Understanding the War in Yemen

Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs ISSN: 2373-9770 (Print) 2373-9789 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rifa20 Understanding the War in Yemen Marcel Serr To cite this article: Marcel Serr (2018): Understanding the War in Yemen, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/23739770.2017.1419405 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2017.1419405 Published online: 04 Jan 2018. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 6 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rifa20 Download by: [95.90.247.96] Date: 07 January 2018, At: 05:46 Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 2018 https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2017.1419405 Understanding the War in Yemen Marcel Serr Marcel Serr is a political scientist and until recently served as assistant director of the German Protestant Institute of Archaeology (GPIA) in Jerusalem. Mr. Serr is an independent researcher and specializes in Israel’s defense and security policy and the military history of the Middle East. Currently, he serves as editor at the Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung in Berlin. A few years ago, Yemen looked as if it might be one of the few “success stories” of the so-called Arab Spring. Since 2014, however, the country has descended into a chaotic civil war; today, it is one of the poorest in the world. According to the 2016 UN Human Development Index, Yemen ranks 168 out of 188 countries, and the population faces severe water and food shortages.1 Whoever thinks that the violence in Yemen is just the result of another fierce con- flict, far away in an unimportant place on the global periphery, should think again. Yemen is strategically located next to Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s major oil producers, and the Ban-el-Mandeb strait, a vital waterway linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. In addition, Yemen could become a major battleground in the fight for regional supremacy between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Thus, there are plenty of reasons to monitor the developments there very carefully. Downloaded by [95.90.247.96] at 05:46 07 January 2018 Background The population of Yemen is almost entirely Muslim, divided between Shi’a Zaydis, who mostly live in the north, and Sunnis. A series of Zaydi dynasties ruled parts of Yemen from the ninth century until 1962. However, in the 1960s, a civil war in the north and an uprising in the south against the British—who had ruled the port city of Aden and its surroundings since the nineteenth century—changed the political landscape. The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was established, and in the south, the socialist People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was born. In 1990, North and South Yemen merged to form the Republic of Yemen. Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former ruler of the YAR, became president of the newly © Israel Council on Foreign Relations under the auspices of the World Jewish Congress (2018) 1 Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs unified country. His rule was characterized by nepotism and corruption, and unsurprisingly, Yemen remained among the poorest nations in the Arab world.2 The “Arab Spring” in Yemen As unrest spread across the Arab world in 2011, youth–led demonstrations chal- lenged Saleh’s rule in Yemen and attracted broad popular support. Soon, the pro- testers were joined by key players of the regime who understood that the “writing was on the wall.” In mid–2011, the confrontation became increasingly violent, with street battles erupting in the capital city of Sana’a and elsewhere. In November 2011, Saleh agreed to a transition plan that granted him immunity in return for his resignation. In February 2012, Yemen held presidential elections with only one candidate— former Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. As a result, a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was convened to design and implement constitutional reforms before new elections were held. The NDC ended inconclusively in January 2014. Eventually, the participants extended President Hadi’stermby another year. Hadi was plagued by a number of problems, including attacks by al-Qa‘ida; a separatist movement in the south; the continuing loyalty of many military officers to Saleh; as well as corruption, unemployment, and food insecurity. The Houthis, a Zaydi movement in the north, took advantage of the government’s weakness. Within weeks of the NDC’s conclusion, they launched a military offensive against Hadi, taking control of Sana’a and other parts of the country’s north and west until the summer of 2014. Some members of the security services, who were pro–Saleh, supported the Houthis, thus bringing the tacit Houthi–Saleh alliance to light. Downloaded by [95.90.247.96] at 05:46 07 January 2018 In January 2015, the Houthis seized the presidential palace, setting up a shadow government and reinforcing their control over Sana’a by placing Hadi and his government under house arrest. A few weeks later, they completed their coup d’état by establishing a “revolutionary council” and other associated governmental bodies. Hadi eventually escaped to Aden in the south of Yemen, accusing the Houthis of perpetrating a coup and stressing his own legitimacy as the internationally recognized head of state. Hadi was quick to form an anti–Houthi/Saleh alliance that included elements of the southern separatist movement, Islamists, and tribes- men mostly from the south and from Sunni areas of the north. Yemen rapidly descended into chaos. The Houthis attempted to take control of the entire country with the help of security forces loyal to Saleh, but their expansion alienated significant segments of Yemen’s population. Making matters worse, 2 Marcel Serr al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and a branch of the nascent Islamic State (IS) exploited the state’s weakness, asserting territorial control in Yemen’s southeast. Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia in March 2015 as the Houthis prepared to capture Aden. This was the tipping point for Saudi King Salman and his favorite son and newly appointed successor, thirty-two-year-old Defense Minister Muhammad bin Salman. Alarmed by the rise of the Houthis, whom they rightly believed to be backed by their nemesis, Iran, Riyadh formed an alliance of mostly Sunni Arab states, which launched a military campaign at the end of March 2015. The declared objective of that operation was to defeat the Houthis and restore Hadi’s government.3 Who Is Fighting Whom? There are two oppositional factions, the first being the bloc of Houthi forces allied with ex–President Saleh, who receive Iranian support; the second is a messy anti– Houthi/Saleh alliance, which supports the Hadi government and is backed by a Saudi–led coalition. It is supported by the United States and other Western states. These factions are internally diverse, with each of the actors having compet- ing interests and priorities. The Houthi/Saleh Bloc The Houthis are a prominent Zaydi–Shi’a4 clan who claim descent from the prophet Muhammad. Their roots are in a Zaydi revivalist movement and they see their actions as a response to Wahhabi proselytizing in Shi’a areas, and Saudi influence in Yemen in general. Their base is in the northern governorate Saada, and they operate a trained militia of 20,000–30,000 fighters. Downloaded by [95.90.247.96] at 05:46 07 January 2018 Having ruled for more than thirty years, ex–President Saleh commands an exten- sive tribal, military, and political network throughout the country. He cooperates with the Houthis to ensure his political survival—the alliance is one of necessity. Despite a fraught history, Saleh and the Houthis are bound together by common enemies. But like many political marriages of convenience, their relation- ship lacks a solid foundation. Many of Saleh’s supporters are proud of belonging to a secular party and view the Houthis as religious zealots. The Houthis, in turn, despise Saleh and his close circle because of their corrupt past.5 Saudi Arabia and the Hadi government accuse the Houthis of being Iran’s proxy. They claim that Iran provides them with significant amounts of military equip- ment, and training. While the exact amount of assistance is unclear, there is no 3 Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs doubt that the Houthis do receive military support from Iran, albeit to a limited degree. Intercepted weapons shipments are proof of the fact that Iran provides light and medium weaponry to the Houthis.6 Over the course of the past year Iran has ramped up its military support, supplying advanced munitions that enable the Houthi–Saleh faction to counter certain capa- bilities of the Arab coalition and threaten freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. The Houthis have been flying Iranian drones right into the radar sets of the Saudi Patriot missile systems. With the radar disabled, rebels can fire missiles at coalition forces. As US Vice Admiral Kevin Donegan told Reuters: “These weapons didn’t exist … before the war.”7 They must have come from somewhere and Iran is the most likely source. Until Tehran exerts control over Houthi decision making, the Houthis cannot truly be considered a direct Iranian proxy. This, however, may change with a further escalation of the war in Yemen.8 The Anti–Houthi/Saleh Bloc The opposing bloc has even more unlikely partners, whose alliance is founded solely upon their shared opposition to the Houthis. It includes the internationally recognized government and combines three main domestic actors: southern separatists, Sunni Islamists, and other tribal actors.

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