The Chinese Communist Party Decides Its Path, Sneevliet Suggests a Different Route
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CHAPTER 4 The Chinese Communist Party Decides its Path, Sneevliet Suggests a Different Route When Sneevliet arrived in Shanghai on June 3, 1921, posing as a journalist, the party had fallen into disarray following Voitinsky’s departure.1 On arrival, he immediately contacted Nikolsky, who had recently been sent by the Far East Secretariat based in Irkutsk (Bericht des Genossen H. Maring, July 1922).2 Sneevliet had to start from the beginning (Isaacs, 1971, p. 102), working under “highly unfavorable conditions” (Bericht des Genossen H. Maring, July 1922). The Russian representatives in Beijing and the Irkutsk Bureau informed him that the communists had weak links with the working-class and that very little real organizational work had been accomplished (Isaacs, 1971, p. 103). Only in Guangdong, where the Guomindang (GMD) and anarchist influence were strongest and among the railway workers at Changxindian was modern organizational work carried out. Facing this situation, the two men set about breathing life back into the party and encouraging it to convene the Congress. Sneevliet came with no specific instructions, basing his preparation on the discussions and theses of the Comintern. However, he did come armed as a veteran activist who was well-versed in the norms of a Bolshevik revolutionary party and his experiences in the Dutch Indies. The Comintern theses provided him with a tactical plan that necessitated promoting a national-revolutionary movement and prioritizing the need to find a nationalist movement within which to work. Sneevliet enjoyed great flexibility in the field, enhanced by the difficul- ties in communicating with his “superiors” in Moscow. He made the unlikely claim that until early December 1921 while in Shanghai, he avoided undertak- ing independent work to prevent organizational disruption and he confined himself simply to executing orders that he and Nikolsky received (Bericht 1 For details of his troublesome trip to China and the dating see Saich, 1991, vol. 1, pp. 31–33 and his July 7–9, 1921 letter to the Comintern, in Sneevliet, July 7–9, 1921, 2011, p. 5. 2 Initially, Chinese sources referred to Nikolsky as a representative of the Profintern, primarily based on the memoirs of Bao Huiseng. However, the two contemporary sources both name Nikolsky as a representative of the Far Eastern Secretariat: Sneevliet’s report to the Executive Committee of the Communist International and the report on the First Party Congress writ- ten in the latter half of 1921 and sent to the Comintern. The Russian version and an English translation can be found in Saich, 1991, vol.1, pp. 200–08. Nikolsky was also known as Viktor Aleksandrovich Borg. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004423459_005 The Chinese Communist Party Decides its Path 67 des Genossen H. Maring, July 1922).3 After agreeing to work together, the two men met frequently.4 A Russian comrade, probably Polevoy, linked them up with Chinese and Russian comrades. Sneevliet was under the impression that he was the Comintern representative, proposed by Lenin himself (Sneevliet, March 29, 1942) but on arrival, a courier informed him that he had been appointed a member of the Far Eastern Secretariat.5 It is highly unlikely that Sneevliet, when reporting to the Executive Commit- tee of the Communist International (ECCI), would say anything other than that he was executing orders. This comment might also have been intended to deflect any blame for problems in the work of the Far Eastern Secretariat. Sneevliet was scornful of the role of the Secretariat and his position within it, claiming that he was a “member in name only” and he never received any literature from Irkutsk (Bericht des Genossen H. Maring, July 1922). Moreover, he opposed the whole idea of the Secretariat, feeling that a Comintern Secretariat for the Far East in Irkutsk was useless as the city was too distant and no regular links could be maintained through Manchuria. In July 1922, he stated that “I cannot bear any responsibility for the tactics of the now dissolved Secretariat, especially with respect to the Korean affair.” He remained bitter and he continued his harsh critique of the Secretariat in his 1935 discussions with Harold Isaacs. He criti- cized its pro-Wu Peifu orientation and its perception of Sun Yat-sen as “an idle dreamer,” with the Secretariat’s activities governed “solely by what it consid- ered to be Russia’s interests in North China” (Isaacs, 1971, p. 102). This reflected Sneevliet’s increasing frustration with the rise of the Russian national interest at the expense of the demands of the global revolutionary movement. Sneevliet’s critique notwithstanding, the Secretariat played an important role in pushing the convocation of the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which Sneevliet and Nikolsky both attended. Voitinsky’s visit had prompted the Secretariat to promote a centralized organization for the radi- cal activists in China. The Secretariat had already developed its own contacts with representatives of the Chinese communists and in March 1921, Zhang 3 While in China, Nikolsky had three tasks to perform. The first was to handle the arrange- ments for the First Party Congress, the second was to manage financial affairs and the third was to arrange for the Congress of the Toilers of the East. After returning to Russia to attend the latter Congress, Nikolsky changed his name and began work in Northeast China. Personal communication from Professor Kartunova. 4 Sneevliet letter July 7–9, 1921 [2011]. Nikolsky arrived a few days after Sneevliet with the remit to work on China, Japan and Korea. Importantly, Nikolsky brought some money and received various supplies. 5 Organizationally, this was feasible, as the Secretariat in Irkutsk had not been set up when Sneevliet attended the Comintern Congress and was not established until January 1921 to coordinate work..