DOCSLIB.ORG

General. Kanneh Further Testified That Bockarie Said That It Was "President Taylor, Pa Taylor" (A.K.A

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
General. Kanneh Further Testified That Bockarie Said That It Was General. Kanneh further testified that Bockarie said that it was "President Taylor, Pa Taylor" (a.k.a. Charles Taylor) who had given him these promotions. 14750 Prosecution Witness TF 1-516 6532. Witness TFl-5l6, an RUF radio operator,14751 testified that after the 1998 ECOMOG Intervention, Bockarie immediately retreated to Buedu. Right after TF 1-516 arrived in Buedu, Bockarie called a muster parade "right to the MP" and announced that " I am just here from the other side" and that he had been promoted "by the Chief, Charles Taylor" to the rank of General, and that everyone should now take their instructions from him. Bockarie had a new combat fatigue with the insignia of a general, and with the military jeep that "the Chief' had given to him. The military fatigue was the same type offatigue that was worn by the Liberian Anti-Terrorist Unit (a.k.a. ATU), who the witness understood to be the body guards to Charles Taylor. 14752 Prosecution Witness Albert Saidu 6533. Witness Albert Saidu, an RUF adjutant from 1991 to 2001,14 753 testified that when he was assigned to Koindu in March 1998 an RUF junior commando named Selasie showed him a radio message they had received from Buedu from Charles Taylor with the subject line "promotion", which stated that Taylor had promoted Sam Bockarie to the rank of General. 14754 Prosecution Witness TF 1-585 6534 . Witness TFl-585, an RUF radio operator,14755 testified that prior to Johnny Paul Koroma's arrival in Buedu in the period after the February 1998 ECOMOG Intervention, Sam Bockarie travelled to Monrovia and returned with a green tactical jeep, new arms, and a combat suit with a crown or badge that signified the rank of General. TF 1-585 testified that Bockarie "told us" that it was the "Pa", or Charles Taylor, who promoted him, and that there 14750 Kannoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 939 2- 9396. 14751 TF 1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008 , p. 6845. 14752 TFI -516 , Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6854- 6856 . 14753 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, p. 10895. 14754 Albert Saidu, Transcript 4 June 2008, pp. 11 004-11005. 14755 TF 1-585,Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15582-155 84, 15589-15592 (PS). 2276 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 201 2 were documents to that effect. Bockarie took this trip to Monrovia before Johnny Paul Koroma arrived in Buedu.14756 Prosecution Witness Perry Kamara 6535. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,14757 testified that when Johnny Paul Koroma arrived in Buedu sometime after the ECOMOG Intervention, that Koroma immediately met with Sam Bockarie. During that same week , Koroma transmitted a message over the radio for all ofthe AFRC, RUF, and STF, announcing that because he did not understand jungle exercise, that all of the AFRC and RUF were to take commands from Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito), and that from that date onwards Bockarie should be the "leader for the movement". 14758 Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor 6536. Witness Isaac Mongor, an RUF senior commander,14759 testified that after the AFRC/RUF fighters were pushed out of Freetown in February 1998, and after he had taken Johnny Paul Koroma to Koidu Town, that the command of the " People' s Army" was restructured. Among other changes, Koroma promoted Sam Bockarie to "defence chief ofstaff for the whole movement". Mongor testified that Koroma said that he made this promotion after speaking to "his brother" Charles Taylor, because Koroma was planning to travel and prior to leaving he wanted to leave the AFRC and RUF "in one accord". 14760 Prosecution Witness Augustine Mallah 6537 . Witness Augustine Mallah, a security officer to Mike Lamin from 1996 to disarmament,14761 was posed the following question: "You mentioned to the Judges earlier that when Johnny Paul Koroma and Sam Bockarie or Mosquito met, that Mosquito told 14756 TFl-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15617-15622. The new arms were described as "a series of AK­ 47, brand new ones that were not even being used with new AK rounds. They were in something like sardine tins with rockets". 14757 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008 , p. 3039. 14758 Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3094, 3110-3111 . 14759 See for example: Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 Apri12008, pp. 6512-6513, 6551-6556, 6613-66 15. 14760 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, pp. 5740-5741 . 14761 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, pp. 20092-200923, 20102-20103; Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20209-20210. 2277 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T (Jll 18 May 20 12 4 0 3 '1-0 Johnny Paul Koroma that now Mosquito was in charge. Can you tell us what was the command structure now after the intervention and after you had come back to Buedu?" Mallah responded, in pertinent part, that in the post-Intervention period, after Mallah had returned to Buedu, Bockarie "had structured the RUF command structure. He was there taking care of the RUF on behalf of our leader Foday Sankoh ....". He further testified that everyone, including the AFRC, reported to Sam Bockarie at that time.14762 Later in his testimony, Mallah testified that Sam Bockarie had promoted himself to the rank of General, after which he also assigned himselfthe position ofbattlefield commander. 14763 Prosecution Witness TFI-539 6538. Witness TF 1-539 testified that following the February 1998 ECOMOG Intervention, the entire army fell into disarray, disturbing the command structure. However, Sam Bockarie "was able to put the entire RUF structure under a strong command and control.. ..the men we expected to receive commands from, like Johnny Paul and some of his Supreme Council members, they had all gone into disarray somewhere in the north, whilst some of us found ourselves in the east, so there was actually no command structure amongst the SLA. It was only Sam Bockarie who had the absolute command". 14764 The Accused 6539. The Accused, denied that he promoted Sam Bockarie when Bockarie met with him for the first time in Monrovia in February 1998 after the ECOMOG Intervention. 14765 Taylor further denied that he provided Bockarie with a jeep, medicines, uniforms, or that he promised him a safe house in Monrovia. When asked whether he promoted Bockarie to be commander of the RUF, Taylor testified that he had not done so, but that rather Foday Sankoh had made that promotion. 14766 6540. When questioned on the testimony of Prosecution Witness Karmoh Kanneh, Taylor responded that he did not promote Bockarie, and that this evidence conflicted with evidence 14762 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 13 November 2008, pp. 20203-20204. 14763 Augustine Mallah, Transcript 17 November 2008, pp. 20412. 14764 TFl-539, Transcript 10 June 2008, pp. 11397-11398. 14765 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, pp. 25811-25814. When asked "Did you promote Sam Bockarie to General?" Taylor testified "No, no, no, no, no, no. Why would I do that? Sam Bockarie is not my ~ he is not my military personnel. How could I promote him?" 14766 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, p. 25815. 2278 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18 May 2012 403'1-f already before the Trial Chamber that those promotions were made by Johnny Paul Koroma after he retreated from Freetown in February 1998, and that Johnny Paul Koroma held a meeting and he made those promotions in which Sam Bockarie became the chief ofdefence staff in Sierra Leone. Taylor said, "Now he is attributing that to me . Never, ever gave any suggestion or recommendation tor any promotion or anything closely related to that in Sierra Leone. Never did". 14767 When questioned again concerning this promotion, Taylor stated, "I'm not and 1really mean not involved in any promotion or recommendation ofany officers ofthe RUF at all. None".14768 6541. The Accused also denied that he promoted Bockarie to Lieutenant-General after the Freetown Invasion.14769 He stated that if Bockarie was promoted to Lieutenant General, he would have had three stars, and not two, because two stars denotes a Major General. 14770 The Accused, as President, could not have promoted a general anywhere, because even in the Government of Liberia the President does not promote generals. The Accused also wondered why, if Bockarie has been in charge all ofthe years that Foday Sankoh was gone, that he would have been promoted by Taylor, and testifies that perhaps Bockarie was "just messing with these boys".14771 Further, even if Bockarie did return to Sierra Leone from Liberia with a two-star beret, he could have bought it at any military store in Monrovia, put It. on, and pronounced he was a genera1.1477-7 Defence Witness Issa Sesay 6542. Witness Issa Sesay, a senior RUF commander,14773 testified that he arrived in Buedu in late February or early March 1998. When he arrived, Sam Bockarie was still a field commander, but a few days later Johnny Paul Koroma appointed Bockarie as Chief of Defence Staff and promoted him to the rank of Brigadier. When asked in examination-in­ chiefwhether it was in fact Charles Taylor who promoted Bockarie, Sesay testified that "No, it was not Charles Ta ylor. In fact, this was .. .in the presence of many of us. 1 was not the only person or Bockarie alone; all the other officers in Buedu were at Sam Bockarie's house 14767 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30574-30575. 14768 Charles Ghankay Taylor, 2 November 2009, pp.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Taylor Trial Transcript
    Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T THE PROSECUTOR OF THE SPECIAL COURT V. CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR THURSDAY, 10 JULY 2008 9.30 A.M. TRIAL TRIAL CHAMBER II Before the Judges: Justice Teresa Doherty, Presiding Justice Richard Lussick Justice Julia Sebutinde Justice Al Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate For Chambers: Mr Simon Meisenberg Ms Doreen Kiggundu For the Registry: Ms Rachel Irura For the Prosecution: Ms Brenda J Hollis Mr Mohamed A Bangura Mr Alain Werner Ms Julia Baly Ms Maja Dimitrova For the accused Charles Ghankay Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC Taylor: Mr Terry Munyard CHARLES TAYLOR Page 13359 10 JULY 2008 OPEN SESSION 1 Thursday, 10 July 2008 2 [Open session] 3 [The accused present] 4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.] 09:31:04 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. I note appearances as are 6 before, Mr Bangura. 7 MR BANGURA: Good morning Madam President, your Honours. 8 Good morning counsel opposite. Yes, your Honour, our 9 representation remains the same but for the record may 09:31:20 10 I introduce the members of the Prosecution. 11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please do so. 12 MR BANGURA: Ms Brenda J Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura, 13 Mr Alain Werner and Ms Maja Dimitrova, your Honours. 14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr Munyard, likewise I think 09:31:36 15 your appearances are as before. 16 MR MUNYARD: Madam President, that's correct. Good morning 17 your Honours, good morning counsel opposite. Courtenay Griffiths 18 QC, myself Terry Munyard and Scott Schaeffer for the Defence. 19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Munyard.
    [Show full text]
  • Negotiating Peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the Justice Challenge
    Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue rDecembeerp 2007 ort Negotiating peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the justice challenge Priscilla Hayner Report The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue is an independent and impartial foundation, Contents based in Geneva, that promotes and facilitates 1. Introduction and overview 5 dialogue to resolve armed conflicts and reduce civilian suffering. 2. Background to the 1999 talks 8 114, rue de lausanne 3. Participation in the Lomé talks: April–July 1999 10 ch-1202 geneva 4. Amnesty in the Lomé process and Accord 12 switzerland The context 12 [email protected] t: + 41 22 908 11 30 Rapid agreement on a blanket amnesty 13 f: +41 22 908 11 40 A second look at the amnesty: was it unavoidable? 16 www.hdcentre.org The amnesty and the UN and other international participants 17 © Copyright 5. Other justice issues at Lomé 19 Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2007 A Truth and Reconciliation Commission 19 Reproduction of all or Provisions for reparations 20 part of this publication The security forces and demobilisation of combatants 20 may be authorised only Reaching an agreement on power-sharing 21 with written consent and acknowledgement of the 6. After the agreement: a difficult peace 22 source. Slow implementation and near collapse of the accord 23 The International Center The Special Court for Sierra Leone 25 for Transitional Justice Implementing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 26 assists countries pursuing Judicial reform efforts 28 accountability for past mass Creation of a new Human Rights Commission 28 atrocity or human rights abuse. It assists in the development Demobilisation, and reform of the armed forces and police 29 of integrated, comprehensive, and localized approaches to 7.
    [Show full text]
  • Profile of Internal Displacement : Sierra Leone
    PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT : SIERRA LEONE Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council (as of 15 October, 2003) Also available at http://www.idpproject.org Users of this document are welcome to credit the Global IDP Database for the collection of information. The opinions expressed here are those of the sources and are not necessarily shared by the Global IDP Project or NRC Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project Chemin Moïse Duboule, 59 1209 Geneva - Switzerland Tel: + 41 22 799 07 00 Fax: + 41 22 799 07 01 E-mail : [email protected] CONTENTS CONTENTS 1 PROFILE SUMMARY 6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT 9 BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT 9 CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SINCE INDEPENDENCE (1961 - 2000) 9 HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF THE FIRST EIGHT YEARS OF CONFLICT (1991-1998) 13 CONTINUED CONFLICT DESPITE THE SIGNING OF THE LOME PEACE AGREEMENT (JULY 1999-MAY 2000) 16 PEACE PROCESS DERAILED AS SECURITY SITUATION WORSENED DRAMATICALLY IN MAY 2000 18 RELATIVELY STABLE SECURITY SITUATION SINCE SIGNING OF CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT IN ABUJA ON 10 NOVEMBER 2000 20 CIVIL WAR DECLARED OVER FOLLOWING THE FULL DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMSIL AND THE COMPLETION OF DISARMAMENT (JANUARY 2002) 22 REGIONAL EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN PEACE IN SIERRA LEONE (2002) 23 SIERRA LEONEANS GO TO THE POLLS TO RE-ELECT AHMAD TEJAN KABBAH AS PRESIDENT (MAY 2002) 24 SIERRA LEONE’S SPECIAL COURT AND TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION START WORK (2002-2003) 25 MAIN CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT 28 COUNTRYWIDE DISPLACEMENT
    [Show full text]
  • Taylor Trial Transcript
    Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T THE PROSECUTOR OF THE SPECIAL COURT V. CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR WEDNESDAY, 21 APRIL 2010 9.33 A.M. TRIAL TRIAL CHAMBER II Before the Judges: Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding Justice Richard Lussick Justice Teresa Doherty Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate For Chambers: Mr Artur Appazov For the Registry: Ms Rachel Irura Ms Zainab Fofanah For the Prosecution: Mr Nicholas Koumjian Mr Mohamed A Bangura Ms Kathryn Howarth Ms Maja Dimitrova For the accused Charles Ghankay Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC Taylor: Mr Terry Munyard Mr Morris Anyah Mr Silas Chekera CHARLES TAYLOR Page 39477 21 APRIL 2010 OPEN SESSION 1 Wednesday, 21 April 2010 2 [Open session] 3 [The accused present] 4 [Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.] 09:27:21 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances 6 first, please. 7 MR KOUMJIAN: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours. 8 For the Prosecution this morning, Mohamed A Bangura, Maja 9 Dimitrova and Nicholas Koumjian. 09:33:35 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours, 11 counsel opposite. For the Defence today myself, Courtenay 12 Griffiths, with me Mr Morris Anyah and Mr Michael Herz of 13 counsel. 14 Madam President, before we commence, can I raise two 09:33:56 15 matters with the Court, please. The first is this: As a 16 consequence of the disruption of airline traffic into Europe, we 17 will have problems progressing the trial next week because 18 currently there is only one further witness in The Hague, and we 19 know not how long the current travel difficulties will persist or 09:34:28 20 whether, indeed, flights will be coming in from West Africa at 21 any time soon.
    [Show full text]
  • Sierra Leone and Conflict Diamonds: Establshing a Legal Diamond Trade and Ending Rebel Control Over the Country's Diamond Resources
    SIERRA LEONE AND CONFLICT DIAMONDS: ESTABLSHING A LEGAL DIAMOND TRADE AND ENDING REBEL CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY'S DIAMOND RESOURCES "Controlof resourceshas greaterweight than uniform administrativecontrol over one's entire comer of the world, especially in places such as Sierra Leone where valuable resources are concentratedand portable.' I. INTRODUCTION Sierra Leone2 is in the midst of a civil war that began in 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded the country from neighboring Liberia.3 RUF rebels immediately sought control over one of the country's richest resources--diamonds.4 Since gaining control over the most productive diamond fields, the rebels have at their fingertips an endless supply of wealth with which to fund their insurgencies against the Government of Sierra Leone.' The RUF rebels illicitly trade diamonds for arms in open smuggling operations. 6 Diamonds sold by the RUF, in order to fund the rebel group's military action in opposition to Sierra Leone's legitimate and internationally recognized government, are called "conflict diamonds."7 1. WIulIAM RENO, WARLORD POLITICS AND AFRICAN STATES 140 (1998). 2. Sierra Leone is located on the west coast of Africa north of Liberia and south of Guinea. The country has 4,900,000 residents, almost all of whom belong to one of 13 native African tribes. Country: Sierra Leone, Sept. 3,2000, availableat LEXIS, Kaleidoscope File. One of the primary economic activities in Sierra Leone is mining of its large diamond deposits that are a major source of hard currency. Countries that predominantly import goods from Sierra Leone include Belgium, the United States, and India.
    [Show full text]
  • SCSL Press Clippings
    SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE OUTREACH AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE PRESS CLIPPINGS Enclosed are clippings of local and international press on the Special Court and related issues obtained by the Outreach and Public Affairs Office as at: Monday, 14 September 2009 Press clips are produced Monday through Friday. Any omission, comment or suggestion, please contact Martin Royston-Wright Ext 7217 2 Local News “ Taylor Killed Sam Bockarie”…/ The Exclusive Page 3 Taylor Denies Killing Samm Bockarie / Concord Times Page 4 Taylor Refutes Prosecution Testimony / The Spectator Page 5 Taylor Said Prosecution Allegation is Nonsensical / Standard Times Page 6 Reparation is the Hallmark to Reconciliation / The Senator Pages 7-8 Sierra Leonean Becomes Acting Prosecutor of the Special Court / Cotton Tree News Page 9 International News Taylor Rebuts Prosecution Evidence About His Role in Sierra Leone Conflict / Charlestaylortrial.org Pages 10-12 Report From The Hague / BBC World Service Trust Page 13 Taylor Denies Execution of Bockarie & Family / The Analyst Page 14 UNMIL Public Information Office Media Summary / UNMIL Pages 15-18 Stephen Rapp: Obama's Point Man on War Crimes / The Times Pages 19-21 War Crimes Court Convicts French Former Spokeswoman of Contempt… / Breaking News 24/7 Page 22 Florence Hartmann Guilty of Contempt of Yugoslavia Tribunal / Radio Netherlands Worldwide Page 23 UN Accuses Congo of Possible War Crimes / Voice of America Pages 24-25 International Criminal Court Eyes Role Beyond War-Crimes Trials / The Christian Science Monitor Pages
    [Show full text]
  • IDRC Doctoral Research Award No
    IDRC Doctoral Research Award No. 103342-9990675-067 Technical Report Submitted By: M. Zubairu Wai Date: 12 July 2008 Project: Understanding Contemporary Conflicts in Africa: The Sierra Leone Civil War and its Challenge to the Dominant Representations of African Conflicts Introduction: The aim of this research was two fold: first, it sought to go beyond the immediate impact of policy, and develop an epistemological critique of knowledge on contemporary African conflicts and assess the impact of such knowledge on the formulation of policy; and second to develop alternative ways of looking at such conflicts in order to allow for the reformulation of extant policies as well as the articulation of alternative ones. It started from the basic assumption (as suggested by evidence) that the policies derived from the dominant studies on African conflicts were not producing their desired results where they are being implemented, a proposition that was leading to a questioning of the knowledge and the analytical frameworks on which they are based. The research therefore sought to address this problem by (a) developing a critique of the existing body of knowledge on African conflicts; and (b) suggesting alternative interpretations that would help us better understand these conflicts. Using the Sierra Leone civil war as its empirical case, it sought to investigate: (a) what the modalities of the dominant perspectives on contemporary African conflicts were; (b) Who produces them, how and why?; (c) what were included and left out in the knowledge produced (d) what effects were these knowledge having on the articulation of policy towards Africa; what these policies were and what they sought to achieve; and finally, (f) how an alternative reading of the Sierra Leone civil war might lead to the formulation of better understanding and policies.
    [Show full text]
  • Sierra Leone: Critical Discussion on Conϐlict Resolution and the United Nation Mission
    Conlict Studies Quarterly Sierra Leone: Critical Discussion on Conϐlict Resolution and the United Nation Mission Dilan CIFTCI Abstract: The aim of the current study is to explore the conceptual development of African civil conlicts with regards to ive global dimensions in the African Societies. Sierra Leone Conlict and Conlict Resolution in African civil conlict studies presents a unique opportunity for the investigation of African culture due to its alive and luid effects of the present situation. Currently, there is no comprehensive study that integrates the conceptual development of global dimen- sions of African civil conlicts through criticising the conlict resolution and UNAMSIL at the same time. In order to provide a conceptual evaluation of the ive major global dimensions of African civil conlicts Sierra Leone conlict, conlict resolution and UNAMSIL were elaborated under the name of politics and contemporary issues in UN peacekeeping operations. The current criticism suggests that African civil culture related to the socio-economic issues have an impact on the conlict resolution reported over time by UN peacekeeping operations. During the chosen case, the analysis of national identity, weak governance structure and ethnic tensions were distinctive for Sierra Leone conlict and its aftermath. Keywords: Sierra Leone conlict; conlict resolution; neo-patrimonial state; African conlicts; UNAMSIL. 1. Introduction To begin with, an African civil conlict has Dilan CIFTCI ive major global dimensions. These are the Assist. Prof. Dr. lack of national identity, weak governance Near East University structure, the corruption and neo-patrimo- Faculty of Communication nial state, ethnic tensions and the lumpen E-mail: [email protected] culture (Pham, 2006, p.
    [Show full text]
  • Sierra Leone Assessment
    Sierra Leone, Country Information http://194.203.40.90/ppage.asp?section=...erra%20Leone%2C%20Country%20Information SIERRA LEONE ASSESSMENT April 2002 Country Information and Policy Unit I SCOPE OF DOCUMENT II GEOGRAPHY III HISTORY IV STATE STRUCTURES V HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES VI HUMAN RIGHTS - SPECIFIC GROUPS VII HUMAN RIGHTS - OTHER ISSUES ANNEX A: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS ANNEX B: POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS ANNEX C: PROMINENT PEOPLE REFERENCES TO SOURCE MATERIAL I. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT 1.1. This assessment has been produced by the Country Information & Policy Unit, Immigration & Nationality Directorate, Home Office, from information obtained from a variety of sources. 1.2. The assessment has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the asylum determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive, nor is it intended to catalogue all human rights violations. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in asylum claims made in the United Kingdom. 1.3. The assessment is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the source material is readily available in the public domain. 1.4. It is intended to revise the assessment on a 6-monthly basis while the country remains within the top 35 asylum producing countries in the United Kingdom. 1.5. An electronic copy of the assessment has been made available to the following organisations: Amnesty International UK 1 of 43 07/11/2002 5:44 PM Sierra Leone, Country Information http://194.203.40.90/ppage.asp?section=...erra%20Leone%2C%20Country%20Information Immigration Advisory Service Immigration Appellate Authority Immigration Law Practitioners' Association Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants JUSTICE Medical Foundation for the care of Victims of Torture Refugee Council Refugee Legal Centre UN High Commissioner for Refugees 2.
    [Show full text]
  • G U I N E a Liberia Sierra Leone
    The boundaries and names shown and the designations Mamou used on this map do not imply official endorsement or er acceptance by the United Nations. Nig K o L le n o G UINEA t l e a SIERRA Kindia LEONEFaranah Médina Dula Falaba Tabili ba o s a g Dubréka K n ie c o r M Musaia Gberia a c S Fotombu Coyah Bafodia t a e r G Kabala Banian Konta Fandié Kamakwie Koinadugu Bendugu Forécariah li Kukuna Kamalu Fadugu Se Bagbe r Madina e Bambaya g Jct. i ies NORTHERN N arc Sc Kurubonla e Karina tl it Mateboi Alikalia L Yombiro Kambia M Pendembu Bumbuna Batkanu a Bendugu b Rokupr o l e Binkolo M Mange Gbinti e Kortimaw Is. Kayima l Mambolo Makeni i Bendou Bodou Port Loko Magburaka Tefeya Yomadu Lunsar Koidu-Sefadu li Masingbi Koundou e a Lungi Pepel S n Int'l Airport or a Matotoka Yengema R el p ok m Freetown a Njaiama Ferry Masiaka Mile 91 P Njaiama- Wellington a Yele Sewafe Tongo Gandorhun o Hastings Yonibana Tungie M Koindu WESTERN Songo Bradford EAS T E R N AREA Waterloo Mongeri York Rotifunk Falla Bomi Kailahun Buedu a i Panguma Moyamba a Taiama Manowa Giehun Bauya T Boajibu Njala Dambara Pendembu Yawri Bendu Banana Is. Bay Mano Lago Bo Segbwema Daru Shenge Sembehun SOUTHE R N Gerihun Plantain Is. Sieromco Mokanje Kenema Tikonko Bumpe a Blama Gbangbatok Sew Tokpombu ro Kpetewoma o Sh Koribundu M erb Nitti ro River a o i Turtle Is. o M h Sumbuya a Sherbro I.
    [Show full text]
  • An Oral History of the Civil War in Sierra Leone Interviewer
    An Oral history of the Civil War in Sierra Leone Interviewer: Kyle Hardy Interviewee: Michel duCille Instructor: Mr. Whitman February, 14, 2012 Hardy 3 Table of Contents Interviewee Release Form Interviewer Release Form Statement of Purpose……………………………………………………………………………...4 Biography………………………………………………………………………………………….5 Blood Diamonds: A Decade of Tragedy in Sierra Leone………………………………………..6 Interview Transcription…………………………………………………………………………..13 Analysis Paper…………………………………………………..……………………………….30 Works Consulted…………………………………………………………………………………34 Hardy 4 Statement of Purpose The purpose of this oral history interview is to further understand the horrifying war in Sierra Leone. The civil war, between 1991 and 2002, was rarely reported to news and till remains widely unknown. Though a relatively small country, the horrendous actions taken throughout this war should not be ignored nor forgotten. This interview will serve as a guide for those remain unaware of the horrors of the war and give a first-hand account of Sierra Leone during this time. Hardy 5 Biography of Michel duCille Michael duCille is a Jamaican-American photographer who currently works for the Washington Post in Washington, DC. He spent most of his childhood in Jamaica and describes his time her as “Idyllic”. He father, who was a preacher, instilled in him the values of education, and in 1970, his family moved to Gainesville, Georgia with hopes of improved education and a more stable financial means. He started school in America at Gainesville High school when he was 15. The school he entered also welcomed the first year the school intergraded blacks and whites. His father, who was also a journalist, introduced him to journalism. At the age of 16, he began to take pictures for the newspaper and has been a professional photographer every since.
    [Show full text]
  • Sierra Leone Apr2001
    SIERRA LEONE COUNTRY ASSESSMENT APRIL 2001 Country Information and Policy Unit CONTENTS 1. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT 1.1 - 1.5 2. GEOGRAPHY 2.1 A. Location, Climate, Population and Language B. Economy 2.2 3. HISTORY A. 1961 – 1996 3.1 - 3.5 B. Armed Insurrections 3.6 - 3.8 C. 1996 - 1997 3.9 - 3.16 4. INSTRUMENTS OF THE STATE A. Judiciary 4.1 - 4.4 B. Security Forces 4.5 C. Police and Prisons 4.6 - 4.8 D. Civil Defence Force 4.9 - 4.11 5. HUMAN RIGHTS 5.1 - 5.4 A. Introduction 5.5 - 5.28 B. Security situation (i). Recent event 5.29 - 5.31 C. Revolutionary United Front 5.32 - 5.36 D. United Nations 5.37 - 5.41 (i). International assistance 5.42 - 5.46 B. SPECIFIC GROUPS (i). Minorities/Ethnicity 5.47 - 5.50 (ii). Women 5.51 - 5.56 (iii).Children 5.57 - 5.62 6. OTHER ISSUES A. Freedom of Association and Assembly 6.1 - 6.4 B. Freedom of the Press 6.5 - 6.11 C. Freedom of Religion 6.12 - 6.14 D. Freedom to Travel and Internal Flight 6.15 - 6.20 ANNEX A: Common Abbreviations/Political Parties ANNEX B: Prominent People ANNEX C: Chronology of Major Events BIBLIOGRAPHY BULLETINS 1. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT 1 1.1. This assessment has been produced by the Country Information & Policy Unit, Immigration & Nationality Directorate, Home Office, from information obtained from a variety of sources. 1.2. The assessment has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the asylum determination process.
    [Show full text]