunification.6 Furthermore, infringement of the right to self-determination has been used by the European Community as a potential ground for withholding recognition of an entity as a State and hence to deny the legitimacy of a government or a State which

1 Thurer D. op. cit., p. 368. 2 Hillier T. op. cit., p. 612. 3 Self-Determination, Digest of International Law (ed. M. Whiteman), Washington, 1974, v. 5, § 4, p. 39. 4 Starushenko G. op. cit., p. 214. 5 Resolution 545 (VI) of February 5, 1952. 6 Thurer D. op. cit., p. 368.

30 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Papian does not protect the right of self-determination. In the EC Declaration on the Guide- lines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union (December 16, 1991), there is the requirement that a potential new State has constitutional guarantees of democracy and of “the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities” before recognition by the EC States would be granted. Moreover, a new rule of international law holds that a State established in violation of the right of self-determination is a nullity in international law.1 Another question which concerns the self-determination of peoples is: Can the right of self-determination be applied to non-colonial entities? Certainly the main objective of the right of self-determination was to bring a speedy end to colonialism. However, since codification of that principle in the UN Charter, not one of the major international instruments which have dealt with the right of self-determination, have limited the application of the right to colonial situations. For example, the common Article 1 of the two International Human Rights Conventions of 1966 (Interna- tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Eco- nomic, Social and Cultural Rights) applies the right to “all peoples” without any re- striction as to their status, and the obligation rests on all States. Likewise, principle VIII of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference 1975 includes: “by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development”. State practice also supports a broader application of the right of self-determination beyond strictly colonial con- fines. Indeed, the international Commission of Jurists, in its report on Bangladesh’s secession, stated that: “if one of the constituent peoples of a State is denied equal rights and is discriminated against, it is submitted that their full right of self- determination will revive”.2 In the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (12 September 1990), which was signed by four of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, it was expressly mentioned that the “German people, freely exercising their right of self-determination, have expressed their will to bring about the unity of Germany as a State”, [Preamble, para. 11], despite the fact that neither East nor West Germany was a colony. It was also been applied by States in the context of the break-up of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia.3

1 Ibid., p. 369. 2 The Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists, Report on “Events in East Pakistan, (1971)”, Geneva, p. 69. 3 McCorquodale R. Self-Determination: Human Rights Approach, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 43, # 4 (Oct. 1994), p. 861. 31 A.Papian «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Territorial Integrity and Political Independence

“Territorial Integrity”: Evaluation and Content The notion of “territorial integrity” has been employed only three times in international instruments. All other cases are only references to these said documents. The concepts of territorial integrity and political independence emerged during the years immediately following the end of World War I. Article 10 of the Cove- nant of the League of Nations stipulated that: “the Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League”.1 The same understanding of “territorial integrity” was reaffirmed in the UN Charter: “2(4). All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The other important international instrument which is often referred to is the Helsinki Final Act (adopted on August 1, 1975) which requires the following: "The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State…”. It is obvious that the Helsinki Final Act, likewise the UN Charter and League of Nations Covenant earlier, condemns merely the use of force against territorial integrity and does not unconditionally advocate for the absolute maintenance of territorial integrity. It makes clear that use of external force or threat of use against territorial integrity and political independence is unacceptable. Meanwhile, the Helsinki Final Act (Chapter 1) specifically holds that: " frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.” It is apparent that ever since the first time that the notion of “territorial integrity” appeared within the domain of international law, it has been closely intertwined with the question of the use of external force. In other words, the principle of “territorial integrity” is traditionally interwoven with the fundamental principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force2 and not with the absolute preservation of the territory of a state intact. As it was mentioned above, it is just

1 Rozakis Ch. Territorial Integrity and Political Independence, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public Interna- tional Law, v. IV, Amsterdam, 2000, p. 813. 2 Ibid., pp. 812-13.

32 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Papian the “prohibition of use of [external] force”1 and the renunciation of “the use of force by one state to conquer another state or overthrow its government.”2

“Territorial Integrity”: Scope, Limitation and Status under International Law In modern political life there are repeated wrongful attempts to present “territorial integrity” as a general limitation on the right to self-determination. The basis for such limitation is false because the government of a State which does not represent the whole population on its territory without discrimination cannot succeed in limiting the right of self-determination on the basis that it would infringe that State’s territorial integrity.3 Moreover, state practice shows that territorial integrity limitations on the right of self-determination are often ignored, as seen in the recognition of the independence of Bangladesh (from Pakistan), Singapore (from Malaysia) and Belize, “despite the claims of Guatemala”.4 In addition, after the recognition by the international community of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, recognition of East Timor and Eritrea, recognition to a certain extent of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it could now be the case that any government which is oppressive to peoples within its territory may no longer be able to rely on the general interest of territorial integrity as a limitation on the right of self-determination. Therefore there is a clear-cut understanding: only a government of a State which allows all its peoples to decide their political status and economic, social and cultural development freely has an interest of territorial integrity which can possibly, only possibly, limit the exercise of a right of self-determination. So territorial integrity, as a limitation on the exercise of the right of self-determination, can apply only to those States in which the government represents the whole population in accordance with the exercise of internal self-determination.5 Thus, there is an apparent conceptual link between democracy and self-determination. Democracy is often viewed as internal self-determination, and secession as external self-determination, that is, as the right of a people to govern itself, rather than be governed by another people.6 Moreover, it is clear that those deprived of the right of self-determination can seek forcible international support to uphold their right of self-determination and no

1 Restatement of the Law (Third), op. cit., p. 389. 2 Ibid., p. 383. 3 McCorquodale R. op. cit., p. 880. 4 Maguie J. “The Decolonization of Belize: Self-Determination v. Territorial Integrity” (1982) 22 Virginia Journal of In- ternational Law, p. 849. 5 McCorquodale R. op. cit., p. 880. 6 Moore M. National Self-Determination, Oxford, 1998, p. 10.

33 A.Papian «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

State can use force against such groups. As it was referred above, the Declaration on Principles of International Law provides that “every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples … of their right of self determination and freedom and independence”. The increase in actions by the international community which could be classed as humanitarian intervention, such as in Somalia and with the creation of “safe havens” for the Kurds North of the 36th parallel in Iraq1 (1991-2003), indicates the reduced importance given by the international community to the territorial integrity of a State when human rights, including the right of self-determination, are grossly and systematically violated.2 The right of self- determination applies to all situations where peoples are subject to oppression by subjugation, domination and exploitation by others. It is applicable to all territories, colonial or not, and to all peoples.3 Indeed, many of the claims for self-determination arose because of unjust, State-based policies of discrimination and when the international legal order failed to respond to the legitimate aspirations of peoples.

Self-Determination: Human Rights and the Right to Secession One of the supposed dangers of self-determination is that it might encourage secession. First of all, there is no rule of international law that condemns all seces- sions under all circumstances. Self-determination includes the right to secede.4 In a situation when the principle of territorial integrity is clearly incompatible with that of self-determination, the former must, under present international law, give way to the latter.5 For instance, if a majority or minority insists on committing an international crime, such as genocide, or enforces a wholesale denial of human rights as a deliberate policy against the other part, it is submitted that the oppressed party, minority or majority, may have recourse to the right of self-determination up to the point of secession.6 As Azerbaijan used force in answer to the free and peaceful expression of the will of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh (rallies, referendums, claims, appeals), took inadequate means of punishment, perpetrated massacres of the Armenian citizens of Azerbaijan in Sumgait, Baku, Kirovabad, and waged a ruthless war with Ukrainian, Afghan, Russian mercenaries and sustained defeat, it cannot expect that the people

1 Security Council Resolution 688 (April 5 1991). 2 McCorquodale R. op. cit., p. 882. 3 Ibid., p. 883. 4 M. Moore, op. cit., p. 23. 5 O.U. Umozurike, op. cit., p. 187. 6 Ibid., p. 199.

34 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Papian of Nagorno-Karabakh will renounce their lawful right and will not exercise their right of self-determination. Actually, the world community is under legal and moral obligation to recognize the political self-determination of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, i.e. to recognize the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh; if a de facto state has crystallized, refusal to recognize it may be tantamount to a denial of self-determination. Moreover, there is a clear understanding in international law: after the international requirements for the recognition of belligerency have been fulfilled (as it was done with regard to Na- gorno-Karabakh by the Bishkek Protocol (May 5, 1994), and by the Cease-fire Agreement, (May 12, 1994)), a duty of recognition of belligerency necessarily follows, and refusal of recognition is interference with the right of political self- determination of the people of a State, and therefore constitutes illegal intervention.1 This obligation arises from the understanding that the principle and rules on self- determination are erga omnes, that is, they belong to that class of international legal obligations which are not “bilateral” or reciprocal, but are in favor of all members of the international community.2 In the Loizidou v. Turkey Case, a 1996 judgment of the European Court of Hu- man Rights, Judge Wildhaber identifies an emerging consensus that the right of self- determination, more specifically secession, should be interpreted as remedial for certain human rights abuses: “Until recently in international practice the right to self- determination was in practical terms identical to, and indeed restricted to, a right to decolonisation. In recent years a consensus has seemed to emerge that peoples may also exercise a right to self-determination if their human rights are consistently and flagrantly violated or if they are without representation at all or are massively under- represented in an undemocratic and discriminatory way. If this description is correct then the right to self-determination is a tool which may be used to re-establish international standards of human rights and democracy”.3 As Judge Wildhaber attests, there is increasing agreement among authors that the right of self-determination provides the remedy of secession to a group whose rights have been consistently and severely abused by the state.4 The self-determination of the people of Nagorno- Karabakh must certainly be assessed as an act of corrective justice as well. So a minority’s entitlement to self-determination can and must be judged within a human rights framework. Self-determination postulates the right of a peo-

1 A.V.W. Thomas and A.J. Thomas, Non-Intervention: The Law and its Import in the Americas, Dallas, 1956, p. 220. 2 A. Cassese, op. cit., p. 134. 3 Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), European Court of Human Rights, 18 December, 1996, (1997) 18 Human Rights Law Journal 50 at p. 59. 4 K. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law, Cambridge, 2002, p. 74. 35 A.Papian «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 ple organized in an established territory to determine its collective political destiny in a democratic fashion.1 It is legal nonsense to presume that self-determination should take place within previous administrative borders, without regard for the cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity of the people there. Internal boundaries in the former Soviet Union were often drawn in a way which ensured that many members of the titular nation were outside the boundaries of their (titular) republic, as it was with Nagorno- Karabakh.2 A politically disempowered distinct group in a specific region has the right to independence,3 regardless of whether or not they are organized in an administrative unit. There is no doubt that the people of Nagorno-Karabakh (not only the people of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region) are entitled to independence as their choice of self-determination due to the extreme discrimination that they faced under Azerbaijan.

Summary • Self-determination is an ancient political right. Presently the right to self- determination is a well-established principle in public international law. The principle has been confirmed, developed and given more tangible form by a consistent body of State practice and has been embodied in various international instruments. • The principle of self-determination is exemplified in the decisions by the In- ternational Court of Justice (ICJ). • The principle of self-determination is one of the fundamentals of peaceful and friendly international relations. Respect for self-determination is a condition for world peace. Those deprived of the right of self-determination can seek forcible international support to uphold their right of self-determination. • Self-determination as a principle of international law is universal in scope. The right of self-determination applies to all situations where peoples are subject to oppression by subjugation, domination and exploitation by others – all peoples and nations, without distinguishing between those which have attained statehood and those which have not. • The principle of the self-determination of peoples is a legal principle and is a jus cogens (peremptory) norm of international law.

1 Ibid., p. 85. 2 M. Moore, op. cit., p. 140. 3 T.M. Frank, The Power of Legitimacy among the Nations, New York, 1990, p. 171.

36 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Papian

• The right of self-determination is the right to choose a form of political organization and relations with other groups. Denial of the right of to self-determination is a human rights violation and constitutes a breach of international law. • The right of peoples and nations to self-determination is a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights. Therefore the General As- sembly recommended that the member states of the United Nations uphold the principle of self-determination of all peoples and nations. • Article 2(4) of the UN Charter has nothing to do with absolute “territorial integrity”, but is simply the rule against intervention, a “prohibition of use of force” and purely calls to refrain from “the use of force by one state to conquer another state or overthrow its government.” • Self-determination includes the right to secede. The people of Nagorno- Karabakh (not only the people of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region) are entitled to independence as their choice of self-determination. • Self-determination postulates the right of a people organized in an established territory to determine its collective political destiny in a democratic fashion.

June, 2010.

RAND CORPORATION AND WE: ARMENIA-TURKEY RELATIONS

Ara Marjanyan*

The end of the Cold War has not di- minished Turkey’s strategic importance – as many initially feared – in American eyes. On the contrary, Tur- key’s strategic importance has increased, not decreased. S. Larrabee, RAND Corporation, February, 2010

The recent developments directed to establishing Armenia-Turkey relations are arguably one of the most important factors (if not the single most important factor) shaping the future of our region. Countries of the region and world power centers alike pay close attention to this issue. On the other hand, the studies of RAND Corporation in the recent decades have repeatedly had serious influence on the U.S. politics, sometimes even forming or transforming the U.S. strategic approaches and the very mindset in a wide range of both international and domestic problems. Therefore, it should be no surprise that this article aims at analyzing the most recent and relatively comprehensive publication by RAND Corporation regarding Turkey’s role in our region and the current process of normalizing Arme- nia-Turkey relations.

* World Bank/GEF Renewable Energy Project Coordinator in Armenia, Ph.D. 38 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Marjanyan

1. Troubled Partnership: U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change On February 3, 2010 the presentation of Stephen Larrabee’s research report MG- 8893-AF Troubled Partnership: U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopoliti- cal Change [1] took place at RAND Corporation. The research has been conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND for fiscal year 2007, most likely as part of a larger “Troubled Partnerships: The Growing Challenge of Managing U.S. Security Relationships and Implications for the United States Air Force” study1. The research has been carried out within the framework of Project AIR FORCE and was sponsored by the Director of Operational Planning, Policy and Strategy, Regional Issues Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans and Re- quirements, Headquarters United States Air Force [1, pp iii-iv]. The main points and conclusions of [1] are presented below without any comments. The translation closely follows the original. Words that are absent in the English original, but allow better equivalence of the Armenian translation are given in square brackets. Our observations are only in footnotes, whereas some analysis and comments follow in the last part of the article.

US - Turkey Relations According to [1], in recent years U.S. - Turkish relations have undergone serious strains and even deteriorated. In the view of some analysts it has been conditioned by loss of Turkey’s strategic significance in American eyes since the end of the Cold War. Mr. Larrabee’s opinion is different – on the contrary, Turkey stands at the nexus of four areas strategic importance, which have become increasingly critical to U.S. security since the end of the Cold War: the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus/Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf region. In all these areas, as Mr. Larrabee argues, Turkey’s cooperation is vital for achieving U.S. policy goals. The origins of many of the strains in U.S. – Turkey relations and a sharp rise in anti-American sentiment in Turkey can be traced back to the following three circumstances. First, Turkish officials seriously feared that the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and perspective of creation of a Kurdish separatist state in northern part of the

1 “Troubled Partnerships: The Growing Challenge of Managing U.S. Security Relationships and Implications for the United States Air Force”. It could be asserted with a high degree of confidence that by its spirit and substance this study inherited and logically continued the study R-244 that constituted the erstwhile fame of RAND in building the U.S. international military cooperation and strategy. The fact that issues related to İncirlik and other military bases run like a golden thread through almost all pages of the report, comes to prove that. 39 A.Marjanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 country posed a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. These fears have been ex- acerbated by the resumption of an insurgency by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has stepped up cross-border terrorist attacks against Turkish territory from sanctuaries in northern Iraq. These terrorist attacks are Turkey’s number-one security concern. These strains have been compounded—and to some extent reinforced—by differences over policy toward Iran and Syria. Whereas the United States sought to isolate Iran and Syria, Turkey has consistently pursued a policy of rapprochement with Iran and Syria. This divergence between political approaches began to manifest itself before the assumption of power in Ankara by the Justice and Development Party in 2002, but it has become more pronounced since then. Finally, though concerned by Iran’s nuclear program, Turkey however, is strongly opposed to a military strike against Iran. [In the viewpoint of Turkey] it would lead to destabilization of the Middle East. Mr. Larrabee provides details on this issue, arguing that: “A U.S. military strike against Iran would create a crisis in U.S.-Turkish relations and could prompt the Erdoğan government to halt or curtail U.S. use of Turkish military facilities, particularly the air base at İncirlik.” [1, pp. xii, see also pp. 36-37]1 Summarizing these circumstances, Mr. Larrabee states that U.S. defense cooperation with Turkey has undergone a downturn in the last few years. For instance, Congress has held up a number of major weapon sales to Turkey due to Turkey’s human-rights policy and policy toward Cyprus. Generally, this defense-industry relationship has stagnated lately. Since a sale of 17 Seahawk helicopters in fall 2006 fi- nalized, nothing much has been seen in this area2. Turkey has begun to regard the United States as a less-than reliable defense partner and has expanded its defense relationships with countries that impose fewer procurement restrictions, particularly Israel and Russia [1, pp. xii, see also pp. 77-78]. What are the suggestions made in [1] for revitalizing U.S.-Turkish [strategic] cooperation? There are total 18 of those, formulated by exploring the issue in 7 different dimensions. These dimensions are

1 The probability assessment of such strike by Israel and analysis of its ramifications are not addressed in [1], although no doubt such analyses have been implemented within the framework of the mentioned larger study. It is also worth mentioning that no review whatsoever on Israel’s policy with regards to Turkey and Caucasus is presented in [1]. In our opinion this is a serious shortcoming in comparison with Mr. Larrabee’s earlier study conducted in 2003 [2]. The latter informs that at the beginning of the new century “Israel has expanded its role in Eurasia, especially with Azerbaijan. Israel strongly supported Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh war... Cooperation in the intelligence field has intensified and there are some indications that Israel may have supplied arms to Azerbaijan.” The current status of this issue is not clarified in [1]. 2 Actually, Mr. Larrabee means only U.S. commercial sales of arms to Turkey. Arms worth $15 billion to be supplied under inter-government agreements are still quite impressive.

40 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Marjanyan

1. Turkey and Northern Iraq, the Kurdish Challenge [1, Ch. 3]; 2. Turkey and the Middle East [1, Ch. 4]; 3. Turkey vis-à-vis Eurasia and Caucasus [1, Ch. 5]; 4. Turkey and the EU [1, Ch. 6]; 5. Turkey and Greece/Cyprus [1, Ch. 6]; 6. U.S.-Turkish Military Cooperation [1, Ch. 7]; 7. Democratization and Turkey’s domestic reforms.

The most interesting dimension for us is Turkey vis-à-vis Eurasia and Cauca- sus, analysis of which are presented in the next section of this article.

Turkey and Northern Iraq, the Kurdish Challenge There are five proposals directed to revitalizing Turkey-U.S. relations in this area. First, the United States should increase its political and intelligence support for Turkey’s struggle against PKK terrorism. According to Mr. Larrabee, U.S. support for Turkey’s struggle against the PKK is regarded by Turkish officials as the litmus test of the value of the U.S.-Turkish security partnership. Second, the United States should put greater pressure on the Kurdistan Re- gional Government (KRG) [in Northern Iraq] to crack down on the PKK and cease its logistical and political support of the group. In Mr. Larrabee’s opinion, this would allow weakening the growth of anti-American sentiment among the Turkish public. Third, the PKK threat [for Turkey] cannot be resolved by military means alone. Hence, it must be combined with social and economic reforms that address the root causes of the Kurdish grievances. According to [1], the Erdoğan government’s “Kurdish Opening,” launched in the summer of 2009, represents an encourag- ing sign in this context. Fourth, the United States should strongly encourage and support Turkey’s efforts to open a direct dialogue with the leadership of the KRG in northern Iraq. Im- portant steps in this direction have been taken since late 2008. However, the process is fragile and needs strong U.S. support. Mr. Larrabee writes: “There can be no stability on Turkey’s southern border over the long term without [some] accommodation between the Turkish government and the KRG. This does not mean that Turkey should recognize an independent Kurdish state, but for regional stability to exist, Turkey needs to work out a modus vivendi with the KRG. Ultimately, this can only be achieved through a direct dialogue with the KRG leadership.” And fifth, as the United States withdraws its forces from Iraq, it needs to intensify efforts to defuse tension between the KRG and the central government in

41 A.Marjanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Baghdad. This growing tension represents a serious threat to Iraq’s viability as an integral state and could seriously complicate Turkey’s security challenges. The time factor is of decisive importance here. The U.S. military presence in northern Iraq has more or less acted as leverage for the U.S. on the situation on the ground in the country. However, United States should maintain some military presence in northern Iraq as long as possible without violating the terms of the Status of Forces Agree- ment signed with the [Iraq’s] Maliki government1.

Turkey and the Middle East There are three proposals in [1] regarding the Middle East regional processes. First, U.S. policymakers should avoid portraying Turkey as a model for the Middle East. It makes the influential Kemalist circles of Turkey uncomfortable because they feel it pushes Turkey politically closer to the Middle East and weakens Turkey’s Western identity. In addition, they fear that such propaganda [by the U.S.] will be countered by strengthening political Islam in Turkey and erode the principle of secularism over the long run. The latter concerns are particularly strong within the Turkish armed forces. Second, the United States should continue to express a readiness to open a dialogue with Iran and Syria and to engage both countries in diplomatic efforts to help stabilize Iraq. Third, Washington should also intensify its efforts to persuade Tehran to abandon any attempt to acquire nuclear weapons.

Turkey and the EU In the dimension of EU-related processes there are two suggestions formulated in [1]. First, the United States should continue to support Turkey’s membership in the European Union. The successful completion of this process would help put to rest the claim that the West is innately hostile to Muslims. Meanwhile, the opposite process would strengthen the anti-Western forces in Turkey, which is in the interest of neither the West nor Turkey. Second, given the sensitivity of the issue of Turkey’s EU membership among EU member states2, the United States should support Turkish membership through quiet diplomacy behind the scenes and avoid overt pressure and arm-twisting.

1 In other words, after U.S. President Obama announced to world the timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, the “countdown timer” for this issue is on. The necessity to avoid this time pressure was the reason for the former U.S. president George W. Bush administration’s staunch refusal to announce any Iraq withdrawal timetable. Their approach was “the time will come when the mission is over.” (see also below) 2 Mr. Larrabee first of all means France, Germany and Austria [see 1, Ch. 9, p. 112] 42 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Marjanyan

Turkish-Greek relations and Cyprus Two suggestions are put forward for the issue of Greece and Cyprus as well. First, the United States should intensify efforts to get Greece and Turkey to re- solve their differences over the Aegean. At a time when NATO faces serious challenges in Afghanistan and the post-Soviet space, the last thing the United States needs is a new crisis in the Aegean, says Mr. Larrabee. Second, the United States should also encourage and support the intensification of the intercommunal dialogue being conducted under UN auspices between the two Cypriot communities. Progress in this issue would give Turkey’s EU membership bid critical new momentum.

U.S.-Turkish Military Cooperation In this regard two proposals are formulated in [1]. First, in the wake of the Obama visit1, the U.S.A. should initiate a broad strategic dialogue with Ankara about the future use of Turkish bases, particularly İncirlik. Mr. Larrabee mentions in this aspect that given Turkey’s growing interests and increasingly active policy in the Middle East, Ankara is likely to be highly sensitive about allowing the United States to use İncirlik and other bases for Middle East contingencies. The United States therefore cannot assume that it will have automatic use of Turkish bases in Middle East contingencies unless such use is regarded as being in Turkey’s direct national interest. Second, ballistic missile defense could be an important area for future U.S.- Turkish defense cooperation. In light of the growing threat posed by the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, the United States should explore missile- defense [systems installation] options [in Turkey], both bilaterally and through NATO. Mr. Larrabee thinks that this would ensure that Turkish territory is protected against the growing threat posed from ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East2.

1 (in the wake of …). Mr. Larrabee alludes to President Obama’s visit to Turkey in early April 2009. 2 Unfortunately, this conceivably sensational proposal for our region from RAND Corporation has not been duly covered in either our local or foreign media (save the brief message in the February 19, 2010 issue of The Financial Times; note that the presentation of [1] took place on February 3, 2010). Neither anything is mentioned about it in Chapter 7 of [1] that elaborates on U.S.-Turkey military cooperation. Generally, it appears this proposal does not belong to the context of the subject matter report. There is an impression that it was a last-minute addition responding to some signals from the Pentagon or White House.

43 A.Marjanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Democratization and Turkey’s Domestic Reforms The following proposals are made in [1] in this aspect: 1. The United States should encourage democratization and domestic reform process in Turkey; 2. The United States should not overreact to the growth of religious consciousness in Turkey.

2. Turkey and Us According to RAND Having gained some understanding about six of the seven dimensions in proposals for revitalization of U.S.A.-Turkey strategic cooperation as presented in [1], we shall also review the proposals made in “Turkey vis-à-vis Eurasia and the Caucasus” dimension that are of most interest for us. There are only two of these and they are quite laconic. These proposals are presented at the end of this section, and here we shall explore the analyses which have led Mr. Larrabee to the mentioned two proposals.

Turkey vis-à-vis Eurasia and the Caucasus The analysis on Turkey vis-à-vis Eurasia and the Caucasus dimension are concentrated in Chapter 5 of [1], which in the body of the report are quite remarkably titled as “Russia and Eurasia” instead. The review in carried out in five directions: 1. The Russian Factor 2. Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement 3. The Armenian Genocide Resolution 4. The Broader Regional [Relations] Dimension 5. The Energy Dimension1

The following is mentioned regarding the Russian Factor [1, Ch.5, pp. 48- 51]. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the initial Turkish euphoria about the prospects for expanding Turkish influence in the Central Asia has been tempered during presidency of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev in Russia. Russian influence in Central Asia proved stronger and more enduring than Turkish officials had anticipated2. At the same time Turkey’s relations with its historical adversary

1 In Chapter 5 of [1], the number of pages addressing issues related to Armenia and all Armenians (5 pages) is equal to that regarding energy problems, exceeds by one page that of the Russian Factor (4 pages) and is significantly more than the number of pages on regional problems (1 page). Thus, technically it turns out that 40% of relations in “Turkey vis-à- vis Eurasia and the Caucasus” dimension are conditioned by Turkey’s problems with Armenia and Armeniancy. 2 This is true for elsewhere, too. Note that publication [1] was presented well before yet another coup was staged in Kyrgyzstan and perspectives for the USAF Manas airbase became unclear. This circumstance proves adequacy of such assertion made in [1].

44 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Marjanyan

Russia1 have improved markedly during V. Putin’s presidency, especially since joint declaration on the “Deepening of Friendship and Multi-Dimensional Part- nership.” Currently Russia supplies 65 percent of Turkey’s natural-gas imports and 40 percent of its crude-oil imports. Construction projects in Russia account for about one-fourth of all projects carried out by Turkish contractors around the world2. Moreover, on a number of issues related to Central Asian and Caspian security, Turkey’s position is closer to Russia’s than to U.S.A.’s, for example, with regards to the George W. Bush administration’s typical efforts to promote democracy. Turkey fears that this could destabilize the regimes and lead to increased regional turbulence and political unrest. Some Turkish strategists have begun to look to Russia as a possible strategic alternative. Although these views represent a minority, support for this “ostensibly insane” position has grown in recent years3. However, Mr. Larrabee argues that a serious strategic realignment away from the West toward Russia is unlikely for four reasons: 1. Mistrust of Russia is deeply embedded in the Turkish historical consciousness. 2. Turkish and Russian goals and ambitions conflict in a number of areas, and particularly the Caucasus (a region in which Turkey has deep and longstanding strategic interests). 3. Third, Russia and Turkey are energy competitors in the Caspian and Central Asia. Russia wants to control the distribution and export lines of energy resources in those regions and has opposed such schemes as the Transcaspian and Nabucco projects. 4. A realignment toward Russia and a repudiation of the policy of Westerniza- tion would represent a radical departure from the fundamental principles of Kemalism and would be anathema to the Turkish military elite. In Mr. Larra- bee’s opinion this is the most important contradiction.

Summarizing this section Mr. Larrabee states that in the aftermath of the Rus- sian invasion of Georgia4, Turkish-Russian relations will be strongly affected by the

1 “Over the last several centuries, Turkey and Russia have fought 13 wars against each other, most of which Turkey lost. … Stalin’s aggressive policy toward Turkey early in the Cold War, was the driving force behind Turkey’s decision to join NATO in 1952” [1, p. 48]. Mr. Larrabee’s conspicuous identification of Ottoman and Russian Empires with Turkish Republic and USSR/Russian Federation respectively is noteworthy. 2 “Construction contracts against energy and electric power supply” formula is characteristic to the energy policy of Turkey. Moreover it is often used as a sanction of sorts. For instance, Turkey suspended imports of electric power from Bulgaria after some Turkish companies were left out of tenders for construction projects in Bulgaria. 3 The following article by Burak Bekdil is quoted here: Burak Bekdil, “An Incursion Which Is Not—and Russophiles in Ankara,” Turkish Daily News (Istanbul), June 8, 2007. 4 This is how it is exactly worded in the original (In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Georgia…).

45 A.Marjanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 evolution of Russia’s broader ties to the West, especially the United States. He quotes Ian O. Lesser’s observation1 that since the end of the Cold War Turkey no longer has had the luxury of not having to choose between its Western and Eurasian interests, particularly those in the Caucasus. In this regard Mr. Larrabee notes that sharpening of U.S.-Russian competition would make it more difficult for Turkey to balance these competing interests, particularly in the Caucasus, and increase the pressure on Turkey to choose. As far as Turkish-Armenian rapprochement is concerned [1, Ch. 5, pp. 51- 54], the section begins with an interesting paragraph: “The five-day war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 unleashed a new set of regional dynamics in the Caucasus. On the one hand, it shattered the old political balance in the region and strengthened Russia’s role as an Ordnungsmacht (regional hegemon)2 in the Caucasus. On the other hand, it created new challenges for Ankara and sparked a new activism in Turkish policy toward the Caucasus designed to strengthen regional stability and mitigate the destabilizing political dynamics unleashed by the Russian invasion.”3 In this respect, continues the author of [1], “The most important manifestation of this new activism [of Turkey] has been Ankara’s attempt to improve relations with Yerevan” that have been strained by two issues in particular: (1) Armenia’s campaign to brand Turkey guilty of genocide for the mass deaths of Armenians in 19154 and (2) Armenia’s invasion and occupation of Na- gorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. In the aftermath, as Mr. Larrabee states, Ankara closed its border with Armenia and suspended [its own?] efforts to establish diplo-

1 Ian O. Lesser, “After Georgia: Turkey’s Looming Foreign Policy Dilemmas,” On Turkey, German Marshall Fund of the United States, August 26, 2008a, p. 2 2 The German geopolitical term Ordnungsmacht does not mean so much “regional hegemon” as presented in English [1, p. 51]. A more correct translation would be “law enforcing or order keeping force; a “policeman” if anything (remember the 19th century phrase “Russia the gendarme of Europe”). Also, it is very remarkable to see a German geopolitical term appear out of the blue in this report, especially in the section about Turkish- Armenian rapprochement. Such things never happen just by chance in works of analysts like Stephen Larrabee. What is more important, things like that never take place accidentally in our region either (see below). 3 Turkey’s infamous “Caucasian Platform” is undoubtedly referred to here, because today hardly anyone remembers the 2000 Turkish-Georgian “South Caucasus Stability Pact” that was brought to an early grave. Then again, it would worth for some of our homegrown analysts and figures to remember about it. 4 The phrasing “Armenia’s campaign to brand Turkey guilty of genocide for the mass deaths of Armenians in 1915” [1, p. 51] with a clumsy logic and awkward English syntax is used in the original. Of course, this is because Mr. Larrabee had to do it this way, rather than because he lacks good command of his mother tongue or basic logic (mass deaths caused by what? Maybe as a result of fatigue caused by lavish lifestyle?). The Armenian translation attempts to maintain this awkwardness. One may imagine what uproar it might have raised, had an expression referring to some sort of mysterious mass deaths of Jews in 1941-45 would have appeared in RAND’s reputable publications. Mr. Larrabee’s language was more courageous in 2003, when he was referring to “the legacy of the massacre of Armenians by the Ottoman forces in 1915–1916” [2, p. 106].

46 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Marjanyan matic relations with Yerevan. However, since the Russian invasion of Georgia1 in August 2008, Turkey has intensified its effort to improve relations with Armenia. This effort was given important new impetus by President Gül’s historic visit to Yerevan, setting off an intensive round of diplomacy aimed at normalizing bilateral relations. Mr. Larrabee specially mentions that this visit was the first visit ever to Armenia by a Turkish head of state2. The author continues that on April 22, 2009, after more than a year of behind-the-scenes diplomatic talks, Turkey and Armenia released a joint statement saying that the two sides had agreed on a framework for a roadmap to normalize relations. According to Mr. Larrabee, this framework includes: 1. establishment of diplomatic representation in each country, 2. a gradual reopening of the Turkish-Armenian border, 3. Armenian recognition of Turkey’s international borders, 4. establishment of a historical commission to investigate the disputed events of 19153.

And here Mr. Larrabee provides a quite noteworthy footnote clarification: “The timing of the publication of the joint statement—two days before the celebra- tion of Armenian Remembrance Day, a day on which the U.S. president traditionally issues a statement commemorating the mass deaths of the Armenians killed in 19154 - suggests that the joint statement was primarily designed to forestall the use of the word “genocide” in Obama’s statement and defuse the genocide issue in advance [in the agenda] of Obama’s trip to Turkey on April 6–8, 20095.

1 One gets an overwhelming sense that the August, 2008 aggression of Georgia against South Ossetia and Russian peacemakers stationed there, and the military response of Russia to it has left a deep impression on Mr. Larrabee and many other analysts in the U.S., as well as elsewhere. Indeed, implied as a decisive factor in regional developments, “August 2008” is mentioned at least 9 times in Chapter 5 of [1]. Undoubtedly, Russia’s recognition of S. Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence further deepened this impression (not to mention the current developments in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, recent agreements on Russia’s Black Sea Navy, etc.). 2 Wouldn’t it be more adequate to say that “The process aimed at normalizing bilateral relations was given an important new impetus by Armenian president Sargsyan’s historical invitation to Turkish president Gül to visit Armenia and the latter’s acceptance of the invitation.” Furthermore, “this is was the first invitation ever of an Armenian leader to a Turkish head of state.” Generally speaking the efforts of Mr. Larrabee (and not only his) to credit the initiative of Armenian-Turkish rapprochement almost entirely to Turkey are so obvious and lopsided that they make one suppose he (and other analysts) are somewhat confused about this issue. 3 It is apparent that Mr. Larrabee got somewhat carried away by his own description of this framework. The published originals do not contain the wording “gradual reopening of the border” and “disputed events of 1915.” How- ever, even being carried away so much, Mr. Larrabee quite properly avoids mentioning “occupied territories of Azer- baijan”, “Nagorno Karabakh problem” or anything like that. 4 (… mass deaths of the Armenians killed in 1915). Again we see this clumsy logic and phrasing. 5 Note that Mr. Larrabee’s logic becomes slippery not only with formulations related to the Armenian Genocide. It is clear that at least in our universe, a statement issued on April 22, 2009 cannot “defuse in advance” anything planned and implemented on April 6-8, 2009, even such an important thing as the agenda item of the U.S. president’s trip to Turkey is. 47 A.Marjanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Afterwards, [1] lists the important benefits from U.S.-Turkey strategic cooperation viewpoint that would stem from normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. First, it would enable Armenia to reduce its economic and political dependence on Moscow. Second, it would give new impetus to Turkey’s EU membership bid. Third, it would enable Armenia to be integrated into regional economic and energy schemes from which “it is currently excluded.” Finally, it would defuse pressure to pass the Armenian Genocide Resolution currently before the House of Represen- tatives [of the U.S. Congress]. However, Mr. Larrabee stresses, normalization of relations with Armenia is far from a done deal [in Turkey]. This has caused serious strains in Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan. Baku fears that it will lose important leverage in the negotiations with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh if Ankara reestablishes diplomatic ties to Yerevan, and it has linked its support for Turkish-Armenian rapprochement to prior progress toward a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. In an attempt to allay Azerbaijani concerns, Ankara has assured Baku that the Turkish- Armenian border will not be opened until Yerevan withdraws its troops from Na- gorno- Karabakh1. [From this point on] Ankara sees the opening of the border and progress on Nagorno-Karabakh as parallel and mutually reinforcing processes. This is likely to complicate the process of normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, Mr. Larrabee states2. Russia could also pose an obstacle to full normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, Mr. Larrabee thinks. Indeed, this circumstance would reduce Yerevan’s need for Moscow’s support and open up prospects for Armenia to expand its ties to the West3. Such a development is not in Russia’s interest because it would reduce Moscow’s leverage over Yerevan and its influence in the Caucasus more broadly. Thus, at some point, Moscow could decide that the rapprochement entails too many risks to its interests in the Caucasus and put pressure on Yerevan to retrench, causing the process of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation to cool or falter4.

1 Mr. Larrabee here makes a reference to Emrullah Uslu’s May 14, 2009 article (Emrullah Uslu, “Erdo-gan Reassures Azerbaijan on Turkey’s Border Policy with Armenia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 93, May 14, 2009). Thus, willingly or not, Mr. Larrabee clearly verifies Turkey’s obvious departure from the framework of the “roadmap” that was a result of “more than a year of behind-the-scenes diplomatic talks.” That is why in his text above Mr. Larrabee baselessly adds the phrase “gradual reopening of the border”, involuntarily becoming the devil’s advocate. 2 As the saying goes, he must have second sight. 3 Unfortunately, Mr. Larrabee does not specify these new prospects for Armenia to expand its ties to the West. If this is about Armenia’s full membership in NATO, then with all due respect we suggest that in this regard Mr. Larrabee recalls RAND’s another very interesting study (see [3], also [4]). And after all, did the Georgians “get to first base”, so we follow suit? 4 All is right, what is right, as the English (and advocates of the right-wing forces in the U.S.A.) say. It is pity though that Mr. Larrabee fails to mention the January 12, 2010 ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Arme- nia. He could have done that since the timing allowed, and he must have done that since the content called for it. 48 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Marjanyan

After listing the internal difficulties and barriers to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement both in Turkey and Armenia, Mr. Larrabee finally gets to the announce- ment of the two well-known protocols [1, p. 54]. The author mentions that in the first one “the two sides promised to establish diplomatic relations on the first day of the first month after the ratification of the protocol and to open the border within two months of ratification of the protocol.”1 The mere three paragraphs about the Armenian Genocide Resolution [1, p. 55] point out the following. The Turkish-Armenian rapprochement process is further complicated by the Armenian genocide issue in the U.S. Congress, which the Arme- nian Diaspora in the United States regularly seeks to introduce. These resolutions have been sharply condemned by the Turks and have been a source of serious discord in U.S.-Turkish relations. In the fall of 2007, the Bush administration narrowly averted a [rise of a] serious crisis with Ankara only by a last-minute, all-out lobbying campaign that prevented the Armenian Genocide Resolution (H.R. 106) from coming to a vote on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives. The resolution was introduced again in 2009. Mr. Larrabee continues that during the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, Obama supported the resolution (as did Hillary Clinton). How- ever, as president, Obama has given priority to strengthening ties to Turkey and carefully avoided specific reference to genocide in his statement on Armenian Re- membrance Day on April 24, 2009. This suggests that he is unlikely to support passage of the [U.S. Congress] resolution in the near term. Summarizing this section Mr. Larrabee notes that passage of the H.R. 106 resolution would deal a serious blow to the Obama administration’s efforts to put U.S.- Turkish relations on a firmer footing, and it could prompt the Turks to take retalia- tory action, including, potentially, imposing constraints on U.S. use of Turkish facilities.2 It could also seriously set back the process of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation currently under way and undermine the more open attitude toward addressing the Armenian issue that has been emerging in Turkey in the last few years3.

1 Italicized by us – A.M. From the precise quotation of this part of the protocols it becomes clear that opening of the border has nothing to do with any aspects of the “Karabakh issue,” and this should have made Mr. Larrabee to re- word his aforementioned statements. Oh well, all of us are human and imperfect. 2 In Mr. Larrabee’s assessment 70% of U.S. troops, military cargo and materiel destined for Iraq transits through İn- cirlik Air Base [1, p. 113]. We have to record that avoiding the use of the word “genocide” by the U.S. president on April 24, 2009 and 2010, and yet another (potential) failure to pass the Armenian Genocide Resolution in the Con- gress have paradoxically been predestined since November 2008, when the Democratic Party won the presidential elections. It turns out that the tenets of most interest for us in this party’s electoral campaign are not the promises of B. Obama and H. Clinton to support one or another aspect of the Armenian Cause, as some people might have assumed particularly among the Armenian diaspora of the U.S.A., but rather the pledge to withdraw American troops from Iraq and the return to Realpolitik. 3 Mr. Larrabee here quotes an article by Şaban Kardaş (Turkey Confronts a Disputed Period in Its History. Şaban Kardaş Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 240, December 17, 2008. Notice the chronology), according to which Tur- key has opened its Ottoman archives pertaining to the period under question to scholars (foreign as well as Turkish) and that beginning in 2009, Armenian language and literature will be taught at Turkish universities.

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Mr. Larrabee starts the section on the Broa-der Regional Dimension [1, p. 56] with the following claim: “Turkey’s drive to improve relations with Armenia has been part of a broader effort by Ankara to enhance peace and stability in the Cauca- sus on a regional level. The centerpiece of this effort has been the Erdoğan government’s initiative for a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform1 launched in the immediate aftermath of the Russian invasion of Georgia.” However, Mr. Larrabee continues, the initiative appears to have been slapped together rather quickly “with little effort to coordinate it with [Turkey’s] key Western allies.” Moreover, it has a number of weaknesses that are likely to limit its chances of success. First, having just suffered a Russian military invasion, Georgia has little interest in joining a regional scheme that could enhance Russia’s economic and political involvement in the Caucasus. The unresolved territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh poses a second important obstacle to the realization of the plan, contends Mr. Larrabee2. Russia’s recognition of the independence of the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia poses a third important obstacle that is likely to limit the success of the initiative. The Russian action sets a precedent for separatism that few countries in the region are willing to legitimize. This is particularly true for Turkey because [this precedent] could encourage and legitimize Kurdish separatism in Turkey3. Finally, as Mr. Larrabee writes, the initiative does not include the United States, the EU, or Iran, all of which are important actors in the Caucasus. These actors do not appear to have been consulted before the initiative was launched, and their support for the initiative has been lukewarm at best. Hence, the initiative does not seem likely to meet with much immediate success, the author concludes. However, Mr. Larrabee adds that Turkish authorities regard it as an additional vehicle for

1 Strangely, Mr. Larrabee (and some others) fail to acknowledge the fact that under Turkey’s stubborn refusal to recognize the Armenian Genocide, such a peculiar initiative by Turkey to “enhance peace and stability” among us would be akin to a call by the Third Reich Reichsführer-SS H. Himmler to the Jews for “establishing peace and stability.” Oh, immortal Aesop, indeed “the fox is put in charge of guarding the chicken coop.” However, Mr. Larrabee probably has some feeling like that, as he makes hay of this initiative by Turkey in the subsequent lines, although based on some other considerations. 2 It is unfortunate that Mr. Larrabee does not wish to see a more adequate and logical formulation of this statement, that is, Azerbaijan’s appeals to Turkey and the latter’s response to them constitute a serious hurdle for the accom- plishment of the program proposed by Turkey itself. 3 The fact that Turkey has been deeply impressed by Russia’s recognition of S. Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence (and not only by that) is hard to remain unnoticed. However, it would be quite interesting to learn about the calculations that bring Mr. Larrabee to an assessment that “few countries” in the region would be interested in this precedent. Alas, these calculations, as well as Mr. Larrabee’s definitions and ideas on countries in our region are missing from the subject matter report of RAND (for example, how, by what and why countries in our region differ from states, especially in this era of collapsing transnational colonial systems and awakening of national mindsets?). Perhaps, these could be found in RAND’s series of publications on Nation Building, but this is out of the scope of this article.

50 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Marjanyan engaging Armenia, and they hope that it may help promote greater regional cooperation over the long run. As already usual, starting the section on the Energy Dimension [1, pp. 57-61] with a reference to the “Russian invasion of Georgia,” the author then mostly speaks about Nabucco project and other parallel projects1.

* * * Summarizing all these observations, Mr. Larrabee formulates the RAND’s proposals for revitalizing U.S.-Turkish strategic cooperation in the “Turkey vis-à-vis Eurasia and the Caucasus” dimension: 1. The United States should support recent efforts to promote an improvement in relations between Turkey and Armenia, particularly the opening of the Turk- ish-Armenian border. 2. The Obama administration should work closely with Congress to prevent the passage of an Armenian genocide resolution2.

3. Alternative Turkish Futures according to RAND What remains for gaining a full understanding of RAND’s publication, is to examine the scenarios of Turkey’s future development (alternative futures) set forth in Chap- ter 9 of [1]. There are four of those: a) pro-Western Turkey; b) an “Islamisized” Turkey; c) a nationalist Turkey; d) military intervention.

Let us set it from the very beginning that in the medium term the “Nationalist Turkey” scenario is considered the most probable one in [1], so we shall begin with it. As above, our review closely follows the original. Our comments are provided in the footnotes.

1 All these issues have been and are being thoroughly covered in the “21st Century” journal and the website of Nora- vank Foundation. Consequently, we shall not focus on them too much. 2 As seen, these proposals pertain solely to Armenia and Armeniancy. Thus, in “Turkey vis-à-vis Eurasia and the Caucasus” general dimension, Turkey’s problems with Armenia and Armenians comprise not just 40% as one could have concluded from the volume of studies (see above), but entire 100% as it follows from the proposals formulated based on these studies.

51 A.Marjanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Future scenario: A Nationalist Turkey Disappointed and frustrated by the EU’s continuing tendency to impose new obstacles to its membership, Turkey would abandon its quest for EU [full] membership but still maintain strong economic and trade ties to Europe, accepting some form of “privileged partnership” with the EU along the lines currently proposed by the Christian Democratic Union in Germany and by [president] Sarkozy in France. Turkey would maintain important defense ties to the United States but pursue a more independent policy, especially toward the Middle East and Central Asia. Ties to Russia would be strengthened in the economic area, and defense cooperation between the two countries would be expanded. Turkey would also adopt a tougher position toward the Iraqi Kurds and be more willing to take unilateral military action against the PKK. This scenario would make Turkey a more difficult partner for the U.S., and U.S. use of Turkish bases would be more constrained. Politically and militarily, the United States would not be able to rely on Turkish support in use of the İncirlik and other bases, particularly on issues related to the Middle East. This scenario is the most likely development over the medium term— especially if Turkey’s relations with the United States and the EU continue to dete- riorate. Signs that Turkey is moving in this direction would include a visible increase in popular support for nationalist political parties; an intensification of anti-Western rhetoric in the Turkish press; a failure to repeal Article 301 of the Turkish penal code1; a more overtly hostile attitude toward minorities, particularly the Kurds; a resurgence of nationalist rhetoric over Cyprus; a weakening of rapprochement with Greece; growing antipathy toward the EU; and a weakening of ties to the United States and NATO.

Future scenario: an Islamisized Turkey In this scenario, Turkey would increasingly stress its Muslim identity, although would not go the way of Iran or adopt the shari’a as a fundamental principle of government. Its ties to the West would weaken, while those to the Islamic world would strengthen. This could come about if (1) the Erdoğan leadership, which is composed of moderate Islamists, were replaced by a more radical Muslim leadership, (2) the EU continued to throw roadblocks in the way of Turkish membership, and (3) the United States failed to maintain sustained support for Turkey’s campaign against the PKK.

1 This article stipulates criminal punishment for insulting so-called “Turkishness”. 52 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Marjanyan

This scenario would have important negative implications for U.S.-Turkish relations. Turkey’s ties to the West—and specifically to the United States—would significantly weaken. The U.S. ability to use Turkish bases would be sharply reduced, probably terminated. Loss of İncirlik would seriously impede the U.S. ability to conduct [military] missions in Iraq. United States would have to seek alternative military bases in the region. On many issues—especially those related to the Arab- Israeli conflict—Turkey would openly adopt a pro-Arab position. Turkish defense and intelligence cooperation with Israel would be sharply curtailed, probably ended. Security cooperation with Iran and Syria would increase. Turkey would withdraw from NATO and abandon efforts to join the EU. Mr. Larrabee opines that the chances of such a scenario materializing, however, are low—provided that the United States shows enough sensitivity and wide support to Turkey’s most pressing security concerns, particularly its problems with the PKK. Signs that Turkey was moving in a more-Islamist direction would include a weakening of secular control of education and the judiciary; a weakening of the military’s influence in Turkish politics; increased domestic polarization between secularists and Islamists; growing pressure to prohibit the sale and consumption of alcohol; an intensification of Turkey’s ties to Iran and other radical Muslim regimes; a significant strengthening of Turkish support for the Palestinian cause; an intensification of Turkey’s ties to radical groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas; and a decision by Turkey to withdraw from NATO.

Future scenario: A Pro-Western Turkey In this scenario, Turkey would become a member of the EU or be well on its way to achieving membership. The EU would abandon the goal of becoming a strong federal entity and become a looser confederation of nation-states, making Turkish membership in the EU easier to achieve and more politically acceptable to EU mem- bers1. Turkey’s human rights record would significantly improve, civilian control of the military would be strengthened, and the economic gap between EU members and Turkey would be narrowed. This scenario would anchor Turkey in a broad Euro-Atlantic framework. It would also provide an important bridge to the Muslim world for the West. However, over the long run, for security issues Turkey would increasingly look to Brussels, not

1 It has to be noted that according to RAND, success in Turkey’s bid for EU membership implies a certain structure of EU, that is: a looser confederation based on ideas “variable geography” or “concentric circles,” and requires some “behind the scenes” directing of processes inside EU [1, pp. 111-112]. Naturally, this approach is at odds with the vision for “strong Europe,” an approach supported in France and especially Germany. 53 A.Marjanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Washington. Over time, Turkey’s policy would become more Europeanized, and An- kara would be even less willing to follow the U.S. lead on matters that affected Tur- key’s relations with Europe. Important signs that things develop in this direction would include։ continued momentum toward political reform in Turkey, particularly repeal of Article 301 of the Turkish penal code; a more forthcoming attitude in Turkey toward minority rights, particularly the rights of the Kurds; stronger civilian control of the Turkish military; visible progress toward a Cyprus settlement.

Military Intervention: future scenario In this future scenario an escalation of political and social tensions in Turkey leads to intervention by the Turkish military. Such [internal] confrontation could take place if the AKP takes actions seen by the military as crossing important red- lines. There are two possible variants of the intervention scenario: one is a “soft coup,” in which the military would mobilize social pressure against an AKP-led government, eventually forcing it to resign and the other is a direct military intervention. The latter it is not very likely as the military has been sobered by [the experience of] its previous direct interventions. In addition, these circles [in Turkey] have little enthusiasm for governing directly, and in recent years, they have preferred to rely on indirect methods to achieve their goals1. However, repeating the “soft coup”, as the military did to force Prime Minister Erbakan’s ouster in 1997, would be much harder to do against the AKP. Unlike the AKP, Erbakan’s party had incomparably less popular support. Thus, the military could not count on mobilizing social pressure against an AKP-led government. Moreover, in Mr. Larrabee’s opinion, AKP’s landslide victory in the July 22, 2007 election represented a direct slap [by the Turkish society] in the face for the military who had submitted the “midnight memorandum” on April 27, 20072. In any case, direct military coup would create many difficulties for the United States. It would have a negative impact on Turkey’s bid for EU membership and pro- voke a crisis in Turkey’s relations with the EU. And here Mr. Larrabee continues in quite a remarkable manner: “[in this case] Congress might impose sanctions or hold

1 In confirmation of Mr. Larrabee’s observation, it has to be noted that with the recent developments related to “Ergenekon,” the short-term probability of a direct military coup in Turkey apparently declines in further. 2 Parenthetically, let us notice that in our domestic specialized publications it is hard, if not impossible, to find any analysis of parallels in a wider geopolitical context between the processes of the 1997 “soft coup” ouster of Turkey’s Prime Minister Erbakan on one hand, and resignation of the Republic of Armenia first president L. Ter-Petrossian a year later, on the other hand. That being said, we do realize there were considerable differences between the two processes, but at the same time we reckon that the analysis of their no less important similarities could have been very useful.

54 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Marjanyan up the delivery of arms to Turkey. Passage of the Armenian Genocide Resolution [by the U.S. Congress] would become more likely.”1 Summarizing the examination of this scenario, Mr. Larrabee finds that even in the case of direct military intervention there is no guarantee that the military would pursue a pro-Western course. Moreover, it is more likely that they would pursue a more nationalistic course, would take a harder line toward the Kurdish issue, over- turn or reverse the AKP achievements, pursue a more interventionist policy toward the KRG and be more inclined to adopt a tougher line on Cyprus2.

4. We and Turkey: the Time to Get Serious Anyhow, April is a difficult month for Armenians. It is not easy in Turkey either, and even in the U.S.A. it causes some headache for the staff at the Office of the President and State Department3. All in all, our times are not simple (as if they have ever been). Indeed, the world becomes more complicated and unstable under the burden of the numerous problems of global scale. Future developments are hazy and full of dangers. New geopolitical power centers emerge, national inter-state relations and regional conflicts aggravate, and competition intensifies for the natural resources. Tabloids, mov- ies and television, even reputable academic publications are flooded with colorful depictions of all sorts of Armageddons that humankind is heading toward, with de- tailed and affectionate descriptions of pessimistic scenarios for the future. Some prominent intellectuals in different continents became bywords for their books, articles and films on the subjects of “The World without West,” or “The World without the U.S.A.,” or “The World on the Brink of a Precipice.” They even amassed some

1 Thus, according to RAND, the higher likelihood of the U.S. Congress passing the Armenian Genocide Resolution is perceived as a mere element of U.S. sanctions directed against direct military coup in Turkey. This is Realpolitik in its sordid nakedness. 2 Note that any of the characteristics pertaining to all 4 scenarios have nothing to do with the rights of Armenians in Turkey or with the processes of establishing relations and rapprochement between Republic of Armenia and Turkey. The same holds for Turkey-Syria relations. Such approach startles. It profoundly contradicts to other conclusions made by Mr. Larrabee in [1]. It appears that the reason for such a blatant contradiction is that these scenarios of “modelled future” have been composed before August 2008; a date that Mr. Larrabee so much likes to evoke. 3 “If you want to know, for the people of Earth (in our context, of the U.S.A. – A.M.) massacre is a very unpleasant thing. They don’t like reading about that or things like that in morning newspapers. One doesn’t feel good to read about massacres while drinking coffee in mornings. Such news may ruin the whole day. Three-four massacres, and one may get so anxious that all of a sudden might vote for another candidate in next elections,” – writes with a bitter sarcasm Robert Sheckley, one of the most gifted science fiction writers of the 20th century in his 1965 marvellous short story “Shall We Have a Little Talk?” (see [5] – the excerpt above is translated back from the Armenian edition, as no copy of the English original was available). It is worth to be included in our handbooks on geopolitics and history of colonial system (as well as linguistics).

55 A.Marjanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 wealth by doing that, not to mention the newly-made prophets who tirelessly fore- tell every day and in every language the coming of a new world order. What does this all mean and what does this imply for us in practical terms? In pragmatic sense all of this derives from the reality that the bipolar (Commu- nist states vs. the West) and monopole (U.S. hegemony) world orders have come to end. However, we think what is more important, is that since November 2008 the giant pendulum of the U.S. political and public thought swings from messianism to isolationism, heralding the start of a new phase in political history of the world. There is a reason why some veterans experienced in international relations forecast return of Europe to the state of affairs prevalent in 19th or even 18th century. In any event, diving into the pathos so typical to the current analytic journalism one may argue that there is a single reality underlying all this talk about the “imminent new world order” – that the messianic America leaves the world. It abandons many regions of the world, including Caucasus and maybe our whole region; its beloved brainchild the “Greater Middle East.” It leaves its place to a more pragmatic U.S.A. (some would say to the U.S.A. that has failed in its historical mission). In short, the U.S. will be adopting a policy of so-called realistic1 and pragmatic weighing of balance between various geopolitical interests; the Realpolitik. Obviously, this “ideological retreat” of the U.S.A. will not happen overnight or over a year; it may take time and numerous nuances of this or that application of “smart force.” 2 A vivid manifestation of these nuances for us was the U.S. political support to Armenia in Turkish-Armenian rapprochement on one hand, and U.S. president’s “careful avoidance” of the “G-word,”3 exactly as prescribed by RAND’s publication discussed above, on the other hand. Understandably, this strategic retreat may reverse at some point in future. Nevertheless, many things would have to change in the world for that, and first of all a considerable shift would be needed in the American public. Before that, this ideological and if anything, moral retreat is going to be the main geopolitical factor in our reality over the short to medium term. In practical terms this means two things for us.

1 It has to be noted that no reality is as flimsy and prone to distortions as the one at the times of establishing “realistic politics.” This is because at this very time it becomes critical who exactly, how and based on whose interests will determine what the reality is, what is real, and hence, what is realistic. As it was said in China of the Warring States Period: “Chaos reigns in country when fighters for order show up. Injustice reigns in country when soldiers of justice show up.” 2 The term “smart force” has been frequently used by the U.S. President B. Obama and Secretary of State H. Clinton to describe the current foreign policy of the U.S.A. By the way, it has to be added that the idea of “smart force” would have to come up sooner or later in some “think tank” (sorry for the pun). 3 “The G-word” is euphemism for the word Genocide that was used last April by the White House spokesman. It was immediately copied in pages of many U.S. and international editions. Do the authors of this euphemism realize what a horrendous, offensive and immoral trick and deed is that? Although it is consoling to know that two of the greatest and most pious presidents, the benefactor (and Democrat) president Woodrow Wilson and the crusader (and Repub- lican) president Ronald Reagan had recognized the truth about Armenian Genocide.

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* * * First, we believe it is necessary to accept and realize the painful fact that out of some objective and subjective reasons Armenia and Armeniancy have failed to make the issue of the Armenian Cause and restitution a political reality during the whole 20th century (especially at the beginning and the end of the century) and the first decade of the new century, especially when messianism reigned in the U.S.A. and when this country truly made the history on the global theater. In its turn, among other things this was because the Armenian structures in the U.S.A. constantly and firmly supported only one party; the Democrats, regardless of in what phase the giant pendulum of the U.S. public thought was, and which party embodied the messianic ideas. We are deeply convinced that recognition of the Armenian Genocide and the Armenian Cause, being calls for justice and morality above all, were (are) most likely to become a political and geopolitical reality only when the messianic United States realized (realizes) its historical and sublime mission in the entire world and before the world. This was the case during W. Wilson’s presidency1, at the time of the At- lantic Charter2 and during R. Reagan’s presidency3. In this context the partisanship of a U.S. president is secondary. It is a lot more important to be privy to the fundamental system of values and drivers in that country; act in harmony with them, and be in phase with the constant periodical fluctuations of these forces. And not to act with monotonous steadiness thus dropping out of the history’s beat, be in antiphase and fail to create a beneficial resonance where our demand for justice would at last coincide with that of the reality. Meanwhile, as long as some high-flying representatives of strategic and analytical communities in the U.S.A., Russia and elsewhere identify or confuse empires with republics in response to the realities reigning around the world, Armenia and all Armenians must be alert, vigilant and balanced. We have to implement policies that balance all active geopolitical vectors in our region, and be strong and focused. We cannot afford relying only on the U.S.A., NATO and EU as Saakashvili’s Georgia does, or counting mainly on the U.S.A., Turkey and Israel as father and son Aliyevs’ Azerbaijan does. Meanwhile, as long as Ankara does not recognize the homeland-stripping genocide of Armenians perpetrated by Turkey, Armenia and all Armenians may, or

1 But not at the time of Brest-Litovsk Treaty 2 But not during the Yalta Conference 3 But not during Clinton’s presidency, when the Aliyev-Shevardnadze-Netanyahu insane doctrine of “Central Asia- Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey-Israel” unified energy and geopolitical region was developed and launched, effectively initiating efforts to regionally isolate Armenia, Iran and Russia. Now it can be safely stated that these were futile efforts [see more in [4]).

57 A.Marjanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 rather must perceive the “deep and long-standing strategic interests of Turkey in Caucasus” as a strategy toward a “final solution” to the “Armenian Question”, and as a direct, serious and immediate threat to our national interests. Repeating some of Mr. Larrabee’s words, a centuries-long mistrust of Turkey is deeply embedded in the historical consciousness of Armenia and Armeniancy. Finally, it is paramount to avoid at any costs the fruitless and dichotomic problem statement of whether it should be “Armenia’s development through making concessions in the Armenian Cause” or “developing Armenia without any compro- mises”. This is actually a fallacy that does not adequately reflect the reality and leads to a deadlock.1 We believe that instead we have to pursue the following logic and persuade the regional actors to stick to it as well. Recognition of the Armenian Genocide, first of all by Turkey, is a serious guarantee for ridding the Caucasus of the development restraints, for establishing a real and sustainable economic and political cooperation in the long run for the entire region. This is a task for all Armenians, and if anything, even for the progressive humankind as a whole. Without solving this problem an undisturbed course of the 21st century would be impossible – neither more nor less. * * * The factor conditioned by the retreating messianic U.S.A. is important for us in practical terms by the following, as well. Modern geopolitics “would not tolerate a vacuum” in the same manner as the nature. The vacuum created in our region and the Caucasus by the American retreat has to be filled by some other force or combination of forces. Since almost the beginning of the U.S. presidential elections year and especially since summer 2008, Russia, Germany, Turkey, Israel and Georgia all realized well that things were heading this way. Do not be surprised by the list of these very countries. In one of our articles, interpreting the “Farley’s Law” for geopolitics we have incidentally stated: “From the summer of the U.S. presidential elections year to the beginning of the next year the most painful problems of modernity pop up, conflicts aggravate, processes and trends that have been previously fuzzy get exposed and unmasked with most vivid, often tragic consequences” [4, p.24]. This is espe-

1 Remember the problem statement «War or Peace?” not by Count Tolstoy (he used the much wiser conjunction “and,” and never asked useless questions), but the one that happened in our not so distant past and was posed at a very wrong time. Remember the unproductive and hence, dangerous dispute between L. Ter-Petrossian and V. Manukyan on “whether Armenians are a unique nation or not,” the negative effects of which predictably did not wait for long to materialize. Meanwhile, a sober perception of reality devoid of momentary tensions and based on complementarity principle would have immediately prompted that over the last 5000 years of the human civilization there were only 300 years of peace (6.0%), and that Armenians are undoubtedly a unique nation with their very own mission, exactly as many other nations of the world are. So there is no need to fuss over it.

58 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Marjanyan cially true for presidential elections that are expected to change the strategic policies of the U.S.A. The August 2008 events and ensuing processes that still continue in the “Greater Middle East” and especially the Caucasus come to prove the aforesaid. Indeed, when Georgia realized that the defeat of the Republican Party in forthcoming U.S. elections was imminent and enormous lobbying1 efforts to gain the support of this very party might turn to dust, it then rushed to embark on S. Ossetia military adventure motivated by the legacy of mini-imperialistic ambitions left from comrades Jughashvili, Ordzhonikidze and Beria. This adventurism seriously threatened the security not only in the Caucasus, but also in the larger region, and possibly even in the whole world2. Russia, being fully aware of the impending strategic retreat of the U.S.A., also realized the “moment of truth” has come for it in the Caucasus. It responded decisively to the Georgian aggression, sending “shockwaves” around the region and globe3. Turkey that has been consistently widening and improving relations with Russia since 2004, impressed by the decisive Russian counterblow to Georgia’s aggression, launched hasty attempts to rediscover and reconsider its influence in the Caucasus. Confusion in Turkey deepened by Russia’s recognition of S. Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, Armenian president’s historical invitation to his Turkish counterpart and Armenian initiatives directed toward normalizing Turkish- Armenian relations, which in all likelihood were greatly supported by Russia from the very beginning. Azerbaijan has followed these events with bated breath. Realiz- ing that it might lose leverage in negotiations with Armenia around Nagorno- Karabakh Republic, Azerbaijan conditioned its strategic, energy-related, political and other support to Turkey in matters of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and opening of the border by a progress in these negotiations in its favor. The condition of this sort contradicting to the letter and intent of the “roadmap,” in fact wrecked the current phase of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement4, a logical colon for which was

1 I remember the ironic grin on one of my colleagues face whenever I started talking about unbelievably effective work of the Georgian lobby in the U.S.A., especially among the exceptionally influential Jewish-American neocons of the Republican Party. 2 Amusingly, in the March 27, 2008 The New York Times article “Georgia on their minds,” Mr. Larrabee opposed German Chancellor A. Merkel’s blunt opinion that "countries that have unresolved conflicts cannot become members" of NATO, and fervently insisted on urgent necessity for Georgia’s NATO membership, considering it "highly unlikely” that “Moscow may formally recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.” (http:// www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/opinion/27iht-edlarrabee.1.11471355.html). Well, it is amusing now, but at that time a slightly different course of events might have thrown the entire region into an unthinkable nightmare. 3 Not to be confused with those of “Օil shockwaves” simulation. 4 It has to be noted that since the Azerbaijani aggression in response to NKR’s exclusively peaceful and legal expression of its self-determination right, this has been second time by now that Azerbaijan’s actions seriously threatened security in the Caucasus and the entire region, and pushed back the much-desired prospects for establishment of a lasting peace, sustainable development and cooperation. Isn’t it enough; are Shahdeniz or other Caspian oilfields worth that much? Does oil cost more than life and peace between people?

59 A.Marjanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 put down by the Armenian president’s April 22, 2010 decree. We call it a colon, rather than full stop, because we are confident that the process of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement will continue. It must continue to the benefit of peoples living in the Caucasus and the larger region. Finally, Israel re-emphasized the issue of American involvement in its strategic goals, bringing to the forefront the oil factor and the necessity to punish Iran. Before that, it hastened to invade Gaza strip once again, toughened the stance on construction of new Jewish settlements and actually, contested the idea “two peoples – two states”. In the meantime Germany also clearly realized that the U.S. strategic retreat is imminent. Being tired of EU incapacity and deformity, and up- set by the small political role it has to play in the Union’s political activities, this European giant began directing its geopolitical attention to Russia and beyond; the Caucasus and Middle East1. The vacuum created in the Caucasus by the retreating messianic U.S.A. will most likely be filled by a balanced combination of geopolitical power vectors of Rus- sia and Germany, as well as Iran and Turkey. The fact that Germany has an opportunity and starts to play a geopolitical role in our region is something new for us. We suppose this very circumstance made Mr. Larrabee use the term Ordnungsmacht, perhaps subconsciously, in the RAND’s publication discussed above. It is good that Germany’s increasing geopolitical role in our region has not remained unnoticed by our domestic analysts. It is worth drawing attention to probably the first publication ever in this regard – [6]. Having endorsed the analysis presented there, we would like to add the following. It is important for us to remember and remind others that in the 20th century the strategic interests of Georgia had come in conflict with Armenia’s strategic and national interests at least on three occasions, and Georgian actions had posed direct, serious and immediate threats to Armenia’s interests and Armenian people. Armenia had paid a high geopolitical, strategic, national and moral price for that. In the short history of the 21st century Georgian strategic2 interests had conflicted with national interests of Armenia at least once, and yet again Armenia had to pay the price. The root for all of this can be traced back to the strategic plan of German Empire’s Gen- eral Staff to isolate Russia from the Caucasus and Middle East by creating a single

1 Remember the brilliant phrase: “Germany and Russia, these two giants stare at each other like in a mirror for so many decades, dreamily waiting for the real strategic dialogue to come.” 2 The phrasing “Georgian strategic interest” is used here, because we are absolutely sure that in the past decades the Republic of Georgia did have strategic interests, but was never able to adequately formulate its national interests, as it failed to develop and carry out a national policy of its own. In case of the Republic of Armenia, we believe these two concepts are almost synonymous.

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Christian buffer state in the Caucasus; the Orthodox Georgia. The plan also included to have a single Muslim state comprised of Caucasian Tartars, which is current-day Azerbaijan. As seen, there was no room for either Armenians or Armenia in this vision. This could have been left with a safe conscience to the judgment of historians and geo-politicians who study the history of his issue, if the following important circumstance was not there. Geopolitical constructs are highly durable. Once formulated by “power centers” and brought to life in time of change, they never disappear with the end of a given political situation and completion of processes. They arise again at new times of change. For us and our region such times of change occurred during the agony of the Russian Empire in early 20th century and collapse of the USSR at the end of the 20th century. And reemergence of old geopolitical constructs did not wait for long take place. We are referring to the “Aliyev doctrine” conceived in mid-1990s by a former Soviet Politburo member and KGB leader H. Aliyev, a former Politburo member and Soviet foreign minister E. Shevardnadze, and a number of Turkish, Jew- ish and American strategists. It was about linking Azerbaijan and Central Asia with Turkey, Israel and Europe through energy, economic, political ties and ultimately, through security guarantees and systems, cutting the Caucasus from Russia, distanc- ing the whole region from Russia and Iran1, and choking Armenia to death. Al- though based on the currently open sources no German participation has been re- corded in this, it cannot go unnoticed that the “Aliyev doctrine” and the early 20th century vision of German Empire’s General Staff are as like as two peas in a pod. Therefore, the return to Caucasus of Germany – the EU’s most powerful nation, Turkey’s old-time friend, and Georgia’s EU guardian – is understandable, wel- come and helpful for us only under a condition that it should neither promote the current split in Caucasus, nor encourage Armenia’s “exclusion from regional energy and economic projects.” It must aim at full regional integration of Armenia, Iran and Russian Federation without threatening to strangle us to death or “twist our arms.” Generally, it can be asserted with a high degree of confidence that in the short term a feverish activity will unfold in our region to fill up the aforesaid vacuum. The highest profile visits to the region will take place at an unprecedented frequency; media will be flooded with all sorts of analyses of those, etc. In the upcoming helter- skelter, we believe it is critical to fix in a few fundamental truths that outline the geopolitical foundation of our regional reality.

1 Phrasing is not ours; found in the OREA CEI-9812 document prepared by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in December 1998 and declassified in April 2007.

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In response to NKR’s exclusively peaceful and legal expression of its self- determination right, Azerbaijan launched a military campaign in which Armenians won a decisive victory1. This country would have to either unleash a new war, or develop its modus vivendi with a sovereign Karabakh, very much in the way it is proposed in [1] to Turkey with regard to KRG. The only country in the region that has a “Karabakh problem” is Azerbaijan2. Armenia does not have such a problem. Turkey undertook a warfare action against Republic of Armenia by blocking its border with Armenia in 1993, and hence, denied itself any moral and logical basis for acting as a mediator in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, at least until it reopens the border with Armenia without articulating any third party problems. Furthermore, Turkey faces a deep identity crisis and has territorial disputes with Greece, Cyprus, Syria and Iraq. Although currently inactive, the territorial dispute with Armenia is not settled either. Turkey continues to vehemently deny the fact of the homeland-stripping Armenian Genocide. Such stance deprives our whole region of strategic development prospects. Georgia utterly failed in developing and putting into action a national accord within its post-Soviet borders. By taking on a military adventure it posed a threat to peace and stability in the region and triggered a direct challenge to retaining its territorial integrity. Iran’s isolation from regional developments leads to a situation that the region “has developed abnormally.”3 Russia-Armenia-Iran economical, energy, cultural, political and geopolitical cooperation is an effective strategic factor stabilizing and bringing balance to our region. It may expand and involve a Russia-Armenia-Turkey component that would complement the inevitable development of Turkey-Iran cooperation. Germany is in a position to support and contribute to this. Before the West’s indifferent eyes Armenia continues to suffocate because of the forced blockade and being “excluded” from the development of regional infra- structures. The main strategic factor for security of the Republic of Armenia was, is and will remain the combat readiness of Armenian troops in Artsakh and at Arme- nian-Azerbaijani border. In the short to medium term Armenia’s security system in the international realm will remain anchored in the treaty with the Russian Federa- tion and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. In the past two decades the West failed to provide a strategic alternative for this problem in the Caucasus region,

1 Phrasing is not ours; found in NATO and Caspian Security: A Mission Too Far? RAND, Project Air Force. 1999. 2 That is if we disregard H. Aliyev’s saying “One Nation, Two States” so much liked by the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan. It is hard to understand why Mr. Erdoğan is unable to say the same thing for Armenia and Artsakh. 3 Phrasing is not ours; found in the OTI 99-10031 report prepared by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in Novem- ber 1999 and declassified in April 2007.

62 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 A.Marjanyan not least because of adopting and implementing the fundamentally faulty and ultimately unrealistic “Aliyev doctrine.” In summary, using Mr. Larrabee’s example, let us remark that since August 2008 many things have changed in the Caucasus, in the whole region, in our way of thinking and calculations. The most significant change is that it finally can be stated: it is time to get serious. This time has come for Armenia, for Turkey and for the world. May, 2010.

Reference Sources and Literature 1. (Troubled partnership: U.S.–Turkish relations in an era of global geopolitical change. F. S. Larrabee. RAND, Project Air Force, MG-8893-AF. 2010. xxiii + 138 pages. 2. Turkish foreign policy in an age of uncertainty. F. Stephen Larrabee, Ian O. Lesser. RAND, Center for Middle East Public Policy, MR-1612. 2003. xxi + 217 pages. 3. NATO and Caspian Security: A Mission Too Far? RAND, Project Air Force. 1999. xix + 113 pages. 4. Marjanyan, A., Our Future in the Eyes of NIC, Noravank Foundation, «21-st Cen- tury» (Russian edition), Nо 3, 2009, pp. 74-98: 5. Sheckley, R, Scent of Mind, Soviet Writer Publishing, Yerevan, 1984, in Armenian language, translated by R. Avetisyan (R. Sheckley. Shall We Have a Little Talk? Galaxy, 1965). 6. Ter-Harutyunyan, G., Russia-Germany: The Probable Scenarios in the Context of the Regional Security http://www.noravank.am։ April 26, 2009. See also: Harutyunyan, G., The Strategy of Development and Geopolitical Scenarios, Noravank Foundation, «21-st Century», # 3, 2010

ON SOME PROBLEMS OF THE ARMENIAN NATIONAL MINORITY IN TURKEY

Ruben Melkonyan*

Ottoman Empire was known as a multi-national, multi-ethnic and multi-confessional state, but due to different circumstances (the Armenian Genocide, ethnic clean- sings, exchange of population, etc.) the Republic of Turkey inherited a country mostly populated by Muslims and with incomparably smaller number of people of other religions. According to the Lausanne Treaty three communities of other religions – Armenians, Greeks and Jews – were recognized as national and religious minorities. Attention should be paid to the fact that all other ethno-religious groups in Turkey did not get separate rights and status, and in fact they were presented as a part of the Turkish nation, whereas some more specialized professional circles consider them ethnographic groups of Turks of other ethnicity. According to various sources, the number of the Armenians in the initial formation years of the Turkish Republic was 250-300 thousand [1, p.75], and they re- tained some rights stipulated by the clauses of the Lausanne Treaty. However, scruti- nizing the policies of the republican Turkey allows to state that the national minorities, including Armenians, were generally subject to a policy of persecutions and discrimination of a varying severity in different years. Let us try looking into some manifestations of that policy, the result of which is that according to the official statistics the Armenian Christian community in Tur- key today barely totals to 50-60 thousand [2]. Among the main manifestations of that policy the following three are notable: • the conscription of “the twenty classes” (1941-1942) • the property tax (1942-1944) • the events of September 6-7, 1955

* Candidate of Science (Philology), Associate Professor, Vice-dean of the Oriental Studies Faculty of the YSU. 64 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 R.Melkonyan

The conscription of “the twenty classes”. One of the poorly studied issues in the discriminatory policy toward national minorities carried out in the republican Turkey is the so-called conscription of “the twenty classes”. This conscription mainly involved adult male Armenians, Greeks and Jews (according to different sources, aged 18-48 [3, p. 504], 26-45 [4, p.40], 18-60 [5, p.162]), most of whom were hastily drafted during the World War II (in 1941). Remarkably, even those who had already served in the army and were then in reserve were conscripted [6, p. 4]. The draft was implemented in strict secrecy and any leakage of information was prevented as much as possible [6, p.9]. The main peculiarity of this conscription was that it applied exclusively to non-Muslim citizens [6, p.9]. The researcher Rifat Bali found out from the eyewitness interviews he conducted that during the draft no exemptions were made for any special circumstances: even the handicapped, blind and otherwise physically disabled persons were conscripted. Sarkis Cherkezian, an Armenian draftee, later told that together with him people with mental disorders had been conscripted; their only “fault” was that they were a national minority [7, p.121]. However, these conscripts could not be qualified as true soldiers, because they were given no weapons and quite often they did not even wear military uniforms. These non-Muslims were gathered in labor battalions where no Muslims were enlisted, even more deepening the suspicions and widespread fear that they were pulled together to be annihilated when a suitable moment comes. Interestingly, the Turkish state had differentiated approaches to the three non-Muslim national minorities. For instance, Greeks and Jews served in the Army’s auxiliary battalions or in airfields construction, whereas Armenians mostly performed public service duties [4, p.40], which was determined by the distrust to them. With regards to the causes and ends of the “the twenty classes” conscription it is worth mentioning that the few information sources available suggest, and eyewitness accounts confirm the version that, by and large, it was a premeditated ethnic cleansing with all its derivatives. The prevail- ing and widespread point of view on the matter was that wishing to partake in the World War II, Turkey gathered in advance all unreliable non-Muslim men regarded a “fifth column”. It has to be also noted that due to the poor conditions during the service there were deaths and diseases among the conscripts. Anyhow, this roughly yearlong “service” left a deep scar on the national minorities, among which the at- mosphere of fear and distrust aggravated even more, making many of them seriously think about emigration from Turkey.

The Property Tax. In November 1942, shortly after the conscription of “the twenty classes”, the Turkish government, headed by the Prime Minister Şükrü Sara- coğlu submitted the so-called “Property Tax Law” to the Grand National Assembly for approval, which unanimously passed it on November 11, 1942 [8, p.72]. How-

65 R.Melkonyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 ever, before adopting the law, the Turkish Ministry of Finance demanded all the data about the wealth of the national minorities from the financial departments of the provinces, banks and security services [8, p. 67-68]. It can be seen with a naked eye that the law was specifically directed against the national and religious minorities. For instance, the “Property Tax Law” divided the taxpayers in 4 groups, in accordance with their religious affiliations: 1. Muslims 2. Non-Muslims 3. The converted (“dönmeh”) 4. Foreign nationals

In fact, this violated the constitutional provision on equal rights for all citizens of Turkey, including non-Muslims. What draws an attention is that even in the mid- 20th century Turkey people were taxed based on their ethnic and religious background, rather than commensurate with their property. Special commissions were created who set tax rates at will, and most importantly, taxpayers had no right to legally challenge these rates. The tax amount often exceeded the property value, and if a taxpayer was not able to pay the tax within the set time limit (30 days), then the property was auctioned off. In case even that sum did not cover the tax, then the taxpayer was exiled to perform a penal servitude to work and pay the owed tax. The main place of exile was Aşkale province, known for its cold climate. The Prime Min- ister Saracoğlu’s formal excuses for adopting the “Property Tax Law” were strengthening Turkish lira, decreasing the money supply, fighting the black market, inflation and speculators [8, p.58]. However, in about two months after passing the law, the “Cumhuriyet” newspaper (January 21, 1943) published some of his more sincere thoughts that uncovered the real goals of this taxation. “This law will be enforced strictly on those, who taking advantage of the hospitality of this country grew rich, but despite this they avoid performing their duties in this hard time” [8, p.11]. The “Property Tax Law” had multi-layer effects: first of all, the economy was mostly Turkified, because the bankrupt non-Muslim businessmen were substituted by the nouveau riches who bought off their assets at low prices; almost all of them were Muslim and the Turkish Armenian bourgeoisie was almost totally eliminated. Rıd- van Akar, a Turkish researcher, considers it an “economic genocide” of national minorities [8, p.15].

The events of September 6-7, 1955. In Istanbul and Izmir the state arranged assaults on houses, shops, churches of the national minorities (mostly Greeks and Armenians), accompanied by pogroms, pillage and rape. During those events 10-12

66 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 R.Melkonyan people were killed, 400 women were raped [9], 73 churches, 1 synagogue, 8 Greek sacred sites, 2 monasteries, 2 cemeteries, 21 factories, 26 schools, 5 sports clubs, 1004 houses, 4348 shops/workshops, 27 pharmacies and laboratories, 110 cafeterias, cafes and hotels were plundered and destroyed [10, p. 197]. These events were the last straw that broke the camel's back for the national minorities and many of them finally decided to leave Turkey for good. The above mentioned were the main, but not all the methods used in the policy of discrimination against the national minorities, as such manifestations could have also been observed in other areas and in everyday life. All of this played a key role in formation of the current situation in the country. Consequently, many Arme- nians migrated from Turkey and today we have what we have. Suffice it to mention that apart from Istanbul, a rather small number of Christian Armenians is left in Turkey, who can hardly be regarded as a community, and in the press one may find articles titled like “The Last Armenian of Diyarbakir” [11] or “The Last Armenian of Arabkir”. According to the official data, besides Istanbul, there are Armenians in Malatya, Sebastia, Ankara, Antakya and Elâzığ [1, p.169]. A few pages are not nearly enough to present the Armenian cultural heritage, but there are a couple of points we would like to mention. Being one of the native peoples of these lands, Armenians have created many cultural monuments over the course of the centuries. Most of these monuments in Turkish Republic (especially in its eastern parts) are in shabby condition. The term “cultural genocide” frequently used today applies well to the Armenian cultural heritage on the territory of Turkey. The official state has had an ill-disposed attitude towards these monuments: this is evidenced by the policy implemented with regard to them, which we will try to present here below: • Left without care, Armenian historical monuments dilapidated over time. • The ownership of Armenian churches was transferred to the local Muslim population who use them as they wish. • Citing the interests of the state as an excuse, historical monuments are destroyed, e.g. they are used as shooting targets during war games. • Armenian churches are turned into mosques.

The latest example was Surb Arakelots (Saint Apostles) Church in Kars: this 10th century church was restored and reopened as a mosque in 2008. Built during the reign of the Armenian king Abas Bagratuni the church was closed in 1920 and after that never served its intended purpose. Since then it was used as a warehouse, museum and a mosque. When the restoration works began there was a hope that it would be reopened at least as a museum, but actually it became Kümbet Cami

67 R.Melkonyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 mosque. It has to be mentioned that Turkey does not lack mosques; they are built everywhere and the idea of turning Surb Arakelots Church into a mosque was not quite explicable. Also, the local faithful Muslims do not visit the church made a mosque too often, and this is an evidence of people’s peculiar memory. On the other hand, it is worth noting that had Surb Arakelots Church not been turned into a mosque, it could have suffered the dire destiny of many other Armenian cultural monuments. With regards to the Armenian monuments and particularly churches, it should be mentioned that in the eastern part of Turkey it is difficult to find a single func- tioning Armenian church and even Surb Khach (Saint Cross) Church on Akhtamar island which caused so much clamor, still does not have a cross on it and, in fact, does not function as a church. Naturally, we should understand that such phenomenon is closely related to the insufficient tolerance among the local population and certain strata of the Turkish society in general. The issue of education and schools is currently one of the vital matters for the Armenian community in Turkey. This issue is a part of the educational problems of the national minorities in Turkey, and in this respect rather interesting facts were published in the EC report “Combating Discrimination and Promoting Minority Rights in Turkey”. For example, according to this report, a decrease in the number of national minority schools and students is obvious, and this is mostly connected with the policy carried out by the state in which assimilation elements dominate. The part of the report concerning the educational system is titled rather interestingly – “Forgotten or Assimilated? Minorities in the Educa- tion System of Turkey”1. According to the data presented in the report, in 1930-31 there were 117 schools of the national minorities in Turkey and in 1995-96 their number shrunk to 34 [12, p.14]. The situation with the Armenian schools is deplorable, too. For instance, according to the statistics, in 1972-73 there were 32 Armenian schools with 7360 students in Istanbul, while in 1999-2000, 18 schools remained with 3786 students [13, p. 24] and in 2008 the number of the Armenian students decreased to 30722. As seen, in the period of 30 years Armenian community lost almost half of its schools and students. As Garo Paylan, an Armenian pedagogue from Istanbul stated: “Every year we lose around 150–200 students; if it continues this way, we will close down 6–7 schools in the next years.”3

1 Unutmak mı Asimilasyon mu? Türkiye’nin Eğitim Sisteminde Azınlıklar http://www.hyetert.com/yazi3.asp?s=1&Id=409&DilId=1 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 68 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 R.Melkonyan

It has be noted that recently the Turkish authorities and part of the society have started to pay more attention to the issue of the national minorities, because Turk migrant workers who came to Europe in 1960s, formed their communities and became a national minority there, and thus began tasting “the sweet and bitter fruits” falling on the lot of the national minorities. Today Turks themselves face the issue of the national minorities but in another geographic locale – in Europe – where a multi-million strong Turkish community exists. It should be mentioned that Turk- ish authorities have always kept the issue of the Turks in Europe in the spotlight and always supported them in preserving their national and religious self-consciousness to struggle against assimilation. Prime Minister Erdoğan addressed this issue during his visit to Germany in 2008; he urged the Turks in Europe to integrate in the society they live in, but at the same time, to avoid assimilation. Moreover, he expressed an idea that assimilation is a crime against humanity. “You cannot demand from any human being, any society to reject their language, religion, culture and customs. And if you do that, you would commit a sin against humanity” [14], - said Erdoğan. Turk- ish media often voice and harshly criticize problems related to the Turkish communities in different countries. A recent instance of such criticism was about the policies concerning the Turks in Bulgaria [15]. However, to be truthful one can say that the same and even harsher methods were and are used in Turkey towards the national minorities, leading to their partial or full assimilation. After all, the policy of assimilation was one of the cornerstone policy elements of both the Ottoman Empire and the leaders of the Turkish republic. Today the statements of some high-ranking Turkish officials still cause concern. Among those the statement of Vecdi Gönül, Minister of Defense of Turkey, made in November 2008 in Brussels, is noteworthy: “If Greeks had continued to live in the Aegean, and Armenians in various parts of the country, could Turkey have become the nation-state it is?” [16]. This statement triggered a wide response: the representatives of the intelligentsia and Armenians of Istanbul appealed to the Prime Minister with an open letter, articles criticizing that statement were published. It is true that the Minister tried to comment upon his statement, but the negative impression remained. To summarize, the Armenian national minority in Turkey currently faces serious problems: part of the Armenian cultural heritage has been destroyed and another part is in an extremely deplorable condition. In addition to that, certain circles in Turkey perceive national minorities as aliens and enemies.

March, 2010.

69 R.Melkonyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Reference Sources and Literature 1. Kaplan S., 1915-te ne oldu?, İstanbul, 2005, 2-nci baskı. 2. Dışişleri: Azınlık sayısı 89 bin, Milliyet, 12.12.2008. 3. Симонян Гр., Из истории турецко-армянских отношений, Ереван, 1991 (на армян- ском языке). 4. Koçoğlu Y., Hatırlıyorum Türkiyede Gayrimüslim Hayatları, İstanbul, 2003. 5. Аванесов С., Положение национальных меньшинств в Турции, Ереван, 1963. 6. Bali R., “Yirmi kura ihtiyatlar” olayı, Tarih ve Toplum, 1998, sayı 175. 7. Çerkezyan S., Dünya Hepimize Yeter, İstanbul, 2003. 8. Akar R., Aşkale Yolcuları (varlık vergisi ve çalışma kampları) İstanbul, 2006. 9. Kılıç E., 6-7 Eylül Yağma Olayları Bir MİT Organizasyonu, Sabah, 01.02.2009. 10. Macar E., Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi, İstanbul, 2003. 11. Matur B., Diyarbakır'ın Son Ermeni'si, Zaman, 2.12.2008. 12. Cumhuriyet Dönemi İstanbul İstatistikleri, İstanbul, 1998. 13. Гуйумчян С., Очерки армянских школ Стамбула, Стамбул, 2000, с.24. (на армянском языке) 14. Hürriyet, 03.04.2008. 15. Ezgi Başaran, Azınlık ezilirse özgürlük olmaz, Hürriyet, 15.06.2009; Asimilasyon utan- cımız, Hürriyet, 18.06.2009. 16. “Mübadele olmasa, milli devlet olabilir miydik” Hürriyet, 11.11.2008.

ARMENIAN PROTESTANTS

Tigran Ghanalanyan*

The Armenian Protestant Church was established in the 19th century, in almost three hundred years after the origin of Protestantism. This was conditioned by a number of development peculiarities of both the world and Armenian history. Armenian Protestants launched vigorous activities in both Western and Eastern Armenia. Broadening the scope of their activity, they soon became an important factor in the life of the Armeniancy. Armenian Protestants continued their activity over the period of the First Republic of Armenia and in the first years of the Soviet Armenian. The following years were marked by the extensive activities of Armenian Protestants in the Diaspora. They resumed their activities in Armenia after the country gained independence. Today Armenian Protestants are very active in spiritual, educational, social, benevolent, cultural areas in the Republic of Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and numerous communities in the Diaspora. Besides the adherents of the Armenian Apostolic Church who constitute the overwhelming majority of Armenians, there are also adherents of other confessions – Catholics and Protestants. The study of historical, sociopolitical, cultural, demographic, psychological and confessional peculiarities of the Armenian Protestants (as well as other multi-confessional strata of the Armeniancy) is of great importance in the context of national consolidation, broadening the scope of unified activities of the Armeniancy, achieving the national goals. The origin of the Protestantism is connected with the Reformation movement that emerged in Europe in the 16th century. Protestant Churches were formed in a result of a struggle against the Catholic Church. Unlike the vertical hierarchy of the Catholic Church, they are much more partitioned and scattered. The origin of Protestantism in Armenia is related to a number of historical circumstances. In the early modern era missionaries undertook vigorous activities in Armenia. Of course, the spread of the Protestant movement in Armenia took place

* Expert at “Noravank” Foundation. 71 T.Ghanalanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 gradually, but in the 19th century it became massive and as a result, the Protestants scored a significant success. Of the Protestant teachings, the Evangelical movement spread the most among the Armenians. Typically, the missionaries did not belong to any centrally managed structure. They often served to the interests of different states. In this regard Raffi wrote that the English missionaries were a lot more dangerous than the American ones [1, pp. 488-489]. Thus, studying the activities of missionaries, the political actions implemented by them should be covered in addition to the confessional and clerical dimension. The activities of missionaries found fertile ground among the Western Ar- menians, given their difficult legal, political and socioeconomic situation. Interestingly, while Armenian Catholics were called “franks”, the Protestants were nicknamed “ingliz”. If the spread of Catholicism among Armenians was conditioned by the Rome factor, the penetration of Protestantism took place mainly through Anglo-American missionaries. Conversion to Protestantism was accompanied by cultivating the Eng- lish-speaking Western civilizational values, which could have been a reason good enough to call the Armenian Protestants “ingliz”.

Establishment of Protestantism in Armenia On June 1, 1846 Armenian Evangelicals were recognized as a separate “millet” (literally – nation) in Ottoman Empire. In fact, Armenian Evangelicals were actually separated on official basis from the Armenian Apostolic Church and acquired an independent status. Earlier, the Armenian Catholics had acquired such status in 1830. Consequently, two new Armenian independent entities were established in the Ottoman Empire. The foreign powers played an important role in recognizing the Armenian Evangelicals as a separate “millet”: “…through an immediate mediation of the American and English ambassadors to the Sultan’s High Porte …” [2, p. 261] Since the middle of the 19th century the Armenian Evangelical movement spread over Western Armenia, Cilicia and other regions of the Ottoman Empire populated by Armenians. Starting from the 1860s the Armenian Evangelical churches formed unions in different parts of Turkey. Before the Armenian Genocide, four Evangelical unions existed on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. The first one to be formed was the union of Butaniya established in 1864 (included 27 churches); the Eastern union was established in 1866 with 4 districts (68 churches); the Cilicia union– in 1867 (4 districts, 65 churches); the Central union – in 1868 (3 districts, 42 churches). There were many Armenian Evangelical educational institu-

72 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 T.Ghanalanyan tions in the Ottoman Empire. The number of secondary schools in 1908 was 35, of which 20 were for girls. Prior to the Genocide Armenian Evangelical seminaries functioned in Kharberd (since 1859), Marash (since 1864), Marzvan (since 1865). In 1875-1915 there were 7 colleges in Turkey: (Aintap, 1876), Yeprat college (Kharberd, 1878), Girls’ Central College (Marash, 1885), Anatolia college (Marzvan, 1886), St. Paul’s college (Tarson, 1888), Jenanian college (Konia, 1892), International college (Izmir, 1903). [3, p. 701, 704] It is noteworthy that the formation of Evangelical unions began in 1860s when a new stage of ethnic persecutions kicked off. Apostolic Armenians often adopted Protestantism in order to avoid discrimination on ethnic grounds. The study of the national policy of the Turkish state helps to understand the cause-and-effect relation of Protestantism spreading among Armenians. Naturally, the power and influence of the Armenian Patriarchate weakened because of this. This way the national policy of the Ottoman Empire made efforts to divide the unity of the Armenian people. However, granting the status of separate “millet” to the Catholic and Protestant Armenians also led to negative effects for Turkey. Taking advantage of the existence of Armenian Catholic and Protestant communities, foreign powers interfered with Turkey’s domestic affairs on the pretext of protecting the rights of their coreligionists. It has to be noted that the Armenian Protestants took part in the Armenian liberation struggle at the end of the 19th century. “…as Armenians by feeling and nature, the Armenian Evangelicals could not watch indifferently those atrocities taking place at the time all over the country”. [4, p. 395] In contrast to Turkey, where the state policy often supported the activities of missionaries so as to divide the unity of the Armenians, Iran tended to strengthen the positions of the Armenian Apostolic Church in an attempt to hamper the ener- getic activities of the missionaries. In spite of that, the Armenian Evangelicals carried out significant activities also in the regions of Iran inhabited by the Armenians. Garabed Adanalian’s account in this regard is noteworthy: “In the major cities of Iran like Hamadan, Sultanabad, Burburot, Tabriz, Farajabad, Kendi, Leilahan, Ortichaman, Isfahan, Gharakhan, and in many surrounding small villages, despite the lack of funding and shortage of pastors the Evangelical Church did its best to promote the cause it inherited” [4, p. 211]. Evangelical were ideas spread among the Eastern Armenians at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries by the first Protestant individuals and small groups. The spread of Protestantism among Eastern Armenians was boosted by the small separate communities and individuals affiliated to Protestantism and Baptism

73 T.Ghanalanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 that were scattered in Eastern Armenia and in a number of regions in Georgia, as well as by Swiss, German and Swedish Protestant preachers who had settled in the Caucasus in the 1820s. The Evangelical Churches in Eastern Armenia were separate and independent units. It can be attributed to the political partition of Armenia, and as a result, the Western Armenians and Eastern Armenians each took their own peculiar ways of historical development. Despite the numerous appeals, the Russian Empire did not formally recognize the Eastern Armenian Evangelists as a separate religious community till 1914 (only the Lutheran Church officially functioned in the Russian Em- pire). The Lutheran Church did make attempts to subordinate the Armenian Evan- gelicals in the Caucasus. In 1820s-1890s the centers of the Armenian Evangelicals in the Transcaucasia were Shamakhi and Karabakh. The Armenian Evangelical schools in Shushi, Shamakhi and Tiflis were eminent in Transcaucasia. By the middle of the 19th century there were Armenian Evangelical communities in Yerevan, Vagharshapat, Aleksandrapol, Kars, Tiflis, Baku, Batumi and Sukhumi. Since the end of the 19th century, and especially by early 1900s, Yerevan had become the center of Evangelicalism in Eastern Armenia. On January 31, 1914, the Armenian Evangelical Union of Ararat was formally registered, which included the Armenian Evangelical communities in Yerevan, Vagharshapat, Aleksandrapol, Kars, Nor Bayazet and in the surrounding villages. On June 28, 1917, the Armenian Evangelicals of the Ararat Valley held their annual meeting in Yerevan with participation of more than 300 representatives from the Ararat Union, Vagharshapat, Kars, Aleksandrapol and surrounding villages, as well as Evangelicals from Van and Bitlis. There was an intention to form a union of Ar- menian Evangelical churches of Caucasus, Van and Bitlis, and to unite the Evangeli- cal Armenians of Caucasus and Turkey. Although a commission consisting of 11 members was elected, the materialization of this intention proved impossible due to the political reasons [5, p. 6-7]. The Armenian Evangelicals in both Western and Eastern Armenia always considered themselves the progeny of the Armenian Apostolic Church and the same nation. They endeavored to contribute to the development of the nation, shared the common pains, bore and maintained in themselves the all-Armenian values. By stay- ing loyal to these principles in word and deed, they have asserted their right of existence and have secured their place and role in the Armenian society [6, p. 129]. This is particularly conditioned by the fact that Armenian Evangelicals have never taken a repudiating stance toward the national values and have attached an ever-increasing importance to the national and political issues [7, p. 13].

74 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 T.Ghanalanyan

The activity of the Armenian Evangelicals in the First Republic is remarkable. The declaration of independence of the Republic of Armenia on May 28, 1918 opened a new stage in the life of the Armenian Evangelical churches. Many experienced pastors, preachers and evangelists worked in Armenia in 1919. One of the most renowned figures of the Evangelical Union of Ararat in the period of the First Republic and first years of the Soviet period was Rev. Hakob Mudoyan, who was the secretary of the central council of the Ararat Union. In 1915 he took part in the he- roic struggle in Van-Vaspurakan, organized and commanded the self-defense com- bats in Hayots Dzor. In 1918 Rev. H. Mudoyan became a member of the parliament of the Republic of Armenia. Hence, we may conclude that the Armenian Evangeli- cals carried out quite extensive activities during the period of the First Republic of Armenia. The parliament membership of an Evangelical leader is an evidence of tol- erant and open-minded state policies. In fact, it proves that the participation of the Armenian Evangelicals in the governance issues was regarded important in the Re- public of Armenia. The number of the Evangelicals in the Republic of Armenia was about 3000 [5, p. 7]. The Union headquartered in Yerevan functioned till 1928. It was led by Rev. Vahan Mikaelyan. In 1923 the authorities of the Soviet Armenia officially recognized the Armenian Evangelical Union of Ararat and registered its charter. In 1920s there were 15 communities in Soviet Armenia recognized by the state and additionally, spiritual meetings were allowed to be held at 15 other places. In 1918-1930 there were 2500-3000 Armenian Evangelicals in Armenia and about 3500-4000 in the whole Transcaucasia. Almost all communities had churches or prayer houses, Sunday schools, ordained pastors. At the end of the 1920s repressions against the religious communities in the Soviet Union intensified. Since 1930, the activities of the Armenian Evangelical churches along with many other churches had been banned in the USSR. In February 1946 the government of the Soviet Armenia officially recognized the Evangelical Christian-Baptist Church of Yerevan and the Evangelical-Baptist Church in Gyumri became its part.

The Structure of the Armenian Evangelical Church Today the Armenian Evangelical Church functions both in Armenia and Diaspora. Armenian Evangelical spiritual, educational, benevolent and other bodies play an important role in the spiritual field in Armenia and in the life of the Armenian communities in the Diaspora.

75 T.Ghanalanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

The Armenian Evangelical Church has no clergy like Catholicoi, bishops, ar- chimandrites, and no dioceses. Each church has three official bodies: 1. Church council, which controls the general activities of the church (particularly, the spiritual activities), 2. Trustees, who administer the economic matters and the property of the church, as well as issue marriage certificates, 3. School committee, which controls the schools owned by the church. Sunday schools, Christian youth organizations, women’s and cultural unions, joint worship groups constitute an important part of the Evangelical churches.

Since 1991 the Armenian Missionary Association of America has been func- tioning in Yerevan. On July 1, 1994 the Armenian Evangelical Church secured the right to work in Armenia officially. There are 50 Evangelical churches and prayer houses in Armenia. In May 1995 the Union of Evangelical Churches of Armenia was established in Yerevan. And in August 1995 the Armenian Evangelical Union of Armenia, Georgia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia was established (headquartered in Yerevan, with Rene Leonian as chairman). The Union incorporates the Union of Armenian Evan- gelical Churches of Armenia, Armenian Evangelical Union of Georgia1, the Arme- nian Evangelical Baptist Church in Sukhumi, Armenian Evangelical churches of So- chi and Moscow, as well as the Armenian office of the Armenian Missionary Asso- ciation of America. There are no precise data about the number of the Evangelicals in Armenia, and therefore one has to rely on approximate figures. Rene Leonian mentions that the number of the members of the Armenian Evangelical Church is 25-30 thousand and the total number of adherents of Evangelically oriented churches in Armenia is about 100 thousand [8]. There are 3 Armenian Evangelical Unions in the Diaspora. 1. Union of the Armenian Evangelical Churches in the Near East (established in 1924, headquartered in Beirut, includes 11 churches in Syria, 6 – in Lebanon, 3 – in Iran, 3 – in Turkey, 2 – in Greece, 1 – in Egypt). 2. Armenian Evangelical Union of France (established in 1927, recognized by the government in 1946, headquartered in Paris, includes 14 churches). 3. Armenian Evangelical Union of North America (established in 1971, headquartered in New Jersey, includes 20 Evangelical churches in the US and 4 in Canada).

1 There are Armenian Evangelical churches in Tbilisi, Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalak, Bolnisi, Lilo, Isain. Armenian Evan- gelicals of Georgia maintain extensive relations with the Evangelical-Christian and Baptist Union of Georgia.

76 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 T.Ghanalanyan

There are Armenian Evangelical Churches in Buenos Aires, São Paulo, Monte- video, London, Brussels, Sofia, Sidney [3, p 701]. At the beginning of the 1980s 3 unions of Diaspora formed the Armenian Evangelical World Council (headquartered in New Jersey, USA) and later on, 2 Un- ions of Armenia joined it. It seems natural that the Armenian Evangelical World Council is located in New Jersey. It implies that the US Armenian Protestant community takes an important place in the Armenian Protestant reality. The Council manages joint activities of the unions. The chairman is elected for a 2-year period and can be re-elected for a second time. The Council has an executive body, in the meetings summoned by which representatives of five Armenian Evangelical unions (of Near East, France, Eurasia, Armenia and North America) and the Armenian Evangelical Association participate. Issues concerning the activities of the Armenian Evangelical churches and preserving Armeniancy are discussed at these meetings. The members of divan consisting of the president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer and executive director, are elected at these meetings.1 On June 7, 1918 the Armenian Missionary Association of America (AMAA) was established in Worcester, MA, USA. This is the organizational and executive body of the Armenian Evangelical churches and the first and the only Armenian Evangelical missionary organization. The AMAA has its branches and offices in ap- proximately 20 countries all over the world, including Armenia (since 1991) and NKR (since 1995). The AMAA carries out its projects in Armenia and Artsakh together with the French organization “Hope for Armenia”. The projects pursue two main directions – charitable and educational. Among the important goals of the AMAA the followings can be mentioned: assistance in rehabilitation of the regions suffered from the December 1988 earthquake; care of the orphans and children of the deceased freedom fighters; Christian education for the young generation; medical services, as well as assisting the two Armenian states in agriculture, construction, and education. The Armenian Evangelical Church implemets its benevolent, educational, publishing, social service activities through about a dozen of organizations managed either by the Armenian Evangelical Church or together with the Armenian Apos- tolic and Catholic Churches. Some of the notable ones are Jinishian Foundation, Philibosian Foundation, Armenian Evangelical Social Service Center (Los Angeles), Armenian National Sanatorium (Lebanon), Armenian Old Age Home (Aleppo), etc.

1 The regular meeting of the executive body of the Armenian Evangelical World Council (October 17, 2008) http://www.azad-hye.net/media/r1/armenian-evangelical-world-council.htm

77 T.Ghanalanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Reinforcing the ties of the Diaspora’s Armenian Evangelicals with Armenia is of great importance. This cooperation facilitates both the collaboration between Ar- menian Evangelicals and adherents of the Armenian Apostolic Church, and strengthening relations between Armenia and Diaspora. Joint efforts directed to bol- stering the RA-NKR-Diaspora relations are particularly crucial. In this respect, the activities of Armenian Evangelical communities in different countries are certainly critical. Having their own peculiarities, these communities are part of the Protestant Armeniancy that in its turn constitutes an integral part of the entire Armeniancy. Armenian Evangelical Church regarded and still regards the Armenian Apos- tolic Church as the Mother church, accepts the Holy Fathers of the Armenian Church, uses Armenian medieval sharakans during worship, carries out joint cere- monies together with the clergymen of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The civilizational significance of the Armenian Catholics and Armenian Prot- estants is not to be underestimated. The latter, for instance, provided access to different cultural values, which played an important role for the Armeniancy. In addition, their activities contributed to the promotion of the issues of the Armeniancy in various circles abroad [2, p. 369]. The Armenian Evangelical Church is one of the founding members of the World Council of Churches and it cooperates with American, European and Middle Eastern churches.

Educational Institutions of the Armenian Evangelicals Since the formation of the Armenian Evangelical Church, Evangelical educational institutions have been created – preschools, secondary schools, colleges, schools. Ar- menians who wish to study in these educational institutions are admitted irrespective of their confessional affiliation. Presently there are 18 Armenian Evangelical educational establishments (from preschool to higher education). Armenian Evan- gelical educational institutions play an important role in Lebanon and Syria, as well as in Armenia, Greece, Iran and the USA. Haigazian University, the only higher education institution of the Diaspora (established in 1995), is distinguished among these educational institutions.1 The Near East School of Theology (Beirut), the Aleppo Col- lege (Syria), and the Evangelical Theological Seminary of Armenia established in 1997 in Yerevan are also notable.

1 See www.haigazian.edu.lb for details 78 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 T.Ghanalanyan

Armenian Evangelical Press Armenian Evangelical Church has published periodicals: the first Armenian newspaper in Ashkharhabar (modern Armenian language) – “Fount of Useful Knowledge” was published with interruptions in 1839-1856 in Zmurnia. It was followed by “Aveta- ber” (Istanbul, in Armenian and in Turkish with Armenian script). Currently, “Ban- ber” (since 1925, Paris), “Badanekan Artsakank” (since 1936, Beirut), “Chanasser” (since 1937, Beirut), “Le Lumignon” (Lyon, in French), “Lraper” (since 1965, New Jersey) magazines, “Forum” (since 1975) and “Our Daily Bread” (since 1991) periodicals of the Armenian Evangelical Union of North America, the “Haigazian Armenological Re- view” (since 1970, Beirut) annual publication, “Armenian Evangelical Church” quarterly (since 1997, Yerevan), are published [3, p. 704].

Conclusions • Today the matters of the Armenian Protestants play an important role in the self-organization processes of the Armeniancy. The protection of the Arme- nian national values and strengthening the national self-consciousness among the Protestant Armenians are urgent matters for the social and political consolidation of the Armeniancy. • The positive, continuous development of relations between the Protestant Ar- menians and Armenian Apostolic Church can ensure the good will in mutual perception and collaboration between the Armenian adherents of these two Christian teachings. • In addition to the Armenian Evangelical-Armenian Apostolic relations, the cooperation of the Armenian Evangelicals with other confessional strata of the Armeniancy manifests some tendencies for development and has a great potential to broaden, deepen and strengthen. • The issues of Protestant Armenians are also important in the context of preserving the national identity of the Armenian Diaspora. The Protestant Arme- nians ought to preserve their national identity and not to get alienated from their Apostolic compatriots. The approaches of both parties, which should be based on national unity, tolerance, emphasis on common values and joint en- deavors, are crucial in this matter. • Armenian Evangelicals represent a great civilizational value, and their appre- ciation and maximum involvement in handling the challenges faced by the Armeniancy are imperatives of the 21st century. June, 2010.

79 T.Ghanalanyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Reference Sources and Literature 1. Րաֆֆի, Ինչ կապ կա մեր և Տաճկաստանի հայերի մեջ, Երկերի ժողովածու, 9-րդ հատոր, Երևան, 1958. 2. Եղիայեան Բ., Հայ կաթոլիկ եւ Աւետարանական յարանուանութեանց բաժանումը ԺԹ. Դարուն, Անթիլիաս, 1971. 3. Հայ սփյուռք հանրագիտարան, Երևան, 2003. 4. Rev. G. B. Adanalian, Hooshartzan (Monument of the Early Armenian Reformers and Evangelical Churches) (Fresno: Crown Printing Co., 1952). 5. Ղազարյան Ա., Հայ Ավետարանական համայնքներն Արևելյան Հայաստանում մինչև խորհրդային կարգերի հաստատումը (համառոտ ակնարկ), Հայաստանյայց Ավետարանական եկեղեցի, 1 (53), 2010. 6. Ղազարյան Ա., Լևոնյան Ռ.Ն., Հայաստանյայց Ավետարանական եկեղեցի (Հայաս- տան-Կովկաս), Երևան, 1999. 7. Քասունի Ե., Հայ Աւետարանականութեան նպաստները հայ ժողովրդի կրօնական կեանքին, Պէյրութ, 1946. 8. «Հայոց աշխարհ», 27.06.2009.

THE ARMENIAN PROTESTANT COMMUNITY IN LEBANON

Vahram Hovyan*

Comprehensive exposure and consolidation of the national potential implies studying different strata of the Armeniancy. The article examines the current situation of the Armenian Protestant Community in Lebanon. The Armenian Protestant organiz- ing bodies and their activities are presented. A special attention is paid to the relations of the Armenian Protestant Community with the Armenian Apostolic and Ar- menian Catholic Communities. It is shown that despite the confessional differences, the Armenian Protestant community in Lebanon remains an integral part of the local Armeniancy. Armenian Protestants of Lebanon, alongside with Apostolic and Catholic Ar- menians, are one of the three confessional strata of the Armenian community in the country. The Armenian Protestant community, established back in the 19th century, expanded after the Armenian Genocide when Protestant Armenians, together with other Armenians, fled to Lebanon from other places of the Ottoman Empire. Refer- ring to the exodus of Protestant Armenians to the Near East Rev. G. Adanalian wrote: “Some of those who survived Turkish atrocities against Armenians settled in these Arab countries… they formed prayer and assembly houses, churches and unions… There are tens of thousands of Genocide survivors from 125 cities and villages, 4 unions and more than 100 churches in Beirut only” » [1, p. 353] The Protestant Armenians today constitute 5% (4-5 thousand people) of the Armenian community in Lebanon. They are mostly concentrated in Beirut and its suburbs – Bourj Hammoud, Ashrafieh, as well as in Anjar town. To some extent Bei- rut can be considered the centre of the Protestant Armenians in the Near East, because it hosts the Union of the Armenian Evangelical Churches in the Near East. Since the Protestant Armenians make up a large number among the Lebanese Protestants in general, the single seat or mandate for the Protestant community in the Lebanese parliament from time to time is held by an Armenian deputy. In this

* Expert at “Noravank” Foundation. 81 V.Hovyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 case the number of seats for Armenians reaches 7 because the Apostolic Armenians and Catholic Armenians are also separate communities to which five and one (total six) seats in the parliament are allocated, respectively1. The general situation with the Armenian Protestant community in Lebanon can be presented by the following characteristics: 1. The Protestant Armenian community in Lebanon is rather organized, viable and active. Its viability is expressed, first of all, in the diligent activities of its organizational bodies. 2. The Protestant Armenians are not alienated from the Apostolic and Catholic Armenians, but rather comprise an organic unity with them. The manifestations of this include: • the Protestant organizations’ activities of both communal and pan-Armenian importance; • inter-confessional collaboration with both Apostolic and Catholic Armenians within frameworks of many pan-Armenian projects and for solution of different problems.

The Protestant Armenian Organizations in Lebanon In addition to the religious structures, the abundance of educational, benevolent and other organizations is as typical for Protestant Armenians as it is for the Lebanese Armenians in general. The Protestant Armenian organizations in Lebanon are divided into four main groups, according to the character of their activities: • spiritual-clerical, • social, • educational, • informational.

Spiritual-clerical organizations. The Protestant churches were established in the Armenian community of Lebanon in the 1920s, in parallel with the growth of the local Armenian Protestant community. The first Protestant church – the First Evangelical Armenian Church of Beirut – was established in 1922. Currently there are six Armenian Evangelical churches in Lebanon2. The leader of the Protestant Ar- menians in Lebanon is Rev. Paul Haidostian.

1 The state structure of Lebanon is based on the religious/confessional distribution of the population. Each confessional group is allocated a number of the deputy mandates in the parliament commensurate with their share of the population. According to this principle, Armenians are also allotted two minister portfolios in the Lebanese government. 2 See AMAA Directory 2009: Armenian Evangelical Churches, Institutions, Organizations, Pastors and Christian Workers Worldwide, p. 13. http://www.amaa.org/Directory%20for%20website.pdf

82 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 V.Hovyan

Social organizations. The social organizations were established by the Arme- nian Protestants of Lebanon out of necessity, in order to help the Armenians who took refuge in Lebanon after the Armenian Genocide. Today they carry out benevolent, medical, educational and other activities. Among well-known Protestant Arme- nian organizations in Lebanon are Armenian Evangelical Social Service Centre, Ar- menian National Sanatorium, Christian Endeavour Union of the Armenian Evangeli- cal Churches of Syria and Lebanon, etc. Educational institutions. The most renowned educational institution of the Armenian Protestants in Lebanon is the Haigazian University in Beirut, which is the only higher educational institution in the entire Diaspora. Haigazian University was established in 1955 as a liberal arts college, and in 1966 it became a university. In addition to religious studies, various disciplines of art and science are taught in the four faculties of the Haigazian University1. The president of the university is Rev. Paul Haidostian, the leader of the Protestant Armenians in Lebanon. The seven schools of Armenian Protestants are highly regarded not only among the Protestant Armenians, but also among all Armenians in Lebanon. They are located in Beirut and other cities of Lebanon2. Information institutions. The printed publications are the main informational structures of the Protestant Armenians in Lebanon. These are “Badanegan Artsa- kank”, “Chanasser” monthlies and “Luys” quarterly. The annual “Haigazian Ar- menological Review” published by Haigazian University since 1970 stands out among the printed publications by its importance. (The Armenian Protestant organizations are concisely presented in the Appendix).

The Pan-Armenian Activities of the Protestant Organizations The activities of the Armenian Protestant organizations in Lebanon are not restricted to the Protestant Armenian community; they do involve the entire Armenian community of Lebanon. These very activities of pan-Armenian significance prove that the Protestant Armenians in Lebanon are an integral part of the Armenian community in general. The activities of pan-Armenian significance include the following areas: • educational, • social, • informational.

1 See http://www.haigazian.edu.lb/Academics/Pages/UndergraduatePrograms.aspx 2 See AMAA Directory 2009: Armenian Evangelical Churches, Institutions, Organizations, Pastors and Christian Workers Worldwide, pp. 13-14. http://www.amaa.org/Directory%20for%20website.pdf

83 V.Hovyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

In the area of education the pan-Armenian character of the activities carried out by Protestant organizations is apparent through two circumstances: 1. The confessional composition of the students. Catholic and Apostolic Armeni- ans study in the Armenian Protestant educational institutions in Lebanon along with Protestant Armenians. In this sense Haigazian University has to be noted, the activities of which are not restricted even to the Armenian community in Lebanon. Every year the university admits students from 20 countries regardless of their confession1. Referring to the all-Armenian nature of the Haigazian University, Rev. Paul Haidostian mentions: “Haigazian University is a unique institution which has created a social and moral educational environment with an academic seriousness, contribut- ing greatly to our people. Haigazian University strives to educate the generations and show that there should be no discrimination based on communal, confessional, political, partisan and economic attributes. This institution is a forge where we have to learn that we all are parts of one reality, life and nation and we are uniquely posi- tioned to open our doors to all people of all nationalities, religions and kinds” 2. As for the schools, the Armenians in Lebanon make no difference in choosing them. That is why, “… children of Apostolic Armenians, as well as of Catholics and Evangelicals study”3 in Armenian schools in Lebanon, including the Protestant schools. The fact that Armenian Protestant schools provide education not only to Prot- estants, but also to children of the other Armenian confessional groups, remains a traditional phenomenon in Lebanon. From this point of view rather interesting sta- tistical information is given in the 1947-48 review of the Armenian Evangelical Sun- day Schools in the Near East. According to this review in the 29 schools covered, of which 14 were in Lebanon, only 54% of 2,700 students were Evangelical. 41% were Apostolic and the remaining 5% were adherents of other confessions [1, pp. 358-359] 2. Educational programmes. Besides the religious matters, Armenian educational institutions also teach Armenian studies in general. Armenian literature, history, politics and culture are researched and taught at the Haigazian University’s Chair of Armenian Studies. In this respect, alluding to the role and significance of the university Paul Haidostian notes: “…institutions like Haigazian have assumed the serious responsibility for re-discovering what was lost during those long and gruesome years of the Genocide, deportations, loss of the land, and demoralization”4. Thus, owing to the educational programmes the Haigazian University graduates become active members of not only the narrower Protestant community, but of the whole Armenian community in Lebanon.

1 The fact that almost half of the students at Haigazian University are foreigners confirms the international significance of the university, as well as its good reputation at the international level. 2 Interview with Rev. Dr. Paul Haidostian, President of Haigazian University, http://www.keghart.com/ Moskofian_Haigazian 3 Լիբանան. Սփյուռքի սիրտը և շտեմարանը, http://wap.report.am/?lang=AM&id=1286 4 Interview with Rev. Dr. Paul Haidostian, President of Haigazian University, http://www.keghart.com/ Moskofian_Haigazian

84 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 V.Hovyan

The two circumstances mentioned above are interconnected and they ensure the pan-Armenian spirit of the activities carried out by the Armenian Protestant educational institutions in Lebanon. The fact that Armenians of different confessions come to study at Protestant institutions is conditioned by the availability of educational programmes on Armenian studies. The all-Armenian nature of the Haigazian University is also confirmed by the fact that it is sponsored by many Armenian benefactors regardless of their confessional affiliation. Rev. Paul Haidostian has made an interesting remark in this regard: “… if one makes a contribution to Haigazian, he/she contributes to the Armenian people as a whole”1. Therefore, Armenian Protestant educational institutions in Lebanon are Prot- estant only to the extent they belong to the Armenian Evangelical Church. In other aspects, as the president of the Haigazian University Rev. Paul Haidostian puts: “We consider ourselves a part of the unity which is called the Armenian people, who we serve”2. Regarding the issue of the image of Haigazian University, Reverend mentions: “Haigazian must be presented as a necessity for Armenia and Armeniancy. Of course, Armenia and Armeniancy are important for Haigazian, but the opposite must be true, too, as an important factor in the Armenian reality, an institution the existence of which makes every Armenian proud”3. The Armenian Protestant institutions in the social area have been established at the time so as to take care of the Armenians in Lebanon who found themselves in a desperate situation. Hence, it is obvious that their activities could not have been restricted to the Protestants only and should have included all Armenians in Leba- non irrespective of their confessional affiliations. These social organizations established and owned by the Armenian Protestants of Lebanon – the Armenian Evan- gelical Church – serve the whole Armenian community in Lebanon. Informational area. The periodicals published by Protestant Armenians cover not only the matters relating to the Protestant community, but also those concerning all Armenians in Lebanon, as well as pan-Armenian matters. The “Haigazian Ar- menological Review” that addresses issues of Armenian studies is especially distinguished by its pan-Armenian significance.

1 Ibid 2 Ibid 3 Ibid

85 V.Hovyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Inter-confessional Collaboration Despite the confessional differences, the Armenian Apostolic, Catholic and Protes- tant communities are closely integrated and they form a single integral unity. There are two integrating factors in the heart of this unity: 1. The feeling of a common ethnic affiliation. There is a feeling of a common ethnic affiliation in all the three confessional strata of the Armeniancy in Lebanon, which is based on a high level of national self-consciousness. Moreover, as it is the case with the Protestant Armenians in general, among the Armenian Protestants of Lebanon the sense of ethnic affiliation prevails over that of religious affiliation. The Armenian Prot- estants first of all perceive and feel themselves as Armenians, rather than Protestants or Christians. In a convincing indication of that, when once asked whether he was Chris- tian or Muslim, Rev. Paul Haidostian answered he was an Armenian1. The historical memory of the Armenian Genocide holds a special place among other factors underlying the high national self-consciousness which unites the three Armenian confessional communities in Lebanon. The collective memory of the Ar- menian Genocide, which is the main support pillar for the Armenians in Diaspora to preserve their national self-identity being far away from their motherland, at the same time also unites Armenian communities in Diaspora, in this case the three confessional strata of the Armenian community in Lebanon. As ethnographer H. Marut- yan notes: “… the memory shared by members of an ethnic community or a nation is a means that connects its members and forms their relations and actions” [3, p. 9]. An important factor here is that during the massacres and Genocide there was no differentiation made with regard to the Armenians based on confessional grounds and “…Armenians were destroyed almost indiscriminately, whether they were adherents of Apostolic Church, Catholics and Evangelical” [4]. 2. Providing security to the Armenian community in the complicated and instable social and political environment in Lebanon. Common challenges usually have a uniting effect and lead to consolidation of forces. The complex and instable environment in which they live is a common challenge for all the three confessional strata of Armenians in Lebanon. Armenians in Lebanon realize they have to subordinate all their ideological principles to the idea of protecting the Armenian Community2. The cooperation between Armenian Apostolic, Catholic and Evangelical Churches in implementation of various pan-Armenian projects is a manifestation and symbol of consolidation of the Armenian Apostolic, Catholic and Protestant communities in one integral whole, i.e. the Armenian Community in Lebanon.

1 Арье Гут, Армянская община Ливана встала на сторону «Хезболлы» http://www.araspel.org/showthread.php?p=4528 2 Ibid

86 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 V.Hovyan

The collaboration of the Armenian Evangelical Church with other confessional groups also includes different areas of public life: • social, • scientific and educational, • political.

The social sphere is a priority in the inter-confessional collaboration of the Armenians in Lebanon. A vivid example of such collaboration was the establishment of a national sanatorium in Maameltein by the Apostolic and Evangelical churches in 1923, which later moved to Azouniyeh in 1937. The establishment of the national hospital was necessitated by the imperative to treat the diseases (particularly tuber- culosis) spread among the Armenians who had fled to Lebanon after the Genocide. Considerable contribution to the establishment of the sanatorium was made by the Catholicos of the Great House of Cilicia His Holiness Sahag Khabayan and Rev. Yenovk Hadidian. Currently this national hospital is co-owned by the Armenian Ap- ostolic and Evangelical Churches. Being one of the leading medical facilities in Leba- non it continues its mission for the benefit of the Armenian people. The hospital is governed by a board of trustees consisting of eight members of which four are Apos- tolic and four are Evangelical. According to the charter, the post of the chairman of the board of trustees is reserved for a representative of the Apostolic Church and the position of his deputy – for a representative of the Evangelical Church. At the same time the secretary is always an Apostolic while the treasurer is Evangelical1. In fact, this is a good case of an inter-confessional institutional collaboration. In the scientific and educational spheres the inter-confessional collaboration is manifested in the following: • the rigorous activities of the Apostolic Armenians and Catholics in the Protes- tant educational institutions, • active participation of all communities in the events organized by one of them.

The experience of the Haigazian University is again noteworthy in the sense of activities by the Apostolic and Catholic Armenians in the Protestant educational institutions. Although the university belongs to the Armenian Evangelical Church and its president is the spiritual leader of the Protestant Armenians in Lebanon, there are many adherents of the Armenian Apostolic Church and Catholic Church in the administrative and teaching staff. The Catholicos of the Holy See of Cilicia, Aram I often reads lectures on Armenian studies, theology and ecumenism in the Haigazian University. A. Granian, the editor-in-chief of the “Haigazian Armenological Review”

1 Հայ ազգային բուժարան, Ազունիէ, Լիբանան, http://www.keghart.com/Moskofian_Azunie 87 V.Hovyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 is among the prominent representatives of the Armenian Catholic Church who teach at the university1. The ties between the schools that belong to the three Armenian confessional communities also point to the inter-confessional cooperation and relations. Rita Boyadjian, Principal of the Kevork Harboyan School of the Armenian Catholic Patri- archate in Beirut spoke about such ties: “… we have ties with the managements of AGBU and national schools, secretariat of the Armenian Evangelical schools.”2 An interesting example of the active involvement of the communities in the events arranged by one of them was the Conference on the Culture of Cilician Arme- nia, arranged jointly by the Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia and Matenada- ran (Yerevan) in Antelias, in which the Armenian Catholic and Evangelical Churches of Lebanon actively participated3. This is another fact proving that the Catholic and Protestant Armenians are part of the common Armenian civilisational realm. The participation of the Armenian Apostolic and Catholic Churches, represented by Bishop Kegham Khatcherian, Primate of the Armenian Prelacy, Diocese of Lebanon and Bishop Vartan Ashkarian, General Vicar, Armenian Catholic Patriar- chate of Lebanon, respectively, at the 50th anniversary of the Haigazian University in 2005 was also noteworthy.4[5] Another remarkable example was the conference organized by the Catholico- sate of the Great House of Cilicia devoted to the centenary of Adana massacres, where the inter-confessional cooperation was brought to a regional level. Delegates from the Armenian communities of the Near East participated in the congress, including the Armenian Catholic and Evangelical churches, represented by Fr. An- tranig Granian and Rev. Haroutioun Selimian, correspondingly5. A fresh example of all communities participating in the events organized by one of them was the inaugural ceremony of the new Heritage Building of the Haiga- zian University on April 29, 2010 which was a celebratory event not only for the Armenians of Lebanon, but also for the whole Lebanese society [6, pp. 21-22]. The inter-confessional collaboration in the political sphere is expressed by a common stance and efforts directed at facing pan-Armenian problems and challenges. The Armenian community in Lebanon, despite its inner stratification on partisan or confessional grounds, stands united for such issues of pan-Armenian signifi-

1 Ливанские эскизы, http://aniv.ru/view.php?numer=16&st=2 2 Mrs. Rita Boyadjian, the principal of the Kevork Harboyan School of the Armenian Catholic Patriarchate of Beirut: “For every Armenian parent who wants their child to stay Armenian the only way is to sent him/her to an Arme- nian school” http://www.keghart.com/Moskofian_Boyajian. 3 Ливанские эскизы, http://aniv.ru/view.php?numer=16&st=2 4 Հայկազյան համալսարանի ոսկյա հոբելյանը, Ազգ, 06.07.2005թ.։ 5 Rev. Haroutioun Selimian is the President of the Armenian Evangelical Churches of Syria, as well as the President of the Armenian Evangelical World Council. 88 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 V.Hovyan cance as the Genocide, Armenian Cause, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, refuting Turk- ish claims, etc. The symbol of this unity is the monument in Bikfaya honouring the victims of the Armenian Genocide; the inscription on it reads that the monument was erected with the cooperation of the whole Armenian community1. It is inferred from this that all Armenians of Lebanon, regardless of their partisan or confessional affiliations, are united in promoting the recognition and condemnation of the Armenian Genocide. The unity of the three Armenian religious communities in political issues was expressed by the common statement of the Armenian Apostolic, Catholic and Evan- gelical Churches in August 2006 against the deployment of the Turkish peacemakers in Lebanon2. Besides being closely integrated with the local Armenian Apostolic and Catholic communities, the Armenian Protestant community in Lebanon is also strongly integrated with other Armenian Protestants in the Near East. The Arme- nian Evangelical Community in Lebanon is a part of the Union of the Armenian Evangelical Churches in the Near East, which is headquartered in Beirut, as it has already been mentioned. However, the integration of the Armenian Protestant Community in Lebanon is not restricted to the ethnic level. It also reaches the international or transnational levels, which is demonstrated by the regional integration. In particular, through the Union of the Armenian Evangelical Churches in the Near East, the Armenian Evan- gelical Community in Lebanon is affiliated to the Fellowship of the Middle East Evangelical Churches and within the framework of the latter is closely integrated with other Evangelical communities in the region. This integration first of all is manifested in organizational and structural dimensions. In the Fellowship of Evan- gelical Churches of the Middle East important offices are often held by representatives of the Armenian Evangelical community in Lebanon. Particularly, at the 6th General Assembly of the Fellowship of the Middle East Evangelical Churches, held on January 11-13, 2010 in Bethanya, Harissa, Lebanon, the president of the Union of the Armenian Evangelical Churches in the Near East Rev. Megerditch Karageozian was elected a member of the Executive Committee of the Fellowship of the Middle East Evangelical Churches3. Thus, the pan-Armenian significance of the activities carried out by the Prot-

1 Armenians in Lebanon, http://www.horizonworld.com/vb/showthread.php?t=63 2 See Армяне Ливана против включения турецких сил в состав миротворческого контингента, http://www.regnum.ru/news/690305.html 3 6th General Assembly of the Fellowship of the Middle East Evangelical Churches http://www.chanitz.org/2010/01/6th-general-assembly-of-fellowship-of.html 89 V.Hovyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 estant Armenian organizations, as well as the extensive inter-confessional collaboration, prove that “... the past “dashnak-hnchak-ramgavar” and “Apostolic-Catholic- Evangelical” acute struggles in Lebanon are all but gone”1. Consequently, being a rather active and viable community, the Protestant Armenians in Lebanon are integrated with other Armenians living in Lebanon and together they form a single organic unity; that is the Armenian community in Lebanon.

June, 2010.

Reference Sources and Literature 1. Rev. G. B. Adanalian, Hooshartzan (Monument of the Early Armenian Reformers and Evangelical Churches) (Fresno: Crown Printing Co., 1952). 2. AMAA Directory 2009: Armenian Evangelical Churches, Institutions, Organizations, Pas- tors and Christian Workers Worldwide. 3. Հ. Մարության, Հիշողության դերն ազգային ինքնության կառուցվածքում, Երևան, 2006։ 4. Alik, 01.11.2009։ 5. Azg, 06.07.2005։ 6. Լուսաբաց, 15.05.2010։

1 Լիբանան. Սփյուռքի սիրտը և շտեմարանը, http://wap.report.am/?lang=AM&id=1286 90 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 V.Hovyan

Appendix

ARMENIAN PROTESTANT ORGANIZATIONS IN LEBANON1

Churches Organization Head Address Contacts Armenian Evan- Pastor: Rev. Raffi Ainjar, Bekaa, Tel: (961-8) 620-628, gelical Church Messerlian Lebanon [email protected] P.O.Box 66 Zahle, Bekaa, Leba- non Armenian Evan- Pastor: Rev. Sog- Ashrafieh, Beirut, Tel: (961-1) 442-596, gelical Church homon Kilaghbian Lebanon [email protected] P.O.Box 80758 Bourdj Hammoud, (Beirut) Lebanon First Armenian Pastor: Rev. Hagop Mexique Street, Tel: (961-1)349-817/343- Evangelical Sarkissian Beirut, Lebanon 182, Fax/Tel։ 349-815, Church P.O.Box 11-2508 [email protected] Beirut, Lebanon Armenian Evan- Pastor: Rev. Nor Amanos Tel: (961-1) 241-636, gelical Emmanuel Hovhannes Svajian (Dora), Lebanon Fax: (961-1) 241-637 Church P.O.Box 80169 [email protected] Bourdj Hammoud, (Beirut) Lebanon Armenian Evan- Pastor: Rev. Nor Marash, Tel: (961-1) 261-239 gelical Church Megrditch Kara- Bourdj Hammoud goezian Lebanon Syriac Evangelical Pastor: Rev. Selim P.O.Box 11-0377 Tel.: (96-1) 680-724 Church Sabounji Riad El Solh 1107 [email protected] 2040 Beirut, Lebanon

1 The main source is the AMAA Directory 2009: Armenian Evangelical Churches, Institutions, Organizations, Pastors and Christian Workers Worldwide, p. 3, 13-14.

91 V.Hovyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Educational Institutions Organization Head Address Contacts Haigazian University President: Rev. Dr. Mexique St., Kantari, Tel/Fax: Paul Haidostian Beirut, Lebanon (961-1) 739-412, P.O.Box 11 1748 353-010/1/2, Riad El Solh 1107 349-230/1 2090 Pres. Office Beirut, Lebanon (961-1) 349-230, Tel./Fax: 350-926 Pres. Res. (961-1) 739-375 www.haigazian.edu.lb [email protected] Near East School of President: Sourati Street, Hamra, Tel:

Theology Dr. Mary Mikhael Beirut, Lebanon (961-1) 346 708, P.O.Box 13 5780 354 194, Chouran, Beirut, Leba- 349-901 non Fax: (961-1) 347-129 [email protected] Armenian Evangeli- Principal: Mexique St., Kantari, Tel: cal Y. & M. Phili- Zaven Messerlian Beirut, Lebanon (961-1) 349 816,

bosian College P.O.Box 11-3672 863 592 Riad El Solh Fax: (961-1) 751-469 Beirut, Lebanon [email protected] Armenian Evangeli- Principal: Ashrafieh, Beirut, Tel: (961-1) 442 594 cal Central High Mrs. Maral Deyir- Lebanon Fax: (961-1) 562-155 School menjian P.O.Box 80758 [email protected] Bourdj Hammoud, Lebanon Armenian Evang'l Principal: Rev. Hrayr Nor Marash, Bourdj Tel: Shamlian Tatigian Cholakian Hammoud, Lebanon (961-1) 261-749, Secondary School P.O.Box 80907 240-995 Bourj Hamoud, Lebanon Fax: (961-1) 240-996 [email protected] [email protected] Armenian Evangeli- Principal: Anjar, Bekaa, Lebanon Tel: (961-8) 620-629 cal Secondary School Rev. Raffi Messerlian P.O.Box 66 [email protected] Zahle, Lebanon Armenian Evangeli- Principal: Nor Amanos (Dora), Tel: (961-1) 265-521 cal P. & E. Torossian Seta Karagoezian Bourdj Hammoud, Fax: (961-1) 241-637 Middle School Lebanon [email protected] P.O.Box 80169 Bourdj Hammoud, Lebanon Armenian Evangelical Principal: Mar Mekhayel - Had- Tel: (961-1) 442 278 Guertmenian School Sahag Dedeyan jin, Beirut, Lebanon [email protected]

92 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 V.Hovyan

Social Institutions

Organization Head Address Contacts Armenian Evangeli- Social Worker: Trad, Tel: (961-1) 263 155 cal Social Service Rita Lao Bourdj Hammoud, AE- Center Mangilikian Lebanon [email protected] P.O.Box 11 0377 Riad el Solh 1107- 2040 Beirut, Lebanon

Armenian National Director՝ P.O.Box 11 0377 Sanatorium Tigran Boyajian Riad el Solh 1107- (Azounieh, Leba- 2040

non) Beirut, Lebanon CAHL (Centers for Director: Trad, Bourdj Ham- Tel: Armenian Handi- Kevork Karaboyad- moud, Lebanon (961-1) 260 533/4,

capped in Lebanon) jian P.O.Box 80250 266 822, Bourdj Hammoud, 484 175, Lebanon (961-3) 291-509 Fax: (961-1) 249-479 [email protected] Christian Endeavor Chairman: P.O.Box 11-0443 Tel: (961-1)443 547 Union of Armenian Rev. Raffi Messer- Beirut, Lebanon Fax:(961-1) 565-629 Evang’l lian [email protected] Churches of Syria and Lebanon Jinishian Memorial Director: Trad, Bourdj Ham- Tel/Fax: (961-1) 268 Program Seta Pamboukian moud, Lebanon 020 Tel։ P.O.Box 11-0437 (961-1) 261 008, (Code No. 55) 499 749 Beirut, Lebanon [email protected] KCHAG (Christian Beit Meri, Lebanon Endeavor Summer P.O.Box 11-0443

Camp) Beirut, Lebanon

93 V.Hovyan «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010

Informational Structures Organization Head Address Contacts Haigazian Editor in Chief: Mexique St., Kan- Armenological Fr. Antranig tari, Beirut, Lebanon review Granian P.O.Box 11 1748 Riad El Solh 1107 2090 Beirut, Lebanon Badanegan Director: P.O.Box 11-0377 Tel: (961-1) 565-719 Artsakank Mrs. Rosette Riad el Solh 1107- Publications Alemian 2040 @uaecne.org Beirut, Lebanon Chanasser Director: P.O.Box 11-0377 Tel: (961-1) 565-719 Mrs. Rosette Riad el Solh 1107- publications Alemian 2040 @uaecne.org Beirut, Lebanon Luys Director: P.O.Box 11-0377 Tel: (961-1) 565-719 Mrs. Rosette Riad el Solh 1107- Publications Alemian 2040 @uaecne.org Beirut, Lebanon

Regional Governing Body

Organization Head Address Contacts Union of the Arme- President։ P.O.Box 11-0377 Tel: nian Evangelical Rev. Megrditch Riad El Solh 1107 Res. (961-1) 444- Churches in the Karagoezian, 2040 439, Near East Beirut, Lebanon (961-1) 739-375 (UAECNE) Chair Union (961-1) 565- Central Committee 628 of UAECNE։ HU Off. (961-1) Rev. Soghomon Ki- 350-926 laghbian, Fax: (961-1) 565-629 www.uaecne.org uaecne@cyberia. net.lb

GLOBALIZATION AND EDUCATION

Mitra Abdollahi *

Globalization is a process derived from the weaknesses of modernity that have led to the emergence of modernism. The most significant factor for its evolution has been the rapid progress in information technologies. In connection with that our interest shall focus this time on classification, processing, analysis and creation of the data, rather than mere access to them. Investing in educational systems and developing shifts to such ideas as decentralization, creativity, school centraliza- tion, as well as applying technologies in schools are all essential for not falling behind the globalization. All those who are in charge of the current educational systems, consider the particular changes and evolutions comprehensively in order to design a reliable program for the students to help them enter a sophisticated and dynamic future that is going to be influenced by economical, social, cultural and educational factors. How is it possible to develop globalization with the help of information technologies while simultaneously keeping the specific norms and ideologies of a society? The concept of globalization has a prominent history in the political and international literature. Some believe that globalization is 400 years old and the emergence of modernism only helped to shape it. Some suggest that modernism has various features and globalization is one of its irreversible streams. Modernism origi- nated in the West and initially encountered strong opposition from traditionalists, but eventually it prevailed. Globalization began in the past; its form has been re- newed, and the rapid progress in information technologies has been a major shaping factor for it. “The beginning of all current changes is the emersion of a phenomenon called globalization” says Kingel. He believes it was signified around half a century ago, in India by Salvador Dali’s 1943 painting “Geopoliticus Child Watching the Birth of the New Man”. It is no surprise that in this masterpiece, “new man” refers to the person

* Post-graduate student at the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law of the RA National Academy of Science. 95 M.Abdollahi «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 from North America who had to live in that era. (6) Anthony Giddens maintains globalization is a process derived from modernity and suggests that postmodernism is a complete globalization. (2) There are many evidences pointing to the new circumstances in the world. Weaknesses displayed by the modernity and emergence of postmodernism together with the sets of values, principles and rules; the spread of the international trade; development of the information and communication technologies with transformation of communications in various aspects such as their time, speed, shape and cost; the flow of international investments; the relative elimination of the borders are all simply the significant attributes of the globalization path. (5) In Toffler’s opinion, the current structure of civilization is based on the “third wave”: the advance of the information age. Accordingly, awareness brings along wealth and power and unawareness results in ignorance and poverty. In his view, the firms were created in the first wave (age of agriculture) and they focused on mass production and development in the second wave (age of industry). In the post- industrial and information age, the companies are built to satisfy the new changes and what becomes important in the world of information explosion is not so much the access to this information, but its creation, classification, processing, and analysis. It is obvious that these are possible with the help of the information technologies. (9) Generally, it can be stated that globalization has generated a situation where each society can benefit from it depending on its own political, economical, cultural, and educational aspects. As a matter of fact, educating students and improving the structure of education must be the first focal point. As far as education itself is concerned, one may articulate that it refers to the educational system of each nation that is a regular and targeted systematical flow aimed at development and growth of talents. Education is a process that is individu- ally achievable in several years. It is a targeted system with goals emerging in the long run which result in a steady growth of the cultural, social, and economical levels of a society. A typical example of the education’s influence on development of a country can be demonstrated by a simple case. After the industrial revolution implemented by Stalin in the Soviet Union, the Russians launched the first satellite to the space, which caused the fear of the Americans who started to think about their weakness and figured out that the problem lies in their educational system. They embarked on reforming their educational programs and invested heftily in that. They did achieve outstanding successes and education is now accessible to

96 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 M.Abdollahi any children in America. (10) For this reason, school programs are of special concern in the developed countries and teachers have to update their knowledge and skills, whereas those lacking this aspiration have sought an early retirement. (10) Since the educational system is a part of the whole, it is intensely affected by globalization. In a globalized educational system, creativity, initiative, school cen- tralization, cooperation, and applying modern technologies are crucial. Nowadays, centralized structures and bureaucracy in learning have been replaced by postmod- ern structures that feature cooperation from bottom to top, respect to an individual’s mentality and creativity, privatization of education, decrease in the number of public schools and equipping schools with information technologies. These days, education is no longer an elite training as compared to the past when education was specifically devoted to training governing elites for the country. Today students are trained for workplaces that are in constant change, teaching them to adapt themselves to the everyday development. In places where hierarchical management has been replaced with a horizontal one and creativity has become more important than following the instructions, the educational system should work on group skills of the students, their flexibility and tolerance to other cultures. (7) Globalization has compelled most countries to analyze their educational systems continuously and to identify, circumvent and replace any inefficient strategies. Decentralization is one of the most important factors for managing progress and globalization. Developed countries have made their employees autonomous through decentralization and delegation of power which has led to growth of the personal identity. As a special trait in the neoclassic management, it has been demonstrated that in smaller organizations the idea generation is more effective and applicable. (6) Under these organizational and directional developments, the educational system is also brought to the regional/local decision-making level and the number of large schools has decreased. In this dimension, school management plan has been proposed and it has resulted in improvements of the employees’ morale and efficiency. Therefore, it is essential to apply participation-based structures in educational organizations. Nowadays, in order to keep pace with globalization, each country has to train its students to possess a pair of identities in a manner that they would not be contra- dictory: First, it is the national identity that in the past used to be the only cherished one to the point of being sacred; students must challenge it with their personal ex- periments as to institutionalize them eventually. Second, a global identity of a world citizen who is inseparable from the other people of the world, and who lives in a

97 M.Abdollahi «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 global village where in this age of communication everybody will be informed of any event. Such event will be reflected on everyone’s life, economy, politics, learning, and culture. This is why globalization is a process that compresses time and space. Dr. Giddens believes that globalization is a movement that intensifies the social interactions and connects distant places, so that any event will impact the people’s destiny. (8) Hence, schools are responsible to prepare students for development and train students to become active constituents in various groups. Schools should foster students’ global identity, i.e. they should encourage students to embrace other cultures, humanitarianism, and to comprehend their global responsibility. (7) Presently, Internet has brought the possibility of utilizing the proper learning opportunities for everyone, which is one of the factors of globalization. Those who have not used this opportunity are called the vulnerable illiterate individuals. Since Internet has prepared an environment for instructors to learn and comprehend, ad- vancement of the learning process quality through the Internet network is one of the expectations from the information technology. Surveys have demonstrated that among the significant effects of information technology are effectiveness of teaching via Internet, increase of learning motivation, and activating the learners through involving them with the materials taught. Other benefits include saving time, capital, educational equipment and facilitating the decision making process for managers. (8) Lirtard believes that any science that lacks the possibility of being transformed into computer-recognizable values is going to be done away with and that the direction of the new studies will depend on their capability of being interpreted in a computer language. Therefore, the features of globalization of education include: 1. Shift in the research priorities such as reduction of the information lifetime. 2. Compression of the environment: the world is set like a class to teach creativity and there is a possibility of arranging audio and speech communications among all students and instructors throughout the world. 3. Change in educational objectives. 4. Variations in methods of gaining knowledge: learning assignments based on computer language capabilities, supplementing the traditional memory databases with computer data processing databases, growth of virtual universities, etc. Managers of education must direct the educational programs to globalization through such things as peer-learning and cooperative learning; experi- mental learning based on the real world; development of mental work and critical self-awareness; free and unlimited education through various appropri-

98 «21st CENTURY», № 2 (8), 2010 M.Abdollahi

ate approaches, for instance convergence of the close and relatively similar subjects and creation of inter-disciplinary specialties; probable shift from the required education to an in-time, particular and occasional learning; curricula based on learners’ requirements and commercial needs; and finally, developing skills crucial for individual life and career aspects such as group work, problem-solving, data processing, computer use and communication. (10, 3)

July, 2010.

Reference Sources and Literature 1. Ali Allagheband. Basics of Educational Management. Tehran. First Edition. 2005 2. Bahare Sazmand. Culture & Human Rights under Strategic Globalization. No. 36. 2005 3. Heydesh, Z. Bullock E. Debber. Challenges in Graduate Education in the Third Millen- nium. 2002 4. IIEP Newsletter. Vol. XVI. No. 2. Apr 1998 5. Madan Sarap. An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism. 1993 6. Mark Olssen, John A. Codd, Anne-Marie O'Neill. Education Policy: Globalization, Citi- zenship and Democracy. Thousand Islands Sage. London. Delhi. 2004 7. Parker, Walter C., Akira Ninomiya, & John Cogan. "Educating ‘World Citizens’: Toward Multinational Curriculum Development." American Educational Research Journal, 36 (Summer 1999): 117-145 8. Sekineh Shahi. Investigating Organizational Communication Structure in Graduate Stud- ies in the Path to Globalization. Ph.D. Graduation Work in Khuzestan. 2008 9. Soleyman Iranzadeh. Adaptive Management in the Framework of new Paradigms. Tabriz. Center of Governmental Management Education. 2001 10. www.ren2010.cps.k12.il.us 11. Yadollah Mehrali Zadeh. Globalization, Organizational Changes and Resource Expansion Programming. Ahwaz. 2006

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