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– EU member states vowed vowed states – EU member crisis migration 2015 and the 2010 crisis debt European –the calamities two previous the During crisis. unprecedented manage this to unison in act EU could the that show to on was pressure the in , outbreak coronavirus the to response common their discuss to avideoconference via March 26 Thursday on met leaders Union European When Introduction Shutterstock Source: of nationalism and populism that followed. followed. that and populism of nationalism rise the by apart further drifted gradually they in reality But stronger. emerges Union the that and make sure together work to but also its Union’sonly the economy, health and Why the lack of solidarity threatens not Corona: EU’s existential crisis 2020 APRIL 1 of division” germ “the that warnings dire issued officials EU senior various that, another. of one top On towards solidarity much show did not actions and later initial their takes”, both it while “whatever do to pledging are and EU institutions governments national days Similarly, these

28 division’’ of ‘germ with Aris Oikonomou,Aris March 2020. ‘Epidemic infects Europe Europe infects ‘Epidemic , Agence France-Presse 1 or or ,

Bob Deen & Kimberley Kruijver Clingendael Alert Clingendael Alert

“the lack of ‘all for one spirit’”2 threaten the health crisis in a tailored manner suited to existence of the European project itself. their own specific situation and the state of To the outside, these statements portray an the outbreak. But that does not mean the unsettling image of disarray. Although most EU could not play a more prominent role in attention has so far been paid to the public promoting intergovernmental co-operation health and economic havoc wrought by and in co-ordinating matters such as border COVID-19, it also poses threats to the social policies, research efforts and the production cohesion and security of the EU itself. and sharing of scarce medical supplies such as face masks and ventilators. This is It does not have to be this way. Over the particularly relevant in case the virus returns years the EU has developed a raft of crisis in multiple waves until a vaccine has been management instruments and has articulated developed. the ambition to achieve ‘strategic autonomy’. Although the crisis is still rapidly unfolding, The initial responses indicate how individual certain important lessons can already be countries react to external threats, as drawn from the early responses in the fields they would in the case of a major security of health, the economy and security. hazard. Logically, the first reflex is one of separation: each European country prioritises the protection of its own population and Health systems: in search of distancing is an essential part of containing European solidarity the pandemic. Italy, as Europe’s ‘ground zero’, was the first to experience the full gravity of the threat but was largely left to fend for Several commentators have argued that the itself. What is most striking was the slow EU has no role to play because the governing reaction of fellow EU countries to Italy’s call of health systems is a national competence.3 to activate the Mechanism This, however, is too -sighted and of Civil Protection for the supply of personal overlooks both the transnational aspect of protective medical equipment. Even though the threat posed by COVID-19, as well as the Emergency Response Coordination existing EU policies designed to combat of Centre is now active, the initial silence of EU such threats. In the field of health protection member states sent a shocking message. the EU has committed itself to “monitoring, Even more so after Italy’s ambassador to the early notification of and combating serious EU publicly stated that Europe’s ‘strategic cross-border threats to health” following rival’ China, helped more bilaterally than the Article 168 (1) TFEU. Moreover, the EU Global EU did.5 Solidarity, one of the EU’s values Strategy explicitly aims to “work for more enshrined among others in Article 222 TEU, effective prevention, detection and responses initially seemed to be forgotten and was only to global pandemics”4 and its Common invoked after widespread criticism.6 After Security and Defence Policy more than once several weeks of self-preservation responses, stresses unity in protection from external better-off EU countries such as Germany are threats and safeguarding the Union’s security now increasingly sharing medical supplies from within the EU’s borders. and taking in some critical-care patients from overstretched neighbours. The primary responsibility for the health sector indeed lies with national governments, and each member state should address the

5 Maurizio Massari, ‘Italian ambassador to the EU: 2 Beatriz Rios, ‘Commission chief, MEPs slam Italy needs Europe’s help’, Politico, 11 March 2020. lack of EU solidarity in COVID19 crisis’, Euractiv, Joint Communication to the , 26 March 2020. the and the Council on EU-China 3 David M. Herszenhorn, Carmen Paul and Jillian – A strategic outlook, 12 March 2019. Deutsch, ‘Europe fails to help Italy in coronavirus 6 Hans von der Burchard, Jullian Deutsch and Maïa fight’, Politico, 7 March 2020. de la Baume, ‘Berlin pushes back in coronavirus 4 EU Global Strategy, 2016, p. 43. propaganda war’, Politico, 25 March 2020.

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Economic measures: nine EU countries led by France, Italy and persisting divides to create a special joint debt instrument known as ‘corona bonds’.

As it became apparent that COVID-19 would The Netherlands in particular incurred have far-reaching economic consequences, the wrath of southern EU member states the EU did demonstrate that it had learned due to its intransigence, particularly when from the previous crisis and acted Finance Minister Hoekstra proposed that the relatively swiftly to try and avert a major should investigate economic meltdown with both fiscal and why certain states did not sufficiently reform monetary measures. their economies to be able to weather this crisis. This was denounced as “repugnant” In particular the European by Portuguese Prime Minister Costa, who was quick to reverse course, after initially threatened that “either the EU does what downplaying the seriousness of the threat, needs to be done, or it will end.”8 On 31 March and has now made it clear that it will not Hoekstra did admit to a “lack of empathy”.9 only do “whatever it takes”, but also has However, the reaction of Costa betrays a much “no limits” in its attempts to shore up the deeper frustration felt across the southern economy of the Eurozone. This decisive EU member states about the lack of support response was possible because the ECB, and understanding by their wealthier fellow unlike the European Council, can outvote EU members, while the latter know that their frugal states such as Germany and the populations will not support vast north-south Netherlands, who made their displeasure transfers – especially as they face prospects known. The massive monetary of of of their own. its bond purchases has so far fended off speculators and pushed down interest rates on especially Spanish and Italian bonds, but Threats to social cohesion, longer-term risks to the stability of security and stability the . Besides an expansion of the ECB interventions, more coordinated policies by the Eurozone leaders are called for to Other than major repercussions for public address the crisis.7 health and the economy, COVID-19 will also have an impact on European security Particularly on the part of the finance and stability that so far only receives scant ministers divisions run deep. On 13 March attention at the European level. The virus may they agreed to relax fiscal spending limits, give societies an initial sense of purpose in but those still largely concern national the fight against a common enemy, but it also expenditure. The real fight that threatens aggravates existing problems that threaten to tear apart the very fabric of the EU the Union from within – and from outside. is over whether or not solidarity should have a financial side as well. The same The first is a dangerous confluence of divisions that already hampered agreement Eurosceptic populism and ‘coronationalism’.10 on the EU’s overall budget again became Populists across Europe have been eager to apparent during discussions on the use of misuse the crisis to blame the elite, migrants, the European Stability Mechanism; several globalisation or ‘Asians’, and have been the northern states resisted the request of

8 Hans von der Burchard, Ivo Oliviera and Eline Schaart, ‘Dutch try to calm north-south economic storm over coronavirus’, Politico, 27 March 2020. 9 Eline Schaart, ‘Dutch finance minister acknowledges 7 Ben Hall, Martin Arnold and Sam Fleming, lack of empathy on corona bonds’, Politico, 31 March ‘Coronavirus: can the ECB’s ‘bazooka’ avert 2020. a eurozone crisis?’, the , 10 Ko Colijn, ‘Coronationalisme’, Clingendael Spectator, 22 March 2020. 18 March 2020.

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loudest to demand the closure of borders.11 the protection of their own populations. In wealthier EU countries populists are also This may make sense from a public health the staunchest opponents of providing perspective, but these national responses financial assistance to poorer EU member should be co-ordinated at a European level states. If not carefully handled, this could to maximise their effectiveness. Funding set in motion a vicious cycle whereby joint research, the sharing of scarce medical populist arguments and an economic supplies and co-ordinated border policies further strengthen existing are areas where the EU has a role to play. nationalist sentiments, which in turn causes Tentative signs of solidarity are emerging the countries’ leaders to set out their own as countries struggle to get the outbreaks protectionist policies and erode Europe’s under control. community of values from within. is a case in point.12 This is in sharp contrast to the economic front, where the ECB has bought time Second, this moment of vulnerability provides but the fight over sharing the costs of the an opening to yet another potential threat crisis strikes at the heart of the Union. The to the security of the EU: the spread of economic and monetary interdependence ‘fake news’ and disinformation. Not only did of the EU is such that no country can spend countries both within and outside the EU its way out of this crisis alone, but southern- quickly decry the lack of European solidarity, imposed transfers of financial resources will but China, Cuba and Russia also received not be supported by electorates in northern positive press as they quickly sent medical Europe and may lead to a populist backlash. supplies and, in the case of Russia, even the The room for manoeuvre is limited, especially military to aid Europe’s southern countries.13 at a time when emotions run high, but In addition, according to an internal EU cooler heads should prevail and a careful report, pro-Kremlin Russian media have compromise needs to be negotiated. been trying to undermine European confidence in the emergency response.14 And finally, as a matter of priority the EU The more disagreement and distrust also needs to take the security aspects takes root inside the EU, the easier it is for of this crisis into account. The EU so far outsiders to manipulate these divisions for has not prepared itself sufficiently for the their own purpose, and the more the EU’s upheaval that may follow from a deep and security is at stake. protracted economic crisis. Besides the lives of patients that are directly at stake, the Corona crisis has serious societal Conclusion and consequences, which deserve a quicker, recommendations more united and better coordinated crisis management approach. For example, the EU has accumulated significant The initial response to the coronavirus experience in fighting disinformation and outbreak showed that the first reflex of EU should help its Member States, including countries is nationally oriented, prioritising by supporting factcheckers and others combating ‘fake news’. It should also invest in societal resilience, learning from preparatory measures such as those taken 11 Pawel Zerka, ‘Ill will: populism and the coronavirus’, by the Nordics. European Council on Foreign Relations, 5 March 2020. COVID-19 is more than a stress test; it is an 12 Shaun Walker, ‘Hungary to consider bill that would existential crisis. The EU will need every crisis allow Orbán to rule by decree’, , management instrument it has at its disposal 23 March 2020. 13 France24 video, ‘Coronavirus pandemic: Russia, to overcome it. But more than anything, it Cuba, China send aid to Italy’, 23 March 2020. should not succumb to the “germ of division”. 14 Barbara Wessel, ‘Is Russia running a coronavirus This requires a sense of solidarity and disinformation campaign?’, Deutsche Welle, common purpose that will require political 20 March 2020. courage from its embattled leaders.

4 About the Clingendael Institute Clingendael – the Netherlands Institute of International Relations – is a leading and academy on international affairs. Through our analyses, training and public debate we aim to inspire and equip governments, businesses, and civil society in order to contribute to a secure, sustainable and just world. www.clingendael.org  @clingendaelorg [email protected]  The Clingendael Institute +31 70 324 53 84  The Clingendael Institute  Newsletter

About the authors

Bob Deen is Senior Research Fellow on Security and Defence at the Clingendael Institute. His research focuses on international security issues, geopolitics and multilateral co-operation.

Kimberley Kruijver is Junior Researcher at the Clingendael Security Unit. Her research concentrates on (European) security and defence matters.